

A DIALOG OF DEVELOPMENTAL GREATS

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adapted from *Stages of Faith*

The Fictional Conversation

Convener: Friends, we welcome you to this symposium and express our gratitude for your participation. May I ask each of you to introduce yourself and briefly say something about the distinct focus of research and theory from which you will be speaking? Would you begin, Mr. Erikson?

Erikson: [clears his throat and begins to speak. His voice is a soft husky baritone; his words are clipped a bit with the accents of his first language.]

Erikson: I am Erik Erikson. In my youth and early adulthood I set out to be an artist. During my mid-twenties (which were also the mid-twenties of this century) I began teaching art and social studies to children in a school in Vienna. The school was begun for the children of Americans and Canadians who came to undergo psychoanalysis with Sigmund Freud, his daughter Anna, and other members of the growing circle of Viennese psychoanalysts. That teaching experience led to two kinds of professional training: I earned a certificate as a teacher, and I underwent a training analysis and supervision with Anna Freud that qualified me in the new field of child psychoanalysis. The rise of Hitler in Germany, meant that I had to leave Austria. We emigrated to Boston where I became that city's first child psychoanalyst.

Building on Freud's theoretical work on psychosexual growth, I sought to extend his insights in two directions. First, I wanted to see psychological and bodily development theory extended to take account of its interaction with social and cultural environments. Second, I have wanted to extend our perspectives on this psychosocial development beyond puberty to adulthood in its various phases. As a corrective to my discipline's tendency to focus on pathology, I have been fascinated with human strength and health. My work has sought to illumine the growth and crises of the healthy personality.

To do this, I have found it necessary to introduce some new concepts. The idea of *identity* has been one of my focuses as has the notion of a psychosocial moratorium in adolescence and young adulthood. This is a time when the near young adult avoids premature over-commitment either by taking time out, or by committing him or herself to an arduous apprenticeship in some field of endeavor unexpected by those who hold urgent and hopeful expectations for the youth.

In addition to my psychoanalytic practice I have engaged in several anthropological studies of childhood and human development in other cultures. I have tested the usefulness of our theoretical formulations in the study of biographies. And as readers of my work will know, I have considerable interest in the understanding of religion and faith and their contributions in the ongoing cycle of the generations. Perhaps I should stop with that.

[A smaller man with dancing eyes behind large, black-framed glasses puts down his pipe. Sparse on top, his white hair frames the square features of his face. He speaks somewhat slowly. His English betrays that he is more at home in French.]

Piaget. I am Jean Piaget. My colleague Erikson began as an artist. Perhaps I may be excused if I speak from a standpoint decisively shaped by *my* first professional training---genetic epistemology. My early grounding in biology and my commitment to the rigor of the scientific method served me well as my career focused at the intersection of biology and philosophy. It has yielded, if I may say so, a distinct method of inquiry and body of theory in psychology.

My central question across nearly sixty years of work may be stated in this question: What operations of mind can be scientifically demonstrated to underlie the achievement of rationally certain knowledge and how do those operations take form in human beings? How, in individuals and in the species as a whole, do the forms of thought required for successful use of the scientific method emerge and take form? As our discussion proceeds I will offer our understanding of these logics to clarify how the child or adolescent may be going about the important business of thinking and reasoning.

[*Piaget picks up his large pipe again, tamping its bowl with his finger. As he lights it the younger man beside him begins to speak. His angular features are crowned with unruly brown hair. The faded checked shirt and baggy trousers give an overall impression of a somewhat disheveled intensity. He begins a little haltingly.*]

Kohlberg. My name is Lawrence Kohlberg. Some years ago, I was invited to address the twenty-fifth reunion of my prep school class. I spoke on my research on moral development. After the talk several of my old teachers and classmates expressed dismay that I should be working in this field. Their memories of me as an adolescent in the school made it seem a highly unlikely field for me.

How did I get into the study of moral development? Immediately upon graduation from high school I signed on as a crewman on a freighter that was part of the effort by certain groups after World War II to get refugees out of Europe. Restricted by United Nations regulations, this emigration was illegal. My ship flew a Panamanian flag. As we neared Cypress our ship was intercepted by a British destroyer and boarded. Crew and passengers were taken to the island for confinement. In the bus on the way to the stockade I was faced with a moral dilemma. Should I stay with the passengers, go to the stockade and do what I could to aid and assist them, or should I try to escape so that I could make my way back and join the crew of another boat? Actually this was only the latest of many moral dilemmas I had encountered in the course of this service. In all of them I found that I was utterly unprepared to deal with moral issues in any consistent or rational manner.

I did escape and after it was over, I returned to the United States and enrolled in the University of Chicago. Every University of Chicago student read Plato and John Dewey. There I began to find some lasting help on ethics and moral reasoning. When I enrolled in a Ph.D. program in clinical psychology, I soon learned something of Piaget's work in his book *The Moral Judgment of the Child*. Piaget had combined philosophy and psychol-

ogy in an empirical approach to the development of moral reasoning that excited me. When it came time to do my doctoral dissertation I undertook a cross-sectional study of moral reasoning in seventy-five boys distributed in age from early childhood to late adolescence. From this emerged an extended hypothesis of six stages in the development of moral reasoning. In the intervening twenty-two years, I and a number of younger associates at Chicago and Harvard have continued my original study longitudinally and have supplemented it with extensive investigations in other cultures.

Piaget's focus on an active knowing subject interacting with a dynamic environment has shaped our approach. His concern to harness empirical psychological inquiry for dealing with philosophical issues, I have carried over into ethics. Whereas Piaget has been content to restrict himself to mainly how persons know the world mathematically and scientifically, I and my associates have studied how persons structure their judgments about the *social* world. Taking a rational understanding of justice as the norm for moral judgment, I have argued, both empirically and philosophically, that moral reasoning develops through a succession of stages. I hold that the sequence of these stages is invariant and universal and that "higher" stages are more adequate-more "true," if you will--than the earlier ones. Needless to say, I have not experienced any lack of debate partners! In my contributions to our discussion I will speak about how the person is likely to reason about moral dilemmas in different stages.

Fowler: My name is James Fowler. As the theologian of the group, I am interested in universal truth about man as well as God. The English word "Psyche" is a direct transliteration from the Greek, "Psoche" which is translated "soul". The soul is the proper study of theology as well as psychology. During my training and subsequent teaching at Harvard and Boston College, I took a special interest in the psychology of religion. I had the privilege of being an intimate with Dr. Kohlberg. I have met Dr. Erickson, heard him lecture, and attended a graduate seminar on his thought. Dr. Piaget I have not met, but I am privileged to sit with him today on loan from...(embarrassed pause; clears throat)... well, on loan from whoever keeps the great thoughts of departed sages alive in the world.

The faith stages theory I published in my book *Stages of Faith: the Psychology of Human Development and the Quest for Meaning* in 1976, was based, of course, on the thought of the three authors preceding me here today. In addition, our group did empirical research on 359 Boston area people using a standardized interview technique. We were able to obtain 85-90% inter-rater reliability in our staging. Our sample was not totally representative and was non-random, but we hope to expand our data as time goes on. We believe our theory will be generalizable to all cultures and faiths since our stages describe structure of faith operation and not belief content per se. Indeed, faith does not even have to be about God as we conceptualized it. Let me explain.

One evening in the 1960's I was driving to a workshop I was giving on faith development. I thought of some opening remarks that might stimulate honest discussion.

What are you spending and being spent for? What commands and receives your best time; your best energy?

What dreams, causes, goals, or institutions are you pouring out your life for?

As you live your life, what power or powers do you fear or dread? What powers do you rely on and trust?

To what or whom are you committed in life? In death?

With whom or what group do you share your most sacred and private hopes for your life and for the lives of those you

love? Where do those hopes come from? Are they worthy things to be directing my life toward?

You see, these are the faith questions. Jung taught that no person can live without meaning. Faith is about that meaning that gives people a reason to go on living. To quote Wilfred Cantwell Smith, as opposed to mere belief, "Faith is deeper, richer, more personal. It is engendered by a religious tradition, in some cases and to some degree by its doctrines; but it is a quality of the person, not the system. It is an orientation of the personality, to oneself, to one's neighbor, to the universe; a total response; a way of seeing...; a capacity to live at more than a mundane level; to see, to feel, to act in terms of a transcendent dimension." This is what we studied and what I hope to intrigue you with today.

Convener: "Our thanks to each of you for these introductory remarks. Perhaps before we begin to build a shared understanding of stages of human development we had better take notice of some differences in your respective approaches. As a way of highlighting some of these let me ask each of you to speak briefly about what you mean when you refer to a "developmental stage."

