International recognition and support for violence among nonpartisans[*]

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Abstract

What reduces individual support for the use of violence in self-determination conflicts? We assess the impact of a new variable, international recognition, on popular support for the use of violence using a survey experiment centered around the 2012 UNGA recognition of Palestine as a state. We find that international recognition significantly reduces popular support for violence among nonpartisans, who constitute a plurality of the Palestinian population. We argue that international recognition shifts the payoffs associated with the use of violent and non-violent strategies by self-determination movements, and that nonpartisans, who tend to have more fluid political opinions, are particularly sensitive to these shifts. This is the first article to demonstrate that international diplomatic engagement can reduce popular support for violence in the case of an ongoing conflict. This is important because most previously identified determinants of support for violence are either very difficult to change or change very slowly.

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Introduction

What reduces individual support for the use of violence in self-determination conflicts? The answer to this question matters for at least two reasons. First, at a minimum, militant groups require the tacit support of at least some individuals within a society. Without this support, militant groups may lack access to food, shelter, hiding places, information or other resources, threatening their ability to sustain violence and even their survival. To paraphrase Mao Zedong, 'guerrillas must move among the people as the fish swim in the sea. The fish cannot survive without a sea to support it.' Second, changes in popular support for the use of violence may also shape the negotiating behavior of militant groups. When popular support for the use of violence increases, leaders may face popular pressure to abandon negotiations or not enter them in the first place. When popular support for the use of violence decreases, leaders may become more willing to accept the political risks of negotiation.

This article assesses the impact of a new variable - international recognition - on popular support for the use of violence. International recognition is one of the primary political goals of self-determination movements and is also sometimes pursued by militant groups seeking control of the central state (Krasner, 1999; Coggins, 2011). Because international recognition is a key goal of these political actors, and because international recognition can shift the payoffs associated with using violent or non-violent strategies for achieving self-determination, international recognition can shape mass attitudes towards the use of violence during conflict.

Our main argument is that, in self-determination conflicts, international recognition reduces support for violence among nonpartisans - that is, among individuals who do not identify with any political party. We argue that international recognition reduces support for the use of violence among nonpartisans because it shifts the payoffs associated with the use of violent and non-violent strategies for achieving national political goals. International recognition can shape the payoffs associated with different strategies for achieving self-determination in at least two ways. First, because international recognition is in and of itself the outcome of a non-violent strategy

of diplomacy, international recognition is likely to increase the perceived efficacy of non-violent strategies. Second, international recognition also increases the bargaining power of the recognized group (Shelef and Zeira, 2017) , thereby increasing the payoffs associated with a non-violent strategy of negotiation. Nonpartisans are especially sensitive to shifts in the payoffs associated with different strategies of conflict because they are not committed to any political party and its strategy for achieving national political goals. In other words, nonpartisans are uncommitted to either the non-violent strategies espoused by moderate parties or the violent strategies espoused by more radical parties.

We test this argument using a survey experiment centered around the United Nations General Assembly's (UNGA) recognition of Palestine as a "non-member observer state." The international recognition of Palestine by the UNGA offers a rare opportunity to examine the impact of international recognition on popular support for the use of violence in the context of an ongoing, violent conflict. This case also offers a relatively hard test since UNGA recognition is a weaker form of international recognition than that awarded by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). We return to this question and the issue of generalizability in the conclusion.

This article makes two main contributions. First, it introduces a novel international-level variable into scholarship on the determinants of public opinion towards the use of violence. Existing literature on this question has identified a number of important determinants of support for violence including individual characteristics such as gender, socioeconomic status, birth cohort, religious identity and piety, personal history and experiences, and attitudes towards the future, as well as the behavior of the other side in the conflict (see, e.g., Tessler and Nachtwey, 1998; Nachtwey and Tessler, 2002; Shamir and Shikaki, 2002; Krueger and Malečková, 2003; Victoroff, 2005; Shikaki, 2006; Fair et al., 2012; Longo et al., 2014; Jaeger et al., 2011). Our finding that international recognition reduces popular support for the use of violence among nonpartisans builds on this work and suggests that international factors - specifically, international recognition - can also shape mass attitudes towards the use of violence. This is important because many of the factors previously found to shape popular support for the use of violence are either very difficult to change or change very

slowly. In comparison, international recognition provides policy-makers with a potential policy instrument with which to shape public attitudes during conflict.

Second, this paper integrates well-established insights about the role of "swing," "undecided," and "nonpartisan" voters from electoral studies into conflict studies to offer a novel perspective on conflict dynamics. This literature shows that the strength of identification with political parties varies across the population and that nonpartisans - those who do not identify with any political party - tend to be have more fluid political opinions than partisans (Converse, 2006; Campbell, 2008; Zaller, 1992; Druckman and Leeper, 2012; Taber and Lodge, 2006; Weghorst and Lindberg, 2013; Martin, 2004; Kosmidis and Xezonakis, 2010). We apply this logic to explain changes in individual support for violence within the context of an ongoing, national self-determination conflict. We argue that, much like "swing" or "undecided" voters in an electoral context, nonpartisans in a conflict context are less committed to a particular party's strategy for achieving national political goals. As a result, they are more open to changing their attitudes towards the use of violent strategies in response to external shocks, such as international recognition. Such shifts in opinion among nonpartisans are consequential because, outside of the U.S., nonpartisans frequently account for a substantial segment of the population (Lupu, 2013, 2015b; Carreras et al., 2015). Indeed, in the Palestinian context, nonpartisans represent a plurality of the population.

This study also has implications for the growing literature that analyzes the internal political dynamics of movements and groups engaged in civil conflict. As this research has pointed out, such movements are rarely unitary. Rather, they are usually made up of multiple, rival factions which compete with each other for leadership of the movement (Kydd and Walter, 2002; Pearlman, 2009; Christia, 2012; Cunningham et al., 2012; Staniland, 2012; Krause, 2014). Since nonpartisans are by definition not affiliated with any faction and because different factions within a movement compete with each other for the support of these as yet "unaffiliated" individuals, changes in nonpartisans' attitudes could shape both the strategies these factions choose and the wider domestic political contest.

The argument

Our main argument is that international recognition reduces popular support for violence among nonpartisans by shifting the payoffs associated with using violent and non-violent strategies to achieve national political goals. International recognition increases the payoffs associated with using non-violent strategies such as diplomacy and negotiation, thereby reducing support for violent strategies. We expect nonpartisans to be particularly sensitive to shifts in the payoffs associated with non-violent strategies because they are not committed to a particular political party and its strategy for achieving national political goals. Thus, consistent with a large body of work in electoral politics and political psychology, they are more likely to be influenced by external political events and forces than partisans.

International recognition can shift the payoffs associated with different strategies for achieving political goals in at least two, closely related, ways. First, international recognition can increase the payoffs associated with non-violent strategies by increasing their perceived efficacy. International recognition can increase the perceived efficacy of non-violent strategies because it is, in and of itself, the outcome of diplomacy and international engagement. Put simply, the achievement of international recognition shows that 'diplomacy works.' This increase in the perceived efficacy of non-violent strategies should, in turn, lead to greater popular support for these strategies (Tucker, 2007; McAdam, 2010). Prominent work on the Palestinian case has also found a strong and robust association between individual attitudes about the perceived efficacy of violent and nonviolent strategies and popular support for violence (e.g., Shikaki, 2006; Shamir and Shikaki, 2010).

Second, international recognition could also increase the payoffs associated with a non-violent strategy based on negotiations by increasing the bargaining power of the recognized group. As Shelef and Zeira (2017) have argued, international recognition is likely to strengthen the bargaining position of the recognized group by providing the group with new outside options to negotiation such as accessing international institutions (e.g., the International Criminal Court). International recognition is also likely to strengthen the bargaining position of the recognized group by giving

them "something for nothing"; that is, international recognition gives groups seeking international recognition one of their cardinal goals without requiring that they make any concessions to their opponent. As a result of this improved bargaining position, any negotiated settlement that is struck between the group and their opponent is likely to be more attractive to group members than it would have been otherwise. As a negotiated settlement becomes more attractive, in turn, group members should become less likely to support violence because it may undermine the possibility of reaching this newly more attractive settlement.

In sum, there are good reasons to expect that international recognition would reduce support for violence by increasing the payoffs associated with nonviolent strategies and making them more attractive. However, it is also likely that the impact of international recognition varies with individuals' prior attitudes towards the use of violence. In the next section, we suggest that partisanship is a key source of such attitudes in many conflict contexts.

International recognition and support for violence among nonpartisans

International recognition is likely to have a greater impact on support for violence among nonpartisans, who, by definition, do not identify with any political party. As a large and influential body of research in electoral politics and political psychology demonstrates, nonpartisans tend to be more persuadable than partisans (Zaller, 1992; Lau and Redlawsk, 2001; Druckman et al., 2013; Bolsen et al., 2014; Leeper and Slothuus, 2014; Weghorst and Lindberg, 2013; Kosmidis and Xezonakis, 2010). Whether nonpartisans do not identify with a party because they hold weak political attitudes or the other way around, nonpartisans tend to have weaker, less consistent political preferences than partisans (Campbell, 1980; Converse, 2006; Lebo and Cassino, 2007). Particularly on issues on which political parties are polarized, nonpartisans are likely to hold less stable and well-formed attitudes. In addition, nonpartisans are also less likely to engage in "motivated reasoning" than partisans. Whereas partisans wish to preserve their existing attitudes on policy preferences shared with their party, non-partisans do not have a vested interest in defending these positions (Kunda, 1990; Taber and Lodge, 2006). As a result, when confronted with arguments or information that

are inconsistent with their beliefs, non-partisans are less likely to ignore or reject these communications (Taber and Lodge, 2006; Lodge and Taber, 2013; Druckman and Leeper, 2012). For both these reasons, nonpartisans are more likely to change their minds in response to external stimuli or events that offer new information than partisans.

