

# Vote Buying by the United States in the United Nations\*

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## Abstract

A compelling body of scholarship has established a consistent link between a state's election to a rotating membership on the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and increases in the foreign aid that the state receives, especially from the United States (Kuziemko & Werker 2006, Vreeland & Dreher 2014). Unable to directly link payments to votes, this literature leaves open the question of whether increases in foreign aid truly result from US attempts to buy support from rotating members on resolutions coming before the UNSC. This project takes a step towards demonstrating the US's strategy in deploying foreign aid to temporary UNSC members. It does so by generating testable hypotheses based on theories of vote buying about the relationship of relative ideological proximity to the US and foreign aid received from the US. We leverage natural variation in relative ideological proximity to the US resulting from the rotating structure of non-permanent members on the UNSC. The robust, causal relationship we uncover is consistent with the predictions from vote buying theories, lending strong support to the notion that the US deploys aid to UNSC members strategically to buy votes.

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# Introduction

Scholars have demonstrated in great depth that non-permanent members of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) receive enhanced financial assistance while serving on the council (Kuziemko & Werker 2006, Dreher, Sturm & Vreeland 2009*a*, Dreher, Sturm & Vreeland 2009*b*, Vreeland & Dreher 2014). Furthermore, and consistent with expectations, states with a vested interest in the outcome of Security Council resolutions, primarily the United States, contribute a great deal of this financial aid (Kuziemko & Werker 2006). While the literature suggests that this aid, much like other forms of aid, is distributed for strategic and political purposes (Alesina & Dollar 2000), scholarly research has not yet definitively determined whether this aid constitutes an attempt to buy affinity on the UNSC.

While the question motivating this project is *if* the United States is buying influence on the Security Council, we tackle this question by examining *how* the US is allocating aid. Utilizing the theoretical literature on vote buying, we ask, if the US is attempting to purchase affinity with foreign aid, what pattern should these payments take? Specifically, do payments increase as ideological proximity to the US decreases until the desired level of support is reached, as vote-buying theory predicts? If the US is directing foreign aid in the way that vote-buying theory would predict, it would constitute the strongest, most direct evidence to date that the US deploys foreign aid in exchange for affinity among UNSC members.

Our inability to observe the counterfactual outcome – how the state would have voted in the absence of attempts at vote-buying – plagues any study of vote buying in the UNSC (Kuziemko & Werker 2006). We obtain causal identification on our question by leveraging the natural variation in relative ideological proximity to the US provided by the staggered rotation of non-permanent members on and off of the Security Council. We find a statistically significant and robust inverse relationship between relative ideological proximity to the US and US foreign aid received for those states we predict will prove pivotal for securing the passage of a resolution. The US thus deploys aid to UNSC mem-

bers in a manner consistent with the predictions of theories of vote buying, supporting the notion that the US uses foreign aid strategically to procure the affinity of members of the Security Council. We then expand our test to include all rotating members of the security council, and find a nonlinear relationship between payments and ideological distance that peaks at the point of pivotal membership. These results suggest that while the US may seek unanimity from the Security Council on some votes, is often satisfied with a smaller winning coalition.

## **The United Nations Security Council and Foreign Aid**

The United Nations Security Council is the principal UN apparatus charged with the maintenance of international peace and security. The UNSC examines any situation that might lead to international tension or give rise to a dispute to determine whether the situation, if it persists, will endanger the maintenance of international peace and security. If the Security Council determines that there is a threat to global peace or that an act of aggression has occurred, it determines what measures – up to and including the use of military force – are necessary to create or restore peace. Under the Charter of the United Nations, the UNSC has the authority to enact binding resolutions and require that all members of the UN carry out its decisions. The Security Council thus has substantial power on questions of great importance in both the international and domestic political arenas.

Since 1965, the Security Council has consisted of 15 member states. Of these, five of the member states, representing the victors from World War II, remain permanently on the council: the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Russia, and China. These states each have the power to veto any substantive resolution brought before the council. In addition to these permanent members, there are 10 non-permanent members that hold their seats on a rotating basis. Each temporary member serves a two-year term, starting on January 1, after having been elected during the previous year. Terms are staggered so five new members rotate on every year. Each rotating member, then, serves its entire

term with four other rotating members, and serves each half of its term with a different, additional set of five temporary members. Elections to the Security Council occur by geographical region.<sup>1</sup> Of the 10 rotating members, three UN member states represent Africa on the council, two member states represent the Asia-Pacific, Latin American and Caribbean, and Western Europe and advanced industrialized nations groupings, and one nation represents the Eastern European region. The passage of a resolution requires nine affirmative votes, i.e., a two-thirds majority, and any member of the Security Council, permanent or rotating, may abstain.

Recent studies have persistently found that UN member nations receive more foreign aid and financial assistance during a rotating membership on the UNSC. A non-permanent member of the council experiences a 59% increase in total aid from the United States during its two-year term, as well as an 8% increase in development aid from the United Nations (Kuziemko & Werker 2006). Aid from other nations similarly spikes when countries rotate onto the UNSC (Vreeland & Dreher 2014). The number of World Bank projects a country receives increases by roughly 10% when the state is a temporary member of the UNSC (Dreher, Sturm & Vreeland 2009*a*). Additionally, temporary UNSC members are more likely to receive IMF loans and face fewer conditions on said loans while on the UNSC than when they have rotated off the council (Dreher, Sturm & Vreeland 2009*b*).<sup>2</sup>

Two main, competing explanations exist for why states receive more foreign assistance when serving on the Security Council. The first explanation is that when states rotate

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<sup>1</sup> Vreeland & Dreher (2014) suggest politicking to become a member of the UNSC, to the extent that it exists (while some argue that states regularly seek out and campaign for a position on the Security Council (Malone 2000), often a fairly strict norm of rotation governs selection to the UNSC), occurs regionally, as each region decides for itself which country will represent it on the UNSC, with pro forma by the General Assembly. This limits the influence of states from outside the region who may wish to determine Security Council outcomes.

