1	SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON FOR SKAGIT COUNTY	
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3	The State of Washington, ) Skagit County	
4	) No. 18-1-00622 Plaintiff,	<u>1</u> -2
5	vs. )	
6	) Hazen Shopbell ) Anthony Paul )	
7	Defendant. )	
8	Delendant. )	
9	VERBATIM REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS	
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11	THE HONORABLE BRIAN L. STILES Skagit County Courthouse	
12	Mount Vernon, Washington 98273	
13	<u>APPEARANCES:</u>	
14	For the Plaintiff: <b>EDWARD NORTON</b> Deputy Prosecuting Attorney Skagit County Prosecutor's Offi	Ce
15	605 S. Third Street Courthouse Mount Vernon, WA 98273	
16	For the Defendant: <b>DAVID SMITH</b>	
17	Anthony Paul Garvey Schubert Barer 1191 Second Avenue, Suite 1800	
18	Seattle, WA 98101	
19	For the Defendant: GABRIEL GALANDA	
20	Hazen Shopbell Galanda Broadman, PLLC 8606 35th Avenue NE	
21	Seattle, WA 98115	
22	DAME: Tuno 10 2010	
23	<u>DATE:</u> June 18, 2019	
24	<u>REPORTED BY:</u> JENNIFER C. POLLINO, WA CCR #222 OFFICIAL REPORTER	1, RPR
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## MOUNT VERNON, WASHINGTON 1 2 1:30 P.M. 3 4 Okay. Folks, we are here again on two 5 THE COURT: matters, State v. Paul 18-1-00622-29 and State v. Shopbell. 6 Am I 7 pronouncing that correctly? 8 MR. GALANDA: Yes, Your Honor. 9 THE COURT: Under Cause Number 18-1-00621-29. We heard 10 argument earlier on this matter after a special set hearing, if I can recall correctly. It's set today for additional argument or 11 12 a ruling. I see there's been some supplemental filings since our 13 last opportunity to get together. 14 So, Mr. Smith, I want to give everybody a chance to argue 15 again, or update, or supplement again if you would like, 16 particularly since you've got your new submission. So I'll hear 17 you from first. 18 Thank you, Your Honor. I attempted to MR. SMITH: 19 supplement the record with some additional photographic evidence 20 that, I think, will help the Court understand why defense takes the strong, strong position that the actions of Detective 21 22 Willette on August 22, 2016 were in direct violation of the 23 defendant's constitutional rights to have evidence available for 24 the defense that would be material to quilt or innocence.

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So the photographs I will briefly touch on I think they are

very helpful. If you look at my supplemental, second supplemental declaration we hopefully provided you with color copies of --

THE COURT: I did get color copies, and thank you for that. We don't always get color copies, yeah.

MR. SMITH: So Exhibit YY shows several bags of black plastic bags, six in total, that we understand to be the contents of at least one or several of the totes. And I can't tell from the picture whether the bags were the original containers that the bait clams were in, but that's what it appears to be just based on the photographs. But you can see they look like they are kind of similar in some of the pictures in terms of the species or type of clam. Then when you look at a close up, which is Exhibit ZZ, you can see that basically the bags were contained in a large quantity of ice that was probably, you know, in the bags when the clams were put in there then stuck into the freezer.

Then Exhibit AAA shows Fish and Wildlife officers inspecting all four totes. You can see that they have the blue one open and the three red ones open, and they are looking at the contents. Again, from this picture what I believe it depicts is that you can see that inside the totes there's a black plastic bag they had the clams apparently grouped together for some reason. That would have been by Puget Sound Seafood Distribution, the owner.

Then you see in photograph, the next photograph in Exhibit AA the sledge hammer that Fish and Wildlife agents were using to apparently try to break up the frozen bait clams. And in the process it looks like they damaged some. They certainly, you know, were using force and mechanical means to try to break open the clams. And the third picture in Exhibit AA shows a Fish and Wildlife Officer actually using a hammer to try to break up the contents.

Then Exhibit BBB shows what looks to be the contents of the blue tote and inside, which is the next picture in BB, you can see a piece of meat that was inside one of the totes.

And then Exhibit CC --

THE COURT: Can we go back while you are on BBB?

MR. SMITH: What's the circled area on the first page?

Is that emphasis by you, the yellow circle, and what does that depict?

MR. SMITH: What we think it depicts is what is seen in the next photograph.

THE COURT: The meat.

MR. SMITH: The meat. And the point I was trying to make is just to illustrate is that when they got weighed, and I can't tell exactly in the timeline when they weighed the totes. But it's clear to me that you are looking at totes that contained ice and other things than clams that were weighed. So we really don't know the volume of bait clams because the weights

apparently that were recorded by Fish and Wildlife apparently reflect other things than just the clams themselves, ice, other species of bait, some meat that was in the totes.

Then Exhibit CC documents what I would describe as the cavalier thoughtless way in which Fish and Wildlife agents simply dumped the contents of the totes, making no attempt to do an inventory of the contents, making no attempt to preserve through photographs or other documentation what was actually inside the totes. And so by weight again our calculation is that Fish and Wildlife destroyed about 99 percent by weight of whatever was in the totes; so like leaving less than one percent. I think it's .03 percent of the contents, which consist of the four baggies that contained 15 clams.

