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Discrimination within Political Cultures: Contrasting Islamophobia in Canadian Regions

By Shannon Coyne

Since the United States declared a 'war on terror' after 9/11, Muslim people and communities have increasingly become political and social targets in Canadian society. Although Canadian Political Science literature addresses Islamophobia, there is a significant focus on discrimination specifically within Quebec or broadly at the federal level. The exclusion of other provinces from academic scrutiny is problematic and can lead to the assumption that certain social issues are more prominent in Quebec than in the rest of Canada. In fact, differences in each province's political culture suggests that discrimination against Othered groups may appear in varied ways. The recognition of different types of discrimination is important because it will impact how to prevent bias against the vulnerable group. By utilizing a social constructivist lens to compare and contrast case studies of Islamophobia in Alberta and Quebec, this research paper argues that provincial political culture influences the ways in which Islamophobia may manifest.

There is a cultural myth that suggests that Canada supports and celebrates a pluralist society because of its recent policy of multiculturalism. However, this idea fails to take into account that, though it may provide legal support against hate crimes and instances of discrimination, the *Canadian Multiculturalism Act* does not realistically protect vulnerable groups from economic, social, and political inequalities. A poll by Angus Reid Institute states that a total of 68% of Canadians believe that immigrants ought to fit in more with mainstream society (Angus Reid Institute, 2016). This strong majority suggests that Canada is not necessarily the multicultural, accepting society it claims to be. Since 9/11 immigrant and Canadian-born Muslims have increasingly become targets of Canadian media and government legislation. Academic research focuses on national (and specifically Quebec) Islamophobia,

however I argue that it is prominent in the political and public culture of Western provinces such as Alberta as well. By analysing media responses to instances of Islamophobia in Alberta and Quebec, this essay will explore similarities and differences in both province's imagining of the Muslim Other.

To do this, I will discuss two cases of Islamophobia, Bill 94 in Quebec and the Webber Academy incident in 2015 in Alberta, in order to highlight that the diverse political cultures of these provinces results in different forms of direct or indirect discrimination, and therefore should be treated as different problems with different solutions. My methodology will be to adopt a social constructivist lens to analyze language used in policies and media coverage of these situations. Before delving into those case studies, I will clarify academic vocabulary regarding discrimination and multiculturalism to aid in diagnosing and addressing each case study. I will first explore academic literature to prove that discrimination of Muslims is present in Canada, and that it has a significant negative impact on individuals, our collective society, and the legitimacy of the Canadian government's promise of 'multiculturalism'. Lastly, I will give a brief description of the similar and varying elements of Alberta and Quebec's historical and political culture in order to establish a basis before comparing and contrasting the discrimination within both. In this text I mainly refer to the veil or hijab, however I acknowledge that women can pair it with an abaya, niqab, jibab, or other garments, and that they may also be worn in different styles. I also recognize that, though I only refer to 'Muslims' and 'Islam' there are a variety of manifestations and sects of Islam within the Canadian Muslim community.

The Multiculturalism Act (1988) provides legal support against racialized and religious discrimination, among other forms. Though for many, Canada's official stance of multiculturalism is anti-racist and meant to protect minorities, there are many scholars who critique multiculturalism as a form of racialization. For instance, Jakeet Singh argues that this policy is a "liberal difference-blind approach" which assumes that all religious and cultural aspects are meant only for the private sphere, whereas white culture is seen as neutral and appropriate for public life (Singh 451). In other words, "while whiteness becomes associated with the public and universal, other forms of life become marginalized, as they are associated with the private" (451). By consequence, this liberal approach to multiculturalism racializes non-white people, whereas whiteness is seen as a neutral form of life. Canadian public opinion polls supports Singh's analysis of Canadian culture. In 2016, 58% of Canadians agreed that religion ought to be "[kept] completely out of public life" (Angus Reid Institute 2016). Singh suggests the liberal difference blind approach did not begin with *The Multiculturalism Act* (447), but that it is simply propagating it in Canadian political culture.

Through this critique of Canadian liberal difference-blind multiculturalism, we begin to understand how racialized groups and individuals are still facing discrimination on political, social, and economic levels. Before delving into specific examples, I draw on the work of Denise Helly to explore differences between direct, indirect, systematic, institutionalized, and voluntary discrimination. These definitions will be useful when contrasting and comparing forms of discrimination in Quebec and the rest of Canada. Helly defines direct discrimination as "when one or more personal characteristics based on unlawful criterion are explicitly applied to deny a right or a freedom" (DRE). An example of this type of discrimination is a hate crime because it is based on a personal trait, and prohibits the right to dignity, safety, and/or the enjoyment of property (Helly). Hate crimes are often seen through vandalism, public insults, violence, or incitement of hatred. Unfortunately, hate crimes are often poorly recorded due to scarcity of victims formally complaining as well as a lack of police uniformity in recording details of hate

crimes (Helly 2004). While direct discrimination is an act which purposefully disadvantages and harms people of specific characteristics, indirect discrimination occurs when an action has an unevenly damaging effect on specific groups or persons who share a common personal characteristic, without needing the discriminatory intention (Helly 2004). For example, employment policies which, though perhaps unintentional, unfairly omit particular genders or cultural groups. Similarly, institutionalized discrimination is the exclusion of specific people from enjoying rights available to others through public laws and measures (Helly 2004). The difference between this form and indirect discrimination, is that institutional discrimination is perpetrated by government or political forces through policies, laws, or other means. A Canadian example of this is from the early to middle 20th Century, when immigration quotas were applied to applicants from Middle Eastern or Asian countries but not to predominantly white European states.

The last two forms of discrimination are not analysed through one specific incident or action, but rather a collective mindset and history surrounding racialization and exclusion of specific groups. When academics use the term *systemic discrimination*, they typically refer to “inequalities between groups of people [that] are not ascribable to an identifiable factor but seem to be linked to a number of past and/or present factors” (Helly 2004). An important example of this in Canadian society is the imbalance between educational success and post-graduation economic success. According to a study by Statistics Canada in 2011, second generation racialized Canadian men will typically have more educational success, yet receive less earnings than a white employee (Banting and Thompson 2016, 5). This trend is the same for women, yet with a lesser wage gap between a white and racial minority women. This inequality is not easily identifiable, but demonstrates subtle discriminatory factors in employers and workplaces. Systemic discrimination can often point to voluntary discrimination, which is the attitudes or actions that exclude people from daily society due to unlawful criterion. Helly recognises that voluntary discriminations is “difficult to prove, difficult to quantify, poorly documented, and seldom results in formal complaints” due to its subtle and social nature. However, there are examples of how it could manifest, such as the underrepresentation of ethno-cultural groups in specific community clubs, associations, and social networks (Helly 2004). In relation to Muslim Canadians, Helly identifies the high concentration of coverage on an orientalist view of conflicts in the Middle East as voluntary discrimination.

To summarize, academics provide us with useful tools and language to analyse and identify sources and types of discrimination in the multicultural political, social, and economic spheres of Canada. Singh analysed Canada’s apparent state of “non-culture” in order to identify a liberal difference-blind approach which assigns whiteness to the neutral public sphere and excludes non-whiteness to the voluntary private associations. This, paired with Helly’s explanations of types of discrimination (direct, indirect, institutionalized, systemic, and voluntary), allows an analysis of discrimination within the Canadian context. The following section will prove that discrimination against Muslims is present in Canada and that it has a significantly negative impact on individuals, collective society, and the legitimacy of Canadian multiculturalism.

In theory, multiculturalism is supposed to provide a tolerant sphere, where any individual can express their thoughts and beliefs without fear of harassment or assimilation. However, as seen by analysing Canadian multiculturalism, Whiteness is believed to be the neutral state, and any “voluntary” signs of religion or belief is meant for a private sphere. Some scholars suggest that “religious minorities are stigmatized and experience discrimination based on religion, and on a perception of religious

minorities as a racialized “other”” (Reitz 2009, 701). Increasingly, and paradoxically, the religious garments that Muslim women choose to wear has become a public and political issue. For instance, in 2015 whether Muslim women should be allowed to wear a veil in court or citizenship ceremonies was a federal election issue. Canadians often view the hijab as a form of oppression, which Muslim women are to be passively freed from (Rahmath 34). However, according to interviews done with twenty-six Muslim women in Thunder Bay, Calgary, and Toronto, many women choose to veil to represent and abide by religious values, as well as to escape from “Western beauty standards” (38). In fact, some immigrant Muslim women only began to veil themselves once arriving in Canada, in order to demonstrate religious beliefs (37). Despite having religious and cultural motivations for veiling, which should be protected under *The Multiculturalism Act (1988)*, many Muslim women reported an increased sense of fear and hostility since beginning to wear the hijab (37). Canadian Muslims often face hate crimes, such as threats and vandalism of symbolic buildings, as well as voluntary discrimination in social interactions. This has been worsened by the concentration of media upon Muslims and conflict, which has led to Muslim people to be associated with danger. From having to prove rationality and Canadian citizenship, to verbal insults and threats, “the perception of being viewed as the “other” was expressed by many of the participants” (37). This study has clearly demonstrated that on an individual level Muslim people, and women in particular, face societal discrimination that has a negative impact on their sense of belonging and security in Canada.

At a collective level, systemic discrimination is evident due to slower rates of integration for Muslims, Sikhs, Buddhists, and Hindus (Reitz 2009, 695). Though all visible minorities are typically at an economic disadvantage in Canadian society, when comparing income relative to CMA (Census Metropolitan Area) mean, it is clear that visible minority Muslims are at the highest disadvantage at an income of 15,320 under the mean (710). As discussed earlier, there is also an imbalance between the educational success and economic success of racialized men (Banting and Thompson, 5). These statistics demonstrate that at a societal level, racialized Muslim people are systematically discriminated against in Canadian society. This points to a problem of legitimacy of Canada’s policy of multiculturalism, since it is clear that its “[antidiscrimination provisions] offer little protection for social or economic rights and no guarantees of racial and class equality in economic terms” (11). At an individual and collective economic level, Muslim people face voluntary, direct and systemic discrimination in Canadian society. This proves that Islamophobia is present in Canadian society, despite our political policies, and that it has a negative impact on social unity. This is not only a problem for Muslim Canadians, but for the nation in general. Slow integration of particular groups demonstrates that Canada is not a mosaic of cultures, but a hierarchy in which Whiteness is the neutral and desired characteristic of public life.

Case Studies

In the previous section, I clarified academic lexicon to distinguish differences in discrimination and then statistically demonstrated that Islamophobia is present and significant in Canada. I will now argue that there are differences in this discrimination based on region- namely, that there are differences within Quebec compared to the Rest of Canada. I argue that this variety of types of discrimination originates from the differences in political culture of each region. I explore this by comparing two case studies, one in Alberta, and the other in Quebec. I acknowledge that there are provincial and regional differences within Canada beyond the Quebec/Rest of Canada divide. Due to space limitations of this

research paper, I am unable to compare the differences within each province, and assume Alberta to be mildly representative of the Rest of Canada.

Before exploring the case studies, I will give a brief description of Quebec's political culture relative to the Rest of Canada. There are three main aspects that influence and differentiate Quebecois political society from other Canadian provinces: its history of public secularism, unofficial interculturalism, and the imposition of multiculturalism.

Though French Canadian culture has traditionally been dominated by Catholicism, during the 1960s Quebecois populations shifted away from religious influence, taking up the view that the Catholic Church was impeding social progress (Bakali 2015, 414). Whereas the Church had initially provided vital social services such as education, it was incrementally pushed out of public life in place of secularism (414). This period of time is known as the Quiet Revolution, which is characterized by increased secularism, resistance to economic disadvantages and discrimination towards French Canadians. Also, due to an increase in immigration post World War II, ethnic and linguistic tensions rose, and nationalism became founded upon the protection of the French language and identity (415). The focus of Quebec on preservation of language and privilege has led to tensions between the province and the federal government and ultimately, to two separatist referendums. However, Quebec nationalism has not only strained the province's dynamic outside of its borders, but within as well. Since its protectionist history emphasizes public secularism and French culture, immigration presents a challenge. Notably, Muslim identities within Quebec have been treated as a threat to French white secular values (416). The debate surrounding 'reasonable accommodation' is often portrayed by media as a medium for this Muslim threat, because it allows individuals to request exception to norms or laws on a religious basis (Conway 2012, 196). For a political culture that values separation between religion and public life, this issue has been increasingly problematic and has further 'Othered' Muslim Quebecois.

Another important aspect of Quebec's political culture is that the policy of multiculturalism was imposed upon the province by the federal government in order to counter the Quebec separatist movement. *The Multiculturalism Act* (1988) enabled the government to appeal to Canadians as a collection of diverse cultures, thereby underemphasizing the distinction of Quebecois culture from the rest of Canada. In response to multiculturalism, the province has unofficially adopted the policy of interculturalism, which is a social contract between the public and 'new comers' that ensures that French public culture is protected (Bakali 418). Interculturalism is "rooted in the notion of self-preservation" and promotes the assimilation of racial minorities in favor of "French white Quebecois culture" (418). These characteristics are a significant part of Quebec political culture and will therefore influence how discrimination against Muslims manifests within the province.

For the most part, academia focuses largely on Canadian Islamophobia at the federal level or specifically in Quebec. However, it is clear that in the Rest of Canada there is Islamophobia at a provincial level as well. In fact, a study demonstrates that a smaller percentage of racialized Muslims within Quebec report discrimination and vulnerability (described as "feeling uncomfortable or fearing attack" (Reitz 2009, 711)) than those residing outside of Quebec (711). This indicates that Islamophobia is an issue in the Rest of Canada as well, even if scholars have not explored it. In fact, The Alberta Muslim Public Affairs Council (AMPAC) has recently created a hotline for victims of Islamophobia in order to provide support in response to rising frequencies of hate crimes in the province (Rieger 2016). Also,

whereas a 2013 Angus Reid Institute poll demonstrates that Quebec opinions of Muslims has remained consistent at approximately 69% holding an unfavorable view, in the rest of Canada unfavorable opinions of Islam has risen from 46% in 2009 to 54% in 2013 (Geddes 2013). Clearly, Islamophobia is not unique to Quebecois political culture and it could be growing in Canada as a whole.

Due to variations in provincial and regional differences, it is difficult and problematic to assign one specific cultural characteristic to the Rest of Canada. However, since I am focusing my case study on Alberta and Quebec, I can identify aspects that are present in Quebec that are not an important aspect of Albertan political culture. For instance, whereas Quebec has favored secularist political policy, “Alberta remains the bedrock of small-c conservatism, favouring smaller government and more emphasis on individual rights and responsibilities when responding to policy face-off questions” (Angus Reid 2016). There is little provincial government involvement in Albertan Islamophobia, instead discrimination seems to be confronted by Muslim associations or through the judiciary system. The lack of government intervention could be a result of the Progressive Conservative Association of Alberta’s forty years in provincial government. However, a lack of government response does not mean that Islamophobia against Muslims is not present. Instead, it suggests a tendency towards seldom reported types of incidents such as direct, voluntary, and systemic discrimination. On the other hand, a political culture that values provincial government intervention to protect secularism and French culture might tend towards institutionalized discrimination through laws and policies.

The contrast between Albertan and Quebecois Islamophobia is demonstrated by exploring two case studies. The first was an incident in Calgary, Alberta in 2015, in which two Sunni Muslim both were prohibited from praying at their private school, Webber Academy. They were in Grade 9 and 10, and their families had explicitly confirmed prior to enrollment that they would be permitted to occasionally pray for approximately 5 minutes at school (Tucker 2015). However, they were quickly prohibited from praying due to their religion being “too obvious for a non-denominational school” (Graveland 2016). The school has a policy of no religious activities on campus, which included discreet, private prayer on campus. However, it is important to note that this policy of secularism only applies to certain faiths which require prayer during the school day and whose forms of prayer is physically noticeable. One of the boys testified that “[he] had this intense sense of shame and humiliation, despite that I was just exercising my right as a Canadian citizen, as a human being, to practice my faith” (Graveland 2016). The Alberta Human Rights Commission fined the private school \$26,000 due to discriminating against the boys and causing them distress and loss of dignity (Dempster 2015).

This incident demonstrates key aspects of Islamophobia in Alberta. First of all, it was a form of direct discrimination because it denied a right to fulfillment of faith and religion based on a specific type of prayer. The situation also highlights the impact of liberal difference-blind dominance in Canadian society because the policy of non-denominational education assumes that religion can be separated from public life. The characterization of Muslims as a ‘special interest group’ is a prominent idea in Albertan political culture, which is reflected in the media coverage of this case. In an analysis of articles from three well-known and reputable news sources (*National Post*, *Global News*, and *CBC News*), all three headlines specifically explicitly include “Muslim” and only one of them includes the name of the school in the headlines. This is an example of how Muslims and Islam is repeatedly associated to conflict. The article from Global News was by far the most sympathetic, as it took a perspective from the boys’ families. However, the other two both place the private school as the subject of the article title, and the “Muslim

students” (Dempster 2015, McClure 2015) as the object. This places the boys in the syntactic position of action, which hints that they were perpetrators of the incident and the school was the passive victim. While all articles do present factual information about the issue, some titles initially send a biased message. This case study is an example of how discrimination manifests non-politically in Alberta, and perhaps in the Rest of Canada as well. Since it is often through direct, voluntary, or systemic discrimination, these instances often go unreported or are solved by the legal system.