In conflict settings, political parties are often polarized around the use of violence. Organized political divisions around the appropriateness of the use of violence to achieve national goals are a pervasive feature of self-determination movements (and many insurgent movements more broadly). Indeed, in cases ranging from the Irish Republican Army to the Zionist Irgun, organized political factions arose out of disagreement within the broader movement about the use of violence (Shelef, 2010; Krause, 2017). Similarly, among Palestinians, the two main parties, Fatah and Hamas, are divided over the use of violence to achieve national aims. In the last two decades, the Fatah party, while not eschewing violence completely, has been the party most closely associated with nonviolent strategies of negotiation and diplomacy in seeking the goal of an independent Palestinian state.[1] It spearheaded the 2011 Palestinian campaign for international recognition and access to international institutions. Its main rival, Hamas, is an Islamist nationalist party that is committed to using violence to achieve an independent Palestinian state (Sayigh, 1997; Mishal and Sela, 2000; Bröning, 2013).

When political parties are polarized around the use of violence, public opinion about the use of violence is also likely to be divided along party lines (see e.g., Levendusky, 2009). Supporters of moderate parties will tend to favor nonviolent strategies such as diplomacy and negotiation whereas supporters of more radical parties will prefer these parties' more militant approach. In contrast, nonpartisans - who do not identify with any political party - are likely to be uncommitted to either the nonviolent strategies espoused by moderate parties or the violent strategies espoused by more radical parties. Nonpartisans may be undecided about the merits of different strategies for achieving national goals advocated by the different parties and, therefore, choose not to support

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[1]Fatah, a secular nationalist party, is the ruling party within the Palestinian Authority. It has historically been the largest and most influential Palestinian faction.

any party. Similarly, they may be flexible about the use of violence - opposing violence when it is perceived to be ineffective, but supporting it when negotiation is not a viable alternative - causing them to have fluid party allegiances. Alternatively, nonpartisans may not identify with a party for other reasons and, because they are not loyal to any party, do not come to adopt a particular party's position towards the use of violence. In either case - that is, regardless of why nonpartisans fail to identify with a party - nonpartisans should be less committed to a particular party's strategy for achieving national goals than partisans.

As a result, with respect to their support for violence, nonpartisans are likely to be more persuadable than partisans. When external events suggest that "diplomacy works" or results in gains at the negotiating table, nonpartisans should reduce their support for violence. In contrast, partisans who already hold strong positions on the use of violence should maintain their position or, as a result of motivated reasoning, could even increase their support for violence. As a result, international recognition should reduce popular support for violence among nonpartisans in particular.

Partisans and nonpartisans in the Palestinian context

Nonpartisans are a significant part of the Palestinian political spectrum. Following Johnston (2006), the Arab Barometer surveys, and the quarterly public opinion polls conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) for nearly twenty years, we measure partisanship using a survey question asking respondents about their support for a list of all political parties competing in elections. We identify nonpartisans as those respondents who explicitly chose "None of the above" in response to a question asking "Which of the following political parties do you support?"[2]

In the Palestinian context, unlike in the U.S., nonpartisans constitute a plurality of the population. As Figure 1 shows, for the last decade, approximately 30% of the population has not

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[2]We exclude the ten respondents who identified with smaller, third parties in all subgroup analyses.

Figure 1: Percent nonpartisans among the Palestinians, 2000-2015

Source: PSR polls. Percent choosing "None of the above" to a question asking "Which of the following political parties do you support?"

identified with any single political party.[3] Keen observers of the Palestinian political scene have noted that Palestinians, especially the younger generation, appear more and more disengaged from the established political parties (Kuttab, 2014; Bligh, 2013; Brown and Nerenberg, 2016). As a result, we might expect the nonpartisan segment of the Palestinian population to increase in the future, making their role in Palestinian politics that much more important.

Are nonpartisans really in the middle when it comes to support for violence?

Our argument that international recognition reduces support for violence among nonpartisans is based on the assumption that nonpartisans are less committed to a particular strategy for achieving national self-determination than partisans. We evaluate the validity of this assumption in the Palestinian context by testing the following two hypotheses. First, nonpartisans should be significantly more supportive of the use of violence than Fatah partisans. Second, nonpartisans should be

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[3]The striking drop in the percentage of nonpartisans in 2006 corresponds to the timing of the last Palestinian elections, during which nonpartisans likely became mobilized and identified with a particular party in the short-term. This temporary move towards identification with a party is consistent with our argument about the movability of nonpartisans more generally.

significantly less supportive of the use of violence than Hamas partisans. In other words, nonpartisans should be "in the middle" of Fatah partisans and Hamas partisans in terms of their support for violence.

We test these hypotheses using external data from the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR).[4] We use data from PSR Poll Number 37 from September 2010, which is the most recent, publicly available survey to the fielding of our experiment that includes multiple measures of support for violence. This survey contains four measures of support for violence. The first two questions ask about support for a "return to the armed intifada and confrontations" and "armed confrontations", respectively. A third question asks about support for a particular armed attack on Israeli settlers conducted by Hamas and is thus similar to our survey question about support for violence against Israeli civilians outside Israel. The fourth question asks about support for armed attacks against Israeli civilians inside Israel. We combine the four survey questions into a single index of support for violence after validating this approach with factor analysis (*PSR Index*).[5]

Figure 2 presents the mean support for violence among Fatah partisans, nonpartisans, and Hamas partisans. Consistent with our assumptions, nonpartisans are "in the middle" when it comes to their support for violence. As seen in the figure, mean support for violence is 0.02 on the PSR Index or approximately equivalent to the median value of -0.01. Mean support for violence among Fatah partisans is -0.39, or 0.41 lower than among nonpartisans.[6] Conversely, mean support for

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[4]We obtain similar but less precise results when we use a smaller dataset of control group respondents in the survey experiment (n=109). See Figure A.4 in appendix. Note that we cannot use the full dataset (i.e., both the treatment and control groups) to test these assumptions because the support for violence variables are post-treatment variables that are presumably affected by the experimental treatment. As such, we cannot use them to examine initial (pre-treatment) differences in support between Fatah partisans, Hamas partisans, and nonpartisans.

[5]See appendix for results of factor analysis, as well as the text of all four PSR survey questions.

[6]A difference of 0.41 on the PSR Index is also equivalent to 0.41 standard deviations (SD's), since the standard error of the index variable is 1.

Figure 2: Support for Violence by Party Identification

Note: Mean support for violence with 95% confidence intervals shown. N=1270.

violence among Hamas partisans is 0.78, or 0.76 higher than among nonpartisans (i.e., 0.76 SD's). These differences between nonpartisans and Fatah and Hamas partisans are strongly statistically significant at the 99% confidence level, even after adjusting for multiple comparisons.[7]

These results have two main implications. First, the results are consistent with the assumption that nonpartisans are "in the middle" of Fatah partisans and Hamas partisans when it comes to their support for violence. This implies that, since nonpartisans are less committed to a particular strategy for achieving national goals, they are likely to be more sensitive to the shifts in payoffs to various strategies that occur as a result of international recognition.

Second, and more generally, the results also demonstrate that partisanship and attitudes towards the use of violence are strongly linked in the Palestinian context. Here, as in many conflict contexts, political parties are polarized around the use of violence, and public opinion towards its use is

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[7]See Table A.4 in appendix.

divided along party lines.

Study design

In the wake of the UNGA recognition of Palestine in November 2012, we conducted a survey experiment in thirty-two localities in the West Bank.[8] To ensure a representative sample, randomization was employed at every level of sample selection from the governorate to the individual respondent. Survey sampling was conducted using a multistage, stratified random sampling procedure. At each stage, the probability with which units were selected and the number of survey questionnaires assigned to a stratum were proportional to their population size.[9] The response rate for the survey experiment was 75.3%.[10]

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[8]This survey experiment was conducted as part of a larger study on the impact of international recognition on conflict attitudes, which also included a separate panel survey. For reasons beyond our control, the second wave of the panel study was fielded following intense fighting between Israel and Hamas. Because past periods of fighting have substantially increased popular support for violence (see, e.g., Arian, 1995; Gordon and Arian, 2001; Shikaki, 2006; Shamir and Shikaki, 2010; Berrebi and Klor, 2008), this timing limits the reliability of the panel survey data for assessing the impact of international recognition on support for violence. As such, we focus our analysis and discussion on the survey experimental data; we discuss how the context of the survey experiment may affect our findings in the conclusion.

[9]Governorates, localities, and enumeration areas within most localities were selected in this fashion. Enumeration areas within large Palestinian localities were selected using simple random sampling due to the lack of reliable population data below the city level. See appendix for a more detailed description of the sampling procedure.

[10]The response rate was calculated using AAPOR Response Rate 5.

The survey experiment was conducted among 226 Palestinian residents of the West Bank.[11] While this is a relatively small sample, we show below that the study nonetheless enjoys a high degree of both internal and external validity. Using randomization inference, we demonstrate that our results have high internal validity and are not simply due to the chance of random assignment in any particular experiment, which is a key concern facing smaller, lower-powered studies. Our survey also has a high degree of external validity because the sample closely approximates the Palestinian population (see Table A.1 in the Appendix).

Respondents were assigned to two experimental conditions: a treatment group and a control group. The experimental treatment consisted of a news article about the UNGA recognition of Palestine that was based on real news articles appearing in the Palestinian and Arabic language press after the decision (see Figure 3). Following standard procedure in survey experiments, respondents assigned to the control condition received a neutral news article about sports programs for Palestinian youth, which we carefully chose for its non-political content (see Figure 4). Verifying that the treatment worked as intended, a manipulation check showed that respondents randomly assigned to the treatment group evaluated Palestine's status in the world more positively than respondents randomly assigned to the control group (see figure A.2 in the appendix).

Individuals were assigned to either the treatment or control condition using blocked randomization. Blocking the sample prior to randomization offers an improvement over simple randomization by ensuring that covariates are balanced across the experimental conditions (Moore, 2010). Respondents in our survey experiment were placed into one of twelve blocks based on their gender, refugee status and level of education, helping to ensure balance on these predictors of attitudes towards violence.[12] Blocking was done using the coarsened exact matching procedure described in Iacus et al. (2012). Table 1 presents the results of a balance test comparing treatment and control

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[11]Surveys were conducted in the West Bank only due to the ongoing closure of the Gaza Strip and historically low survey response rates in East Jerusalem.

[12]Level of education was measured as a three-level categorical variable: (1) illiterate, elementary or primary; (2) secondary; and (3) college diploma or higher.

