Freedom and Movement—Necessities for Community Well-Being

Life is movement. Those who crave life crave movement. Almost every satisfaction young people seek is associated with movement—a chance to work at their major interests, or recreation, adventure, companionship, "excitement," new experience, live issues. Even craving for security is not an exception. The craving is for security for movement, not for inaction. Take away movement and a sense of movement from any community, and young people will desire to leave. It is because the city seems to be a place of movement that young people go there. Bring to a community a strong sense of significant, varied and sustained movement, and young people will not leave.

If progressive advance is not provided for and encouraged, whether in neighborhood, religious association or nation, the craving for movement becomes pathological, the desire for security thwarts the need for change, and degeneration sets in. This need extends to all units of society.

If opportunity for movement dies out in small communities, escape from such communities to the city gives small promise for enduring increase of opportunity. The urban masses become subjected to the regimentation of government, business and professional bureaucracy, and the greatly increased friction of urban life. It is necessary to go to the roots of the problem, to cure the breakdown of movement at the level of small community relationships, carrying freedom up from these roots into the wider associations of states, cities and nations.

Superficial change is not movement, as is indicated by the saying, "The more things change, the more they stay the same." Live movement must be at once progressive and conservative, free from outdated restrictions, governed by more universal laws and principles. It is the purpose of this issue of Community Service News to examine this problem of freedom and to suggest some general principles by which to develop sound conditions of freedom and progressive movement within society.
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Ninth Annual Conference on the Small Community

Yellow Springs, Ohio, June 17-18, 1952

(See announcement on back cover)
FREEDOM IN THE SMALL COMMUNITY

By Arthur E. Morgan

Freedom is much more talked about and written about than it is thought about. It is not the simple, clear matter that our legal traditions, our slogans and our dogmas often imply.

This is true even of the philosophical doctrine of freedom of the will. One might suppose that the choice is between whether a man is a god, able to do anything he will, or is like a stone, moved by external forces, and freely contributing nothing. The subject has a much narrower range. "Which of you by taking thought can add one cubit"—eighteen inches—"to his stature," or can change the color of his eyes, or arrange that his planet earth shall revolve about the star Arcturus rather than about our sun? At most man has a limited degree of freedom. Only an all-wise and all-powerful being could have unlimited freedom, and there would be room for but one such in the universe.

When we bring the problem down to human scale it remains complex. Robinson Crusoe on his island had a kind of freedom not experienced in Manhattan or on Main Street in Littleville. Crusoe had no traffic rules, no taxes, no employer's dictation or union rules. No rules of fashion prescribed what he should wear; there was no prohibition to his taking as his own anything he saw and wanted. Such freedom!

Yet, gentle reader, if you were alone on Crusoe's island and by rubbing a magic cocoanut could summon a magic banana leaf to whisk you instantly to Manhattan or to Main Street in Littleville, would you go or stay? Yes, you would go, fully realizing that every single one of the freedoms we have mentioned must be left behind.

More than that: suppose that on arriving at Manhattan or on Main Street in Littleville you could wave a magic wand and repeal all such laws, restrictions and other compulsions as those we have mentioned, would you wave your wand? Not if you were in your right mind, for you would know that if these controls should be removed, confusion or worse would follow. The freedom you most crave would become less, rather than more.

What, then, is this freedom we crave? Is it not freedom to fulfill our own lives? Being civilized, social creatures we want the advantages of modern society, and we know that these are possible only under rules and customs which restrict personal freedom for the sake of the general freedom which comes only with social organization, social discipline, and general order and welfare.

The freedom we seek is freedom from arbitrary, capricious or needless
restriction. We want only such controls as will best contribute to our living full lives.

Even such freedom must be qualified, for other people also want to lead full lives. As with trees in a forest, there is not enough place in the sun to allow each individual to spread out without restraint. When we see that a very rich man has pushed many poor people off the land to create for himself a vast estate where he can expand at will, his kind of freedom does not capture our admiration.

*The Nonconformist in the Small Community.* Some very great contributions to human progress have been made by men of strongly individual personality whose thinking in some significant respects was independent of the prevailing mores, or even contrary to them.

Copernicus, working out, contrary to prevailing belief, the motion of the earth; Mendel, working alone in his garden year after year with his pigeons and sweet peas to discover the processes of heredity; Elijah, feeling alone among all men in calling his people from idolatry; Henry Thoreau, living alone at Walden or refusing to pay his taxes, but transmitting a precious inheritance—for many such independent thinkers of greater or lesser rank a sense of independence or even of separateness from the prevailing thought or spirit has been an important factor in social pioneering.

Probably many, many other men and women have had capacity and inclination for original creative thinking, but lacked the combination of drive and hardihood to break through the prevailing and seemingly authoritative conventional pattern of thought and action, and their possible contributions were thereby lost. That controlling dominance of the prevailing pattern would seem the most probable reason for the apparent uncreativity of many primitive cultures over long periods.

The small community does well to develop tolerance for variants from its patterns. But that tolerance should be discriminating. Whether tolerance leads to creative variety and human advance, or to superficiality, degenerating indulgence, and general decadence, will depend on whether the community, or the larger culture of which it is a part, is strongly committed to fundamental principles of living.

What we mean by fundamental principles may be illustrated from the field of science. In its way the world of science is a world of freedom. It is but little opposed to new theories and new ideas. It is strongly committed to freedom. However, it has exacting standards for determining whether new ideas shall be received into the accepted body of scientific opinion. The ideas must have been arrived at by processes of thought and experiment which are fully disclosed. They must be verified and supported by other, independent inquiry. The freedom of science is in the recognized freedom to explore without restraint. Toward violation of its fundamental principles
science is not tolerant. New ideas which are arrived at in violation of those principles are refused place in the body of science. The freedom of science is a disciplined freedom.

Freedom of opinion in the community, as well as in larger social units, calls similarly for general principles of control. To the extent that it has those well chosen principles, the tolerance and freedom which it encourages will bring enlargement and refinement of living. To the extent that those controlling principles are lacking, variation from tested community ways may lead to disintegration of community life and values.

What general, recognized principles of community life and thought can we identify which may well be the control of freedom? One is that people should deal honestly and openly with each other. Freedom in the community should not include tolerant acceptance of or indifference to subterfuge, malicious gossip, intrigue or other forms of deceit.

Another general principle is that each person should see his own interests in relation to the community as a whole and in relation to its members. The freedom of a member of the community should not go to the extent of pursuing his own interests regardless of their effects upon the interests of others. Yet, in case of conflict, such deference to the interest of others should in turn defer to more universal values.

Social welfare is in considerable degree dependent on the individual physical well-being of the members. Personal habits are contagious, and therefore freedom in the community should not go so far as to be indifferent to the spread of physical habits that are physically or psychologically destructive. For example, a sound society will undertake to eliminate the use of opium by addicts. Because of the question of fact as to the actual harmfulness of various physical habits the application of this principle to marginal problems may always be subject to controversy. However, the fundamental principle of the right of a community or of a larger society to be intolerant of clearly destructive physical habits, or to prevent its social climate from being permeated with them, seems clear. Tolerance where the truth of the matter is not clearly established, and freedom to critically inquire into the truth, are reasonable areas of freedom. Whether or not the issue is reasonably clear, as in the case of opium, is a matter of practical judgment.

Another general principle of community life should be encouragement of honest, competent, responsible inquiry in any field. To illustrate the qualifications of "competent" and "responsible," it would be neither competent nor responsible inquiry for a member of the community not trained in the field to put typhoid germs in the public water supply to find out at first hand whether they would cause an epidemic. In such a case Jefferson's often quoted saying may not apply: "It is safe to tolerate evil if truth is left free to fight it." There will always be marginal issues involving the sincerity,
responsibility and competence of inquiry. Final reliance cannot be placed on any dogma about freedom, but only on the intellectual, ethical and emotional climate of the society involved.