Erikson [indicating that he wants to speak first]: The origins of the stage concept derive from Freud's suggestive work on psychosexual stages. With ingenious insight Freud saw psychosexual development proceeding by way of the successive energizing and sensitization of erogenous zones and the emergence of their characteristic modes. In the first year of life libidinal energy (Freud's term for life-energy as a whole) focuses in the oral zone. The oral modes associated with feeding--taking and receiving, later biting, are generalized and become characteristic of the infant's ways of relating to its environment as a whole. The great achievement of this oral period--for both child and mother (or her surrogate)--is the mutual regulation of giving and taking, a fitting of the child's need with the parent's need to be needed.

For the child from eighteen months to two years, with the maturation of the sphincter muscles, Freud saw the new focus of libidinal energy centering in the now sensitized anal area. During the time when toilet training becomes possible, the modes of this zone, holding on and letting go we will suggest, become generalized in the two-year-old's vigorous ability to assert that things are "mine" and the ability to say a stubborn "No!"

A third psychosexual stage Freud saw emerging with the Oedipal period, an period from age three to five or six, in which there is a first energizing and sensitization of the genital zone in infantile sexuality. In fantasy and everyday life the child experiments with initiatives that are generalizations from genital modes, including aggressive intrusiveness and the aggressive and seductive holding onto or recruitment of adults and other children into his or her activities.

Freud saw the elementary school years as a time of psychosexual latency when libidinal energy could be directed toward the mastery of physical and mental skills and in the forming of cooperative relationships.

Then puberty, with its explosive changes in body size and glandular functions, marked the adolescent return of libidinal energy to focus in the now maturing genital zone.

When I speak of a psychosocial stage, I refer to a phase of development marked by significant bodily changes, accompanied by emotional and cognitive growth, giving rise to new ways of relating and new social roles in the context of their social setting. Each new stage is initiated by a crisis; a struggle between the optimal possibilities presented by the emerging new capacities, on the one hand, and the failure to integrate them into one's

being on the other.

The stages are cumulative. Each new crisis must struggle with the inadequate residue of past solutions. Each new stage requires the reworking of those past solutions.

Piaget [stirring, and with a slight frown clouding his brow, moves into the pause]: For my work a stage is defined as an integrated set of operational structures that constitute the thought processes of a person at a given time. Development involves the transformation of such "structures of the whole" in the direction of greater internal differentiation, complexity, flexibility and stability. A stage represents a kind of balanced relationship between a person and his or her environment. This is a less colorful definition than Dr. Erickson's, but a somewhat more precise one. I suppose cognitions will always conform to precision better than feelings will.

Kohlberg [leaning forward and taking up the conversation]:

Let me build on what M. Piaget has been saying. A central thrust of my work is the claim that moral judgment and action have a rational core. Moral choice is not just a matter of feelings or values. It involves the interpretation of a moral dilemma situation, the construction of the points of view of the various participants, and the weighing of their respective claims, rights, duties and commitments to the good. These are all cognitive acts. Similar to M. Piaget's position, therefore, we see a stage of moral judgment as describable apart from any particular content, pattern of thought, or reasoning employed by a person. And just as Piaget sees formal operational thinking as the most developed stage of cognition, so we see the universalizing exercise of the principles of justice as the most developed stage of moral reasoning.

These stages, our research indicates, are *hierarchical* that is, each builds on the capabilities of the previous stages. They are *sequential* one coming after the other in logically necessary fashion. And the sequence is *invariant*. You can't skip over a stage. Based on cross-cultural research we believe this sequence to be *universal*. The rate at which persons in different societies move from one stage to another, and the point of arrest or final equilibration that is "average" for adults in given cultures will vary. But the same series of stages--if *formally* described--seem to characterize the path of development in moral judgment in each society.

Fowler: Enough said. They have covered it well.

Convener: Now, in order to get on with our discussion, let me offer one final clarification: Professor Erickson's "eight ages" of the life cycle correlate closely with biological maturation and chronological age. Dr's Kohlberg, Piaget, and Fowler, on the other hand, have affirmed that their stages, while dependent upon maturation and time, are not tied to them. Movement from one developmental stage to another is not automatic or inevitable. As the wisdom of our television advertising industry demonstrates, many American adults do not attain Piaget's formal operational stage of reasoning. Kohlberg's research has consistently shown that a majority of persons in American society are best described by the conventional stages of moral judgment.

One can "arrest" or equilibrate in one of the intermediate stages. Yet the person who so arrests, in cognitive, faith, or moral developmental terms, still must meet the life challenges described in Erickson's stages. We might say that the psychosocial crises come "ready or not." This means, gentlemen, that when a good parallelism in cognitive, moral and psychoso-

cial development occurs, it is likely to be the exception rather than the rule. Different peoples' ways of meeting and dealing with the developmental crises Erikson delineates may differ in significant ways, depending upon their stages of cognitive and moral judgment development. It is further useful to note that disharmony between these developmental stages and psychosocial challenges is the cause of much suffering we commonly refer to as neurosis and personality disorder in psychiatry. The psychotherapy disciplines then arise to address these disharmonies and further the development of personality and diminish suffering.

Let us now proceed to our discussion of the different phases of life beginning, of course, with the infant.

INFANCY

Piaget : The baby's first thinking or intelligence arises out of its actions. In this first stage, thought is the coordination of actions and the gradual elaboration of reflexes to become action schemata are the things by which the baby orients itself to the world.

In the early months of life an infant experiences the world as a relatively formless and fluid sequence of stimuli, having no conceptualized permanence or reality apart from the infant's paying attention to it. The psychoanalysts speak of this phase as characterized by feelings of narcissistic omnipotence in the child. In cognitive theory we must insist it is a narcissism without Narcissus since as yet there are no "self" and "other" well defined cognitively.

Throughout the first year to eighteen months the child is involved in the gradual loss of self as the center of the universe. It is a gradual experiencing of self as separate, permanent, and having its own characteristics in space, time, and with cause and effect. This knowledge is of a tangible kind: the child's action schemata enable it to move and maneuver in a world of permanent objects. By around seven or eight months babies begin to search for objects they have seen and handled before even when they are removed from them and hidden by researchers in experiments. At four months, typically, they do not search for the hidden objects. "Out of sight is out of mind." By the age of seven to eight months we may infer that the child has developed structures of thought that enable it to construct and retain a mental image of the misplaced object. Many observers have also reported the emergence at about that same time of a new quality of anxiety in babies. It is as though the absence of or coming and going of those who give primary care is now experienced as more threatening and disturbing. This stranger anxiety can have negative developmental effect if mishandled by parents.

Sensorimotor thought, our name for this stage of cognitive development, shows the marks of genuine intelligence, including the construction of rudimentary schemata of space, time, causality and the permanence of objects. Infants experiment, draw causal connections, invent means, ends, and procedures, and they frequently give indications of insight. But sensorimotor intelligence is prelinguistic. The roots of intelligence and speech in the infant are separate. When they begin to converge, between twelve and eighteen months on the average, we are ready for a new stage in cognitive development.

Erikson: Piaget frequently calls attention to the fact that cognitive development does not occur apart from emotional development. The very processes of differentiation of self and other and of decentration of self from environment are occasions of great emotional impact in the child's forming sense of self and world. The student of psychosocial development cannot afford to forget

the infant's *first* traumatic experience of separation, that of birth.

The symbiotic mutuality of prenatal life is interrupted. The first order of business for the newborn the reestablishment of a bond in which the unequilibrated neediness of the child can be met by the readiness and capacity of the adults to provide nurture. At stake in this effort at mutuality between infant and provider is the baby's forming, rudimentary sense of basic trust. Trust is in tension with feelings of basic mistrust. I must use the word "sense" here because as Piaget has pointed out, the infant experience is sensory-motor, therefore it is preverbal, not self aware, and at the level of intuition. Dr. Caldwell has treated a case where this separation from symbiosis and the sense of connection to God haunted a woman throughout her life until she remembered it and could deal with it more consciously.

The establishment of a dependable bond between care givers and the baby was not formed in this case. The girl was the fourth of four girls born to an overly busy attorney, his harried wife, during a period of financial crisis and excessive alcohol use

by the father. Mother's failure to provide a well attuned bond with this girl created an over sensitivity to rejection, emotional dependency, and difficulties with obesity and later bulimia and depression following the loss of her own newborn infant to adoption when she delivered out of wedlock. Losing the bond with her newborn reawakened the loss of symbiosis at the time of the woman's own birth and triggered a severe depression.

