

# Admired Rich or Resented Rich? How Two Cultures Vary in Envy

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[journals.sagepub.com/home/jcc](http://journals.sagepub.com/home/jcc)**Sherry Jueyu Wu<sup>1</sup>, Xuechunzi Bai<sup>1</sup>, and Susan T. Fiske<sup>1</sup>**

## Abstract

Rich people inhabit a distinct social category that may elicit universal images or perhaps different perceptions in different cultures. Whereas inequality research has mostly focused on lower socioeconomic classes, the current research investigates cultural variations of prejudices about rich groups, toward understanding societal dynamics. Three studies investigate stereotype content and evaluations of rich people in China and the United States, cultures that might be expected to differ. Consistent with U.S. data from the stereotype content model, Study 1 demonstrates mainland Chinese likewise view the rich in general ambivalently as competent but cold. Examining a more specific level, Study 2 identifies both distinctive and overlapping rich subgroups across the two cultures, but both reporting mixed stereotype content. Study 3 tests whether clearer cultural contrasts might occur in implicit (vs. explicit) stereotypes toward rich people: Both U.S. and Chinese respondents, however, expressed positive implicit stereotypes toward the rich compared with middle class, in contrast with their self-reported explicitly ambivalent (or, rarely, negative) wealth stereotypes. This research is the first to examine stereotype content about rich people on the subgroup level, and both implicit and explicit levels, offering theory-based social structure predictors of this culturally shared but somewhat variable stereotype content.

## Keywords

social class, rich people, culture, stereotype content model, implicit evaluations

“They deserve to die.”

—Chinese comment on news of international students’ murder at the University of Southern California

On April 11, 2012, Ming Qiu and Ying Wu, two Chinese graduate students, were shot to death when sitting in their BMW parked near the University of Southern California campus in Los Angeles. In Weibo, the Chinese equivalent of Twitter, many ordinary web surfers quickly latched onto one detail of the news coverage—the victims’ luxury car—and opined that the two students were showing off their wealth. Many of the comments about this news were hateful. For instance, one comment said, “They are either second generations of the wealthy or the politicians. They deserve to die,” which received 3,150 upvotes.

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Notwithstanding the media and commentators having linked such web comments with a suspected “hatred against the rich<sup>1</sup>” phenomenon in mainland China, only limited empirical research so far disentangles people’s responses to the so-called rich social class (Durante, Tablante, & Fiske, 2017; Horwitz & Dovidio, 2015). Moreover, even less evidence examines the cultural variations in rich perceptions across societies. Do the Chinese indeed hate the rich? Do Americans respond similarly? Some theories argue for similarity, but others would predict differences.

Social-class hierarchies exist in every society (Sidanius & Pratto, 2001). Although wealth is a continuum, past research demonstrates that *the rich* and *the poor* form distinctive social groups in people’s minds and elicit respective stereotypes that are similar across societies (Durante et al., 2017; Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, & Xu, 2002). Depending on the resources possessed, individuals may be categorized into different levels of wealth hierarchies such as the rich, the middle class, the working class, and the poor (Pew Research Center, 2012). In general, the rich are ambivalently stereotyped as competent but cold across cultures, whereas the poor seem incompetent (sometimes cold, sometimes warm), and the working class and middle class seem competent and warm (Fiske et al., 2002).

However, past research has mostly focused on poverty and the poor. According to the Task Force on Socioeconomic Status from the American Psychological Association, Task Force on Socioeconomic Status (2007), “There has been an almost exclusive focus on those at the very lowest level of the SES spectrum” (p. 18). Empirical knowledge about the other end of the spectrum, the rich and the upper class, is surprisingly scarce (Horwitz & Dovidio, 2015). Because wealth groups exist as distinct social categories, perceptions of different wealth groups may be independent, and thus, what we have learned about the poor cannot necessarily be translated to (opposite) knowledge about the rich. The current research shifts focus by investigating people’s stereotypes and evaluations of the rich groups, contributing to understanding societal dynamics. Studying the perceptions of the rich would be especially meaningful as social classes are not stagnant categories—Individuals might move up or down in their lifetime, reinforcing social mobility of a society. People’s perceptions of the rich, or any social class above theirs, may motivate climbing the social ladder or serve as a reference point for perceiving social (in)justice and socio-political institutions (Tyler, 2006).

The worsening divide between social classes during and after the Great Recession calls for examining the cultural and psychological features of this divide (Moya & Fiske, 2017). Given substantial inequality nowadays, how do people feel toward rich people, both explicitly and implicitly? What types of people come to mind when individuals think about the rich? Is there a prototype of the rich, with varying subgroups, or are they all the same in stereotype content evaluations? In all these ways, are wealth stereotypes similar or distinctive in the two contrasting cultures?

The current research aims to investigate people’s stereotypes and evaluations of rich people by primarily focusing on two contrasting cultures—the United States and China. The United States and China are known to be distinct on various dimensions: West and East, individualistic and collectivistic, independent and interdependent cultural orientations, democratic and nominally communist (Jacques, 2009; Nisbett, 2003). As major competitors in the global market, the United States and China have differing ideologies, in the past at least, even if both now function as market economies. The two societies seemingly differ—but how do they vary on people’s perceptions of social groups, especially the rich social class?

## **American Dream and Chinese Middle-Way**

American culture generally endorses upward mobility—people would like to become rich, and climbing up the social ladder is aspirational (Kasser & Ryan, 1993; Roberts & Robins,

2000). In fact, financial success or becoming rich is part of the national ethos known as the “American Dream” (Kasser & Ryan, 1993; Nickerson, Schwarz, Diener, & Kahneman, 2003). Despite the United States facing large income inequality and one of the lowest rates of actual social mobility among industrialized nations, citizens largely overestimate class mobility and see themselves likely to move in income status (Kraus & Tan, 2015). The American Dream, being a core cultural value, suggests that individuals from any sector of society have equal opportunity to raise their status; such mobility beliefs encourage system support (Day & Fiske, 2017).

Therefore, social class may be perceived as a malleable construct because everyone seems to have equal opportunity to become rich. A logical extension of the desire to be rich is general admiration for the rich. Some psychologists assert that Americans’ pervasive aspiration to be rich is a product of capitalist and consumerist culture (Dittmar, 2007; Kasser, Cohn, Kanner, & Ryan, 2007). All these suggest that accumulating wealth and becoming rich is highly desirable, so the rich should be admired and envied.

Different from American cultural values that idealize the wealthy, the Chinese society has had a popular suspicion of the wealthy over a long history (Gerth, 2011). A folk expression, derived from Confucius’ disciple Mencius, holds that “One cannot become wealthy without being unjust” (*wei fu bu ren*). Frequent depictions from aphorisms and classic literature underscore the incompatibility between the righteous (*yi*) and the profitable (*li*) and between the public (*gong*) and the private (*si*). Part of the sentiment might stem from the Confucian teaching of the middle-way, or Doctrine of the Mean, which emphasizes maintaining harmony and balance, opposing excessive diversion from the mean.

The cultural values of the middle-way were turned into antagonism toward the new aristocracy in China’s recent history as a socialist country. During the Maoist era, capitalists and the rich were vilified and liquidated as a class in the late 1950s (Gerth, 2011). As Communist propaganda promised, ordinary people, identified as “workers,” were the masters of the new Chinese society. Because the majority of Chinese (50.2%) perceive themselves as working class, a group in conflict with capitalists or bourgeoisie (Xiao & Qiu, 2017), perceived tension toward the rich seems likely. As market economy and institutional reforms continuously unfold in China, social-class divisions have worsened, and income inequality has been record high (Bian, 2002; Hauser & Xie, 2005; Xie & Jin, 2015).

Starting from 2001, the phrase “hatred against the rich” (*chou fu xin li*) became one of the most popular terms online and attracted attention from the general public and academicians (Gerth, 2011; Shen, 2010). The media noticed a rise in the number of luxury automobiles being vandalized, which was attributed to increasing hatred of the rich (“Building an Economic Civilization That Supports the Wealthy,” 2003). Other reported forms of hostility targeted the rich, such as “bullying, exclusion, harassment, pranks, conspiracies to entrap, and even a prevalent public attitude of hatred” (W. Chen, 2005). The Chinese media have also linked hatred of the rich to horrific crimes, including several murders of wealthy Chinese. Web commenters at the time overwhelmingly expressed hostility toward the deceased, with comments like “he deserved to die” and “the murder was nicely done” (Gerth, 2011). Sometimes such crimes are seen as a form of wealth redistribution, or as depicted in a popular phrase “robbing the wealthy to aid the poor” (*jie fu ji pin*). Granted, strong sentiment against the rich, as implied by the media, could be just “politically correct” and a mere exaggeration, so the true existence of a “hatred against the rich” culture cannot be verified without empirical research. However, its unique history gives good reasons to believe that the Chinese people may have different attitudes toward the rich, contrasting with the U.S. history regarding social class. Chinese culture may represent the rich either as capitalist successes, or alternatively as harmony disruptors. So the rich might be resented and envied—or not.

## **Stereotype Content Model (SCM), Applied to the Rich Subgroups**

The SCM (Fiske et al., 2002) postulates stereotypes of social groups described along two primary dimensions, warmth and competence, although related models' labels differ (communion vs. agency, Bakan, 1966; socially vs. intellectually good–bad, Rosenberg, Nelson, & Vivekananthan, 1968; see also Abele & Wojciszke, 2007). Some societal groups are seen as both warm and competent (e.g., middle class), while some groups are seen as neither warm nor competent (e.g., the poor, the homeless). However, some societal groups elicit ambivalent combinations of stereotypes, so that they are perceived as competent but cold (e.g., the rich) or as incompetent but warm (e.g., the elderly). Thus, in contrast to previous research, where stereotype content had been assumed to be unambivalently positive or negative, the SCM demonstrates that ambivalence can manifest as perceiving the social group to be warm (i.e., trustworthy, sincere, friendly) or not on one dimension, and simultaneously competent (i.e., capable, skillful, confident) or not on another dimension (Fiske et al., 2002). Related evidence comes from ambivalent racism (Katz & Hass, 1988), ambivalent sexism (Glick & Fiske, 1996), and evaluatively mixed perceptions of Asians (Lin, Kwan, Cheung, & Fiske, 2005), older people (Cuddy & Fiske, 2002; Cuddy, Norton, & Fiske, 2005; North & Fiske, 2013), working mothers (Cuddy, Fiske, & Glick, 2004), gay men (Clausell & Fiske, 2005), and native Americans (Burkley, Durante, Fiske, Burkley, & Andrade, 2017).

