A Cross-Cultural Study of Oral Narrative Style

Deborah Tannen
University of California, Berkeley

Since the introduction of the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis at least, linguists, along with psychologists and anthropologists, have tried to understand the relationship between language and cognition and to determine the influence of culture on thought. That differences exist between members of different cultures has long been a basic claim of anthropological linguists. More recently, such differences have been documented in psychological studies of cognitive style (Cole and Scribner, 1976); in ethologically-oriented studies of nonverbal behavior (Hall, 1959); and even in studies of facial expressions (Ekman, 1973). However, attempts to locate differences at specific levels of grammar and lexicen have not been entirely successful.

More recently, the focus on discourse analysis has begun to shed light on these as on other linguistic questions. In conversation, for example, the work of cognitive anthropologists and ethnographers of speaking have made available insights into cultural differences in identification of speech activities, and the work of John Gumperz (1971) has shown the mechanisms by which speech activities are carried out. Linguist Robin Lakoff (1978) has suggested that style differences may grow out of differing notions of politeness and communicative strategies which are placed on different points of a directness/indirectness continuum.

At the same time, there has been illuminating research in narrative text-building, both oral and written. Perhaps the most intriguing in this area is Becker's (in press) on Javanese, demonstrating that the very basic text-building constraints are culturally based. Whereas western texts hinge on temporal unity and linear causality, Javanese shadow theater plots hinge on coincidence and are constrained with regard to place rather than time. In other words, events in the shadow play need not be presented in the order in which they occurred, but the play must begin and end in a certain place and pass through a certain other place only.

In a narrower but also revealing study, Kaplan (1966) examined 700 essays written by foreign students in English and compared them to essays published in those students' native languages. Kaplan concluded that each of the language groups he studied favored a unique, conventionalized rhetorical structure. In Arabic and other Semitic languages, "paragraph development is based on a complex series of parallel constructions (p.6); Chinese and Korean writing "is marked by what may be called an approach by indirectness" (p.10); and "much greater freedom to digress or to introduce extraneous material is available in French, or in Spanish, than in English" (p.12).

All of these rhetorical strategies contrast with the favored American English structure which Kaplan characterizes as a straight line of logical development.

Continuing in this fruitful tradition of discourse analysis, research done in connection with a project directed by Wallace Chafe at the University of California, Berkeley, was designed to permit systematic analysis of how the same visual-auditory stimulus is transformed into narrative by members of different cultures. A six-minute movie containing sound but no dialogue was made and shown in a dozen countries around the world. In each country, 20 women were interviewed. Women between the ages of 17 and 20 viewed the film in groups of five and, one by one, told another woman of similar age what they had seen in the film. The present paper will discuss the narrative thus generated by students at the University of California, Berkeley, and at the Hellenic American Union in Athens, Greece.

To say that the stimuli for the narratives are identical--i.e., the same film--is to say that the content of the narratives is the same. Quite the contrary, the question of how the content of the film is transformed into narrative content is at the heart of our investigation. As suggested by previous work such as Becker's, and as supported by data from the present study, there can be no "identical content," since content itself is mediated by cultural and personal differences. Polanyi (in press) reminds us that "what stories can really be about is, to a very significant extent, culturally constrained: stories, whether fictional or non-fictional, formal and oft-told, or spontaneously generated, can have as their point only culturally salient material generally agreed upon by members of the producer's culture to be self-evidently important and true."

Polanyi's observation about the point of a story is related to C. Wright Mills' (1940) notion of "vocabs of motives." That is, speakers in a culture learn to express motivations, or explanations of any "situated actions," in terms of justifications which they know will be accepted as reasonable by other members of their culture. If there are agreed-upon vocabularies of motives, so are there conventionalized ways of organizing events into narratives, of choosing particular elements of the action and setting experienced or seen for inclusion in the realization and indeed in memory. The ensuing discussion compares narratives told by Greek and American young women in response to the question, "What happened in the movie?" It cannot be assumed that the narratives are products of their cultures involved. However, it is not to say that the narratives are not "natural." As Hess Wollman wisely argues in a recent essay in Language in Society (1960), "natural" speech is simply speech appropriate to the occasion. While an interview with a stranger in the presence of a tape recorder is a special sort of occasion, it is nonetheless interesting to compare the two sets of narratives which were naturally produced by members of two different cultures on these two occasions.