Now, it's of interest, I think significant, that if the Court were to look at Exhibit DDD the first picture, I believe shows that one of the clams that was not destroyed was dyed. And the color is hard for me to describe from the picture. But Officer Willette described it as a blue dyed clam. The State's contention in this case has been that what made the possession of the clams unlawful is that they were dyed. Well, we now know that some of them were dyed. How many? We don't know because Fish and Wildlife didn't do an inventory of the contents of the totes before they destroyed the contents. So we don't know if this was one dyed clam, if there were many dyed clams. We have no idea at this point how many there were. We also don't know how

it got there because there's no inventory, and there's no way for us to go backwards in time now to trace where the various clams came from and then say okay. As we provided the Court a sample of the treated shellfish receiving tickets as Exhibit EEE. You can see these were all Swinomish Tribe harvested clams, and they are described as Cockles.

Now, the difficulty is that we now have shellfish receiving tickets for at least the Swinomish harvested clams that show that certain clams, certain species were purchased by a representative of Puget Sound Seafood Distribution, but we have no way of tracing that purchase to the clams that were found in the Marine Cold Storage Facility. We don't know if these were the same clams or if these are different clams. So while these tickets are helpful to the defense in terms of yes, the harvest of these particular clams was done legally and properly under Swinomish Tribal Law. What we don't know is were these the Cockle clams that Fish and Wildlife seized on August 22nd, 2016 or were there different clams?

So, again, the defense is handicapped materially because we can't connect the dots that we should be able to connect to show these clams are harvested here. This was proper under Federal Law for this reason. They were sold to Puget Sound Seafood Distribution. And they were kept this way for this reason as appropriate under the Tulalip Tribal Laws and Regulations, and then they were used for treating fishing activities. We can't

connect any of the dots anymore because the bait clams are gone.

The part that I find just very disturbing is that the timeline, which I tried to recreate in my supplemental addendum on page 2, shows that search of Mr. Paul's home and his arrest without warrant took place on June 13th of 2016. On July 29th -- I'm sorry -- on June 22nd Fish and Wildlife sent Mr. Paul a notice that they intended to forfeit some of the materials taken from his home during the service of the search warrant.

Mr. Paul then files a replevin action to get his property back on July 29, 2016 in Thurston County Superior Court. I have every reason to believe that Detective Willette would have been aware that that action would have been filed because the State of Washington Attorney General's Office representing the Department of Fish and Wildlife responded to the filing of that lawsuit.

Judge Anne Hirsch set a hearing on our motion for return of property and replevin for October 3rd, 2016. Three days later, August 15th Detective Willette goes to Marine View Cold Storage and inspects the contents -- inspects the property and finds the four totes of bait clams. She, we believe, was responsible for CPS going to Mr. Paul's house on August 19, 2016 and for the Department of Revenue sending a letter regarding purported failure to file tax returns for tribal purchases and sales on August 17th.

Now, there is no explanation offered by the State. Why?

When Detective Willette had been to Marine View Cold Storage and

had seen the clams, if she believed that their ownership or possession was unlawful she could have placed a hold on it on that day so it couldn't be released to the owner, Puget Sound Seafood Distribution; so she had preserved the evidence on August 15th, 2016.

No one has offered a reasonable explanation as to why she went back with other agents on August 22, 2016 and decided to destroy the evidence that she had placed a hold on on August 15th. And I would invite Mr. Norton if you can provide a reasonable explanation to give it to us, because I've never heard why it was necessary, lawful, or appropriate for her to just make the decision on her own to destroy the evidence that she had secured on August 15th.

Puget Sound Seafood Distribution found out about the seizure of the bait clams on August 24th, and at that point wrote Assistant Attorney General Young, who was representing the Department in the replevin case to say what's the deal here, why are you, you know, why did you seize our stuff? The request was made for a due process hearing with AG Young who wrote in a letter saying no, you are not entitled to one. And it wasn't until much later that defense realized that -- or sorry, Puget Sound Seafood Distribution realized that Detective Willette had, without any authorization from the Court, without any permission from any judicial officer to my knowledge, has taken it upon herself to destroy the clams. Then my client gets charged a

couple years later with a crime that basically is based on his purported unlawful possession of the evidence Detective Willette had destroyed two years earlier.

It is unimaginable to me that the Court could allow something like this to -- a case like this to proceed to trial where the defense has essentially been accused of possessing something that we can no longer, the jury, the trier of fact, can no longer see, examine, or identify as evidence supporting the charge against them. So essentially we just have a bunch of paper now and some photographs that tell us that there were bait clams. We don't know where they came from, who owned them, how they got in the possession of Puget Sound Seafood, how they got into the totes because Detective Willette, without anybody's authorization, decided to destroy the evidence. It's clear that she has a malevolent motive of some sort for doing that, because no reasonable law enforcement officer would think it's appropriate for them to decide to destroy the evidence in a case.

THE COURT: Tell me how it impacts your defense specifically. Tell me what you are concerned about.