We have given illustrations of general principles which should guide a community or other society in determining its attitude toward freedom. Where such general principles are imbedded in the life and thought of a community, encouragement of freedom within the framework of those principles, and honest, competent, responsible inquiry into the validity of the general principles themselves, will be wholesome. Such encouragement will result in wholesome, creative, progressive and sound development. Where such governing principles are lacking in the spirit, the climate and the understanding of a society, undisciplined freedom will tend to develop into license, indulgence, antisocial selfishness, and a tendency to social degeneration. Such degeneration will continue until fundamental principles emerge or until some form of dictatorship takes over.

In most actual societies there is neither full development nor total absence of recognition of general social principles. Therefore, in most societies some elements of freedom are leading to wholesome, creative growth, while at the same time to some extent the tolerance of indifference is leading to social decadence and disintegration.

The freedom which is wholesome and creative is in large degree a byproduct of the achievement of general principles of social living. Only that kind of freedom grows to greater freedom. The tolerance of indifference tends to destroy freedom. Almost invariably it leads to coercion and dictatorship.

* * * * *

To a considerable degree a man's personality is made up of the attitudes and traits which he accepts and defends as part of himself. A lame man does not accept and defend lameness. It has been forced upon him by adverse circumstance. He would give it up if he could, and does not propagandize to promote lameness. Similarly a person may have a defect of personality, such as a bad temper or a weakness for alcohol, which he does not willingly accept and does not defend. It does not become an accepted part of his personality.

Where a person does accept and defend an attitude or a trait which is unacceptable to his society and identifies it with himself, he unconsciously associates his survival with the survival of that element of his personality. Freedom to him is unobstructed opportunity to live in accord with such trait or attitude. He will fight and propagandize for his attitudes and habits which are socially unacceptable, and will try to make them the accepted standards of society, because he intuitively sees those attitudes as part of him-
self, and his own survival as involved in their survival and their social acceptance. Any infringement upon free expression of those attitudes he sees as lack of freedom, as prejudice and bigotry.

Where a society has achieved and made a part of its spirit and structure such fundamental attitudes as we have previously described, the presence of persons who accept and defend contrary attitudes sets up social disharmony, and raises the issue of freedom. What should a community or other social unit do in such case?

First, it should carefully and critically examine its standards to see whether they are in fact fundamental principles of good living. Sometimes obsolete ways, or even special privileges, may be embedded in the so-called principles of good society.

Next the community should examine its own behavior. Sometimes non-conformist action only brings into the open the fact that the publicly approved standards of the community are not the actual standards by which it lives. Until such incongruity in the general life of the community is resolved the nonconformity which is present may be little more than open avowal of the actual community standards.

Where community standards stand the test of honest inquiry, and where the major part of the community lives in accord with them, the problem remains of what to do in case of the nonconformist whose action tends to destroy the peace and harmony of the community, or to infect its spirit with decadence. This problem in its details commonly has been and long will continue to be a subject of inquiry, research, experiment and disagreement.

In many excellent small communities the chief reliance for changing antisocial attitudes will be on the influence of good will, friendly understanding and patience, along with clear, firm, open acceptance of recognized community standards. Only a few antisocial persons will long withstand such a course. Where the community spirit has not risen to a level to sustain such attitudes, various forms of discipline, ostracism, coercion and punishment will be tried, with varying results.

Thus we see that the problem of freedom in the community is not the simple matter of "more freedom is necessarily better and less freedom is worse" that it sometimes is presented to be. Freedom is a byproduct of a way of life, and cannot be long maintained on any other basis.

In accord with this general pattern of thought are there any generally desirable policies with reference to freedom in the small community? The ancient community tended to enforce an entire traditional pattern on its members. The habit not only of allowing but of encouraging critical, honest, serious, open-minded examination of its inherited standards is a kind of freedom which should be greatly increased.
Respect for marked individuality, which goes its own way rather than the conventional way of the community, should be encouraged so long as such divergence comes within the limits of well-considered community standards.

The community which has achieved well-considered general principles of attitude and of action will begin to have a distinctive personality, based on community character. Any land will have a rich and varied culture to the extent that its communities have achieved sound and creative standards.

Ethical and social concern to explore, to critically appraise, and to establish vital principles of community life, and courage to espouse them and to encourage them openly and unequivocally, are the very essence of good community life. Without such temper and attitude creative freedom cannot be retained. Failure to distinguish the disciplined, creative freedom which results from living by vital principles, from the undisciplined, indulgent laxity which is the outcome of lack of principles of living—such failure is a prelude to sure social deterioration and decadence. Freedom is a byproduct of a way of life.

Community must live in accordance with reality. The growing population of the world, and growing technology, both compel closer human interrelationships. It is in recognition of such inevitable relationships that community must survive and flourish. We can make such changes into either catastrophe or opportunity by our way of dealing with them. The following is from The Historic Faith and a Changing World, by W. Norman Pettinger:

"At every point today, the individual is 'cabined, cribbed, confined!' This may be for good or bad—that is not our interest here. The point is that from police regulations about driving speed to the Security Exchange Commission's control of the stock market, there is constant interference with the individual's self-expression. And the area of interference is growing rapidly so that almost no part of the citizen's life is without some measure of control. It is this fact that points the way to the nature of the new society. Whatever may be said of this coming order, it will be one of increasing control of the individual. Some may not like this trend, others may approve it. But whether we like it or not it is on the way and we can do little or nothing to arrest it. The best we can do is to try to direct it to a growth as sound and healthy as possible." Is it not possible that the healthy community shall create an environment in which external control may be displaced by internal harmony and freedom, even within a closely interdependent world?
Freedom and Community

One of the reasons why young people leave their home communities is to secure greater freedom. Desire for greater range and choice of activities is a deep and natural craving, common to nearly all men. The way to meet this desire is not to discourage or to suppress it, but to find ways within the community pattern to encourage and to satisfy it.

Old-time communities varied greatly in respect to the freedom their members enjoyed. Stefansson describes a degree of freedom in Eskimo villages which would seem extreme to us. It was bad form even to urge a person to do anything against his will. If both a fishing and a hunting party were planned, and if a husband should prefer to fish and his wife to hunt, it was improper for either one to urge the other. The choice must be free. Belief and unbelief and their expression were free, except that the community would not tolerate tale-bearing or trouble-making which would tend to create cleavages and enmities in the group. On the other hand, anthropologists picture many primitive communities in which life and thought are severely regimented, and in which the individual is surrounded throughout his life with compulsions, prohibitions and inhibitions.

European and American communities are between these extremes, but on the whole there is less freedom of thought and action in our small communities than in our cities.

In the past, the Indian village was alive and vital, but had a social and even personal quality that hampered the free development of the individual. It did not allow its inmates that freedom from constant interference which active and adventurous spirits demand. It was like a fussy mother that will not recognize that the children have grown up and must lead their own independent lives. The development of towns was accelerated not only by the greater variety of opportunities presented in them but also by the comparative impersonality which made intercourse between different groups and individuals freer and easier.

—Humayun Kabir, of Indian Ministry of Education.

According to all the precepts, it is quite easy to train men in great bodies for almost any purpose you will—to hunt wild beasts, and even to track down beggars and other human beings. But to see that these trained creatures remain human, and righteous, and good—that is, in truth, not easy, nor can it be expected to be so. —Pestalozzi.
THE SOCIAL FOUNDATIONS OF
POLITICAL FREEDOM
AN APPRECIATION OF ALEXANDER PEKELIS*

By Robert A. Nisbet

On the evidence of the essays in this book† the untimely death of their
author, in 1946, took from the United States and the world of scholarship
in general an outstanding interpreter of legal institutions and social orga-
nization. . .