Though direct discrimination, such as violence, verbal insults, and other hate crimes are present in Quebec (*CBC News* 2013), the province also demonstrates Islamophobia through political means. The second case study that I will analyse is the media and academic response to the Quebec provincial government’s Bill 94, *An Act to Establish Guidelines Governing Accommodation Requests Within the Administration and Certain Institutions*, which was tabled in 2010. Ultimately, this Bill requires women requesting services from or working for the public sector to remove face coverings. Premier Jean Charest justified Bill 94 as “respect[ing] the principle of equality between men and women, and the religious neutrality of the state” (*CBC News* 2010) by ensuring that there are conditions upon which reasonable accommodation can be granted. Though Islam was not mentioned explicitly in the Bill, some scholars argue that “it would have a disproportionate effect on Muslim women wearing a veil” (Conway 2012, 195). A popular opinion is that the Bill would liberate Muslim women from “a symbol of patriarchal oppression” (Conway 201). However, as explored through Rahmath’s interviews with Muslim women, the veil is often a source of empowerment to Canadian women, and not a sign of submission. Despite the popularity of the Bill in Quebec, the Parti Quebecois did not support it, and it did not pass (Maclean’s 2014).

This Bill reflects a significant difference in Islamophobia between the Alberta and Quebec. Whereas both provinces have instances of direct and voluntary discrimination, Quebec is exceptional in that there have been multiple instances of institutionalized discrimination against Muslim people. This case study demonstrates that the Quebec political culture of protecting the ‘neutral’ public sphere allows for non-white French Quebecois values and rights to be marginalized under the justification of secularism. Bill 94 has simply been one instance in the reasonable accommodation debate which implicitly revolving the perceived threat of the Muslim ‘Other’. The Quebec government has attempted to impose public service secularism with Bill 62 Bill 94, and the Charter of Values, which demonstrates a pattern of using political means to discriminate and marginalize Muslims in Quebec. I argue that this pattern originates from Quebec’s unique political culture within Canada, especially from its protectionist policy of interculturalism and the secular influences of the Quiet Revolution.

Since there is variety in manifestations of Islamophobia in between the Rest of Canada and Quebec, they cannot be solved in the same way. Though Canadian political culture as a whole seems to value ‘neutral’ secularism, Quebec propagates this notion through political laws and policies that target specific groups of people. Therefore, democratic means, such as organized protests or the lobbying of associations and groups could provide some voice for marginalized groups within Quebec. On the other hand, in the Rest of Canada (particularly in Alberta) the government seldom intervenes in matters of direct discrimination and perhaps ought to enhance discrimination prevention strategies. One aspect that is not altered by the political cultures of individual provinces is that fear and discrimination of Muslims challenges multiculturalism as a valid policy within Canada. The rhetoric that Canada accepts of all cultures, ethnicities and religions only seems to apply to non-racialized peoples whose beliefs adhere

to the assumed 'neutral' sphere of Canada. *The Multiculturalism Act* (1988) is not satisfactorily protecting minority groups, especially Muslims.

Throughout this research paper I argued that differences in Canadian regional political cultures impact the forms of Islamophobia by comparing the political culture and Islamophobia in Quebec and Alberta. To do so, I clarified academic vocabulary and theory in order to understand how forms of discrimination can be distinguished from each other. I have drawn from Singh's exploration of Canadian multiculturalism from a liberal difference-blind perspective in order to highlight problems with Canada's emphasis on secular public space. This theory and academic research aided in contrasting Quebecois and Albertan political cultures and incidences of Islamophobia. These incidents both demonstrated that political culture can have a significant influence on how discrimination might manifest within a society, and therefore should be taken into consideration when attempting to find a solution to the issue. Islamophobia challenges the belief that Canadian identities and values are centered on multiculturalism and acceptance, and proposes that either the principle or the policy will need to be reworked in the future.

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Judging the Judiciary as Federalism's Umpire

By Nathan Fung

When an attempt to shift the responsibility for unemployment insurance from the provinces to the federal government in response to the Great Depression was halted in 1937 after having been deemed unconstitutional by the judicial committee of the Privy Council, it provoked angry responses from contemporary legal scholars. Some questioned the wisdom of British Judges making rulings of social importance over Canadian affairs. However, newer analysis of the Court's decision, as well as a breakdown of some of the criticisms of the past shows that many of the arguments levied against the JCPC were misguided and that the JCPC, like the modern Supreme Court that replaced it, effectively played the role of an umpire in setting disputes between the two levels of government in a democratic fashion, as well as in a manner that conforms to Canada's multinational character.

Since the introduction of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, attention to issues of federalism within the constitution has dwindled, yielding to a more modern approach with a strong emphasis on individual rights (Greschner 2000, 58). However, that does not mean that the division of powers between the provinces and the federal government is no longer an issue. It is easy to forget that the Constitution Act of 1867 still draws the lines between provincial and federal jurisdictions, which sections 91 and 92 of the act dictate. And in the days before the Charter, sections 91 and 92 provided the grounds on which the two levels of governments fought for legislative control while under judicial supervision. The role of the courts in mediating these conflicts is an important detail worth examining. With that said, the focus of this paper will be on one prominent controversial episode in which the division of powers was brought into question and differing views on Canadian federalism and the purpose of the courts came into conflict: the failure of R. B. Bennett's New Deal in 1937 in which six out of eight pieces of legislation passed by the federal government to ease the suffering inflicted by the great depression were struck down by the courts as unconstitutional. At the time, the judgement of the courts sparked a strong negative reaction from academics who loudly condemned the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. Did the courts behave correctly at the time? Or did intervention by the courts constitute as an undemocratic hindrance to the legislative process? Despite the backlash it received over the failure of the New Deal, an examination of the court's decision will show that it acted properly despite the problems inherent in the JCPC, such as the problematic nature of having British judges pass rulings on Canadian issues. With

their ruling on the New Deal, the JCPC played the role of the umpire in federalism and a moderator between the federal government and the provinces adequately.

In detail, what happened in 1935 was this: in an attempt to emulate what President Roosevelt had done in the United States, Prime Minister Bennett promised to instigate reforms through the Employment and Insurance act, which would have involved “a more progressive taxation system, a maximum work week, a minimum wage, closer regulation of working conditions, unemployment insurance, health and accident insurance, a revised old-age pension and agricultural support programs” (English 2006, n.p.). Following Bennett’s defeat in a general election, his successor Mackenzie King referred the package to the JCPC and key provisions of the Act were ruled to be ultra vires, beyond the jurisdiction of the federal government. (Simeon et al., 2014, 74). The Court’s reasoning was that social security is under the jurisdiction of the provinces, through their power over property and civil rights as granted by section 92 (13) (Baier 2008, 25). Following the Rowell–Sirois Commission, an inquiry into federal-provincial relations, all the provinces agreed to a constitutional amendment transferring the responsibility of unemployment insurance from the provinces to the federal government.

As mentioned earlier, the court’s actions evoked the ire of English-Canadian scholars. In his article “The Special Nature of Canadian Federalism”, F. R. Scott directed harsh criticisms towards the JCPC while arguing for greater centralization. He makes several interesting points. First he argues that “many social problems exceed the boundaries of provincial jurisdiction within which they legally lie” (1947, 13). This argument lies on the assumption that the federal government, with greater access to financial resources, is more capable and more competent at tackling large scale issues than the provinces are. He then proceeds to argue that Canadian federalism is centralist by nature and design, citing the Peace, Order and Good Government clause in section 91 (1947, 20), the federal government’s power of disallowance (1947, 16), as well as the intentions of the Canada’s founding fathers. The amount of weight he gives to the inherent power of the federal government is evident when he discusses his views on the 1940 amendment:

Hence I view the amendment of 1940, granting the subject of unemployment insurance to the Dominion, as effecting no transfer from provinces to the Dominion at all; all it did was to clarify a Dominion power which the courts, by their long line of restrictive judgments, had lost the capacity of identifying. For it would be difficult to imagine a subject more obviously national in scope and importance, more surely beyond the local aspect of property and civil rights, than unemployment insurance designed to protect the national economy from the mass misery and widespread dislocation brought about by the world’s greatest economic depression. (Scott 1947, 24)

Scott’s first point is sound enough. The effects of the depression were indeed beyond the scope of the provinces to tackle. This is evident enough as all the provinces agreed to the amendment to transfer unemployment insurance responsibilities to the federal government. But Scott argues that the effects of the depression amounted to a national crisis, and the JCPC were mistaken in striking down the act in the first place (1947, 24). However, the Courts did not see the depression as an emergency (Hogg and Wright, 2005, 340). With hindsight, it could be argued that while the effects of the depression were beyond the scope of the provinces to effectively handle, it did not pose an threat to the country in the same way the two world wars did, as those were seen as national crises. The effectiveness of the provinces

to handle an issue is insufficient reason to allow the federal government to override provincial authority. This principle was just recently affirmed in the court's opinion on the Securities Act (2011) when it explained that "as important as the preservation of capital markets and the maintenance of Canada's financial stability are, they do not justify a wholesale takeover of the regulation of the securities industry which is the ultimate consequence of the proposed federal legislation." With that in mind, the JCPC was acting in a way today's Supreme Court would. As Cairns puts it,

"In a constitutional system the function of judicial review must be more than simply allowing desirable policies to be implemented by whatever level of government so wishes. A worthwhile court of final appeal is bound on occasion to prevent one level of government from doing what a group of temporary incumbents or its supporters would like to do. Criticism of a court based on the fact that it has prevented a desirable objective from being attained is not good enough" (1971, 342).

What about Scott's larger point that by its nature, Canadian federalism is heavily centralized in favor of the federal government? Scott bases his argument on the intentions of the founding fathers of confederation. Fredrick Vaughn makes a similar argument, explaining that the centralist design of Canadian federalism was a response to the American civil war (1986, 505). But the intentions of the framers of the constitution have been disputed. Peter Hogg and Wade K. Wright argue that the founders had been divided from the start on whether Canada was meant to be a heavily centralized state or a loose confederacy, and that an argument based on what the founding fathers intended depended on who is being regarded as framers of the BNA act. As Hogg and Wright explain, if "Sir John A. Macdonald and the other English-Canadian federalists are regarded as the framers, the conclusion that will inevitably follow is that the framers intended Canada to be highly centralized. On the other hand, if only the provincial politicians from Quebec and the Maritimes are regarded as the framers, the conclusion that will inevitably follow is that the framers intended Canada to be highly decentralized." With that in mind, it would appear that Scott's argument for greater centralization fits into the former and has neglected to consider the non-English-Canadian federalist perspective, meaning that its argument to adhere to a centralist vision is not conclusive.

More importantly, however, it is not the function of the courts to guide their decisions based on what the founding fathers may have intended. Instead, it is the responsibility of the courts to base their decisions on the text of the constitution, a text that was meant to be open to interpretation and not confined to the views and perspectives of men from the 1860's. As Hogg and Wright argue, "the text is ambiguous, probably intentionally so" (2005, 338). The 1867 constitution contains evidence to support visions of a more centralized federal system, such as POGG power and disallowance, as well as evidence for a more decentralized system such as the province's control over property and civil rights in section 92 (13). In this case, unemployment insurance was deemed to fall under section 92 (13). Largely, it was through the court's generous interpretation of section 92 (13) which gave provinces a chance to broaden their jurisdiction. The ability to interpret the text of the constitution without having to constrain judgements on historical or outdated understandings is an important one. An important example of this is in *Edwards v Canada* (1929), which ruled that women were qualified persons and can sit in the Senate. It is also the case from which the living tree doctrine emerged, a doctrine that relies on liberal interpretations of the constitution which are free from the confines of framer's intent. As Lord Sankey

explained in the ruling, "The British North America Act planted in Canada a living tree capable of growth and expansion within its natural limits".

Having dealt with the criticisms of the JCPC and the arguments for centralization, just how well did the JCPC fulfill its role as an umpire over the Employment and Insurance act? Considering the outcome, the Courts served its role well. Firstly, the legislation that was struck down was replaced by legislation that was both constitutional and fulfilled the same purpose. The fact that this was achieved by amending the constitution rather than amending the legislation matters little as both the courts and the legislatures fulfilled their roles in that "the courts speak to the legislative and executive branches[...] the legislature responds to the courts ; hence the dialogue among the branches" (Greschner 2000, 54). By ruling the Employment and Insurance Act as unconstitutional, the courts spoke to the provinces and the federal government, which in turn sparked inter-governmental negotiations, negotiations which resulted in a constitutional amendment to which all the province agreed. Without that agreement, there would have been no amendment and the provinces would have been left with the responsibilities of fighting the effects of the depression with their limited resources. So not only was there a dialogue between legislatures and the courts, but elected lawmakers were able to have the final word and not appointed judges in Britain, which ultimately makes the process a democratic one.

It should be noted that while the JCPC did manage play the role of the umpire, they weren't necessarily the most desirable one. While they fulfilled their function reasonably well, especially in this case, there are good reasons for the abolishment of appeals to the JCPC. First, it makes sense that Canadian judges would have a superior understanding of Canadian socio-political issues than distant judges residing across the Atlantic (Cairns 1971, 328). In addition, both old and modern day scholars have levied charges of bias towards the JCPC. The judges harbored particularly protective attitudes towards the provinces and saw themselves as more than just umpires but as policy makers (Cairns 1971, 313). It's possible that as a result of this bias, that the courts chose to liberally interpret section 92 (13) of the BNA act, and not the peace, order and good government clause in section 91. This bias is what stops the JCPC from being the ideal impartial umpire that we expect modern courts to be when they moderate disputes about federalism.

However, the end of appeals to the Privy Council in 1949 did not result in a drastic swing towards centralization (Hogg and Wright 2005, 352). Some had thought that without having to appeal to the JCPC, the Supreme Court would act as an agent of centralization (Cairns 1971, 333). However, the courts continue to draw an even line between federal and provincial power that does not result in one being subordinate to the other, as they did when they ruled that provincial consent was needed to patriate the constitution in the Patriation Reference (Hogg and Wright 2005, 350). Perhaps this means that as flawed as it may have been, the judges in the Privy Council weren't completely out of touch and that Canada's decentralized federalism has more to do with Canadian society than with the foreign intervention of the JCPC. Hogg and Wright also argue that the decentralization brought on by the JCPC was generally in line with Canadian society being a multination state, as to avoid alienating Quebec through strong centralist trends (2005, 345). This gives us another explanation as to why the courts did not liberally interpret section 91 of the BNA act in order to empower the federal government: preserving national unity as opposed to favoritism being exercised by the judges towards the provinces. As Pierre Trudeau wrote in 1968:

“It has long been a custom in English Canada to denounce the Privy Council for its provincial bias; but it should perhaps be considered that if the lawlords had not leaned in that direction, Quebec separatism might not be a threat today; it might be an accomplished fact” (198).

Hogg and Wright concluded that overall, the Supreme Court has not departed from the lines of authority established by the Privy Council in that Canada had not shifted radically towards either greater centralization or decentralization (2005, 350). Yet, accusations of bias were still raised against the Supreme Court following the end of appeals (Greschner 2000, 66). So despite the digression exercised by the Courts, those who see themselves on the losing side of the Court’s decisions are generally vocal about what they regard as bias. Overall, this adds to the legitimacy of the court’s decision regarding the Employment and Insurance Act. It also shows that in spite of the problems that may have been inherent to the Privy Council, it fulfilled its function as a responsible judiciary.

In conclusion, history seems to have vindicated the Privy Council of the wrongdoings its critics had charged it with when it struck down the Employment and Insurance act. Flawed as it may have been, when we consider the ideal role of the courts in Canadian politics and how they ought to moderate conflicts between the two levels of government and not to cripple either one of them, we can see that the Privy Council acted quite fairly. To adhere to the framers’ intent, as many of the Privy Council’s critics wanted, would have not only go against the living tree doctrine which continues to guide our courts, but would’ve been contrary to the multinational characteristic of the country. We could also see that the process was indeed a democratic one as the court’s decision resulted in an agreement between all the provinces and Ottawa, transferring responsibilities for unemployment insurance from the provinces to the federal government, thus empowering them to handle the effects of the depression and allowing political will to take its course. Because of that, we can see that the courts were successful in fulfilling a key role by facilitating a conversation between the three parties.

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Settler Colonial Pseudo-Solidarity: Indigenous Peoples and the Occupy Movement in Canada

By Evan MacDonald

As a reaction to neoliberalism, the Occupy movement in Canada presents a radical argument for a just economy. However, it does not engage in any meaningful way with decolonization. Through settler moves to innocence – equating the struggles of indigenous people within colonization with the plight of settlers – Occupy fails to support the cause of indigenous self-determination. Without both effectively centering decolonization within a social justice cause and including indigenous voices within decision-making processes, there can be no long-lasting solidarity created between progressive settlers and indigenous communities. Neoliberalism as a modern face of colonialism is a worthy target of social justice action, but the negation of settler history and treaties provide a roadblock to solidarity. The process of decolonization asks the settler to accept less, but the rhetoric of Occupy focuses on reclaiming wealth and resources that have been seized from their natural owners: working Canadians. The colonial attitudes of most Occupy camps in Canada have resulted in a breakdown in potential alliances, and provide a warning for the next universalizing social justice cause.

In 2011, during the recovery from the Great Recession, many Canadians joined in solidarity with their American neighbours and activists around the world to participate in the occupation of public space through the vessel of Occupy movements. Activists within these movements were concerned over neoliberal forces that “continue to [push people] out of jobs, lands, and homes in order to secure an economic model that seeks to commodify all social relations in a context of growing global inequality.” While the Occupy movement is justified in its resistance against neoliberal capitalism as a system built on dispossession, they ignore the complexities of their own actions. In Canada, Occupy largely claimed to bring awareness to the broken treaty relationship between indigenous peoples and the Crown, but it absorbed the concerns of indigenous communities within the movement without consent and without a respectful voice. The Occupy movement does not aid in resistance to colonization, but instead empowers

it through disengagement. The analysis that folks within Occupy have done has led them to the conclusion that the forces of neoliberal capitalism have marginalized workers of all stripes, and that through a retaking of land that should belong to their class, the plutocrats that run the country's affairs will be depowered. Like all meaningful critique, I posit that the Occupy movement had good intentions, but asked the wrong questions. Instead of asking why the richest in society do not share their wealth with everyone else, activists on the left should instead centre decolonization as a source of liberation for all. Not engaging with the source-point of Canada's wealth does not question its legitimacy, which leaves little to no space for valuable solidarity between this movement and Indigenous nations struggling against a settler-colonial state.

