

SPECIAL SECTION

Getting a Seat at the Table: The Origins of Universal Participation and Modern Multilateral Conferences



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Inclusive participation by all states is now taken for granted in many global governance efforts, but this was not always the normal practice. Nineteenth-century multilateralism, embedded in a world of “great powers,” actively rejected broad participation, valuing small numbers, hierarchy, and status in coordinating action. Construction of broader participation norms in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was a joint project that owes much to innovations in the Americas and regional norms developed within that group as it organized meetings among the American states. Central to these norms was sovereign equality that, in the American context, entailed universal participation of all American states and voting on a one state–one vote basis at conferences. This article traces the spread of these norms from the Americas to the Hague Conferences of 1899 and 1907, and highlights the varied sources for many of our contemporary multilateral practices in these early events. KEYWORDS: universal participation, multilateralism, Global South, norm diffusion, multilateral conferences, Hague Conferences, norms, sovereign equality, Latin America, international law.

UNIVERSAL PARTICIPATION IS TAKEN FOR GRANTED NOW IN MANY AREAS OF global governance. Some issues, notably finance, still overtly limit participation (think Group of 8 or Group of 20) and of course regional efforts at governance are common, but the procedures for most major multilateral governing efforts are organized around universal participation. Every state gets a seat at the table. The fact that the United Nations is a frequent sponsor of big governance efforts certainly contributes to this outcome. The UN, after all, aims at universal membership (with a few notable exceptions). Excluding interested states from participation is difficult and requires good reasons coupled with effort.

Yet universal participation was not always the norm in global affairs. Prior to the twentieth century, management and governance of the international system was conducted by the “great powers”—an elite club that controlled its own membership, made its own rules, and imposed those rules on others. The status of “great power” was clearly understood by states in the

system and was justified with a normative claim of “great power responsibility.” Other states knew who “the powers” were and, while they might not have liked their rules, they recognized the status and shared expectations that great powers would call the shots on many matters of shared concern from redrawing international borders to managing piracy.¹

The Hague Conferences of 1899 and, particularly, 1907 mark an important inflection point in the evolution of expectations about participation and shared governance. International conferences had been growing in number and frequency since the 1863 Geneva Conference (which produced the first Geneva Convention in 1864), but participation in these was often idiosyncratic, relying on whims of the organizer. Congresses following Vienna were called only when one of the great powers saw fit to do so. Participation in the 1899 Hague Conference was idiosyncratic in just this fashion, but for the 1907 conference, participation was greatly expanded. In contrast to the twenty-six states participating in 1899, forty-four states took part in the 1907 conference.² Of particular significance was the fact that while the number of European delegates remained roughly the same between the first and second Hague Conferences, participation from the Global South (particularly Latin America) expanded dramatically. Only the United States and Mexico were represented at the first Hague Conference, but all Latin American states were invited to the second Hague Conference, with a total of nineteen American states ultimately attending.³

Expanded participation in 1907 was notable for several reasons. First, it was not essential for any functional reason. Unlike the International Sanitary Conferences, for example, where even small states could be breeding grounds for disease,⁴ small states did not obviously contribute a lot to the arms control and arbitration topics that were front and center on the Hague agenda. Second, after 1907, the universal participation norm took root. In 1899, no one had much missed the Latin American and other smaller states. After 1907, broad participation became the norm at major meetings. The change is all the more remarkable because it was with the Hague Conferences that voting became standard procedure for European states. Previous major European congresses and conferences had taken the form of diplomatic gatherings to exchange views.⁵ Invitations to the Hague meetings, by contrast, were issued with clear statements that there would be decisions by voting, and that each state would receive only one vote. We now take for granted this format for large multilateral meetings where all states participate and decisions are made by voting one state—one vote, but there is nothing obvious or necessary about this template for global politics. The Hague Conferences also departed from past European practice by establishing expectations for regular, recurring meetings (at least after 1907); by experimenting with departures from unanimous decision rules; by creating a “preparatory committee” to manage business between meetings; and by relying on parliamentary procedural tools, such as plenaries and committees, to organize its work.