According to the SCM, the competence dimension follows from perceived socioeconomic status (SES), and the warmth dimension follows from perceived interdependence (cooperative–competitive). These sociostructural factors predict a group's location on the SCM map (Fiske et al., 2002), where perceived competence and warmth differentiate social groups' stereotypes, validated across a wide range of target groups such as occupations, nationalities, ethnicities, religions, and across cultures (see Cuddy, Fiske, & Glick, 2008; Cuddy et al., 2009 for review). Hence, a rich group's high status predicts perceived competence, and their competition predicts (low) warmth.

Social groups' stereotype contents (images) relate to the emotions and behavioral tendencies they elicit. Competent but cold groups (e.g., the rich) elicit envious prejudice, and passive facilitation but active harm. That is, people go along to get along with the rich, but may sabotage them if given the chance. In contrast, incompetent but warm groups (e.g., the elderly) elicit pitying, paternalistic prejudice, and active facilitation (help) but passive harm (neglect). Incompetent and cold groups (e.g., the homeless) elicit contemptuous prejudice, and both active and passive harm. Competent and warm groups are admired, receiving both active and passive facilitation (Cuddy, Fiske, & Glick, 2007; Fiske et al., 2002).

### ***SCM Ratings of the Rich in General***

The current research applied SCM, a shared theoretical framework, to study rich attitudes. In general, the rich are viewed as ambivalently competent but cold across cultures, and are generally envied (Durante et al., 2017). Research using 37 cross-national samples<sup>2</sup> found that more unequal societies report more ambivalent stereotypes: The warmth–competence tradeoff serves as a buffering rationale that helps justify the social hierarchy under inequality (Durante et al., 2013). Study 1 addresses whether China, as one of the unequal societies (Gini = 42.2, World Bank, 2012), similarly stereotypes the rich ambivalently as competent but cold, eliciting envious prejudice.

### ***Subgroups***

However, even if overall rich stereotypes are similar in China as elsewhere, perhaps within the rich-people category, different subgroups come to people's mind, along with occupation, gender,

and various other demographic dimensions. Both distinctive and overlapping rich subgroups might emerge in China and America, reflecting varying social categories that are salient to people based on social dynamics and cultural values across two cultures. For example, rich subgroups categorized by occupation (e.g., bankers) may emerge in both cultures due to a shared market economy, while categories based on respective histories may lead to differences. For example, as noted, contemporary Chinese society may lack “old money,” given the elimination of influential and rich families in mid-last-century (Gerth, 2011; Xie, 2016).

Thus, is the superordinate group, *the rich*, meaningfully coherent, or rather are specific subgroups, such as CEOs, old money, young money, or doctors evaluated distinctively? For example, prior research on gay men found differing stereotype content for various gay male subgroups (Claussell & Fiske, 2005). If the overall category comprises disparate parts, then the whole might have psychologically distinctive meaning from its parts. Chinese and Americans might be thinking of different rich subgroups and responding accordingly.

Several evaluative processes might function here. One hypothesis is that the evaluation of the whole (rich people) is consistent with every single part (e.g., CEOs, etc.). Another hypothesis is that a prototypical rich subgroup (e.g., old money) could represent the whole category’s default and, therefore, drive the general evaluation, while other subgroups, different in stereotype content, are perceived as exceptions that do not reflect the overall evaluation. The current research (Study 2) explores this part–whole puzzle for rich people, examining the subgroup structure and psychological meaning of the broad rich-people stereotypes to see whether stereotypes of distinctly evaluated subgroups are consistent with the ambivalence of the overall stereotype about rich people, and any cultural similarities and differences.

## Explicit and Implicit Evaluations

Stereotypes and evaluations elicited from surveys and other forms of self-reports can be described as individuals’ explicit responses. Despite cultural values that idealize the rich, many Americans explicitly reject this message (Horwitz & Dovidio, 2015). As in stereotype content research discussed above, rather than being perceived as unambivalently positive, the rich are viewed ambivalently as competent but cold. In contrast, the poor are sometimes viewed as unambivalently negative (incompetent and cold), sometimes ambivalently as incompetent but warm, while the middle class seem unambivalently positive (competent and warm; Cuddy et al., 2008).

Although people do not express favoritism toward the rich on surveys, they might hold unconscious, unacknowledged, implicit positive implicit evaluations of the rich. Demand characteristics are particularly of concern for Chinese participants’ self-reports, because explicitly rejecting social-class tension and favoring the rich would be deemed inconsistent with the communist political beliefs. Implicit attitudes, which rely more on automatic processes, may reflect latent cultural values even when these attitudes are not explicitly endorsed (Arkes & Tetlock, 2004). From a meta-analysis of predictive validity (Greenwald, Poehlman, Uhlmann, & Banaji, 2009), researchers found that measures using the Implicit Association Test (IAT) have significantly higher predictive validity on behavioral tendencies than explicit self-report for socially sensitive topics.

Consistent with the possibility of pro-rich implicit attitudes, a small number of previous researchers looked at dual-level attitudes toward different social groups and found an implicit, but not explicit, preference for the rich over the poor (Cunningham, Nezlek, & Banaji, 2004; Rudman, Feinberg, & Fairchild, 2002). However, these studies conflate the conclusion around the pro-rich and antipoor implicit attitudes, so it was unclear whether the implicit positivity toward the rich was truly driven by a pro-rich implicit attitude or by an antipoor implicit attitude, assessed as relative preference with a Rich–Poor Implicit Association Task. Another study compared the rich and the middle class and found that Americans implicitly, but not explicitly, favored the rich over the middle class (Horwitz & Dovidio, 2015).

Study 3 uses the SCM as a theoretical framework to test the implicit and explicit stereotypes toward the rich, contrasting with the unambivalently positive middle class and working class. For American participants, implicit evaluations of the rich should be more positive than those of the middle class and more positive than the explicit evaluations of the rich, but for Chinese participants, both implicit and explicit evaluations of the rich could be negative.

## Review of Hypotheses

The goal of this research is to investigate stereotype content and evaluations of rich people in China and the United States. Previous work in the United States and many other countries demonstrated that the rich generally are stereotyped as competent but cold and are envied (Cuddy et al., 2007; Durante et al., 2017; Fiske et al., 2002).

We made the following hypotheses based on theories and empirical evidence:

**Hypothesis 1:** In mainland China, as in other countries, the rich are generally (a) stereotyped as competent but cold and (b) envied.

**Hypothesis 2:** Distinct rich subgroups appear across the two cultures, both reporting mixed stereotype content.

**Hypothesis 3:** In both cultures, rich groups' positions in the SCM map predict (a) people's expressed emotions (different manifestations of envy) and (b) behavioral tendencies toward the rich.

**Hypothesis 4:** For American participants, implicit evaluations of the rich will be (a) more positive than those of the middle class and (b) more positive than their explicit evaluations of the rich.

**Hypothesis 5:** For Chinese participants, implicit evaluations of the rich will be (a) more negative than those of the working class and (b) as negative as their explicit evaluations of the rich.

## Current Studies

Three studies test these hypotheses. Study 1 maps the stereotype content in mainland China, which has not been systematically published in English in past SCM research (Durante et al., 2013). We focused on the location of the rich in the stereotype content map relative to other social groups to examine people's general evaluations of them. Study 2 elicited relevant rich subgroups and tested the stereotypes on the subordinate level, generalizing beyond overall stereotypes of the rich in two distinctive cultures—the United States and China. Because perceptions of social classes could be deemed sensitive in China and susceptible to demand if tested on an explicit level, Study 3 examined implicit evaluations of the rich in the two cultures, compared with the middle or working classes, which normally elicit unambivalently positive stereotypes.

This research is the first to examine stereotype content of the rich group on the subgroup levels, and both implicit and explicit levels. It also fills the gap of SCM in mainland China. It investigates individuals' cognitive, emotional, and behavioral tendencies toward the rich across two distinctive cultures. Moreover, it studies the underlying mechanism, offering theory-based social structure correlates as predictors of stereotype content.

## Study 1: SCM in Mainland China

Whereas previous research in SCM has collected data from more than 37 cross-national samples from Europe, the Americas, Oceania, Asia, and Africa, it never obtained a systematic sample from mainland China except for an older Hong Kong Chinese sample (Durante et al., 2013) and an older student sample not published in English (Chen & Fiske, 2008).<sup>3</sup> Study 1 complemented

the SCM literature by conducting a standardized SCM procedure with a large sample of Chinese participants living in mainland China.

Based on extensive work on SCM showing social groups are described along the core dimensions of warmth and competence, Hypothesis 1a predicted that the Chinese sample would validate the SCM. Given the current interest in stereotypes and evaluations of rich people, we paid particular attention to the location of the rich group in the SCM map compared with other social groups, the emotional and behavioral tendencies toward the rich, and the socio-structural correlates.

## Pretest

Twenty-five Chinese participants completed an open-ended questionnaire online. Participants read the following instructions in Mandarin Chinese: “Off the top of your head, what various types of people do you think today’s society categorizes into groups (i.e., based on gender, occupation, ability, etc.)? In the space below, please list between eight and 16 such groups.”


Participants altogether listed 124 different groups, plus many verbatim duplicates. We selected groups mentioned by at least 15% of respondents (Fiske et al., 2002). Groups that met the criterion were men (48%), women (48%), adolescents (48%), children (44%), students (40%), rich people (32%), employees (28%), white collars (28%), workers (24%), migrant workers (24%), businessmen (24%), intellectuals (24%), blue collars (20%), poor people (20%), doctors (20%), politicians/government officials (20%), government workers (20%), unemployed (20%), disabled (16%), urban residents (16%), rural residents (16%).

## Main Study

**Method.** The main study followed standard SCM procedure.

**Participants.** An online crowdsourcing platform in mainland China, which provides functions equivalent to Amazon Mechanical Turk, recruited 262 participants. We dropped those who failed the attention check ( $n = 63$ ).<sup>4</sup> The attention check question appeared at the end of the survey, “To ensure that you are paying attention to our survey, please select “slightly liberal” for this question.” Responses other than slightly liberal were considered as failed.<sup>5</sup> A total of 199 participants constituted our final sample (40% women,  $M_{\text{age}} = 25$  years,  $SD = 5.21$ , 95% identified as ethnic Han—the ethnic majority group in China). Median education level was some college background ( $n = 115$ ). Modal response on monthly household income was 1,001 to 2,000 yuan (US\$146-US\$289;  $n = 44$ ). As for the subjective SES, the median value of the self-identified social ladder (Adler, Epel, Castellazzo, & Ickovics, 2000) was 6 (1 = *top of the ladder, people who are the best off—those who have the most money, the most education and the most respected jobs* to 10 = *bottom of the ladder, people who are the worst off—those who have the least money, least education, and the least respected jobs or no job*). Median political orientation (1 = *extremely liberal* to 7 = *extremely conservative*) was 3 (*slightly liberal*) for political, social, and economic issues.