Figure 3: Experimental Treatment (English translation)

Wave II Treatment

Palestine wins
UN welcomes State of Palestine

UNITED NATIONS (Al-Quds) -- The United Nations General Assembly has voted to recognise a Palestinian state.

The vote, which was taken at a meeting of the 193-member body in New York on Thursday, represents a long-sought diplomatic triumph for the Palestinians.

The United Nations' decision recognizes Palestine as a state in the West Bank, East Jerusalem and Gaza Strip. It allows Palestine to sign international treaties and join a number of United Nations agencies, as well as the International Criminal Court.

In his speech to the General Assembly, Abbas called on the United Nations "to issue a birth certificate of the reality of the State of Palestine."

The United Nations General Assembly voting

groups on these covariates and other key covariates of interest.[13]

Table 1 indicates that the treatment and control groups are balanced with respect to nine key, pre-treatment covariates. These include the blocking variables mentioned earlier (gender, refugee status, and level of education), as well as age, household income, partisanship, party identification, political knowledge and political interest. The treatment and control groups are not significantly different on any of these nine covariates, indicating a high degree of balance. Importantly, the treatment and control groups are well balanced with respect to partisanship, indicating that the results are not due to preexisting differences in partisanship across the treatment and control groups.

The treatment and control groups are also well balanced within the nonpartisan subgroup in our

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[13]Following Iacus et al. (2012), we compare balance between groups using the original survey measures rather than the coarsened variables used for blocking. Education is measured as a 7 level ordinal variable ranging from "illiterate" to "M.A. or higher." Household income is measured on a 10-point scale ranging from 1-500 NIS to 4501-5000 NIS. News consumption is measured as a 5 level ordinal variable ranging from "never" to "everyday or almost every day." Political interest is measured as a 3 level ordinal variable ranging from "not interested" to "very interested" in politics.

Figure 4: Control condition (English translation)

Basketball schools training future teams

RAMALLAH (Al-Quds) -- Basketball schools play an important role in training future players, coach Samir Issa said Monday.

Samir teaches at a basketball school in Ramallah. Set up a year ago, it has attracted dozens of children aged 7 - 12 who are already playing against local teams.

The school's focus is on teaching children modern basketball techniques, Samir told Al-Quds.

Training children in basketball schools is in the interest of future teams, he added.

sample (see Table 2). Checking for balance within the nonpartisan subgroup is important because, while the international recognition treatment was randomized, partisanship was not. Thus, within the non-partisan sample, the treatment and control group could potentially differ from each other in ways that could bias the results. For example, if the nonpartisans that received the treatment were older and therefore less likely to support violence than the nonpartisans that received the control condition, then the treatment may appear to reduce support for violence among nonpartisans, when in fact the result is due to the confounding effect of age. As Table 2 shows, however, our treatment and control groups are also nicely balanced within the nonpartisan sample, indicating that the effect of the treatment is not due to the characteristics of nonpartisans.

In the following analyses, we thus report the results of simple, difference-in-means comparisons across the treatment and control groups without adjusting for imbalanced covariates. Our main results are also robust to conducting an OLS regression analysis controlling for party identification, on which we find substantively meaningful but statistically insignificant differences across

Table 1: Balance Across Treatment and Control Groups

	Treatment	Control	Treatment - Control (SE)	p-value
Proportion Male	0.50	0.44	0.06 (0.07)	0.41
Proportion Refugee	0.25	0.18	0.06 (0.05)	0.24
Education	3.62	3.72	-0.10 (0.18)	0.58
Age in years	41.08	39.28	1.79 (2.03)	0.38
Household Income	4.30	4.21	0.09 (0.28)	0.76
Proportion Partisan	0.56	0.56	0.00 (0.07)	0.95
Proportion Fatah	0.33	0.43	-0.10 (0.06)	0.13
Political Interest	1.13	1.08	0.05 (0.10)	0.66
News Consumption	3.29	3.30	-0.00 (0.15)	0.98
Observations	117	109		

the treatment and control groups in the full sample (see Table A.7 in the appendix).[14]

We collected information on popular support for violence using three measures, which were based on the recurring surveys conducted by PSR in the Palestinian context. The first is a general measure of support for violence and is based on the following survey question: "To what extent would you support or oppose a return to violent resistance to achieve Palestinian rights?" (Completely support, somewhat support, neither support nor oppose, somewhat oppose, completely oppose, can't choose/don't know). The second two measures are specific measures of support for violence against Israelis civilians that differ by location. The first question asks about support for

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[14]Although there were no statistically significant differences across the treatment and control groups, the treatment group by chance included fewer Fatah supporters than the control group (33% versus 43%). This difference should make it more difficult for us to find that the treatment reduced support for violence because Fatah supporters generally exhibit lower support for violence. Nonetheless, we control for identification with the Fatah party in a robustness check reported in the appendix.

Table 2: Balance Across Treatment and Control Groups among Nonpartisans

	Treatment	Control	Treatment - Control (SE)	p-value
Proportion Male	0.47	0.44	0.03 (0.10)	0.74
Proportion Refugee	0.24	0.19	0.05 (0.08)	0.57
Education	3.63	3.75	-0.12 (0.29)	0.68
Age in years	40.01	38.96	1.12 (3.22)	0.73
Household Income	4.06	4.17	-0.11 (0.42)	0.79
Political Interest	0.90	0.87	0.03 (0.15)	0.85
News Consumption	2.84	3.06	-0.22 (0.25)	0.38
Observations	48	51		

armed attacks against Israeli civilians inside Israel, while the second question asks about support for armed attacks against Israeli civilians outside Israel (see appendix for full survey questionnaire).

We combine all three measures into a single index of support for violence ("SZ Index"). We choose to use an index measure for two reasons. First, an index measure is generally less "noisy" than any of its individual components. This improves the precision of statistical estimates, which is important given our relatively small sample size. Second, factor analysis reveals that the multiple measures load onto a single factor and therefore reflect a single underlying concept of support for violence. Our factor analysis yields a Cronbach's alpha of 0.74, which is above the 0.70 threshold used by most scholars to determine whether an index is valid (see Section A.5 in appendix).

Finally, the survey also included questions on attitudes towards international law and norms and the other alternative explanations evaluated below. See the appendix for the complete survey questionnaire (treatment questionnaire shown).

International Recognition and Support for Violence

We now turn to examining the effect of international recognition on popular support for the the use of violence using this index.[15] The main independent variable in our analysis is a binary indicator of assignment to treatment ("Treatment"). The main moderating (i.e., conditioning) variable in the analysis, partisanship, is also a binary measure of whether or not a respondent identifies with any political party.

Figure 5 presents the results of difference in means tests comparing support for violence across the treatment and control groups among all respondents, partisans, and nonpartisans, respectively.[16] As seen in the figure, we do not find an average treatment effect of international recognition on support for violence. Although average support for violence is slightly lower in the treatment group than in the control group, this difference is small and far from statistically significant.

Figure 5: The effect of international recognition on support for violence by partisanship

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
[15]See Figure A.3 for distribution of index.

[16]See Table A.5 in the appendix for results in tabular form.

However, Figure 5 shows that international recognition substantially reduces support for violence among nonpartisans. Among nonpartisans, international recognition decreases support for the use of violence by 0.45 on our index of support for violence (p=0.04). At nearly 0.5 standard deviations (SD's), this is a substantively large effect. To help put this effect into perspective, the effect of international recognition on support for violence among nonpartisans is larger than the effect of the endorsement cue among the poor identified by Blair et al.'s (2013) recent study of support for militancy in Pakistan (0.20 SD's). It is also larger than the effects of birth cohort (0.05 SD's), gender (0.10 SD's) and education (0.20 SD's) found by Jaeger et al.'s (2011) study of support for moderation in the Palestinian case.

These results demonstrate that international recognition reduces popular support for the use of violence among nonpartisans, who, we argue, are relatively less committed to a particular political party and its preferred strategy for achieving political goals. This effect is robust to controlling for: (1) the method of randomization by including strata dummies, as recommended by Bruhn and McKenzie (2009); (2) support for the ruling Fatah party; and (3) other potential differences across groups that may have arisen during survey sampling. It is also generally consistent with the results using the three individual measures used to construct our index in place of the aggregate index measure.[17]

Finally, these results are also robust to the use of randomization inference to assess the internal validity of findings from small studies (Gerber and Green, 2012; Keele et al., 2012). An important concern about smaller, lower-powered studies like ours is that they may provide inflated estimates of effect sizes. When such studies detect statistically significant effects, they may do so because, due to the chance of random assignment within any particular experiment, they find an effect that happens to be large. For example, if the true effect is small in size - and therefore requires a large study with high statistical power in order to detect it - only those small studies that by chance over-estimate the magnitude of this effect will find a statistically significant effect. This tendency for small studies that find statistically significant effects to suffer from inflated estimates of these

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[17]See Sections A.1 and A.7 in the appendix.

effects is sometimes referred to as "the winner's curse" (Button et al., 2013).

Figure 6: The results of randomization inference

Note: Bold, vertical line indicates ATE across all simulations.
Bold, horizontal line indicates the 95% confidence interval.

We address this challenge using randomization inference. Randomization inference involves simulating all possible random assignments of the data into treatment and control groups (i.e., dividing the sample into every possible combination of treatment and control groups) and calculating the treatment effect for all simulated random assignments. In other words, it simulates conducting the experiment many times over on the same sample (Gerber and Green, 2012). By comparing the results from this procedure with our original results, we are able to assess the certainty with which our results are due to the treatment (i.e., international recognition) or to chance (i.e., the particular

random assignment of the data in our particular experiment) (Keele et al., 2012).[18]

Figure 6 displays the results of randomization inference.[19] It shows that over 95% of simulated random assignments produced a negative and statistically significant treatment effect of international recognition among non-partisans. Across all simulated random assignments, the average treatment effect among nonpartisans was -0.45 ($p < 0.05$) - virtually identical to our original estimate. Thus, the effect of international recognition does not appear to be inflated due to the relatively small sample size of the study.