In this article we trace the origins of broad participation norms in global governance and other procedural innovations in multilateralism to inter-American politics in the nineteenth century. States in the Americas had been meeting for several decades prior to the Hague Conferences and had developed norms and understandings about how to manage these broad inclusive meetings. Central to these changes was the norm of sovereign equality, a concept developed in Europe and embedded in public international law, but which also had particular resonance among the postcolonial states of the Americas.⁶ Sovereign equality was the logical basis for universal participation at these Pan-American conferences. It was also the basis for one state—one vote, a practice established with the invitation to the first International Conference of American States (ICAS) in 1888. Transplanted to the Americas, the sovereign equality norm took on new meaning and created new diplomatic practices in advance of adoption of such practices back in Europe.

International Conferences Prior to 1899

Interstate meetings and diplomatic engagement are certainly as old as the interstate system, but the form such meetings take and expectations about them have changed dramatically. The whole notion that state representatives would sit down together simultaneously at a table and negotiate is, itself, relatively recent. Landmark agreements like the Peace of Westphalia were negotiated remotely, through serial written communications.⁷ The Congress of Vienna in 1814–1815 was unusual in bringing the principals together for joint face-to-face discussions, but other features of the congress “form” were quite different from what would be expected in multilateral meetings today.⁸ Participation was limited to the great powers. The parliamentary and bureaucratic structure of contemporary meetings was also largely absent. The congresses were diplomatic gatherings at which views were exchanged and, when possible, collective decisions made. After Vienna, congresses were held episodically, whenever one of the great powers felt the need, and toward the end of the century congresses occasionally expanded participation but there was never any expectation of broad participation. Indeed, quite the opposite. The congresses emphasized status and hierarchy, not equality, among sovereigns.

Over the course of the nineteenth century, the form of such meetings changed and the menu of possible forms broadened. Participation expanded, regular and repeated meetings became the norm, and voting was introduced, along with other parliamentary procedures such as committees and formal agendas. These changes came from two sources. One was functional meetings, often convened by civil society. The 1863 Geneva Conference on laws of war and the war wounded was organized—not by great powers or by any state at all—by a civil society group, the Geneva Society for Public Welfare.⁹ Participation at meetings was self-selected: if a state signed on to the Geneva

Convention(s), it was automatically invited to future meetings to discuss revisions to the conventions.¹⁰

The more far-reaching changes in multilateral conferences and governance norms were pioneered among the states of Latin America. States in the Americas began meeting in 1826 at the Congress of Panama under the leadership and initiative of Simón Bolívar for the purpose of forming a confederation and providing mutual defense against attacks (particularly by Spain).¹¹ This initial congress, unlike the Concert of Europe, was inclusive, with invitations extended to nearly all independent American states regardless of relative wealth or power.¹² While only four countries eventually attended the 1826 congress, this set an important precedent for participation expectations at future inter-American conferences where inclusive invitation and participation continued to be the norm.¹³

A series of wars and revolutions hobbled these efforts at multilateral coordination, but the practice of interstate meetings in the Americas was revived in the 1880s. Interested in promoting commerce in the region, US secretary of state James G. Blaine called for a meeting of American states in 1888 to discuss commercial matters and arbitration for settlement of disputes.¹⁴ Following the American tradition, all states in the hemisphere were invited, and virtually all attended.¹⁵ Equally important to the other American states, who very much feared US domination of the meeting, Blaine made clear that participation in the meeting was to be based on an understanding of sovereign equality: “The Delegates can show to the world an honorable, peaceful conference of seventeen independent American Powers, in which all shall meet together on terms of absolute equality; a conference in which there can be no attempt to coerce a single delegate against his own conception of the interest of his own nation.”¹⁶