<sup>2</sup> It is important to note that there are limits to the benefits of this foreign financial assistance. Bueno de Mesquita and Smith find that when examining the two year term on the UNSC and the two years following this term, nations elected to serve on the Security Council actually experience a 3.5% contraction in their economy relative to nations not elected to the UNSC (Bueno de Mesquita & Smith 2010).

on to the UNSC, they simply become more visible in the international arena. Scholars have argued that serving on the UNSC brings prestige and legitimacy to the nation (Hurd 2002). It may be the case that without this added boost in visibility, these states would not be prominent enough to factor strongly into the foreign aid calculations of the major powers, despite otherwise possessing the need and desire for aid. When the needs of these nations become more fully understood by the global community due to their presence on the Security Council, foreign nations might act to fulfill those needs. Such an argument suggests that foreign aid is based on the need for aid, and thus foreign aid-granting states take action when these needs come to their attention.

However, there is strong evidence that states give foreign aid based on political goals in addition to economic need. In general, cross-country differences in foreign aid can in large part be explained by such political factors as colonial links, military alliances, and strategic interests (Alesina & Dollar 2000), and appear to have little to do with the ability to successfully disburse aid without elite capture and corruption (Weder & Alesina 2002). Additionally, scholars have found that aid to members of the Security Council is significantly larger during years in which major international events occur, particularly those that make the UN more prominent (Kuziemko & Werker 2006). The fact that foreign aid increases in the year in which the country is elected to the UNSC, persists at this level throughout their term as a non-permanent member, and falls to the initial level almost immediately upon completion of their term as a rotating member (Kuziemko & Werker 2006) further undercuts the argument that the distribution of aid is based on visibility and altruism.

The United States, as the predominant security actor in world politics, has a sustained interest at stake in many UNSC decisions, and support from the UN can ease the burden of US action both militarily and financially. Perhaps more importantly, UNSC decisions impact the level of domestic support for US military action on average (Chapman & Reiter 2004), even when accounting for variation within domestic groups (Grieco, Gelpi, Reifler & Feaver 2011). As noted previously, important security questions regarding any threats to international peace come before the UNSC. The security council thus acts as

a signal of the legitimacy of any international security action. Legitimacy is important both internationally (Claude 1966) and domestically (Finnemore & Sikkink 1998), for the UN and the Security Council more specifically (Hurd 2002).

Substantial theoretical work suggests that the United States might use its considerable might to influence Security Council decisions (Voeten 2001), and Dreher, Nunnenkamp & Thiele (2008) present evidence that the US does indeed buy UN general assembly votes successfully. Specifically, the disbursement by the United States of general budget support and grants, thought to be more generous forms of financial support, leads to higher levels of voting coincidence in the UN general assembly, whereas scholars have found no similar patterns of giving when examining the behavior of other major economic powers (Dreher, Nunnenkamp & Thiele 2008). Additionally, scholars have demonstrated that even when democracies are more strongly opposed to US policy preferences than nondemocratic countries, these countries nonetheless vote alongside the US in the UN General Assembly because of the credibility of US threats and enticements regarding aid (Carter & Stone 2015).

These arguments suggest that the US provides foreign aid to temporary members of the UNSC for strategic rather than for purely altruistic motives. Whether the patterns in the allocation of aid reflect this, however, remains an open question. If indeed the US is attempting to purchase affinity from members of the UNSC, then we should expect to see payments follow the pattern predicted by vote-buying theory. Finding that payments align with theoretical predictions would strongly buttress the claim that the US engages in vote buying on the UNSC. In the following section, we isolate a topline finding from the theoretical literature on vote buying and consider the testable implications for this theory in the context of the UNSC.

## **Predictions of Vote Buying and Competing Theories**

Vote buying refers to the offer of a payment that is in some way contingent on vote choice (Nichter 2008). When investigating vote buying within the UNSC, we consider

not the buying of specific votes or outcomes, but rather the purchase of affinity. Because of the timing between foreign aid appropriations and individual votes on the UN Security Council, states are likely unable to redirect aid quickly to reflect the outcome of a single vote. Instead, states set up flows of foreign aid to temporary members that will ensure a pattern of aligned voting during their time on the Security Council. Nonetheless, it is instructive to ask how the United States would most cost effectively allocate aid to members of the United Nations Security Council to procure support for any given vote. Accordingly, we turn to the theoretical literature on vote buying in legislatures, which takes as its motivation the question of how to cost-effectively trade payments for votes.

Scholars have examined vote buying by party organizations or other interest groups both of individuals in elections (Stokes 2005) and of members of a legislative body (Groseclose & Snyder 1996). The payments may take many forms, including offering goods and services in exchange for election results (Brusco, Nazareno & Stokes 2004) or offering benefits in exchange for voter turnout (Nichter 2008). In the context of legislatures, the payments under consideration are often less akin to bribes, but rather confer some electoral benefit on the recipient. For example, students of the US Congress have examined the use of distributive outlays as a means to procure support for votes (Alexander, Berry & Howell 2016) or the exchange of a vote on one issue in exchange for a vote on another issue, a process commonly known as log-rolling (Stratmann 1992).

Models of both single (Snyder 1991) and competing (Dekel, Jackson & Wolinsky 2009) vote buyers in legislatures generate the same prediction regarding US deployment of foreign aid across members of the UNSC. Specifically, payments will increase as members grow more ideologically distant from the US. The logic underlying this prediction is that as a state's propensity to vote alongside the US on the Security Council decreases, the aid necessary to change its latent ideological inclination increases. Of course, no vote buyer wishes to purchase more support than necessary. As such, vote-buying theory predicts that payments will be made to the cheapest (most ideologically proximate) members and fall sharply after the necessary votes are procured.

If the US seeks the successful passage of a resolution, we must first ask how many

rotating members are necessary for a US-backed resolution to pass. Since passage of UNSC resolutions requires nine affirmative votes, the US will seek out at least four rotating members (in addition to the votes of permanent members, who must not veto). It has often been the case throughout the history of the UNSC that Russia and/or China will abstain on an individual resolution, neither voting in favor nor vetoing. With the abstention of one or both parties, the US would require five to six votes from rotating members. Due to the inability to distribute foreign aid based on individual votes, general uncertainty over vote choice, and fluctuations in how ideologically proximate states are corresponding to the issue in question, we suppose the United States would seek to secure at least six temporary members' votes to ensure a winning coalition. The theory therefore predicts payments would increase such that the least ideologically proximate of these six members would receive the largest amount of aid.

A vote buyer such as the US may have one of two goals: to obtain the minimum support necessary for the passage of resolutions, or to obtain unanimity (to the extent possible) among the members of the Council. If the US desires only a minimum winning coalition, payments would increase to the least ideologically proximate of pivotal states, with aid dropping off for those members even less ideologically disposed to the US. Previous scholarship, however, suggests that near-unanimity may be important to access the legitimacy that the UNSC bestows (Dryzek & Niemeyer 2006, Hurd 2007). If this is the case, we would predict that (nearly) all rotating UNSC members receive aid, and that aid increases as ideological distance from the US increases across all 10 non-permanent members.