**Materials and procedure.** Methods followed the protocol from previous SCM research (Clau- sell & Fiske, 2005; Cuddy et al., 2009; Fiske et al., 2002; Lee & Fiske, 2006). Participants answered an online questionnaire with instructions designed to elicit cultural beliefs and to minimize social desirability: “To what extent do most Chinese view members of this group as . . . .” Each survey page consisted of stereotype content measures in terms of warmth and competence . . . (friendly, sincere, warm, capable, competent). Participants rated the 22 social groups from the pretest using a 5-point Likert-type scale (1 = *not at all* to 5 = *extremely*). In addition, participants also rated these groups’ perceived structural positions (social status and competitiveness), and emotions and behavioral tendencies directed toward them. Participants provided standard



**Figure 1.** Six-cluster solution of Chinese social groups on competence and warmth.  
 Note. SCM = stereotype content model.

demographic information at the end. To avoid fatigue, participants were randomly assigned to answer one of two sequences, each consisting of half the groups (11 groups). A full copy of the questionnaire can be found in Online Appendix B.

**Results.** This section first reports all 22 groups' stereotype content (warmth, competence) cluster analyses, correlations, and cross-cluster comparisons, and then focuses on the rich group in China. More detailed results on all social groups can be found in Online Appendices C and D.

*Overall SCM clustering for social groups in China.* To (a) capture how perceivers differentiate different social groups in terms of warmth and competence and (b) categorize groups that locate (dis) similarly, we conducted a two-step cluster analysis. First, a Ward's agglomerative hierarchical cluster analysis suggested a six-cluster solution as optimal to capture the variances in our sample. Next, K-means clustering partitioned the dataset into six clusters based on specific ratings on the warmth and competence dimensions of each group (see Figure 1). The largest cluster contained eight groups: the rich, businessmen, doctors, employees, adults, urban residents, white collars, and men. A second cluster included five groups: blue collars, intellectuals, women, workers, and migrant workers. A third cluster comprised children, students, adolescents, and rural residents. A fourth cluster had two groups: the poor and disabled. A fifth cluster involved another two groups: government officials/politicians and government workers. The last cluster had only one group, the unemployed.

Two follow-up statistical tests validated this six-cluster solution. A univariate analysis revealed main effects of cluster on both competence,  $F(5,16) = 30.86, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .91$ , and warmth,  $F(5,16) = 31.05, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .91$ , dimensions. A two-way 6 (clusters)  $\times$  2 (stereotype dimensions) analysis of variance (ANOVA) demonstrated an interaction of cluster by dimension,  $F(5, 16) = 18.95, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .86$ , supporting both dimensions as combining to classify target groups. Table 1 shows the warmth and competence means for each cluster, along with their paired comparisons. Group-level analysis revealed that perceived warmth and competence were not correlated,  $r(22) = .18, ns$ .



**Table 1.** Competence and Warmth Means for Each Cluster, Mainland China Overall SCM.

Cluster	Competence		Warmth
Rich, businessmen, doctors, employees, adults, urban residents, white collars, men	3.55	>	2.96
Government officials/politicians, Government workers	2.80	>	2.27
Children, students, adolescents, rural residents	3.03	<	3.98
Poor, disabled	2.73	<	3.32
Blue collars, intellectuals, women, workers, migrant workers	3.56	=	3.45
Unemployed	1.83	=	2.30

Note. Within each row, > or < indicate means differ ( $p < .05$ ). SCM = stereotype content model.

*Overall competence–social status correlation.* According to SCM research, social groups' competence and warmth have respective antecedents of social status and cooperative interdependence (Fiske, 2015). As expected, competence positively correlated with social status,  $r(22) = .53, p < .05$ , and warmth marginally negatively correlated with competition,  $r(22) = -.41, p = .06$ . The unpredicted correlation between competence and competition was  $r(22) = -.26, ns$ , and the unpredicted correlation between warmth and social status was marginal,  $r(22) = -.42, p = .051$ .

*Perception of the rich: Competent but cold.* In line with our particular interest here, a matched pair  $t$  test demonstrated that the cluster involving the rich group scored higher on competence ( $M = 3.55$ ) than warmth ( $M = 2.96$ ),  $t(7) = 5.40, p = .001$ . Moreover, the group-level paired-sample  $t$  test targeting the rich group revealed that it was perceived as significantly more competent ( $M = 3.50$ ) than warm ( $M = 2.46$ ),  $t(105) = 13.15, p < .001$ . Consistent with SCM in other countries (Cuddy et al., 2009; Durante et al., 2013; Fiske et al., 2002), the rich group in general was perceived as competent but cold compared with other social groups in mainland China. The rich scored higher on competence than 60% of other groups, yet lower on warmth than 82% of other groups (see Table 1 and Figure 1). Hypothesis 1a is supported.

Individual-level analysis also focused on the rich group's correlation between competence and warmth and perceived social status and competitiveness. Distinct from the group-level analysis, the rich group's competence positively correlated with warmth,  $r(106) = .50, p < .001$ . Competence positively correlated with social status,  $r(106) = .19, p < .05$ , but no warmth–competitiveness relation was observed. The lack of variance on participant ratings (individual level consensus around the attributes of the rich) in perceived warmth and competitiveness may account for this.

*Rich people in China are envied as well as admired.* SCM research also suggests people report distinct emotions toward groups with different levels of competence and warmth (Fiske et al., 2002). The rich group, which was consistently captured by the high-competence but low-warmth space, typically elicits envy. We compared the different levels of emotions expressed toward the cluster containing the rich group and all the other clusters. Participants reported higher envy ( $M = 3.15$ ) and admiration ( $M = 3.13$ ) toward this cluster compared with others, but less contempt ( $M = 2.38$ ) or pity ( $M = 2.10$ ),  $F(3, 21) = 12.81, p < .01, \eta_p^2 = .65$ . Next, analyzing individual responses to the rich group confirmed these emotional tendencies. A one-way repeated measures ANOVA indicated that participants endorsed significantly different emotions toward the rich,  $F(3, 315) = 162.54, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .61$ . Partially supporting Hypothesis 1b, pairwise comparisons revealed that participants strongly endorsed envy ( $M = 4.41$ ) toward the rich, and relatively high contempt ( $M = 3.27$ ) and admiration ( $M = 3.26$ ), which did not differ from each other, but less pity ( $M = 1.74$ ).

*Cooperating with the rich.* People not only endorse different emotions but also show distinctive behavioral tendencies toward different social groups. The Behavior from Intergroup Affect and Stereotypes (BIAS) map (Cuddy et al., 2007) suggests high-competence but low-warmth envied groups would elicit passive facilitation (associating, cooperating) but active harm (fighting, attacking), rather than active facilitation (helping, protecting) and passive harm (neglecting, demeaning). Active facilitation is defined as one explicitly aims to benefit a group, active harm is defined as one explicitly intends to hurt a group and its interests, passive facilitation is defined as one accepts obligatory association or convenient cooperation with a group, and passive harm is defined as one demeans or distances other groups by diminishing their social worth (Cuddy et al., 2007).

First, cluster-level two-way repeated measures ANOVA demonstrated an interaction of behavioral pattern (four levels) by cluster membership (six levels),  $F(15, 48) = 3.42, p < .05, \eta_p^2 = .52$ , suggesting different clusters elicited distinct behavioral tendencies. However, the mainland China sample only partially replicated the BIAS map. On the cluster level, the cluster involving the rich group consistently indicated higher passive facilitation ( $M = 3.62$ ), less active facilitation ( $M = 2.50$ ), and less passive harm ( $M = 2.22$ ), but unexpectedly least active harm<sup>6</sup> ( $M = 2.27$ ),  $F(3, 21) = 34.77, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .83$ . On the group level, participants reported, as expected, significantly higher passive facilitation—going along to get along ( $M = 3.54$ ) with the rich than other behaviors. Contrary to expectations, passive harm ( $M = 2.99$ ) was rated higher than active harm ( $M = 2.58$ ) or active facilitation ( $M = 2.37$ ), which did not differ from each other,  $F(3, 315) = 58.21, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .36$  (Table 2).

## Discussion

Study 1 tested the SCM in mainland China. The 22 most relevant social groups in China differentiated across the warmth and competence quadrants, forming six distinct clusters. Four clusters reflected ambivalent stereotypes, high on either competence or warmth and low on the other. The number of clusters reflect the diverse perceptions toward social groups in China. The competence dimension, supporting prior research and Hypothesis 3, correlates with perceived status, while the warmth dimension marginally correlates with competition, and social status in the China sample.

Consistent with SCM in other nations, rich people are perceived as competent and cold. Hypothesis 1a was supported, while Hypothesis 1b was only partially supported. Participants expressed both envy and admiration toward the rich group, and reported passive facilitation behaviors such as association and cooperation rather than active harm, opposing a suspected “hatred against the rich” culture as implied by social media in China. Perhaps, then, such hatred might only be directed toward subtypes of the rich rather than the general rich population, a possibility that Study 2 addresses. Or perhaps Chinese respondents consider this a sensitive topic, such that implicit measures might be more effective, a possibility that Study 3 addresses.

Notably, middle class was not mentioned as a distinct social group by more than 15% of the participants in our sample, reflecting on the lack of a consensus on what “middle-class” theoretically means in China. For example, “workers” in China, a proxy for the U.S. counterpart of the middle class, are located in the high–high quadrant and, thus, are perceived as unambivalently positive. Generic employees (white-collar) land in the ambivalent envy quadrant, along with rich people.

## Study 2: Rich Subgroups in the United States and China

Although people commonly mention rich people as a general social category, rich people consist of many different types across occupations, age, gender, and possibly the means through which they obtain their wealth. Stereotype evaluations of the rich subordinate groups may agree with

**Table 2.** Descriptive Summaries of General Rich Group in Mainland China.

Category	Dimensions	Scores
Stereotype content	Competence	<b>3.50</b>
	Warmth	2.46
Emotions	Envy	<b>4.41</b>
	Contempt	<b>3.27</b>
	Admiration	<b>3.26</b>
	Pity	1.74
Behavioral tendencies	Passive harm	2.99
	Active harm	2.58
	Passive facilitation	<b>3.54</b>
	Active facilitation	2.37

Note. Numbers in boldface indicate ratings that are statistically higher than other dimensions within that category ( $p < .05$ ,  $df = 105$ ), see text for details.

those of the general rich people as a superordinate category. As an alternative, the reported overall stereotypes of rich people may be driven by certain prototypical rich subgroups, regardless of the different evaluations on the other rich subgroups. Perhaps only certain subgroups are hated in China and may not even emerge in the United States.

Study 2 aims to investigate this part-whole puzzle by mapping out the stereotype content of various components of the rich. First, it addresses what subgroups, if any, Chinese and American participants consider under the label “rich people.” As before, the pretest employs a free-response task, and the main study rates the identified subgroups on warmth and competence dimensions to assess the applicability of the SCM to rich subgroups in both China and the United States. This method both examines the stereotypes and evaluations of the rich and further tests the SCM at the subgroup level.