Alternative Explanations

We have shown that international recognition reduces support for violence among nonpartisans and argued that this is because, being less committed to a particular strategy for national self-determination, nonpartisans are more sensitive to shifts in the payoffs associated with different strategies. However, these patterns could also arise from other differences between partisans and nonpartisans, such as their political knowledge and interest.

Political knowledge and interest may account for the impact of international recognition on support for violence among nonpartisans because many scholars believe that nonpartisans tend to be less informed about and interested in politics than partisans (Albright, 2009; Lupu, 2015a),[20] and because priming may have a stronger effect among less informed individuals. Less informed individuals may have less well-formed attitudes or process new information less critically, making

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[18]Another advantage of randomization inference is that it does not rely on the distributional assumptions made by other statistical tests, which may not hold for small samples (Gerber and Green, 2012, 65).

[19]Randomization inference conducted using the R package "ri." As recommended by Gerber and Green (2012, 114), we conduct the simulated randomizations within the blocks created by our blocked randomized design.

[20]For a contrasting perspective, see Dalton (2013).

them more susceptible to priming (Converse, 2006; Markus and Converse, 1979; Zaller, 1992). Less informed individuals could also be more susceptible to priming because they have not yet been exposed to the information contained in any given prime and thus have not yet internalized it as a "consideration" shaping their political attitudes (Zaller, 1992). In other words, the prime may be more novel to less informed individuals and thus have a greater impact on their attitudes. For all of these reasons, the international recognition treatment could have a stronger impact among less informed individuals. If Palestinian nonpartisans are less informed (as are nonpartisans in many other contexts), this lack of information may then provide an alternative explanation for the impact of international recognition among this group.

We assess this alternative explanation in two ways. First, we consider whether Palestinian nonpartisans are indeed less politically informed or interested than partisans. Second, we examine whether international recognition reduces support for violence among less informed individuals in particular. If Palestinian partisans are less politically informed and international recognition reduces support for violence among the less informed, then differences in political knowledge may explain the differential impact of recognition among nonpartisans. On the other hand, if either of these two conditions are not met, we can reject this alternative explanation.

Figure 7 displays the mean level of political knowledge and political interest among partisans and nonpartisans.[21] Consistent with findings in other contexts, it shows that nonpartisans are substantially less informed about, and less interested in, politics than partisans. These differences between nonpartisans and partisans are both statistically significant at the 99% confidence level.[22]

However, these differences in political knowledge and interest do *not* appear to explain the

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[21]Political knowledge is measured using a five-point scale of frequency of media consumption. Political interest is measured as a three-point scale of self-reported interest in politics. The text of both survey questions is adapted from similar questions in the Arab Barometer surveys and is included in the appendix.

[22]See Table A.6 for results of difference-in-means tests comparing nonpartisans and partisans on these dimensions.

Figure 7: Political knowledge and interest among partisans and nonpartisans



Note: 95% confidence intervals shown.

differential impact of international recognition on nonpartisans. Figure 8 presents the result of difference in means tests comparing support for violence across the treatment and control groups among all respondents, politically knowledgeable respondents, and non-knowledgeable respondents.[23] If international recognition reduces support for violence among nonpartisans because they are less knowledgable about politics, then we should observe that international recognition also reduces support for violence among less politically knowledgeable respondents.

Consistent with our argument and contrary to this alternative explanation, Figure 8 shows that international recognition is associated with an *increase* in support for violence among less knowledgeable respondents. Among respondents who were less knowledgeable about politics, support for violence was higher in the international recognition treatment group than in the control group although this difference was not statistically significant. In other words, the effect of international

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[23]For ease of interpretation, we dichotomize political knowledge into a binary variable, where 'more knowledgeable' is at the median or above and 'less knowledgeable' is below the median.

recognition among less politically knowledgeable respondents runs in the opposite direction than its effect among nonpartisans. Thus, while Palestinian nonpartisans may be less knowledgable about politics than partisans, this does not seem to explain why international recognition reduces their support for violence.

Figure 8: The effect of international recognition on support for violence by political knowledge

Similarly, we also do not find evidence that international recognition significantly reduces support for violence among respondents who are less *interested* in politics. Figure 9 presents the result of difference in means tests comparing support for violence across the treatment and control groups among all respondents, politically interested respondents, and non-interested respondents.[24] As the figure shows, we find a null effect of similar magnitude among both more interested and less interested respondents. Overall, these results suggest that, although nonpartisans are indeed less knowledgeable and interested in politics than partisans, these differences do not explain why they are differentially affected by international recognition.

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[24]As for political knowledge, we dichotomize political interest into a binary variable, where 'more interested' is at the median or above and 'less interested' is below the median.

Figure 9: The effect of international recognition on support for violence by political interest

A second possible explanation for our findings is the diffusion of international norms about the use of force to the Palestinian mass public. According to this alternative explanation, international recognition of statehood may signal changing norms among political leaders about the legitimacy of using violence, and nonpartisans may be especially sensitive to these cues because, as we argue earlier, they are "in the middle" in terms of their support for violence.

A significant literature suggests that states join treaties and international organizations to signal that they accept the international norms promoted by those treaties and organizations or, alternatively, to signal their higher international status (Downs et al., 1996; Pevehouse, 2005; Hawkins, 1997; Towns, 2012; Hafner-Burton et al., 2013). By acceding to treaties or international organizations, leaders also signal to domestic political forces that they endorse the norms behind these treaties (Thomas, 2001). As such, the Palestinian application for UNGA recognition may have sent a signal to the Palestinian public that their leadership supports, and will abide by, international norms about the use of violence. This signal may have a more pronounced impact on nonpartisans because, as we argue earlier, nonpartisans are less committed to the use of violence to achieve

national goals. As a result, they may be especially sensitive to signals from national leaders about the legitimacy of using violence.

We investigate this possibility by testing the effect of international recognition on acceptance of international norms about the use of violence and whether this effect varies by partisanship. We proxy acceptance of international norms about the use of violence using a survey question that asked respondents about their acceptance of international law in general. The question asked: "Some people believe that international law should take priority over national goals when they conflict, while others believe that national goals should take precedence in this instance. To what extent do you agree with the position that international law should take precedence over national goals when they conflict?" (Strongly agree, Agree, Neither agree nor disagree, Disagree, Strongly disagree, Can't choose, Decline to answer).[25] While this question does not ask specifically about international norms against the use of violence, individuals who express support for the position that international law should take precedence over national goals when they conflict should also support international norms against the use of violence. Figure 10 shows the results of difference in means tests comparing acceptance of international law across the treatment and control groups among all respondents, partisans, and nonpartisans.

As seen in Figure 10, we do not find any effect of international recognition on acceptance of international norms regarding the use of violence. Specifically, we do not find any average treatment effect of international recognition on acceptance of international norms or any subgroup effect of international recognition among nonpartisans in particular. As such, acceptance of international norms regarding violence does not seem to well explain why international recognition reduces support for violence among nonpartisans. While it is possible that our proxy measure of acceptance of international norms regarding violence is not sufficiently fine-grained, these results suggest that international recognition does not reduce support for violence through norm diffusion. Future research on the impact of diplomatic engagement on mass attitudes towards the use of violence can

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[25]This question is coded as a five-level ordinal variable, with higher values indicating greater acceptance of international law.

Figure 10: The effect of international recognition on acceptance of international law

use more fine-grained measures to further disentangle the precise causal mechanisms at work.

Conclusion

This article shows that a new explanatory variable - international recognition - can shape popular support for the use of violence to achieve political goals. Drawing on a unique survey experiment conducted in the wake of the UNGA's recognition of Palestine, we demonstrate that international recognition reduces support for the use of violence to achieve political goals among nonpartisans by nearly half of a standard deviation. We argue that international recognition has this large effect among nonpartisans because it shifts the payoffs associated with the use of violent and non-violent strategies for achieving national political goals. Nonpartisans are especially sensitive to shifts in the payoffs associated with different strategies for achieving national political goals of conflict because they are not committed to any political party and its favored strategy.

This finding is important because attitudinal shifts among nonpartisans are likely to affect the

strategic choices made by leaders and their willingness to participate in negotiations. In electoral contests, nonpartisans matter because they can sway elections one way or another or function as the keystone that holds up winning coalitions. Nonpartisans may play a similar role in conflict situations. Since different factions within political movements compete for popular support and may strive to win favor with "unaffiliated" individuals, swaying nonpartisans away from supporting the use of violence to achieve national goals could be an important part of building a domestic coalition in favor of negotiation and conflict resolution. Such shifts in opinion among nonpartisans could be particularly consequential because, unlike in the U.S. context, nonpartisans are a large and arguably growing segment of the population in many parts of the world (see, for e.g., Lupu, 2015a, 235).

To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study that empirically explores the attitudes of Palestinian nonpartisans. As we noted above, observers of Palestinian politics have identified important trends of depoliticization and increasing apathy among the population of the Palestinian Territories (Kuttab, 2014; Bligh, 2013; Brown and Nerenberg, 2016). These observers argue that, faced with the perceived impossibility of achieving a Palestinian state, increasing numbers of Palestinians are abandoning existing political parties and turning to a more atomized pursuit of short-term arrangements intended to improve their daily lives. Our finding suggests that, all other things equal, this process may simultaneously render the political attitudes of these increasingly politically uncommitted Palestinians more sensitive to international diplomatic engagement.

The use of the UNGA recognition of Palestine as a state in order to investigate the impact of international recognition on support for violence may raise questions about the generalizability of our findings.[26] This is because there are different levels of international recognition that confer

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[26]Technically, the UNGA is not endowed with the legal capacity to "recognize" statehood. Our use of the term "recognition" nonetheless reflects the wide-ranging support for full recognition among member-states that state-status implies. Indeed, this was explicitly indicated in the text of the UNGA resolution dealing with the status of Palestine (UN General Assembly, 67th session, 2012).

different degrees of international legitimacy on states and, therefore, may affect their bargaining power and the perceived efficacy of nonviolent strategies in different ways. The strongest form of international recognition is full membership in the United Nations conferred by the UNSC. Other kinds of multilateral recognition, including recognition by the UNGA, confer less legitimacy than UNSC recognition but still endow the newly recognized state with a significant degree of international legitimacy and a platform for participation in the international community. Bilateral recognition, including that sometimes sought by militant groups seeking to gain control of a state, confers less legitimacy, though it may still provide significant political, military, and economic benefits. Because different levels of international recognition differ in the legitimacy they confer upon states, they can be expected to shift the payoffs associated with violent and nonviolent strategies to varying degrees.