Another particular critical time is the separation that comes about with the onset of teething. Whether weaning is from breast or bottle, it occurs in earnest as the teeth begin to break through. Teething feels like a kind of painful explosion of the gums. When the baby vigorously pursues the only activity that promises relief, namely biting, the previously available sources of oral succor--fingers and nipples--are likely to be withdrawn. That this corresponds with the time when Piaget sees the emergence of the schema of the permanent object, bringing with it a new awareness of "otherness" I find this quite suggestive.

Stages of Optimal Human Development: Parallels of the Major Paths

<i>Eras and Ages</i>	<i>Erickson's Psychosocial Development</i>	<i>Piaget's Cognitive Development</i>	<i>Kohlberg's Moral Development</i>	<i>Fowler's Faith Stages</i>
Infancy (0-1 1/2)	Basic Trust vs. Basic Mistrust (Hope)	Sensorimotor	--	0. Undifferentiated Faith (Infancy)
Early Childhood (2-6)	Autonomy vs. Shame and Doubt (Will) Initiative vs. Guilt (Purpose)	Preoperational or Intuitive		1. Intuitive-Projective Faith (Early Childhood)
Childhood (7-12)	Industry vs. Inferiority (Competence)	Concrete Operational	<i>Preconventional Level</i> 1. Heteronomous Morality 2. Instrumental Exchange	2. Mythic-Literal Faith (School Years)
Adolescence (13-21)	Identity vs. Role Confusion (Fidelity)	Formal Operational	<i>Conventional Level</i> 3. Mutual Interpersonal Relations	3. Synthetic-Conventional Faith (Adolescence)
Young Adulthood (20-35)	Intimacy vs. Isolation (Love)		4. Social System and Conscience <i>Postconventional Principled Level</i>	4. Individuative-Reflective Faith (Young Adulthood)
Adulthood (35-60)	Generativity vs. Stagnation (Care)		5. Social Contract, Individual Rights	5. Conjunctive Faith (Mid-life and Beyond)
Maturity (60+)	Integrity vs. Despair (Wisdom)		6. Universal Ethical Principles	6. Universalizing Faith

Parents convey a sense of trustworthiness and reliability not so much by the quantity of food or overt fawning attention they provide, but rather by the quality and consistency of their care. By the ways they hold and handle the child. By their deep looking in the eyes. By the guidance, permissions and prohibitions they give, they convey to the child a deep, almost bodily conviction that there is meaning to what they are doing. The child, feeling cherished, feels an inner sense of trustworthiness and reliability that can balance the terrors of separation and abandonment.

Fowler: The infancy stage of faith is undifferentiated, but the experience of the mother--child bond has everything to do with the ease or difficulty with which people will be able to feel the presence of God subjectively in later life. Transcendent reality will often break through in the most hardened soul, but if the experience of God is like unto love, and this foundational parental love

experience is defective, we often see people have a great deal of problem ever really believing God could love them. Indeed a whole generation of German theologians demonstrate this fact. Our grandparent's generation in Germany was under the firm belief that the best way to treat infants when they cry is to leave them alone until they stop crying. That way they would not be spoiled. The children of these parents, our parents' generation, created a group of theologians who were who wrestled with a God who one longed for but who seemed to seldom come. It was tragic. The Theological Virtues of Faith, Hope, and Love definitely have their roots in infancy

Early Childhood

Convener: Thank you, presenters. M. Piaget, let's ask you to begin again as we now look at the years from two to six, or early

childhood.

Piaget: In terms of cognitive development the era we now examine really should be thought of as a long transition, initiated by the joining of language and thought, toward the emergence of the first real logical operations around the ages of six or seven. Yet it is more than a transition. The young child's characteristic patterns of thought have a kind of integrity of their own that justifies our speaking of this as a stage. We call it *preoperational* or *intuitive* thinking.

The differentiation of self from world effected in the sensorimotor stage undergoes another decisive step as the child begins to use language to express and explore experience. Language makes possible the "*socialization*" of action schemata. They can be named, remembered and spoken about with others. Also, inner states and feelings can be expressed. Observations of young children's conversations and group play, however, remind us of the ongoing egocentrism of the child in this era. In speaking of egocentrism, I mean to point out that the child, for the most part, is limited to his or her own perspective on and feelings about things. He or she has not yet developed the next stage's ability to differentiate the self's perspective from that of others and to coordinate the two different outlooks simultaneously. Young children playing together at this age demonstrate this through their talk and play which frequently take the form of parallel monologues. The rules of their games are fluid and egocentric and often both or all win, if winning is important at all.

Children in this stage demonstrate the inability to coordinate two dimensions of magnitude--length and thickness--at the same time. A ball of clay reshaped into a snake and back again will not be conceived of as having the same mass. Preoperational thought also lacks the ability to mentally reverse the operations performed on the ball, imaginatively restoring it to its previous shape. Unable to coordinate the two shapes as different conditions of the same substance, the children drew conclusions based on their perceptions and intuitive hunches.

Kohlberg. M. Piaget's description of some of the features of preoperational thinking provides a good way into understanding the first steps toward moral reasoning in young children. Moral judgment requires the construction and coordination of the points of view of self and others. It involves balancing self-interests with the interests, rights and needs of others. Given Piaget's account of the egocentrism of the young child, you can readily see why I frequently say that our first stage really describes a pre-moral position. The inability yet to coordinate the perspectives of self and others and the domination of thought by perception and feeling mean that the child will look primarily to external cues to determine the rightness or wrongness, the goodness or badness of actions.

Therefore, we find that persons best described by stage one (and these are not, by the way, always preschoolers) determine the rightness or wrongness of actions in terms of anticipated punishment or reward. Stage one looks to the consequences of an act and the probable degree of punishment it would entail. In the preoperational stage children consistently weigh magnitude of consequences over motives for action in assessing moral blame. They regularly see the child who accidentally breaks five glasses while trying to help a parent as deserving more punishment than a child who breaks one glass while trying to steal a forbidden cookie. Criteria such as physical size and visible symbols of authority are employed to determine who should be listened to and obeyed.

Erikson: My observations on the early childhood era lead me to

distinguish two periods or stages in early childhood. The first, which I designate as the crisis of *autonomy* vs. *shame and doubt*, depicts the struggle of the two- and three-year-old. The second, emerging and finding resolution roughly between four and six, I call the crisis of *initiative* vs. *guilt*.

The differentiation of self from others and the joining of thought and language, of which Piaget has spoken, combine with certain features of physical maturation around age two to make possible (and necessary) a new stage of psychosocial growth. Physically, the child has learned to stand up and to walk. By virtue of this a child becomes one who can go far, or indeed go too far. In addition, control of the sphincter muscles is developing and, in an achievement which has considerable social meaning, at least in this culture, the child is becoming one who can "hold on" or "let go." As we hinted earlier, these new physical modalities have their correlates in the child's ways of relating socially to others. The child can now begin deciding whether to let go of an instinctual urge or hold on and delay gratification--a foundation experience for socialization.

Further, the child with these new capacities, including language, encounters a more challenging and complex range of expectations from the significant others around him or her. Taken together, these new capacities and the child's experience of self in relation to others reactions to him or her, give rise to the ability to say "I," "my," and "mine" with conviction. There is now an experience sense of self as separate from others. The child now frequently uses the word "no," with conviction. Her or his new-found readiness to demand and resist forcefully signal the emergence of boundaries of the self. This we may call a growing sense of *autonomy*. By saying "no", in other words, the child is declaring what is "me" and what is "not me".

This "sense of autonomy" or a "sense of shame" pervades surface and depth, consciousness and the unconscious. They are ways of inner *experiencing*, ways of *behaving* observable by others, and unconscious *inner states* determinable by test and analysis.

The same child who is learning to stand and walk alone becomes quickly aware of the great discrepancy in height and size between him- or herself and adults. In addition to this awareness of smallness, he or she must face the relative ease with which the assertions of infantile autonomy can be overwhelmed or "shamed" by adults or older children. Shame is a visual phenomenon. It derives from a sense of being seen or exposed before one is ready. Exposure means revealing one's vulnerability or one's deficiency. The vulnerability or deficiency connected with shame is not a matter of moral failure. It feels like something deeper and more essential to self is innately defective. The person (or child) who feels shame experiences an exposure to others in which a deficiency of *being*, an inadequacy intrinsic to self, is on display. Psychoanalytic insight alerts us to likely connections between the emergence of shame and its twin brother, doubt, in the child's awareness of having a backside.