### Pretest

American ( $n = 32$ ) and Chinese participants ( $n = 34$ ) were recruited, respectively, from Amazon Mechanical Turk and Zhubajie (a similar online crowdsourcing platform). All participants completed an open-ended questionnaire for a study about perceptions of various social groups. Participants read the instructions in their native language: “Off the top of your head, what various types of rich people do you think today’s society categorizes into distinct groups (i.e., based on occupation, gender, age, region, business, etc.)” and were asked to list between eight and 16 such groups.

We selected groups mentioned by at least 15% of respondents in each culture. American participants cumulatively listed 98 rich subgroups, and Chinese participants cumulatively listed 116 rich subgroups. In the United States, the most mentioned rich subgroups were CEOs (56%), actors/actresses (56%), doctors (41%), lawyers (41%), politicians (41%), professional athletes (41%), celebrities (41%), bankers (38%), musicians/singers (38%), stock brokers (31%), oil tycoons (25%), men (28%), old money (25%), IT workers/engineers (22%), young money (22%), entrepreneurs (19%), businessmen (19%). The most mentioned rich subgroups by the Chinese participants included real-estate tycoons (65%), actors/actresses (68%), politicians/government officials (53%), Fu Er Dai/second generation of the rich (47%), CEOs (32%), entrepreneurs (30%), coal tycoons (26%), managers (26%), businessmen (24%), Guan Er Dai/second generation of government officials (24%), Beijing people (24%), bankers (24%), IT workers/engineers (24%), stock brokers (21%), Shanghai people (18%), telecommunication workers (18%), investors (18%), and the sudden rich (15%).

**Table 3.** Demographic Summary for Cross-Cultural Sample.

	Study 2 (explicit SCM)		Study 3 (implicit SCM)	
	The United States <i>n</i> = 86	China <i>n</i> = 142	The United States <i>n</i> = 90	China <i>n</i> = 106
Gender	55% female	44% female	41% female	48% female
Age	37 ± 11	25 ± 4	35 ± 12	30 ± 7
Ethnicity	84% White	97% Han	88% White	94% Han
Annual household income(modal response)	US\$30,001-US\$50,000 ( <i>n</i> = 23)	US\$3,475-US\$5,210 ( <i>n</i> = 42)	—	—
Self-identified social ladder	6.0 ± 1.7	5.7 ± 1.6	6.6 ± 1.7	5.5 ± 1.8
Education level (modal response)	Graduated college or vocational school ( <i>n</i> = 41)	Students in college or university ( <i>n</i> = 84)	Bachelor's degree ( <i>n</i> = 32)	Bachelor's degree ( <i>n</i> = 55)
Political liberalism	2.5 ± 1.6	2.9 ± 1.2	3.0 ± 1.7	3.2 ± 1.2
Social liberalism	2.7 ± 1.8	2.8 ± 1.2	—	—
Economic liberalism	3.0 ± 1.7	2.9 ± 1.2	—	—

Note. Gender includes female and male, no other gender reported. Self-identified social ladder, 1 = *top* to 10 = *bottom*. Political orientation, 1 = *extremely liberal* to 7 = *extremely conservative*. Reported with mean and standard deviation, otherwise indicated. SCM = stereotype content model.

## Main Study

**Method.** The method followed Study 1 and the standard SCM procedure.

**Participants.** U.S. participants (*n* = 91) were recruited via MTurk. We dropped five U.S. participants who failed the attention check, so 86 valid responses from U.S. participants constituted our final sample (55% women,  $M_{\text{age}} = 37$  years,  $SD = 11$ , 84% identified as White or European Americans). Chinese participants<sup>7</sup> (*n* = 199) were recruited through Zhubajie. Applying same screening procedure, 142 valid Chinese participants composed our final sample (44% women,  $M_{\text{age}} = 25$  years,  $SD = 4$ , 97% identified as the majority ethnic group—Han). Table 3 detailed demographic summary for the cross-cultural sample.

**Materials and procedure.** Instructions and procedures were largely identical to Study 1, except (a) participants were randomly assigned to rate half the rich subgroups (nine groups), and (b) the survey asked about their impressions of rich subgroups in their own societies.

**U.S. results.** We first present results for the U.S. rich subgroups in the United States, followed by those from China. Within each section, we examine SCM clustering space, social structural correlates, and emotional and behavioral tendencies (refer to Table 4 for reliabilities checks).


**The United States: cluster analyses.** Following the same analytic strategy as in Study 1, we used Ward hierarchical and K-means clustering to apprehend how rich subgroups differentiate in competence and warmth dimensions, and which rich subgroups are (dis)similar to each other. The U.S. results suggested a three-cluster solution as optimal. The first cluster (competent warm rich) comprised seven rich subgroups: entrepreneurs, professional athletes, IT workers/engineers, doctors, actors/actresses, musicians/singers, and men. The second cluster (competent but cold rich) included another seven groups: lawyers, stock brokers, oil tycoons, old money, CEOs, bankers, and businessmen. The third cluster (incompetent cold rich) included celebrities, young money, and politicians (see Figure 2).

Two follow-up statistical tests validated a three-cluster solution as necessary to model the warmth–competence dimensions. A univariate analysis revealed main effects of cluster on both

**Table 4.** Inter-Item Consistency Summary for U.S. and China Rich Subgroups in Study 2.

Categories	Items	Cronbach's $\alpha$ (the United States)	Cronbach's $\alpha$ (China)
Dimensions	Competence	.84	.71
	Warmth	.85	.78
Social structure	Status	.68	.47
	Competitiveness	.67	.46
Emotional prejudice	Admiration	.79	.73
	Envy	.84	.69
	Contempt	.92	.89
Behavioral tendencies	Pity	.63	.72
	Active facilitation	.79	.63
	Passive facilitation	.71	.75
	Active harm	.82	.78
	Passive harm	.77	.80

Note. SCM = stereotype content model.



**Figure 2.** Three-cluster solution of American rich subgroups on competence and warmth.

Note. SCM = stereotype content model.

competence,  $F(2, 14) = 25.39, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .78$ , and warmth,  $F(2, 14) = 32.58, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .82$ , dimensions. A 3 (clusters)  $\times$  2 (stereotype dimensions) ANOVA demonstrated an interaction of cluster and stereotype dimension,  $F(2, 14) = 16.68, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .70$ , supporting both dimensions as necessary to classify target groups.

*The United States: univalent rich subgroups.* Distinct from the existing literature on ambivalent subgroup stereotypes (gay men: Clausell & Fiske, 2005; gender: Eckes, 2002; immigrants: Lee

**Table 5.** Competence and Warmth Means for Each Cluster, U.S. Sample Rich Subgroups.

Cluster	Competence		Warmth
Politicians, young money, celebrities	2.32	>	2.16
CEOs, stock brokers, bankers, lawyers, oil tycoons, businessmen, old money	3.43	>	2.11
Entrepreneurs, men, IT workers, actors/actresses, professional athletes, musicians/singers, doctors	3.84	>	3.12

Note. Within each row, > or < indicate means differ ( $p < .05$ ).

& Fiske, 2006), Americans' stereotypes about rich subgroups were relatively univalent on competence and warmth dimensions as the rich subgroups largely occupies the two traditionally univalent quadrants (high–high and low–low). For any given cluster of rich subgroups, competence scores constantly surpassed warmth scores. The correlation between competence and warmth was high,  $r(17) = .61$ ,  $p < .05$ . Nevertheless, some between-cluster variations still captured the heterogeneity of distinct rich subgroups (Table 5).

First, between-cluster analysis among the Americans demonstrated that the warmest rich group cluster ( $M = 3.12$ ) was the one comprising entrepreneurs, professional athletes, IT workers/engineers, doctors, actors/actresses, musicians/singers, and men—all rich groups that might be seen as earning their wealth in benign ways. On the other hand, the least competent rich group cluster ( $M = 2.32$ ) was the one involving celebrities, young money, and politicians—perhaps wealthy through less legitimate means. Next, within-cluster analysis revealed the warmest cluster (entrepreneurs, professional athletes, IT workers/engineers, doctors, actors/actresses, musicians/singers, and men) was rated not only high in warmth ( $M = 3.12$ ) but even higher in competence ( $M = 3.83$ ),  $t(6) = 6.37$ ,  $p = .001$ .

Second, the coldest rich groups cluster contained lawyers, stock brokers, oil tycoons, old money, CEOs, bankers, and businessmen—perhaps seen as holding their wealth by exploiting others. Paired sample  $t$  test demonstrated that this cluster was perceived as the most ambivalent, with low warmth ( $M = 2.11$ ) but high competence ( $M = 3.43$ ),  $t(6) = 9.72$ ,  $p < .001$ . The least competent rich groups cluster—comprising celebrities, young money, and politicians—was rated low in competence ( $M = 2.32$ ), and even lower in warmth ( $M = 2.16$ ),  $t(2) = 23.52$ ,  $p < .01$ .

*The United States: Lack of correlation between competence and social status among rich subgroups.* First, group-level analysis among the Americans revealed no correlation between perceived competence and social status,  $r(17) = .22$ ,  $ns$ ; however, perceived warmth was strongly negatively correlated with competition,  $r(17) = -.91$ ,  $p < .001$ . Since warmth and competence among rich subgroups were significantly correlated, perceived competence also correlated with competition,  $r(17) = -.67$ ,  $p < .005$ . Warmth and social status were not correlated,  $r(17) = -.05$ ,  $ns$ . Individual analysis indicated a small correlation between perceived competence and social status,  $r(963) = .27$ ,  $p < .001$ . Warmth and competition were negatively correlated,  $r(963) = -.44$ ,  $p < .001$  (see Table 6).

*The United States: Contemptuous envy or admiring envy.* Given that rich groups in general possess higher social status ( $M = 4.34$ ), Hypothesis 3a predicted that participants would not express paternalistic prejudice (pity and sympathy) toward rich subgroups. Meanwhile, given rich subgroups were all perceived as more competent than warm, Hypothesis 1b posited that participants would express high envious prejudice (envy and jealousy) toward all rich subgroups (Fiske et al., 2002).

An ANOVA on perceived emotion revealed that American participants reported equally high envy toward all clusters ( $M = 3.31$ ,  $ns$ ), and low pity toward all clusters ( $M = 2.52$ ,  $p < .01$ ). Contempt and admiration significantly differed between clusters. The SCM would predict that

**Table 6.** Social Structural Correlates, U.S. Sample Rich Subgroups.

	Group level		Individual level	
	Status	Competition	Status	Competition
Competence	.22	-.67**	.27***	-.34***
Warmth	-.05	-.91***	-.02	-.44***

Note. Group-level  $df = 17$ ; individual-level  $df = 963$ .