What gives unity to the book, besides the discipline of the author’s
mind, is a philosophical position that can best be described as cultural plural-
ism. . . For Pekelis, pluralism is not a dogma, not a set of conclusions pre-
determined by assumptions. It is a framework of thought, a perspective,
within which the social and legal problems of our time may be considered
and, through pragmatic research, eventually solved. . .

Pekelis offers his homage to “the man who first had the extraordinary
daring to conceive the idea that while singing or playing two or more
themes simultaneously you could bring about, not a terrible musical cacoph-
ony or political anarchy, but a newer, better, more perfect union and beauty.
The strong fabric of the common law, the social structure of the common
law countries, building a unity of their very variety, represent one of the
most astonishing achievements of legal and political contrapuntal harmony.”

Pekelis argues that the historical effect of the Continent’s civil law codes
is the conceptual creation of aggregates of socially isolated legal atoms,
given organization only by the myth of the omnipotent State, an organiza-
tion that must always be precarious and always prejudicial to the contexts
of freedom. He believes that in doctrines of legal formalism and political
atomism are to be found some of the prime sources of the creation of the
modern masses, aggregates of people stripped of their cultural and social
identities. Modern political centralization, in its war against internal class,
association, and community, has tended to level the barriers between man
and State, leaving only a dust heap of humanity powerless to cope with
tyranny.

In one of the most valuable essays, Pekelis examines critically the prev-
alent assumption that the Anglo-American legal tradition is “individualistic.”

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*Extracts reprinted from Autonomous Groups Bulletin, Autumn 1951 (Maria
Rogers, editor, 1004 Hotel Ambassador, New York 22).
†Law and Social Action: Selected Essays of Alexander Pekelis; edited by Milton
R. Konvitz; publication of New School for Social Research; Cornell University
What other students of American life have so often called individualism turns out to be in fact intolerance of central authority; an intolerance based upon collective appreciation of the significance of communities, regions, the States, and the whole network of loyalties developed within a great diversity of social and cultural associations, through which the challenges of the American frontier were continuously met. "Through a kind of optical error," he says, "this phenomenon . . . has sometimes been taken for individualism."

One is reminded at this juncture that when the first American edition of Tocqueville's *Democracy in America* made its appearance, it was necessary for the translator to explain in a special footnote that by "individualism" Tocqueville meant something quite different from the prevailing American use of the word . . . Tocqueville's major argument was that anti-governmentalism sprang, not from individuals, abstractly conceived, but from the non-individualistic social organizations of family, religion, association, and community . . .

What Pekelis does superbly in this book is to reinforce the implications of Tocqueville and place the argument in the specific contexts of legal history. He demonstrates that the basic element of American freedom is not the abstract individual of Utilitarian fancy, but the concrete social groups in which Americans actually meet the exigencies of life and resist the encroachments of external authority. And he demonstrates with equal skill that it is in Continental doctrines of centralized, formal law that we actually encounter individualism. Hence, as he points out, France has been at the same time a typically centralized and typically individualistic country.

It is, then, the social group, the local area, and the cultural association that Pekelis sees as the real foundation of legal and political freedom. But it must not be supposed that he makes the naive mistake of identifying social plurality with the universal good. There are evil associations as well as good ones. Crime as well as altruism, intolerance as well as tolerance, ethnic prejudice as well as ethnic accord, superstition as well as enlightenment, are nourished by the associative ties of human beings. These essays have the merit of recognizing that all cultural values, good and evil, are given structure and meaning by the social groups in which they are set.

What Pekelis is asking is that for good and bad, these groups, rather than unreal aggregates of legal individuals, be seen as the actual elements of social organization and that the reality of groups and associations be recognized by our legal system. This is asking a great deal. "We all profess the official credo of our era according to which society and state are composed of single individuals rather than of groups and individuals . . . We forget that groups have a reality of their own, rights of their own, and that the exclusive emphasis on individual rights runs the risk of atomizing society, of creating a centralized organization of isolated and helpless individuals,
and of ultimately impairing the delicate network of primary communities—the basic source of individual freedom and happiness."

It is the major argument of most of the essays in this book that the prime necessity of the present age is an outright reversal of older philosophical and legal doctrines of atomism and a frank recognition by courts of law that groups, not less than natural persons, have substantive reality. . . .

Already there is evidence, the author states, that constitutional lawyers and the courts are slowly coming to recognize a new dimension of constitutional regard—the dimension of "private sovereignties." It may well be, he says, that this recognition will prove the greatest single advance in constitutional law since the years immediately following the American Civil War. But the way is perilous and needs the most careful examination.

The central problem involved is illustrated by a dilemma with which American society is confronted at the present time. On the one hand we have a constitutional philosophy that emphasizes the equal rights of citizens, and a court system that zealously restrains official governmental agencies from encroaching upon these rights. On the other hand, however, arbitrary inequalities and widespread discriminations are often engendered and reinforced by the "private sovereignties" of social organization—labor unions, business groups, neighborhoods, trade associations, and the like. Seldom are human rights to equal opportunity limited or blocked by formal agencies of government in the United States. When they are, the courts do so. Pekelis points out, within the prevailing view of the Constitution as essentially a set of limitations upon the powers of the executive and legislative branches of government. This conception of the Constitution is one of the glories of the Anglo-American system of judicial checks upon political power.

Nevertheless, we are confronted by a situation where by very reason of the permissive power-system of Anglo-American government, private sovereignties arise, under the protection of freedom of association, which often do in practice what formal agencies of government are prevented from doing: that is, establish formidable restraints upon individual rights and equalities. And they can do this effectively because of the existence of one of our most cherished and valuable liberties—liberty of private association.

"If you can stop the sale of a book as chairman of the Booksellers' Board of Trade Committee," Pekelis points out, "it is senseless to try to become Boston's chief of police. . . . If you wish to keep Jews or Japanese out of your village, you might better do it as director of a realtors' association than as the village mayor."

This is the kind of situation which, historically, has led impassioned exponents of human rights to attempt to use the absolute power of the State to sterilize the social groups and cultural associations which often lie behind odious discriminations and social injustices. It is the kind of situation which
lead Rousseau to see in the absoluteness of the political State, not tyranny, but release—release from social bonds. . . .

Pekelis rejects this easy but fatal prescription for moral reform. Freedom and diversity of association are, he repeatedly insists, the very essence of genuine freedom. Discrimination based upon color, religion, or race is offensive, but measures to abate it must not destroy the diversity of association and belief which so frequently forms the context of private discriminations. There is, Pekelis maintains, a freedom of prejudice as well as a freedom of reason. . . .

What then is to be done? How do we maintain the reality and the autonomy of "private sovereignties," so necessary to cultural freedom, and, at the same time, lessen the incidence of discriminations which, far more than any set of purely economic conditions, tend to breed dissatisfaction and eventual recourse to totalitarian methods of redress and emancipation? . . .

Pekelis' approach to the problem is twofold. On the one hand, he recommends dealing with it formally, through a fuller incorporation of the dimension of private association into present constitutional law and jurisprudence. On the other hand, as it is in essence a moral problem, he believes that ultimately our hope of solving the dilemma lies in the achievement of the desired objectives through the private sovereignties themselves, and through the smallest units of political government. . . .

There is, as Pekelis makes clear, already a growing tendency by the courts to deal with the Constitution in these more inclusive terms. Already there are decisions by the Supreme Court which make clear that the private sovereignties of neighborhood, labor union, business association, do not possess unrestricted autonomies of action when the residential, occupational, and welfare rights of individuals are violated. The merit of Pekelis' essay is its eloquent argument for wider recognition, within a pluralist perspective which will never sacrifice the fundamental necessity of diverse, autonomous association in society, of both the philosophic and judicial precedents in this direction. . . .