The invitation to the 1888–1889 International Conference of American States specified that voting would be used at the meeting and, in keeping with this equality norm, that each state (not each delegate) would have one vote.¹⁷ Debates over whether unanimity would be required for all decisions or whether majorities could carry the day were formally decided in favor of the latter. According to rules established at the first ICAS conference and followed at subsequent conferences, resolutions could be approved by a majority of the delegations. In practice, however, states put a premium on achieving unanimity.¹⁸

Other familiar features of modern multilateralism were also pioneered at the early inter-American meetings. A nascent secretariat was established. During the first ICAS conference, delegates voted to create the International Union of American Republics, which would be represented in Washington, DC, by a bureau (known formally as the Commercial Bureau of the American Republics).¹⁹ Established in 1890 “for the prompt collection and distribution of commercial information,”²⁰ this body expanded in 1902 with the creation

of a governing board that met monthly.²¹ This governing board provided a forum in which to exchange information between ICAS meetings.²² The governing board even had a dedicated meeting place, a “palace” given to the ICAS for this purpose by Andrew Carnegie who was a delegate to the 1889 meeting.²³ Importantly, every independent state in the region was invited to participate in these meetings and to participate in the ongoing work of the governing board, not just the wealthier and more powerful American states.²⁴

While no concrete decisions were made about subsequent meetings at the first ICAS conference, many delegates clearly assumed there would be follow-on work and subsequent meetings. The creation of the bureau suggests as much. In fact, the bureau was set up to test states’ enthusiasm for the meetings. It had a ten-year lease on life. If no state withdrew, the bureau could begin another ten-year term. Not only did no state withdraw, but membership became universal in that first decade.²⁵ At the second ICAS conference in Mexico City in 1902, delegates unanimously called for a third Pan-American conference with the expectation of more to follow.²⁶

Thus, even prior to the 1899 Hague Conference, states in the Americas had experience in inclusive interstate gatherings and had developed norms and procedures for conducting them. Fundamental to these was the norm of universal participation. Latin American participants and commentators are clear about the normative logic and necessity for this: universal participation was a logical corollary to sovereign equality, in the inter-American understanding. Sovereigns, recognizing no higher authority, are juridically equal under international law. They could not be bound without their consent, ergo all needed to participate in any rule-making enterprise. The normative framework for these assumptions and this argument was explicitly legal and, as shown below, it was the structure of law that provided tools for managing expanding multilateralism. The ICAS model of multilateralism contained other innovations that later appeared at the Hague Conferences, notably voting, which was a part of the ICAS procedure from the beginning. Invitations sent in 1888 for the first ICAS conference stated clearly that “no State shall be entitled to more than one vote.”²⁷ Hague participants built on these changes and transplanted them into a European context, but the practices themselves had deep roots in the Americas.

Globalizing the New Template for Multilateral Conferences

These innovative modes of multilateralism spread beyond the Americas when European states began meeting to discuss disarmament at the end of the nineteenth century. The first of these Hague Conferences, in 1899, more nearly resembled the old European congress pattern. The meeting was called by one of the great powers, Russia, for reasons of its own: it was concerned that it could not keep up with the arms buildups going on in Germany and Britain.

The decision rule for issuing invitations was idiosyncratic: states with diplomatic presence in Saint Petersburg were invited.²⁸ Twenty-six countries participated: twenty from Europe, four from Asia (China, Japan, Siam, and Persia), and two from the Americas (the United States and Mexico).²⁹ Thus, while participation was much broader than the Concert of Europe, it still excluded many states. Interestingly, voting was expected at the conference—hardly a regular feature of the Concert—and the invitation letter to the 1899 conference specified that “each Power, whatever may be the number of its Delegates, will have only one vote.”³⁰ Unanimity was the decision rule.³¹ No bureau or secretariat-like body was constituted, however, and no provisions were made for repeated meetings.³²

It was at the 1907 Hague Conference, however, where the modes of multilateralism developed in the Americas took hold. The United States, as the largest American state but by no means a great power at the time, was not surprisingly a major conduit for these ideas. Yet the United States was drawing on ideas developed by and with its southern neighbors and was supported by Latin Americans in crucial ways at the conference.