However, there are at least two features of this case that suggest that it is a relatively "hard case" in which to detect any impact of international recognition on support for violence. First, as we note above, recognition as a state by the UNGA is a relatively weak form of international recognition. As a result, we might expect stronger forms of recognition, such as UNSC recognition, to have even stronger effects on support for violence. Second, for reasons beyond our control, the survey experiment was fielded following a period of intense fighting between Israel and Hamas in the Gaza Strip and Southern Israel. As scholarship in this case has shown (see, e.g., Shikaki, 2006; Shamir and Shikaki, 2010; Berrebi and Klor, 2008) popular support for the use of force typically increases during periods of violence. The fact that the the ongoing fighting likely raised the overall level of support for the use of violence during our experiment makes it a hard test for detecting any mitigating influence of international recognition, even if it exists. Our finding that international recognition reduced support for violence among nonpartisans in this setting suggests that our results may fall along the lower bound of the impact of international recognition on support for violence.

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Appendix

A.1   Survey and Experimental Design

The survey experiment was conducted in person (i.e., face-to-face). Respondents were surveyed in their homes by a well-trained Palestinian enumerator from their home region (North, South, or Central West Bank).[1] Following standard practice for surveys of this type in the Palestinian Territories, survey questions were read to respondents by the enumerator. For any survey questions containing images such as maps, the respondent was also shown the relevant images.

    The survey experiment was administered to a sample of 226 respondents, including 66 respondents interviewed as part of a separate panel survey who were also given the survey experiment.[2] Survey sampling for the survey experiment and the panel survey was conducted using the same sampling procedure, which we describe below. Our main results are robust to controlling for possible differences between these 66 respondents and the majority of our sample via the inclusion of dummy variables indicating "respondent type" (i.e., "Respondent Type Dummies"). See Table A.7 below.

    To ensure a representative sample, randomization was employed at every level of sample selection from the governorate to the individual respondent. Respondents were selected using a multistage stratified random sampling procedure. In the first stage of the sampling process, governorates (the largest administrative unit in the Palestinian Territories) were selected with probability

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[1] Surveys were conducted in the West Bank only due to the closure of the Gaza Strip and historically low survey response rates in East Jerusalem.

[2] These 66 respondents were interviewed as part of the second wave of a separate panel survey. They were selected to replace respondents interviewed in the first wave of the survey who we were unable to reinterview in the second wave, and these "replacement respondents" were given the survey experiment in order to increase the sample size for the experiment. They received an identical survey questionnaire to the rest of our survey sample.

proportional to size from three regional strata (North, South, and Central). Four governorates were selected from the eleven governorates in the West Bank. In the second stage, thirty-two localities were selected from strata based on community type (urban, rural, and refugee camp), also with probability proportional to size.[3] The number of survey questionnaires assigned to each stratum was also proportional to population size.

For most localities, the locality served as the final enumeration area. For large urban centers, however, a third stage of selection was carried out in which smaller enumeration areas were randomly selected from within the locality. Due to the lack of population data at the sub-locality level, these enumeration areas were sampled using simple random sampling. In the final stage, households were randomly sampled from within enumeration areas using a random walk procedure, and, within households, individuals were randomly sampled from a household roster using a random number table. As seen in Table A.1, our survey sample is very similar to the Palestinian population of the West Bank on a large number of covariates although it is slightly less wealthy.[4]

A.2   Randomization

Individuals were assigned to either the treatment or control condition in the survey experiment using blocked randomization. Blocking the sample prior to randomization offers an improvement over simple randomization by ensuring that covariates are balanced across the experimental conditions (Moore, 2010). Respondents in our survey experiment were placed into one of twelve blocks based on their gender, refugee status and level of education, helping to ensure balance on these important predictors of conflict attitudes.[5] Blocking was done using the coarsened exact matching procedure described in Iacus et al. (2012).

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[3]Sixteen localities were selected for the survey experiment; the additional sixteen localities were initially selected as part of the panel survey.

[4]Census figures are taken from Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS) (2009, 2012).

[5]Level of education was measured as a three-level categorical variable: (1) illiterate, elementary or primary; (2) secondary; and (3) college diploma or higher .

Table A.1: Population proportions in 2007 Census and survey experiment

	2007 Census	Survey Experiment Sample
Female	0.49	0.53
Male	0.50	0.47
Urban locality	0.69	0.70
Rural locality	0.26	0.24
Refugee camp locality	0.05	0.06
Refugees	0.28	0.22
Illiterate, elementary, or primary	0.41	0.45
Unemployed (2011)	0.17	013
Unemployed & underemployed (2011)	0.25	0.31
Monthly income (NIS)	2246	1501-2000
Muslim	0.96	0.96
Christian	0.02	0.04
Age: 20-29	0.35	0.21
Age: 30-39	0.26	0.22
Age: 40-49	0.18	0.24
Age: 50-59	0.10	0.12
Age: 60-69	0.06	0.09
Age: 70-79	0.03	0.04
Age: 80+	0.01	0.00

Census figures are for the West Bank population.

Monthly income reports average monthly income (census) and median income bracket (survey experiment)

We present the full results of a balance test comparing treatment and control groups on these and other key, pre-treatment covariates in Table A.1. Following Iacus et al. (2012), we compare balance between groups using on the original survey measures rather than on the coarsened variables used for blocking. Education is measured as a 7 level ordinal variable ranging from "illiterate" to "M.A. or higher." Household income is measured on a 10-point scale ranging from 1-500 NIS to 4501-5000 NIS. Fatah is measured as a binary variable indicating whether or not the respondent identifies with the Fatah political party; see the survey questionnaire below for the exact text of all survey questions. Political knowledge is proxied as the frequency with which respondents "follow news about politics and government in Palestine", which is measured as a 5 level ordinal variable ranging from "never" to "everyday or almost every day." Political interest is measured as a 3 level ordinal variable ranging from "not interested" to "very interested" in politics.

Figure A.1 indicates that the treatment and control groups were balanced with respect to these key, pre-treatment covariates. The treatment and control groups were not significantly different on any of these eight covariates at either the 95% confidence level or the more conservative 90% confidence level, indicating a high degree of balance. In our main analyses, we thus report the results of simple, difference-in-means comparisons across the treatment and control groups without adjusting for covariates. Our results are also robust to conducting an OLS regression analysis controlling for party identification, on which we find substantively meaningful but statistically insignificant differences across groups (see Table A.7 below).

A.3   Treatment and Manipulation Check

As noted in the article, the experimental treatment consisted of a news article about international recognition by the UNGA that was intended to increase the salience of this event. The control condition consisted of a neutral news article about basketball programs for Palestinian youth. Both the treatment and control conditions were based on modified real news items appearing in the Palestinian and Arabic-language press.

To verify that the treatment increased the salience of international recognition as intended, we

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Figure A.1: Balance Across Treatment and Control Groups

Note: Figure shows difference in means (Treatment - Control) with 95% confidence intervals.

conducted a manipulation check in which we asked respondents to evaluate Palestine's status in the world. As Figure A.2 illustrates, the distribution of perceptions about Palestine's status in the world in the treatment group looks quite different from that of the control group. Specifically, the treatment shifted the lower half of the distribution upwards: respondents in the lower 50% of the treatment group had more positive evaluations of Palestine's status in the world than respondents in the lower 50% of the control group. Indeed, respondents in the lower quartile of the treatment group rated Palestine's status in the world a half-point higher (on a 7-point scale) than respondents in the lower quartile of the control group.

We measure individual perceptions of Palestine's status in the world - the outcome of the manipulation check - using a survey question that asks respondents to rank the extent to which they agreed or disagreed with the following statement: "Here are a number of words that may or may

Figure A.2: Manipulation Check: Palestine's status in the world

not apply to Palestine's status in the world. Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with each statement. I see Palestine's status in the world as ...1. Accepted 2. Negative 3. Recognized 4. Rejected 5. Positive 6. Unrecognized." The question was coded as follows. First, all negative modifiers (e.g., "rejected") were reverse coded to the same scale as the positive modifiers (i.e., from most negative to most positive). The average score was then calculated for each matching word pair (e.g., for the word pair consisting of the words "accepted" and "rejected"), and the average of these scores was taken to construct a cumulative index. This procedure is similar to that used in scoring other indices using word pairs such as the Ten-Item Personality Index (Gosling et al., 2003).

A.4   PSR Index of Support for Violence

Text of PSR Survey Questions Used to Construct PSR Index of Support for Violence[6]:

Q35-5) Return to the armed intifada and confrontations: (Certainly support, Support, Oppose, Certainly Oppose, DK/NA)

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[6]All questions were taken from PSR Poll Number 37, September 2010

Q40) If such armed confrontations like these were to take place, would you support or oppose them?: (Certainly support, Support, Oppose, Certainly Oppose, DK/NA)

Q53)Do you support or oppose this armed attack?*: (Certainly support, Support, Oppose, Certainly Oppose, DK/NA)

*This question follows Q52, which reads "Hamas carried out an armed attack near Bani Na'im in the Hebron region leading to the death of four Israeli settlers. What in your opinion was Hamas' primary motivation behind this attack?"

Q55) Concerning armed attacks against Israeli civilians inside Israel, I…: (Certainly support, Support, Oppose, Certainly Oppose, DK/NA)

Table A.2: Factor Analysis of PSR Survey Questions.

	Observations	Item-Test Correlation	Item-Rest Correlation	Avg. Inter-Item Correlation	Cronbach's Alpha
Armed Intifada	1245	0.72	0.46	0.38	0.65
Armed Confrontations	1220	0.75	0.53	0.34	0.61
Hamas Attack	1201	0.72	0.47	0.38	0.65
Israeli Civilians Inside	1240	0.73	0.48	0.37	0.64
Test Scale				0.37	0.70

Note: All items were coded to enter the scale in a positive direction.

A.5   AUTHOR Index of Support for Violence

Table A.3: Factor Analysis of Violence Survey Questions.