I have said that Pekelis believes that ultimately our hope lies in the achievement of the moral objectives through the private sovereignties themselves and through the smallest units of political government. In final analysis, he rests his case for this solution upon the essential character of the American constitutional and social system. For, as he states repeatedly, the real federalism of our structure of government is a federalism, not of forty-eight states merely, but of the whole network of communities, regions, associations, and groups which, with their traditional autonomies of action, comprise American society. Some of these are political in nature; some are purely social; many share in both the political and the social. Multiplicity coupled with decentralization, this is the reality; and our social action and
reform must always keep this in mind. We must seek, to the maximum, to accomplish moral objectives from the base of the social pyramid, not from the top down. Localism is a virtue never to be lost in any real program of social action. . . . There is no magic in it, there is no guarantee of solution of all social problems. But as the framework for a program of action it does guarantee that the greatest single obstacle to totalitarianism—the existence of powerful diversified cultural communities and social groups—will not be destroyed through either malice or virtue.

The picture of Pekelis which is given in the foregoing article indicates a deep commitment to the autonomy of private and local associations, in addition to traditional respect for the rights of individuals. This is an emphasis greatly needed in the United States and in the world at the present time. Yet to see this principle of cultural pluralism as having no limits would be disastrous. There is a nearly universal characteristic of living things, the balance of opposing forces. In the human body, for instance, there are processes which tend to heat the body, and other factors which tend to check the heating process. The result is a temperature control within about one degree of 98.6 Fahrenheit. There are many other characteristic bodily oppositions. If these antagonisms fail to balance properly, there is illness or death.

In human society viewed as a whole, similar oppositions are essential to health and survival of the whole. The present-day failure to control centralization calls for such presentations as that of Pekelis. Yet centralization also is a vital principle. The oil industry and the labor unions at this moment threaten the national economy. Even though they make peace this time, they illustrate a kind of risk which cannot go uncontrolled. In a dynamic society the existence of powerful antagonistic groups calls for a superior mediating or coordinating power which will prevent private groups from destroying the life of the country.

The Bill of Rights of the Federal Constitution was an effort to identify elements of social interest which should be recognized as transcending the control of local or private associations. The fourteenth amendment to the Constitution gave effect to the conviction stated by Lincoln that the nation cannot exist “half slave and half free.”

The emphasis of Pekelis is highly valuable as contributing to a necessary counterbalance to centralization, not as a weapon for its destruction. What constitutes good balance between centralization and autonomy of local and private associations must be arrived at, not by abstract or absolute social theory, but by intelligence, skill, and good intent in the art of government.

—A. E. M.
HARMONY IN INTIMATE COMMUNITY RELATIONS

In the Book of Acts it is recorded of the earliest Christians—so few in number that they could all meet together—that they had all things in common. When the little band of pilgrims in the Mayflower approached the American coast they drew up a compact with similar condition of sharing. In some of the Palestine Kvutzot (cooperative farming and living groups) the principle of sharing was carried so far that clothes were owned in common. Clean clothes were issued from the laundry in routine order, regardless of who had worn them previously.

With these and similar cases as examples it often is affirmed that the ideal state of human society is one in which all experiences and resources are shared. Often it is assumed that sharing is in itself a virtue—the more sharing the greater approach to ideal living. Whenever the intimacy of sharing is lessened it is assumed by some people that there is necessarily a loss of excellence in social relations.

In actual experience we find that sharing of goods and living conditions tends to vary inversely with the size of the group. The smaller the group, the greater the sharing; the larger the group, the less the sharing. It seems to us that this tendency does not necessarily represent a failure of human association in larger groups, but is normal and desirable.

In the family—the smallest and most intimate social group—sharing is carried furthest, with the result that in a good family, personal and group traits appear which represent the finest achievements of human culture. In the primary group, or face-to-face small community, the degree of sharing is less than that in a single family, but greater than in larger and more impersonal groups.

Harmony in intimate family relations is achieved at the cost of resolving many personal stresses. The members of a good family have learned by practice how to subordinate personal inclinations to the general family welfare or to the welfare of other individual members. Family groups can be either too small or too large for the most successful adjustments. A childless or one-child family may find intimate adjustment more difficult than a family with four or five children.

For any given degree of intimateness of association, the larger number of persons involved beyond the optimum, the greater will be the energy involved in making adjustments and in maintaining harmony. In a home for orphan children, relations between the children and between the children and foster parents are less intimate than in case of similar relations in a single family. No matter how selfless, affectionate and devoted the house
mother of twenty children, it is not physically or nervously possible for her to have the same kind of relations as those of a mother with a family of half a dozen children.

It is natural and desirable that society consist of groups of varying size and complexity. The intimacy of affection and of sharing in a normal family of from four or five to eight or ten members develops qualities of emotional security, mutual understanding and appreciation which are very precious. Effort to maintain a similar degree of intimacy in a greatly enlarged group usually is unsuccessful. (Sometimes, of course, a person with unusual vigor and emotional resources can maintain as intimate relations with a group of twenty as another person of very limited vigor and emotional or spiritual quality can in a family of three or four.)

We do well to recognize these limitations of human association, and to organize our world with reference to them. It would be an irreparable loss to society to lose the qualities of personality which develop from intimate family associations. Beyond the individual family the face-to-face small community makes possible another degree of intimacy of relationship—less intense than that of the family, but more so than that of the city or the region. To lose the qualities of character which thrive in the relatively intimate relations of the small face-to-face community would be a great social tragedy. Similarly the region has its degree of acquaintance more intimate than that of the nation, and the nation allows a degree of understanding and intimacy beyond that of mankind as a whole.

These degrees of intimacy of human relations are valuable and necessary to a good social order. Each level of association has contributions to make which can be made by no other. There can be no sound social policy without recognition of this principle of levels of intimacy of association. Absence of recognition of this principle leads to many undertakings which distort social relations and deteriorate social quality.

Promoters of cooperative communities often plan for a program of "all things common" on a scale which results either in nervously and emotionally overtaxing the members, or reducing family relations to a less intimate level and to more routine association. One of the greatest offenses against this principle is the program of school consolidation. The number of associates with whom a normal child can have normal, intimate play and association is very limited. To herd together large numbers because of financial economy results in loss of a quality of intimate association which is desirable for childhood and youth, and essential for full personal development. At the other extreme we have a world federation movement which inclines to depreciate national life, and to take a single step from the individual to world government. If such world organization should be
achieved it would be disastrous to much that is excellent in human culture.

Varied degrees of size and intimacy in human association are vital to human welfare at all levels. This fact is inadequately recognized in present-day living. However, the ignoring of a need does not save us from the consequences of our course. Much of the maladjustment of present-day society is a direct outcome of our failure to realize the need for a hierarchy of human associations, from the family, through the small community, the local region, the general region, the nation, the regional association of nations and an over-all world society.

—A. E. M.

COMMUNITY NEPOTISM

It is well for members of a family to stand together to face the world. It is well for them to share the family resources, to divide the burdens among them, and for the strong to help the weak. How natural and how beautiful for the mother to give tenderest care to the weakest child.

Yet all this mutual consideration should relate to the use of legitimate family resources. For a family to place one of its members where he will put other families or the community under tribute is not good nor beautiful. Such practice goes by the ugly word “nepotism.” Within the family we do well to bear each other’s burdens, and to extend the spirit of brotherhood and sharing as far abroad as we can. But the sharing we arrange for members of our family should be a sharing of what is ours, not a sharing of what properly belongs to others.