It was an American, Theodore Roosevelt, who initially called for a second Hague Conference to continue the work of the first.³³ As mentioned above, the expectation of recurring, even regular, conferences was part of the Pan-American normative system. It was not, however, part of the European states’ normative system and the initial reaction to Roosevelt’s suggestion was ruffled feathers in Russia. The Hague meetings were understood (by Russia, at least) to be Russian meetings. For another state to call for a meeting was to impinge on Russian great power prerogatives. A compromise was quickly found when Roosevelt graciously stepped aside and allowed the Russians to call the meeting.³⁴

Latin American states had shown great interest in the activities of the 1899 Hague Conference, particularly its work to construct a mechanism for arbitration of disputes. Arbitration had long been a topic of interest in the Americas going back to the early–nineteenth-century gatherings and had been a central issue at the ICAS conference in 1889.³⁵ At the second ICAS meeting in 1902, the American republics formally adhered to and recognized as “Public International American Law” the three conventions signed at The Hague in 1899, and they authorized the United States and Mexico (the two American states that had already signed because they attended) to negotiate with the other original signatories for recognition of this adherence to the conventions.³⁶ This legal move provided the opening to get them invited to the next Hague Conference.

Elihu Root, who became Theodore Roosevelt’s secretary of state in 1905, took a particular interest in improving relations in the hemisphere. Early in his tenure he made an extended trip through the region, the first US secretary of state to do so, and was attentive to discussions at the 1906 ICAS conference in Rio de Janeiro. Root also had a strong interest in arbitration. A

distinguished lawyer, he had been an active member in the arbitration movement in the United States for many years and made furthering the cause of arbitration, both in the hemisphere and at The Hague, a priority.³⁷ Securing invitations for other states in the Americas to participate at the next Hague meeting would both demonstrate US goodwill and provide additional support (in the form of votes) for expanded arbitration provisions.

The one obstacle to Root's plan was that the Russians, having agreed to convene a second conference, chose dates that conflicted with the third ICAS conference that was scheduled to be held in Rio in 1906. Root intervened with the Russian ambassador in Washington, DC, and succeeded in getting the Hague meeting pushed back.³⁸ The next task was to get the Latin American states invited to the 1907 conference. Adherence to the 1899 Hague treaties provided the "hook" by which Root could push this move.

Procedures for treaty adherence were well understood in international law, but these Hague Conventions made no provision for accession to (i.e., joining) the particular group that had drawn up the treaty (though Article 60 of the first Hague Convention provided a road map for adherence to the convention, just not accession). This is not surprising since the group had made no specific provisions for ongoing meetings. Now that additional meetings were planned, some procedure was needed whereby adhering states could become part of the club. Root proposed, and the Russians agreed, on a course of action to allow additional states to accede to the Hague group—representatives from the 1899 conference would sign a new protocol admitting them.³⁹ Thus, there was a motivated actor using ambiguities in the structure of legal rules to achieve preferred policy ends. Of course, expanded participation by these additional states was not welcomed universally. Critics claimed the inclusion of "lesser powers" would crowd the conference and stall any progress. The *New York Times* noted that a "problem to consider" was that "one-third of the voting power is controlled by sixteen small obscure republics" mostly from South America, "which only a schoolboy could locate without consulting his atlas."⁴⁰ Despite this, eighteen Latin American states attended the 1907 Hague Conference.⁴¹

Expanded participation created procedural challenges, however. The most obvious challenge was to put increased pressure on the unanimity decision rule. Formally, unanimity was the rule at both Hague Conferences. Unanimity was, again, a logical corollary to sovereignty: if states are sovereign, they cannot be bound against their will. Unanimity, or at least some form of consensus, might be a reasonable aspiration in a small gathering like the Concert of Europe. But as the number of sovereigns rose to twenty-six and then forty-four, the degree of difficulty increased and so, too, did frustration with the entire process.