The two possibilities just discussed are observationally equivalent over the six most ideologically proximate members, predicting an inverse relationship between ideological proximity and foreign aid received. As such, this constitutes the clearest testable prediction from vote-buying theory. We summarize this prediction in the following hypothesis.

**Vote-Buying Hypothesis** *US foreign aid to a non-permanent member of the UNSC increases as ideological distance of that member to the US increases, over the six most ideologically proximate non-permanent members.*




Variants (a) and (b) of the Vote-Buying Hypothesis represent the competing predictions regarding payments across all 10 rotating members outlined above. Throughout, the null hypothesis is that there does not exist a positive relationship between ideological distance from the US and the aid a non-permanent member of the UNSC receives from the US. Figure 1 illustrates these variants.

**Vote-Buying Hypothesis, variant (a): Unanimity** *US foreign aid increases with ideological distance to the US across all rotating members of the UNSC.*

**Vote-Buying Hypothesis, variant (b): Minimal Winning Coalition** *US foreign aid increases with ideological distance to the US over the six rotating UNSC members most ideologically proximate to the US, plateauing or declining with ideological distance over the remaining rotating members.*

Figure 1: Vote-Buying Hypotheses



## Research Design and Data

Effectively testing the Vote-Buying Hypothesis – and potentially distinguishing among the competing variants – presents both design and measurement hurdles. Specifically, we must account for confounding patterns potentially present in cross-sectional data, isolate exogenous variation in ideological proximity, and construct a measure of latent ideological proximity to the US that is not reflective of security council behavior potentially related to

US aid. We begin by clarifying our explanatory variable of interest: ideological distance from the US. We then specify our identification strategy, which exploits the staggered rotating structure of the non-permanent members of the UNSC. Finally, we outline the data and variables that support this identification strategy.

As we have discussed, evidence suggestive of vote buying would entail increases in US foreign aid as ideological distance from the US increases. As states grow farther ideologically from the US, the aid necessary to change their latent voting propensities increases, i.e., their affinity becomes more costly. Simply performing a cross-state analysis would risk confounding evidence of vote-buying with other systematic patterns between a countries voting tendencies and the amount of aid it receives.<sup>3</sup> To isolate changes in a given state's relative ideological proximity to the US, we ultimately wish to study changes in relative, or rather ranked, ideological proximity to the US, where we rank the most ideologically proximate rotating member 1, and the least ideologically proximate rotating member 10. With the addition of state-specific effects and year dummy variables, as well as other controls to be detailed later, we are leveraging within-state changes in relative ideological proximity to the US to speak to the relationship of ideological proximity to the US and aid across states.

To further clarify the expectation of an inverse relationship between ranked proximity to the US and US foreign aid, suppose that states' latent ideologies are fixed for the duration of their two-year term on the UNSC. Then consider a change to the UNSC membership such that the third most ideologically proximate state to the US becomes the fourth closest. The cost of persuading the state should not have changed, and in each case the member's vote would be necessary for approval of any resolution. The year dummies account for the average payments made in a given year to rotating members, and the state-specific effects account for the expected payments to a given member. If vote-buying theories hold, then a year in which the member is the fourth closest to the

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<sup>3</sup> For instance, if poorer states are generally farther (closer) from the US in voting tendency, then their generally higher receipt of aid per capita would inflate (deflate) evidence of vote buying.

US rather than the third closest implies the UNSC is more favorable to the US, and the US will need to make lower overall payments to procure support. A smaller year-specific constant will be subtracted from aid received, and relative to the state's expected payments, the state will have received higher relative payments by virtue of its being less ideologically proximate to the US by an additional rotating member.

A change in a rotating member's measured ideological proximity to the US resulting from actions it took would raise concerns that the state made said choices to secure additional foreign aid. As such, we require a source of exogenous change to rotating members' ranked ideological proximity to the US as well as a measurement of a state's ideological proximity to the US that is immune (to the extent possible) to manipulations from UNSC politicking. We take each in turn.

The staggered rotation structure of the UNSC provides exactly the type of exogenous variation in ranked ideology we seek.<sup>4</sup> Still supposing that we are able to assign a fixed, latent ideology for states for their two-year term, a member's ranked ideological proximity may shift within their two-year term simply because of the natural institutional replacement of five of the members. The variation this produces will be somewhat limited. First, we have only one such rotation to exploit for each member, i.e., we only get one shot to observe a change in ranked ideological proximity. Second, since a new member will be from the same region of the world as the state it replaces, and since there may be greater correlation in the ideologies of successive members from the same region than across regions, the rotation of members may be unlikely to change the ideological landscape of the UNSC dramatically. As a result, employing only this source of variation in ranked ideological proximity constitutes a fairly conservative test.

To obtain a measure of a state's latent ideological proximity to the US, we employ a similar method to Fowler & Hall's (2016) to estimate a state's propensity to vote in alignment with the United States. To insulate this estimate from merely picking up the hypothesized vote-buying, we calculate this propensity using voting in the General As-

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<sup>4</sup>This ensures that the parallel trends assumption necessary for identification in difference-in-difference analyses holds.

sembly (UNGA), rather than the UNSC (Voeten, Strezhnev & Bailey 2009). Realizing that vote buying in the UNSC may affect voting in the UNGA, we employ UNGA voting from the session before a member's term on the UNSC to measure states' latent ideologies.<sup>5</sup> We then fix this estimate as the state's propensity to vote with the US for the two years of its membership on the UNSC, and we use this measure to rank the members on the UNSC each year to create our independent variable of interest, *Ranked Ideological Proximity* (RIP).<sup>6</sup> The within state-UNSC term standard deviation of this variable is just over 0.8, indicating an average change of one rank between the two years of a state's UNSC term.

