in this bill are provisions to cut off all military and economic aid to the Government of Pakistan and Greece. I would welcome this opportunity to praise both the Foreign Affairs Committee and the House of Representatives for taking positive action toward ending the slaughter in Bengal.

This is in marked contrast to the attitude of the Nixon White House. In his news conference of August 4, President Nixon called the House’s action “counterproductive”” adding that “we are not going to engage in public pressure on the Pakistanis and the West Pakistanis. Whatever private pressure the President might be using does not seem to be having very much effect. Every day the media report new atrocities committed by the Pakistani Army. I have included an article in the New York Times by Mr. Alvin Toffler, author of “Future Shock,” who recently returned from a trip to the Indo-Pakistani border. The scene he portrays can only further emphasize the helplessness of the House’s action on Tuesday. I urge the President to reconsider his remarks, and join with the Congress in trying to stop the carnage in East Pakistan.

The Reviled People of East Pakistan

[From The New York Times, Aug. 5, 1971]

The Reviled People of East Pakistan

(By Alvin Toffler)

A planetary catastrophe is taking place in Asia, a human disaster so massive that it can be nothing but future in blood, not just for Asia but for those of us in the West as well. Yet the response of the global community has been minimal at best. In the United States, official response has been worse than minimal and morally numb.

I have just returned from Calcutta and the border of East Pakistan, where I conducted interviews with refugees streaming into India as a result of the West Pakistan’s genocidal attack on them. Since March 25, West Pakistani troops have bombed, burned, looted and murdered the citizens of East Pakistan in what can only be a calculated campaign to demoralize them or to drive them out of their villages and over the border into India.

Part of the time I traveled with a Canadian parliamentary delegation. We saw babies Literally starving death, hooded women who told us they would rather die today in India than return to East Pakistan after the tragedies they had witnessed. Widespread starvation, widespread refugee camps, and the unbelievable magnitude of this forced human migration—67 million refugees pouring into India within a matter of four months.

I saw Indian villages deluged by masses of destitute refugees, every available inch commandeered by bodies of refugees. Innumerable, blistering sun and the torrential rain. I saw refugees still streaming along the roads unable to find even a resting place. I saw mothers and babies sharing their meager food with the latest frightened and hungry arrivals. I saw thousands of men, women and babies lined up, waiting patiently under the sun for hours to get their rations. These pitiful few ounces of rice, wheat and daal provide a level of nutrition so marginal it contributes to protein breakdown, liver illness, and a variety of other diseases in addition to the cholera, pneumonia, bronchitis that are already rampant in Indian relief officials struggling heroically, and with immense personal sympathy, to cope with the human tidal waves that now do us a budget of one rupee a day—about 15 cents per human.

COMMUNIST CHINA POLICY

HON. JOHN ROUSSELOT

OF CALIFORNIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Friday, August 6, 1971

Mr. ROUSSELOT. Mr. Speaker, the recent official reversal of our policy toward Communist China has made it de rigueur to convey concern to me. The following memorandum, which is dated November 6, 1968, and was first reprinted in “Tactics” on February 70, 1969, clearly outlines the steps to be taken and the role of the United States, and the eventual achievement of reconciliation. The specific steps we propose below in pursuit of these objectives will require some imagination with this Communist dictatorship. The memorandum is addressed to “President-Elect Nixon,” and it is my understanding that Dr. Henry Kissinger personally delivered this memorandum to Nixon after his election to the Presidency in 1968. I urge my colleagues to carefully study this document. The effect it has obviously had on our policy toward Communist China has been massive. Kissinger’s “advice” so closely parallels the position taken in this memorandum that I cannot overemphasize how important it is that each Member realize that as early as November 6, 1968, in the time when we were most deeply committed in Vietnam in the plan which is being followed today to appease Communist Chinese aggressors was being presented to the President:

MEMORANDUM FOR PRESIDENT-ELECT NIXON ON U.S. RELATIONS WITH CHINA


November 6, 1968.

As scholars in the field of East Asian studies who have completed a year of private diplomatic relations with East Asia under the auspices of the Institute of Politics of Harvard’s J. F. Kennedy School of Government, we write to you to offer our thoughts on the pivotal issue of United States relations with China.

