It is ever so plausible that we have credence-like states of mind, and that we should often like to coordinate them. If we have credence-like states of mind, why should we have adopted a linguistic practice compelling us to squeeze these highly structured states always into a simplistic propositional medium for conversational transmission?

1. Brief comments on contextualism
2. Content
3. Nesting
4. De Morgan's with mixed disjunctions
5. Epistemic modality de re
6. Partition-sensitivity of probably
If you posit extensive and very flexible sorts of context-sensitivity, important not to lose sight of all the negative data.

My mom is confused. According to her, John might be on a bus, even though he’s not on a bus.

A: Is it raining?
B: I personally have no idea. But I was talking to Bill, and according to him, it’s probably raining.

B: I personally have no idea. But I was talking to Bill, and it’s probably raining.

The idea that certain phrases (in view of…, according to…, given…) make manifest the implicit restriction is pretty hard to establish.
The idea that certain phrases (in view of..., according to..., given...) make manifest the implicit restriction is pretty hard to establish.

In view of what we know, you can’t be parked here.

In view of what the tribal laws are, the guy performing the ceremony must be the chief.

In view of the current marriage laws, we should protest.

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One way to use “content” in a Bayesian setting: contents are the objects of credence and preference. The probability and utility functions are structural aspects of the attitudes, not part of the contents of this states.

Not the way Sarah talks. Is there a substantive issue here?

Are preferences or desires really attitudes towards sets of utility functions?
Bill believes that probably it's raining

(set of probability spaces)

(content)

Bill believes that probably it's raining

(set of worlds)

Bill believes that probably it's raining

(set of probability spaces)

(content)

Bill believes that probably it's raining

(set of worlds)
Either the certainty operator seems to need to go into a lot of the attitudinal environments we tend not to see epistemics…

…or sets of probability spaces don’t figure in the right account of how we characterize these nondoxastic states of mind.
Bill believes that it's raining. What Bill believes isn't true. #Of course, it might be raining.

Seems also that sets of probability spaces tend to be less apt for subsequent anaphoric reference, even with belief.
I wonder how robustly available nested epistemic modality is.

? It's likely that Jones might get the job, and likely that he might not get the job.

? It's unlikely that it's possible that Jones is probably in my office.
It's likely that Jones might get the job, and likely that he might not get the job.

It unlikely that it's possible that Jones is probably in my office.

I'm not likely to come to the party, but it's possible that I will probably be there.

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Bill is not handsome or likely to get a date

Bill is not handsome or likely to get a date  ⇒
Bill is not handsome

¬(H ∨ likely(D)) ⇒ ¬H

¬(H ∨ likely(D)) ⇒ ¬H
¬(cert(H) ∨ likely(cert(D)))
Bill is not handsome or likely to get a date  \(\Rightarrow\)
Bill is not handsome

\[\neg(H \lor \text{likely(D)}) \Rightarrow \neg H\]
\[\neg(\text{cert}(H) \lor \text{likely(cert(D)))) \Rightarrow \neg H\]

4. De Morgan’s with mixed disjunctions

Bill is not handsome or likely to get a date.
#But he might be handsome.
1. Brief comments on contextualism
2. Content
3. Nesting
4. De Morgan's with mixed disjunctions
5. Epistemic modality de re
6. Partition-sensitivity of probably

Four marbles: three white, one black. They are randomly distributed under four cups.
Four marbles: three white, one black. They are randomly distributed under four cups.

? A marble which is black and probably white is under a cup.

10 people quarantined. Every person quarantined is a person who might be infected. One person in the quarantine—we know not who—isn't infected.
10 people quarantined. Every person quarantined is a person who might be infected. One person in the quarantine—we know not who—isn’t infected.

Not everyone who might be infected is infected.

10 people quarantined. Every person quarantined is a person who might be infected. One person in the quarantine—we know not who—isn’t infected.

Not everyone who might be infected is infected.

?Someone who might be infected is not infected.

10 people quarantined. Every person quarantined is a person who might be infected. One person in the quarantine—we know not who—isn’t infected.

? Someone who is not infected and probably is infected is quarantined.

The winner might not have been the winner.

(de re metaphysical modality)
The winner might not have been the winner.

(de re metaphysical modality)

? The winner might not be the winner.

(de re epistemic modality)

The tired Californian might not have been tired.

(de re metaphysical modality)

? The tired Californian might not be tired.

(de re epistemic modality)

The tired Californian might not have been tired.

(de re metaphysical modality)

? The tired Californian is a person who might not be tired.

(de re epistemic modality)

5. Epistemic modality de re
1. Brief comments on contextualism
2. Content
3. Nesting
4. De Morgan's with mixed disjunctions
5. Epistemic modality *de re*
6. Partition-sensitivity of *probably*

An urn contains a number of marbles. The chart below indicates how many of the marbles in the urn are green, and how many are not green.

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>green</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not green</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A marble is selected at random and placed under a cup.

An urn contains a number of marbles. The chart below indicates how many of the marbles in the urn are green, and how many are not green.

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A marble is selected at random and placed under a cup.

"The marble under the cup is probably green."
An urn contains a number of marbles. The chart below indicates how many of the marbles in the urn are green, and how many are not green.

<table>
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<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Blue</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yellow</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Green</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orange</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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A marble is selected at random and placed under a cup.

“The marble under the cup is probably green.”

Can’t say that probably $p$ means:
$p$ is more likely than each of the alternatives.
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“The marble under the cup is probably green.”

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