MR. SMITH: My concerns are that I can tell the jury we know they had some dyed clams. I don't know how many. I don't know how they got there. I don't know what the back story is to that. I can't say: Oh, look, here are the fish receiving tickets from the Swinomish Tribe saying that they legally purchased Cockle clams because I don't know what happened to

them. I can't say oh, and the weight that they are saying commercial quantity, I don't really know what the quantity is because they weighed them, a tote full of ice and other things, and then just wrote down that number. And I don't know what percentage of that number represents clams, what percent represents other things, what percentage is ice. So I can't do that.

So I'm going to stand up, if we went to trial, and tell the trier of fact: Hey, my clients, you know, didn't do anything. It was done by their employee, and they understood they had done everything lawfully. Then the State will probably say: Oh, but they harvested them, these clams, illegally. And I'm going to say: Well, how do I know that? I don't know which clams you are talking about. There is no evidence here. I don't know where these came from.

You know, it puts, I think, the prosecution almost in a way in a worse position that they are going to argue that there's evidence that something was harvested illegally. And nobody is ever going to know exactly what it was because the people who harvested the clams won't be able to identify them because they are destroyed. The fish receiving tickets we have are now meaningless because nobody will be able to tie that ticket to those clams. So it really just guts the whole case. It puts the defense in an impossible position where we are arguing we did something legally and right, and they are saying no you didn't.

But the trier of fact will never know actually what happened.

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THE COURT: Sure. What is the interplay between Tribal rights and the State's rights to regulate here in this case?

MR. SMITH: So the statute they relied upon we think is inapplicable because that statute describes it as applicable to people who are growing clams. So essentially they just took a random RCW that had nothing to do with Puget Sound Seafood Distribution, nothing to do with Indian tribes, tribal fisheries, our clients as individuals. They simply said we are claiming the right under this random law here regulating other people to destroy your property. And you are not entitled to due process of law. You are not entitled to a hearing. You are not entitled to notice. You are not entitled to anything. And after, if that wasn't a bad enough insult to our client's rights to then charge them with a crime based on possession of things that you've already destroyed is the height of a system that would have to resemble what happens in Russian or other countries where there's a show trial because it wouldn't be the American system of justice that you can be charged with a crime on that something the government had destroyed and no one can now see.

THE COURT: There was some discussion last year, and I can't recall, about clams being taken then in usual and accustomed areas, and without the clams there's no way to verify that, or test that, or is there some test that can determine where these clams came from and whether they were in a closed

season or not?

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MR. SMITH: So it would have been by species. So my surmise would be that if we had fish tickets for Cockle clams and we can say okay they bought Cockle clams from the Swinomish Tribe. Here's the weight. We add them all up, we go and separate all the clams by species and say, okay, this weight comes close to the amount of total weight on the fish receiving tickets for Cockle clams. Okay. We know where those came from.

All right. Let's go to the Butter clams. Let's figure out where Butter clams come from. And then we could have gone back and asked the tribal harvesters. You know, okay, like back in 2016 when you were harvesting Butter clams where would you go? Then I assume they would be able to tell us oh, yeah, Butter clams grew here at this beach. And we harvested them this way because it was legal under our tribe regulation to do that. could even call witnesses from the tribe to say oh, yeah, yeah that's totally appropriate. But we can't do that because we have no idea how many Cockle clams were in those totes. We have no idea how many butter clams. We have no idea the other species of clams that were in the totes that got destroyed. We really have no way to show in a concrete way. These came from here. This is how they were harvested. This is why it was appropriate and legal to do it that way.

THE COURT: Some of the charges, at least under the amended information, if I allow the amendment, talk about

commercial purposes and even dollar amounts. I assume that that would be impacted as well in this case because you don't know the weight. You don't know the value. You don't know how many species, the different prices, and all that sort of thing.

MR. SMITH: Yes, Your Honor. Everything we would want to show in the defense is compromised to the plight of being impossible to demonstrate.

THE COURT: Are you asking for the suppression of any kind of evidence relative to the clam versus a dismissal of all of the charges? Is there a distinction? Or is it a practical effect? I'll have to ask the Prosecutor that I suspect.

MR. SMITH: I think in terms of the proposed amended information, suppression -- let me back up. I can certainly see how the Court can look at this and say, well, you have the four baggies containing the 15 clams so I'm not going to grant your motion to suppress as to them because they are still here. But I will grant your motion as to everything else. I think if the Court were to enter that kind of an order on the suppression part it would essentially mean that the charge that was proposed in the amended information would be unsustainable because there wouldn't be any commercial quantity. There wouldn't be enough by weight or volume to establish that this was done for commercial purposes.

If the Court were to grant the motion on that basis I still think dismissal is the required remedy because this wasn't some

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accidental destruction of evidence. This was a deliberate,
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      intentional, premeditated destruction of evidence that Detective
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      Willette had placed a hold on on August 15th, and then went back,
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      you know, seven days later and intentionally destroyed. That
      separates this case from a typical case where the Court would
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      simply find suppression as an adequate remedy.
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              THE COURT: All right. Mr. Galanda.
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              MR. GALANDA: I'll be brief, assuming you received my
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      latest brief on treaty?
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              THE COURT: I did not. When did that come in?
              MR. GALANDA: We submitted it on the 11th of June.
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              THE COURT: You know, the last thing that is in my
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      Odyssey, the scanning is June 6th, which is the supplemental
      directive here.
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              MR. GALANDA: This is three-page brief that we took care
      to have messengered here as well as working copies.
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              THE COURT: Tell me about it.
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              MR. GALANDA: In large part it's groundwork that I
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      covered with Your Honor, that I covered with Your Honor --
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              THE COURT: Before.
              MR. GALANDA: But I wanted to make sure that we had a
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      full opportunity to present to Your Honor the treaty basis for
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      why, at least as to Mr. Shopbell, the original information or the
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      proposed amended information simply cannot be accepted by the
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      Court as lawful. I was --
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THE COURT: What you are arguing does not apply to Mr. Paul?