Given our theoretical justification, we seek the form of US foreign aid that is both most manipulable and most independent from other political considerations. Military assistance fits this description better than economic aid. Although both military and economic aid are fungible from the perspective of the recipient (Khilji & Zampelli 1994, Feyzioglu, Swaroop & Zhu 1998), from the perspective of the US government it is more palatable politically to give military aid for strategic purposes. Building the national security capacity of potential partner nations is explicitly one of the most important strategic outlets for the United States to promote international security and advance its interests, according to the state department (Sullivan, Tessman & Li 2011). Additionally, there is strong evidence that, as an instrument of national security, military assistance is more clearly under the purview of the executive (Milner & Tingley 2015), while the evidence suggests that domestic political and economic factors systematically influence American legislators' choices regarding the distribution of foreign economic aid (Milner & Tingley 2010). These domestic distributional implications and the inability to assess confidently who is responsible for aid decisions make it difficult to directly connect economic aid to vote buying. Further, scholars have shown that the relationship between economic aid and vote choice depends on the nature of the aid, making military aid a stronger choice method-

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<sup>5</sup> Elections for temporary members of the UNSC occur at the end of each calendar year towards the end of the General Assembly's session.

<sup>6</sup> The appendix contains the formal expressions of each variable we construct as well as the exact specification of the regression analysis performed.

ologically to serve as our outcome of interest (Dreher, Nunnenkamp & Thiele 2008).<sup>7</sup>

The Congressional budgeting process for fiscal year  $s$ , which runs from October of calendar year  $s - 1$  through September of calendar year  $s$ , occurs throughout year  $s - 1$ . The UNSC usually convenes during the latter quarter of calendar years, i.e., first quarter of fiscal years. As such, it makes most sense to match foreign aid from fiscal year  $t + 1$  to explanatory variables reflecting calendar year  $t$ , as Congress would have budgeted this aid during calendar year  $t$  for support on UNSC votes taken at the beginning of fiscal year  $t + 1$ .

Because of the left-skew of the data and the long, sparsely populated right tail, we use the natural logarithm of the aid data. We transform the US foreign aid data using a hyperbolic sine function before doing so to incorporate the zeroes in the data.<sup>8</sup> Indeed, roughly 50% of the state-year observations of military aid are zeroes. In some cases, a state may receive no aid during both years of a term on the UNSC. In other cases, it might be just one year that the state receives no aid. In both sets of cases, it could be that the US simply does not want to assist a given state or that state does not have a need for aid (a genuine zero), or that the US actively wishes not to contribute to a state's military capability (perhaps masking a desire to give less than zero, were that possible). An appropriate estimation strategy must account for the mass of zeroes resulting from what is essentially bottom censoring of the aid data, so we employ a Tobit model for our analyses.

As specified above, we include year dummies to control for the overall spending by the United States on UNSC members in a given year. To conduct a within state-UNSC term analysis, we also include include state-specific effects for each term served on the Security Council. Tobit models do not support fixed effects, so we use state-by-term random effects (Wooldridge 2010). Additionally, we analyze models including a lagged

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<sup>7</sup>We nonetheless consider economic aid flows in the appendix. All data on foreign aid can be accessed at <https://explorer.usaid.gov/reports.html>.

<sup>8</sup>This transformation merely constitutes a less *ad hoc* approach to avoid losing observations equal to zero than simply replacing zeroes in the data with a value of one before taking logs, but the resulting analyses from both approaches are nearly identical.

dependent variable. This analysis – which is closer to a fixed-effects analysis – does not rely on the strong assumptions of a random-effects analysis.<sup>9</sup> As a check against potentially underestimating the standard errors, we bootstrap the standard errors in all models.

We introduce a number of control variables for each model. While these factors should not threaten our ability to make causal inferences using our design, and thus are not strictly necessary to avoid a spurious result, each factor may influence the willingness of the United States to grant aid for reasons other than ideological proximity, and thus we include these variables to reduce residual noise. First, aid from the United States might vary according to characteristics of the foreign government, such as where they fall along the political spectrum, and thus domestic political changes in the rotating member state may influence the level of aid that the US delivers. To measure domestic changes, we use the *Change in Source of Leader Support* (CHISOLS) data set (Leeds & Mattes 2013). This data set records all leadership changes in countries with a population of 500,000 or greater from 1919 to 2008, coding whether or not a new leader’s ascent to power is associated with a change in the underlying base of domestic support. The occurrence of a military conflict between a rotating member and the United States may also curtail the amount of aid the US is willing to send. We therefore control for the onset of a militarized interstate dispute (MID) with the United States for each year using the Correlates of War (COW) Militarized Interstate Disputes dataset (Jones, Bremer & Singer 1996). If a potential recipient forms an alliance with the United States, the terms of the agreement may lead to a higher baseline propensity for aid. We consider if the rotating member has an defensive or offensive alliance with the US in the Alliance Treaty Obligations and Provisions (ATOP) data set (Leeds, Ritter, Mitchell & Long 2002) during a given year. Lastly, we control for whether the rotating member is in its first or second year on the UN Security Council, since previous scholars have demonstrated that the economic benefits of UNSC membership are strongest in the second year (Dreher, Sturm

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<sup>9</sup> Specifically, it is not clear that the state-specific effects are uncorrelated with the other explanatory variables, as the use of random effects requires.

& Vreeland 2009a).

We limit our analysis to the period of 10-member UNSCs, 1966-2015, with our unit of analysis as the state-year.<sup>10</sup> The data on several of the control variables are missing for the most recent years, so regressions including controls have a somewhat reduced sample size. As discussed above, if vote buying is occurring, we are most confident that the relationship between RIP and US aid will manifest itself over the six states most ideologically proximate to the US. Whether the relationship holds over the entire UNSC will reflect whether unanimity leads to the persuasion of all rotating members rather than just those necessary for passage of a US-supported resolution. Accordingly, after examining those countries with RIPs less than or equal to six, we turn to the whole sample, to examine the possibility of a linear or nonlinear relationship when including those states past the pivotal point.

## Results

Table I presents our main results. Columns 1 and 2 include only those rotating members with an RIP less than or equal to six in a given year (i.e., the members most ideologically proximate to the US), recalling that higher values of RIP constitute less ideological proximity to the US relative to the other countries on the UNSC in a given year. We observe a statistically and substantively significant positive relationship between RIP and military aid received. US foreign military assistance increases as RIP increases for the first six rotating members of the UN Security Council. Of the nations necessary to secure a successful vote for the US, those relatively more distant from the US receive a higher proportion of the US military assistance budget. Figure 2 depicts the average partial effects of RIP on the log of military aid. It indicates that the expected increase in military aid associated with a state moving from, for example, the third to the fourth rank is nearly twice the expected increase in military aid associated with moving from the second to the third rank. This offers strong support for the presence of vote-buying,

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<sup>10</sup> In total, we have 497 observations due to a few one-year terms.