\*\* $p < .01$ . \*\*\* $p < .001$ .

besides being envious, people would also express contemptuous prejudice (contempt, anger, resentment, and disgust) toward low-competence, low-warmth rich groups. As predicted, the low-competence, low-warmth cluster (celebrities, young money, and politicians) elicited high contempt ( $M = 3.35$ ),  $F(2, 14) = 19.45$ ,  $p < .001$ ,  $\eta_p^2 = .74$ .

However, different from expectations that ambivalently competent but cold groups (lawyers, stock brokers, oil tycoons, old money, CEOs, bankers, and businessmen) should reflect only envious prejudice, American participants also endorsed high contempt ( $M = 3.30$ ),  $F(2, 14) = 19.45$ ,  $p < .001$ ,  $\eta_p^2 = .74$ .

Consistent with SCM hypotheses (Hypothesis 3a), high-competence, high-warmth rich groups (entrepreneurs, professional athletes, IT workers/engineers, doctors, actors/actresses, musicians/singers, and men) elicited more admiration,  $M = 3.40$ ,  $F(2, 14) = 20.94$ ,  $p < .001$ ,  $\eta_p^2 = .75$ .

*The United States: Active harm or passive facilitation.* According to the BIAS Map (Cuddy et al., 2007), emotional prejudice predicts discriminatory behavioral tendencies. Specifically, the behavioral tendency toward both envied and contemptible groups is active harm (fight and attack). Therefore, envied and contemptible rich groups should elicit active harm. Likewise, the behavior tendency toward both envied and admired groups is passive facilitation (cooperate and associate), so envied and admired rich groups should elicit passive facilitation.

To examine Hypothesis 3b, multiple regression analysis first tested whether the envious and contemptuous emotions significantly predicted American participants' active harm behavioral tendencies. Contempt significantly predicted active harm tendencies ( $\beta = .69$ ,  $p < .001$ ), not envy ( $\beta = -.09$ , *ns*). The results of the regression indicated the two emotions explained 88.2% of the variance,  $R^2 = .88$ ,  $F(2, 14) = 52.10$ ,  $p < .001$ .

We then examined whether envy and admiration significantly predicted behavioral tendencies toward passive facilitation. Regression analysis revealed that envy ( $\beta = -.31$ ,  $p < .05$ ) and admiration ( $\beta = .56$ ,  $p < .001$ ) both significantly predicted passive facilitation,  $R^2 = .77$ ,  $F(2, 14) = 23.81$ ,  $p < .001$ .

Furthermore, a one-way ANOVA on behavioral tendencies demonstrated main effects of cluster on all four behavioral patterns ( $p < .001$ ). The two clusters with groups who are both contemptible and envied elicited higher active harm ( $M = 2.92$ ) than the other cluster ( $M = 2.00$ ),  $F(2, 14) = 11.97$ ,  $p = .001$ . On the other hand, the cluster of groups who are both admired and envied elicited higher passive facilitation ( $M = 3.23$ ) than the other two clusters, which did not differ from each other (average  $M = 2.61$ ),  $F(2, 14) = 11.94$ ,  $p = .001$ . (Table 7).

*Chinese results.* Following the same cluster analytic procedure as in the previous two studies, results pointed to a four-cluster solution on Chinese rich subgroups' competence and warmth (Figure 3). The first cluster (highest competence and warmth) included five groups: CEOs, businessmen, bankers, entrepreneurs, and IT workers/engineers. The second cluster (second highest competence and warmth) comprised six groups: Beijing people, Shanghai people, actors/

**Table 7.** Emotions and Behaviors Expressed for Three Clusters, U.S. Sample Rich Subgroups.

	Envy	Contempt	Admire	Pity	Passive harm	Active harm	Passive facilitation	Active facilitation
Incompetent cold rich (politicians, young money, celebrities)	<b>3.46</b>	<b>3.35</b>	2.32	1.63	<b>2.94</b>	<b>2.95</b>	2.68	2.26
Competent but cold rich (CEOs, stock brokers, lawyers, oil tycoons, businessmen, old money)	<b>3.25</b>	<b>3.30</b>	2.20	1.49	<b>2.67</b>	<b>2.89</b>	2.53	1.93
Competent warm rich (entrepreneurs, men, IT workers, actors/actresses, professional athletes, musicians/singers, doctors)	<b>3.22</b>	2.00	<b>3.40</b>	1.92	1.94	2.00	<b>3.23</b>	<b>2.75</b>

Note. Numbers in boldface indicate emotions or behaviors predicted to be high for particular clusters.

actresses, stock brokers, investors, managers, and telecommunication workers. The third cluster (second lowest competence and warmth) included four groups: politicians, coal tycoons, real-estate tycoons, and the sudden rich. The fourth cluster (lowest competence and warmth) was composed of the second generation of the rich (“Fu Er Dai”) and the second generation of the politicians (“Guan Er Dai”).


*China: Univalent rich subtypes.* Similar to the U.S. results, Chinese rich subgroups’ perceived competence and warmth were highly correlated,  $r(18) = .83, p < .001$ , which consequently portrayed a univalent SCM space (social groups are clustered around the diagonal rather than spread over the space). First, the second generations cluster consisted of the least competent ( $M = 2.02$ ) and least warm ( $M = 1.99$ ) ratings, which did not significantly differ from each other,  $t(1) = -.352, p = .785$ . The competence score ( $M = 2.71$ ) of the second lowest competence and warmth rich group cluster (politicians, coal tycoons, real-estate tycoons, and sudden rich) also did not differ from their warmth score ( $M = 2.24$ ),  $t(3) = -2.725, p = .072$ .

The second highest competence and warmth cluster (Beijing people, Shanghai people, actors/actresses, stockbrokers, investors, managers, and telecommunication workers) were rated as more competent ( $M = 3.30$ ) than warm ( $M = 2.95$ ),  $t(6) = 2.55, p < .05$ . The last cluster with both the highest competence ( $M = 3.90$ ) and warmth ( $M = 3.12$ ) ratings contained CEOs, businessmen, bankers, entrepreneurs, and IT workers/engineers. In addition to being perceived as the warmest groups among all rich groups in China, a paired-sample  $t$  test indicated that they were distinguished as even more competent than warm,  $t(4) = 7.33, p < .01$ .

Despite the within-cluster analysis, a one-way ANOVA demonstrated significant main effects of cluster on both competence,  $F(3, 14) = 38.34, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .89$ , and warmth,  $F(3, 14) = 30.43, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .87$ . Post hoc pairwise  $t$  test revealed that clusters significantly differed from each other in rated competence, all  $ps < .05$ . The two clusters with highest warmth ratings significantly differed from the two with lowest warmth ratings ( $ps < .001$ ), and otherwise the warmth ratings did not differ from each cluster (see Table 8).

*China: competence and warmth have social structural correlates.* In group-level analyses among Chinese participants, perceived competence was positively related to social status,  $r(18) = .51, p < .05$ ; perceived warmth was negatively related to competitiveness,  $r(18) = -.86, p < .001$ . Whereas the correlation between competence and competition was large and significant,  $r(18) = -.62, p < .01$ , the correlation between warmth and social status was essentially zero,  $r(18) =$





**Figure 3.** Four-cluster solution of Chinese rich subgroups on competence and warmth.  
 Note. SCM = stereotype content model.

**Table 8.** Competence and Warmth Means for Each Cluster, China Sample Rich Subgroups.

Cluster	Competence		Warmth
Second generations: GuanErDai, FuErDai	2.02	=	1.99
Politicians, coal tycoons, real-estate tycoons, sudden rich	2.71	=	2.24
Actors/actresses, Shanghai people, Beijing people, managers, stock brokers, investors, telecommunication workers	3.30	>	2.95
CEOs, businessmen, bankers, entrepreneurs, IT workers/engineers	3.90	>	3.12

Note. Within each row, > or < indicate means differ ( $p < .05$ ). GuanErDai means second generations of government officials; FuErDai means second generations of the rich.

-0.0003, *ns*, consistent with SCM predictions. Individual-level analysis among Chinese participants showed a positive competence and social status correlation,  $r(1,278) = .40, p < .001$ , and a negative warmth and competitiveness correlation,  $r(1,278) = -.33, p < .001$  (see Table 9).

*China: Contemptuous envy or admiring envy.* Chinese participants reported similarly low pity ( $M = 1.84, ns$ ) and high envy ( $M = 3.47, ns$ ) toward all clusters. However, Chinese participants expressed significantly different contempt and admiration emotions toward different clusters. In particular, within-cluster analysis demonstrated that participants strongly endorsed both envious ( $M = 3.87$ ) and contemptuous prejudice ( $M = 3.55$ ) toward the lowest competence and warmth rich groups (second generations of rich and of politicians),  $F(3, 3) = 63.35, p = .08$ , and both envy ( $M = 3.70$ ) and contempt ( $M = 3.42$ ) to the next-to-lowest competence and warmth rich groups (politicians, coal tycoons, real-estate tycoons, and sudden rich),  $F(3, 9) = 97.96, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .97$ .

On the other hand, Chinese participants reported both high admiration ( $M = 3.45$ ) and envy ( $M = 3.37$ ) toward the highest competence and warmth rich groups (CEOs, businessmen, bankers, entrepreneurs, and IT workers/engineers),  $F(3, 12) = 24.38, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .86$ . As for the cluster in the next-to-highest competence and warmth (Beijing people, Shanghai people, actors/

**Table 9.** Social Structural Correlates, China Sample Rich Subgroups.

	Group level		Individual level	
	Status	Competition	Status	Competition
Competence	.51*	-.62**	.40***	-.24***
Warmth	.0002	-.86**	.17***	-.33***

Note. Group level  $df = 18$ ; individual level  $df = 1,278$ .

\* $p < .05$ . \*\* $p < .01$ . \*\*\* $p < .001$ .

actresses, stock brokers, investors, managers, and telecommunication workers), although not as high as the top cluster, this cluster also elicited high envy ( $M = 2.95$ ) and admiration ( $M = 2.82$ ),  $F(3, 8) = 15.80$ ,  $p < .01$ ,  $\eta_p^2 = .86$ .

*China: Passive facilitation with all rich groups.* First, a between-cluster analysis on behavioral tendencies among Chinese participants revealed no significant difference in passive facilitation behaviors toward different clusters,  $M = 3.41$ , *ns*. All rich subgroups receive cooperation and association.

Other behavioral tendencies significantly differed between clusters. The two clusters high on envy and contempt were rated as lower on receiving active facilitation ( $M = 1.67$ ) than the two clusters high on envy and admiration ( $M = 2.05$ ),  $F(3, 14) = 31.27$ ,  $p < .001$ . Chinese participants reported higher tendency of active harm toward the envy–contempt clusters ( $M = 3.33$ ) than the others ( $M = 2.11$ ),  $F(3, 14) = 32.55$ ,  $p < .001$ —and higher passive harm ( $M = 3.46$ ) than the other two clusters ( $M = 2.07$ ),  $F(3, 14) = 53.69$ ,  $p < .001$ .