Again, creative agents devised and adapted rules to facilitate the work of these conferences, allowing some kind of progress without alienating states. One practice that emerged is what has been termed "quasi-unanimity." Min-

utes at The Hague reported outcomes such as a measure being “adopted unanimously with the exception of two states (United States and Great Britain) with one abstention (Portugal)” as was the case with one of the explosive bullets proposals.⁴² On its face, this is nonsensical, but in the context of the conference, statements like this provided a valuable finesse of the rules. Thus, while the Hague Conferences never formally abandoned unanimity, participants at times preferred to vote in ambiguous ways rather than upend the entire conference.

A second solution was use of the *voeu* (plural *voeux*). A *voeu* is a recommendation (literally, a vow or wish) that states can collectively express, often in the final acts of conferences, which require only a majority vote to be approved.⁴³ At The Hague, *voeux* were used only in conjunction with the final acts of the conferences. Subsequently, their use expanded enormously and they became essential to the operation of the League of Nations. Unanimity was also the formal decision rule in the League Assembly and, predictably, it quickly became unworkable. *Voeux*, which were originally intended to be exceptional procedures, became part of the standard toolkit for League work. The process by which this occurred neatly conforms to Diane Vaughn’s concept of “normalization of deviance” whereby small calculated deviations from standard rules, over time, become the new rule.⁴⁴ The *voeu* was initially used to respond to a thorny dilemma about electing nonpermanent members to the League Council, but quickly became widespread. “It is slightly startling to see the almost casual way in which it was done,” according to one observer. “It is probable that few, if any, of the First Assembly’s delegates quite realized the extent to which the unanimity requirement was thus attenuated.”⁴⁵

After the confusion about calling the second Hague Conference, regularizing and institutionalizing the Hague Conferences was also a priority for the American states. Root instructed his delegates to support regular meetings and the creation of machinery to set the program for these (indeed, the US delegates introduced the measure) and cited the inter-American experience as support: “Encouragement for such a course is to be found in the successful working of a similar arrangement for international conferences of the American Republics.”⁴⁶ Introduced as a *voeu* in the Final Act of the conference, the US resolution called for the creation of a “preparatory committee” that would

be charged by the governments with the duty of collecting the various propositions to be submitted to the conference, of investigating matters susceptible of future international regulation, and of preparing a programme to be approved by the governments soon enough to permit its serious study in each country. This committee shall also be charged with the duty of proposing a mode of organization and procedure for the conference itself.⁴⁷

Many Midwives for Modern Multilateralism

Delegate lists, meeting forms, and voting procedures do not excite most students of global governance. These core structures are the wallpaper of modern multilateralism, features so embedded in contemporary practice that we often take them for granted, yet they distribute power and determine outcomes in many ways. Conventional histories of international organization usually trace its roots to the Concert of Europe and the Hague Conferences, but to do so neglects these earlier innovations in the Americas that preceded the Hague Conferences by a decade or more. Europeans, left to their own devices, were not in a hurry to open the doors to broader participation at The Hague. What made change possible was the active pressure for inclusion from states in the Americas, coupled with creative entrepreneurship by Root and his colleagues. Structures of international law and the increasingly rational-legal character of multilateral gatherings facilitated the push for change. Sovereign equality norms, initially promulgated in Europe, had taken deep roots in the Americas and provided an important normative support for, as well as a vocabulary for, broader participation. Legal practices of treaty adherence and accession offered procedural tools that could be exploited to this end. States of the Americas are certainly not the only sources of contemporary multilateral forms, such as global meetings at which every state has a seat and a vote, but the construction of this outcome cannot be understood without their contribution. 🌐

Notes

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1. Robert A. Klein, *Sovereign Equality Among States: The History of an Idea* (Toronto, ON: University of Toronto Press, 1974), chaps. 1–2; Kurt Taylor Gaubatz, “Democratic States and the Sovereign Equality Norm,” Working Paper (Norfolk, VA: Old Dominion University, n.d.)