UNITED STATES OBJECTIVES

The past two decades of American-East Asian relations have been dominated by the central realities of American hostility and deadlock. It seems evident that, whatever the nature or timing of a Viet Nam settlement, the Cold War problem will continue to dominate our East Asian relations in the years of the new Administration and, indeed, through the decade of the 1970s. The prominence of ideology, relative isolation, potential power and current internal upheaval increase the dangers of instability in a chronically unstable part of the world. The central objective of America’s China policy has been and should continue to be to avoid war with China and to minimize its disruption of surrounding areas.

Since the end of the Korean War, previous Administrations have generally followed a twofold policy to achieve these objectives. On the one hand, we have maintained a posture of containment in order to deter some possible effort at communication with the China mainland through amphibious and air-borne military intervention abroad. We move more positively toward the relaxation of tensions between China and the United States, and the eventual achievement of reconciliation. The specific steps we propose below in pursuit of these objectives will require some imagination with this Communist dictatorship.
EXTENSIONS OF REMARKS

August 6, 1971

rupted mainland China for the past three years remains unclear, we do not anticipate a desire to improve relations with the United States. It is therefore highly likely that any and all of the initiatives that the present Administration is being pressurized by the Peking’s leaders in the foreseeable future.

We propose these initiatives, nonetheless, because we believe that our national interests in Asia will be best served by an American policy that offers the Chinese the clear option of a less-hostile relationship with the free world. At a minimum, we will complicate a Peking decision-making process that has all too easily been based on a zero-sum American/Ho Chi Minh's gain or loss of world's vision of the world. Unless we achieve this better balanced policy, we may at the least miss significant opportunities to moderate Peking's behavior and, at the worst, may help lay the groundwork for a war with China that neither side can hope to win.

PROPOSALS: A. RELATIONS WITH MAINLAND

1. Exploratory Meeting. You should seriously explore the possibility of arranging a confidential—perhaps even deniable—conversation by Chinese representatives and someone in whom you have confidence. Your emissaries would convey the new Administration's interest in a more serious conversation than we have had in the past on a wide range of subjects including Viet Nam and disarmament and in probing, unofficially and in a more informal setting than any previous exchange, the possibility of a normal relationship. It may well be that the Chinese will refuse to receive such an emissary; the effort should nonetheless be made to signal a readiness to move forward.

2. Viet Nam Negotiations. The arduous process of a Viet Nam settlement may well offer an opportunity for the improvement of relations with China and engagement of China in the international order. Despite China's present hostility to a negotiated solution, the new Administration should be alert to opportunities to involve Peking in some state of the Viet Nam negotiating process—perhaps through a reconstructed forum for Viet Nam and North Vietnam. A plan that would bring China, both Viet Nams, and other divided nations into United Nations. The chief of such a plan must be used effectively by the Chinese to enhance their strategic positions and by the United States to improve our strategic situation in the region. This plan must therefore come— and probably be prerequisite to—improved relations between China and the United States.

B. RELATIONS WITH TAIWAN

The foregoing steps involve preliminary attempts to restructure the Washington-Peking relationship. Simultaneously with such steps should come, inevitably, a restructuring of the Washington-Taipei relationship. The main object should be to bridge the gap between rhetoric and reality. The United States recognizes the Chinese Nationalists as a fact of life. They are courting both us, perhaps for purposes of the mainland as well as Taiwan and the Pescadores; but Washington has long since begun to treat them as a fact of life. The United States recognizes that China is the only China. The new Administration should find an early opportunity to erase this gap between rhetoric and reality. This might be the time to restate officially the Administration's broad China strategy and publication. In order to demonstrate the importance that you attach to the implementation of this plan, the Administration should break the ice by providing an early reassessment of China's policy.

1. Your Administration should send an Ambassador to Taiwan, a move that would strengthen the Administration's broad China strategy and publication. In order to demonstrate the importance that you attach to the implementation of this plan, the Administration should break the ice by providing an early reassessment of China's policy.