The experience of evacuating the bowels --praiseworthy when done on schedule and in appropriate places, is followed by prohibitions of contact with that which felt good as it passed, but now is said to be dirty, filthy and eminently disposable. That objectionable material, which after all forms within me and is part of me, emerges from that visually inaccessible and physically vulnerable "dark continent" of my backside. Indeed, the backside of something is often a symbol of the shadow in dreams. Shame and doubt, as well as the shadow structure of mind, have their social origins in the child's experiences of the culture's responses to these physiological processes and features.

The outer control exerted by parents and others at this stage must be firmly reassuring. The child must come to feel that the

basic faith in existence, which is the lasting treasure saved from the rages of the oral stage, will not be overthrown by these sudden, violent wishes to have a choice, to grasp and claim things and to eliminate stubbornly. Consistent affirmation coupled with firm guidance must protect the child from the potential anarchy of the as yet untrained sense of control, the inability to hold on and let go with discretion. As the environment encourages the child to "stand on his or her own feet," it must protect them against meaningless and arbitrary experiences of shame and of early doubt. The fruit of such guidance and of the growth it nurtures is the emergence of the ego strength or virtue of *will*.

By the age of four or five, children have mastered the use and coordination of arms and legs. They experience a new quality of ease in movement. In accompaniment with these developments, initiative adds to autonomy the quality of undertaking, planning and "attacking" a task for the sake of being active and on the move. Though new patterns of sex role socialization may have some effect in this regard, we must still say that this "making," this pleasure in attack and conquest, has somewhat different emphases in boys and girls. In the boy the emphasis remains on phallic-intrusive modes; in the girl it turns to aggressive modes of "catching" or to the milder forms of making oneself attractive and endearing.

In relation to older siblings initiative brings with it rivalry. And in the child's desires for and fantasies of an exclusively privileged relationship with the parent of the opposite sex, the results can be secret fears and dreams of intense retribution. This brings us to the issue of *guilt*. In this stage, a fateful split occurs in the emotional life of the child. Under the impact of emerging infantile sexuality with its fantasies and the answering terrors of incest taboos and other prohibitions, a child internalizes the constraining **voices** of parental judgment. If shame is a visual phenomenon, *guilt* is auditory. With an inner ear the child hears the admonitory or judging voice of the now internalized set of parental injunctions and prohibitions, curbing or circumscribing the child's thrustings and seductions. The problem is the infantile conscience or superego can be more primitive, cruel and uncompromising than the parents or other adults ever intended. A pervasive sense of guilt and self-judgment can lead children to over control and overconstrict themselves to the point of self-obliteration. This is the danger of the stage. Where parental and other adults' guidance can contribute to a mutual regulation of instinctual energy and controlling conscience, the child experiences the emergence of the virtue or ego strength we may call *purpose*.

Fowler: The faith of early childhood we call Intuitive-Projective. Imagination is perhaps the key ingredient here. Long-lasting images and feelings, both positive and negative, about life and death, God and spiritual things are laid down which only in the next stage will be able to be processed by reason. After reason and later identity inform and modify these images, the imagination again becomes important in adult faith in meditative practices and imagining trustworthy objects in the unseen realms. This process can be interfered with if there are images of terror and destructiveness associated with parents or with moral or doctrinal expectations.

Kohlberg: I would urge you here to let the descriptions given by these theories guide you to a new quality of observation of and listening to children. Each of the theoretical perspectives we are sharing grew out of systematic and careful observation of the language, thought, play and behavior of children. Having these stages in mind as you play with children of various ages is quite enlightening.

Convener: Good. I think we'd better move on now to the next era, that of childhood proper--the elementary school years.

Childhood

Piaget. Since I have been quiet in this discussion for an uncharacteristically long time I would like to open up the discussion of this era. Around age seven, give or take a year, a typically rather rapid and pervasive transformation in the thought patterns of children occurs. The domination of thought by egocentrism and perception begins to give way to what may be designated as the first truly logical operations of thought. The previous stage's tendency to give magical explanations of causal relationships and its inability to think in terms of processes that can be mentally prolonged or reversed are overcome in this period. The emerging stable and flexible system of logical operations we call *concrete operational* thinking.

In order to move beyond the fluid, unpredictable and magical world of preoperational thought, a new system of stable mental operations has to emerge. This is what we mean by operations. *Operations*, like action schemata before them, are patterned mental acts exercised on the mental objects--that is on internalized images, words, and patterns. They are *generalizable*, that is, they can be used on a wide range of possible objects in the imagination. For example, operations such as the union of two classes (fathers united with mothers constitute parents) or the addition of two numbers are actions characterized by very great generality since the acts of uniting, arranging in order and so on enter into many types of actions. Further, operations are *reversible* (the reverse of uniting is separating, the reverse of addition is subtraction, and so forth). Another feature of true operations is that they are never isolated but are always able to link together to create a larger system of events.

The operational logic of childhood gives rise to a mental model of reality that is increasingly orderly, predictable and linear in time. Conservation of mass like with the reshaped clay balls, now present no problem due to the child's ability to mentally reverse the action of rolling the ball into a sausage. Moreover, the child begins to learn the operations of arithmetic and the system of numbers.

With the assembling of these operational "groupings" there develops an ability that has great significance for social and moral development. The understanding of a more stable and predictable physical universe enables the child to begin to take account of differences of perspective between the self and others. He or she can now coordinate the effects on perspective by occupying vantage points different from their own.

We must remind ourselves, however, that the operational logic of childhood remains concrete. Its perspective taking is largely limited to those flesh and blood others with whom the child interacts. Universal or philosophical principles are not yet available to the child. The elaboration and use of the operations arise out of interaction with objects and persons that are concretely present, visible and accessible. We might say that the concrete operational mind reflects *with* the operations of logical thought, but it does not yet reflect *upon* these operations. To think about thought itself does not develop until puberty. It is a logic of objects and not yet a logic of propositions about objects. The propositional logic with its ability to imagine theoretically all possible perspectives is a function of the next phase.

Kohlberg.. The logical operations appearing typically at seven or eight have important implications for the child's approach to making moral judgments. Stage two in moral development we call *instrumental exchange*. Concrete operational thinking is *neces-*

sary but not sufficient for this stage and for the form of social perspective taking it assumes. An additional range of interactions and experiences is required for moral development beyond those required for cognitive development alone. Opportunities for taking the perspectives of others, for facing and conversing about situations of moral conflict and perhaps for observing and hearing others' ways of dealing with moral dilemmas are some of the requisite experiences for the development of new structures of moral judgment and social perspective.

The person whose moral judgment is dominantly stage two is no less self-interested than the person of stage one. In a special sense we may say that he or she is *more* self-interested. Having begun, as M. Piaget suggested, to be able to differentiate the self's perspective from and to coordinate it with those of others, we may say that those in stage two are more clearly aware of and therefore more effectively able to pursue their own interests and desires. The differences from stage one's egocentrism, however, are very significant. Now the moral actor *is* aware of and must take account of the interests, needs and claims of others. There is the recognition that in order to get others to assent to or even to cooperate in the achievement of one's goals, one must be prepared to reciprocate. For a time we subtitled stage two "You scratch my back and I'll scratch yours."

A very significant step toward the understanding and performing justice involves coming to feel and honor the force of reciprocal rights and claims. We should recognize, moreover, that *this* moral logic informs all theories of punishment and retribution of the type "an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth." In this concrete reciprocity we find the roots of justice as fairness. The perspective taking underlying justice as reciprocal fairness is concrete and *individualistic*. It does not yet generalize beyond particular face-to-face situations. We see, therefore, why the school boy or girl or older person stalled at stage two remains heavily dependent upon specific sets of rules, guidelines or directives for shaping their moral behavior.

Erikson.. A healthy resolution of the pre-school oedipal developmental situation is to accept that the child will have no lasting place in the home or as a marriage partner for a parent. A healthy child of school age, therefore, has energy and interest to turn outward. All societies provide some form of educational preparation for adult membership in the group. That this is begun universally at about the ages of six or seven is powerful testimony that some new level of emotional and intellectual readiness is present. This era and its challenges focus on the crisis I call *industry vs. inferiority*.

A sense of industry accrues as the child learns to utilize her or his physical and intellectual capacities in potentially productive work. In becoming a "worker", the growing person must learn to contribute as a productive unit in cooperative enterprises. This involves, in addition to developing particular cognitive and physical skills, learning the disciplines of group life and the expression and integration of emotions.