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MR. GALANDA: Well, I'm arquing that in so far as Mr. Shopbell has been accused of only telling an employee to buy the clams. And I will challenge Mr. Norton in a minute or invite him to challenge me with some assertion to the contrary. But I've now briefed the idea that on April 26th and June 11th that the only evidence the State has as to Mr. Shopbell is he allegedly told Ms. Torpey to, quote, unquote, "buy the clams". The clams were then purchased from a Tulalip tribal member on the Tulalip Indian Reservation after they were harvested within Point Elliott Treaty guaranteed usual and accustomed areas. There is no crime for a Tulalip Indian to be involved with buying clams from another Tulalip Indian on the Tulalip Indian Reservation when those clams were harvested from U and A. US v. Washington makes that very clear and the brief that I will make sure that Your Honor gets that as of June 11th makes clear that the State has no regulatory interest for police power unless it is for off-reservation fishing activity. They have no right to impair rights quaranteed to and reserved by Tulalip Indians to fish in usual and accustomed areas, then whether it's to transact or consume those fish within the Tulalip Indian country. That is bedrock US v. Washington, bedrock Federal Indian Law, and that's quaranteed by the Treaty of Point Elliott.

THE COURT: What if it could be proved or shown that it

was used for bait, which would be off reservation, wouldn't it,
or not?

MR. GALANDA: Again, Mr. Norton cannot show anything other than a report from Ms. Willette that suggests Mr. Shopbell asked an employee to buy the clams. He didn't say buy the clams for bait. He didn't say buy the clams and take them off the reservation. He didn't say buy the clams so we can take them off the reservation. He didn't say buy the clams and sell them to somebody else. He didn't say buy the clams and take them to the marine storage facility in Burlington. He said simply buy the clams, which were then bought by the employee from Tulalip at Tulalip and harvested at Tulalip.

THE COURT: Isn't it an argument that don't fill out tickets, and isn't that a separate issue?

MR. GALANDA: Well, Mr. Norton continues to misrepresent that my client said something about fishing. He didn't. He said, quote, unquote, "buy the clams" period, full stop. It's a misrepresentation or a gross misrepresentation to say my client said something else. He had nothing to do with the fish tickets or an accounting of the alleged information in the amended information, nor did he have anything to do with trafficking or purported plans to do anything with the clams whatsoever. So if you just look at <u>US v. Washington</u> and the Treaty of Point Elliott and the law that I'm happy to recite to you that says that the State has no police power regulatory interest unless the fishing

activity occurs off the reservation. Mr. Shopbell is immunized from this prosecution. And I hope Mr. Norton can finally come up with some evidence, having presented this argument on April 26th and he said nothing. On June 11th he said nothing. And during the last hearing he said nothing other than the State continues to misrepresent that my client did something that he did not do, which is something other than to just instruct someone to buy the clams. The Treaty of Point Elliott immunizes my client from prosecution, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Mr. Norton.

MR. NORTON: Your Honor, there's a lot to respond to here, and most of my response is contained in my prior written response to the Court. It is clear, Your Honor, that what the officers did in this case was they took apart the clams in a manner that counsel says, it's their testimony, the officer's testimony that indicate that they only found one dyed clam throughout the quantity of this. And the Court has the representative photographs for that. And so to a certain extent it is their testimony, whatever we were talking about, they would say this is what we found, this is what we inspected, this is what we found.

Your Honor, our contention is that the clams themselves are not exculpatory. And that the clams stored in the manner was wrong and improper, and that the clams themselves admittedly the value would be in dispute at trial; in other words, what quantity

of this versus this versus that were bait clams, and that would be factual dispute at trial. And the things that counsel has recited regarding the fact that there was ice and things like that. And maybe an amount of other items commingled within it; although it appears to be a small amount, would go to the weight of the evidence in this particular case.

And my representations as to the involvement of these individuals are based upon the reports the officers submitted therein at this time.

THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Smith any response?

MR. SMITH: I can only reemphasize just the inherent unfairness of putting someone on trial for the possession of something and then intentionally depriving them of the ability to point out that the State's representations about what happened are wrong. Essentially we're put in a position right now where, if Mr. Norton's representation is accurate, a Fish and Wildlife officer will testify: Well, I looked and there was only one blue clam. Well, how do I know that's true? How do I know the officer actually looked? If I don't have the clams, there's no photograph showing that they did some thorough inventory inspection. I would be forced to simply take the officer's word or try to ineffectively probably cross examine the officer about how they could be so certain there's only one dyed clam when there is no way for me, or the jury, or a trier of fact to know if the officer's testimony was accurate and credible. It's a show

trial. All I can do is simply have police officers stand up and say this is what happened, and then have no way of effectively cross examining them and pointing out some other evidence that their testimony is inaccurate.

