Comments on Moss

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It is ever so plausible that we have credence-like states of mind, and that we should often like to coordinate them. If we have credence-like states of mind, why should we have adopted a linguistic practice compelling us to squeeze these highly structured states always into a simplistic propositional medium for conversational transmission?

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1. Brief comments on contextualism

2. Content

3. Nesting

4. De Morgan's with mixed disjunctions

5. Epistemic modality *de re*

6. Partition-sensitivity of *probably*

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1. Brief comments on contextualism

If you posit extensive and very flexible sorts of context-sensitivity, important not to lose sight of all the negative data.

My mom is confused. **According to her,** John might be on a bus, even though he's not on a bus.

My mom is confused. ??John might be on a bus, even though he's not on a bus.

A: Is it raining?

B: I personally have no idea. But I was talking to Bill, and **according to him,** it's probably raining.

B: I personally have no idea. ??But I was talking to Bill, and it's probably raining.

The idea that certain phrases (*in view of…, according to…, given…*) make manifest the implicit restriction is pretty hard to establish.

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In view of what we know, you can't be parked here.

In view of what the tribal laws are, the guy performing the ceremony must be the chief.

In view of the current marriage laws, we should protest.

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2. Content

One way to use "content" in a Bayesian setting: contents are the objects of credence and preference. The probability and utility functions are structural aspects of the attitudes, not part of the contents of this states.

13

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Not the way Sarah talks. Is there a substantive issue here?

14

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Not the way Sarah talks. Is there a substantive issue here?

Are preferences or desires really attitudes towards sets of utility functions?

15

One way to use "content" in a Bayesian setting: contents are the objects of credence and preference. The probability and utility functions are structural aspects of the attitudes, not part of the contents of this states.

Not the way Sarah talks. Is there a substantive issue here?

Are preferences or desires really attitudes towards sets of utility functions?

Or are belief and desire really attitudes towards sets of probability space-utility function pairs?

16

Bill believes that probably it's raining

17

Bill believes that probably it's raining

proposition
(set of worlds)

18

(set of probability spaces)
content

Bill believes that   probably   it's raining

proposition
(set of worlds)

19

(set of probability spaces)
content

Bill believes that   it's raining
Bill believes that   probably   it's raining

proposition
(set of worlds)

20

Slide 21

(set of probability spaces)
content

Bill believes that   cert   it's raining
Bill believes that   probably   it's raining

proposition
(set of worlds)

21

Slide 22

(set of probability spaces)
content

Bill believes that   cert   it's raining
Bill believes that   probably   it's raining

proposition
(set of worlds)

?
Jane wants   cert   it to be raining

22

Slide 23

(set of probability spaces)
content

Bill believes that   cert   it's raining
Bill believes that   probably   it's raining

proposition
(set of worlds)

?
Jane wants   cert   it to be raining

Either the certainty operator seems to need to go into a lot of the attitudinal environments we tend not to see epistemics…

23

Slide 24

(set of probability spaces)
content

Bill believes that   cert   it's raining
Bill believes that   probably   it's raining

proposition
(set of worlds)

?
Jane wants   cert   it to be raining

…or sets of probability spaces don't figure in the right account of how we characterize these nondoxastic states of mind.

24

Slide 25

(set of probability spaces)
content

Bill believes that   cert   it's raining
Bill believes that   probably   it's raining

proposition
(set of worlds)

?

Jane wants   cert   it to be raining

Seems also that sets of probability spaces tend to be less apt for subsequent anaphoric reference, even with belief.

25

Slide 26

(set of probability spaces)
content

Bill believes that   cert   it's raining
Bill believes that   probably   it's raining

proposition
(set of worlds)

Bill believes that it's raining. What Bill believes isn't true.
#Of course, it might be raining.

26

Slide 27

2. Content

27

Slide 28

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28

3. Nesting

I wonder how robustly available nested epistemic modality is.

? It's likely that Jones might get the job, and likely that he might not get the job.

? It's likely that Jones might get the job, and likely that he might not get the job.

? It unlikely that it's possible that Jones is probably in my office.