2. The total of independent states in the system was fifty-nine in 1899 and fifty-seven in 1907. William I. Hull, *The Two Hague Conferences and Their Contributions to International Law* (Boston: Ginn, 1908), pp. 10, 14–15.

3. Hull, *The Two Hague Conferences*, p. 14.

4. The International Sanitary Conference of 1881, for example, included delegates from states that had “jurisdiction of ports likely to be infected with yellow fever or cholera,” which ultimately included states as diverse as Haiti, Liberia, and the Netherlands. See “Memorandum in Relation to Points Proposed to Be Submitted to an International Sanitary Conference,” US National Archives and Records Administration, Record Group 43, Records of International Conferences, International Sanitary Conference, 1881, 250-8-51, Box 1, Folder 1 of 3; “List of Delegates to the International Sanitary Conference of Washington,” US National Archives and Records Administration, Record Group 43, Records of International Conferences, International Sanitary Conference, 1881, 250-8-51, Box 1, Folder 1 of 3.

5. The Geneva Conferences, understood to be relatively minor, did begin voting in 1868. On voting procedures in the Geneva Conferences, see G. F. von Martens, *Nouveau recueil general*, XX, 380, as quoted in Edwin DeWitt Dickinson, *The Equality of States in International Law* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1920), p. 283.

6. For a discussion of Andrés Bello's contributions to legal understandings of sovereignty and equality, see Louise Fawcett, "Between West and Non-West: Latin American Contributions to International Thought," *International History Review* 34, no. 4 (2012): 679–704; Ivan Jaksic, *Andrés Bello: Scholarship and Nation-building in Nineteenth-century Latin America* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001).

7. The treaties of Munster and Osnabruck were negotiated largely in writing, through diplomatic notes. R. B. Mowat, *Diplomacy and Peace* (New York: Robert M. McBride, 1936), pp. 50–52.

8. Martha Finnemore, *The Purpose of Intervention: Changing Beliefs About the Use of Force* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003), p. 113.

9. Pierre Boissier, *From Solferino to Tsushima: History of the International Committee of the Red Cross* (Geneva: Henry Dunant Institute, 1985); Martha Finnemore, *National Interests in International Society* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996), chap. 3.

10. Many thanks to Giovanni Mantilla for information on this point.

11. For a helpful overview of the conference proceedings, see Samuel Guy Inman, *Inter-American Conferences, 1826–1954: History and Problems* (Washington, DC: University Press, 1965), pp. 1–11.

12. Paraguay was apparently "overlooked," according to James Brown Scott, "Introduction," in James Brown Scott, ed., *The International Conferences of American States: 1889–1928* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1931), p. ix.

13. Gran Colombia, Peru, Mexico, and the Federation of Central America attended the 1826 meeting with observers present from Great Britain and the Netherlands. Subsequent meetings occurred in 1847–1848 (Lima), 1856 (Santiago), and 1864 (Lima). Inman, *Inter-American Conferences*, pp. 3–7.

14. Blaine actually proposed a Pan-American meeting as early as 1881 while serving as secretary of state under President James A. Garfield. That proposal highlighted arbitration and avoiding war as its chief purpose and made no mention of voting, but it emphasized equality among participants and bent over backwards to downplay US power or pride of place. See "Mr. Blaine to Mr. Osborn Proposing the First Pan-American Conference," Washington, DC, 29 November 1881. Reprinted in James Brown Scott, *The Hague Peace Conferences of 1899 and 1907*, vol. 1, *The Conferences* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1909), appendix 1, pp. 753–756.