Next, within-cluster analysis examined behavioral differences in each cluster, which were marginal perhaps due to a lack of power (limited number of subgroups within a cluster). The lowest competence and warmth rich groups (second generations of the rich and the politicians) elicited high active harm ( $M = 3.45$ ), passive harm ( $M = 3.60$ ), and passive facilitation ( $M = 3.29$ ), but much less active facilitation ( $M = 1.62$ ),  $F(3, 3) = 67.45$ ,  $p = .08$ .

The next-to-lowest competence and warmth cluster (politicians, coal tycoons, real-estate tycoons, and sudden rich) also elicited high active harm ( $M = 3.21$ ), passive harm ( $M = 3.32$ ), and passive facilitation ( $M = 3.29$ ), but less active facilitation ( $M = 1.72$ ),  $F(3, 9) = 79.44$ ,  $p < .001$ .

The next-to-highest competence and warmth cluster (Beijing people, Shanghai people, actors/actresses, stock brokers, investors, managers, and telecommunication workers) received high passive facilitation ( $M = 3.27$ ), but less active harm ( $M = 2.12$ ), passive harm ( $M = 2.15$ ), or passive facilitation ( $M = 2.42$ ),  $F(3, 18) = 37.98$ ,  $p < .001$ .

The highest competence and warmth rich cluster (CEOs, businessmen, bankers, entrepreneurs, and IT workers/engineers) was rated higher on passive facilitation ( $M = 3.77$ ), less active facilitation ( $M = 2.54$ ), the least active ( $M = 1.97$ ), or passive harm ( $M = 1.98$ ),  $F(3, 12) = 61.49$ ,  $p < .001$  (see Table 10).

Finally, multiple regression analysis replicated relations between emotions and behavioral tendencies in the Chinese sample. Envy ( $\beta = .35$ ,  $p < .001$ ) and admiration ( $\beta = .46$ ,  $p < .001$ ) significantly predicted passive facilitation,  $R^2 = .85$ ,  $F(2, 15) = 43.74$ ,  $p < .001$ , while only contempt ( $\beta = .85$ ,  $p < .001$ ) predicted active harm,  $R^2 = .85$ ,  $F(2, 15) = 149.99$ ,  $p < .001$ .

## Discussion

Study 2 tests Hypotheses 2 and 3, comparing the stereotype content for perceptions of 17 rich subgroups in the United States and 18 rich subgroups in China. Across both cultures, warmth and

**Table 10.** Emotions and Behaviors Expressed for Four Clusters, China Sample Rich Subgroups.

	Envy	Contempt	Admire	Pity	Passive harm	Active harm	Passive facilitation	Active facilitation
The lowest competence and warmth rich (second generations: GuanErDai and FuErDai)	<b>3.87</b>	<b>3.55</b>	1.94	1.75	<b>3.59</b>	<b>3.45</b>	<b>3.29</b>	1.62
The next-to-lowest competence and warmth rich (politicians, coal tycoons, real-estate tycoons, sudden rich)	<b>3.70</b>	<b>3.42</b>	2.32	1.63	<b>3.32</b>	<b>3.21</b>	<b>3.29</b>	1.72
The next-to-highest competence and warmth rich (actors/actresses, Shanghai people, Beijing people, managers, stock brokers, investors, telecommunication workers)	<b>2.95</b>	2.08	<b>2.82</b>	2.01	2.15	2.12	<b>3.27</b>	<b>2.42</b>
The highest competence and warmth rich (CEOs, businessmen, bankers, entrepreneurs, IT workers/engineers)	<b>3.37</b>	2.03	<b>3.45</b>	1.97	1.98	1.97	<b>3.77</b>	<b>2.54</b>


Note. Numbers in boldface indicate emotions or behaviors predicted to be high for particular clusters.

competence differentiate rich subgroups. Supporting Hypothesis 2, the rich subgroups are all on average perceived as more competent than warm, even though the perceptions of each individual subgroup are distinctive.

Study 2 started with the question of the possible part–whole relationship between the subordinate groups and the superordinate group of the rich. That is, does the position of the overall rich group (high competence, low warmth) represent the average of all the rich subgroups—or do only some prototypic rich subgroups land in that quadrant? Evidently, the consistently higher competence than warmth perceptions of the rich subgroups would average to a high competence, low-warmth overall perception of the group as a whole. Such a pattern supports the speculation that the general stereotype evaluation of the rich is largely consistent with those of its subgroups.

Although in most of the clusters, competence is rated higher than warmth, stereotypic perceptions across rich subgroups show little ambivalence by an indicator at the between-subgroup level: Warmth and competence are highly correlated, and people seem to have an ordinal preference for different rich clusters and, therefore, see them as “good” rich and “bad” rich. Such a pattern manifests in both cultures and is especially obvious in the Chinese sample, where competence and warmth are so highly correlated that they form almost a 45-degree vector in the warmth–competence space.

Some cultural differences emerge with regard to perceptions of rich subgroups. Cluster analysis reveals a three-cluster solution spread across the competence and warmth space for the United States, while the same analysis reveals a four-cluster solution for the China sample. Comparatively, rich subgroups are more heterogeneous in China. Spatial distance on the SCM map can easily categorize the U.S. rich subgroups into a low-competence, low-warmth (LC-LW) cluster (e.g., the celebrities, young money, and politicians), an HC-LW cluster (e.g., CEOs, lawyers), and an HC-HW cluster (e.g., doctors, IT workers, and professional athletes), whereas an LC-HW does not exist.



**Figure 4.** Rich versus middle-class competence-BIAT and warmth-BIAT.

Note. BIAT = Brief Implicit Association Task; IAT = Implicit Association Test.

The Chinese rich subgroups map less easily into a  $2 \times 2$  warmth–competence space. As shown in Figure 3, the four clusters differentiate in perceived competence, but not warmth: The far-right cluster (e.g., engineers and entrepreneurs) is rated most positively, while the far-left cluster containing the second generations of the rich and the politicians is rated most negatively. Thus, ordinal preferences for various rich clusters can be sorted out based on their locations in the perceived warmth and competence dimensions.

In the China sample, competence was correlated with social status, while warmth was correlated with competitiveness, consistent with prior literature. Inconsistent with prior results, we did not find any correlation between competence and social status among rich subgroups in the United States, while both competence and warmth are negatively correlated with competition. Possibly, the U.S. sample has a ceiling effect, not enough variation in perceived social status among all the rich subgroups. Such results suggest that the correlation between competence and status would require more data sensitivity on a subgroup level. Since rich subgroups are generally in high status, whether they are competent or not may no longer be a good indicator for social status.

The emotional and behavioral tendencies toward rich subgroups show (Hypothesis 3), in both cultures, people are more likely to express envy and contempt toward less favorable rich subgroups, and envy and admiration toward more favorable rich subgroups. The reported feeling of pity was extremely low for all rich subgroups.

Across both societies, people’s emotional tendencies are associated with their behavioral tendencies toward the rich. For envy–contempt rich subgroups, people are more likely to engage in passive and active harm, while for envy–admiration rich subgroups, people are more likely to engage in passive and active facilitation. A particular divergence appears in the China sample, where the Chinese participants reported passive facilitation (associating and cooperating) with all rich subgroups. Such a finding could suggest a utilitarian motive when people are dealing with rich individuals.

Given all these cultural similarities, we still lack an explanation for Chinese (but not American) violence against the rich and a purported “hatred against the rich” culture, which is grounded neither in overall cultural differences in stereotype content nor generally in subgroups. There are two possibilities. First, there were no real “hatred against the rich” sentiment spreading in mainland China—it was rather a product promoted by social media. Second, we were not able to capture it on the explicit level, as reporting social-class relations might be deemed sensitive in China. Thus, implicit measures such as IAT might be a better empirical measurement if the “hatred” were a sensitive topic, or it only functioned as an automated process on the unconscious level, reflecting a latent cultural value.

### Study 3: Implicit SCM in the United States and China

Studies 1 and 2 focused on the explicit evaluations and stereotypes of the rich in general and specific rich subgroups. Study 3 moves beyond explicit evaluations and examines people's implicit stereotype evaluations toward the rich to test Hypotheses 4 and 5. Using implicit measures would reduce demand and enable us to test responses that might be somewhat sensitive (Greenwald et al., 2009). Especially in China, if expressing opinions on social-class perceptions would be related to possible ideological dissent, explicit evaluations might not faithfully represent people's perceptions of different social classes. Although literature suggested implicit positive attitudes toward the rich among Americans (Horwitz & Dovidio, 2015), we have little evidence on how Chinese implicitly perceive the rich. Therefore, in Study 3, we aim to further disentangle how people perceive the rich and whether there are cultural differences in implicit stereotypes and evaluations. To our knowledge, the present study is one of the first to investigate implicit stereotypes toward the upper-class social groups.

#### Method

**Participants.** U.S. participants ( $n = 100$ ) were recruited through MTurk, and Chinese participants ( $n = 125$ ) were recruited through online crowdsourcing platforms, Zhubajie and WeChat. We removed incomplete ( $n_{\text{US}} = 0$ ,  $n_{\text{China}} = 5$ ) and attention check failure responses ( $n_{\text{US}} = 0$ ,  $n_{\text{China}} = 7$ ; Oppenheimer, Meyvis, & Davidenko, 2009), and participants who had abnormal reaction time patterns in the behavioral measures (more than 10% responses faster than 300 ms,  $n_{\text{US}} = 10$ ,  $n_{\text{China}} = 7$ ; Nosek, Bar-Anan, Sriram, Axt, & Greenwald, 2014). The final sample was composed of 90 U.S. participants (41% female,  $M_{\text{age}} = 35$  years,  $SD = 12$ ) and 106 Chinese participants (48% female,  $M_{\text{age}} = 30$  years,  $SD = 7$ ). Demographic information is summarized in Table 3.

**Materials and procedure.** Study 3 used Inquisit software for web-based studies (Inquisit 5.0.5.0). Participants, who consented to a study involving word-categorization and survey tasks first completed two sessions of Brief Implicit Association Task (BIAT) that measured implicit associations between social groups and competence and warmth dimensions, then answered a questionnaire for explicit measures on stereotypes and evaluations and standard demographic questions. All materials were translated (with back translations) into Mandarin Chinese for Chinese participants. Scripts in both languages can be found in the Online Appendix E.