THE COURT: Okay. Anything, Mr. Galanda, anything else?

MR. GALANDA: Just to explain my point, Your Honor, you heard Mr. Norton say nothing specific as to Mr. Shopbell at all.

The State continues to try to lump the defendants together for purposes of defeating this motion. In its response to our original set of motion papers the State said, quote, "WDFW deputy agents were informed by Jaime Torpey the clams for which she had been directed not to fill out any fish tickets, paid money at the direction of Anthony Paul and Hazen Shopbell. I have now repeatedly asked the State to proffer Your Honor and us some information that specifically suggests Mr. Shopbell did something other than say, quote, unquote, "buy the clams from a Tulalip member harvested at Tulalip. The State again falls short.

The <u>Boldt</u> decision is crystal clear. Treaty fishing rights, quote, reserved by the Indians cannot be qualified by the State. The State has police power to regulate off-reservation fishing only. Mr. Shopbell was not involved in any off-reservation fishing activity, whether it involved fish tickets, whether it involved alleged trafficking. He simply asked somebody to buy clams at Tulalip from the Tulalip and harvested at the Tulalip. That is not a crime, Your Honor.

1 THE COURT: You want to respond to that, Mr. Norton? 2 Your Honor, my response on the MR. NORTON: jurisdictional issue primarily at the prior hearing is the 3 4 State's contention was that this was as alleged commercial shellfish activity, not the individual activity of either of the 5 defendants that we're prosecuting. And our jurisdiction is based 6 7 upon that activity and the evidence. And we were asked, you 8 know, what connection do we have to Skagit County? One of the 9 business applications for Ms. Torpey to apply and sign on behalf 10 of Puget Sound Seafoods listed the Burlington address. THE COURT: Okay. Well, that goes to the venue issue, I 11 12 suspect, Mr. Norton, tell me about one thing that was raised in 13 some of the materials was that the probable cause, I quess, was 14 shopped to other counties before it ended up in Skagit County to 15 be filed. Do you know any information about that? 16 MR. NORTON: Well, Your Honor --17 THE COURT: And I know you were not the Prosecutor that 18 filed the charges. 19 MR. NORTON: No, I wasn't the Prosecutor. And the history of those cases is not entirely known to me. I know that 20 Pierce County dismissed their prosecution. I know that the 21 22 information that I have is the Pierce County Prosecution was --23 there also may have been some other legal factors in connection 24 with it as well. 25 THE COURT: Well, there's some discussion about an MOU, I

suspect between the tribe and the County or somebody.

MR. NORTON: Right. And that actually was dealt with by Judge Svaren in the prior matter. And both jurisdictions and the MOU and the decision of this office to prosecute versus King County or Pierce County.

THE COURT: What do you mean already decided? I haven't looked back. What do you mean by that?

MR. NORTON: There was previously a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction that was heard by Judge Svaren on a number of issues and briefed by the parties. And that issue was denied before this issue related to its issues were brought. And prosecutors have a choice to prosecute or not to prosecute. And as I know this Court knows, but I'll state it for the record, prosecutors do have a lot of discretion to prosecute or not prosecute. The decision not to prosecute we actually spend a lot of time not prosecuting. And different prosecutors will come up with different ideas on how to do that.

My concern discussing the Pierce County matter is I think that there were, and honestly I didn't bring all of those materials here, Your Honor, there was some discussion related to the Pierce County matter that some representations may have been made to the people involved in addition to the MOU. I heard something about an extension of the season or something like that that may have also been granted. I honestly don't know. I've seen their paperwork. I've seen some of the things that have

been given and apparently an email, a very inappropriate email by way of public disclosure came out. And I think it's best the prosecutors either prosecute or not prosecute. And police officers, whatever their feelings about the decision to prosecute or not prosecute frankly shouldn't have been made. Honestly, Your Honor, at the previous election there was discussion of I think somebody did bad, but no reasonable prosecutor would prosecute. I don't know that law enforcement should do that. I honestly think prosecutors should charge or not charge and certainly not ruminate about well it was close but I didn't charge.

THE COURT: Well, no, what I'm getting at and maybe I'm missing some materials but the Pierce County thing was maybe on a different set of facts, correct me if I'm wrong. But then this set of facts was shopped and not prosecuted by King County and not prosecuted in Snohomish or somewhere and then shopped up here to your office and charges were filed. I'll let you folks respond in a second. I was just curious of whether there's any notes that Mr. Johnson, the prior prosecutor that filed the charges, knew that it had been shopped before to other counties and not prosecuted.

MR. NORTON: Well, Your Honor, I filed my response on November 27th of 2018 discussing some of these issues, Your Honor. And the MOU specifically by its terms, which was signed May 31st of 2017, states that it doesn't affect the

jurisdictional rights of the parties, and, of course, that it cuts both ways. And that it also does not state it will control investigations before its signing. And that it was executed after the date of the violations. And, therefore, it does not, in fact, control the case. The fact that a Prosecutor, and, again, I think there was some other facts there that looked at that and said okay I don't want to prosecute now. They are certainly within their view, within their purview of the law doing it. The fact that Mr. Johnson looked at the materials that had any time and decided to prosecute is also within the prosecutor's discretion. I'll leave the rest of it with those issues and certainly counsel can respond. And, frankly, they have also responded in writing as well.