15. Santo Domingo (which became the Dominican Republic) refused to come because the United States had yet to ratify an earlier treaty regarding arbitration and commerce made with Santo Domingo in 1884 and as such Santo Domingo was not "at liberty to enter into a new discussion of the subjects already settled by the Treaty of 1884" (as quoted in Inman, *Inter-American Conferences*, p. 34). Canada, while it had substantial domestic self-governance, did not control its own foreign policy and did not have the ability to enter into international treaties.

16. Roberto Herrera, "Evolution of Equality of States in the Inter-American System," *Political Science Quarterly* 61, no. 1 (March 1946): 90–119, 91.

17. Invitations were issued in 1888 for a meeting in 1889. For the invitation letter, see *International American Conference: Reports of Committees and Discussions Thereon*, vol. 1 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1890), p. 11. On the

one state—one vote policy, see Article XV in *Minutes of the International American Conference* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1890), p. 46, as cited in Herrera, “Evolution of Equality of States in the Inter-American System,” p. 98. Voting was rare, to say the least, prior to 1899. Dickinson, *The Equality of States in International Law*, pp. 282–283. Note that equal voting was never challenged for general matters of the meeting, but proportional voting was debated for economic matters. Herrera, “Evolution of Equality of States in the Inter-American System,” p. 98.

18. Herrera, “Evolution of Equality of States in the Inter-American System,” p. 99.

19. *Minutes of the International American Conference* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1890), minutes from meeting of 14 April 1890, “Special Report of the Committee on Customs Regulation,” pp. 683–684.

20. *Ibid.*, p. 684.

21. US Senate, *Second International Conference of American States: Message from the President of the United States, Transmitting a Communication from the Secretary of State, Submitting the Report, with Accompanying Papers, of the Delegates of the United States*, S. Doc. 330 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1902), p. 17.

22. James Brown Scott, ed., *The International Conferences of American States: 1889–1928* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1931), p. xiii. By 1899, all American states had representation at the bureau; see Calvin DeArmond Davis, *The United States and the Second Hague Peace Conference: American Diplomacy and International Organization, 1899–1914* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1975), p. 41, who references James D. Richardson, comp., *A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents*, vol. 9 (New York: Bureau of National Literature, 1920), pp. 6381–6382.

23. Scott, *The International Conferences of American States*, pp. xii–xiii.

24. *Ibid.*, p. xiii.

25. Davis, *The United States and the Second Hague Peace Conference*, p. 41.

26. *Ibid.*, p. 49.

27. *International American Conference*, p. 11.

28. Actually, this was only the starting rule of thumb and Russia “used its discretion in extending invitations in a wise and clever manner.” Hull, *The Two Hague Conferences and Their Contributions to International Law*, p. 10. Some European states without a presence in Saint Petersburg were added—Luxembourg, Montenegro, and, interestingly, Siam. Very small European states were omitted—Monaco, San Marino, and the Vatican. South Africa was also excluded, probably because of its ties to Britain. Brazil was invited but declined, saying it had no military to speak of. Hull, *The Two Hague Conferences and Their Contributions to International Law*, pp. 10–11. See also Scott, *The Hague Peace Conferences*, pp. 95–100.

29. “List of Governments Represented at the Peace Conference at the Hague and Their Delegates,” National Archives and Records Administration, RG 43, Records of International Conferences; Records of the US Delegation to the First International Peace Conference, Proceedings, 18 May–1 July 1899, Box 1, Entry 22. This is twenty-six of fifty-seven or fifty-nine total states in the system, depending on how one counts some pieces of the British Empire.

30. The text of the original invitation from the Netherlands government can be found in Frederick W. Holls, *The Peace Conference at the Hague and Its Bearings on International Law and Policy* (New York: Macmillan, 1900), pp. 32–34.