**Implicit SCM.** Each participant completed two successive sessions of BIAT (Sriram & Greenwald, 2009)—competence-BIAT and warmth-BIAT (order counterbalanced). The competence-BIAT consisted of two combined blocks: *Rich (Middle Class)—competent (incompetent)*, which asked participants to sort synonyms representing rich and middle class, with regard to synonyms representing competence and incompetence. To clarify, we used *middle class* and synonyms in the United States, and *working class* and synonyms in China.<sup>8</sup> Participants viewed words one at a time and were asked to respond as accurately as they could by pressing the “E” or “I” key on the keyboard. According to the architecture logic of BIAT (Sriram & Greenwald, 2009), if response times are faster when *rich* and *competent* are paired together than when *middle class* and *competent* are paired together, this indicates a stronger association between *rich* and *competent* than *middle class* and *competent*. Similarly, the warmth-BIAT comprised two combined blocks: *rich (middle class)—warm (cold)*, which assessed associations between social group categories and warm or cold attributes.

**Explicit SCM.** Participants reported their perceived competence and warmth stereotypes of rich people and middle-class people with a 5-point Likert-type scale (1 = *not at all* to 5 = *extremely*). In the end, participants answered basic demographic questions.

## Results


**Implicit SCM.** We conduct two types of analyses to test reaction time in the BIAT task. First, the recommended IAT scores assess faster or slower sorting of target social groups with characteristic attributes (Nosek et al., 2014). An IAT effect, or D score, has a possible range of  $-2$  to  $+2$ . Break points for “slight” (.15), “moderate” (.35), and “strong” (.65) reflect conservative psychological norms for effect size (Greenwald, Nosek, & Banaji, 2003). Second, conventional reaction time latencies compare the differences between average latencies for association categories (Greenwald et al., 2003). Given that the conventional reaction time results were the same as those from recommended IAT effects, we focus on recommended IAT effects. All IAT effects (D scores) can be found in the Online Appendix F.

Participants in both the United States and China had faster pairing of *rich people* with *competence* than *middle class* with *competence*, which indicates implicit association between the rich and high competence, whereas participants showed no significant implicit association between either social group and *warmth*. Specifically, for the *rich–middle class* competence-BIAT, U.S. participants slightly associated the rich with high competence over the middle class, mean  $D = 0.18$ ,  $SD = 0.42$ , one-sample  $t$  test comparing to zero,  $t(89) = 4.15$ ,  $p < .001$ , 95% confidence interval (CI) =  $[0.10, 0.27]$ ,  $d = 0.88$ . Likewise, Chinese participants showed a moderate to strong association of the rich with high competence over the middle class, mean  $D = 0.43$ ,  $SD = 0.41$ ,  $t(105) = 10.92$ ,  $p < .001$ , 95% CI =  $[0.35, 0.51]$ ,  $d = 2.13$ . On the other hand, there was no association between either social group and the warmth dimension, U.S. participants'  $D = -0.09$ ,  $p = .058$ ; Chinese participants'  $D = 0.04$ ,  $p = .381$ , both *ns* (Figure 4).

**Explicit SCM: the United States.** For the U.S. sample, an explicit score resembled the competence BIAT, comparing competence between the rich group and middle class. We first transformed individual explicit competence ratings of the rich ( $C_r$ ) and middle class ( $C_m$ ) into one variable: competence preference score,  $C_p = C_r - C_m$ ; positive scores indicate the rich group is more competent than the middle class, whereas negative scores suggest the middle class is more competent. Contrary to the implicit results, a one-sample  $t$  test demonstrated that explicit results suggested no significantly different competence preference between the rich and middle class among American participants,  $C_p = .07$  ( $SD = 1.16$ ),  $t(89) = 0.59$ ,  $p = .56$ . . .

Applying the same rationale, we then transformed the warmth preference score ( $W_p$ ),  $W_p = W_r - W_m$ ; positive scores indicate the rich group is warmer than the middle class, whereas negative scores mean the middle class is warmer. Opposite from implicit warmth results again, American participants rated the rich as significantly colder than the middle class, mean  $W_p = -1.63$  ( $SD = 1.01$ ),  $t(89) = -15.25$ ,  $p < .001$ , 95% CI =  $[-1.84, -1.42]$ ,  $d = 2.14$ .

**Explicit SCM: China.** In the mainland Chinese sample, congruent with the competence-BIAT results, participants rated the rich group as significantly more competent than the middle class, mean  $C_p = .81$  ( $SD = 1.06$ ),  $t(105) = 7.82$ ,  $p < .001$ , 95% CI =  $[0.60, 1.01]$ ,  $d = 1.00$ . However, counter to the warmth-BIAT results, which showed nonsignificant relations between warmth and social groups, but consistent with the U.S. explicit result, Chinese participants rated the rich group as less warm than the middle class, mean  $W_p = -.61$ ,  $t(105) = -5.47$ ,  $p < .001$ , 95% CI =  $[-0.83, -0.39]$ ,  $d = 0.53$  (Figure 5).



**Figure 5.** Explicit competence and warmth when comparing rich to middle class.

Note. Scores indicate participants' competence/warmth preference: A positive score means favor more the rich, and a negative score means favor more the middle class.

**Table 11.** Implicit–Explicit Correlations.

Rich BIAT	Mean BIAT D (SD)	Implicit explicit correlation
U.S. Rich–Middle class/competent—(incompetent)	.18 (0.42) <sup>***</sup>	.16
U.S. Rich–Middle class/warm—(cold)	-.09 (0.45)	.25*
China Rich–Middle class/competent—(incompetent)	.43 (0.41) <sup>***</sup>	.05
China Rich–Middle class/warm—(cold)	.03 (0.41)	-.04

Note. BIAT = Brief Implicit Association Task.

\* $p < .05$ . \*\*\* $p < .001$ .

*Implicit–explicit relationship.* Except for a small correlation between the U.S. warmth-BIAT and the explicit warmth preference,  $r = .25$  ( $n = 90$ ,  $p < .05$ ), no other significant implicit–explicit correlation emerged (Table 11).

*Supplemental analysis.* First, IAT effects showed no age differences, but we observed a gender difference in the United States. One-way ANOVA indicated a significant effect of gender on levels of implicit warmth stereotypes in the United States,  $F(1, 88) = 4.35$ ,  $p = .04$ ,  $\eta_p^2 = .05$ , where men ( $M = -0.01$ ) associated more warmth with rich group than did women ( $M = -0.21$ ). No other gender effect was found. In addition, there were no significant correlations between education level and implicit/explicit stereotypes in either the U.S. or Chinese sample.<sup>9</sup> Finally, a linear regression model entered participants' subjective social status, as measured by their standing on a social ladder, to predict their implicit and explicit evaluations of *rich* or *middle class* groups. For U.S. participants, subjective social status significantly predicted explicit warmth toward rich people,  $b = -0.45$ ,  $t(88) = -2.07$ ,  $p = .04$ . In other words, for U.S. participants, people in higher social ladder positions tend to evaluate rich people as warmer. No other significant relationships were found.

**Discussion**

Study 3 demonstrates that reported societal stereotype content of the rich does not necessarily match people's own implicit and explicit evaluations. Hypothesis 4 was supported, assuming people prefer social groups with higher competence and warmth, while Hypothesis 5, which posited both implicit and explicit negative evaluations for the Chinese, was not supported. Using *middle class*, which is an unambivalently positive social group (high competence, high warmth), as a

comparison group in the BIAT, rich social groups are implicitly associated with higher competence than the middle-class social groups, while there is no difference in implicit perception of warmth between different upper-class and middle-class social groups. Comparing with low ratings on both dimensions or low on one dimension while neutral on the other, high ratings on both dimension or at least high on one dimension while neutral on the other can be classified as more positive than negative. The implicit associations of higher competence and NOT less warmth (high ratings on one and neutral on the other) with the rich are observed in both America and China, though the implicit perception of high competence is especially pronounced for the Chinese sample. So implicit competence associations fit SCM patterns, but implicit warmth does not.

In contrast to the implicit perceptions, people's own explicit evaluations of the upper and middle class match the SCM societal stereotypes, where rich people are perceived as competent but cold. Indeed, comparing the rich with the middle class in the United States, people in general prefer the middle class, so that the rich are rated as significantly less warm but in an exception, not more competent. Preliminary evidence suggests a demographic difference in implicit and explicit evaluations of the rich and middle class. For example, men in both societies evaluated the rich as warmer than women did.

## **General Discussion**

Although wealth and financial resources are operationally continuous dimensions, "the rich" repeatedly emerge as a distinct social category and elicit consistent stereotype content across two societies' online samples. Although prior research has focused on the poor and the lower socioeconomic class, the current research shifts its lens to investigate societies' stereotypes and evaluations of the rich, upper socioeconomic class. Perceptions of the rich, or broadly those in possession of resources, would lead to implications for the legitimacy of the societal institutions, from a perspective of procedural justice (Tyler, 2006). Study 1 mapped the stereotype content for various social groups in mainland China to replicate and complement SCM across other nations.

Study 2 was the first to explore the most salient rich subgroups, examining variances in the culturally relevant subgroups underlying the overall category. Study 2 also examined the part-whole puzzle for the wealthy in the United States, with comparison to China. Unlike a few other existing subgroup analyses (Clausell & Fiske, 2005), societal perception of the rich subgroups reproduced the competence > warmth pattern of the overall category. And the SCM space comprising subgroup was relatively univalent—Competence and warmth were highly correlated on the group level, showing an ordinal ranking of "good" and "bad" rich. The lowest Chinese rich subgroups were second generation, not found in U.S. samples.

To search farther for cultural contrasts, Study 3 examined people's implicit and explicit stereotype evaluations of the rich and middle class. In both countries, people implicitly associated more positive attributes to the rich compared with the middle class, whereas their explicit perceptions toward the rich were mostly negative (the United States) or ambivalent (China).

The Chinese–U.S. differences in perceptions of the rich were nuanced, the two societies with seemingly different cultural dynamics. The rich in general are perceived as competent and cold in China, as in the United States, but eliciting the emotions of envy–contempt or envy–admiration depending on the specific subgroups that are salient, with results similar to the United States. For example, relative to other rich subgroups, politicians are seen as both incompetent and cold, and likely to elicit envy–contempt and both passive and active harm (both neglect and attack). In contrast, entrepreneurs and engineers are seen as relatively competent and warm, and likely to elicit envy–admiration, and both passive and active facilitation (both association and help). Providing a basis for envy, the explicit evaluations of the rich along the core dimensions of warmth are also similar—Compared with the middle class, both American and Chinese participants attributed low warmth to the rich.



So a purported Chinese hatred toward the rich appeared in neither comparing the rich with other societal groups, nor identifying unique rich subgroups (except for Chinese second-generation rich), nor examining implicit and explicit evaluations. Several possibilities emerge for future work.