Table I: Tobit Analyses of the Effect of Ranked Ideological Proximity (RIP) to the US on Military Aid Received from the US


	RIP $\leq 6$			All Non-Permanent Members			RIP $\leq 6$			All Non-Permanent Members		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
RIP	0.789*** (0.263)	1.009*** (0.319)	-0.036 (0.110)	-0.075 (0.151)	1.427*** (0.468) -0.128*** (0.039)	1.544** (0.616) -0.142** (0.057)	0.357** (0.163)	0.276 (0.239)	0.010 (0.109)	-0.047 (0.140)	1.315*** (0.460) -0.120*** (0.040)	1.446*** (0.509) -0.136*** (0.048)
RIP Squared												
Second Year		0.212 (0.498)		-0.063 (0.331)		-0.025 (0.303)		-0.630 (0.733)		-0.539 (0.698)		-0.529 (0.574)
Ruling Coalition Shift		-0.676 (0.652)		-0.120 (0.622)		-0.508 (0.691)		0.721 (0.989)		0.208 (1.118)		-0.149 (1.073)
Alliance with US		2.795** (1.403)		-0.515 (1.222)		-0.005 (1.084)		-0.453 (0.929)		-1.078 (0.778)		-0.790 (0.786)
MID with US		0.595 (1.910)		1.084 (1.364)		1.683 (1.335)		1.201 (5.082)		0.148 (9.034)		0.080 (6.748)
Lagged Log Military Aid							1.151***	1.169***	1.161***	1.179***	1.123***	1.135***
Constant	-3.229* (1.945)	9.879*** (1.719)	-0.141 (1.655)	13.382*** (1.272)	-3.422* (1.791)	9.773*** (1.886)	(0.049)	(0.050)	(0.036)	(0.042)	(0.042)	(0.053)
RE/Lagged DV	RE	RE	RE	RE	RE	RE	Lag DV	Lag DV	Lag DV	Lag DV	Lag DV	Lag DV
N	313	267	497	418	497	418	313	267	497	418	497	418

*Notes:* The dependent variable is the natural log of US military aid received. All models are tobit regressions with year dummy variables. The first six models include state-level random effects; the second six instead include the lagged value of the dependent variable. Our variable of interest is RIP, the ranked ideological proximity to the US of the rotating member of the UNSC, where 1 signifies being the closest to the US ideologically and 10 signifies being farthest. The heading “RIP  $\leq 6$ ” indicates that the models include only the six UNSC rotating members most ideologically proximate to the US. The heading “All Non-Permanent Members” indicates that the models include all rotating members of the UNSC, of which the second pair of these under each heading allows for a nonlinear relationship of RIP and US aid with the inclusion of a squared term. Bootstrapped standard errors appear in parentheses below the estimated coefficients of all models.



and it does so over the set of states for which this prediction was clearest.

Figure 2: Visualizing Marginal Effects of RIP on Military Aid Received Over Six Non-Permanent UNSC Members Most Ideologically Proximate to the US




*Notes:* The marginal effects above reflect the results from Model 2 of Table I, with other variables held at their means.

Columns 3 and 4 include all rotating members. These regressions ask whether the proposed vote-buying relationship exists across the entire council, implying that the US seeks unanimity nearly always. In order to test variant (a) of the Vote-Buying Hypothesis these models include only a linear RIP term. The estimated coefficient of RIP cannot be distinguished from zero, and its sign is in the opposite direction of our expectations. Figure 3 depicts the average partial effects of RIP on the log of military aid received.

In order to test variant (b) of the Vote-Buying Hypothesis we must allow for non-linearity, so in columns 5 and 6, we include the square of RIP. Employing a quadratic term in a within-group analysis requires some care. In this setting, we do wish to understand whether there exists a nonlinear relationship across ranks, not just around an individual state’s mean rank. For this reason, we square the rank itself, not a mean-deviated RIP.


The estimates suggest that within the set of members most ideologically distant relative to the US, states receive less aid as they become relatively more extreme within the UNSC. Predicted payments peak around the rank that would ensure sufficient support

Figure 3: Visualizing Marginal Effects of RIP on Military Aid Received Across All 10 Rotating Members on the UNSC



*Notes:* The marginal effects above reflect the results from Model 4 of Table I, with other variables held at their means.

Figure 4: Visualizing Nonlinear Marginal Effects of RIP on Military Aid Received



*Notes:* The marginal effects above reflect the results from Model 6 of Table I, with other variables held at their means.

for the resolution to pass, i.e., five or six, and fall thereafter, as depicted by the average partial effects in Figure 4 of RIP on log military aid. This bolsters the case that

persuasion through aid does not always seek to achieve unanimity.<sup>11</sup> Rather, the US is likely comfortable ensuring only the necessary winning coalition for many votes. It also explains the null results for the linear specifications in columns 3 and 4. The decline in the relationship for the farther ranks outweighed the positive relationship among the closer ranks.

Within Table I, we also employ a lagged dependent variable in place of using random effects. This represents a similar approach to the use of fixed effects, which we would prefer to random effects, but which are not supported in tobit models. The results in models 7-12 are similar to those obtained with the use of random effects in models 1-6, suggesting that our results are not highly sensitive to the approach taken to control for state-specific unobservables.

In sum, the results taken together offer strong support for variant (b) of the Vote-Buying Hypothesis. Payments in the form of military aid given to UNSC members increase as the relative ideological distance of the member increases, though only over the set of states that comprise the most cost-effective minimal winning coalition. The change in expected increases when moving between consecutive ranks is substantial, even given a rather strict identification strategy.

In the online appendix, we present a number of robustness checks and extensions. In Table II, we explore the results for different cut points of pivotal members. While the results are similarly strong when considering only members with an RIP less than or equal to four or five, they decrease in substantive and statistical significance when including non-permanent members with RIPs less than or equal to seven and become null if the cut point is the member ranked eighth in ideological distance from the US. These results support our theoretical position regarding which vote is pivotal. Similar patterns obtain when a lagged dependent variable is used instead of random effects.