Chief Mawedopenais said during the third day of treaty negotiations with the Crown in 1873 that "We think where we are is our property ... we have a rich country." Indigenous communities are often characterized by progressive causes as simply protectors of the land, or noble beings who are disinterested in relationships of power, but this completely ignores efforts made by Indigenous communities to enter into renewed treaty relationships with the state. By including a pseudo-indigenous voice to a settler cause, decolonial efforts are undermined. The absence of a decolonial lens from progressive movements "reveal[s] the limitations to "solidarity," without the willingness to acknowledge stolen land and how stolen land benefits settlers." The wealth redistribution proposed by the Occupy movement is in some ways incongruous to a decolonial project that strives to give land, resources, and sovereignty to indigenous nations. By returning to a relationship based in treaties, a decolonial Canada "would impoverish, not enrich, the 99%+ settler population", which brings us to the importance of treaties. Without them being upheld, settlers like activists in Occupy can "co-opt the power of place: physical resources of minerals, timber, fertile land and conceptual power relationships with the land enacted through private property and the nation state." When progressives utilize their privilege while refusing to acknowledge that the land they occupy is only accessible to them through the act of treaty-making, solidarity becomes an incredibly tenuous concept. The resources that Occupy seeks to redistribute were exploited through colonial practices, and without returning those resources to the detriment of the settler, peaceful coexistence within a shared territory is impossible. Noted, there were some shifts in the work of Occupy due to indigenous activism from within, through #decolonise, but "many organisers felt that their interventions were only partially taken-up at #occupy". For true solidarity to emerge between indigenous peoples and anti-capitalist groups like Occupy, the frame of conversation must be moved away from simply being anti-neoliberal to being anti-colonial.

In order to understand why there is so much stagnation on the effort to meaningfully merge interests between Occupy-esque groups and decolonial efforts, I will explore how neoliberalism and colonialism operate on everyone in Canada. Neoliberalism is an economic and social doctrine that emerged in the 1980s as a response to the debt-immobilized welfare states of the post-World War II era. Neoliberalism is an ideology of isolation: collective strength is undone by union-busting and deregulatory economic policies, and it "redefines citizens as consumers, whose democratic choices are best exercised by buying and selling, a process that rewards merit and punishes inefficiency". Neoliberalism is a contemporary and often invisible face of colonialism that settler-Canadians in the Occupy movement recognize as a harmful force on Canada's social fabric, and therefore direct action against it through reoccupation of public spaces. They are correct in their contestation of the adverse effects of neoliberalism, but this critique is not rooted enough in place or history to attract worthy

participation of indigenous communities. Neoliberalism's adverse social effects are some of the biggest threats to endanger a decolonized future for this land, but the transformational work that needs to be done in the face of those effects is the key element to the strife between Occupy and indigenous peoples. This ideology's social impacts range from "epidemics of self-harm, eating disorders, depression, loneliness, performance anxiety and social phobia" to the false consciousness of "[t]he poor [beginning] to blame themselves for their failures, even when they can do little to change their circumstances." This results in a working class that is understandably less critical of the world around them, and too inwardly-focused to empathize with indigenous communities still struggling under a settler-colonial government. The crushing weight of this new form of capitalism on all workers serves to legitimize its oppressions by prioritizing the individual experience rather than allowing for a collective awareness of the struggle of working people. A crucial question that neoliberalism introduces into the attempted solidarity between Indigenous communities and settler-Canadians is which unjust system should be targeted: settlers can easily feel the impact of capitalism on their everyday lives, but doing the work to expand their lens to incorporate how resources have been extracted from indigenous lands, as well as the failure of the settler-colonial government to live up to its treaty obligations allows for a more robust conversation on the next economy; an economy that is not simply a reworked capitalism that still relies on colonial exploitation.

To explore these divides in practice, I turn to the experiences of indigenous activists analyzing the Occupy movement within Canada. There was only one Occupy group in Canada that "adopted a statement of unity that took indigenous sovereignty as foundational to its analysis", which was #OccupyWinnipeg, and very few others acknowledged colonialism through their online activities. Similar disengagements can be seen at other cities where Occupy was strong: in Oakland, CA the movement refused to change its name after critique by indigenous peoples, and in Montreal concerns over decolonization were considered supplemental to the overall goal of confronting neoliberalism. Occupy Montreal exhibits a particularly stagnating practice that many progressive movements undertake: recognition without action. After a diverse group of organizations created an enclave within Occupy Montreal for the purpose of indigenous solidarity, no further action was implemented by Occupy. This kind of placation that progressive causes undertake to seem anti-colonial is sinister: it undermines decolonial efforts while gaslighting decolonial activists into supporting their causes. Occupy Toronto became so fraught with tension that a group of indigenous scholars held a forum on their differences with the movement in the aftermath of resistance to indigenous leadership. In Occupy's attempt to universalize the struggle of workers under neoliberalism, it has disregarded the lens of decolonization in favour of one that best serves their narrative, and in doing so they have become proponents of the legitimation of the settler-colonial state.

The kind of future that Occupy envisions is a difficult one to coexist with a renewed treaty relationship. With an emphasis on "take back the commons" rhetoric, anti-neoliberal movements deny the existence of a treaty-relationship that should govern how Canadians interact with indigenous power structures and transverse indigenous lands. Occupy in Canada is governed by each city's General Assembly, but they have main themes and goals that are universal within the movement: what is most remembered now is how "activists came together to denounce how increased inequalities affect people's lives." To discover what Occupy's alternative economy would look like in practice, one can turn to their camps as an example. Bartering-esque trading could be found amongst occupiers as a projection of a desired end-state economy, but in terms of policy options to reverse the trend of growing inequality,

literature recommends “revisiting policy instruments such as government transfers to persons, investments in education and human capital as well as minimum wage legislation.” This kind of imagination could certainly ease the pain that many in our neoliberal economic system endure, but it is an appeal to colonial institutions instead of a rethinking of how our settler-colonial state is organized. The movement’s camps represented how neoliberal capitalism forces us out of public spaces, but the underlying assumption in that work is that working class settler-Canadians are the true owners of this territory, and it has been taken by the capitalist system. There is clearly truth in the assertion that business interests have transformed our interactions with public space, however, the rhetorical indigenizing of settlers to this land is a troubling thought. Tuck and Yang would call this method of combatting neoliberalism as a settler move to innocence, specifically reoccupation. They explain these moves as being “fantasies of easier paths to reconciliation” where settlers can imagine themselves as being equally oppressed to indigenous peoples through a misreading of their own history. It is an obfuscation that “has legitimized a set of practices with problematic relationships to land and to Indigenous sovereignty.” Although in some senses the Occupy movement attempted to produce its ideal society by having a form of direct democracy through their General Assemblies, Jessica Yee points out how this and other progressive causes fail the indigenous peoples of North America:

This is part of a much larger issue, and in fact there is so much nationalistic, patriotic language of imperialism wrapped up in [left causes] that it’s no wonder people can’t see the erasure of existence of the First Peoples of THIS territory that happens when we get all high and mighty with the pro-America agendas, and forget our OWN complicity and accountability to the way things are today.

Must the onus always fall to indigenous activists to push progressive causes into adopting a decolonial lens? Even when the predominantly-settler Occupy was encouraged by indigenous activists across Canada to centre decolonization in its efforts, the idea was rarely taken up. By trying to create a universally anti-imperialist movement with a faulty decolonial lens, it “is deceptively embraceive and vague, its inference: ‘None of us are settlers.’” It is then easier in the Canadian imagination to envision a new society for settlers outside of capitalism than it is to envision a land of shared sovereignty with indigenous nations.

Neoliberal capitalism has activated Canadians who are startled by growing inequality to take on organizing efforts to “take back the commons.” When this claim is problematized, it becomes very clear who the commons need to be taken back for: Canadians. There is a belief expressed through the Occupy movement that neoliberalism has dispossessed workers of a public life in a manner not dissimilar from indigenous peoples and it is up to settler-Canadians burdened by economic inequality to remake the system for the benefit of all. When meaningful indigenous participation in the Occupy movement was present, it usually resulted in in-fighting or inaction from the camps. What the Occupy movement wants is not entirely congruous with indigenous decolonial efforts: a reorganization of the economy without decolonization at its centre does not address the historical and contemporary exploitation of resources that Canada has benefited from, and it does not establish a renewed nation-to-nation relationship between a post-capitalist Canada and sovereign indigenous nations. If anything, Occupy largely believes

that once capitalism ends the suffering that indigenous peoples endure through colonialism ends. Occupy desires to build a pan-interest group that targets their efforts towards reducing economic inequality, but when an analysis is introduced to these movements that shifts the focus of their work, they have largely not been well-received. Neoliberalism in Canada only exists because it is a settler-colonial state, and the relative silence from Occupy activism, or worse, the adoption of a pseudo-indigenous voice or interest within the movement itself, indicates that they are not seriously interested in the work of dismantling the current power structures that undermine indigenous self-determination. The project of decolonization is commensurable with making current conditions better, but through strengthening colonial institutions without dramatically reforming them and having the ability to remove participation in Canadian life through sovereignty efforts, Occupy does not reflect the goal of a decolonized land and it relies on the wealth accrued by the colonial process to power its efforts. If the Canadian left wishes to ally itself with indigenous peoples, it cannot unilaterally dictate the way forward, or proceed without objecting to and actively working against colonial power dynamic within their own movements.

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Egypt and Syria: Islamism as a Functioning Political Ideology

By Alannah Piasecki

By examining recent conflicts in both Egypt and Syria, this paper examines whether or not Islamism has the potential to serve as a functioning political ideology. Through Middle Eastern countries previous attempts to Islamize politics, the existence of militant/radical Islamists, and western countries stereotyping of Islam, this paper argues that though Islamism cannot be ruled out as a valid political ideology; it is currently unable to be a functioning political ideology due to the fact that previous attempts to make Islamism the main political ideology have led to hindrance of democracy and violent uprisings across the Middle East that has yet to pacify.

Introduction

Though Islamism has the potential to be a functioning political ideology, based on the current events in Egypt and Syria it is not a viable political option. Political scholars identified Islamism as one of the most powerful ideological movements and also a great source of conflict for the Middle East (Stein, 2014: 149). Though it is a known fact that certain forms of conflict can be healthy in fostering appropriate competitive and strong relationships, it is clear that the conflicts in Egypt and Syria are not healthy, politically or otherwise. There have been previous attempts to make political Islam dominant, attempts that have only led to authoritarianism and further violent conflicts across the Middle East. This paper will use opposing views to conclude that Islamism, given the current political state of these countries, would not be able to serve as a functioning political ideology.

Before this paper continues it is important to address the difference between Islam and Islamism/political Islam. Islam is the religion that Muslim people follow and Islamism (used interchangeably with the term political Islam) is forcing Islam upon society. This paper is not an argument against Islam as a religion but is rather an analysis of the possibility of Islamism being a functioning political ideology. Much of this paper is focused on post-Arab Spring events and how those coupled with western imaginations of Islamism have prescribed political Islam as ineffectual.

Islamism After the Arab Spring

The rule of Islam and its practice refers to how people should devote themselves to God's truth and that the law of God should be the law that governs people (Khan, 2016: 27). It is not that different from other religious affiliations in that the practice of religion includes being obedient to a higher power. In contemporary Islamist politics there are two forms that are the most widely recognized: radical Islamism and conservative Islamism. Salwa Ismail, Professor of Middle Eastern politics at the University of London, describes radical Islamism as the kind we frequently hear about on the news: violent and all about using Islam as an agent of aggressive social change. Comparatively, conservative Islamism uses existing institutions to preserve political norms while "Islamizing" society (Ismail, 2003: 28). She also notes a stark difference in ideology. Radical Islamism associates with a rejection of society and describes it as *jahilaya*, which roughly translates to "an ignorance of Islam or God" and the conservative counterparts ideological foundation is pulled from public tradition regarding the practice of religion (28-29).

Egypt and the Arab Spring

In 2011, the Egyptian military sought to approve various constitutional amendments using Islamism as the main agent of change. For Islamists, this was great because it would increase the Islamist voice by bringing their values to the forefront of the constitution (Brown, 2013: 47). Further elections resulted in an Islamist majority with Mohamed Morsi of the Muslim Brotherhood (an organization that advocates for the application of Muslim ideals at various social, economic, and political levels of society) being elected president. However, non-Islamists were fearful because they felt that Islamists were trying to gain a majority in order to push their political agenda, not with the goal of being the voice of the people (54). Islamist discourses in Egypt are very authoritarian. In 2011, Egypt began to experience an abundance of large-scale protests against authoritarian rule that continued after the Arab Spring and deflated the idea that Islamism could ever mollify Egypt. On July 3, 2013, President Morsi was forcibly removed from his position which not only signified the unsuccessful attempt to make Islamism a functioning political ideology but also Egypt's failure to transition into a democratic state.

Despite the unraveling of a potentially democratic government, that does not mean it is the fault of the Muslim Brotherhood or Islamism as a whole. Political scholar Ashraf El Sherif (2011) argues that Islamist groups are in fact assisting countries all over the Middle East with their transition to democracy because they are encouraging participation from those that participate in the religion of Islam. He says ex-radical/militant Islamist groups are active participants in Egypt's electoral process and that the democratization process as a whole gives Islamist reformists the opportunity to meet their long-term goals (El Sherif, 2011: 358-359). However, despite the fact that it was not the Muslim Brotherhood's fault that democracy crumbled or that Islamism does have place in the political realm, it does not mean that it can serve as a functioning political ideology. It is impossible to ignore that Islamism has been and continues to be a source of localized and international conflict.

The fall of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt showed that when faced with forms of counter-mobilization, the appeal of Muslim groups dissipates (Stein, 2014: 151). Egypt's failure to transition was not that the Muslim Brotherhood was antidemocratic, but rather the fact that their

interpretations of democracy were skewed after years of authoritarian rule (Brown, 2013: 50, 57). Their downfall was not realizing people's deep opposition to their role in politics. A key argument presented by a lot of scholars in the field is that Islamism has become hegemonic not because it projects the values of the people, but because the Egyptian military has been projecting it on the country since the 1950s (Stein, 2014: 151). This downfall coupled with the failure of the Arab Spring thrust Egypt into the grey zone, specifically in the form of dominant power politics. This showed that not all attempts to abandon authoritarianism lead to a democratic outcome. Dominant power politics describe countries with real political space that have basic institutional democracy but are dominated by one leader/party; have a dependent judiciary; and consist of regimes characterized by fraudulent elections, low levels of participation, and corruption. Much of the Middle Eastern States, including Egypt, meet these requirements.

Political Evolution in Syria

In 1963, the socialist Ba'ath Party was in power in Syria and in 1964 they banned the Islamic movement. The Muslim Brotherhood was a source of heavy opposition and declared Ba'ath policies to be an enemy of their values. In 1970, the Assad regime took over and conflicts began arising out of political repression, an unfortunately regular practice at the time. In March of 2011, Syria experienced the beginnings of a revolt against the Assad regime. This sparked what it is referred to as the Syrian Revolution that lasted for approximately two years. The defining features of this revolution were the fact that there was no military or political resolution following the various uprisings, and, the constant Islamisation of the revolution (Cepoi, 2013: 549).

In her article "The Rise of Islamism in Contemporary Syria: From Muslim Brotherhood to Salafi-Jihadi Rebels," Ecaterina Cepoi identifies several factors that explain the Islamisation of the Syrian resistance. First, the impact of conflicting ideologies in various international communities and Islamist regimes; the outside influence of countries such as Qatar and Saudi Arabia; and lastly, extremists attaching their values to that of the Muslim identity (Cepoi, 2013: 553). All of these identified factors describe a warrior mentality that has been created by a conflict between those who follow the religion of Islam and those engaging in militant Islam in Syria. This mentality has arisen not only from the previously described factors, but also from Islamist use of radical violence without regard for civilian casualties, the legitimization of violence by defining it as essential to survival, and the evolution of the armed jihad (560). The jihad is the act of implying force to spread Islamism/political Islam. In Syria and across the Middle East, jihad groups and other radical Islamist forces dominate the political realm by imposing their interpretation of Muslim ideals on the general public. Based on this, Cepoi says, "Islamist groups will be the main sources for insecurity and political instability" (149) in Syria and given the current crisis in the region, she has yet to be proven incorrect. Religious contentions are already fueling much of the conflict in Syria so if Islamism were to be enforced as the hegemonic political ideology, it is doubtful that it would function effectively or peacefully.

Contemporary Views of Islamism

Ewan Stein identifies two common arguments as to why Islamism cannot serve as a functioning political ideology. The first is that the Islamist ideology and democracy are inherently not designed for

each other because the underlying goal of these groups is to create tyrannical Islamic states (Stein, 2014: 149). The second is that Islamism failed as a viable political ideology because Islamists abandoned true Muslim ideals, such as preaching peace (149). These claims however, are informed by western stereotypes of Islam and do not provide any relevant political evidence. After the events on September 11th, fear was understandably widespread and stereotypes of those that practice Islam-rooted faiths were becoming more prevalent. Osama bin Laden fueled active western imaginations that furthered this tradition of vilifying *the other* (Anders and Wörn, 2011: 14). The enemy became not only bin Laden but other Islamic people as well and western media outlets were eager to identify a foreign enemy. Western media and popular culture began spouting phrases like *the unstoppable tide of Islam* or referring to it as a *force*. However, these imaginative rhetorics were result of popular imagination and illustrate western media's obsession with mythologizing the Middle East (Stein, 2014: 151). This portrayal of contemporary Islamism has only furthered tensions between western states and the Middle East. It is also important to acknowledge that western liberal values are not always appreciated by "those who are at the receiving end of neo-colonial domination" (Anders and Wörn, 2011: 31) and that is something that western states, especially when attempting to install democracy abroad, need to take into consideration. Just because a state does not identify with western ideals does not mean that their ideals are wrong.