### *Limitations and Future Directions*

Future work could compare other classes with the rich. In contrast with many prior studies, where the rich or high SES group are compared with the poor or low SES group, our studies contrasted the rich with the middle class. There are several advantages to this method. As the poor are usually attributed with unambivalently negative stereotypes (low-C, low-W), pro-rich evaluations would be less diagnostic, as to whether the difference was driven by the preference for the rich or the negative evaluation for the poor. The middle class is usually attributed unambivalently positive stereotypes (high-C, high-W), whereas in our studies, the middle class is implicitly perceived as significantly less competent but no warmer than the rich in both nations. In other words, the rich gained higher summed implicit evaluation in warmth and competence than the middle class, which is inconsistent with people's explicit evaluations. Despite our participants being mostly middle-class Americans (6.6 out of 10 in social ladder) or Chinese (5.5 out of 10 in the social ladder), and as societal in-groups that tend to have nonmixed positive stereotypes (Fiske et al., 2002), our middle-class participants still implicitly viewed the rich more positively than their in-group middle class. Whether low-income participant groups would show more cultural differences remains an open question.

Interpretation of our implicit data remains to be supplemented and developed. So far, stereotype content researchers have relied on explicit measures of stereotypes. Few attempts have systematically studied ambivalent stereotype content with implicit measures (Carlsson & Björklund, 2010). Implicit and explicit evaluations may not correlate, so they provide distinct evidence and, thus, complement the understanding of explicit stereotypes and evaluations. Implicit evaluations are known to be less susceptible to social desirability bias (Fazio & Olson, 2003) and tackle issues that people cannot accurately identify with introspection and, thus, cannot express explicitly even if they are motivated to do so (Greenwald & Banaji, 1995), which particularly addresses the concern of social-class perceptions being a potentially sensitive topic and perceptible to demand in China. Moreover, implicit stereotypes of social groups, commonly measured with IAT, predict relevant behavior (Greenwald et al., 2009). However, same as all measurements, IAT is not impeccable. Challenges such as how strongly IAT scores correlate with real-world behavior (Greenwald, Banaji, & Nosek, 2015; Greenwald et al., 2009; Oswald, Mitchell, Blanton, Jaccard, & Tetlock, 2013) remain. The little-to-no correlation between people's explicit and implicit rich evaluations (except for the U.S. warmth measures) not only supports prior research on implicit attitudes (Horwitz & Dovidio, 2015) but is also consistent with the argument that, although people may implicitly stereotype certain groups as altogether positive or negative, they explicitly state a more balanced view that includes both positive and negative evaluations and, thus, ambivalent stereotypes. The usage of implicit measures helps illuminate mixed stereotypes and those that might be influenced by social desirability and egalitarian concerns. More work remains to make these linkages.

These data do not explain why the implicit associations of the rich are positive. However, because the echo of American Dream and the ideology of upward mobility are strong in the United States, both children and adults might routinely get messages that idealize the upper class (Kendall, 2011), and implicit attitudes are theorized to reflect on such cultural values, even when they are not explicitly endorsed (Arkes & Tetlock, 2004). Thus, it is possible that even though people's explicit evaluations reveal the rich as less warm and no more competent than the middle class, the rich are still implicitly seen as more competent and no less warm in a more idealized image.

Moreover, the results in China are inconsistent with the "hatred of the rich" culture developed in contemporary China. It is possible that our sample of participants was not representative of the large

Chinese society, and a different and more representative sample might reveal a different pattern. As an alternative, the strong sentiment against the rich might be exaggerated by the social media, while in reality, such “hatred of the rich” culture did not fully exist or was only applicable to a limited subgroup of the rich. Thus, further research should aim to replicate the studies with a broader and more representative sample in China. In addition, it would be beneficial to conduct a more thorough investigation of implicit and explicit wealth evaluations using a wider range of measures such as directly probing the valence to offer additional insight into this new area of research.

The current research also tackles the part–whole puzzle of the rich people and found considerable distinctions between different wealth groups. Different rich subgroups have distinct representations and elicit unique evaluations. Such differences might be based on various characteristics of rich subgroups, such as how people acquire their wealth (entrepreneur vs. inheritance vs. winning a lottery). Depending on how the wealth attitudes form, rich subgroups may elicit distinct implicit and explicit evaluations. Perhaps the “hatred against the rich” phenomenon as described earlier was attributed to only one type of the rich people (e.g., second generation). Further research can explore the implicit and explicit evaluations of various subgroups and tackle the dynamics of social-class perceptions.

Additional considerations should be given to the predictive power of rich evaluations for behavior toward people from different social-class groups. The current research found apparent cultural differences in the predictive power of explicit stereotype evaluation on rich subgroups. American participants were more likely to engage in passive (neglecting) and active harm (harassing) toward rich subgroups that elicited the feeling of envy–contempt, while they only engage in passive (associating and cooperation) and active facilitation (helping) with rich subgroups that elicited the feeling of envy–admiration. However, while Chinese participants also engage in harm with the envy–contempt rich subgroups and active facilitation with envy–admiration groups, they were likely to engage in associating and cooperation with all rich subgroups regardless of types. The emphasis on passive facilitation toward all rich groups might be attributable to either a utilitarian motive (associate and cooperate as strategic behaviors to achieve material or social status gain) or a harmony motive (associate and cooperate to maintain social harmony). Both motives can be related to cultural elements in China: the importance of maintaining social harmony as implied by the interdependent culture and *the Middle Way*, and the philosophy of pragmatism as implied by modern Chinese international orientations and market economy (Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Yu-lan & Bodde, 1949). Such motives might serve as potential mediators for the behavioral tendencies expressed toward the rich and other social groups.

## Implications

The current research has several implications for general SCM theorizing. We demonstrate that first, warmth and competence dimensions are effective on a subgroup level: SCM captures large variations in stereotype perceptions of subgroups within a superordinate social group. Second, social status is less diagnostic of competence on a subgroup level, at least for the rich: Rich subgroups are generally high in social status, so the range restriction in social status makes it not a good indicator of their competence. Third, we found mixed emotions (envy–admiration and envy–contempt) toward rich subgroups, extending beyond previous research where a particular emotion would associate with a particular stereotype content for a social group. Future work should address the possibilities. Finally, past subgroup analyses (gay men: Clausell & Fiske, 2005; gender: Eckes, 2002; immigrants: Lee & Fiske, 2006; native Americans: Burkley et al., 2017) showed that subgroups spread across the SCM space, similar to maps of the general groups with both univalent and ambivalent quadrants. But sometimes—for rich people—that is not the case. These data add another piece to solving the ongoing puzzle of subgroup/general group relationships.

The research results have broader implications for the psychology of social class and inequality. Although social classes exist in virtually all societies, class differences tend to go unnoticed when a society is relatively egalitarian and virtually every citizen has the resources to live with dignity. The reality of social classes and their consequences intensely emerge only under increasing inequality (Moya & Fiske, 2017). Despite the cultural differences between China and America, they have one stark similarity—High levels of income inequality intensified following the Great Recession. In highly unequal societies such as contemporary China and America, class differences are more visible and discussed, resulting in more complex socio-group perceptions than in more equal societies (Durante et al., 2013). This explains the nuanced image the present research paints about people's perceptions of the rich and their subgroups. We found large inconsistencies in people's own implicit and explicit perceptions of the general rich people, and distinct emotions and behavioral tendencies toward the subgroups that compose the overall group. Such results implicate a nuanced view of the intergroup relations between social classes, considering most of our sample came from a middle-class or working-class background.

We know relatively little about the social psychology of social class and much less about the relations between social-class groups under inequality (Moya & Fiske, 2017). Stereotype perceptions toward social class shapes and is shaped by gateway institutions that control mobility. Individual-level perceptions, group-level stereotypes, and institutional-level cultures and ideologies reinforce each other and sustain social-class divide. Understanding ordinary people's perception of the rich and upper class may shed light on their motivation to achieve upward mobility and eventually climb up the social ladder. Deepening the analysis is a first step in designing measures and interventions to tackle inequality.

## Conclusion

The current studies provide a novel set of evidence that adds to the literature on SCM and social class more generally. By learning people's stereotypes and evaluations of the groups that are positioned high on the social ladder, we extend the understanding of the societal dynamics and intergroup relations between people from different layers of the social hierarchy in the aim to promote social equality. Understanding the perceptions, targeted emotions, and behavioral tendencies toward the rich group across cultures can help illuminate the intergroup relations and psychological processes that underlie wealth inequality in modern societies.

## Authors' Note

The study protocol was approved by Princeton's Institutional Review Board. Datasets from the current research are posted at Open Science Framework (<https://osf.io/z7n24/>). Study materials and additional analyses can be found in the online appendices. In this article, the use of "the rich" or "the poor" only serves rhetorical purposes for describing stereotypes and does not mean to dehumanize various social groups.

## Declaration of Conflicting Interests

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## Notes

1. This is a direct English translation from "*chou fu xin li*" (仇富心理) in Chinese.
2. Mainland China was not in the sample.
3. This sample's depictions of rich people correspond to the data presented here.

4. We conducted the same cluster analysis with all responses ( $N = 262$ ) including those who failed attention check. Results did not differ, see Online Appendix D.
5. We acknowledge that this item might fail to catch slightly liberal participants who were not paying attention.
6. All groups received low active harm, ranging from 1.94 (children) to 3.01 (unemployed). Pairwise tests revealed no significant difference between groups.
7. Zhubajie is a crowdsourcing platform that runs through public bidding: Participants complete posted tasks and bid on the platform, while researchers select the bids that meet the expected quality and close the bids when enough participants are recruited. The number of participants depends on the popularity of the bid and the bid open time. Therefore, the researchers do not have direct control over the specific number of responses that will count toward their data collection.
8. Brief Implicit Association Task (BIAT) test stimuli in the United States: middle class, ordinary people, plain folks, regular people; stimuli in mainland China (translation): working class (*gong xin jie ji*), people with average income (*zhong deng shou ru ren qun*), ordinary people (*ping min*), plain folks (*lao bai xing*). Refer to the Online Appendix E.
9. However, when education was treated as a categorical variable rather than continuous variable in data analysis, the U.S. sample showed a significant effect of education level on explicit warmth stereotypes toward the middle class,  $F(2, 87) = 3.23, p = .044$ . Post hoc tests revealed that people with degrees higher than a bachelor's ( $M = 4.23$ ) explicitly rated middle-class members as warmer compared with people with bachelor's degrees ( $M = 3.73$ ),  $p = .035$ . On the other hand, the China sample showed an opposite significant effect of education on explicit warmth stereotypes toward the rich,  $F(2, 103) = 4.17, p = .018$ . Post hoc tests revealed that people with degrees lower than bachelor's ( $M = 3.13$ ) explicitly rated rich group members as warmer compared with people with bachelor's degrees ( $M = 2.60$ ),  $p = .014$ .

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