In Table III, we take as our outcome the log of economic aid. The models taken together suggest that economic aid shares the same inverse relationship between ideological

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<sup>11</sup> That the US does deliver aid to the nations that are quite ideologically distant may indicate that the US occasionally seeks a larger-than-minimal winning coalition.

proximity to the US and aid received over the closest ranked rotating members as was the case with military aid. Unlike military aid, however, this relationship continues at higher ranks with less attenuation. We may infer that the deployment of economic aid, too, is also in service of persuasion. Further, to the extent that the US seeks unanimity, it may rely more on economic aid than military aid when attempting to persuade less ideologically similar states. However, because economic aid allotment is likely more reflective of domestic political interests within the US, we hesitate to draw definitive conclusions about the exact causal nature of this relationship.

In addition, we consider in the appendix the possibility that the allotment of foreign military assistance as a tool to secure support within the UN Security Council varies according to the party of the US President, as historically the President has had substantial influence in shaping the allocation of US military assistance (Pach 1991). The evidence, presented in Tables IV-V, suggests that there are minimal differences between Republican and Democratic administrations. While the point estimates for administrations led by just one party or the other are imprecisely estimated due to a low number of observations (especially in the case of Democratic administrations), both Republican and Democrat-led governments demonstrate vote buying of the first six rotating members with respect to ranked ideological proximity, with payments falling thereafter.

As a final extension, we examine these models for only the Post-Cold War time frame in Table VI. The results are substantively stronger since the end of the Cold War, although less precisely estimated, suggesting that US vote buying practices have only intensified with the rise of unipolarity since the fall of the Soviet Union. The rise of China and accompanying decline of unipolarity holds promise for further analyses, as discussed below.

## **Discussion and Conclusion**

Previous studies have found a persistent and strong connection between membership on the United Nations Security Council and receipt of foreign aid, particularly from the

United States. The evidence was suggestive of vote buying, but the analyses were unable to adjudicate between vote buying and other possible explanations. In this paper, we fill this gap by testing the predictions of vote buying theories on the provision of aid by the United States to the temporary members of the Security Council.

We find that the allocation of military aid from the US to UNSC members reflects the predictions made by vote buying theory. Specifically, focusing on those rotating members that should be pivotal for the successful passage of a resolution within the UNSC, we observe a statistically and substantively significant positive relationship between a rotating member's relative ideological distance to the US and military aid received from the US. That this is especially true for the most cost effective set of states to target for persuasion serves to bolster the case that this pattern reflects strategic considerations. When we expand the analysis to include all temporary members of the UNSC, we find that payments peak at the most extreme (i.e., most expensive) of the cheapest set of states that ensures sufficient support for the resolution to pass, but payments fall thereafter. This suggests that the US relies on vote buying to procure closer to a minimal winning coalition rather than unanimity. Most importantly, however, given the identification strategy and robustness of the results, this constitutes the strongest evidence to date that the US is, in fact, providing aid to rotating members to secure their affinity for the voting term.

In addition to expanding our understanding of foreign aid provision and UNSC voting, there are a number of normative implications worth noting. First, this provides additional evidence that foreign aid provision is political and strategic rather than based on need. Second, our research calls into question the legitimacy derived from UNSC decisions given US attempts to secure the votes of temporary members. Third, we find that a norm of consensus does not dominate decision-making within the UNSC, as the US appears to seek only to buy those that are pivotal for the passage of a resolution. Broadly, we also see that patterns of political behavior present in domestic politics are also present at the level of international institutions.

In light of these findings, future scholarly work might examine the role the other permanent members play in vote buying on the UNSC. While models suggest that the

decision of who to buy should be unaffected by the presence of a competitor for votes, the necessary payments to secure certain rotating members may increase and the frequency of vote buying may decrease in light of an outside option (Laslier & Picard 2002, Dekel, Jackson & Wolinsky 2009). This is especially interesting in light of the increasing role of China as both an emerging donor of foreign aid (Woods 2008) and as a global counterweight to the United States, as well as President Donald Trump's proposed cuts to the foreign aid budget.

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## Online Appendix

The measure of states' latent ideological proximity to the US, which we call the US Vote Probability (USVP), is simply the estimate of the state-specific fixed effect of the regression given in equation 1. The dependent variable takes the value of 1 if a state voted the same way as the US, 0 if the state voted the opposite as the US, and 0.5 if a state abstained but the US cast a yes or no vote. We regress this outcome, for all combinations of states,  $i$ , and General Assembly resolutions,  $j$ , in a given year,  $t$ , on which the US did not abstain, on resolution-specific fixed effects and state-specific fixed effects. Our USVP measure is simply the estimated coefficients for the state fixed effects, as this represents the state's latent propensity to vote with the US, controlling for general agreement with the US's position on that resolution.

$$\mathbb{I}(\text{vote}_{i,j,t} = \text{vote}_{US,j,t}) = \delta_{j,t} + USVP_{i,t} + \eta_{i,j,t} \quad (1)$$

As discussed, if state  $i$ 's two-year term on the UNSC consists of years  $t$  ( $SC_1$ ) and  $t + 1$  ( $SC_2$ ), its USVP from the year preceding  $i$ 's term,  $t - 1$ , comprises the fixed, lagged USVP, which is denoted by  $\overline{USVP}$ .

$$\overline{USVP} := USVP_{SC_1, SC_2} = USVP_{t-1} \quad (2)$$

We then create the ranked ideological proximity (RIP) of a state on the UNSC in a given year based on their USVP relative to the other members of the UNSC according to equation 3,

$$RIP_{i,t} = \#(\{k : \overline{USVP}_{k,t} \geq \overline{USVP}_{i,t}, k \text{ on UNSC}\}), \quad (3)$$

and perform the regression analysis specified by equation 4,

$$\ln(AID_{i,t+1}) = \alpha_i + \gamma_t + \varphi_{i,t}RIP_{i,t} + \mathbf{X}_{i,t}\beta + \epsilon_{i,t}. \quad (4)$$

Table II: Robustness Check: Tobit Analyses of the Effect of Ranked Ideological Proximity (RIP) to the US on Military Aid Received from the US with Varying RIP Cutpoints