There are two striking overall differences between the Greek and American narratives about the "peeping Tom" film. First, the Americans tended to discuss the film as a film; they used cinematic jargon to comment upon and criticize technical aspects of its production, noting for example that the soundtrack was out of proportion, or that the costumes were unrealistic, or that the colors were not natural. In fact, the sound effects of the film formed the main point, or "coherence principle," for four Americans. Still another
American structured her narrative around repeated contrasts between what she expected to happen as the film progressed and what actually happened instead. Thus the coherence principle of her narrative was the recreation of her experience as a film viewer. Moreover, the film-viewer perspective was generally maintained throughout the American narratives, as the speakers referred to scene changes, shots, and sound.

In contrast, the Greeks tended to talk directly about the events depicted in the film without mentioning that they occurred in a film. If they did make reference to the film, they did so at the beginning or the end of their narratives, as a way of introducing or concluding their stories, but did not maintain a film-viewer perspective in the course of narration. Furthermore, if the Greeks speakers made judgments about the film, they commented on its message, saying, for example, that it showed a slice of agricultural life, or that it somehow lacked something in its meaning.

The second major difference is related to the first. The Americans in our study tended to report events as objectively as possible, often describing actions in detail, and in general appearing to be performing a memory task. The Greeks, on the other hand, tended to "interpret" the events: that is, they ascribed motives to the characters, offered explanations of the action, and even made judgments about the characters' behavior. Whereas the Americans seemed to be trying to include as many elements from the film as they could remember, the Greeks seemed to voluntarily omit details that did not contribute to their verbalized interpretations, with the result that the Greek narratives were significantly shorter than the American ones. (The average number of units, which we called "minichunks," for the American narratives was 125, as opposed to 84 for the Greeks. The Americans' narratives ranged from a low of 61 minichunks to a maximum of 256, while the Greeks' ranged from 29 to 150.)

These two striking differences -- the tendency to talk about the film as a film vs. talking about the events directly, and the tendency to "report" in detail vs. "interpreting" events, can both be related to the apparently different definitions of the narrative acts being performed. Whereas the Americans in our study focused their critical acumen on the skill of the film-makers and perhaps on the memory task before them, the Greeks brought their critical faculties to bear on the characters in the film and their actions. In short, insofar as any verbal performance is an exercise in presentation-of-self (Goffman, 1959), it seems that our Americans were concerned with presenting themselves as sophisticated movie viewers and able recyclers, while the Greeks were concerned with presenting themselves as acute and upright judges of human behavior. Before we proceed with a more detailed presentation and analysis of these broad and other finer differences, it will be useful to see a typical American and Greek narrative. First, an American one, chosen because it is one of the shortest, even though it is not one of the most film-oriented by any means.

S8: Okay...uh...the movie is basically about uh...um...a number of individuals...uh, a guy who's picking pears...um...and a kid on a bicycle. Basically those are the two protagonists in this...And, um...the guy who is picking pears, um...um...picks the pears...and he puts them in a...in um...these baskets that he has...um...And he's picking the pears, and...um...along comes a man with a donkey. Uh uh a don uh a goat...And he comes along...by...you know...passes him...And then this kid comes along with a bicycle...And he rides off...one of the...baskets of...of pears that he has...So the kid the um...the boy goes along, and he has...um...he's riding his bicycle...and he looks at a...a girl, that was coming the other way, that was on a bicycle...Um...he loses his hat; a...and...there's a stone in the way, so his bicycle falls over...and the pears get...um...um...fall down on the ground...um...um...There's some kids...there are three other boys, ...who are there...They help him...get straightened out...put the pears back...in the basket, straighten out his bicycle, and so forth...And he goes on his merry way...But then...um...the boys realize that he's forgotten his hat...So one of the boys whistles to him, and...stops him, and...gives him his hat back. Um...And then...um...the boy with the pears...gives...the boy who just gave him his hat...um...three pears to...divide among his friends...A...and...the boys go...um...walking along, eating their pears...And um...then the man...um...who was picking pears...comes down from his...um...his ladder...where he's been picking these pears...and he's going to empty out the ones that he's just picked...And he notices...that...instead of the three baskets that he had before...there are only two...And...so...he's puzzled...and...just when he realizes that...one basket is...gone...the three boys come along...eating their pears. And...you're left with this dilemma...what does this guy really think...I guess he thinks that..."I wonder if those guys ripped off with my pears or what." He just doesn't know...He was up in the tree when...the boy on the bicycle ripped off the uh /is/...the pears. Okay?

And now here is a Greek narrative, translated into English in a way that reflects the Greek syntax as closely as possible.