? It's likely that Jones might get the job, and likely that he might not get the job.

? It unlikely that it's possible that Jones is probably in my office.

? I'm not likely to come to the party, but it's possible that I will probably be there.

3. Nesting

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4. De Morgan's with mixed disjunctions

Bill is not handsome or likely to get a date

37

Bill is not handsome or likely to get a date ⟹
Bill is not handsome

38

Bill is not handsome or likely to get a date ⟹
Bill is not handsome

¬(H ∨ likely(D)) ⟹ ¬H

39

Bill is not handsome or likely to get a date ⟹
Bill is not handsome

¬(H ∨ likely(D)) ⟹ ¬H

¬(cert(H) ∨ likely(cert(D)))

40

Slide 41:

Bill is not handsome or likely to get a date ⟹
Bill is not handsome

¬(H ∨ likely(D)) ⟹ ¬H

¬(cert(H) ∨ likely(cert(D))) ⇏ ¬H

41

Slide 42:

Bill is not handsome or likely to get a date ⟹
Bill is not handsome

¬(H ∨ likely(D)) ⟹ ¬H

¬(cert(H) ∨ likely(cert(D))) ⇏ ¬H
⟹ ¬cert(H)

42

Slide 43:

Bill is not handsome or likely to get a date ⟹
Bill is not handsome

¬(H ∨ likely(D)) ⟹ ¬H

¬(cert(H) ∨ likely(cert(D))) ⇏ ¬H
⟹ ¬cert(H)

Bill is not handsome or likely to get a date.
#But he might be handsome.

43

Slide 44:

4. De Morgan's with mixed disjunctions

44

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5. Epistemic modality *de re*

Four marbles: three white, one black. They are randomly distributed under four cups.

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? A marble which is black and probably white is under a cup.

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Four marbles: three white, one black. They are randomly distributed under four cups.

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10 people quarantined. Every person quarantined is a person who might be infected. One person in the quarantine—we know not who—isn't infected.

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Not everyone who might be infected is infected.

53

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10 people quarantined. Every person quarantined is a person who might be infected. One person in the quarantine—we know not who—isn't infected.

Not everyone who might be infected is infected.

?Someone who might be infected is not infected.

54

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10 people quarantined. Every person quarantined is a person who might be infected. One person in the quarantine—we know not who—isn't infected.

? Someone who is not infected and probably is infected is quarantined.

55

The winner might not have been the winner.

(*de re* metaphysical modality)

56

The winner might not have been the winner.

(*de re* metaphysical modality)

? The winner might not be the winner.

(*de re* epistemic modality)

57

The tired Californian might not have been tired.

(*de re* metaphysical modality)

? The tired Californian might not be tired.

(*de re* epistemic modality)

58

The tired Californian might not have been tired.

(*de re* metaphysical modality)

? The tired Californian is a person who might not be tired.

(*de re* epistemic modality)

59

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5. Epistemic modality *de re*

60

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6. Partition-sensitivity of *probably*

An urn contains a number of marbles. The chart below indicates how many of the marbles in the urn are green, and how many are not green.

green	5
Not green	8

A marble is selected at random and placed under a cup.

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"The marble under the cup is probably green."

Slide 65

An urn contains a number of marbles. The chart below indicates how many of the marbles in the urn are green, and how many are not green.

green	5
Not green	8

Red	1
Blue	2
Yellow	1
Green	5
Black	1
Orange	1
White	2

A marble is selected at random and placed under a cup.

"The marble under the cup is probably green."

Slide 66

"The marble under the cup is probably green."

Slide 67

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
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Slide 68

Can't say that *probably p* means:
p is more likely than each of the alternatives.

Slide 69

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Red	1
Blue	2
Yellow	1
Green	5
Black	1
Orange	1
White	2

"The marble under the cup is probably green."

Slide 70

Can't say that *probably p* means:
p is more likely than each of the alternatives.

Red	1
Blue	2
Yellow	4
Green	5
Black	1
Orange	1
White	2

"The marble under the cup is probably green."

Slide 71

6. Partition-sensitivity of *probably*

Slide 72

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End

73