The danger of this stage lies in a sense of inferiority and inadequacy. If one despairs of one's tools and skills--or of one's status among partners in cooperation--then the person may pull back into the more isolated, less capability-conscious familial context of the Oedipal time. The child may despair of his or her equipment in the tool world or in anatomy and consider themselves doomed to mediocrity or inadequacy. Where good modes of leadership and not too severely interrupted opportunities for learning and growth enable children to avoid these dangers, a lasting sense of *competence* results. This virtue or ego strength contributes an abiding confidence that one *can do* and *learn* and that one is capable of performing a valued service in the commu-

nity's economy of work.

Fowler: As children are industriously learning in school, they are also learning the beliefs, observances, and stories of their faith community. Beliefs, morals, and symbolic stories are appropriated with literal interpretations. The rise of concrete operations leads to the curbing and ordering of the previous stage's imaginative composing of the world. Story becomes the major way of giving unity and value to experience. They do not, however, step back from the flow of stories to formulate reflective, conceptual meanings. Drama and epic story, suggest the pathways of relating to the unseen realms of life and meaning and are foundational to later more abstract understandings.

The limitations of literalness and excessive reliance upon this level's conceptions or reciprocity in relationships and fairness, when kept in later years result in an over controlling, stilted perfectionism or "works righteousness" or their opposite, a self-abasing sense of badness if a person has been mistreated. Of course, we ran into these kind of adults among the Pharisees of Jesus' day. A perceptive work of literature emphasizing the failure of many people to grow beyond this period is found in Russian author Feydor Dostoevsky's work *The Brothers Karamazov*. The specific section, called "The Grand Inquisitor", depicts Jesus once again returning to earth during the time of the Spanish Inquisition. The Grand Inquisitor has him jailed and comes to him secretly saying he knows who he is, but that the masses of people really do not want the freedom of higher level thought like he is offering. They want the Inquisitor to tell them what to believe so they can follow like sheep. He convinces Jesus to go back to heaven and leave the flock to his care.

Convener.. You men have given us a lot to digest as we try to grasp the contours of cognitive, moral, faith, and psychosocial development in the elementary years. While lecturing on this once, I expressed a kind of vicarious grief I feel for the child as he or she leaves the imaginatively rich, mythical world of early childhood and begins to live in the more everyday and predictable era of the school years. A woman in my audience offered an insightful response. "But think of the exhilaration the child must experience," she said, "precisely in being more sovereignty able to distinguish fact from fantasy and in being able more reliably to predict the behavior of people and things. To really *know*, when previously you've only been able to intuit, can bring a powerful sense of satisfaction."

As we turn now to the era of adolescence I am certain that we can expect to hear about an equally dramatic confluence of developmental changes.

Adolescence

Piaget.. I suspect that this discussion of adolescence from our several points of view may prove particularly valuable, in that it will show how significant a part cognitive development plays in the crises of adolescence and their resolutions.

It is important to recognize that while the transition from the patterns of thought that ripen in late childhood to those of adolescence does bring disequilibrium, the emerging new cognitive structures provide markedly increased capacity, flexibility and stability. In fact, as I shall try to show, the formation of the personality's ability to reflect upon itself only emerges with the development of formal operational thinking.

Consider an example. Subjects of various ages were presented with a number of metal rods of varying length, thickness, shape, and material. They were then asked to explain the rods' differences in flexibility. Concrete operational subjects did not at-

tempt to separate the possible different factors that might have an influence. Rather, by arranging the rods in order of descending or ascending lengths they began to see whether the rods were increasingly flexible. When other variables, such as thickness or material were seen to interfere with their length theory, these latter factors were analyzed in turn by the same method. But there was neither a systematic isolation of each separate factor, nor any recognition of the necessity of creating a total perspective or theory that could account for all various factors. When pressed to provide proof for their conclusions subjects of nine or ten typically chose a long thin rod and a short thick one to demonstrate the role of length, because in this way, as a boy of nine and a half told us, "you can see the difference."

In contrast, subjects of eleven or twelve or beyond, after some initial groping, made a list of factors by way of hypothesis and then studied them one by one. In this step, which represents the advance over the previous stage, they separated each variable factor, testing each one while controlling or keeping constant all the others. When asked to give proof of the validity of their conclusions the subjects could show that these variables and only these variables could singly and in combination account for the differences. In short they could give you a method, comprehensive and exhaustive, for solving the problem and could demonstrate that it covered all possible relations between factors. We call this *hypothetical-deductive thinking*. It is second-level thinking--that is, thinking about the method of thinking. This method, which we found fairly general at about fourteen, is all the more remarkable in that none of the subjects we interviewed had received instruction in it at school.

In the formal operational stage, thought takes wings. We are now able imaginatively to transcend empirical experience. In social terms, formal operational thinking can be utopian. With its ability to extrapolate or imagine perfection, the adolescent mind can be quite harsh in judging friends, parents, social or political conditions generally or the self. Now able to conceive of the possibility of an infinity of perspectives on a problem, the adolescent shows both a marked improvement in taking the perspectives of others and a tendency to an overconfident distortion of others' perspectives through overassuming of them into his or her own.

The intellectual transcendence we have just described also makes possible a new kind of reflection on the course of one's own life. The concrete operational child is *carried* by the flow of his or her life and reflects on events and relationships from *within* that flow. In contrast, the adolescent begins to be able to reflect on the life course from "above" or "beside" it. The self-aware "observing ego" is forming. Formal operations bring the ability to construct a personal past and to anticipate a personal future, based on expected or projected developmental transformations of the self. Thus, in a qualitatively different sense than before, the youth begins to exhibit personality, that is, the disciplining and conscious effort at shaping one's life in accordance with self-discerned patterns and aspirations.

Kohlberg.' M. Piaget's discussion of the implications of formal operational thought for social relations leads well into a look at corresponding advances in moral judgment and in social perspective taking. The "transcendence" of thought from its embeddedness in the concrete world of objects and relationships manifests its impact in three decisive steps in social perspective taking.

Almost parallel with the appearance of early formal operations (usually about eleven) there can emerge a qualitatively new dimension in taking the perspectives of others. In simple perspective taking I see you seeing a third object, and I imaginatively construct your perspective on it. My knowledge of both you and

the object is enhanced, for as I coordinate our two perspectives on it, I can compare and contrast our ways of seeing it and arrive at a more "objective" knowing of the object.

But with the transcendence that formal operational thinking brings the subject begins to construct the perspective of the other on the *self*. In other words "I see you seeing me."

Now, when I begin to construct your perspective on me, I soon recognize that you, likewise, are constructing my perspective on you. Hence, "I see you seeing me AND I see you seeing me seeing you." This is *mutual interpersonal perspective taking*.

Mutual interpersonal perspective makes for the creation of what may be called a "*third-person perspective*". By this we mean a more dispassionate perspective, inclusive of the perspectives of both the self and others, but not identical with or under the control of either.

A bit of reflection enables us to see how the capacity for third person perspective taking greatly strengthens the possibility of an actor's determining what justice requires in a situation of interpersonal conflict. The distancing, or transcendence, it makes possible enables one to approximate the weighing of another's rights, claims and interpretations with the same scale by which one weighs one's own. The development and consistent use of third-person perspective taking would constitute a remarkable evidence of moral growth. In practice, the third-person perspective is often appealed to in more conventional forms, namely by way of appeal to the sanction of generally accepted social expectations (G. H. Mead's "generalized other") or to a shared understanding of God as a transcendent third person.

Stage three of moral development therefore marks the beginning of the *conventional level* of moral judgment. In stage three actions are right if they conform to the expectations of one's "significant others." A powerful motive of stage three moral action is to please those persons who matter greatly and not to disappoint their opinions and expectations of us. Another criterion for the rightness of actions at stage three involves doing what people generally expect of a person in the role or relation one occupies toward others: that is, doing what a good husband, or a good daughter or a loyal friend would generally be expected to do--a conformist mode of moral decision making.

Though stage three may compose a unified set of social expectations, it does not yet take a true societal perspective. It is limited to an interpersonal construction of the moral domain and formulates its moral tenets, however inclusively, primarily on the basis of an extension from face-to-face relationships. A true societal perspective awaits the next stage.

Erikson: My colleague Piaget, in speaking here of the emergence of formal operations, has emphasized the consequences of this development for social interaction and personality formation. I prefer to speak of self-aware personality formation in terms of *identity* formation. The cognitive developments he describes are central in the identity crisis of adolescence. Professor Kohlberg's additional explication of the dramatic new steps in social perspective made possible by formal operational thought indeed help us to see quite clearly what I might call the cognitive bases of the identity crisis.