	Observations	Item-Test Correlation	Item-Rest Correlation	Avg. Inter-Item Correlation	Cronbach's Alpha
Violent Resistance	208	0.70	0.37	0.73	0.85
Israeli Civilians Inside	217	0.88	0.69	0.31	0.48
Israeli Civilians Outside	219	0.85	0.63	0.38	0.55
Test Scale				0.48	0.74

Note: All items were coded to enter the scale in a positive direction.

Figure A.3: Distribution of Support for Violence Index

A.6 Results Tables (key results in tabular form)

Table A.4: Support for Violence by Party Identification (PSR Index)

	Mean			Difference		p-value (unadjusted/adjusted)	
	Non-Partisans (1)	Fatah Partisans (2)	Hamas Partisans (3)	(1) - (2)	(1) - (3)	(1) vs. (2)	(1) vs. (3)
Support for Violence	0.02	-0.39	0.78	0.41	-0.76	0.00/0.00	0.00/0.00
	(n=378)	(n=440)	(n=178)				

Note: Estimates from difference-in-means tests with unadjusted and adjusted p-values shown; p-values are adjusted using the Bonferroni correction.

Table A.5: The effect of international recognition on support for violence by partisanship (main results in table form)

	Mean		Difference	p-value
	Treatment (1)	Control (2)	(1) - (2)	(1) vs. (2)
Nonpartisans	-0.27	0.18	-0.45	0.04**
Partisans	0.15	-0.06	0.21	0.25
All	-0.03	0.03	-0.06	0.65
Observations	106	95		

Table A.6: Political knowledge and interest among partisans and nonpartisans

	Mean		Difference	p-value
	Partisans (1)	Nonpartisans (2)	(1) - (2)	(1) vs. (2)
Political knowledge	3.56	2.95	0.61	0.00**
Political interest	1.28	0.89	0.39	0.00**
Observations	127	97		

A.7   Robustness Checks

Figure A.4: Support for Violence by Party Identification (Control Group in Survey Experiment)

Note: Mean support for violence with 95% confidence intervals shown.

Table A.7: The Effect of International Recognition by Partisanship

		Support for Violence		
	(Bivariate model)	(Multivariate 1)	(Multivariate 2)	(Multivariate 3)
Treatment	-0.45**	-0.45**	-0.43*	-0.40*
	(0.22)	(0.22)	(0.22)	(0.22)
	[0.04]	[0.04]	[0.05]	[0.07]
Partisan	-0.24	0.15	0.16	0.16
	(0.21)	(0.25)	(0.26)	(0.26)
	[0.25]	[0.56]	[0.53]	[0.54]
Treatment × Partisan	0.66**	0.56**	0.55*	0.55*
	(0.28)	(0.28)	(0.28)	(0.29)
	[0.02]	[0.05]	[0.06]	[0.06]
Fatah		-0.50**	-0.51**	-0.50**
		(0.20)	(0.20)	(0.20)
		[0.01]	[0.01]	[0.01]
Constant	0.18	0.18	0.48†	0.41
	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.32)	(0.45)
	[0.27]	[0.26]	[0.13]	[0.37]
Respondent Type Dummies	No	No	Yes	Yes
Strata Dummies	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	201	201	201	201

OLS coefficients with standard errors in parentheses.
p-values in brackets.
*p<0.10 **p<0.05 ***p<0.01

A.7.1 Results Using Individual Measures of Support for Violence

This section shows our main results using the individual measures of support for violence that we used to construct our index (i.e., the "AUTHORIndex"). As mentioned in the article, the index was constructed using three measures of support for violence, which were based on questions from the quarterly public opinion polls that have been conducted by PSR for nearly twenty years. The first is a general measure of support for violence and is based on the following survey question: "To what extent would you support or oppose a return to violent resistance to achieve Palestinian rights?" (Completely support, somewhat support, neither support nor oppose, somewhat oppose, completely oppose, can't choose/don't know). The second two measures are specific measures of support for violence against Israelis civilians that differ by location. The first question asks about support for armed attacks against Israeli civilians inside Israel, while the second question asks about support for armed attacks against Israeli civilians outside Israel (see below for full survey questionnaire).

Figure A.5 shows the results using the first, general measure of support for violence (i.e., support for a return to violent resistance). As seen in the figure, similarly to our main results, international recognition reduces support for a return to violent resistance among non-partisans by 0.65 or approximately 0.45 standard deviations (p=0.04). We also obtain similar albeit weaker results using our second measure of support for violence against Israeli civilians inside Israel (see Figure A.6 below); using this measure, we find international recognition reduces support for violence by approximately 0.3 standard deviations although this effect falls short of conventional levels of statistical significance (p=0.16). Finally, while we also find a negative effect of international recognition on our third measure of support for violence against Israeli civilians outside Israel, this effect is smaller and less statistically significant than the effects found using our other measures (Figure A.7.) Based on patterns in our dataset, we believe this may be due to heterogeneity in how

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some respondents interpreted this question.[7] Rather than "cherry-picking" the measures that best support our hypotheses, we chose to combine all three measures into a single index of support for violence.

Figure A.5: The effect of international recognition on support for violence by partisanship (measure: violent resistance)

_____

[7]The question was intended to refer to violence against Israeli civilians inside the Palestinian Territories (i.e., Israeli settlers); however, we have reason to think some respondents interpreted it as violence against Israeli civilians in other countries (i.e., international terrorism). Because support for the latter is already very low among Palestinians, international recognition should not affect it very much.

Figure A.6: The effect of international recognition on support for violence by partisanship (measure: violence inside Israel)

Figure A.7: The effect of international recognition on support for violence by partisanship (measure: violence outside Israel)

A.8 Full survey

INTRODUCTION: Good morning/afternoon/evening. I am _____ from the Jerusalem Media and Communications Centre. We are a polling organization conducting research in your area about Palestinian public opinion. We interviewed someone in your household last year. We are now re-interviewing all of the people we interviewed then to learn if their opinions have changed. [If completely new household: We conducted a similar survey in your area last year and we are now following up on that survey to learn if opinions have changed.] This information will be provided to university researchers outside of the JMCC for their own analysis, although any responses provided to them will be kept confidential. The interview will last about 30 minutes. There are no benefits for participating, nor are the risks any greater than talking to any other polling organization. Participation is completely voluntary. The interviewee may end the interview at any time and may skip any questions that he or she does not want to answer. If you have any questions about this research, you should contact the Jerusalem Media and Communication Center (JMCC) in Ramallah at 972-2-297-6555.

Last year, we talked to [name]. If that is you, may we interview you again? [IF YES: GIVE THE RESPONDENT SURVEY NUMBER 3. SKIP THE SCREENING QUESTIONNAIRE]

If that is not you, is that person at home? If not, will he or she be home at any time during the next three days? [IF YES: CALL BACK. IF NO, READ BELOW]

[If that person is not available:] In that case, we would like to interview the person in your household closest in age to that person. According to the information that was shared with us last year, that person is [name]. Is that right? Is that person at home right now? If not, will he or she be at home at any time during the next three days?

Respondent Selection Instructions

-- If the respondent interviewed last year is not at home but <u>will</u> be at home at some other time during the duration of the survey: "call-back" (3 times). If the respondent interviewed last year cannot be contacted after three attempts, select the person from the same household that is closest in age to that person. If that person is also not available, select a new household as per the procedures used in wave 1 of the survey.

-- If the respondent interviewed last year is not at home and <u>will not</u> be at home at some other time during the duration of the survey: select the person from the same household that is closest in age to that person.

--If the respondent interviewed last year <u>is</u> at home and refuses to take the survey: select the person from the same household that is closest in age to that person. If that person also refuses, select a new household as per the procedures used in wave 1 of the survey.

--If neither the respondent interviewed last year nor the person closest in age to that person is available to take the survey after 3 visits to the household: select a new household as per the procedures used in wave 1 of the survey.

1. Is the respondent a replacement respondent?	1. Yes 2. No	
2. If this person is a replacement respondent, what is the survey number of the person he/she is replacing? _____		

Once a respondent has been selected, administer the following brief screening questionnaire:

1. Same respondent interviewed last year:	1. Yes [give him/her survey number 3] 2. No [proceed with screening questionnaire below]	
2. Gender: 1. Male 2. Female		
3.What is the highest level of education that you have completed?	1. Illiterate, elementary or primary 2. Secondary 3. College diploma, BA, MA or higher	
4. Are you a:	1. Registered refugee 2. Un-registered refugee 3. Non-refugee	
5. Have you watched or played any sports in the last month?	1. Yes 2. No 9. Decline to answer [do not read]	

TO BE COMPLETED BY SURVEY ENUMERATOR [ENUMERATOR USE ONLY]:

*If respondent is **male**, go to **Table 1**. If respondent is **female**, go to **Table 2**. Find the cell that corresponds to the respondent's educational level and refugee status. For example, if the respondent is female, illiterate and a refugee, go to cell B1 in Table 2.*

Table 1: <u>Male</u> Respondents

	Highest Level of Education Completed		
Refugee Status	Illiterate, elementary or	Secondary	College diploma, BA, MA or

	primary		higher
Refugee (reg. or unreg.)	A1	A2	A3
Non-Refugee	A4	A5	A6

Table 2: <u>Female</u> Respondents

	Highest Level of Education Completed		
Refugee Status	Illiterate, elementary or primary	Secondary	College diploma, BA, MA or higher
Refugee (reg. or unreg.)	B1	B2	B3
Non-Refugee	B4	B5	B6

What is the respondent's cell code (the letter-number pair corresponding to the respondent's gender, educational level and refugee status?)	1. A1 7. B1 2. A2 8. B2 3. A3 9. B3 4. A4 10. B4 5. A5 11. B5 6. A6 12. B6	

Now go to Table 3A (Table 3B) below. Find the column corresponding to the respondent's cell code. Go to the first row in that column. It should say "1" ("2" if Table 3B). This means you should give the respondent survey number 1 (survey number 2 if Table 3B). Give the respondent the appropriate survey now.