G12: Eh From what I understood... (it) was... ... an episode... (it) happened-- in Mexico... (I) suppose... (they) seemed to me (like) Mexicans-- the people... ... mm (it) showed the...um... (TSK) how a person gathered the pears...and...mm TSK (it) insisted that-- that which (he) did (he) lived...The men-- in other words-- mm... ... the (fact) that (he) was cultivating the earth, the (he) was gathering these-- the harvest... for him something special... (it) was worth something...-- TSK (he) lived which (he) did, he liked (it)... Eh... and (it) showed a scene-- /mum/ (it) must have been probably... mm TSK the agricultural life-- of one region... one who passed with a goats... littlechild... ... a littlechild with a bicycle... who saw the basket, with the pears, and too-k it...[slight laugh]...and then-- (he)
was passing, ... (he) met in the field-- a Iso, ... another girl with (a) bicycle, ... and as (he) looked at her (he) didn't pay much attention a little, ... and fell the-- fell the basket with the pears, ... and there also were-- mm three other friends of his, ... who-- ... immediately he-- loved ... and this was moreover something which showed how much children-- love each other. ... (they) have solidarity, ... (they) helped him to gather them, ... and-- mm... and since (he) also forgot his hat, (there) was a lovely scene where (he) gave them the pears, ... and returned back again. ... In other words, ... generally (I) think that (it) was a scene-- ..., T.S.K... of the agricultural life of that region which (it) showed. ... That's it.

The abovementioned differences in "framing" of the narrative task influenced every aspect of the verbalizations. Typically, S8 (the American) began, "The movie is basically about..." while G12 (the Greek) did not mention the movie. (An even more typical Greek beginning is simply, "There was a worker... "). In fact, 15 of our 20 Greeks and only 4 of our 20 Americans never mentioned the word "film" or "movie" (Greek for. or the cognate  gid 9 ) at all. Not only did more Americans use the word "film," but those who did, used it more often than the Greeks who did. Of the 5 Greeks who used the word "film," four used it only once, and the fifth twice. In sharp contrast, 6 Americans made overt reference to the "film" more than thre and as many as six times.

Even more revealing than the incidence of the word "film" are allusions to the movie perspective, that is, such terms as "protagonist," "soundtrack," or in Greek use of the verb discourse, "(it) shows," when the deleted subject "it" refers to the film. 5 Greeks (and only 1 American) made no allusion to the film at all, while 5 Americans (and no Greek) made more than 10 and as many as 15 such allusions, evidencing considerable attention paid to the film perspective.

Another way that the film-viewer perspective influenced verbalization is in the speakers' choice of verb tense. No scenes in our study showed a strong preference for the present tense, while the Greeks preferred the past. 13 Americans (and 3 Greeks) used the present tense throughout their narratives. 8 Greeks (and 2 Americans) used only the past, and another 6 used a mixture of past and present with the past predominating. Thus a total of 14 Greeks preferred the past tense, while the number of Americans who preferred the present tense increases to 17 when it includes the 4 who began their narratives in the past but then switched to the present and stuck with it to the end. The hypothesis is that the Americans used the "historical present" associated with movies or other works of art which are seen as existing permanently, while the Greeks' use of the past reflects the reporting of events which occurred once.

A close examination of G12's narrative reveals a vast array of verbal devices associated with this process I have dubbed "interpretive," that is, representing the speaker's ideas about the characters and their actions rather than simply reporting events as they occurred in the film. These interpretive devices are similar to elements

Labov (1972) has called "evaluative": they contribute to the effect the speaker is to convey as her main point. The main point or coherence principle, of this narrative is that the film portrays an all's-right-with-the-world romantic view of agricultural life. First of all, the speaker's intonation creates this effect: she soothesingly engendered many of her vowels, and she stringed her clauses together with a combination of lengthened vowels and steady clause-final pitch, giving the entire narrative the sound of a list: a recital of matter-of-fact circumstances rather than novel events. The effect of this intonation is particularly apparent when she tells that the boy took the pears. Nothing in her intonation conveys that anything special is happening; the event fades into the panum of common-farm-life occurrences. Other speakers nearly unanimously concluded that the boy stole the pears, and they gave this theft prominence in their narratives.

G12 uses another common device very broadly. She omits not only much detail but entire events which would not be consonant with her interpretation. She neglects to mention that the boy fell off his bicycle (another salient event for most speakers), and she omits the entire last scene in which the disconcerted pearpicker notices that his basket of pears is missing, just as the three boys walk by him eating pears. G12 prefers to end her narrative with the pleasant image of the three boys helping the one who fell of his bicycle.