Rather than assuming a religion is fundamentally undemocratic, a more probably reason as to why Islamism cannot succeed in terms of being a functioning political ideology is because faith-based political narratives identify other religions as a threat to their religious and political understandings (Anders and Wörn, 2011: 26). Political Islam is not an alternative to other political ideologies such as liberalism or democracy. It is a contributing cultural variant that can be applied to any political ideological trend (31). Therefore, it cannot be a functioning political ideology.

Concluding Thoughts

Islamism and Islamic values carry a huge social resonance both in regions dominated by the cultural practice and those that are not. Western states stereotypical interpretations of Islam have painted a negative picture of the faith and those that practice it. Though most who support Islamism fit those stereotypically radical depictions, the fact of the matter remains that jihadi groups and other radical Islamist forces dominate the political realm by forcing their interpretation of Islam on the general public (Ismail, 2003: 27). After the Arab Spring, the fight against authoritarian oppression combined with widespread religious contentions fueled violent conflicts in Egypt and Syria. Both Egypt and Syria have been deeply affected by the absence of the rule of law and until that is present politically and socially, Islamism will not be able to be a successful political institution. Additionally, because previous attempts to make Islamism the dominant political ideology have failed, it is unlikely that Islamism, whether forced on the people or democratically elected, will prove to be successful. It is also important to reflect on the idea that Islamism is a cultural variant that affects ideological trends and not an ideology in itself. This paper does not argue that Islamism could never be a functioning political ideology. It just cannot serve effectively at this time given past circumstances that have lead to two failed democratic states.

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Impact of Non-Government Organisations and Microcredit Institutions on the Development of Bangladesh

By Murtoza Manzur

In this paper, I will argue that although local microfinance institutions and non-governmental organisations such as BRAC and Grameen Bank have played a significant part in the development and reduction of poverty in Bangladesh, some challenges remain. This paper will first present a brief background of the socioeconomic conditions of Bangladesh. The history of NGOs in the country and their transformation from primarily relief oriented agencies to being full-scale development actors will also be explored. I will analyse the relationship between the state and the non governmental agencies in delivering service to the people of Bangladesh. Furthermore, this paper will present the rise of microcredit institutions and facilities that have changed the economic landscape of Bangladesh. Finally, the essay will present the challenges that are faced by non governmental agencies in the country. This paper will bring forward the bureaucratic hurdles and the political opposition that are faced by such agencies. Public perception of NGOs will also be highlighted in this essay. I will also present the criticisms that some of the microcredit organisations such as Grameen Bank have faced due to their high emphasis on repayment of loans.

The aim of this paper is to study the extent and impact of non-government organisations and microfinance institutions on the development of Bangladesh. This essay will particularly focus on the activities of BRAC (Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee) and Grameen Bank, pioneer development and microcredit institutions in the country. This paper will bring forward the history of NGOs in the country; their transformation from primarily relief oriented agencies to being full-scale development actors will also be explored. This essay will further explore the bureaucratic hurdles and the political opposition that are faced by such agencies. Public perception and criticism faced by NGOs will also be highlighted in this essay. To conclude, I will argue that even though non-governmental organisations face ever-changing challenges, they have greatly contributed to the development and poverty alleviation in Bangladesh.

The emergence of non-governmental organisations in Bangladesh can be traced back to the British colonial period. During the British era, NGOs were mostly working as religion-based trusts managing orphanages, schools and hospitals. The dramatic shift happened after Bangladesh achieved its

independence in 1971 from Pakistan following a bloody war. The post-war rebuilding efforts were largely led by non-governmental organisations. Voluntary organisations started pouring into the country with a massive inflow of funds. During the reconstruction effort these organisations were primarily focused in distribution of relief materials and basic construction. After the reconstruction effort slowed down, the non-governmental organisations were challenged to find to transform themselves to fit the needs of the young country. Through performing relief work, the NGOs had already built a group of dedicated volunteer workers and an efficient mechanism for working at grassroots level. NGOs state that it was during this period they realized that relief efforts do not solve the problem of the poor. They felt that if relief works, the resources they commanded could be channeled in a productive way by involving the recipients (Haider, 2011). One such Non-Governmental Organisation was BRAC (Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee) which was founded in 1972. After initially establishing itself as a relief and rehabilitation organisation, BRAC shifted its focus to long-term development work. The NGO focuses on poverty alleviation and empowerment of the poor. BRAC's earliest project was "participatory development program" – a system in which residents of the community participated in planning and implementation of development programs within their community (Lovell, 1992). In 1975, the organisation set up a Research and Evaluation Division to analyze its activities and plan how BRAC would expand. The division proposed that efforts should be directed to form groups of ultra-poor people where they can play an active role on how to utilize funds and other support received from BRAC through collective decision making. The division came up with the concept of Village Organisation (VO) in 1977. Under this approach, the poorest segment of the society - those who own less than half an acre of land and survive by selling manual labor were targeted by BRAC. Each VO is made up of 40-50 members who are all female. When there is a group interested to come together, a VO is formed under the guidance of the local BRAC staff. Membership in a VO is the required to participate in BRAC activities. They are created within a small geographical area so that members are readily accessible for each other; usually the same village. VOs meet once each month for regular business as determined by the local group and to address issues brought up by the BRAC field staff. Some VOs are divided into smaller groups each having 5-7 members along with an elected leader from within. The VO has a management committee composed of small-group leaders, a chairperson, a secretary, and a cashier from within the VO elected by the VO members. The VOs organise a weekly meeting and a monthly issue-based meeting (Rafi and Mallick, 2002). These VO plan and conduct activities that will be beneficial to their community. Through VOs, BRAC impart knowledge to women about income generation and managing small scale businesses. They focus on six sectors in which it feels large numbers of women can be productively engaged; poultry, fishery, livestock, sericulture, agriculture, and agro forestry. For each sector BRAC offers training in improved techniques, provision of improved breeds and technologies, on-going supply of technical assistance, monitoring and evaluation as needed, and marketing of finished goods. VOs are also the primary outlet from where loans are disbursed to women in the villages. Through this program, BRAC has positioned itself as a capacity builder in the country for developing the poor. The organisation has extended its core services to health, education, social development and legal services. BRAC has been credited single-handedly with the reduction of child mortality in the country through its action in the rural areas showing rehydration techniques to mothers whose children were dying of diarrhoea. BRAC ran joint-campaigns with the Government of Bangladesh to spread the tuberculosis vaccine throughout the country (The Path Through the Fields, 2012). As of 2015, BRAC has become the largest non-governmental organisation in the world in terms of employees and the number of people it has served.

With an annual expenditure of \$1 billion and a reach of 138 million people, BRAC has established 48000 schools and has a team of 117000 healthcare workers (BRAC at a glance, 2015).

In Bangladesh, another non-governmental organisation that has been at the forefront of development is Grameen Bank. In 1976, Dr. Muhammad Yunus, a then university Professor of Economics, started a project by lending an amount of \$27 to forty-two ultra-poor people in a village named 'Jobra' near to his university. Just after the independence of Bangladesh, the postwar economy faced a massive famine in 1974. Dr Yunus started visiting the villages near his university and looked at the condition of the people. He saw people with extreme poverty with no way to come out their predicament. Yunus found that in order to survive, the people take loans from the local informal money lenders with strict loan terms. Since he did not believe in charity, Yunus felt that the living conditions of the people could be made better off if they have access to credit on soft terms. He made a list of 42 people and found out that they needed \$27 dollars to survive. He then provided them the funds from his own savings as no banks were willing to provide the people with the loans. These loans allowed the recipients to diversify their sources of income and in turn better their living conditions. After several years, in 1983, this project was transformed into a formal bank called Grameen Bank. It was established as a specialised bank with its own charter to work exclusively with the poor (Dowla, 2006). The bank follows a unique way in granting small loans. Rather than relying on traditional financial collaterals, Grameen Bank believes in using 'social collateral' (Dowla, 2006). These loans are not disbursed to individuals but to small groups who are collectively responsible for the repayment of the loan. Grameen Bank has a particular emphasis on women, who receive 95 percent of the bank's loans. They are considered better recipients because they do not have access to traditional lines of credit in rural Bangladesh. Moreover, it also allows them to be empowered and play their role in the economy ("Grameen Bank: Taking Capitalism to the Poor", 2004). As of December, 2015, it has 8.81 million borrowers, 97 percent of whom are women. With 2,568 branches, Grameen Bank provides services in 81,392 villages, covering more than 97 percent of the total villages in Bangladesh ("Introduction", 2015). Since the inception of Bangladesh, non-governmental organisations have been at the forefront of development in Bangladesh. Activities by such organisations have spread throughout Bangladesh. They assumed a vital role in certain sectors, such as, poverty reduction, family planning, gender issues, primary health care, education, rural development, improvement of infrastructure and environment protection. However, these sectors seem to be neglected by the government (Haider, 2011). In Bangladesh, it has been argued that NGOs have become a powerful force due the failure of the state to provide such facilities. Such organisations have also threatened the power and legitimacy of the government. Moreover, there is a growing trend for NGOs to compete against governments for foreign aid and sharing political power at local level (Haque, 2002). This has created friction between the government and the non-governmental organisations. From the government's side, the first issue that needs to be tackled is the accountability with NGOs. This resulted in the formulation of 8 ordinances/act that govern NGO activities. The bureaucratic hurdle has been criticized by the NGOs as restrictive and they say these laws have resulted in lengthy bureaucratic procedures, harassment by officials leading to corruption. The Government has stood by its position by claiming that these rules are there for transparency and accountability (Haque, 2002). However, there are instances of partnership between government and NGOs in development sectors. Collaboration can be particularly seen in the health sector. In Bangladesh less than 40 percent of the population have access to primary healthcare. To respond to the overwhelming health challenges, the government encourages the involvement of NGOs in health service delivery. Collaboration between the government and NGOs in

TB, maternal and child health and family planning, Immunisation, leprosy eradication and nutritional programmes has been efficient and effective. CARE-Bangladesh's maternal health project, BRAC's health and development programmes, and the leprosy control programmes of Health, Education and Economic Development (HEED) are among many excellent examples of successful government-NGO collaboration (Ullah, 2006). Another significant outcome of Government-NGO Partnership can be seen in the Extended Immunisation Program (EPI). The EPI program operates throughout the country in collaboration with numerous non-government organisations. During the mid-1980s government sought cooperation from NGOs including BRAC, CARE, Rotary International and many smaller NGOs. Government of Bangladesh did not have the sufficient manpower to carry out a large scale operation such as the EPI and therefore partnered with the NGOs. These organisations have strengthened the immunisation program throughout the country through providing training for vaccinators, managers and communicators, providing immunization services in areas where government services cannot easily reach, providing many of the communication materials and activities which have supported program expansion, and by involving local talent and resources for the program. Extended Immunisation program was very successful. The coverage of children fully immunized reached 62% countrywide as opposed to a mere 2% in 1985 (Osman, 2008).

However, despite all of this, non-governmental organisations have faced their fair share of criticism as well. The micro-credit institutions have come under scrutiny from both the public and the government. Micro-credit has even been termed as a 'death-trap' for the poor. The exorbitant rates of interest charged can be very damaging. It has been argued that the recipients of the loan who are mostly from the rural areas are not properly educated about the repayment procedures. Furthermore, the debt collection method employed by the NGOs have been criticized for their forceful behaviour and harassment (Melik, 2010). Furthermore, critics have argued that microcredit cannot alleviate poverty. Dr Jason Hickel, an anthropologist at the London School of Economics has claimed that such facilities make poverty worse. He claims most microfinance loans are used to fund consumption – to help people buy the basic necessities they need to survive. Therefore, borrowers do not generate income that can be used to repay existing loans (Hickel, 2015). Within the context of Bangladesh, there have been issues that can be related to the claim that Dr Hickel put forward. The phenomenon of overlapping where an individual or a group borrows multiple times from different NGOs to maintain sustenance. Another problem that can be seen in the context of micro-financing organisations is the lack of innovation. Almost all NGOs tend to follow the Grameen Model and has not changed with time and may not be sustainable in the near future (Zaman, 2013).

While all these criticisms may raise doubts about the functions of non-governmental organisations and microfinance institutions, it can be argued that such institutions have played a tremendous role in the growth of Bangladesh. The lack of ability of the government to provide the needed resources has catapulted NGOs into the day to day dynamics of Bangladeshi civil society. The country allocates a tiny proportion of its budget to social safety net 2.2 percent of GDP compared to the suggested 6-8 percent ("Allocate more for social safety nets", 2016). This is where the NGOs come in. Without the programs implemented and funded by NGOs, poverty in Bangladesh would have taken a turn for the worse. Even amidst the criticism, microcredit schemes have worked in most places. Mohammad Razzaque of Dhaka University studies two groups of people with similar incomes and household assets, one of which had regular borrowers from a variety of microfinance institutions and

NGOs and the other of which did not, to see whether microcredit helped. Among the first group the poverty fell from 78% in 1998 to 68% in 2004. In the second group, poverty fell from 75% to 70% ("The path through the fields, 2012). The social effects of women empowerment through NGOs and microcredit institutions cannot be undermined. Research by Dr. Alexandra Bernasek from Colorado State University has shown that women who borrowed money from Grameen Bank have a greater control over the money and many of these women purchased lands in their own names. Dr Bernasek commented that through empirical research it was found that the women who participated in the Grameen scheme were also less likely to be victims of violence carried out by their husbands compared to women who did not participate. She further mentions that women who were members of Grameen were more educated about family planning (Bernasek, 2003).

To conclude, it can be said that while NGOs and microcredit institutions have faced criticism, they have contributed to the socio-economic development of Bangladesh. They have tackled issues ranging from relief operations to infant mortality. However, at the same time it should be mentioned that there is much room to grow. Bangladesh is a poor country with 31.5% of its population living below the national poverty line and the changing climate remains the biggest issue that will face the South Asian country very soon. Bangladesh has a good track record of collaboration between NGOs and the Government. To address future challenges, both parties need to work on their existing strong relations and remove barriers to development and alleviation of poverty.

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Hoosiers, Holcomb and the Landslide: The 2016 Indiana Gubernatorial Results

By Helen Zhang

This research paper assignment on the 2016 Indiana gubernatorial election was done in two parts. The first part (not included) was on predicting the winner of this election. My prediction for the Democratic candidate, John Gregg, was incorrect. This essay is the follow-up analysis (written within two weeks after the election results) of what transpired during the election in relation to my prediction. I argue that the Eric Holcomb win and Gregg loss was due to the larger national Republican victory, a lack of Democratic campaigning power in Indiana, Gregg's (over)emphasis of LGBT rights, his dismay for the RFRA, and Holcomb's optimistic economic plans. Gregg's connection to Mike Pence is also discussed as a defining factor of his win. Demographics of the Indiana exit polls are also considered. While the race was polled, and reported as a toss-up in the weeks before the election, in hindsight, a Republican Governor winning in a largely Republican state is a logical conclusion.

The 51st Governor of Indiana

The Indiana gubernatorial election of 2016 consisted of Republican candidate Eric Holcomb, Democratic candidate John Gregg and a third-party Libertarian candidate, Rex Bell. On November 8th, Holcomb became Governor-elect of Indiana. This means my prediction of a Gregg election was incorrect. This became an open-seat race when the incumbent Republican Governor, Mike Pence, decided to run as vice-president on Donald Trump's ticket. Holcomb is currently serving as the Lieutenant Governor, but only since late March of this year, filling in for the remainder of Sue Ellspermann's term. Pence nominated Holcomb after Ellspermann resigned to become the president of Ivy Tech Community College. Holcomb won on a joint ticket with Suzanne Crouch as the Lieutenant Governor. Gregg was a state representative and served as speaker of the Indiana house of representatives from 1996 to 2002. He was also the Democratic candidate for the 2012 gubernatorial election, in which he was defeated by Pence (although by a smaller margin than the 2016 election). A Democratic win would have ended a 12-year Republican control of the Governor's office, consisting of Mitch Daniels' and Pence's terms. Historically, Indiana has had Democratic Governors, including Evan Bayh, who ran for

the 2016 senate election, but was defeated by Todd Young. Governor-elect Holcomb will take office on January 9th in the upcoming year.

To understand some of the dynamics of my election, you can see the Republican's platform by reading the official website of Indiana. It states that Governor Pence is currently committed to continuing success through "fiscal responsibility, economic development and educational opportunity for every Hoosier child" ("Governor Pence: About"). Accordingly, education was a large aspect of the 2016 gubernatorial election. Noticeably absent from this web-page is anything related to the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) and LGBT rights, which is perhaps what he is most known for, as well as a significant piece of Gregg's campaign.