The same principle should apply to communities. Many years ago the town in which I lived sought an appropriation from the national government for a local improvement. As an engineer I drew attention to the fact that the value of this local project to our community would be less than its cost to the national government. The disapproval of my comment was almost as strong as though I had proposed treason. During recent years various American communities have welcomed local engineering improvements which are uneconomic, but which have resulted in local benefits from national funds.

The willingness of a community to accept at state or national expense benefits that are not worth what they cost, is on the same unethical level as nepotism. As yet our common ethnic standards have not achieved a quality which leads to the repudiation of such special privilege. The fundamental weakness of our nation is not in manpower or equipment, but in standards of action which reduce our total strength. Community selfishness is a serious element in that weakness.

—ARTHUR E. MORGAN
WHY BE CONCERNED ABOUT COMMUNITY?

ARTHUR E. MORGAN

We cannot appraise the future of the community unless we understand its past. The human species, throughout its very long existence and until relatively recent times, has had a certain fairly definite social organization, a type of organization which probably greatly antedated the emergence of the species. For probably more than 99% of human existence the primary group, face-to-face, community, and the family, seem to have been the two universal units of society. Urbanism has been a relatively recent and relatively transient phenomenon. Up to a hundred years ago probably more than 95% of humanity lived in villages or in other rural groupings. Even today, with a degree of urbanization the world never knew before, more than three quarters of the earth’s population are small community dwellers.

So far as we can learn, no societies have long survived the disintegration of small community life. When we say that man is a small community animal we mean that he is so biologically and culturally conditioned to small community life that with relatively few exceptions a family living in an urban environment survives for only a few generations.

This major fact concerning human survival and human society has been generally overlooked by the social sciences and by determiners of public policy. The oversight is not just an academic matter. It has very serious practical consequences. We need that kind of understanding of the history and of the nature of the primary group community which will enable us to see what elements of primary group community life are essential to normal human survival and development.

Although the primary group community seems to have elements which are essential to human survival and well-being, yet today it leaves deep human cravings unsatisfied. Urban life has characteristics which not only satisfy certain strong cravings, but which are of great social advantage.

In earlier times the primary group community covered the whole of living, economic, cultural and religious. Human society is coming to have a split personality. The small community seems to have qualities without which men cannot survive. Yet its shortcomings are such as to drive people away from it. The city, on the other hand, while throughout history it has brought an end to the families which come to live in it, yet has made contributions to progress, free inquiry, culture and tolerance which are among the most prized elements of our inheritance. Under present-day conditions neither the small primary-group community nor the city is a satisfactory environment for living, yet we must have some of the qualities of both.
Human progress in general has not come from drifting with the tide of events, but from an attitude of inquiry and of mastery which moves us to take the raw materials of life as we find them, and to master them and reshape them to our purpose. So it should be with our social environment and our social organization. In the past a drifting with circumstance has led to the almost rhythmic rise and fall of peoples, cultures and nations as the separation of urban and small community life has split society into two parts, both with elements essential to social health and survival, but both also with disabilities which are nearly fatal to social well-being.

It is a major social need that we learn what elements of small community life and what elements of urban life are essential to personal and social well-being, and that we then design or evolve units and ways of social living that will preserve the better elements of both and avoid their perils and disabilities. Never before has such a synthesis been more possible or more necessary. However, it will not come of itself. It must be prepared for—not chiefly by any program of compulsion, but by the dissemination of clear understanding of what is involved.

The need for a clear pattern for human association may be more immediate than we think. Men may soon be struggling intensively to recreate their social structure. If there are no clearly conceived and widely disseminated standards to work by there may follow a long period of fumbling and waste. “Ideas have consequences.” If a wisely conceived, and clear presentation of the fundamentals of human association is developed and becomes widespread, if a great vision of the community becomes general—it will influence the making of plans and the course of events. Vast economies of human life and effort may result.

The possibility of a general change from the metropolitan trend is suggested by two quotations. The first is by Walter Lippmann, confirmed city dweller and world-wide observer.

All over the world, but most particularly in the countries where civilization is supposed to be most advanced, there are collected in great cities huge masses of people who have lost their roots in the earth beneath them and their knowledge of the fixed stars in the heavens above them. They are the crowds that drift with all the winds that blow, and are caught up at last in the great hurricanes.

They are the people who eat but no longer know how their food is grown; who work and no longer see what they help to produce; who hear all the latest news and all the latest opinions but have no philosophy by which they can distinguish the true from the false, the credible from the incredible, the good from the bad.

Is it surprising that as civilization has become more streamlined, democracy has become more unworkable? For these masses without roots, these crowds without convictions are the spiritual proletariat of the modern age, and the eruption of their volcanic and hysterical energy is the revolution that is shaking the world,
They are the chaos in which the new Caesars are born.

... This feeling, which pervades the great urban centers, that all things are relative and impermanent and of no real importance, is merely the reflection of their own separation from the elementary experiences of humanity.

The second quotation is from Lewis Mumford, one of the world's authorities on cities and their place in human society.

For the last generation, city planners and urban sociologists have assumed, without even feeling under the necessity to prove anything so obvious, that the great metropolis, with its concentrated millions of inhabitants, is the final term in urban development. Economists likewise have been bold enough to treat the metropolitan economy as if it were the final form of economic organization. ... By now, many people take for granted that metropolitan concentration will go on throughout the world, accelerated by the forces that have been working so steadily—apparently so inexorably.

... But the fact is that the metropolitan regime is a self-limiting one; and the forces that have been mainly responsible for the growth of big cities since the sixteenth century, forces that antedated the invention of adequate means of rapid transportation, have within our own generation rapidly come to an end. The metropolitan economy was an economy based on the colonization of distant lands, upon the exploitation of the primitive areas that supplied raw materials, upon the possibility of living parasitically upon the underpaid labor of an overseas proletariat supplemented by a surplus of underpaid immigrants or other displaced persons at home.

... Both the conditions and the motives that give rise to metropolitan concentration no longer exist in their original form; what is more, every country, not least the United States, has attempted to achieve internal stabilization and security; and the concept of the common welfare, what the British call Fair Shares for All, has replaced power and profit as the guiding principle of all statesmanship worthy of the name.

Thirty years ago it took, perhaps, a little youthful brashness, as well as prophetic vision, to say that this metropolital regime was destined to fall by its own weight; but today that fact should be obvious to everyone who even dimly discerns the signs of the times.

The fact is that both necessity and choice are leading us in another direction. ... We are approaching, in other words, a new economy that will supplant the metropolitan economy. In this new economy any overgrowth in urban centers, like any overconcentration of wealth and power, will be regarded as a serious disorder, like the excessive functioning of the pituitary gland in the human body. The post-metropolitan economy will be one in which the advantages of concentration will be achieved by organization and plan, not by a mere massing together of population within a limited area; and in which the small community, kept close to the human scale, but subserving a wider range of human needs that any existing small town, will be the normal form of the city. This does not involve a step backward into the primitive and the undeveloped; it rather involves a step forward to a higher kind of organization; more advanced even in its technical facilities, and certainly far more economical, than the metropolitan economy. This
is a step forward comparable to that which took place when the era of the giant armored reptiles gave way to the era of the small mammals, small and feeble where the great Saurians were big and powerful, but possessed of a nervous system which gave the little creatures that culminated in man more adaptability, keener foresight, finer sensitivity, and a greater range of reactions generally than the monstrous creatures who preceded them ever achieved.

Because of the conditions under which our country was settled, we know too little of true community in America. Recently a European student of rural life was taken to see some small agricultural communities in our middle west. She commented that she had seen no communities; only small aggregates of people.

As we work out this new pattern we must realize that the primary group community, which has been the habitat of humanity for more than 99% of its existence, is more than an aggregation of limited size. It is a true social organism, with its own body, soul and personality, as described in Maine's "Ancient Communities East and West." This most of our regional planners and rural sociologists have failed to realize.