2. As long as relative peace prevails in the Formosa Strait, the Administration should take care to prevent the official opening of the invasion of the offshore islands, Matsu and Quemoy. (While occupied by the Nationalists, they provide a lever both for China, should it be used, to draw American forces into an unwanted Asia conflict. It should also press for an end to pro-

anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM). The new ABM system will have to decide whether to continue with the previously authorized “thin” ABM system. In our view, insufficient consideration has been given by the present Administration for Sino-American relations that this system may entail. Aside from the questions of the Soviet-American military balance, plans for an ABM are extraordinarily necessary as a deterrent to Peking but may well be viewed by the Chinese as evi-...
EXTENSIONS OF REMARKS

at $1.30 an hour, and etc., it is obvious that many in what are now to be the upper rungs of eligibility will quit the program as not worth the trouble.

So the Members should be forewarned of the complaints they will be receiving from constituents who have benefited from the Food Stamp program up to now, but who will be cut off, or discouraged from participating, under the new regulations, particularly in the industrialized states.

THE 1970 AMENDMENTS SHOULD BE REPEALED

Mr. Speaker, as many of the Members know, I initiated the legislation which resulted in the Food Stamp Acts of 1959, 1964, 1967, and 1968, but I strongly opposed the 1970 amendments, and I have introduced legislation in this Congress to repeal the 1970 changes. I have also proposed a change in the House rules to remove jurisdiction over food stamp legislation from the Committee on Agriculture, which has largely been hostile to the whole idea of a food stamp program since I first proposed it in 1954, and transfer this Jurisdiction to the Committee on Banking and Currency, which is prepared to provide the proper legislation to deal with this problem. Banking and Currency initiated the rent supplement program, the homeownership interest rate subsidy program, programs of assured access to food stamp and crime insurance, and most of its members believe in helping the poor to improve their standards of living through self-help and intelligent assistance. The food stamps are, in effect, currentries remembable to the Federal Reserve System. The Committee on Agriculture has, in its handling of food stamp legislation over the years, demonstrated that it has no real interest in the program, resents the use of Agriculture Department funds to finance it, and believes it should properly be handled by some other committee if it is to be continued at all, and actually, it would just as soon see it die.

KEEPING THE PICTURE HUNGRY

In any event, Mr. Speaker, in addition to forewarning the Members on the eve of a summer vacation of the political chickens which may come home to roost when low-income constituents begin to understand what the Congress did to them last year in the Food Stamp Act, I want to share with those Members who joined me in opposing the 1970 amendments a letter I wrote to the St. Louis Post-Dispatch disassociating myself from aspects of the 1970 amendments which that outstanding newspaper had criticized in a recent editorial.

Unfortunately, the editorial attributed all of the actions of the Members last year of the Food Stamp bill to an attitude I was expressing on the very minor issue of free stamps.

Where or not my colleagues agree with me on the free stamp issue—and I know some of them do it is true that they will be interested in seeing my reaction to the Post-Dispatch editorial.

Hence, Mr. Speaker, I submit, as part of my remarks, the editorial from the Post-Dispatch of July 25, entitled ‘Assistance or Uplift?’ in the form of a letter to the editor and following that, news articles from both the Post-Dispatch and the St. Louis Globe-Democrat. Both newspapers had supported the idea of a food stamp program over many years.

The material referred to follows:

[From the St. Louis Post-Dispatch, July 25, 1971]

ASSISTANCE OR UPLIFT?

While the new federal food stamp regulations unquestionably contain a number of improvements overall, it is difficult to imagine how either Congress or the Administration can take much price in revisions that would allow 3,000,000 needy persons to help alone for some 65,000 others. Much of the problem, it seems to us, is that legislation has never been able to decide whether the food stamp program should serve as a means of assisting the hungry or as an exercise in moral uplift.

We cannot otherwise understand some of the remarks of the usually enlightened Representative Leo Sullivan that what we give away is not recognized with the appreciation that a person has if he has to sacrifice a bit. Appreciation should have nothing to do with food stamps; the criterion ought to be need, after the program is available.

We are not at issue when Congress establishes tax breaks for the oil industry or when the President proposes to bail out a giant corporation that has been a model of mis-management.

It is all to the good that the new rules will allow 3,000,000 or 4,000,000 to the program by next year. That addition, however, could and should have been accomplished without reducing or eliminating benefits to current recipients. Improvements should have been possible without the vindictive provisions to deny stamps to students or communists. A genuinely impoverished youth struggling through college should be entitled to stamps; an affluent student who feigns poverty should not be.

A truly concerned Government could have devised regulations that would get stamps where they are needed while also preventing them from being abused by those who can afford to purchase food at market prices.