THE COURT: Okay. I'll hear you from, Mr. Smith. I don't want to dredge up issues that have already been determined by Judge Svaren. So tell me about that. What did he decide? You made a motion to dismiss it looks like last fall or last winter.

MR. SMITH: We filed a motion to dismiss on jurisdictional grounds. If I could just back up a little bit.

THE COURT: Sure.

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MR. SMITH: What happened in Pierce County is a little bit different than the posture of this case. So in Pierce County the State, the Prosecutor's Office was unaware that Fish and Wildlife had entered into an MOU with the Tulalip tribe. The

defendants in this case, the main defendants were a Joey Hatch, Senior and Joey Hatch, Junior, they are members of the Tulalip Tribe. They had been prosecuted for the same offenses that are covered in the Fish and Wildlife report by the Tulalip Court. And the MOU typically says that the defendant has been adjudicated in tribal court; then the State isn't going to take jurisdiction over that matter. And so that was one of the big reasons why the Pierce County case was dismissed. Mr. Paul was really not even a main target in that case. He was simply an ancillary player to the Hatches, who were the subject of the all of the enforcement actions going on.

This case arises out of the same case number. If the Court were to look at just the Fish and Wildlife case number that case number has been shopped to King County, Pierce County, Snohomish County, and Kitsap County. And I know that because we did a public records request to Fish and Wildlife, and to the counties, and we know exactly the discussion. So there were meetings held with representatives from Fish and Wildlife posted by the King County Prosecutor's Office and other agencies, including the Pierce County Prosecutor's Office. Ultimately everybody but this county decided that they didn't want to prosecute.

THE COURT: Okay. Do you want to respond at all, Mr. Galanda?

MR. GALANDA: I would just observe for the record that

the Tulalip Tribe, and not to re-plow ground (indistinguishable), did write a letter on a government-to-government basis, meaning the chairman of the Tulalip Tribe wrote a letter to this County asking the County to reconsider the charges filed because they believed, the Tribe believed the charges violated the MOU and also the <u>Boldt</u> decision. I will tell you an email from Wendy Willette to Sloan Johnson it was directed as a, quote, unquote "tactic".

THE COURT: Is that in the record?

MR. GALANDA: No, but I have it to make sure it's available to Your Honor by public record. That was not a tactic. That was a government-to-government move or gesture from one sovereign to the subordinate of another sovereign to ask that subordinate, State of Washington, to reconsider violating the Treaty of 1855. I subserve it to you along the lines of the question to suggest that there has been nefarious political motive by DFW and the detectives to shop these charges to all of those counties, finally resting them here. And I will also tell you that several of those counties responded to DFW saying why don't you prosecute this yourself. You have the power to do that as a Prosecutorial (indistinguishable). So if Your Honor is wondering why didn't DFW bring the charges himself? He shopped it to four other prosecuting offices until it arrived here, then deemed a Tulalip Tribal letter as a tactic.

THE COURT: Is there any -- and I know there were certain

1 transcripts and depositions of this one detective or wildlife 2 game officer about this issue? 3 MR. GALANDA: No. 4 THE COURT: About the shopping part, that was just by public record's request? 5 MR. GALANDA: Well, she has admitted to all of the law 6 7 enforcement agencies that she had shopped charges. There are 8 other charges. She shopped money laundering charges, which were never taken up by anybody. She has shopped charges in Pierce 9 10 County involving drug possession, which was subject to a motion to dismiss. And then she had shopped any number of so-called 11 12 trafficking charges to all of those law enforcement agencies. 13 THE COURT: Well, here's what I'm going to do today --14 anything else, Mr. Norton, for me? 15 MR. NORTON: Your Honor, I guess the only thing I would say and understand I don't know whether counsel meant to suggest 16 17 that Fish and Wildlife has had the Attorney General's Office 18 prosecute this. I don't know if Fish and Wildlife themselves can 19 prosecute. 20 THE COURT: Well, that wasn't -- my concern is whether it's been shopped and continued to be shopped until they found 21 22 county prosecutor to finally file the charges or not. 23 MR. NORTON: My understanding of the law is that the 24 Attorney General's Office would represent the State as to these 25 charges, counsel -- at least that's my review of the statute.

MR. GALANDA: Your I stand corrected. I did mean the Attorney General's Office. And Bill Sherman, in particular, Assistant Attorney General on behalf of DFW, was advised by numerous prosecuting attorneys' offices, including King County and Pierce County. At the time this was King County. And that he certainly had the prerogative to bring the charges himself as an Assistant Attorney, so there's no misunderstanding.

THE COURT: Well, here's what I can do today in any event, I would like to look at the treaty brief. Maybe it's around the courthouse somewhere. I don't recall seeing it, though, and it hasn't made it into the Odyssey system at least the Judge's edition.

Did you see it?

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THE CLERK: I have it in my edition.

THE COURT: You're kidding?

THE CLERK: Number 36. It was filed June 11th.

THE COURT: Mine only goes to June 6th.