	RIP $\leq 4$	RIP $\leq 5$	RIP $\leq 7$	RIP $\leq 8$	RIP $\leq 4$	RIP $\leq 5$	RIP $\leq 7$	RIP $\leq 8$
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
RIP	2.214*** (0.493)	1.750*** (0.465)	0.485*** (0.178)	0.127 (0.212)	0.787 (0.644)	0.499 (0.398)	0.240 (0.223)	0.252 (0.162)
Second Year	0.479 (0.517)	0.625 (0.614)	0.051 (0.436)	0.021 (0.358)	-0.590 (1.159)	-0.328 (0.653)	-0.716 (0.542)	-0.409 (0.636)
Ruling Coalition Shift	-1.349 (1.107)	-0.799 (0.785)	-0.387 (0.538)	0.079 (0.788)	1.157 (2.179)	0.847 (1.376)	0.493 (1.022)	0.215 (0.954)
Alliance with US	2.165 (2.000)	2.570 (1.693)	1.405 (1.383)	0.133 (1.373)	-0.868 (1.993)	-0.092 (0.993)	-0.268 (0.844)	-0.454 (0.895)
MID with US	-0.859 (2.783)	-0.911 (2.890)	0.410 (2.468)	1.407 (2.119)	-1.113 (8.227)	-1.218 (5.721)	1.675 (3.423)	0.110 (8.390)
Lagged Log Military Aid					1.249*** (0.126)	1.202*** (0.083)	1.159*** (0.047)	1.148*** (0.052)
Constant	7.779*** (2.874)	8.116*** (2.034)	11.524*** (1.624)	12.293*** (1.734)	-7.403* (4.247)	-6.725*** (2.028)	-5.741*** (1.379)	-5.574*** (1.215)
RE/Lagged DV RIP Squared	RE	RE	RE	RE	Lag DV	Lag DV	Lag DV	Lag DV
N	179	219	308	346	179	219	308	346

*Notes:* The dependent variable is the natural log of US military aid received. All models are tobit regressions with year dummy variables. The first four models include state-level random effects; the second four instead include the lagged value of the dependent variable. Our variable of interest is RIP, the ranked ideological proximity to the US of the rotating member of the UNSC, where 1 signifies being the closest to the US ideologically and 10 signifies being farthest. The first column includes only UNSC rotating members with RIPs of 1-4. The second through fourth columns add rotating members through with RIPs of 5, 7, and 8, respectively. This pattern repeats for the latter four columns. Bootstrapped standard errors appear in parentheses below the estimated coefficients of all models, with the exception of model 1, for which the bootstrap would not converge, and so robust standard errors were used instead.

Figure 5: Visualizing Marginal Effects of RIP on Economic Aid Received Over Six States Most Ideologically Proximate to the US on the UNSC




Figure 6: Visualizing Marginal Effects of RIP on Economic Aid Received Across All 10 Rotating Members on the UNSC





Figure 7: Visualizing Nonlinear Marginal Effects of RIP on Economic Aid Received



*Notes:* The marginal effects above reflect the results from Models 2, 4, and 6 of Table III, respectively, with other variables held at their means.

Table III: Tobit Analyses of the Effect of Ranked Ideological Proximity (RIP) to the US on Economic Aid Received from the US

	RIP ≤ 6			All Non-Permanent Members			RIP ≤ 6			All Non-Permanent Members		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
RIP	1.644*** (0.410)	1.014** (0.473)	0.651*** (0.160)	0.373** (0.149)	2.062*** (0.676)	1.043 (0.654)	0.192 (0.218)	0.230 (0.324)	0.173** (0.083)	0.203** (0.096)	0.309 (0.342)	0.513 (0.614)
RIP Squared					-0.122** (0.049)	-0.057 (0.045)					-0.012 (0.028)	-0.027 (0.048)
Second Year		0.167 (0.534)		-0.052 (0.230)		-0.032 (0.236)		0.575 (0.817)		0.103 (0.567)		0.107 (0.465)
Ruling Coalition Shift		0.492 (0.936)		0.662 (0.451)		0.514 (0.610)		0.226 (1.191)		0.386 (0.956)		0.332 (1.254)
Alliance with US		-2.295 (1.855)		-2.868*** (1.059)		-2.691** (1.286)		-0.029 (0.720)		-0.633 (0.568)		-0.567 (0.600)
MID with US		1.066 (2.591)		2.371 (1.940)		2.633 (2.297)		3.181 (8.446)		1.739 (1.669)		1.806 (1.827)
Lagged Log Economic Aid							0.870*** (0.060)	1.208*** (0.075)	0.876*** (0.051)	1.104*** (0.039)	0.872*** (0.044)	1.095*** (0.045)
Constant	-4.033 (6.388)	14.410*** (3.333)	4.157 (4.771)	16.146*** (1.382)	1.116 (4.474)	14.563*** (2.650)	0.804 (1.224)	-5.576 (3.573)	0.506 (1.188)	-4.015*** (0.951)	0.249 (0.970)	-4.668** (1.944)
RE/Lagged DV	RE	RE	RE	RE	RE	RE	Lag DV	Lag DV	Lag DV	Lag DV	Lag DV	Lag DV
N	313	267	497	418	497	418	313	267	497	418	497	418

*Notes:* The dependent variable is the natural log of US economic aid received. All models are tobit regressions with year dummy variables. The first six models include state-level random effects; the second six instead include the lagged value of the dependent variable. Our variable of interest is RIP, the ranked ideological proximity to the US of the rotating member of the UNSC, where 1 signifies being the closest to the US ideologically and 10 signifies being farthest. The heading “RIP ≤ 6” indicates that the models include only the six most UNSC rotating members most ideologically proximate to the US. The heading “All Non-Permanent Members” indicates that the models include all rotating members of the UNSC, of which the second pair of these under each heading allows for a nonlinear relationship of RIP and US aid with the inclusion of a squared term. Bootstrapped standard errors appear in parentheses below the estimated coefficients of all models.

Table IV: Tobit Analyses of the Effect of Ranked Ideological Proximity (RIP) to the US on Military Aid Received from the US During Republican Party Control

	RIP $\leq$ 6		All Non-Permanent Members		RIP $\leq$ 6		All Non-Permanent Members	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
RIP	1.179***	-0.038	2.069***	0.093	-0.078	1.149		
	(0.356)	(0.201)	(0.654)	(0.230)	(0.169)	(0.699)		
RIP Squared			-0.191***			-0.112*		
			(0.059)			(0.064)		
Second Year	0.784	0.304	0.247	-0.812	-0.374	-0.404		
	(0.825)	(0.568)	(0.520)	(0.856)	(0.704)	(0.721)		
Ruling Coalition Shift	-1.248	-0.703	-1.224	-0.729	-1.313	-1.489		
	(0.950)	(0.697)	(0.817)	(1.058)	(1.199)	(1.086)		
Alliance with US	2.736	-0.005	0.356	-0.534	-0.048	0.140		
	(1.868)	(1.410)	(1.228)	(0.848)	(0.976)	(0.877)		
MID with US	1.384	1.301	2.056	2.451	-0.381	-0.495		
	(3.579)	(1.798)	(1.378)	(8.171)	(11.228)	(10.767)		
Lagged Log Military Aid				1.162***	1.181***	1.138***		
				(0.062)	(0.051)	(0.060)		
Constant	8.629***	12.754***	8.443***	-2.415	-2.520	-4.517**		
	(2.308)	(1.597)	(2.023)	(1.534)	(1.559)	(1.951)		
RE/Lagged DV	RE	RE	RE	Lag DV	Lag DV	Lag DV		
N	173	272	272	173	272	272		