Community betterment programs, such as are under way in many places and are fostered by many organizations, are necessary and desirable. Much of our interest in community will find such expression. Yet by themselves such efforts are not all that is needed to create and to preserve a fine community. Such efforts are comparable to the work of carpenters, masons and electricians in erecting a great building. They are very necessary, but do not take the place of the architect. A large part of community betterment work is construction without design.

These observations are intended to emphasize the need for thorough-going all-round study of the community as the basic unit of human associations. Energy and interest will not take the place of background and understanding.

Gandhi . . . realized that . . . the basis of national life should be the small community, such as the village and the small market town. Only in such societies, where politics are local and vital since they have to do with the organization of the local economic life, can there be real political and economic freedom and full personal responsibility.

Science should be used to devise tools and machines suitable for use by small industrial units, or guilds, in small communities, so that personal responsibility, creative opportunity and cooperation may be the right of all, to be exercised to the highest degree.

FREEDOM AND THE SURVIVAL OF EXCELLENCE

In the course of human existence there have emerged many social groups of exceptional excellence. Yet in general such a group, after a period of intense maintenance of standards of quality, gradually loses its distinctiveness and comes to be more nearly like the great mass of the population. During the course of such rise and decline the general level of society may be somewhat raised.

Buddhism began as an intensely ethical and intellectually honest religion. In some small and relatively isolated areas it has retained much of those qualities, but mostly it has sunk to near the level of the great populations which espoused it. Is not the same largely true among "Christian" peoples? In numberless other cases a family or a community or a fellowship has achieved exceptional quality, only to sink again to near the level of the great mass, while somewhat raising the general level.

Is such fading of excellence inevitable, or is it possible for a social group by conscious design to maintain and increase excellence indefinitely, until gradually it comes to be characteristic of larger societies? In some respects social evolution is so similar to biological evolution that a comparison may be illuminating, because of both likenesses and differences.

The situation as to biological evolution is well stated in Genetics and the Origin of Species, by Theodosius Dobzhansky.* This work is recognized as a competent summary of prevailing opinion in the field of genetics.

Dobzhansky states that, even though constant, gradual change is necessary to the evolution and long-time survival of a species, survival of individuals and the immediate advantage of the species is commonly better insured by unchanging stability. As he puts it:

Since a majority of mutants are injurious, the adaptive values of strains of high mutability tend to be lower than those of strains in which the mutability is low. Natural selection will, therefore, favor the genotypes [the inborn characters] in which the mutability is kept at a minimum. Yet mutation is, as far as known, never suppressed entirely. . . .

The accumulation of germinal changes in the population genotypes [inborn characters] is, in the long run, a necessity if the species is to preserve its evolutionary plasticity. The process of adaptation may be looked at as a series of conflicts between the organism and its environment. The environment is in a state of flux, and its changes, whether slow or rapid, make the

genotype of the bygone generations no longer fit for survival. The ensuing contradictions can be resolved either through the extinction of the species, or through reorganization of its genotype.

That is, while the processes of long-time evolutionary adjustment to a changing environment require constant, gradual change to more suitable forms, survival of the individual and the immediate welfare of the species or society usually are favored by unchanging stability. Thus there often is conflict between individual interest or immediate social interest, and the long-time interest of the whole society. Dobzhansky states further:

The process of evolution is generally opportunistic: natural selection favors those variants useful at a given time, regardless of their eventual value. Possessing no foresight, selection always tends to suppress mutability. But opportunism leads in the long run to retribution: species or races which become "well adapted" to the point of abolishing mutability do not respond to the challenge of a shifting environment. Evolution viewed in an historical perspective tends to perpetuate types which are, in a sense, not too well adapted. [Emphasis added.]

Similar conditions affect social evolution. Very often the individuals in a society survive best if they conform to the prevailing type, even if that type as a whole is headed for extinction because it is in conflict with long-time needs. For instance, a politician in present-day America, whose success depends upon the approval of a party organization, who should diverge from the prevailing party organization type and be open, honest and impartially fair with all men, probably would seldom if ever be elected to a public office. Yet a society in which openness, honesty and impartial fairness were the established methods of action would be a stronger and better society.

Thus social evolution suffers from the conflict between the immediate interest of the individual or social group and the long-time survival and welfare of the social group and its members. Most antisocial conduct is effort to promote the immediate interest or survival of the individual, or the temporary interest of the group, without regard to long-time social welfare.

What incentive can there be for the individual to act against his own immediate interest in order to further the general, long-time social interest? Such incentives have, in fact, emerged. One of them is patriotism. A patriot is ready to give his life if the welfare of his country requires. Another is the religious or ethical impulse. The truly religious man lives, not in the manner most profitable at the moment, or to himself alone, but in a way that will promote a good society. Christ on the cross has become a symbol of such motive. By living in a very unideal society as a man would live in an ideal society, he risked and lost his life in an effort to increase the possibility of an
enduring good society. Ethical pioneers are needed who live in such a way that if men in general lived in that way the society would be stronger, better and more likely to survive.

Science may chart a desirable social course, but it is common experience that intellectual comprehension is not enough to motivate action against immediate personal interest in favor of long-time social good. Only such quality as patriotism, religion or ethical drive can strongly predispose an individual to risk or to surrender his own welfare or survival for the long-time social good. A chief aim of legitimate emotional religion is to bring about, to inform and to sustain such predisposition.

* * *

In some respects the slow processes of biological evolution need not be followed in social change. Biological change, so far as is now known, is random—good, bad, and indifferent. Only by a very large number of changes, and gradual elimination of the ninety-nine per cent or more of the mutations which by natural chance are harmful, can biological evolution take advantage of the occasional desirable change, and thereby advance. Thus biological evolution is a slow, wasteful process. Dobzhansky sums up the generally accepted view of biologists as follows:

An ideal situation would be if the organism were to respond to the challenge of the changing environment by producing only beneficial mutations where and when needed. But nature has not been kind enough to endow its creations with such a providential ability. Mutations are changes that occur regardless of whether they are or may be potentially useful.

For instance, as random changes continually take place in the structure of the eye, there are many more changes which will upset the fine organization of eye structure than there are which will improve it. Only by constant elimination of the many undesirable changes can the occasional desirable changes be fully used and the quality of eyesight be improved. In nature this elimination of unfitness may be very rigorous. The fish with poor eyesight probably will be devoured. In streams in the dark of Mammoth Cave, where eyes are not used and thus poor eyesight is not a handicap, the accumulation of random changes is not eliminated by selection; eyes become defective, and the fish in the cave are blind.

Human social change in the past similarly has been quite largely random. As evidence of that fact, read Frazier's *Golden Bough*. However, as reflective thinking and critical observation develop, social change can lose much of its random character. The scientific method can be applied to social change as it has been in engineering. A great dam is not built by random experiment. Through research and calculation it can be designed and built.
to effectively fit the particular conditions, and to fully serve its purpose. It must be right the first time—not after many trials and failures.

Thus human design can greatly improve on the process of biological evolution. The time should come when social change, too, should not be random, but should be guided by social engineering. Social evolution may then be very much more rapid than in the past.

* * *

Another social policy which promotes social evolution is discriminating tolerance of social variants. Dobzhansky expresses the biologist's view:

The preservation of a living species demands that it possess at all times a store of concealed genetic variability. This store will contain variants which under no condition will be useful . . . and still other variants which are neutral or harmful at the time when they arise but which will prove useful later on. . . .

If the environment were absolutely constant, one could conceive of the formation of ideal genotypes each of which would be perfectly adapted to a certain niche in this environment. In such a static world, evolution might accomplish its task and come to a standstill; doing away with the mutation process would be the ultimate improvement. The world of reality, however, is not static. A species perfectly adapted at present may be destroyed by a change in the environment if no hereditary variability is available in the hour of need.