Another device found in all our narratives is much more widespread and more extreme in the Greek ones: interpretive naming. By calling the pears "the harvest," G12 invokes an entire "script" which casts the pearpicker as a farmer, and along with her use of the phrase "cultivating the Earth", calls up romantic connotations of agricultural life. The greater use of interpretive naming by Greeks can be seen in the fact that 11 of them refer to the pears as a word which attributes an occupation to him (i.e. "worker" or "farmer"), while only 3 Americans do this. Another instance of interpretive naming in G12's narrative is her use of the term "friends" to describe the three boys who appear and help the fallen boy.

Finally, G12 discussed the pearpicker's attitude toward his work as if it had been known to her, and she concerned herself continually with the film's message, observing, for example, that the whole scene serves an additional purpose of showing "how children love each other." Similarly, her use of the adjective "beautiful" to describe the scene in which the boy gives the others pears, constitutes a judgment about its meaning.

A survey of how the other narratives dealt with the exchange-of-pears scene will further illustrate the differences in the two sets of narratives. S5 was typical of the Americans: "And then the boy with the pears gives the boy who just gave him his hat three pears to divide among his friends." Thus S8 related rather precisely the events which she saw in the film. We have already seen how G12 evaluated the exchange, calling it "lovely." Another Greek subject, G10, rather typically, reported the scene this way: "and then (he) thanked them." G10 did not describe the action at all, but substituted her interpretation of its significance for the action. Twice
As many Americans as Greeks (12 as opposed to 6) reported the exchange of pears without comment. In contrast, 7 Greeks (and only 2 Americans) said that the boy gave the pears in order to thank the other boys for helping him, excluding G12 who called the scene "lie" and another Greek who called the pears "a gift." It seems safe to assume that any of our speakers, if asked, would have said that the boy gave the pears as a gesture of thanks. However, the Greeks more often chose to make that interpretation overt.

Another scene which gives rise to strikingly different verbalizations is the one in which the boy falls off his bicycle. Although the cause of the fall is not made clear in the film, most of our speakers impute causality in their narratives. However, regardless of the way in which they perceived that causality, most of the Americans (13) mentioned all the elements which appeared in that scene: that the boy saw a girl, that he lost his hat, and that his bike hit a rock. The other 7 Americans mentioned two of these. The Greeks, on the other hand, tended to mention only those elements which they used in their interpretation of why the boy fell. Only 4 Greeks mentioned all three elements, and 9 of them mentioned only one.

The way in which Greeks commit themselves more fully to an interpretation can be seen, moreover, in their discussions of this scene. While the film shows the boy passing a girl on a bike, 4 Greeks and no Americans said that "the bikes collided. Two Americans commented: (56) "and you think 'up' you know 'are they going to collide,' " and (524) "and you wonder if there's going to be a collision. But instead they just kind of brush by each other." Again we see a pattern in which Greeks and Americans had similar expectations about events, but these expectations were realized in more extreme form in the Greek narratives.

Interpretation in the Greek narratives became "romantic" in the narrative quoted above. At times this process advanced to the point of philosophicalizing. G16 commented at length about what she perceived as "conflicts" in the film, and G11 went on at even greater length about the many "falls" in the film and related this to her own pessimistic philosophy of life. No American commented in this way, and it seems safe to predict that such philosophicalizing would not have appeared very strange to the American interviewers; G11's reverie does to Americans, observers.

In asking why the Greek and American narratives based on the pears-picking film differ in the ways discussed, we must consider a range of possible influencing factors. For one thing, the situations in which the stories were elicited might have had different social meanings for members of the two cultures. We may safely assume that being the subject of an experiment is an identifiable activity for undergraduates at the University of California, Berkeley, while no such assumption can be made for Greek students at the Hellenic American Union, since psychology, as conceived in American social science, does not exist as a discipline even at the Greek university. Moreover, the question, "What happened in the movie?" though translated from English to Greek, cannot be considered "identical," as the pragmatic effect of these similar words might be very different when spoken in the two languages. Differing definitions of the task at hand must necessarily create different verbal strategies, especially in an "interview" situation in which the speaker is trying to satisfy his own perceptions as the requirements of the questioner.