With the ability for entering into "mutual interpersonal perspective taking" the boy or girl suddenly becomes "self-conscious" in new and potentially confusing ways. His or her range of significant others is widened and may be somewhat diverse.

The views of self that emerge in relations with peers, parents, teachers and others, therefore, like reflected images in a house of distorting mirrors, may not fit together. The young person can say as did St. Augustine did in his *Confessions*, "I became a problem to myself!" But we must add one dimension more from among

these cognitive complexities contributing to the identity crisis. M. Piaget's indication that formal operational thought brings the capacity to compose a personal past and to anticipate a personal future is important. Now one's sense of self--one's felt identity--must try to fit together images of a personal past and its continuities with the images of a personal future and its *possibilities*.

Further, even as the young person is involved in dealing with new capacities for self-awareness and for interpersonal relations, he or she is experiencing physiological transformations of a dramatic sort: changes in body size and musculature, deepening of voice timbre, the growth of body hair, the enlargement toward maturity of genitals and breasts, the onset of menstruation and the ejaculation of semen and sperm. One's body image is in flux and for a time the youth must incorporate almost daily new features in her or his physiology.

The evidences of new thought processes and reflectiveness are not missed by the persons and institutions with which youth interact. New expectations, qualitatively different disciplines and a host of difficult decisions are the requirements with which societies greet the now more womanly or manly adolescent. In trying to meet and fulfill these requirements youth will call on the available and personally resonant ideological resources of their environments, particularly those that are embodied in charismatic and convincing leaders. They will seek sponsoring groups and figures and will appoint otherwise well-meaning persons as temporary enemies over against whom their identities may be clarified. They may band together in tight cliques, overemphasizing some relatively trivial commonality as a symbol of shared identity. In this cliquishness they can be quite cruel as they exclude those who do not share this common element.

In a more constructive mode of approach adolescents may enter a stage of "falling in love," which is by no means entirely, or even primarily, a sexual matter except where the mores demand it. To a considerable extent adolescent love is an attempt to arrive at a definition of one's identity by projecting one's diffuse ego image on another and by seeing it thus reflected and gradually clarified. This is why so much of young love is conversation. In America, teens feel quite deprived if unable to use the phone to talk to their friends for at least an hour a night.

I call this developmental crisis of adolescence the struggle for *identity vs. role confusion*. By identity I mean an accrued awareness of oneself that maintains continuity with one's past meanings. Identity integrates the images of oneself given by significant others with one's own inner feelings of who one is and of what one can do. All of this must be done in such a way as to enable one to anticipate the future without undue anxiety about "losing" oneself. Identity, in this way, is by no means a fully conscious matter. But when it is present it gives rise to a feeling of inner firmness or of "being together" as a self. It communicates to others a sense of personal unity or integration. An American slang term an adolescent might receive from their peer in this regard is "You've really 'got it together'!"

The danger of this stage is *role confusion*. This can be exacerbated by strong previous doubt about one's sexual identity or about one's place or value in the relationships of the family. It can also be heightened by fears about the impossibility of finding adult roles in work or love or social-political status that can sustain present and future identity.

Where social conditions and favorable personal relationships support young persons in building a firm sense of identity to feel ready to *commit* themselves--in friendship, to future work roles or in loyalty to religious or other ideological visions and communities--we may expect the emergence in them of the ego strength or virtue we call *fidelity*.

To you Dr. Fowler.

Fowler: With the onset of operational thought in adolescence, transition, it is now possible for a person to notice an implicit clash or contradiction in stories that leads to reflection on meanings. Previous literalism breaks down. A new "cognitive conceit" leads to disillusionment with previous teachers and teachings.

The emergence of mutual interpersonal perspective taking creates the need for a more personal relationship with the ultimate powers of the faith. As the faith community tries to give answers to the seeming contradictions this adolescent is seeing, if their answers are satisfactory, the faith can synthesize the meanings at this higher cognitive level. We refer to this stage as "Synthetic--Conventional" to emphasize this new synthesizing ability but to denote that the person is still into conformist answer seeking, not the true creative re-examination of the origins of these "answers" required in the next level of development.

Convener: Friends, with his remarks about formal operations and their significance, Professor Piaget has completed his account of the cognitive developmental stages. For Professor Kohlberg there remains another stage at the conventional level of moral judgment, and then we want to hear his discussion of the post-conventional or principled level, stages five and six. To complete his presentation of ages of the life cycle, Professor Erikson will overview the three adult eras he has identified. Dr. Fowler will show how faith is structured when parallel to these stages of development.

We will first ask Professor Kohlberg to resume the conversation with a discussion of moral stage four.

Kohlberg: Let me begin by saying something about the conventional moral level taken as a whole. At this level persons perceive the expectations of their family, group or nation as valuable in their own right. The attitude is not only one of *conformity* to personal expectations and social order but of loyalty to them. As Professor Erikson might say, one's identity is rounded in important ways by one's identifications with family, groups and a social-institutional order that protects them. Conventional moral reasoning, therefore, grows out of one's actively maintaining, supporting and justifying this order and identifying with the persons or groups involved in it.

Moral stage four, which we call *social system and conscience*, requires a further step in social perspective taking. Whereas stage three was limited to interpersonal modes, stage four includes those but widens them to take the perspective of the social system or order as a whole. Stage four sees society as a network of rules or laws and of roles and relationships constituted by them. Therefore in the adjudication of differences between persons one must consider not only the rights, claims, desires and promises that shape their particular relationship and not only the goodness or sincerity of their motives. One must see all those in relation to the more comprehensive interests and requirements of the social system taken as a whole.

Stage four, which in our earlier writings was called the "law and order" orientation, determines the final rightness or wrongness of actions by reference to authority, fixed rules, the social-legal regulations of roles and the maintenance of social order. Stage four emphasizes doing one's duty. It is prepared to subordinate personal and interpersonal interests to this duty sense.

Stage four and the conventional level as a whole have no way of shaping moral decisions beyond interpersonal concord, societal expectations and the legal point of view. Justice, for the conventional level, is inseparable from compliance with these sources of norms. Strictly speaking, civil disobedience, in the

service of a principle of justice that transcends and could correct law or social custom, does not emerge in the conventional level. I will deal with the principled moral stages in my concluding remarks.

Erikson: When a late adolescent or young adult, carries within the self that firm sense of congruence between their meaning to themselves and others that we have called *identity*, there is a readiness for risking that unity of self in relations of closeness with another. The young adult is ready for *intimacy*, that is, the capacity to commit oneself to concrete affiliations and partnerships and to develop the ethical strength to abide by such commitments even though they may call for significant sacrifices and compromises. The prototypical relationship of such intimacy occurs in the full genital union of a man and a woman in the context of marriage. To be sure, the exercise of sexual closeness in many instances does not wait for that formation of identity that brings readiness for commitment and fidelity. Much of the sex life preceding these commitments is of the identity-searching kind or is dominated by patterns of genital self-assertion that makes of it a kind of erotic combat zone.

While marital intimacy provides the prototype, the capacity for intimacy is called upon in quite other contexts as well. Intimacy is required in experiences of the solidarity of close group associations, in close friendships, in physical combat and other forms of conflict, in experiences of inspiration by teachers and in times of intuition or mystical insight. Avoidance or withdrawal from such situations because of a fear of the loss of the self may lead to the counterpoint of intimacy---and the danger of this stage---namely a deep sense of *isolation* and a resulting self-absorption.

Isolation involves not only a withdrawal from or avoidance of intimacy. It can become so extreme as to destroy those persons or forces whose essence seems dangerous to one's own. We see this pattern in married couples who, if they start to feel to intimately vulnerable, start fights with one another, never understanding perhaps why they just can't seem to get along. The capacity for intimacy, as developed in the context of the mutual interpenetration of emotion and will in friendship, and sometimes bodies as well, based on commitment, gives rise to the ego strength or virtue of *love*.

To you, Dr. Kohlberg

Kohlberg. In the early 1970s, we began seeing an interesting pattern in our research. We saw subjects whom we had scored at stage five in their last years of high school seemingly "regress" in their moral judgment scores during their college years to a relativist position that seemed a lot like stage two. This was theoretically very disquieting. It seemed as though our claims about moral stage development being hierarchical and invariantly sequential might have to be revised, at least for the postconventional stages. As we began to work with these issues more closely three factors which have importance in this conversation became part of our thinking.

First Of all, we gathered new longitudinal data. This showed that by age twenty-five everyone of the apparent retrogressed people had returned to stage four and five moral reasoning, with most showing more of stage five than when they were in high school.