In biological evolution there seems to be no purposefulness in variations. In human society, intelligent purpose, aided by critical inquiry and research, can intervene, and the reservoir of potential forms can have a high probability of usefulness. The varied social, economic, religious and ethical movements which exist in a relatively free society like America provide such a reservoir of social possibilities. Many of them are keeping themselves alive in an adverse present environment, ready to be effective when conditions are propitious. Friendly tolerance for such variables will provide a much sounder climate for social survival than does Communist intolerance of divergence from its set pattern, or the efforts of authoritative religion to exterminate all heresy.

* * *

One of the commonest processes by which exceptional traits—either of excellence or its opposite—are diluted and largely lost is that of "scattering." Of this process Dobzhansky comments:

For an understanding of the dynamics of free living populations it is essential, however, not to disregard the existence of another agent besides selection, which tends to diminish the supply of hereditary variation irre-
spective of the adaptive value of the latter, and thus to counteract the mutation pressure. This agency is the scattering of the variability in the process of reproduction...

Conditions most favorable for progressive evolution seem to obtain in a species subdivided into a large number of local populations...

At any one time the average adaptive level of a species broken up into small populations is liable to be lower than that of a large undivided one; [but] evolutionary plasticity must be purchased at the price of sacrificing some adaptive uniformity...

The dominant species densely occupying unbroken expanses of territory today may not be the inheritors of the world of tomorrow...

Evolution may at times defeat its own ends: successful types multiply, spread, conquer vast territories, but in so doing they run the risk of losing the very population structure which enabled them to become successful.

What the author says in biological terminology is substantially this: When a distinctive quality has been acquired by a small group of plants or animals, if members of that group mix freely with a large population, the distinctive traits will tend to be scattered through the larger population until it becomes so dilute and infrequent that its effectiveness is lost. On the other hand, if the group of distinctive character maintains sufficient isolation or separateness, its distinctive quality may be deepened and strengthened. Msgr. Ligutti, speaking of the Quakers, a small group that is becoming widely scattered, remarked that an egg cannot produce a chicken if the shell is prematurely broken. If separateness is carried far enough, a distinct separation from the larger population may develop, and a new, distinct species may emerge. In fact, that probably is the chief method for the origin of species.

We see these same factors at work in human society. Distinctively excellent families may emerge, the result of generations of discriminating selection and discipline.* Then as such families become part of the general mass of contemporary life, their hard-won distinctiveness tends to be diluted until it fades away in the general population. Some social groups have been more successful than others in maintaining enough distinctiveness to retain and perhaps to broaden their excellence, while at the same time avoiding the degree of isolation which would make them distinct social species, unable to culturally "cross-fertilize" or communicate with the rest of society and so absorb elements of other cultures. In human society, as in biological evolution, the greatest promise lies in a large population "subdivided into a large number of local populations." The human species evolved in just such a setting—large populations broken up into small, partly independent communities.

*LePlay described such "stem families" in Norway, and their spread, as the origin of the highest qualities of the Scandinavian and the English-speaking world.
We have indicated, by comparison with biological evolution, some of the problems and possibilities involved in the creation and preservation of distinctive social excellence, and the relation of freedom to those possibilities. We shall summarize them:

1. Receptiveness to diversity will help to keep a community or other society flexible and capable of understanding and accepting desirable change; yet excessive craving for change tends to disrupt and disintegrate communities and other social units. Discriminating tolerance for variety of social pattern allows a reservoir of desirable social possibilities which may emerge to dominance when conditions are favorable.

2. Standards of excellence, those already held and those being considered for adoption, should be subject to unbiased critical appraisal. As a basis for critical appraisal of standards of excellence, something more than intuition is needed. The process of research, design and testing, which we have referred to as social engineering, is necessary. The displacement of relatively random standards by those arrived at by this process can very greatly accelerate desirable social evolution, with great reduction of waste.

3. Desirable social evolution often calls for individuals or groups to act against personal or immediate interest to promote the general and long-time good. Intellectual understanding may point to economical and desirable paths of social evolution; it may justify motivation which would sacrifice personal or immediate good to long-time good, but it does not provide such motivation. Emotional conditioning and discipline are necessary to strongly predispose men and societies to act in accord with intelligent judgment. The common agencies for such predisposition are group loyalty, patriotism, ethical commitment and religious consecration. Such predisposition should be subject to the test and guidance of informed intelligence, but it is additional to intelligence, and is essential to the achievement and maintenance of excellence.

4. To avoid the dilution which so commonly causes the fading out of centers of exceptional excellence where there is unrestrained social mixing, it is desirable, especially in communities which have achieved distinctive quality, that there shall be a large element of family continuity through the generations. There should be enough circulation to prevent provincialism and to achieve a world view, but also enough continuity of persons and families in the community to insure against the loss of distinctive quality, and to encourage its increase. This factor in the survival of excellence has been very generally ignored, but it is vital. A natural inference is that relatively small social groups, in which distinctive excellence can emerge and can be perpetuated, are highly important to social well-being. The small community has been historically a chief locus for such emergence and continuity of basic excellence.
No sure formula ever has been presented which in fact has insured perpetuation of excellence. Yet some efforts have been more productive than others. The times call for re-examination of possibilities for such perpetuation. The intellectual and social methods and insights developed during the last two centuries make possible far better results than those of the past.

—Arthur E. Morgan

**REVIEWS**


*Tribe under Trust: A Study of the Blackfoot Reserve of Alberta*, by Lucien M. Hanks, Jr., and Jane Richardson Hanks (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1950, 206 pages, $4.00).

Both these competent studies emphasize two truths about indigenous human societies: first, that such a society is not just a group of individuals with certain folkways, but is a social organism which lives and survives as an organism. Second, as a dominant culture gradually flows over the earth and comes into contact with such small societies, the shock experienced by the smaller social organism may be nearly fatal both to its social structure as such and to its members.

The Hopi Indians have had a greater social integration than most American Indian societies, partly because of 1500 years of living in the same relatively isolated and difficult environment. The social pattern has been so unified and integrated as to stubbornly resist disruption by the long pressure of the American government to liquidate the social organization and to "Americanize" the individual members. Fortunately at present that pressure is removed and the Hopis are encouraged to live according to their own cultural pattern, while making inevitable adjustment to the modern world.

The story of the Blackfoot Indians ends with less promise. Surrounded by white farmers, unable to survive by the old ways of hunting, living on periodical money payments by the Canadian government, divided in tribal counsels between those who would maintain their ancient ways and those who would live as their white neighbors do, the attrition of the social inheritance is very great. One can sense the losing struggle to preserve the organic life of a people.

Discussing the status of the Hopis, Miss Thompson writes:

"The task of Indian Service cooperation with Hopi life is unique and local, yet actually it is being carried forward on the world stage. Every social enterprise or experiment has its aspect unique and local, and a world-
wide relevance at the same time. In enterprise by and with the Hopi, this proposition—which is, indeed, the theme of the present book—has special weight. Local and unique, and in its postulates and orientations universal: such is the Hopi’s social being. The Hopi are in crisis. In crisis too are ethnic communities throughout the world; and the world is in crisis. Hopi life—the Hopi event—contains and yields meanings of planetary scope.”

As American responsibility for the remote corners of the earth increases, the lessons learned in dealing with the ancient small societies of our own country should help to prevent tragedy in dealing with other small peoples.

These two books are good reading, if for no other reason than that they help to provide a background for social thinking both in domestic and foreign problems. They give interesting glimpses of what the human community must have been like through long periods of relatively undisturbed stability. In them we get something of a view of our ancient past. They are interesting accounts of interesting ethnic groups.