Telling about a movie, however, is a practice that all modern city dwellers engage in under a variety of social circumstances. Thus expectations about how this speech activity is done must have influenced the narratives in our study as well. As the popular culture critic Michael Arlen (1974) points out, Americans are media-wise and pride themselves on "an assertively cynical savviness" about behind-the-scenes machinations of movies and TV. There is no evidence that such media-sophistication is valued in Greece. Some insight into the respective modes of talking about films, as well as into the Greek penchant for vocabulary and sentiments that sound "romantic" to Americans, may be seen in the following excerpts from movie reviews in Greek and American newspapers. Commenting on the same film, Sergei Eisenstein's "Strike," the two accounts begin similarly but develop rather differently:

From his first film "The Strike," he developed new principles for building up dramatic action, enhanced the cinema language, and pioneered expressive potentials in sharp cutting and foreshortening. Nowhere is the force of his images felt as remarkably as in his "Ten Days that Shook the World."


Even in his first film, Sergei Michelovich Eisenstein showed the full maturity of his art, which is at the same time political act and poetry. ...Today... we see again with admiration Eisenstein's images, clear and hard as diamonds, juxtaposed and organized rhythmically in a bursting optical poem, the poem of the betrayed people, who will triumph in the end.

--G. Bakoyiannopoulos, Kathimerini, Apr. 8, 1975, p. 2.

While the American reviewer uses cinematic jargon and discusses Eisenstein's technical accomplishments, the Greek reviewer uses non-specific "poetic" language and makes broad statements of general praise. Certainly repeated exposure to such standardized forms of rhetoric must influence members of a culture.

In an attempt to understand the bases of such contrasting rhetorical conventions, we must consider a number of recent studies: first, Basil Bernstein's (1970) controversial and misused hypothesis about "universalistic" vs. "particularistic" meaning and "elaborated" vs. "restricted" codes -- the latter being a form of speech which does not make contextualization overt. This dichotomy is better explained in the work of Goody and Watt (1962) and David Olson (1976) on the contrast between oral and literate culture. When Greeks do not mention that they are talking about a film, they exhibit a lack of overt contextualization, which is associated with the rhetoric of oral culture. To the extent that Americans are preoccupied with
accuracy of detail and role memory, they are adhering to the rhetoric of literate culture. This is not to say that modern Greeks are illiterate. Literate culture does not replace oral culture in any society but rather is superimposed upon it. As Goody (1977) points out, literate culture becomes associated with formal education, "for schools inevitably place an emphasis on the 'unnatural,' 'unoral,' 'decontextualized' processes of repetition, copying, and mnemonic memory" (p. 22). There exists then a "gap between the public literate tradition of the school, and the very different and indeed often directly contradictory private oral tradition of the family and peer group" (Goody & Watt, p. 342). It is easy to postulate, then, that the Greeks, as a result of their cultural and historical development, have conventionalized forms and strategies associated with the oral tradition of the family and peer group, while, as Cook-Gumperz and Gumperz (1977) point out, American and perhaps other Western European societies have conventionalized literate rhetorical strategies for oral use in many public situations.

The foregoing hypothesis postulates no differences in underlying cognitive processes but in estimations of appropriate forms. This approach is in keeping with Bruner's (1978) analysis, explained in a review of a recently released study conducted in 1932 by the Russian psychologist Alexander Luria. Examining differences in cognitive style between illiterate and collectivized (i.e. educated) peasants, Luria indicated that his illiterate subjects employed functional and concrete reasoning rather than abstraction. Bruner notes, however, that the peasants' reasoning, though different, is abstract in its own way, and he observes, "Most of what has emerged from studies of Africans, Eskimos, Aborigines, and other groups shows that the same basic mental functions are present in adults of any culture, but that differs is the deployment of these functions: what is considered an appropriate strategy suited to the situation and task" (p. 88).

This is substantially the conclusion of Cole & Scribner (1978), who assert, "We are unlikely to find cultural differences in basic component cognitive processes" (p. 193) but rather in "functional cognitive systems, which may vary with cultural variations" (p. 194). Yet again, Eisman (1973) concluded that while people from different cultures exhibit the same facial expressions in association with specific emotions, they differ with respect to "display rules," that is, whether they deem it fitting to allow others to witness those facial expressions.