The National Republican Victory

In my prediction paper, I discussed the issues of the RFRA and its implications on LGBT rights, as well as education programs and funding. The national political conversation dealt with issues such as fixing the economy, change (or lack thereof as implied by "make America great again"), and partisanship. Indiana is mainly Republican so Trump echoed many of the state's sentiments. The most obvious connection of this gubernatorial election to the national election is Pence. Pence's decision to abandon his re-election bid means Indiana will have a one-term Governor for the first time since the "state constitution was changed in the 1970s to allow Governors to seek a second consecutive term" (Tribune News Services). Evidently, an incumbency advantage is not rare for Indiana. Although the Governor's seat was not incumbent, Holcomb does have an advantage of the experience being Pence's Lieutenant Governor. Unsurprisingly, Holcomb also has similar policy positions as Pence (which I will discuss later). The Pence dropout also influenced the dynamics of this election by giving Gregg a new opponent who has not yet defeated him. This also meant that Gregg was competing against a candidate that had connections with the potential vice-president of the United States. An overwhelming split between Gregg and Holcomb voters is whether they have a favorable or unfavorable opinion of Pence. 80% of Gregg voters see Pence as unfavorable while 80% of Holcomb voters see Pence as favorable ("Exit Polls 2016."). This suggests that Holcomb supporters are satisfied or proud of the connection the national race has with Indiana as *their* Governor is good enough to be in national office.

A gubernatorial election cannot be separated from the presidential election happening simultaneously. In a book about American Governors, David Redlawsk points out that the Indiana Governor is elected during the presidential election cycle, meaning that candidates typically "compete against presidential candidates, senatorial candidates (at least in two out of every three elections), and congressional candidates, to gain attention" (Redlawsk, 17). Various other narratives tend to dominate the discussion before election day. Rather than competing with other races, gubernatorial candidates may attempt to align their campaign with various other ones. Redlawsk states that the Indiana Governor is not alone in "possessing a unique electoral mandate, but shares that distinction with other statewide offices, as well as a number of federally elected officeholders" (Redlawsk, 17). Looking at it this way, it is reasonable that people who voted for Trump would have also voted for Pence's Lieutenant Governor. The gubernatorial race was essentially a toss-up as reported by many polls (pre-election), but the presidential race was always certainly going to Trump. All Hoosiers were voting in a society where many people identify as Republican and agree with Trump's ideas.

An additional concern related to the dominant election discourse is Indiana's relation to LGBT rights as seen by the conversations and writings regarding the LGBT community under Trump and Pence. Many people on social media are encouraging people to donate to organizations like *The Trevor Project* (an organization for LGBT suicide-prevention) for those who feel afraid, particularly of Pence's past policies and statements. There has also been a surge in articles covering Pence's apparent anti-LGBT stance. For example, Michelangelo Signorile states that Pence may be one of the most "anti-LGBTQ evangelical Christian political crusaders to serve in Congress and as Governor" (Signorile). Likewise, Liam Stack reports that LGBT leaders were alarmed when Trump chose Pence as his running mate as he has voted for discriminatory bills throughout his political career (Stack).

Analysis of the Indiana Results

Nearly every poll published in the weeks leading up to election day displayed a tie or a Gregg lead. These results were not replicated at the polls. Indiana's election day concluded with Holcomb receiving 51.4% of the total vote. Gregg received 45.4% of the vote, and the remaining percentages went to Bell. Overall, the margin between Holcomb and Gregg consists of 161,891 votes. Gregg collected higher percentages of non-white voters (especially black people) compared to Holcomb. As for other races, the presidential election in Indiana went to Trump. The few counties that voted for Hillary Clinton were Lake, Marion, Monroe, and St. Joseph, all of which went to Gregg also ("Indiana Election Results"). More than half of those who voted for Holcomb are from rural areas. Tony Cook explains that Holcomb was not only strengthened by rural counties, but he also "dominated in the suburban 'doughnut' counties surrounding Indianapolis" (Cook). These were the areas that Gregg underperformed in.

The results from the other state-wide elections allowed Republican power in Indiana to be sustained as they have super-majorities in the legislature and the senate. Republican Todd Young won the senate race, and the positions of attorney general and superintendent of education also went to Republicans. This Republican sweep seen in Indiana can be explained by straight-ticket voting. Harry Enten argues that the straight-ticket voting seen in the 2016 election was "unusual even for the highly polarized era we live in." He explains that during the 2012 elections, Democratic senators won in places that voted for the Republican presidential candidates, including Indiana. In 2016, no states split their vote for senate and president (Enten), this could be extended to governors as well. A dominant theme of the 2016 election is one of division, "growing polarization and partisanship" (Enten), Indiana was not an exception. There are other possible factors to explaining Holcomb's gubernatorial win.

Democratic Campaigning Power

Gregg is Democratic, and unfortunately for him, Democrats do not have much power in Indiana. There have been Democratic Governors in the past, but considering the Trump and Pence electoral college win, Gregg's loss is less surprising. In Gregg's concession speech, he discussed how a Democratic win was tough due to "what happened in the state with the landslide that came across Indiana" (Tribune News Services). Gregg stated on his official Facebook page that "this campaign raised more money than any campaign for Indiana governor in history" ("Friends, Last year"), but despite raising much more money than Holcomb, there was still not much Democratic campaigning power

overall in the state. Clinton made a total of two stops in Indiana since May and her Hoosier supporters received \$500,000 from her campaign. These funds were not for Clinton's presidential support in Indiana, but for the Democrats that were "gaining steam in critical races for Senate and Governor" (Groppe). Nonetheless, this was not enough for the Democrats. People were skeptical of Holcomb's ability to run a campaign in a few short months. Cook states that Holcomb "overcame those hurdles, blitzing the state and banking heavily on the goodwill he had built with GOP activists throughout his career as a behind-the-scenes political operative" (Cook). In his victory speeches, Holcomb acknowledged the critics that said that he would not be able to raise enough money. Yet, with a large enough base, Holcomb's small amount of funds were reconciled. Looking beyond partisanship and fundraising, there are other explanations as to why Gregg may not have been the better candidate in some minds.

LGBT Rights and the RFRA

A primary aspect of Gregg's platform was to protect against LGBT discrimination. His campaign promises regarding LGBT rights were appealing, however it is possible that he fixated *too* much on the topic for those that do not see it as a significant issue or even support a pro-LGBT attitude. Early in Gregg's campaign, he stated that he would challenge Pence once again, only now in opposition to Pence's involvement with the RFRA. Gregg has attempted to re-brand himself as the "LGBT-friendly alternative" to Pence (Cook and Schneider). He saw drawbacks in the RFRA since it attracted national controversy as "many expressed concern over the Act's potential impact on local laws designed to protect LGBT individuals from discrimination" (Katz, 37). Additionally, this controversy drew attention to the fact that Indiana's civil rights laws do not explicitly "ban discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity" (Katz, 37). Conversely, Holcomb believes that Hoosiers have not suffered any significant harm economically due to the act (Tribune News Services). This fails to acknowledge any emotional impacts the RFRA may have had. Holcomb, as a Republican, is more aligned with Pence's views. Considering a WTHR poll, only 35% of Republicans support an LGBT rights expansion while 56% oppose the measure altogether ("Indiana voters support LGBT rights").

Governor-elect Holcomb may have unfavorable implications for LGBT people. Tom Davies suggests that Holcomb's election likely ends "any prospect of state civil rights protections being extended." Furthermore, the Republican House Speaker, Brian Bosma believes that the current state law is appropriate since it allows cities and counties to "adopt local gay-rights ordinances ... Rather than try to shove one heartfelt side's agenda or the other" (Davies, "GOP's Indiana Sweep"). This widely contrasts with what Gregg would have done in office. While Holcomb says that he would have to "wait and see what comes" regarding handling LGBT legislation, his description of the RFRA as "what's done is done" (Cook and Schneider), makes it difficult to imagine that he will progress the extension of rights to the LGBT community. It is plausible to not see the RFRA as discriminatory considering the context of those who live in Indiana. Many Hoosiers chose to view the act as purely religious. For some Hoosiers, LGBT rights can either be a non-issue or one that they agree with state politicians on, making Holcomb the more viable candidate in terms of this social issue. In similar fashion to some Trump supporters, perhaps people are willing to overlook any problematic opinions one may hold, for the sake of focusing on economic policy.

“Revenge of the White Working Class”?

Another prominent piece of discussion in the gubernatorial election is the economy. Ben Casselman states that the main post-election narrative taking place right now is about the “revenge of the white working class over coastal elites” (Casselmann). In Indiana, more rich voters chose Holcomb over Gregg. Those that earn over \$50,000 voted for the Republican candidate to a higher degree than the Democratic one. However, 70% of Holcomb voters do say that the financial situation is worse today than compared to four years ago (“Exit Polls 2016”). This may help explain why more wealthy voters chose Holcomb. Hoosiers may still have voted due to being unsatisfied with the economy, but not due to more lower-class concerns like income inequality and losing manufacturing jobs. Voters may find Holcomb’s platform attractive as he states that he will “continue to accelerate annual wage increases” and uses words like growth, support, and expansion (“Official Website of Eric”). This suggests that the main economic problems are about businesses, infrastructure and institutions (such as schools) being inadequate, but not a dire situation that requires “revenge.”

Holcomb’s primary goals are to balance the budget, cut taxes, invest in education and infrastructure, and “work every day to make Indiana the best place to live and do business in the Midwest” (“Eric Holcomb - Ballotpedia”). Holcomb’s ideas fit accordingly with Pence’s budget plan for 2016-2017, which can be found abbreviated on the *IN.gov* website. This budget priority summary begins with “supporting education”, with a plan to increase the funding for K-12, and the pre-K pilot program for example. Pence’s other priorities include serving those in need, economic development and job growth and the bicentennial celebration. It states that their budget must remain honestly balanced and obtain no new debt (“Governor Pence’s Budget”). Pence’s budget included \$300 million to be used for expanding highway capacity. Holcomb plans to follow through with this, stating that he will continue these investments in Indiana’s roads. A plan unique to Holcomb’s campaign is his proposal to spend \$1 billion on an innovation and entrepreneurship plan which would “expand job growth by making smart investments” (“Official Website of Eric”). Holcomb has said that he wants to be more cooperative compared to the education conflicts during previous terms. For example, Pence often “aggressively” blocked the changes that the Democratic superintendent Glenda Ritz had proposed (Elliot). Cooperation should come easier for Holcomb as Ritz was defeated by Jennifer McCormick. Davies discusses various positions Holcomb has stated and what it means for Indiana now that he has won. He describes that Holcomb wants to undertake expensive projects but has not “specified any funding sources” nor “detailed the extent of any expansion” (Davies, “GOP’s Indiana Sweep”). Essentially, his economic plans are vague in how they will be accomplished. Compared to Gregg, Holcomb’s plans can sound enticing, especially to those that feel secure in their finances and want the state to flourish by spending money on a breadth of programs and infrastructure.

Conclusion

It is difficult to determine what Holcomb will do as Governor since his campaign was short and perhaps did not have the time to develop the specifics of his policies. Social and identity issues were pervasive during this year’s elections, and while Holcomb is not explicitly anti-LGBT, he does not see it as an important issue. Holcomb’s economic policy is currently unspecific, but he has the potential to move Indiana in a good direction if he gets funds to the right places while keeping the budget balanced.

The transition is showing that Holcomb is following in Daniels' footsteps more than Pence's. This is not surprising considering he was a part of Daniels' administration too. Holcomb seems to recognize Daniels' state contribution to a greater degree than Pence's, stating that, "Daniels built a foundation. Mike Pence added a couple stories and Suzanne Crouch and I ... take Indiana to the next level" (Tribune News Services). Holcomb probably wants to be compared to Daniels as in 2011, his administration revealed a \$1.2 billion surplus ("Mitch Daniels - Ballotpedia")/ However, this is only impressive if you ignore the budget cuts made to education totalling \$325 million, contradicting Holcomb's proposed dedication to education. Eventually, we will see to what extent he reflects the ideas of the past two Republican Governors. Over the next four years, some issues may not be fully resolved, but with Republicans in federal and state-level offices, Holcomb will not run into as many conflicts as Gregg potentially would have.

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To What Extent is a Return to a Gold Standard a Desirable and Feasible Option for the United States of America?

By Nicholas Asquin

The purpose of this paper was to evaluate both the feasibility and desirability for the United States to return to a form of gold-backed currency, such as a gold standard. It was first necessary to provide a definition of a gold standard, as well as explain how one functions, before exploring some of the contemporary arguments as to why a return to a system such as this would be a good policy decision. The typical benefits that proponents of a gold standard cite are increased price stability, decreased inflation, and a decrease in the federal deficit through reduced spending. This investigation yielded the findings that not only do these benefits typically fail to materialize under a gold standard, but such a system can actually be detrimental to price stability in the consumer price index. Among other reasons explored that calls a gold standard's feasibility into question, the consensus of eminent economists and journalists points to a political climate inhospitable to a return to a gold-backed currency. It is for these reasons that I conclude a return to a form of gold standard to be neither desirable nor feasible for the United States.

Introduction

Despite having been one of the most prolific globally economic systems in history, today no country abides by the gold standard and few, if any, major countries use commodity money. The abandoned system of gold-backed money is not however without its supporters. In this paper I will explore the call by certain actors in the United States, namely former Congressman Ronald “Ron” Paul, to return to some form of gold-backed currency and evaluate the feasibility of this policy with respect to both economic and political considerations, dispelling counterarguments where they arise. I will conclude that due to the exaggerated merits of gold-backed money, the advantages of the flexible monetary policy of a fiat money system, and a current political climate inhospitable to gold, that a return to the gold standard is neither desirable nor feasible. Before I begin my analysis however, I must first provide a basic history and definition of the gold standard.

Background – The Gold Standard

Beginning in 1879, the United States took part in the nearly global economic system known as the gold standard.[1] Through the gold standard, a single US dollar was pegged at “0.04838 of an ounce of gold”, and holders of US dollars could exchange their currency for a corresponding number of ounces of the precious metal from the central authorities (a rate of about \$20.67/oz at the time).[2] Because the standard provided a *de facto* common currency of gold for trade between states participating in the standard, the primary focus of the system was international trade.

The gold standard relied on a particular mechanism, which its constituent governments had to uphold, in order to fulfil this role, which was that in the event a particular country ran a trade deficit, that country would have to settle the difference by exporting a corresponding amount of its gold reserves to the debtee country.[3] Reducing the gold supply in this manner requires the circulating bank note supply connected to gold to be reduced correspondingly, which causes domestic prices to fall (deflation), in turn lowering the price of their exports and making the debtor country export-competitive again and balancing international trade.[4] Due to the direct linkage between money and gold supplies in this system, the amount of circulating currency in a given country cannot exceed the amount of gold in national reserves. This means that the money supply can only increase when more gold is mined and added to the system, which prevents the federal use of monetary policies such as adjusting interest rates or increasing the money supply to stoke a slowed economy into activity. In this regard, one of the chief roles of the gold standard was to ensure the balance of international trade. The United States has not been on the classic gold standard since 1933, when the Great Depression made it politically and economically disastrous to implement the deflationary policies the gold standard called for.[5] It was at this time that most countries were abandoning the gold standard.

The Contemporary Gold Movement

In recent years, however, there have been several proponents of gold-backed currency reform; the most noteworthy of them is former Congressman Ronald “Ron” Paul. In his video series, Liberty Report, Ron Paul frequently argues that an “honest gold standard” is the solution to the perceived problems of fluctuating prices, excess inflation, and deficit because he believes that gold has inherent value.[6] Under a gold standard, the money supply would be restricted to the amount of gold in US holdings, and because this only increases as gold is mined and refined, the rate of yearly inflation would therefore be low and out of government control.[7] This would prevent governments from spending beyond their means by running deficits. He argues that these factors would limit the possibility for serious economic depressions or recessions to materialize.[8] The primary argument Ron Paul reiterates is that gold can guarantee long-term price stability in a manner which fiat currency cannot.[9] Ron Paul has also called for the creation of private, competing currencies, and that raw gold and silver should be among them, a hallmark of a gold specie standard. [10] Ron Paul is not the only voice calling for some form of a return to gold-backed currency. Although advocacy for this reform is largely confined to the Republican and Libertarian Parties, such advocacy, while not the norm, is not necessarily rare among conservative-minded politicians, such as Steve Forbes, Larry Kudlow, and Paul Ryan.[11]

Feasibility

Having outlined the contemporary case for a return to some form of gold standard, the economic and political feasibility of this policy will now be examined. In this section I will first argue that gold's stability and the degree to which it provides stability is highly exaggerated by Ron Paul and similar figures before examining the damaging implications of switching from the fiat money system to a gold standard. I will finish my analysis by exploring the broad extent of a gold standard's unpopularity in politics.

Economic Factors

Ron Paul's support of gold based on a dislike for inflation is logically coherent with his equal distaste for all forms of taxation; however his perception of gold as a stable medium of business and finance is less accurate.[12] Contrary to the belief that a gold standard would bring price stability, between 1919 and 1933 under the gold standard, the US Department of Labour reports that the Consumer Price Index (CPI) fluctuated by as much as 40%.[13] Since the Federal Reserve began targeting inflation in 2008, fluctuation in the CPI has not exceeded 10% between 2008 and 2013.[14] Gold prices themselves are even less stable, with economist and New York Times columnist Paul Krugman noting wild fluctuations in the price of gold between even 1968 and 2013.[15] Placing the responsibility of growing the US economy on gold mining companies would also have a destabilizing effect, as any shocks to that industry, such as a strike, would be amplified and transferred to the entire US economy.[16] It is for all of these reasons that a gold standard would not yield the price stability it advertises.

In order to sufficiently evaluate the feasibility of the gold standard, it is necessary to determine the economic consequences of adopting it over the fiat money system. The first and most notable difference would be the absence of federal control over monetary policy, since the money supply would be intrinsically tied to domestic gold reserves. Lacking control over money supply means that the government is incapable of stimulating the economy during economic depressions or recessions. Instead, the deflationary pressures of exporting gold to balance international trade payments only worsen domestic conditions; it is for this reason that even before 1919 when the United Kingdom was the main support of the gold standard that during economic downturns the gold standard was temporarily suspended to allow for economically uplifting deficit spending.[17] Another significant contemporary problem that would materialize under a new gold standard is that the current US gold reserves, despite being the largest in the world, could not afford to be used in balancing their most recent trade deficit, as the gold standard calls for. The United States ran a \$500.361 billion trade deficit in 2015 and the market value of the entire US gold reserve was reported on September 30th, 2016 to be \$345.8 billion by the US Department of Treasury.[18] This means that not only can't the United States afford to abide by the gold standard for a single year, in order to do so; the US would have to scale its imports back to their levels in the year 2000, or else deplete their entire gold reserve in balance payments.[19] There are doubtlessly additional economic reasons why an American return to a gold standard is not feasible, but further dissemination is beyond the scope of this investigation.