In any event I don't recall reading it yet, and I have the judge's system on this Odyssey system, and the Clerk has a different one unfortunately.

Here's what I can do today I would allow the State's amendment, proposed amendment to the information. I don't think it's unduly prejudicial, substantially prejudices the defendants' cases. Let's get that out of the way first.

There's lots of claims of retaliation by the Department of

Fish and Wildlife. Apparently there's a civil action. I don't know if it's still pending or whether it's resolved and that sort of thing. Many of those things I think go to that to make those decisions on it. I think there is sufficient evidence from Torpey at least to go forward on the issue of whether this is just a corporate violation or individuals. I think that's a factual question still left.

I am going to suppress the evidence relative to the bait clams with the exception of those fees. I don't know what that does to the State's case, whether that — the State is going to determine that. I think based upon what I've heard that is un refuted in the record I believe the defendants have been prevented an opportunity to investigate and create relevant defenses in this particular case. And the fact that the information was destroyed prevents them from doing that. And this is solely based upon the record I have, gentlemen. I'm not making any determination, a wide branching determination, that this is inappropriate for law enforcement to dispose of large portions of what they think is of some aspect of a criminal incident of any sort. I think if, you know, burning acres of marijuana is an example as illegal in keeping certain portions of it I think that would be appropriate.

In this particular case, however, I think the defendants have shown enough to me in the record that they are prevented from providing and creating a defense and countering the charges

against them. I'm not going to dismiss the cases at this point in time.

It is troublesome to me about this issue of Fish and Wildlife shopping the prosecution. If somebody wants to additionally brief that issue I'm open to that; that can be noted up. And the issue of the interplay with the tribal rights versus the State regulations you briefed, apparently, Mr. Galanda; I'll take an opportunity to review that again. If there's an additional order that might lead to a dismissal at least of your client or maybe both the defendants in this case I'll take a second look at that too. If anybody wants to additionally brief that and do that within the next couple of weeks I can issue a written order without you folks having to come back again.

Mr. Norton, I don't know what this does to the State's position whether they think they can go forward on the case or not. I'll leave that up to you, sir. I can do that ruling.

We should have at least on this 3.6 portion, if you will, of the decision today some kind of findings in any event, just an order just in case we need that for future appeal if need be.

Mr. Norton, what do you got?

MR. NORTON: Well, I guess given the Court is willing to allow the amendment I would propose that being filed in the normal course. I'm going to have to do some serious thinking about ruling number four, suppressing the clams. And I guess the Court would be suppressing all the clams but those retained?

1 THE COURT: Correct.

Mr. Smith, any other findings that you need to make from your perspective today?

MR. SMITH: No, Your Honor. What I would suggest is that I would collaborate with Mr. Norton and Mr. Galanda's proposed findings and conclusions pursuant to Criminal Rule 3.6 (b) for presentation at a date. Could the Court provide us with a date for presentation right now?

THE COURT: No, you guys need to note that up. I wouldn't have my calendar at this point in time, just to do that. If you can circulate an order obviously with everybody's signature you wouldn't have to note it up necessarily. Just send it up and I'll sign it.

I'll hold on to the file for another couple weeks in case anybody wants to do any additional briefing. I'll give you time to look at the brief, Mr. Galanda.

If someone wants to provide me more information about the issue of shopping. Just my gut reaction that's troublesome, Mr. Norton, for me. Now maybe that's common practice in the prosecutorial world.

MR. NORTON: Well, at this point --

THE COURT: Well, you are in the inevitable position of not being the one who filed the charges, probably initial discussions which led to those charges being had. If there's more in the record or somebody wants to create more of a record