Once you have given the respondent survey number 1 (2 if Table 3B), <u>cross off the first cell in that column.</u> For example, if the respondents' cell code is B1, cross off the first cell in Table 3A (Table 3B) as demonstrated in Table 4 (below). <u>The next time you interview a respondent with cell code B1, you will begin with the next row in column B1 (marked red in Table 4).</u> The next row says "2" ("1" if Table 3B) so you will give this respondent survey number 2 (survey number 1 if Table 3B).

Table 3A: Assignment of Survey Questionnaires

A1	A2	A3	A4	A5	A6	B1	B2	B3	B4	B5	B6
1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2

Table 3B: Assignment of Survey Questionnaires

A1	A2	A3	A4	A5	A6	B1	B2	B3	B4	B5	B6
2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1

Table 4: Assignment of Survey Questionnaires
[DO NOT USE TO ASSIGN SURVEYS: EXAMPLE ONLY]

A1	A2	A3	A4	A5	A6	B1	B2	B3	B4	B5	B6
1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2

First Section: General questions

1. Overall, are you satisfied or dissatisfied with the way things are going in Palestine today?	1. Very satisfied 2. Satisfied 3. Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied 4. Dissatisfied 5. Very dissatisfied 8. [Do not read] Can't choose 9. [Do not read] Decline to answer	
2. Generally speaking, how interested would you say you are in politics?	1. Very interested 2. A little interested 3. Not interested 8. Can't choose [do not read] 9. Decline to answer [do not read]	
3. In the past month, how often did you follow news about politics and government in Palestine?	1. Everyday or almost every day 2. Several times a week 3. Several times 4. Once or twice 5. Never 8. Can't choose [do not read] 9. Decline to answer [do not read]	

Second Section: Evaluation of Political Institutions, Political Attitudes, and Palestinian Affairs

4. Based on your experience, how easy or difficult is it to obtain the following administrative or social services from the government?							
Service	Very Easy	Easy	Difficult	Very difficult	Never tried	Can't choose [don't read]	Decline [don't read]

Identity Document							
Registering a child in primary school in public system							
Help from the police when you need it							
Access to individuals or institutions to file a complaint when your rights are violated							

5. Which of the following political parties best represents you politically, economically and socially?	
1. Fatah	
2. Hamas	
3. PFLP	
4. DFLP	
5. Fida	
6. Palestinian People's Party	
7. Islamic Jihad	
8. Other: _____	
9. None of the above	

6. How do you evaluate the performance of president Mahmoud Abbas?	1. Very good 2. Good 3. Neither good nor bad 4. Bad 5. Very bad 8. Can't choose [do not read] 9. Decline to answer [do not read]	
7. To what extent do you think the Palestinian Authority is committed to the vital goals and interests of the Palestinian people?	1. Certainly committed to interests and goals of the Palestinian people 2. Committed to interests and goals of the Palestinian people 3. Neither committed nor uncommitted to the interests and goals of the Palestinian people 4. Uncommitted to interests and goals of the Palestinian people 5. Certainty uncommitted to interests and goals of the Palestinian	

	people 8. Can't choose [do not read] 9. Decline to answer [do not read]	

8. Below are some topics that have been in the news. These topics may or may not be related, and you may receive more or less information about each one.

1. The United Nations considered the issue of Palestine. The United Nations considered whether to recognize Palestine as a state within the 1967 borders, including the West Bank, Gaza Strip and East Jerusalem.

2.

Palestine wins
UN welcomes State of Palestine

UNITED NATIONS (Al-Quds) -- The United Nations General Assembly has voted to recognise a Palestinian state.

The vote, which was taken at a meeting of the 193-member body in New York on Thursday, represents a long-sought diplomatic triumph for the Palestinians.

The United Nations' decision recognizes Palestine as a state in the West Bank, East Jerusalem and Gaza Strip. It allows Palestine to sign international treaties and join a number of United Nations agencies, as well as the International Criminal Court.

In his speech to the General Assembly, Abbas called on the United Nations "to issue a birth certificate of the reality of the State of Palestine."

The United Nations General Assembly voting

9. Consider the map below. Please shade in the area that you consider to be Palestine.

10. Which of the following maps do <u>you</u> consider to be *historical Palestine*? Please give us your own opinion. [use flashcards]	1. Map A [pre-1948 borders] 2. Map B [1967 borders] 3. Map C [1947 Partition plan borders] 4. None of the above 8. Can't choose [do not read] 9. Decline to answer [do not read]	
11. Which of the following maps do <u>you</u> consider to be *Palestine today*? Please give us your own opinion. [use flashcards]	1. Map A [pre-1948 borders] 2. Map B [1967 borders] 3. Map C [1947 Partition plan borders] 4. None of the above 8. Can't choose [do not read] 9. Decline to answer [do not read]	
12. Which of the following maps would you be willing to accept as the borders of Palestine? Please give us your own opinion. [use flashcards]	1. Map A [pre-1948 borders] 2. Map B [1967 borders] 3. Map C [1947 Partition plan borders] 4. None of the above 8. Can't choose [do not read] 9. Decline to answer [do not read]	
13. Which of the following maps do <u>you</u> consider to be the ideal borders of Palestine? Please give us your own opinion. [use flashcards]	1. Map A [pre-1948 borders] 2. Map B [1967 borders] 3. Map C [1947 Partition plan borders] 4. None of the above 8. Can't choose [do not read] 9. Decline to answer [do not read]	

To be used as flashcards:

Map A	Map B	Map C

Third Section: Relationship with Israel and the international community

15. To what extent do you support the two-state solution?	1. Strongly support 2. Support 3. Neither support nor oppose 4. Oppose 5. Strongly oppose 8. Can't choose [do not read] 9. Decline to answer [do not read]	
16. Concerning armed attacks against Israeli civilians *inside* Israel, I:	1. Strongly support 2. Support 3. Neither support nor oppose 4. Oppose 5. Strongly oppose 8. Can't choose [do not read] 9. Decline to answer [do not read]	
17. Now concerning armed attacks against Israeli civilians *outside* Israel, I:	1. Strongly support 2. Support 3. Neither support nor oppose 4. Oppose 5. Strongly oppose 8. Can't choose [do not read] 9. Decline to answer [do not read]	
18. What in your view are the chances for the establishment of an independent Palestinian state next to the state of Israel in the next five years? Are they very high, high, medium, low, or non-existent?	1. Non-existent 2. Low 3. Medium 4. High 5. Very high 8. Can't choose [do not read] 9. Decline to answer [do not read]	
19. Generally speaking, to what extent do others in your community support the two-state solution?	1. Strongly support 2. Support 3. Neither support nor oppose 4. Oppose 5. Strongly oppose 8. Can't choose [do not read]	

9. Decline to answer [do not read]	

20. If Palestinian-Israeli negotiations were to resume, which of the following issues would you like to see addressed first?	1. Borders and settlements 2. Jerusalem 3. Refugees 4. Water 5. Security 6. Prisoners 8. Can't choose [do not read] 9. Decline to answer [do not read]	

22. Different proposals have been made regarding the details of the two-state solution. Please tell us the extent to which you support or oppose the following proposals.

	Strongly support	moderately support	support a little	neither support nor oppose	oppose a little	moderately oppose	strongly oppose	
1) Palestinian state in the West Bank, Gaza, and East Jerusalem with the largest Jewish settlements remaining under Israeli sovereignty.								
2) Palestinian state in the West Bank, Gaza, and East Jerusalem with the largest Jewish settlements remaining under Israeli sovereignty and an equal amount of land transferred to Palestine.								

23. Different proposals have been made regarding other details of the two-state solution as well. Please tell us the extent to which you

support or oppose the following proposals. Under all of these proposals, a Palestinian state would be established in the West Bank, Gaza Strip and East Jerusalem.

	Strongly support	moderately support	support a little	neither support nor oppose	oppose a little	moderately oppose	strongly oppose	
1) The Palestinian state would be non militarized, meaning that it will have no heavy armaments such as airplanes, tanks, missiles, or artillery.								
2) Mutual recognition in which Israel recognizes Palestine as the state of the Palestinian people and Palestine recognizes Israel as the state of the Jewish people.								
3) Refugees will be able to return to the state of Palestine in the West Bank, Gaza Strip, or East Jerusalem and receive compensation.								
24. If Israel were to sign an agreement with the PLO establishing a Palestinian state alongside Israel, i.e. the two-state solution, how likely do you think Israel is to comply with its obligations under the agreement?	1. Very likely 2. Likely 3. Neither likely nor unlikely 4. Unlikely 5. Very unlikely 8. Can't choose [do not read] 9. Decline to answer [do not read]							
25. If Palestinian-Israeli	1. Very favorable							

negotiations were to resume and Israel were to sign an agreement with the PLO, how favorable do you think this agreement would be to Palestinian interests?	2. Somewhat favorable 3. Neither favorable nor unfavorable 4. Somewhat unfavorable 5. Very unfavorable 8. Can't choose [do not read] 9. Decline to answer [do not read]	

26. There have been a number of proposals regarding the final borders of the future Palestinian state. What in your view are the chances for the establishment of an independent Palestinian state within each of the following borders?