Political Factors

Having explored some economic reasons that a gold standard is currently unviable for the United States, it is now necessary to examine the inhospitable political climate towards the idea of a gold standard. The sheer unpopularity of the gold standard is truly remarkable. Matthew O'Brien of *The Atlantic* calls it "the worst economic idea in the world", writing that "Whether it's 1896 or 2012, it doesn't make sense to crucify our economy on a cross of gold".[20] Joe Weisenthal of *Business Insider* remarks that advocates of the standard comprise "a wing of conservatives [who are] willing to chance economic calamity to prevent any kind of budget deal that involves higher taxes".[21] Even in the 1980s when Ronald Reagan established a committee "to consider the feasibility of a metallic basis for U.S. currency", the proposal was broadly rejected.[22] Binyamin Appelbaum of the *New York Times* attributes contemporary support for the idea of a gold standard largely to nostalgia, noting that the concept for the system is roundly rejected by today's economists.[23] To summarize this negative consensus among experts, in 2012 a poll was conducted of the top economists by the University of Chicago, asking how much they agreed with the statement that a gold standard would improve employment opportunities and price stability for average Americans.[24] 40% disagreed with the statement and 53% strongly disagreed, which provides a useful scope of the sheer unpopularity of the gold standard.[25] Given the political consensus against the gold standard, it seems impossible for the policy to gain traction in a democratic country like the United States.

Conclusion

In this investigation, I have explored the feasibility of a return by the United States of America to a gold standard from the current fiat money system. Before scrutinizing the contemporary gold standard policy and advocacy by Ron Paul, I first provided pertinent background information on how the standard works and a brief history of US involvement with it. After outlining the contemporary arguments calling for a return to the gold standard, I then assessed the feasibility of returning to the system with respect to economic and political factors, specifically noting misconceptions surrounding the supposed stability of gold. I also explored the economic damage that such a system reform would cause, namely through lack of monetary policy control and the inability of the US gold reserves to cover the cost of their most recent trade deficits. Lastly, I provided a snapshot of the current negative political climate surrounding the idea of a new gold standard, most notably, the ire it draws from today's top economists. It is for these reasons, both economic and political, that a return to a gold standard, as advocated by former Congressman Ron Paul, is as unfeasible as it is undesirable.

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Understanding Rousseau's Forced Freedom Through Two Concepts of Liberty

By Rostyslav Soroka

How can someone be "forced to be free"? Why is the arrest of a drunk driver not actually against their will? This paper answers these questions by drawing parallels between Rousseau's "Social Contract" and Isaiah Berlin's essay "Two Concepts of Liberty". The coherence of "forced freedom" depends on a specific understanding of "freedom"—namely Isaiah Berlin's notion of "Positive freedom". Positive freedom suggests that free actions are those which act in affirmation of a will rather than those acting in the absence of obstacles. Therefore, Positive freedom is concerned with the source of a will. Rousseau's forced freedom is meant to be applied in cases of incongruence between an individual's various whims, wills, and deep interests. Forced freedom does not act against a will but acts as a rationalization of an existing will to illuminate what it truly desires. In the case of the drunk driver, their implicit participation in society means that they must understand through some capacity why established drunk driving laws exist. An individual's belief in Positive freedom is therefore necessary in order for them to internalize the coercion of the state and to allow themselves to be "forced to be free".

A major paradox of "The Social Contract" is how Rousseau simultaneously calls for the forceful imposition of the social contract, bluntly suggests that yielding to force is not a free act, yet maintains that subjects of the social contract are free. This paradox is apparent from three passages. First, Rousseau calls for forceful imposition of the contract by suggesting that "whoever refuses to obey the general will shall be compelled to do so by the whole body. This means nothing less than that he will be *forced to be free*" (SC 1.7.8).^[1] This statement comes a few chapters after Rousseau claims that "[f]orce is a physical power, and I fail to see what moral effect it can have. To yield to force is an act of necessity, not of will" (SC 1.3.1). Lastly, Rousseau suggests that subjects of the social contract "may still obey [themselves] alone, and remain as free as before" (SC 1.6.4). How can Rousseau coherently suggest that subjects of the social contract are free to obey themselves alone while suggesting that the conditions of this contract be imposed through force which causes subjects to act necessarily? The resolution to this paradox lies within Rousseau's claim that one can be "forced to be free". In this paper I will argue that the coherence of "forced freedom" depends on a "Positive" understanding of freedom. This means that free actions are considered to be those which act in affirmation of a will rather than those acting in the

absence of obstacles. To make this argument, I will discuss Negative and Positive freedom respectively and apply them to an analogy of a drunk driver in order to explain why “forced freedom” is necessarily “forced *Positive* freedom”. The contentions of forcing freedom on individuals in a real life setting are brought up in the final section.

The contradiction of “forced freedom” emerges when we adopt a Negative view of freedom such as the primitive sense of freedom that Rousseau believes existed in the state of nature. Rousseau suggests that freedom in the state of nature “...does not consist so much in doing one’s will, as in not being subjected to the will of others” (OC, volume 3, p. 841 as cited in Neuhouser, 1993, p.380). This freedom is similar to what Isaiah Berlin describes as Negative liberty which is concerned with the question “[w]hat is the area within which the subject - a person or group of persons - is or should be left to do or be what he is able to do or be, without interference by other persons?” (Berlin, 1958, p.2). For an individual to be free in this sense, they would be able to do something other than what is imposed on them by others. However, this interpretation leads to the paradox mentioned in the introduction. If an individual is Negatively free under the social contract, their domain of action must be unrestricted by other people or nature. Being forced to accept the social contract is clearly an obstacle. Rousseau can not coherently call for “forced freedom” if freedom is based on the state of nature where freedom was a matter of overcoming physical obstacles.

To illustrate the incompatibility of “forced freedom” with Negative freedom, let’s use an analogy of a drunk driver. According to Negative freedom, an individual is free to the extent they do not have constraints. In this case, the drunk driver is free to the extent that they are able to drive drunkenly without interference from other people. Therefore, if drunk driving is against the law of the social contract, the forced imposition of the contract is a constraint on the drunk driver’s domain of action. The paradox of “forced freedom” is not resolved since the driver’s participation in the social contract merely places more constraints on what they can do without interference.

Rousseau develops another concept of freedom applicable to modern society. This freedom is what Isaiah Berlin describes as “Positive liberty”—in other words it is concerned with the question “[w]hat, or who, is the source of control or interference that can determine someone to do, or be, this rather than that?” (Berlin, 1958, p.2). For an individual to be free in this sense, they would be able to act in affirmation of their will. The question of identity, and the source of will becomes a central issue of Positive freedom. For a contradiction of freedom to occur, an individual must submit their particular will to another will. Rousseau proposes the General Will as a way to mediate between conflicting sources of control (SC 1.6). The general will is different to a particular will since it is a pooling of rights and power into a social association (SC 1.6). Rousseau suggests that this process of mediation is self-imposed because the social contract involves “obedience to a law which we prescribe to ourselves” (SC 1.8.3). Since a particular will might be contrary to the general will, the disparity between these two wills in spite of association creates a problem since the submission of any will at all would deny Positive freedom to an individual. If we think of the coercion of the state as something which acts upon the *priority* of wills rather than against the wills themselves, “force” merely becomes an illumination of reason—an individual freely accepts the social contract only insofar as they believe and will the universal in the first place. The act of compelling is not directed against an individual’s will, but against their reason—they ultimately remain the agent who chooses to act reasonably. This is what Rousseau means when he says: “The

individuals see the good they reject; the public wills the good it does not see. All stand equally in need of guidance. The former must be compelled to bring their wills into conformity with their reason; the latter must be taught to know what it wills” (SC 2.6.10). Therefore, a disagreeable Individual Will must have been agreeable with the General Will in some capacity. The individual is always free because they always acts in affirmation of the source of their will which is (after the application of force) always the General Will. Therefore, understanding “forced freedom” as “forced rationality” makes it consistent for incongruent interests to be mediated through the social contract since this force does not actually interfere with their Positive freedom.

Returning to the analogy of the drunk driver from the perspective of Positive freedom, the drunk driver would free to the extent that it is their will to drive drunkenly. Yet the drunk driver belongs to the general will of the social contract and the general will has agreed to outlaw drunk driving. The particular will of the drunk driver might disagree with the General Will. However, this incongruence is because this individual is not in tune with their deepest interests which are of the General Will. They might at least intuitively realize that not wanting to be the victim of some else’s drunk driving is a reason not be a drunk driver themselves—they faintly acknowledge that drunk driving laws are a good idea. Therefore the act of arresting this drunk driver is not coercion against their will, it is a forceful imposition—an illumination—of rationality that reminds the driver of their own interests. This case exemplifies how being “forced to be free” is not contradictory to Positive freedom.

An issue to consider is the practical application of “forcing” freedom upon individuals. It’s hard to imagine that individuals might have a substratum of rationality while also being capable of performing irrational acts that they can dislike in retrospect. Rousseau does not make it clear at which point, continuous and deliberate violation of the General Will would mean that a given individual never embraced those principles in the first place. Consider the example of the sociopath who acts without a conscience yet knows that what they are doing is wrong. A sociopath would revel in doing wrong and even understand that they deserve punishment, but would not feel empathy. Is this really incongruence of wills? A sociopath might be very rational and act with premeditation rather than ignorance. The anti-social acts of such an individual would not be out-of-character acts as Rousseau might suggest—they are not acts begging to be corrected—their essence simply rejects Positive freedom by choice rather than by cognitive fault. Also consider the prominence of neoliberalism which seems to reflect a growing acceptance of freedom as the removal of restrictions in the interest of individual economic pursuit. In these cases of Negative freedom, “forced freedom” would not make any sense. However, as demonstrated in this paper, being “forced to be free” is coherent as long as the subject being forced has a Positive conception of freedom.

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^[1]SC 1.7.8 refers to book 1, chapter 7, paragraph 8 of *The Social Contract* by Rousseau. (DI) refers to Rousseau's *Discourse on the Origin of Inequality*, and (OC) refers to Rousseau's *Oeuvres Complètes*

In Defense of Cosmopolitanism: Kant's Conceptions in a Neocolonial World

By Jennifer McCurdy

*This article engages with Immanuel Kant's timeless essay *Perpetual Peace* in order to explore the colonial aspect of cosmopolitanism. Mainly, it explores the question can Kant's cosmopolitanism exist outside of colonialism? It will investigate three key aspects of Kant's essay. Firstly, his calls for a loose federation of nation states, secondly, his insistence that the citizenry must be in charge of all decisions of warfare, and lastly, his assertion of existing universal moral codes. By investigating these three key, yet often misunderstood, aspects and using recent case studies as evidence, this essay concludes that colonialism is not a presupposition of Kant's conception of cosmopolitanism. Kant's cosmopolitanism is a separate and legitimate entity that exists outside of and can transcend colonial relations.*

Introduction

Our modern world exists within a series of colonial interactions governed by dominant Western historical discourse. Reviewing history, it is impossible to deny that colonialism shaped and is still shaping the global sphere of international relations. By WWI imperial powers occupied nine tenths of the planet, and only after the 1960s did nation-states emerge out of these colonial empires (Go 2013, 209). Accounting for this history is the reason that cosmopolitanism has widely been critiqued as neocolonial. Indeed, much of the literature surrounding cosmopolitanism has been focused towards a Eurocentric discourse that privileges Western knowledge. But the question remains: can cosmopolitanism exist outside of colonialism? To answer this, we must explore one of the fundamental documents in cosmopolitan literature: Immanuel Kant's essay *Perpetual Peace* (1903). In it, Kant lays out six preliminary articles to move towards perpetual peace and three definitive articles that act as a guide for states to follow. Many theorists argue that cosmopolitanism is synonymous with colonialism because it fundamentally calls for a consolidation of human communities into a global citizenry (Go 2013, 210). This position is strengthened by turning to the critique of open interactions between nations as being wrought with colonialist power relations. Janet Conway (2011) argues that an attempt to transcend these histories would further entrench the inequality that privileges Western discourse (219). I do not argue that this is indeed true. Whether through political project or sheer ignorance, the failure to acknowledge power relations in the contact between historically unequal nations is detrimental, yet it does not provide

sufficient argument to denote cosmopolitanism as a wholly colonial project. Therefore, in this article, I wish to argue that Emmanuel Kant's conception of cosmopolitanism does not lend itself to colonial ideals. Contrarily, it notes the independence of each state, calling for a total transformation of each government, while engaging with a nuanced version of a human moral code. Therefore, this article will look at three ways in which Kant's conception of cosmopolitanism is traditionally misunderstood. Firstly, it will examine the assumption that cosmopolitanism calls for a universal world republic of peoples. By employing Andrew Linklater's conception in *Cosmopolitan Citizenship* (1998), Kant is specifically seen as theorizing about a loose league of cosmopolitan ideals through which a global social contract can be implemented (27). Secondly, I will explore Kant's favouring of a republican model of government. This was traditionally used to argue for the advancement of Western values throughout the world, however, using Kant's logic, citizens of the state must consent to all decisions of warfare. Using examples from the protests against the Iraq War in Britain as an empirical case study, I will argue that the application of republican modes of government does not imply the dissemination of Western values, it, instead, calls for a reordering of all state governments. Thirdly, I scrutinize the argument that Kant employs a universalist definition of morality to consolidate all political communities into one is unfounded. I use Kwame Anthony Appiah's (2006) nuanced thesis that, while moral codes for each community are different, there are certain values that could be considered universal to the human condition. In exploring these three topics, then engaging with a more modern critique, this paper will conclude that Kant's *Perpetual Peace* is not a neocolonial project, but a nuanced document of hope to escape the perpetual warfare that humans have inflicted on each other throughout conceptualized history.

Terms and Definitions

Before beginning the arguments, a clarification of terms used and an exclusion of certain fields of cosmopolitanism are needed. Cosmopolitanism, very broadly, is founded on the assumptions of a moral obligation existing between all humans based on the very fact of their humanness. Generally, cosmopolitanism calls for a world political community to engage with and be accountable to the rights of all humans so to delineate the moral worth of humans as relying solely on the state (Fine 2007, X). Therefore, cosmopolitanism in this sense is foundationally based on the moral worth of all human beings. It is, in full, is a multi-leveled concept that can be divided into innumerable subfields. These include but are not limited to critical cosmopolitanism, unbounded cosmopolitanism, methodological cosmopolitanism, Fanon even discusses a postcolonial cosmopolitanism (Go 2013, 211). With a term of this diversity, it would be impossible to discuss cosmopolitanism in full, and I recognize here that many forms of cosmopolitanism do indeed employ colonial discourse. Therefore, because of its lasting prevalence and relevance in modern times, I wish to focus solely on Kant's conception of cosmopolitanism in *Perpetual Peace* (1903). It is not in the scope of this article to explore whether cosmopolitanism in Kant's perception is a plausible political project, nor suggest normative ways in which we can begin to implement cosmopolitanism. I stress that an overview of the misconceptions in Kant's work is needed in order to reposition Kant's notion of cosmopolitanism as useful. Especially in a time when humans across the globe seek to implement different ways in which the international system can be organized.

Loose Federation of Free Nations

The moral worth of human beings needs to be protected outside of the scope of state institutions. The Declaration of Human Rights conceptualized in 1949 and regarded as a push towards cosmopolitanism, is entirely dependent on philanthropy to protect chosen groups from persecution (Linklater 1998, 28). Modern day examples of groups needing charity in order to be anointed with the same rights as privileged others can be found worldwide in situations such as the treatment of Indigenous people, internment camps for refugees, and police brutality against certain isolated sections of particular societies. Where the present system of global organization depends solely upon the state bequeathing moral worth onto a human, Kant's loose federation of states would assure multiple sites of moral guarantee as opposed to just one (Kleingeld 2012, 52). Yet, Kant is careful not to call for a world republic, which would be controlling and homogenizing in its effect, but instead calls for a federation of free republics (Lutz-Bachmann 1997, 60). Effectively, Kant argues for the creation of this political community to bring states out of the state of nature, much like the alleviation from the state of nature individuals enjoy in Hobbes' social contract theory (Kant 1903, 128). A rational state is conceptualized, and if some of these states preferred "their senseless freedom to a reasoned governed liberty" they should be equated with "barbarism" (Kant 1903, 130). The idea that states operate comparable to the way individuals would in a state of nature has been employed since the post-Westphalian period. However, from a realist perspective, there is no possibility of a social contract, because there would be no overarching authority (Hutchings 1999, 14). It could be difficult to conceptualize the analogy between states and individuals, due to the vastly different spheres they both occupy. However, this analogy can exist because both entities, beforehand being only responsible to themselves independently of others, are able to relinquish some of their rights into a new sphere by "free contractual agreement" (Lutz-Bachmann 1997, 72). Therein lies the completeness of the contract theory in relation to states that Kant uses – while individuals and states are vastly different, they can both be subject to a social contract theory for they are both rational actors who can give up their freedom to adhere to a new standard of living.