Second, research on the process of stage transition enlarged our understanding of the disequilibrating effects of transition. This enabled us to see that what appeared at first to be regression might better be understood as a kind of transitional moral relativism, which necessarily emerges as persons disentangled themselves from conventional moral thinking and begin to be critical of it. Moreover, careful reexamination of our apparent

college-aged stage two's showed us that their relativism was quite different from the relativism of stage two children or adults. True stage- two relativism grows out of the experienced differences of individual outlooks and desires and the inability to generalize or unify them. The stage four-five relativism, however, arises out of the person's recognition of the relativity of law, customs and group experiences from one society or group to the next.

The post stage four relativists did not really relinquish stage four and regress to stage two, but developed relativistic outlooks and an "enlightened hedonism" that grew out of trying to go beyond the limits of stage four moral reasoning.

For a true ethical orientation of adulthood to develop, the identity crisis must have been resolved sufficiently enough to make possible adult commitments that establish relations of care or generativity toward others.

Based on our longitudinal data and in light of Erikson's suggestions we hypothesize that two kinds of experiences, both of which usually come only after high school, are required for the development of consistent postconventional moral reasoning. First, the young person must leave home emotionally and perhaps physically, and encounter experiences of conflicting values in a context of moratorium. Then, second, the young adult, to develop a true postconventional moral orientation, must have undertaken two further steps that typically being a student does not require: the experience of *sustained responsibility for the welfare of others* and the experience of making and living with irreversible moral choices which are the marks of adulthood personal moral experience.

Not all young adults have had these experiences. Not all young adults who have had these experiences develop postconventional moral orientations. But our research suggests that all young adults, or older adults, who do develop postconventional moral outlooks and commitments have experienced and resolved the adolescent identity crisis. They have had experiences of sustained responsibility for the welfare of others and they have had to make and live with irreversible moral choices.

Now what do we mean by postconventional or principled moral reasoning? At this level persons make a clear effort to define guiding moral values and principles that have validity and applicability apart from the authority of the groups or people holding them. We distinguish two stages in the postconventional level.

Stage five we call *social contract or utility and individual rights*. The social perspective taking on which stage five is based we call the "prior-to-society" perspective. Oriented to human rights that exist prior to social contracts, law, or society, this perspective gives added depth to stage four's appreciation of social order and due process by clarifying the purposes for which they have evolved. Beyond stage four, the prior-to-society perspective serves as a critical principle that can, under certain circumstances, justify civil disobedience and principled efforts to alter or overthrow unjust laws and social policies.


Fowler: I would like to have a word at this point. The same spirit that can now justify disobedience in the area of societal norms is also capable of considering disobedience to the faith community's norms. Stage 4 Individuative-Reflective faith often begins with serious clashes or contradictions between valued authority sources. Things formerly considered universal and unbreachable, for example, the Roman Catholic church's Latin mass, are discovered to be merely relative to time and place. The person needs to reconsider what things are bedrock to their sense of meaning, versus what things can be released.

Reason plays the biggest part here. As yet, the unconscious is not being integrated into ones world view . The sense of who

one is in faith and meaning is growing less and less dependent upon the interpersonal circle of significant others. Identity boundaries are made through thoughtfully considered, explicit systems of meanings. Stage 4 typically translates symbols into conceptual meanings, and typically does not appreciate the richness and multiple meanings in symbols that the later stages will.

Back to you Dr. Kohlberg.

Kohlberg: The next movement in moral development, Stage five, recognizes the relativity of most social rules and laws but affirms the importance of upholding them in the interest of impartiality and because they are the social contract. Some values and rights, however, are not relative and must be upheld in any society and regardless of majority opinion. These include life, liberty, and freedom from arbitrary personal or class oppression. Stage five is oriented to overall principles of utility, committed to "the greatest good for the greatest number." But because of its concern for human rights, it qualifies the utility principle with an equality principle that rejects any maximization of the general good at the expense of a minority or minorities.



This brings me now to stage six, the *universal ethical principle* orientation. Building on all that came before, stage six adds a commitment to principles of justice that can claim universal validity. Principles, of course are different from rules, customs or laws. Principles, we might say, are the abstract, generalizable guidelines and tests by which particular actions, laws or social policies may be made or evaluated. Christ's golden rule, "do unto others as you would have them do unto you" forms such a principle.

The social perspective taking required for stage six adds to the previous stages' contributions a rather decisive new step. I sometimes characterize this as an ability to play "moral musical chairs." A principle for adjudicating moral disputes or establishing social policy is just if and only if a rational, autonomous, interested person could assent to it, no matter which "chair" (social, economic, racial, or political status or group) he or she might occupy. Their formulation, therefore, requires a moral imagination informed enough and detached enough from one's own interests

to accurately imagine the perspective of every person or group affected by a policy or action being considered. The principle is just only if from each of those standpoints its application in law or policy would yield an outcome that is manifestly fair and equal in terms of resulting burdens and benefits.

While stage six moral reasoning is quite rare in our empirical sample, it underlies the leadership policies of persons universally acknowledged as the greatest of moral leaders. Most notable in this century are Mahatma Gandhi and Martin Luther King, Jr. In rather different situations of struggle against oppression both of these men articulated and acted on universal principles of radical love and nonviolent action in the service of justice. I maintain that stage six provides the most adequate and "true," if you will, form of moral reasoning. I claim that both logically and psychologically it is the end point toward which moral reasoning in its sequence of formal stages develops.

Fowler: As restlessness with stage 4 faith gives way to transition, the person finds him or herself attending to what may feel like anarchic and disturbing inner voices. Elements from a childish past, images and energies from a deeper self, a gnawing sense of sterility and flatness of meaning--any or all may signal a readiness for something new. Stories, symbols, and paradoxes from one's own or other traditions may insist on breaking in upon the neatness of the previous faith. Disillusionment takes place with one's compromises and recognition that life is more complex than the logic of clear distinctions and abstract concepts can comprehend. This presses one toward more awareness or the tension of opposites and a multilevel approach to life truth.

Carl Jung recognized and described these tension of opposites within his theories of archetypal psychology and gave psychology the term of "the transcendent function" to describe the mysterious force that is aroused in people during these times of awakening. The transcendent function was seen as an activity of the Archetypal Self. It often came in the form of a symbol of transformation which arose between the two opposite forces within the psyche and providing a previously unimagined integration and movement to a higher level of faith and thought.

This development is unusually after mid-life, an age group which was the focus of much of Jung's work. By this time, the person knows the rigidity destroying experience of defeat and the reality of irrevocable commitments and acts. The self becomes more porous and permeable, and religiously, it is as if the wind of the spirit blows more freely through it. "Illumination" is the term often applied as the consciousness is expanded, and previously unplumbed depths are explored.

A greater openness exists in ideas as well to the strange truths of those who are "other" or different than oneself. Identity is secure, so one need not fear that which formerly threatened by its differentness.

Generativity is important here as well, and with the seriousness that can arise when life is more than half over, this stage is ready to spend and be spent for the cause of conserving and cultivating the possibility of others' generating identity and meaning. Stage 4 & 5 people have been gripped in some measure by the depth of reality to which the symbols, stories, and rituals of their faith refer.

But this stage remains divided. It lives and acts between an untransformed world and a transforming vision and loyalties. In some cases, this division is transcended to yield the actualization of what we are calling Stage 6, a "Universalizing Faith".

From the beginning of our work there has been a complex image of mature faith in relation to which we have sought for developmentally related prior or preparatory stages. It is this normative endpoint, the culminating image of mature faith in this

theory, with which I want to work now. What *is* the normative shape of Stage 6 Universalizing Faith?

In order to characterize Stage 7 we need to focus more sharply on the problem of opposites or paradoxical features of Stage 5 faith. Stage 5 can see injustice in sharp terms because it has an enlarged awareness of the demands of justice and their implications. It can recognize partial truths and their limitations because it has seen a more comprehensive vision of truth. It can appreciate and cherish symbols, stories, and rituals in new depth because it has been touched by the depth of reality to which the symbols mediate. It sees the fractures and divisions of the human family with vivid pain because it has envisioned an inclusive commonwealth of being.