*Notes:* The sample is restricted to only those years in which the US president was of the Republican Party. The dependent variable is the natural log of US military aid received. All models are tobit regressions with year dummy variables. The first three models include state-level random effects; the second three instead include the lagged value of the dependent variable. Our variable of interest is RIP, the ranked ideological proximity to the US of the rotating member of the UNSC, where 1 signifies being the closest to the US ideologically and 10 signifies being farthest. The heading “RIP  $\leq$  6” indicates that the models include only the six most UNSC rotating members most ideologically proximate to the US. The heading “All Non-Permanent Members” indicates that the models include all rotating members of the UNSC, of which the second of these under each heading allows for a nonlinear relationship of RIP and US aid with the inclusion of a squared term. Bootstrapped standard errors appear in parentheses below the estimated coefficients of all models.

Table V: Tobit Analyses of the Effect of Ranked Ideological Proximity (RIP) to the US on Military Aid Received from the US During Democratic Party Control

	RIP $\leq$ 6		All Non-Permanent Members		RIP $\leq$ 6		All Non-Permanent Members	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
RIP	1.066 (0.697)	-0.097 (0.270)	1.587 (1.166)	0.623 (0.444)	0.017 (0.219)	1.820* (1.046)		
RIP Squared			-0.138 (0.100)			-0.164* (0.086)		
Second Year	-1.304 (1.370)	-0.655 (0.620)	-0.590 (0.582)	-0.265 (1.658)	-0.798 (1.100)	-0.675 (1.021)		
Ruling Coalition Shift	0.187 (1.249)	0.613 (1.463)	0.188 (1.251)	2.785 (3.497)	2.460 (2.168)	1.775 (2.541)		
Alliance with US	4.233 (2.799)	-0.700 (1.780)	0.207 (2.192)	0.236 (1.935)	-2.124* (1.236)	-1.717 (1.063)		
MID with US	9.237** (3.731)	10.129*** (2.276)	9.995*** (2.299)	0.710 (6.771)	2.508 (5.428)	2.271 (5.444)		
Lagged Log Military Aid				1.197*** (0.146)	1.167*** (0.084)	1.132*** (0.076)		
Constant	6.511 (4.637)	14.895*** (2.613)	10.054** (4.282)	-8.132** (3.992)	-4.726** (2.219)	-8.375*** (2.838)		
RE/Lagged DV	RE	RE	RE	Lag DV	Lag DV	Lag DV		
N	94	146	146	94	146	146		

*Notes:* The sample is restricted to only those years in which the US president was of the Democratic Party. The dependent variable is the natural log of US military aid received. All models are tobit regressions with year dummy variables. The first three models include state-level random effects; the second three instead include the lagged value of the dependent variable. Our variable of interest is RIP, the ranked ideological proximity to the US of the rotating member of the UNSC, where 1 signifies being the closest to the US ideologically and 10 signifies being farthest. The heading “RIP  $\leq$  6” indicates that the models include only the six most UNSC rotating members most ideologically proximate to the US. The heading “All Non-Permanent Members” indicates that the models include all rotating members of the UNSC, of which the second of these under each heading allows for a nonlinear relationship of RIP and US aid with the inclusion of a squared term. Bootstrapped standard errors appear in parentheses below the estimated coefficients of all models.

Table VI: Tobit Analyses of the Effect of Ranked Ideological Proximity (RIP) to the US on Military Aid Received from the US Post Cold-War

	RIP $\leq$ 6		All Non-Permanent Members		RIP $\leq$ 6		All Non-Permanent Members	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
RIP	1.080*	0.125	2.092***	-0.040	0.085	0.993		
	(0.570)	(0.226)	(0.754)	(0.187)	(0.147)	(0.711)		
RIP Squared			-0.172**					
			(0.068)			(0.066)		
Second Year	-0.171	-0.194	-0.134	-1.019*	-0.669	-0.674		
	(0.356)	(0.364)	(0.363)	(0.595)	(0.725)	(0.663)		
Ruling Coalition Shift	-0.835	-0.248	-0.948	0.186	-0.472	-0.707		
	(0.910)	(0.520)	(0.783)	(0.880)	(0.993)	(1.007)		
Alliance with US	2.865	-0.603	-0.484	-0.441	-0.631	-0.629		
	(2.941)	(1.437)	(1.392)	(0.748)	(1.007)	(1.015)		
MID with US	0.649	2.828	3.715	-10.292***	-17.561***	-16.408***		
	(2.041)	(2.838)	(3.443)	(2.521)	(6.679)	(5.682)		
Lagged Log Military Aid				1.147***	1.078***	1.050***		
				(0.049)	(0.058)	(0.061)		
Constant	10.481***	12.982***	8.567***	-1.078	0.000	-1.388		
	(1.989)	(1.415)	(2.174)	(1.203)	(1.833)	(2.175)		
RE/Lagged DV	RE	RE	RE	Lag DV	Lag DV	Lag DV		
N	122	197	197	122	197	197		

*Notes:* The sample is restricted to the Post-Cold War time period. The dependent variable is the natural log of US military aid received. All models are tobit regressions with year dummy variables. The first three models include state-level random effects; the second three instead include the lagged value of the dependent variable. Our variable of interest is RIP, the ranked ideological proximity to the US of the rotating member of the UNSC, where 1 signifies being the closest to the US ideologically and 10 signifies being farthest. The heading “RIP  $\leq$  6” indicates that the models include only the six most UNSC rotating members most ideologically proximate to the US. The heading “All Non-Permanent Members” indicates that the models include all rotating members of the UNSC, of which the second of these under each heading allows for a nonlinear relationship of RIP and US aid with the inclusion of a squared term. Bootstrapped standard errors appear in parentheses below the estimated coefficients of all models.