For a more concrete conception of this theory, I use Andrew Linklater's essay on *Cosmopolitan Citizenship* (1998). Although he admits that his description extends from what Kant explicitly wrote, I believe that Linklater's conception of human rights within the federation of states provides empirical insight into what this sometimes vague approach would conceptually resemble. Linklater (1998) describes this conception as a system of politics which would not seek to overthrow the state, yet, supplement it in a political arrangement which would not wish to acquire power but only wishes to pursue multiple sites of political responsibility (29). Pertaining to the moral obligations at the heart of cosmopolitanism, human rights would cease to be built on charity, but instead, the creation of a cosmopolitan community where the politically weak could dispute their own grievances while the moral obligation of others would be to listen and respond (Linklater 1998, 28). In fact, I argue that, in reality, the ability of the disadvantaged to have their own platform in speaking against injustices would be a grandiose defeat of colonialism. Instead of waiting on powerful institutions (like the WHO or IMF or UN) or NGOs (like UNICEF or World Vision) which incidentally are almost all Western-lead and have been questioned for their values and effectiveness, to draw awareness to and 'save' vulnerable people from harm, the citizens of the world would be instilled with their own agency to fight their own battle against immoral activities.

Therefore, this conception of a cosmopolitan organization of states into producing political sites where individuals have more freedom to voice concern should not be viewed as a colonial ideal. Nor should it be conflated into states giving up the entirety of their sovereignty. Instead, it is useful to conceive of this concept as a contract, as well as a creation of a world communication system. Just as a citizen is not able to murder another without repercussions, effectively submitting to a governing body, states should not be free to pursue certain goals of their own – mainly their right to declare warfare (Lutz-Bachmann 1997, 69). In exchange for that sacrifice, they would be free from the fear of others inflicting war on them.

All States Must be Republic

Kant's first definitive article in *Perpetual Peace* excludes any state that does not have a republican constitution from joining the federation of states. This should not be taken to mean that, firstly, all countries need to adhere to a Westernized version of government, nor secondly, that he calls for interventionist practices to force states into submission. Instead, the intricacies of the word 'republic' must be examined and critiqued for full comprehension on this topic. 'Republic' is a generally contestable term that has come to have many different definitions throughout the centuries it has been employed. Indeed, in the 16th century Jean Bodin described a republic as any sovereign state who has the common concern of the masses in mind, therefore, any state, including one run by a monarch that is not totalitarian in nature, was a republic (Wilson 2008, 243). However, after the 17th century, the definition became narrowed to modern day conceptions in which a republic is a realization of government that is ruled by elected citizens of the state (Munro 2016). Although, even with this definition, there are many states with republic in their name, yet they do not uphold a republican constitution. The inverse is also true. Britain, for example, as well as the last vestiges of their world empire, are technically ruled by a monarch, although they elect a Prime Minister to carry out the will of the people, therefore, for all intents and purposes in this essay, Britain will be defined as a republic. Therefore, it is still a vastly convoluted term, especially in consideration that Kant wrote the text in 1795 and the first complete English translation from German, which was an extremely difficult task by self-admission from the publisher, was only published in 1903 (Kant 1903, VI).

For this reason, it is useful to use other factors that Kant describes in regard to this notion of republic. For this we turn to his assertion that, in order to maintain peace, the citizens of the state must be the ones with whom the decision lies to go to war or not (Kant 1903, 122). This is imperative in his conception because of the logic that, the citizens will be the ones funding the war, fighting the war, and dealing with the war in their own country. Therefore, it is only natural that they be the ones deciding whether a war should rightly be fought (123). This is such an important concept to consider in his article because of the nature of present republics.

For simplicity's sake in this section I will specifically use only Britain as an example. Their protests against the Iraq War were one of the largest and most chronicled before the 2003 decision by Tony Blair (the former British Prime Minister) to follow the USA into battle. I use it also because, if any, Britain is the archetype for colonialist expansion, having the largest empire the modern world has ever seen at its territorial peak in 1921 (Wilson 2008, 242). In February 2003, the American Secretary of State announced the presence of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq with what retrospectively flawed

and biased knowledge. More than a million people amassed in London's streets and 2 million across Britain, to protest against involvement in Iraq (Barkham 2013, Tharoor 2013). It is cited as being the biggest public protest that has taken place in Britain's history (Fishwick 2016). Although, despite massive public outrage and dissent, little over a month later Tony Blair declared Britain would join the USA in invading Iraq (Tharoor 2013). This decision is pertinent to this discussion because of the implications it has in drawing up a republic conception that Kant explains in his essay. While Britain prides itself with being democratic and for all purposes follows the principles of republic constitution, it did not, as Kant suggested, follow the primary law in which the citizens of the state must be the determinants of decisions of war. Exploring this divisive time in not so distant history, it is obvious that Kant does not call for a Western expansion of values through the conversion of otherwise ruled states to republics, he instead, in his conception of what a republic is, calls for a transformation of all states. Western superpowers like USA and Britain would all have to change to accommodate Kant's conception of a republic rather than try to promote their brand of politics through expansionism and colonialism.

It is also important to note here that, even if Western countries were to change their governmental bodies in order to adhere to Kant's conception of lasting peace, Kant himself does not call for interventionist practices. In Kant's fifth preliminary article, he commands that states must not interfere with the constitution of another. He calls on these states to serve as an example of what not to do, but also implores that the people of a state must be the ones to bring themselves out of despotism (Kant 1903, 112, 137). Where Kant can get convoluted, yet vague at times, Kleingeld (2012) outlines this conception in simpler terms. Even if subjects appear to wish to be free from a despot, it does not necessarily mean that they will want to be liberated on the liberator's terms. In fact, that would lend itself, once again, to simply a different type of despotism (Kleingeld 2012, 54). Instead, the subjects of non-republics, should be neither forced nor coerced into choosing a republic government. For this will preserve their freedom as individuals. Therefore, the colonial aspect of the spread of republic governments cannot be viewed as colonial but as a very real and tangible condition for lasting peace. Countries must be seen as independent agents who can, if desired, pull themselves out of non-republic governments and submit, voluntarily to the social contract between states.

Universalism in Human Morality

The last critique of Kant in colonial terms that will be discussed in this essay is the universalism that he seemingly treats human morality with. Indeed, Kant does call for some sort of universalist value to recognize all citizens as having a right to go anywhere in the world (Kant 1903, 137). In order to live amongst each other peacefully, it is assumed on some level that you must adhere to the same morals. Likewise, in recognizing that there is a moral worth of all human beings, one must agree on what is moral and immoral. However, a more nuanced version of the ways in which humans interact and how morality plays a role in their interaction is key. In fact, Skrbis and Woodward (2013) go so far as to say that acceptability of diversity is the "leitmotif" of cosmopolitanism (14). Cosmopolitanism in Kantian terms calls for a dialogue to be created between different cultures and while moralities can differ, human values, in many senses can be similar. Gray (2006) calls on us to review the difference between morality and human values (26). As rational humans, one can converse with a morally opposite other, while still valuing their worth as a human, because they are a human. Even if we live differently from the Other, we can still value that their protection from genocide, war, and torture is valid because humans, despite vast

differences, have many similarities (Appiah 2006, 97). Appiah believes these similarities to not be universalist values that exist, but similarities in which we can converge on. We can create a community surrounding them while not encroaching on the Other, diverse moralities that exist throughout the world (98).

Appiah takes these human values to understand what Kant was referring to by his universalist conversations regarding human rights. Appiah, firstly criticizes any form of global ethic that is supposedly applied to the international realm, mainly ‘do unto others as you would have done unto to you’, or as it is dubbed in the Parliament of World Religions ‘the Golden Rule’ (Appiah 2006, 60). He argues that people will want, according to their morality, different things done to them in different situations. However, he also says that the spirit of the ‘Golden Rule’ lies in the fact that we should take the morality of other people seriously, and, in effect, learn what Others want done to them (61). With this logic, instead of the imposition of universalist ideals, it is argued that we should enter into a conversation celebrating and respecting differences, while keeping in mind the human values that we share as a human community. Those who disagree with the fact that genocide, torture and warfare are fairly slated as human values are called upon to separate the distinction between *what* we should do in a situation and *why*. While most all citizens of the world would agree to these three values as being critical to protect, they could disagree on *why* they agree with it for a number of reasons (71). Furthermore, most moral ‘decisions’ (in quotations here because Appiah questions the idea of rational decisions to comprise morality) are, more often than not, simply ingrained socially constructed mores. Therefore, when entering into a conversation of morality, it is less about values and more about the way things have always been for a community (75). For example, Appiah utilizes the fact that, while the place of women in earlier half of the 20th century was in the home, arguments in fundamental human morality were not the factor that shifted this view and allowed women a place in the workforce (76). Instead, it was people getting used to the way things were going to be from thereon in. He argues that morality does not play a crucial role in our fundamental conversations towards changing behavior, therefore, a universal morality is not needed nor useful in the cosmopolitan project. Instead, looking onto other cultures, understanding and respecting their community and respecting differences (as Kant conceived of doing) becomes much more important than imposing a universal morality onto all humans.

This challenges the fundamental Western belief that, in order to get along, two entities must be similar. This, after all, was the leading justification of the Western invasion of Iraq previously explored in this paper (Fallows 2015). Although, through his exploration of states and hospitality between states, Kant would also fundamentally be opposed to that ideal, since he calls on citizens of the world to have their rights limited only “to the conditions of universal hospitality” (Kant 1903, 137). This means, that citizens of the world have a right to leave any place and enter into a new one because the place you were born into, after all, is determined by chance. These newcomers, then, ought to be treated with hospitality so long as they are not violent towards anyone else. While Appiah does admit that occasionally the “universalist concern and respect for legitimate difference...clash” he labels this, not as a drawback to cosmopolitanism nor a reason to abandon it, yet, a “challenge” for cosmopolitans to overcome (Gray 2006, 26). The normative way in which these challenges can be defeated will not be explored in this essay, but Appiah and Kant, through their emphasis on conversation across borders would probably cite discussion between cultures as being a starting point for the discovery of new ways in which to work together.

Counter-arguments and their Critiques

While the primary premise of this essay was to engage with critiques commonly conceptualized in Kant, I will bring up a fourth that would be impossible to rebut as a misunderstanding simply because Kant would not have conceived of it during the writing of the text. This last critique, is perhaps the most pertinent and well-founded of the critiques against cosmopolitanism and I will do my best in order to argue that the situation can be avoided. This is the critique that cosmopolitanism, or attempts at cosmopolitanism, ignore the very real power hegemonies that exist in a world that continues to be wrought with colonial histories, relations and imbalances. This is brought to the attention of readers by Conway when she critiques the World Social Forums (WSF), traditionally cosmopolitan in nature, instead as being wrought with Western Eurocentrism and favouring colonial knowledge over other ‘untraditional’ cosmologies (2011, 218). Considering the WSF, or in the case of this essay, all forms of cosmopolitan interactions, as free from the colonial relations that shape the world is akin to perpetuating and entrenching these powers deep within global society. An empirical example of this will now be examined to situate this argument in real situations that exist in the world.

The WSF is dedicated to exploring ways in which social groups across the world can unite for the sake of a more inclusive and sustainable world. The topic of Female Genital Mutilation (FGM) has been taken on by WSF at various meetings since the organization was developed in 2001 (World Social Forum 2016). In 2007, when the annual assembly was held in Nairobi, thousands of people protested the practice outside the meetings, and many countries, including Britain, have pledged millions of dollars to help end the practice (Dorkenoo 2013). While Western forms of knowledge conceive of this action as a human rights issue that must be eradicated, many women in nonwestern countries have been taught that it is a normal practice, if not a title of honour and a vestige of female empowerment (Ahmadu 2009,14). These two positions are not given equal clout in the WSF, nor in other international spheres. Contrarily, one of them is highly favoured as being ‘right’, whereas, traditional forms of knowledge regarding FGM are subordinated as barbaric. Even the use of the FGM instead of a less politically charged term like female circumcision, or traditional nomenclature, such as Bondo, as it is called by the Kono people in Sierra Leone, is indicative of the colonialism influence in the debate of this practice (Ahmadu 2009,14). This is a convoluted field to navigate in terms of colonialism and cosmopolitanism. In this situation, there are two moralities in which Appiah would say are rooted in their beliefs because of historical practices. No less, they are still completely different from each other and pose difficulties in ameliorating relations between those countries that outlaw FGM and those countries that advocate for it.

However, I disagree that this example shows the shortcomings of cosmopolitanism. In fact, it is a pertinent example to illustrate that cosmopolitanism would help ameliorate these issues. Recall in the first section where Andrew Linklater (1998) argues a way for individuals who are unjustly treated to call out their grievances (29). Cosmopolitanism, in its complete form, which admittedly has been extrapolated from Kant’s historical conception, would conceive that discussions regarding the moral worth of all humans are equal. This can be taken to mean as well, by the same logic, that all forms of human morality are equal. In short, humans are a part of a global community and, therefore, have equal worth across the globe. Humans then, can have different moralities cross culturally, yet no morality is greater or lesser in value. Therefore, while one may say that we have a cosmopolitan moral obligation to save women from FGM because it is a human rights violation, a differing cosmopolitan conception would

say that these ideas are distinctly colonial in two ways. Firstly, non-Western knowledge is dismissed and it is assumed that this practice is barbaric and has no moral worth. Secondly, it is assumed that these women *want*, and indeed *need* to be saved from what is often seen as a right of passage and celebration of female empowerment, takes away their own agency in a distinctly colonial way (Ahmadu 2009, 15). I do not wish to comment on my own assumptions of FGM, just to say that, if women who have grown up with FGM, who understand FGM, and who have experienced FGM want to change it, they can change these systems (with *listening* members of Western communities). Western feminists imposing their own conception of ‘human rights’ is not a cosmopolitan ideal. Therefore, instead of creating a WSF to discuss this in terms of Western discourse, cosmopolitanism seeks to create ways in which humans can discuss, yet respect their differences on a human level, and come to understand each other on this plain.

Conclusion

While cosmopolitanism is a very prevalent term throughout the social sciences, including philosophy, sociology, and political science, it remains to be effectively implemented on a global scale with success. Many authors uphold that this is because, while cosmopolitanism works well in theory, it does not function in practice (Kleingeld 2012, 35). I reject this notion, and argue that due to the historical complicated diversions of power that existed and continue to exist today, cosmopolitanism must be constantly redefined in order to fit into normative theories of cosmopolitanism in practice. While this paper does not engage with these normative theories, it is still useful in the fact that, instead of discrediting cosmopolitanism as an ancient theory mired in colonial jargon and intention, cosmopolitanism, from its very roots in Kant, acts as a way to transcend these violent relations. It extends not only the moral worth of humans but the worth of human morals on a global scale. Contrary to many critiques, it does not wish to conglomerate all states into a world republic, yet, instead, pushes for a federation of republic-states, in which, analogously to individuals in the state of nature, states would give up freedoms in order to guarantee peace. Likewise, while many people perceive the imposition of a republic constitution as promoting the spread of Western ideals, Western states themselves do not even embody the view Kant employed of a republic. Fundamentally, citizens of these ‘republics’ cannot decide themselves whether or not they want to go to war. Also, even if republics were a project of Western states, Kant would not call for them to impose their views on different states, for this would lead to other forms of despotism. Instead, a key conception of the federation of states is that the states must *voluntarily* accept the parameters of the social contract. Finally, I argue that, those who believe that cosmopolitanism infers that universal moral codes must be outlined and agreed upon must subscribe to a more nuanced understanding of morality and human values. While some human values (torture, warfare, and genocide) are condemned by virtually all humans, common morality is not imperative to cosmopolitanism nor a preliminary obligation to get along with one another. Therefore, Kant does not call for a homogenation of all morality, simply hospitality to Others who are different. I then engage with a common yet simple critique of Kant that cannot be refuted by using his explicitly stated logic since, at the time of writing colonial hegemonies were not problematized to the extent they are now. FGM is used as an example of how Western discourse is valued above Other cosmologies of knowledge in supposedly ‘free’ relations between states (such as WFS). It is argued that this favouring of knowledge is promoted because of the lack of cosmopolitan discourse that would call for the moral worth of the human as well as the equality of diverse moralities. It is important to realize these conceptions are critically different from neocolonialism so as to move past this critique, while still recognizing the past

and present inequalities. Therefore, we can undo the power relations that have been entrenched into society since the start of globalization and move beyond them to a world where perpetual peace is not unimaginable but a fact entrenched in everyday life.

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Redundancy in the Twenty-First Century: An Examination of and Argument Against APEC

By Erika Hage

Once poised to become a significant regional trade agreement (RTA), the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation's (APEC) strength has waned in the twenty-first century, leading many to question its viability and relevance as a cooperation. Taking into account several other RTAs that have arisen in Asia and the Pacific, the paper examines whether APEC still aligns with the interests of the Cooperation's nations and economies. A closer examination of how APEC is structured reveals several weaknesses inherent in the RTA. These, coupled with the vast geography APEC encompasses, calls into question whether APEC can continue to effectively function in its intended capacity.

Introduction

Founded in 1989, the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) aimed to create a regional trade agreement (RTA) that focused on “open regionalism” (Ravenhill, *Global Political* 70) while still minding and balancing the provision of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) (Ibid 70). APEC's membership is comprised of twenty-one nations spanning Asia, Oceania, and North America. Since its inception, it has been both praised for its attempts to attract investment and trade for its members and criticized for its lack of cohesion and inability to have made much impact in recent years. Through the course of this paper, I will examine these praises and criticisms and argue that APEC's role as a relevant RTA in the twenty first century is becoming redundant.

APEC as a Coalition

When considering RTAs and their inherent benefits and disadvantages, APEC serves as an intriguing case study. As economic exchange and cooperation increased in Asia, nations recognized the need for an agreement that would capitalize on these exchanges, but as C. Fred Bergen writes, “APEC would become neither a customs union like the European Union nor a free trade area like that covered by

the North American Free Trade Agreement” (20). The intent was that APEC would be an organization that would foster open regionalism, a type of trade agreement that would not exclude nor discriminate against non-members, while still recognizing “the need to manage and enhance [its own] maturing linkages” (McKay 43). While there is little debate that APEC has succeeded on these accounts, whether or not the Cooperation is still relevant close to thirty years later is debated. I will now turn to an examination of both its benefits and its disadvantages.