	Almost Certain	Very High	High	Medium	Low	Very Low	Non-Existent	[do not read] I don't know	[do not read] Decline to answer	
1. The Pre-1948 borders										
2. The 1947 Partition Plan borders										
3. 1967 borders (West Bank, Gaza and East Jerusalem)										
4. 1967 borders with land swaps										

27. In your view, how likely is it that the leaders of Fatah and Hamas will succeed in implementing the reconciliation [unity?] agreement and unifying the West Bank and the Gaza Strip in the near future?	1. Very likely 2. Likely 3. Neither likely nor unlikely 4. Unlikely 5. Very unlikely 8. Can't choose/ Don't know [do not read] 9. Decline to answer [do not read]	

28. To what extent would you support or oppose a return to violent resistance to achieve Palestinian rights?	1. Completely support 2. Somewhat support 3. Neither support nor oppose 4. Somewhat oppose 5. Completely oppose 8. Can't choose/ Don't know [do not read]	

	9. Decline to answer [do not read]	
29. In your view, how do you think Israel will respond to Palestine's new status as a state in the United Nations?	1. Will stop transfer of custom funds to the PA and will make conditions of occupation harsher, 2. Will only stop transfer of custom funds 3. Will not stop transfer of customs funds but conditions of occupation will become harsher 4. Will do nothing and the status quo will continue 5. Others (specify ----) 8. Can't choose/ Don't know [do not read] 9. Decline to answer [do not read]	

30. I'm going to name a number of international actors. For each one, please tell me to what extent you trust or distrust them.								
International actors	Trust very much	Trust somewhat	Neither trust nor distrust	Distrust somewhat	Distrust very much	[do not read] I don't know	[do not read] Decline to answer	
1. The US								
2. France								
3. The EU								
4. The United Nations								
31. Generally speaking, how close do you think the position of the international community is to the Palestinian position?	1. Almost identical 2. Very close 3. Somewhat close 4. Neither close nor far 5. Somewhat far 6. Very far 7. Almost opposite 8. Can't choose [do not read] 9. Decline to answer [do not read]							
32. Do you think the position of Egypt today is closer to or further from the Palestinian position than it was under the Mubarak	1. Much closer 2. Somewhat closer 3. Neither closer nor farther 4. Somewhat farther 5. Much farther							

regime?	8. Can't choose [do not read] 9. Decline to answer [do not read]	

33. Some people believe that international law should take priority over national goals when they conflict, while others believe that national goals should take precedence in this instance. To what extent do you agree with the position that international law should take precedence over national goals when they conflict?	1. Strongly agree 2. Agree 3. Neither agree nor disagree 4. Disagree 5. Disagree strongly 8. Can't choose [do not read] 9. Decline to answer [do not read]	
34. To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement: leaders in our society must be obeyed because they are more knowledgeable of the public interest?	1. Strongly agree 2. Agree 3. Neither agree nor disagree 4. Disagree 5. Disagree strongly 8. Can't choose [do not read] 9. Decline to answer [do not read]	
35. To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement: Politics is more a matter of getting the best possible out of a given situation than of sticking to principles?	1. Strongly agree 2. Agree 3. Neither agree nor disagree 4. Disagree 5. Disagree strongly 8. Can't choose [do not read] 9. Decline to answer [do not read]	

36. Do you agree or disagree with the following statements.

Statement	Strongly agree	Agree	Neither Agree nor disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	[do not read] I don't know	[do not read] Decline to answer	
I expect unemployment to become better	1	2	3	4	5	8	9	
I expect poverty to become better	1	2	3	4	5	8	9	

37. Some individuals believe that historic Palestine can never be divided while others believe that historic Palestine can be divided into two states, a Palestinian state and an Israeli state. To what extent do you believe it is <u>legitimate</u> to divide historic Palestine?	1. Completely legitimate 2. Very legitimate 3. Somewhat Legitimate 4. Neither legitimate nor illegitimate 5. Somewhat illegitimate 6. Very illegitimate 7. Completely illegitimate 8. [Do not read] Can't choose 9. [Do not read] Decline to answer	

Fourth Section: Politics and Religion

How much do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements?							
Statements	Strongly agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	[do not read] I don't know	[do not read] Decline to answer	
39-3. Men of religion should have influence over the decisions of government							
39-4. Religious practice is a private matter and should be separated from socio-economic life							
40-1. The government and parliament should make laws according to the wishes of the people							
40-2. The government should implement only the laws of the sharia							
40-3. The government and parliament should make laws according to the wishes of the people in some areas and implement sharia in others							

Fifth Section: Religiosity

43. Today as in the past, Muslim scholars and jurists sometimes disagree about the proper interpretation of Islam in response to present-day issues. For each of the statements listed below, please indicate whether you agree strongly, agree, disagree, or disagree strongly with the interpretation of Islam that is presented.								
Issue	Strongly agree	Agree	Neither Agree nor disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	[do not read] I don't know	[do not read] Decline to answer	
1.Democracy is a Western form of government that is not compatible with Islam	1	2	3	4	5	8	9	
2. Islam requires that in a Muslim country the political rights of non-Muslims should be inferior to those of Muslims	1	2	3	4	5	8	9	

44. The following questions are your personal opinions about the principles that should determine the behavior and situation of women in our society. For each of the statements listed below, please indicate whether you agree strongly, agree, neither agree nor disagree, disagree, or disagree strongly.								
Statement	Strongly agree	Agree	Neither Agree nor disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	[do not read] I don't know	[do not read] Decline to answer	
1. A woman can be a president or prime minister of a Muslim country.	1	2	3	4	5	8	9	
2.A married woman can work outside the home if she wishes	1	2	3	4	5	8	9	
3. Men and women should have equal job opportunities and wages	1	2	3	4	5	8	9	

Sixth Section: Daily Life

45. During the past week, how many times did you visit or go out with friends or family? Count all friends or family, including immediate family members ("first degree").	Not at all (0)	1-3 times (2)	4-6 times (3)	7-9 times (4)	10 or more times (5)	[do not read] I don't know (8)	[do not read] Decline to answer (9)	
46. Now, how many friends or family members did you visit or go out with over the past week? Count each person once even if you saw them multiple times.	1-3 people (0)	4-6 people (1)	7-9 people (2)	10 or more people (3)	Did not participate in this activity (4)	[do not read] I don't know (8)	[do not read] Decline to answer (9)	

47. Before President Abbas' speech at the United Nations in September 2011, did you attend a rally, protest, demonstration or other event related to the UN initiative?	1. Yes 2. No 8. don't know [do not read] 9. Decline to answer [do not read]	
48. If large peaceful demonstrations for Palestinian goals were to take place, how likely is it that you would participate in such demonstrations?	1. Very likely 2. Somewhat Likely 3. Neither likely nor unlikely 4. Somewhat unlikely 5. Very unlikely 8. don't know [do not read] 9. Decline to answer [do not read]	

49. In the past month, did you *personally* witness any of the following:	1. Soldiers verbally harassing someone 2. Settlers verbally harassing someone 3. Soldiers damaging or destroying someone's property 4. Settlers damaging or destroying someone's property 5. Soldiers physically harming someone	

	6. Settlers physically harming someone 7. None of these 8. Can't choose [do not read] 9. Decline to answer [do not read]	
52. Do you know anyone who experienced any of the following *over the last year* where knowing someone means they know you and you know them by name? Choose as many as apply.	1. Physical harm by Israeli soldiers or settlers 2. Arrest by Israeli soldiers 3. Home demolition 4. Other damage or destruction of property by Israeli soldiers or settlers 5. Other:_____ 6. None of these 9. Decline to answer [do not read]	
54. In the past week, did you read an entire news story or watch an entire news program about any of the following topics? Circle all that apply.	1. The economic situation and/or unemployment 2. The recent fighting in Gaza 3. Can't choose 4. Decline to answer	

Seventh Section: Identity and outlook

55. Which of the following best describes you	1. Above all I am a Palestinian 2. Above all I am a Muslim 3. Above all I am an Arab 4. Above all I am a Christian 5. Other (please state)_____ 8. Can't choose [do not read] 9. Decline to answer [do not read]	

56. Here are a number of words that may or may not apply to Palestine's status in the world. Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with each statement.

I see Palestine's status in the world as…	Disagree strongly	Disagree moderately	Disagree a little	Neither agree nor disagree	Agree a little	Agree moderately	Agree strongly			
1. Accepted	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	
2. Negative	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	
3. Recognized	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	
4. Rejected	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	

		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	
5.	Positive	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	
6.	Unrecognized	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	

57. Here are a number of words that may or may not apply to how you are feeling right NOW.   Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with each term. You should rate the extent to which a word describes the way you are feeling now.

I feel:	Disagree strongly	Disagree moderately	Disagree a little	Neither agree nor disagree	Agree a little	Agree moderately	Agree strongly			
1. Excited	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	
2. Ashamed	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	
3. Proud	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	
4. Disappointed	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	
5. Hopeful	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	
6. Anxious	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	

Eighth Section: Demographics

58. Marital status: 1. Single 2. Married 3. Other		
59. What is the highest level of education that you have completed?	1. Illiterate 4. College diploma – 2 years 9. Refuse 2. Elementary 5. BA [don't read] 3. Primary 6. MA or higher 4. Secondary 8. Don't Know [don't read]	
60. Which of the following best describes your current employment status?	1. Employed full-time (30 hours or more a week) 2. Employed part-time (Less than 30 hours a week) 3. Not employed	
61. If you answered not employed, are you:	1. Retired 2. Housewife 3. Student 4. Other: _____	

62. Employment sector: 1. Public 2. Private 3. Other		
63. In the past month, what was *your household's* monthly income in Israeli shekels? Include all salaries, wages and rents received.	1. 1-500 NIS 2. 500 – 1000 NIS 3. 1001 – 1500 NIA 4. 1501-2000 NIS 5. 2001-2500 NIS	

	6. 2501 – 3000 NIS 7. 3001 – 3500 NIS 8. 3501 – 4000 NIS 9. 4001 – 4500 NIS 10. 4501 – 5000 NIS	
64. *Over the last year*, has your family's financial situation gotten much better, gotten a little better, stayed about the same, gotten a little worse or gotten much worse?	1. Much better 2. A little better 3. About the same 4. A little worse 5. Much worse 8. Can't choose [do not read] 9. Decline to answer [do not read]	
65. Do you have any family or friends living in the west or other non-Arab countries?	1. Yes 2. No 3. [Do not read] Can't choose 4. [Do not read]: Decline to answer	
67. Have you or anyone in your immediate family (first degree) ever been a prisoner in an Israeli jail?	1. Yes 2. No 9. Decline to answer [do not read]	
68. Religion: 1. Muslim 2. Christian 3. Other		
69. How often do you read the Quran?	1. Everyday or almost every day 2. Several times a week 3. Sometimes 4. Rarely 5. Never 5. I can't read/am illiterate 8. Can't choose [do not read] 1. Decline to answer [do not read]	
70. Do you pray? 1. Yes 2. No		
71. Do you pray at: 1. Mosque 2. Home 3. Both 4. Church		
72. In general, would you describe yourself as:	1. Religious 2. Not religious 9. Decline to answer [do not read]	

"Thank you. At this time, we would also like to inform you that the news article presented earlier in the survey questionnaire is based on a real news articles that appeared in Al-Jazeera, Ma'an and other sources."