31. Interestingly, “The unanimity rule was not mentioned in the invitations to the conferences nor in the rules of procedure adopted, but it seems to have been accepted

as an essential corollary of the doctrine of sovereignty which admits individual consent alone as the basis of national obligation. The inevitable result was that the conferences largely failed to achieve practical results" (Frederick Sherwood Dunn, *The Practice and Procedure of International Conferences* [Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1929], p. 125).

32. Edwin D. Mead, "The Results of the Two Hague Conferences and Demands upon the Third Conference" (Boston: World Peace Foundation, 1911), p. 2.

33. Theodore Roosevelt's administration was the first government to call for a second conference. Civil society groups in the United States and elsewhere had been advocating follow-up meetings since the 1899 conference adjourned. See, for example, the petition of the American Peace Society and related efforts discussed in Scott, *The Hague Peace Conferences*, pp. 89–90, and Scott's discussion of Roosevelt's initiative (via a circular by his secretary of state, John Hay), pp. 91–95.

34. Hull, *The Two Hague Conferences*, pp. 5–11. The fact that Russia had been preoccupied with the Russo-Japanese war (the irony of which was not lost on commenters at the time) was given as a reason for Russia's delayed attention to the matter of calling a second arms control conference. Scott, *The Hague Peace Conferences*, pp. 93–95.

35. In his proposal for the stillborn 1881 Pan-American conference, Blaine said, "For some years past a growing disposition has been manifested by certain States of Central and South America to refer disputes affecting grave questions of international relationship and boundaries to arbitration rather than to the sword." "Mr. Blaine to Mr. Osborn, Proposing the First Pan-American Conference," 29 November 1881. Reprinted in Scott, *The Hague Peace Conferences*, appendix to chap. 1, p. 753.

36. US Senate, *Second International Conference of American States*, p. 11. See also Articles 1 and 3 of the Protocol of Adherence to the Conventions of The Hague, *ibid.*, pp. 36–37.

37. Robert Bacon and James Brown Scott, ed., *Latin America and the United States: Addresses by Elihu Root* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1917), especially pp. 245–282; Philip C. Jessup, *Elihu Root*, vol. 1 (New York: Dodd, Mead, 1938), chap. 23.

38. Correspondences between US Secretary of State Elihu Root and the Russian ambassador to the US Roman Rosen are reprinted in Shabtai Rosenne, ed. and comp., *The Hague Peace Conferences of 1899 and 1907 and International Arbitration: Reports and Documents* (The Hague: TMC Asser Press, 2001), especially pp. 148–155.

39. Letter from the Russian ambassador to the US secretary of state (12 April 1906), in Rosenne, *The Hague Peace Conferences of 1899 and 1907*, pp. 151–152.

40. "The Hague Greets Peace Conferees," *New York Times*, 15 June 1907.

41. The United States brought the total to nineteen American republics at the conference.

42. Dunn, *The Practice and Procedure of International Conferences*, pp. 129–130. According to Dr. Zorn, a German delegate, voting was "obscure and inconsistent" at the Hague Conference of 1907. Walter Schucking, *The International Union of the Hague Conferences* (English translation), p. 210, as cited in Dunn 1929, p. 130.

43. Voeux were apparently used as early as 1856 in the Treaty of Paris, but the 1899 Hague Conference was the "first occasion upon which the peculiar character of such a practice became fully understood." A. J. P. Tammes, "Decisions of International Organs," *94 Hague Recueil* 261 (1958), p. 292, as quoted in John P. Grant and

J. Craig Barker, *Parry and Grant Encyclopedia Dictionary of International Law*, 3rd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), p. 663.

44. Diane Vaughn, *The Challenger Launch Decision: Risky Technology, Culture, and Deviance at NASA* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996); Michael Barnett and Martha Finnemore, *Rules for the World: International Organizations in Global Politics* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004), pp. 39–40.

45. Margaret E. Burton, *The Assembly of the League of Nations* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1941), p. 183.

46. Quoted in Hull, *The Two Hague Conferences*, p. 501.

47. Resolution quoted in *ibid.*, pp. 501–502.