Benefits of APEC

Despite APEC’s diverse membership, both in terms of the geographic distribution of its members as well as their varying levels of economic development, the cooperation has a distinct advantage in global economics. In addition to boasting the world’s three largest economies, China, Japan, and the US, as members (Park and Lee 99), there are also a number of smaller and developing economies in APEC. Indonesia and Korea, for instance, have much weaker economies in comparison to some of their fellow members. On their own, these nations would stand very little chance of being heard on the world’s economic stage. Being associated with larger economies not only provides an opportunity for their own economies to develop, but also to ensure that their needs and concerns are included in the larger dialogue. Indeed, Bergsten believes that summits that were hosted by weaker nations would “likely place considerable emphasis on developmental issues of greatest concern to the group’s less industrialized members” (23).

Many agree with Bergsten, emphasizing that RTAs such as APEC can serve to more closely align developed economies with those that are developing or less-developed. McKay notes that one of the aims of a 1994 APEC meeting in Bogor, Indonesia was to “narrow the development gap in ways consistent with sustainable growth, equitable development, and stability” (46). Succeeding in this regard ensures that trade in the region is strengthened and that member nations become increasingly appealing for private investors, further strengthening the regional economies and the work of APEC. More importantly, a strong RTA ensures a more prominent role in the global economy, bolstering its credibility and enabling it to further advocate for its members. McKay optimistically described APEC as a “world-class forum,” which drew its strength from a wide array of people who exchanged and debated ideas (47).

Perhaps APEC’s most famous contribution to global economics, though, occurred in the early 1990s. As the Uruguay Round of talks under GATT showed little forward momentum, the APEC Leader’s Meeting provided an impetus to move forward. This in turn was also instrumental in the creation of the World Trade Organization. (Park and Lee, 101 & 99). For a fairly young agreement, these accomplishments marked APEC as a serious and legitimate RTA, able to hold its own among the world’s economic actors.

Critiques of APEC

Despite all the arguments in favour of APEC and the benefit it has had for lesser-developed nations, the organization also has some critical flaws. While many argue that the US’s membership with APEC is beneficial to the Cooperation, there is reason to exercise caution when considering this point.

Since the collapse of the Gold Standard in the 1930s, the US has been the world's dominant economic power, able to easily exert its policies and agendas. There is fear by some that the risk always remains that APEC will be subjected to US demands and that the US will always place its interests first. Berger validates this point and notes that "the USA remains the main regional power in Asia...it exercises a broad and diffuse political and cultural influence" (1025). One question, then, how equal APEC can truly be under these circumstances. More importantly, one is tempted to ask where the lesser-developed nations stand in relation to US hegemony. Not only is there a glaring disparity in the economic standing between the US and poorer nations, but there are also marked cultural differences. It is difficult to imagine such a powerful nation ceding to the demands of a nation so fundamentally different. Arguably, the US is "imposing a North American model on Asia" (Bergsten 25).

In addition to the US problem, there is concern that APEC is no longer the Cooperation it was when it was first formed. It lacks the cohesion and formal structure that is required of such a diverse group which in turn hampers its ability to continue to fulfill its original mandates of fostering trade and investment. Ravenhill criticizes APEC of being "all flexibility and no rigidity" (*APEC and the WTO* 229). This is evident in the fact that the group does not have a clear idea as to their obligations, that members are not required to reciprocate in interactions with other members, a commitment to mandates is voluntary by member nations, and the group hasn't maintained a firm policy on interactions with nations outside of the Cooperation (Ravenhill, *APEC* 229-230). Again, taking into consideration the number of members along with the geographic, economic, and cultural diversity of the member nations, this lack of structure is worrisome because it calls into question the authority of APEC and also its ability to continue as a relevant RTA. Collectively, it is to act as a representative for its members, however as Park and Lee point out, APEC rarely speaks up despite its large size because it lacks the structure and organization of other groups, such as the EU and NAFTA (102). Unfortunately, APEC's previous achievements in helping to bring about the WTO and aiding in the progression of the Uruguay Round pale in comparison to its current reputation and do little to help maintain its integrity.

Related to the argument that APEC lacks direction in terms of its objective is also the reality that several other agreements and organizations now operate in the Asian region specifically. These agreements encompass fewer members in a narrower region yet aim to fulfill the same obligations that APEC had originally set forward. Indeed, "APEC...is not but one of several transregional arrangements, some more formal than others, all aimed at trade liberalization and facilitation" (Ravenhill, *APEC* 133). The Cooperation stands to lose its relevance and footing in the Asian economic region should any one of these arrangements prove to be more structured and pointed in their mandate than APEC currently is. The increased presence of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), for instance, is becoming increasingly prominent in Asia, encouraging growth in trade and investment with the added benefit that the organization possesses a more structured agenda and set of rules than does APEC. Berger argues that the IMF's presence since the Asian Economic Crisis of the late 1990s has rendered APEC "irrelevant" (1026).

I would argue that the decreasing significance of APEC coupled with factors such as the economic and cultural disparity between Western and Eastern members could foreshadow a fragmenting of the arrangement. If there are other agreements operating in the Asia-Pacific region and, for that matter, agreements who operate more effectively, there is little incentive for the Western nations,

especially the US, to continue with a weakening RTA such as APEC. As Ravenhill points out in his article on APEC and the WTO, the US may indeed “find it easier to reach agreement with Western European economies with which it arguably has much more in common than its East Asian partners in APEC” (234).

This is not to say that Asia would be without strong economic allegiances should the US choose to remove itself from APEC. The Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) enabled East Asia to formally link itself with the EU (Ravenhill, *APEC* 233). This arrangement diminishes Asia’s reliance on the US as an intermediary between it and European nations, proving that it is advancing sufficiently to foster its own economic allegiances. I believe that it is to Asia’s benefit to be free of the hegemonic constraints that the US imposes. The region would be able to articulate its own economic and cultural priorities without needing to accommodate those of the US.

Conclusion

Proponents of APEC have been quick to draw attention to its inclusion of weaker economies and its objectives of increasing trade and attracting investment to the region. However, critics of the Cooperation have countered that while APEC made a couple significant contributions to global political economy in its early years, it has suffered from a number of challenges, including a lack of cohesion and growing US hegemony. These developments, coupled with an increasing number of newer regional agreements in Asia, are diminishing APEC’s power as a leading RTA. When discussing APEC, Ravenhill makes note that the “case for strategic trade policies is far stronger in theory than in practice – especially for small and medium-sized and less developed economies” (*APEC* 223). After an examination of both the benefits and disadvantages of APEC, I am inclined to agree with his statement. Should APEC wish to remain a relevant RTA in Asia, it will need to re-examine its membership and strengthen its objectives, rules, and guidelines to regain its former legitimacy and act as an assertive voice for its member nations in the global economy.

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The Silent Gatekeeper: Authoritarianism and Civil Society in China

By Kate Mah

This paper examines the emergence of civil society in China under the authoritarian system in the last thirty years. It seeks to explore the ways in which an initial, traditional notion of civil society has altered in the context of China, as well as the respective challenges faced by both the organizations and the government in carrying out their goals and governance. The rapid rise of market capitalism, globalization and Chinese economic success in the last forty years to present day has made room for the rise of non-governmental organizations as well as social mobilization and engagement from citizens. This paper suggests that China has been able to accept the emergence of civil society, however, despite these developments, the government has been able to sufficiently suppress civil society from carrying out any objectives of transparency, social justice and accountability. It surveys the history of civil society within the authoritarian state, analyzes the specific government-NGO relations between the Chinese Communist Party and civil society organizations, and reflects upon the implications of the current legal and political framework that Chinese civil society must operate under.

With the rise in globalization and neoliberalism, China as an authoritarian state has opened itself up to the free market and the world in order to participate and compete internationally. As a result, the country has experienced great economic success as well as exposed itself to an emerging civil society and civic mobilization. Despite these factors, the Communist Party of China has always been able to maintain both its power and social stability. In the last thirty years, to what extent has China's authoritarian regime affected the emergence of Chinese civil society and to what extent has civil society had an effect on China's authoritarian regime? This essay will argue that the Chinese government has been able to sufficiently suppress civil society from carrying out certain objectives of democratic rights, social justice and accountability when it directly targets the state. The effect that civil society has had on China's authoritarian system is one that the government sees as a threat, and therefore has caused China to implement many regulatory measures on organizations and citizen activism.

Although the definition of civil society is constantly being contested, as a starting point it will be defined as a "third sector" of society, distinct from purely government and business, that is meant to

carry out the interests and will of the citizens. For purpose of scope, this essay will focus on local NGOs only. It will seek to examine the challenges that both civil society organizations and the Chinese government face when attempting to carry out their goals and governance as well as explore the ways in which this initial and traditional notion of civil society has altered in the context of China. In order to answer this question, this essay will first outline the concept of civil society and briefly account for the history of the authoritarian regime in its power and censorship of citizen activism as well as the emergence of civil society organizations in China. It will then proceed to examine the relationship that the government has with these emerging NGO's and what it has done to reduce any threat it sees to the legitimacy of the state, through registration requirements and government-organized non-governmental organizations, or GONGO's. Finally, it will explore the implications of this uniquely created civil society for Chinese citizens in terms of social mobilization, transparency and accountability.

Civil Society and the Authoritarian Regime: History and Concept

As mentioned previously, the concept of civil society is constantly changing and being contested. But as a starting point, civil society is a “third sector” of society, distinct from purely government and business, that is meant to carry out the interests and will of the citizens. However, in the context of China, the lines of this traditionally liberal model of civil society begin to blur. Historically and politically, the authoritarian government does not possess a record of supporting non-state organizations, to the extent that it treats them with hostility due to the view that they are potential threats to the stability of the state. Voluntary social organizations began to emerge after Deng Xiaoping's market reforms in 1979 shifted social welfare from the central to local governments and communities, but any widespread movement was smothered by the government, most infamously following the 1989 Tiananmen square protests.[1] As globalizing and free market forces continued to emerge, so did the exchange of ideas, non-governmental groups and civil engagement. As Ma explains:

the state gradually withdrew – in part by design, in part by default – from many economic and social responsibilities, [and] the Chinese people responded to this new situation with great energy and creativity. . . economic development produced a rapidly enlarging middle class, especially in cities and coastal regions, whose members vigorously pursued associate actions to represent their economic and political voices.[2]

The rising growth of local civic groups and organizations is indicative of the willingness of Chinese citizens to become more engaged in their communities and vocal in defending their rights and seeking deeper fundamental changes in the system.[3] This aspect of civil society is seen as a threat to party control, hence the hostility and exercise of control at times when the state deems it excessively infringing on political and social stability.

Today, civil society organizations have varying relationships with the state. As Wacker explains, “From an official position, civil society and NGOs have been welcomed in China to fill the gap where the state lacks either the capability or the will to provide services or to supplement state efforts”.[4] They may serve as bridges for the government to reach out to the people, as adjuncts to assist a cause the party wishes to push forward, and as a complementary force able to take over responsibilities the government

no longer wishes to carry.[5] In general, the state accepts civil society groups and NGOs when they act in service to the state or contribute to social stability, such as volunteering for the Olympic games in 2008 or donating towards earthquake relief efforts in the Qinghai province in 2010.[6] It has been observed that most civil unrest or protests in China are concerned with blaming the local authorities rather than China's top leaders or the political system,[7] offering a partial explanation as to why nation-wide protests have not materialized in the region. However, explicit relationship and control mechanisms that the Communist Party holds over civil society and related civil mobilization can also provide insight into the lack of collectivization and action.

Government-NGO Relations

The government-NGO relationships that are present in China's civil society are an example of its deviance from the traditional Western framework. The official management of NGOs by the government involves a regulatory registration program. NGOs are required to register with the Ministry of Civil Affairs in their respective local bureaus, yet to do so they must have the approval of its professional supervisory agency, or *yewu zhuguan danwei*, which is usually a governmental organization or CONGO.[8] These supervisory agencies are sometimes referred to as "mothers-in-law" due to their day-to-day oversight.[9] As Ma explains, "strict rules determine what types of organizations or governmental departments can be "mothers-in-law"; they have to be in a similar professional field and at the same administrative level as the organization seeking a sponsor".[10] In the government's eyes, these agencies help to politically and legally control the NGOs by extension.[11] To go further, NGOs with religious affiliation must navigate a fine line regarding their relationships with the government. As Tam and Hasmath write, "RNGOs not only have to deal with the government's complex corporatist model of handling all NGOs, they need to negotiate the additional complex dimension of religion".[12] In order to stay accountable to donors, a specialized form of organizational awareness and flexibility needs to be maintained while retaining the religious mission.[13] It is observed by Tam and Hasmath that RNGOs hold a certain level of cooperation with local agents, foster a certain level of trust with the government and keep a low profile in order to operate and survive. Grassroots NGOs survive only to the extent that they limit any democratization promotion and instead help promote goals of social welfare.[14] As a means of survival, these grassroots groups often collaborate with local state agencies and INGOs for accessing the policy process as well as additional sources of funding and resources.[15] Otherwise, the organizations are reliant on funds and other forms of assistance from the government, which come with adherence to the CCP's ideological and political principles.[16]

The institutional mechanisms put in place by the state have uniquely shaped the power and experience of Chinese organizations, and corporatism is used to explain the government NGO relationship in Chinese civil society. "Corporatism refers to the power and interest arrangements between the state and associations . . . in other words, corporatism indicated a balanced and integrative relationship between the state and interest groups".[17] In China, this seems like an accurate framework to highlight the mechanisms that the state can use to limit and control NGOs political impact.[18] As Hsu and Hasmath argue, "the Chinese state has moved away from the tactics of days past to compel individuals and organizations".[19] Coercion, propaganda, and overt sanctioning are less frequently used to manage social organizations; instead the central and local states are more adept at managing the interests that have potential to undermine the state.[20] Several features of corporatism are apparent in

the state's civil society structure as the government deploys *tacit sanctioning* to condition and foster implicit control. Hsu and Hasmath explain tacit sanctioning behaviour as follows: The state creates and maintains the relationship; select organizations and groups are granted the privilege to mediate interests on behalf of their constituents to the state; and these organizations and groups must adhere to the rules and regulations of the state.[21] Tacit sanctioning creates a mutual beneficiary between the two actors and the state in fact uses the NGOs as a control mechanism in themselves.

When tacit conditioning does not work, the state still holds the ability to explicitly show their power. The CCP has exercised their strength and control in their repressive tactics throughout the years, often targeting certain areas of rights protection and reform-minded activism. As an example, the Sunflower Women Workers' Centre, a grassroots NGO providing leisure activities for female migrant workers in the Guangdong Province, occasionally engaged in rights defense activities. While it had initial support from the local authorities and GONGOs after registering in 2012, the NGO has since experienced harassment by thugs, forced to relocate by landlords, and most recently threatened with closure by officials.[22] This repression is further entrenched by the local bureaucratic apparatuses that are implemented to supervise stability maintenance.[23] Both covert and overt control can be exercised by the government at a gradual or rapid pace due to the structure of civil society in the country.

Implications of China's Unique Civil Society

As a result of the current legal and political framework of Chinese civil society, the accountability, transparency and overall efficacy of local NGOs is called into question. Hasmath and Hsu found that local NGOs responsible for the care of their constituents were not perceived as having the right to the best available service.[24] As explained in *NGOs in China: Issues of Good Governance and Accountability*, the relationship that the NGOs have with their constituents "is affected by the immaturity of the Chinese civil society sector, which to an extent is manifested in the foundations and intentions of the organizations, as well as in the lack of institutional support for them".[25] That is not to say there aren't certain prospects for development. Economic reforms and growth, the diversification of Chinese society, ongoing opening to the outside world and gradual transformation of social values indicate room for growth.[26] Yet, those prospects are still evened out by the fluid control by the government that is able to be stiffened at any time. As Ye and Onyx argue:

The Chinese State is moving in two apparently contradictory directions with respect to civil society organizations. On the one hand there are clear moves towards liberalization and growing support for an independent sector, particularly related to social organizations providing domestic welfare and public benefit services. On the other hand there are increasing restrictions against what are perceived to be foreign interests within civil society, and against those organizations seen as a threat to social cohesion, particularly those organizations concerned with advocacy, labor rights, religion and ethnic minorities.[27]

Some authors argue that the GONGOs, grassroots NGOs, INGOs and corporations combined created a legitimate civil society in China.[28] But factors such as weak rule of law, the social legitimacy of NGO goals, lack of media reporting and censorship as well as purposeful fragmentation of NGO governance by

CCP agencies create the unique government-NGO relationship and tight oversight[29] that is hard to look past. The factor of autonomy is virtually non-existent in Chinese civil society, and if it is being looked towards to bring democratization to the country, it is a vision in the very far distance.

Conclusion

In China, the rapid rise of market capitalism, globalization and economic success in the last forty years has combined to make room for the emergence of non-governmental organizations, social mobilization and engagement from citizens from within the state. While China's civil society is relatively weak in relation to how freely it is able to operate under the authoritarian regime, there is still prospect for further development and mobilization. Civil society in China is here to stay, but it will never fit the Western liberal notion of non-profit, private, autonomous, voluntary and self-governing organizations. The government still holds enough power, pressure and regulation to put a cap on these groups if it deems it too much of a threat to the legitimacy of the state. Looking forward, the power of civil society will continue to emerge and it is up to the state to grapple with and balance the challenges and consequences of more NGO's and activism under its authoritarian regime.

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End Notes

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