A Lesson to be Learned from the Papagos Indians

There is a constantly recurring impression among persons interested in creating new communities that a spirit of cooperation necessarily is accompanied by intimacy of personal association, often including living and eating together. There is much evidence that this is not necessarily the case.

Among the highest native cultures in America is that of the Papago Indians in Arizona and Mexico. They have essentially a cooperative society. In The Desert People, A Study of the Papago Indians* of southern Arizona, we read:

“They have been taught for ages the principles of cooperative family organization and have experienced its satisfactory functioning, which implies the reliance of everyone on everyone else, the condemnation of individual aims which might disturb this organization, and a corresponding modesty and inconspicuousness whenever the individual finds himself in a group situation.”

Villages, like families, are fully cooperative, the work being divided among the members. A typical instance is care of livestock:

“Every village is organized for cooperative undertakings. For the care of their livestock, the men elect a foreman who has proved that he knows horses and cattle. This man, probably chosen from a prominent family in

*By Alice Joseph, Rosamond B. Spicer, and Jane Chesky; University of Chicago Press, 1949, 288 pages, $6.00.
the village, serves, as long as he performs his tasks to the general satisfaction of the community, without remuneration."

Yet in this fully cooperative society a desire for privacy and separateness is no less marked. As to their arrangement of dwellings we read:

"A village of fifty households may cover as much as two square miles. ... Some families live in the midst of their fields, and others live at some distance from them. Closely related families may live fairly near to each other, but most households see the tops of their neighbors' houses over a hundred yards of creosote and cholla bushes. Thus Papagos have privacy without fences; they like this separateness and think nothing of the distances to be walked."

Perhaps recognition of the human craving for privacy and for space would be conducive to greater success in cooperative communities.

The Adult Education Association of the U.S.A. now has offices at 743 N. Wabash Ave., Chicago 11, Ill. This new organization unites the former American Assn. for Adult Education and the Department of Adult Education of the National Education Assn. Publications of the new organization include Adult Leadership, for leaders and followers in all kinds of groups; Adult Education, professional bimonthly journal; and two occasional publications, AEA Newsletter and Research Reports.

An "interdenominational seminary" is being organized at the Bible College of Missouri, Columbia, Mo., "to train rural ministers to serve the town and country church." In announcing this new development of its rural church program the college quotes Lawrence Heppe: "Today it is recognized that specialized training for the rural ministry is necessary, that it is a career in itself rather than a step to urban churches." "Today's town and country minister," the announcement continues, "needs an understanding of the rural community and the program of all organizations which serve the people in the town and country. Even more, he must be so well grounded in interdenominational church work that he can serve people of any faith who are residents of his church community. ... The Bible College became interdenominational in 1914. The Disciples of Christ, Episcopal, Methodist, Presbyterian U.S.A., and Jewish religious bodies cooperate in the teaching program. ... The Bible College and the University of Missouri are separate institutions but cooperate in offering courses in religion. Undergraduate students receive credit through the University of Missouri."
MEETINGS AND CONFERENCES


June 15-18. Assn. of State Planning and Development Agencies, Minneapolis, Minn.


June 22-July 18. Natl. Training Laboratory in Group Development, Sixth Summer Session, Gould Academy, Bethel, Maine. For information write N.T.L. G.D., 1201—16th St. N.W., Washington 6, D.C.


July 6-12. Workshop on "Advanced Training for Community Leaders." Indiana University, sponsored by Community Services in Adult Education, 1804 E. 10th St., Bloomington, Ind.

July 13-24. International Summer Seminar on Problems and Methods of TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE IN COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT, Wageningen, Holland. Sponsored by Dept. of Social Anthropology, Wageningen Agricultural University, and Community Development Projects, Ltd. (110c Banbury Road, Oxford, England—make application to this office). Seminar to be conducted in English. Leaders include Norman J. Hart, exec. dir., Comm. Devt. Projects; Dr. Chas. A. P. Takes, Planning Sociologist, North East Polder Devt. Project; Dr. J. G. Peristiany, Dept. of Social Anthropology, Oxford; and others from New Zealand, Indonesia, Israel, etc. Lectures and discussions on economic and educational aspects of community development, in "developed" and "under-developed" countries, in Holland, India, Africa, the Middle East, South America; land reform, tours to the Polder Project and the Hoge Veluwe National Park. Cost $15; preference given to senior undergraduates and to postgraduates in relevant studies, specialists, administrators, etc.

Aug. 1. Experimental Group in the Danish Folk School Movement leaves for ten-month study of Danish community life, folk schools, social institutions, cooperatives, etc. For youth leaders, teachers, students, etc. Affiliated with the Lisle Fellowship; recognized by Fulbright Committee, G.I. bill; subsidized by Danish Ministry of Education. Cost $950. Apply to Aage Rosenahl Nielsen, 278 Farmington Ave., Hartford 5, Conn.


Aug. 31-Sept. 3. Natl. Council on Family Relations, Rutgers University, New Brunswick, N.J.


October. 29-31. National Town and Country Convocation, National Council of Churches, 35 West Gay St., Columbus 15, Ohio.

Dec. 14-19. Sixth International Conference of Social Work, Madras, India. Theme: "The Role of Social Service in Raising the Standard of Living." For information about low-cost group travel plans write Joe R. Hoffer, 22 W. Gay St., Columbus 15, O. Mr. Hoffer is Secretary-General of the Conference.
Community Service, Inc., annual meeting and

Ninth Annual Conference on the Small Community
Yellow Springs, Ohio, June 17-18, 1952

Integrity and Freedom in Small Communities

This year's Small Community Conference will be devoted to one of the underlying problems of small communities the world over: the simultaneous achievement of freedom and integrity in the small community.

Some of America's ablest men who grew up in small communities could not bear to live in the small community even though they recognized its importance. The small communities they had known were too petty, unprogressive and restrictive to personal freedom and opportunity.

The resistance to change that handicaps the small community is closely identified with the power to survive of the community itself, that has enabled many communities to outlive cities and empires, wars and disasters, and the comings and goings of migratory peoples. The integrity of the community must not be sacrificed to the need for progressiveness and breadth, for upon the integrity of the community depends its capacity for consistent growth and progress.

We are then faced with a number of questions: Is the small community essentially reactionary, narrow and restrictive, or are these but qualities of culture which communities have inherited from the past? Can this undesirable culture be replaced with the qualities of open-mindedness, critical inquiry, progressiveness, and high purpose? How can we develop these qualities as enduring community characteristics?

LEADERS

Claire Huchet Bishop, author of All Things Common, describing the postwar "communities of work" in western Europe, which unite different faiths in mutual respect and harmony.

Morris Bean, president, Morris Bean and Co., aluminum foundry, Yellow Springs.

Ashadevi, leader of Hindustani Talimi Sangh, Sevagram, Wardha, India, carrying on Mahatma Gandhi's educational program.

John H. Given, Lexington, Ky., investment salesman; former director, field service, Bureau of Community Service, University of Kentucky.

Barrett Hollister, assistant to the president, Antioch College.

Henry Federighi, professor of biology, Antioch College; leader in Yellow Springs Community Council.


Annual Conference, Intentional Communities Federation
"Cooperative Communities Around the World"
Yellow Springs, Ohio, June 18-20, 1952

Following the Small Community Conference the recently formed Federation of Intentional Communities will hold its annual educational meeting. Leadership will include: Eberhard Arnold and Leonard Pavitt, of the Community of Brothers, Paraguay; Arthur Wiser, of Macedonia Cooperative Community, Clarkesville, Ga.; Henrik Infield and Edward Norman of Group Farming Research Institute; and representatives of the Israeli communities and the Saskatchewan cooperative farms.

Further information and program of both conferences available from
Community Service, Inc., Yellow Springs, Ohio.