The present study, then, contributes to an understanding of cultural differences which, although they probably do not represent differences in cognitive style, nonetheless constitute real differences in habitual ways of talking which consequently create impressions on listeners—favorable impressions, no doubt, on listeners from the same culture, but possibly unfavorable or confused impressions on listeners from different cultures. It is easy to see how stereotypes may be created and maintained—so that, for example, Americans might develop the idea that some Greeks are romantic and irrational, while Greeks might come to believe that Americans are cold and lacking in feelings. By locating the roots of potential misjudgments in conventionalized rhetorical styles, we may contribute—just a bit—to improved understanding between members of differing cultural backgrounds.

Notes
Research for the present study was funded, in part, by NIMH Grant 25592 to Wallace Chafe. I am grateful, too, to the University of California for a travel grant which contributed to my fare to Greece, and to Bruce Houston for making available to me the students and facilities of the Hellenic American Union in Athens. Thanks are earnestly offered, finally, for helpful comments from Charles Fillmore, and for the unfailing guidance of Wallace Chafe and John Gumperz. A more detailed analysis of these data from the point of Gumperz. A more detailed analysis of these data from the point of Gumperz. A more detailed analysis of these data from the point of Gumperz. A more detailed analysis of these data from the point of Gumperz. A more detailed analysis of these data from the point of Gumperz.

1. The "plot" of the film can be gleaned by reading the American narrative which is transcribed presently.
2. I'm indebted for this term to Charlotte Linde who attributes it to Alton Becker.
3. The "S" before the number refers to a "subject number" of American narratives, while Greek speakers are denoted by a "G" plus number.

The following transcription conventions are used:

- is a measurable pause, more than .1 second. Precise measurements have been made and are available.

- is a slight break in timing.

- indicates sentence-final intonation.

--- indicates clause-final intonation ("more to come")

- indicates lengthening of the preceding phoneme.

words in bold were spoken with heightened pitch or loudness.

--- indicates close transcriptions which are uncertain.

--- is, of course, a glottal stop.

4. The Americans, however, reveal their ethnic consciousness. Whereas only one Greek speaker assigned ethnic identity to the people in the film, calling all of them "Mexican," fully half of our American speakers attributed ethnic identity to the pearpicker, calling him "sort of Latin looking" or "of Spanish or Mexican descent," etc. This is not surprising, considering the appearance of the actor who played the role (although it was unforeseen), together with the expectations of Californians about fruitpicking. It is interesting that the one Greek who picked up on the man's appearance extended this impression to include all the characters rather than noting that the children looked rather "Yankee."

References
Appositive Relatives in Discourse

Emily Yarnall
University of Southern California

Much recent work in syntax, especially on the development of
syntax from discourse strategies, has been concerned with rela-
tive clauses. In this study I was concerned with a sub-type of
relative clause in English, the Appositive Relative (AR), more
usually known as the non-restrictive relative. Keenan and
Comrie (1977) in their work on universals of relative clauses
have defined a hierarchy of ease of relativization for the NPs
within the relativized clause. Their cross-linguistic defini-
tion of RC, however, is necessarily a semantic one and excludes
AR from consideration. Keenan (1975) tested the accessibility
hierarchy (AH) by looking at the actual frequency of relativiz-
ation on Subjects, Direct Objects, Oblique NPs, etc. in written
English. I was interested in whether the same distribution would
be found for AR.

Loetscher (for English) and Sankoff and Brown (New Guinea
Tok Pisin) have given some semantic characterization of the
type of information appearing in appositive relatives.
Sankoff and Brown's work (1976) suggests different discourse
functions for NPs which might correspond to AR and RR in English.
I was also interested, then, in whether ARs were used differently
in the discourse than RR as evidenced by the point of embedding
to the higher sentence, as well as whether they encoded discourse-
new information.

Syntactic models have generally tried to capture the differ-
ence between AR and RR by suggesting in various ways a looser
connection between the main S and AR. Work on subordination
and coordination predicts that tightly subordinated structures
are more 'difficult' (in a sense to be discussed below) or more
'linguistically complex.' This would seem to predict, counter-
intuitively, that AR should be the simpler or 'easier' structure.
I hope to make two points, one, that AR are 'difficult'
structures, and two, that their use in discourse modifying defi-
nite but not identified NPs is evidence of the strength of the
rule of conversation which demands that information sufficient
to identify new referents be provided immediately.

"Difficulty"
The work on syntacticization from discourse strategies gives
diachronic evidence of subordinate structures developing after
coordinate structure (Sankoff for Tok Pisin, Justus' work on
development of restrictive form embedded relatives in Hititite).
Defining and documenting the conditions under which subordi-
nation and coordination are used has been a central problem for
many researchers. Psycholinguistic evidence, experiential and