Stage 5 remains paradoxical or divided, however, because the self is caught between these universalizing appreciations and the need to preserve its own being and well-being. Or because it is deeply invested in maintaining the order of a socioeconomic system, the alternatives to which seem more unjust or destructive than it is. In this situation of paradox, Stage 5 must act and not be paralyzed. But Stage 5 acts out of conflicting loyalties. Its readiness to spend and be spent finds limits in its loyalty to the present order, to its institutions, groups, and compromise procedures. Stage 5's perceptions of justice outreach its readiness to sacrifice the self and to risk the partial justice of the present order for the sake of a more complete justice and the realization of love.

The transition to Stage 6 involves an overcoming of this paradox through a moral and self-sacrificing actualization of the universalizing vision. Heedless of the threats to self, to its cared-for groups, and to the institutional arrangements of the present order, Stage 6 becomes a disciplined, activist *incarnation*---a making real and tangible---of the imperatives of absolute love and justice of which Stage 5 has partial appreciation. The self at Stage 6 engages in spending and being spent for the transformation of present reality in the direction of a transcendent actuality.

Persons best described by Stage 6 typically exhibit qualities that shake our usual criteria of normalcy. Their heedlessness to self-preservation and the vividness of their taste and feel for transcendent moral and religious actuality give their actions and words an extraordinary and often unpredictable quality. In their devotion to universalizing love and compassion they may offend our more limited perceptions of justice. In their penetration through our obsession with survival, security, and significance, they threaten our cautious standards of righteousness and goodness and prudence. Their enlarged visions of universal community disclose the partialness of our tribalism or nationalism. And their leadership initiatives, often involving strategies of nonviolent suffering and ultimate respect for being, constitute affronts to our usual notions of relevance. It is little wonder that persons best described by Stage 6 so frequently become martyrs for the visions they incarnate.

Stage 6 is exceedingly rare. The persons best described by it have generated faith compositions in which their felt sense of an ultimate environment is inclusive of all. They have become incarnations of the spirit of an inclusive and fulfilled human community.

They are "contagious" in the sense that they create zones of liberation from the social, political, economic and ideological shackles we place and endure on human possibility. Living in close appreciation of a power that unifies and transforms the world, Universalizers are often experienced as subversive of the structures by which we sustain our individual and corporate significance---including religious structures like with Jesus. Many persons in this stage die at the hands of those whom they hope to change. Universalizers are often more honored and revered after death than during their lives.

The rare persons who may be described by this stage have a special grace that makes them seem more lucid, more simple, and yet somehow more fully human than the rest of us. Their community is universal in extent. Particularities are cherished because they are vessels of the universal, and thereby valuable apart from any utilitarian considerations. Life is both loved and held to loosely. Such persons are ready for fellowship with persons at any of the other stages and from any other faith tradition.

Even as I read these descriptions I am haunted---as I am sure you are---by memories of Jonestown, Guyana, and the Reverend Jim Jones, the charismatic leader who led his whole commune to mass suicide and murdered an investigative team from the American Congress. Also in my mind are images of the deeply angry, mystical eyes of the aged Ayatollah Khomeini as he looks out across the frenzied, impassioned mobs he inspires with his mixture of chauvinistic nationalism and religious absolutism. The followers of both these men---and those of many other persons like them---would likely hear my descriptions of Stage 6 as depictions of their revered, and feared, leaders. To hear the qualities of Stage 6 in these ways, however, is to miss some extremely important qualifications and dimensions of Stage 6 faith. Fascinated with the charisma, the authority and frequently the ruthlessness of such leaders, we must not fail to attend in the descriptions of Stage 6 to the criteria of inclusiveness of community, of radical commitment to justice and love and of selfless passion for a transformed world, a world made over not in *their* images, but in accordance with an intentionality both divine and transcendent.

When asked whom I consider to be representatives of this Stage 6 outlook I refer to Gandhi, to Martin Luther King, Jr., in the last years of his life and to Mother Teresa of Calcutta. I am also inclined to point to Dag Hammarskjöld, Dietrich Bonhoeffer, and Thomas Merton. There must be many others, not so well known to us, whose lives exhibit these qualities of Stage 6. Many are quite content with obscurity as they work more quietly toward their transforming vision depending on the particular call they feel.

I do not believe that people generally set out to be Stage 6 in a public way. Their humility would not allow it. It is as though they are selected by the great Blacksmith of history, heated in the fires of turmoil and trouble and then hammered into usable shape on the hard anvil of conflict and struggle.

As Universalizing people oppose the more blatantly unjust or unredeemed structures of the social, political or religious world, they also call into question the compromise arrangements in our common life that have acquired the sanction of conventionalized understandings of justice. King's "Letter from Birmingham Jail" was written not to the avowedly racist Ku Klux Klan, but to a group of moderate and liberal religious leaders who had pled with King to reduce the pressure his followers were exerting through nonviolent demonstrations on the city.

This subversive character of the impact of Stage 6 leadership sometimes strikes us as arising from a kind of relevant irrelevance. Mother Teresa of Calcutta's ministry illustrates this powerfully. Mother Teresa, a foreign-born nun in her late thirties, head of a girls' boarding school, was going on retreat. As she traveled through the city she became overwhelmed by the sight of abandoned persons, lying in the streets, left to die. Some of these forgotten people were already having their not yet lifeless limbs gnawed by rodents. Under the impact of those grim sights she felt a call to a new form of vocation---a ministry of presence, service, and care to the abandoned, the forgotten, the hopeless. In a nation and a world where scarcity is a fact of life, where writers and policy makers urge strategies of "*triage*" to ensure that resources are not "wasted" on those who have no chance of recovery and useful contribution, what could be less relevant than carrying these dying persons into places of care, washing them, caring for

their needs, feeding them when they are able to take nourishment and affirming by word and deed that they are loved and valued people of God? But in a world that says people only have worth if they pull their own weight and contribute something of value, what could be *more* relevant?

Erikson: Professors Kohlberg and Fowler move us toward the kind of responsible theoretical synthesis we need in order to understand the inter-relatedness of reason and emotion, of moral judgment and identity, and of individual and society. The people of Stage 6 were certainly generative, weren't they?

The crisis of middle adulthood I characterize as *generativity* *vs. stagnation*. Generativity marks a culmination of the virtues of previous stages in an adulthood that is ready to care for what has been and is being created. Our common attention to the child's dependence upon adults often blinds us to the dependence of the older generation on the younger one. Mature men and women need to be needed.

Generativity is the readiness to care for and nurture the next generation and the life conditions and resources of all kinds they will need to become generative in their generation. This play on words means to suggest a cogwheeling of the generations in which adults play their parts in such a way as to renew and contribute strength to the ongoing cycle of the generations.

The danger in this stage is stagnation. The adult who fails to find ways of contributing to the nurture of culture and individuals forfeits his or her place in the cycle of the generations. This can bring the regression to an obsessive need for false intimacy, often with a pervading sense of stagnation and personal impoverishment. Such individuals often begin to indulge themselves as if they themselves were their one and only child. Such adult "narcissism" derives from the lack of some faith, some "belief in the species," which would make a child appear to be a welcome trust of the community. The composite virtue or ego strength that emerges in generative adults is that of *care*.

Now let me turn, in conclusion, to the crisis of old age. Only

those persons who have in some way taken care of things and people, and who have faced the triumphs and disappointments that come with being originators of others or the generators of products and ideas--only in such persons does the fruit of the other seven stages gradually ripen into what I want to call ego *integrity*. Ego integrity is the ego's accrued assurance of its investment in order and meaning. It is the experience of a post-narcissistic love as part of a world order and grounded in spiritual depth. It is an acceptance of one's one and only life cycle as something that had to be. It thus means a new, a different love of one's parents. Although aware of the relativity of all the various lifestyles that have given meaning to human striving, the possessor of integrity is ready to defend the dignity of his or her own lifestyle against all physical and economic threats. For this person knows that all human integrity is at stake in the one style of integrity of which he or she partakes.

The absence of integrity and the danger in this stage is a sense of *despair*. The lack or loss of integrity is signified by the fear of death. Despair expresses the feeling that the time is now short, too short for the attempt to start another life and to try out alternate roads to integrity. Disgust hides despair.

The virtue old age contributes to cultures out of its integrity is *wisdom*. In the embodied wisdom of genuine integrity the courage and visions of wholeness that give life to persons in other stages are renewed and sanctioned. The integrity of old age thus contributes to the possibility of trust in the first stage. The dictionary defines trust as "the assured reliance on another's integrity." So it appears we have completed a cycle for the generations--back to where we started.

Convener: And so, all has been said. I thank our four presenters. And I thank my attentive, and perhaps not always so attentive listeners for their thoughtful consideration of these stages. May you be inspired to deeper thought and greater endeavors of healing as you each proceed on to your next stage on the life journey.