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      I'd consider that as well.
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              MR. SMITH: I'll try to do that.
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              THE COURT:
                          Let's look at a two-week period of time.
 4
              MR. SMITH:
                          May I ask a procedural question?
              THE COURT:
 5
                          You may.
                         Would it be appropriate for me to waive
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              MR. SMITH:
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      formal arraignment on the amended information and ask the Court
 8
      to enter pleas of not quilty on behalf of Mr. Paul.
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              MR. NORTON: That would be my suggestion at this time. I
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      would like to have the right, as it were, a better information
      from the Court. I need to have a serious thought about what this
11
12
      ultimately does to what I can do.
13
              THE COURT: Yeah, I understand that. But technically we
14
      can arraign them today.
15
              MR. NORTON: That's what I'm saying. I would rather have
16
      the right information.
17
              THE COURT: Do you have an order, an advice of rights
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      form? We can probably go through the arraignment if you wanted
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      to today formally with your client.
20
              MR. SMITH: Yes. I would prefer to do that right now.
              THE COURT: We'll fill out an order that they were
21
22
      arraigned today.
23
            Mr. Paul, why don't you come forward, sir.
24
            Mr. Smith, have you had an opportunity to review with your
25
      client the amended information that's now been filed with the
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Court?
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 2
              MR. SMITH: Yes. Mr. Paul is aware of the amended
 3
      information and the charges contained therein.
 4
              THE COURT: Is he aware of the maximum penalties he's
 5
      facing on each charge?
 6
              MR. SMITH: Yes.
 7
              THE COURT: Mr. Paul, what is your full name and date of
 8
      birth?
 9
              THE DEFENDANT:
                               Anthony Paul 5-11-78.
10
              THE COURT: Sir, have you had a chance to review the
      contents of the amended information that's now been filed with
11
12
      the Court with your attorney?
1.3
              THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor.
14
              THE COURT: Do you have any questions for me about the
15
      general nature of the offenses or the penalties that you are
16
      facing.
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              THE DEFENDANT:
                               No, I don't.
18
              THE COURT: We're going to note for the record not
19
      quilty pleas to each, Count I through V. You're entitled to the
20
      same Constitutional Rights you would have been advised of when
21
      you were arraigned on the initial information. Do you have any
22
      questions about how those rights would apply to you regarding
23
      these charges?
24
              THE DEFENDANT: No, Your Honor.
25
                          So, Mr. Norton, do you have a form order that
              THE COURT:
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1 we can note and set further dates? 2 MR. NORTON: Your Honor, I apologize to the Court. 3 didn't bring either of those with me today. I normally have a 4 stack of them. And maybe given what the Court has mentioned, Your Honor, maybe counsel and I could put together an order that notes 5 that he was arraigned on the amended information. 6 7 THE COURT: You can actually run across and get your --8 once I'm done here, can't you run and get a form at your 9 office --10 MR. NORTON: Oh, certainly. THE COURT: -- and bring it back while they are here and 11 12 they can sign it. All we need to note is the arraignment. 13 think we have previously set dates already for trial confirmation 14 and the like, if the case is ongoing after today. 15 MR. NORTON: Right. The concern that I have is I know counsel wants to put together the findings, and that's obviously 16 17 very appropriate, Your Honor. We have the 28th for an omnibus 18 hearing. And if the findings are all agreed that's pretty 19 straightforward. But if it's not that would be a lousy thing to 20 do on a Friday. 21 Let's do this. Let's arraign Mr. Shopbell THE COURT: 22 before we forget that process. Then we can fill out the other 23 details. 24 What's your full name, sir? 25 THE DEFENDANT: Stephen Graham Shopbell.

1 Is your date of birth May 17th, 1981? THE COURT: 2 Yes, sir. THE DEFENDANT: 3 THE COURT: The State has filed an amended information 4 with the Court and the Court Clerk charging you with Counts I through V. Have you had an opportunity to review a copy of that 5 document with your attorney? 6 7 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor. THE COURT: Do you understand the charges against you? 8 9 THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 10 THE COURT: And the maximum penalties you are facing on each count? 11 12 Yes, Your Honor. THE DEFENDANT: THE COURT: You are entitled to all those rights that you 13 14 would have been advised of when you were initially arraigned on 15 the initial charges, those same rights that apply to you on the 16 amended information. Any questions about those rights? 17 THE DEFENDANT: No, Your Honor. 18 THE COURT: We'll enter pleas of not quilty on Counts I 19 through V as well. Those will be filed with the Court. We have 20 some previous dates. Mr. Norton, I'm going to urge you at this point in time --21 22 we're going to take a short break, folks, instead of having you come back and circulate. I'd like to, before you go today, just 23 24 confirm, even check box order that they were arraigned today and 25 confirm the next date. What I would do, we should probably still

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obviously have written findings from at least today's hearing and any future hearings. Though it may be appropriate for you depending on your timing of your evaluation of the case of where it goes from now before much more work is put in on everybody's behalf. But I'll leave that up for you folks to decide that. I'll be down in my Chambers. If you folks, once you come up with this order as far as the arraignment today, you can call me back if we need to go on the record. We can do that or just sign that in Chambers as well and get copies to each defendant. MR. GALANDA: In case you are not back on the bench on this today, Your Honor, the matter of the treaty argument that would be brought forward in the event of another hearing? THE COURT: You can bring that now if you want. MR. GALANDA: Well, I've already briefed it twice. suppose Mr. Norton would like an opportunity to brief it as well. But I just want to know at what point the finish line would be. THE COURT: Well, I was intending instead of you folks coming back out give everybody a couple more weeks to respond to that, give me a chance to review it. Then I can do that on -which date is the next date? MR. NORTON: June 28th is the next scheduled hearing, Your Honor. THE COURT: If I haven't issued a written ruling then on that date I can give a determination too, if I haven't prior to that time.

MR. GALANDA: That's what I was looking to. Thank you, Your Honor. THE COURT: Okay. So I'll be down in Chambers, Mr. Morales. Mr. Norton, if you could hustle across the parking lot and grab that order for these gentlemen, I don't want them to have to come back, that would be helpful. The Court Clerk would love that too to have a court order before everybody goes. So you folks can wait around a few more minutes we can get that taken care. Okay. Thank you. (PROCEEDINGS ENDING AT 2:25 P.M.) 

1	STATE OF WASHINGTON )
2	) ss: CERTIFICATE
3	COUNTY OF SKAGIT )
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6	
7	I, JENNIFER CHRISTINE POLLINO, Official Court
8	Reporter in and for the County of Skagit do hereby certify;
9	
10	That the foregoing is a true and correct
11	transcript of the proceedings held on
12	
13	Witness my hand on this day of
14	, 2019.
15	
16	
17	
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19	JENNIFER C. POLLINO, WA CCR #2221, RPR
20	Official Court Reporter
21	
22	
23	
24	
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