

# Vote Buying by the United States in the United Nations\*

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## Abstract

A compelling body of scholarship establishes a robust link between a state's election to a rotating membership on the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and increases in foreign aid that state receives, especially from the United States (Kuziemko & Werker 2006, Vreeland & Dreher 2014). This literature suggests this reflects attempts to procure the support for US positions on UNSC votes but does not provide causal tests of this claim, a claim that has important implications for the legitimacy of UNSC decisions. This paper seeks to determine whether the US distributes foreign aid to "buy votes." We generate theoretically-motivated hypotheses about the relationship between relative voting congruence with the US and the receipt of US foreign aid. Leveraging natural variation from the rotating structure of non-permanent UNSC members, we uncover a causal relationship consistent with the claim that the US uses foreign aid to procure support for its positions on the UNSC.

Keywords: United Nations Security Council, foreign aid, vote buying

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# Introduction

Scholars have demonstrated in great depth that non-permanent members of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) systematically receive enhanced financial assistance while serving on the council (Kuziemko & Werker 2006, Vreeland & Dreher 2014). Consistent with expectations about aid's strategic nature (Alesina & Dollar 2000), states with a vested interest in the outcome of Security Council resolutions, primarily the United States, contribute a great deal of this financial aid. Many of these studies further claim that this distribution of foreign aid by the United States appears to be an attempt to buy influence on the Security Council, a claim with significant normative implications for the legitimacy of UNSC resolutions.<sup>1</sup> The evidence these studies present to support the claim that the US is attempting to buy votes, however, is by the authors' own admission less conclusive than the evidence that rotating members receive a bump in foreign aid for their two-year terms. We seek to fill this gap in the literature by developing a research design and measurement strategies that allow us to determine more definitively whether the US distributes foreign aid in a manner consistent with vote buying.

We look to the theoretical literature on vote buying to distill testable predictions about the optimal (i.e., most cost-effective) distribution of payments for an entity seeking to buy influence in a deliberative body such as the UNSC. Specifically, theory predicts that payments from the US increase as the propensity of a state to vote against the US rises, until the desired level of support is reached. We obtain causal identification by leveraging natural variation in relative voting congruence with the US provided by the staggered rotation of non-permanent members on and off of the Security Council. We find a significant and robust relationship between relative propensity to vote against the US and the relative receipt of US economic and military aid for those states we predict the US will target to secure the necessary votes for passage of a resolution. Further, our evidence suggests that the deployment of aid does not extend to attempts to secure

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<sup>1</sup> Questions about vote buying in the United Nations remain as relevant as ever. For example, President Trump threatened to cut aid to those countries that voted for a resolution condemning US recognition of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel (Landler 2017).

unanimity - that is, to those members whose voting is least congruent with the US and whose votes are not strictly necessary for passage.

Finding that the US directs foreign aid in a manner so consistent with the predictions of vote buying provides the strongest evidence to date that US outlays of foreign aid to temporary UNSC members represent attempts to gain influence over UNSC decisions. This confirms the claims of earlier work while simultaneously validating vote buying theory's predictions in a new context. Perhaps most importantly, these findings underscore the questions previous work has raised about the meaning of UNSC decisions. While approval by the UNSC confers legitimacy on the actions of states in both the international (Hurd 2002) and domestic arenas (Chapman & Reiter 2004), its decisions may not reflect the collective will of the international community.

## **The United Nations Security Council and Foreign Aid**

The United Nations Security Council is the principal UN apparatus charged with the maintenance of international peace and security. If the Security Council determines that there is a threat to global peace or that an act of aggression has occurred, it determines what measures – up to and including the use of military force – are necessary to create or restore peace. Under the Charter of the United Nations, the UNSC has the authority to enact binding resolutions and require that all members of the UN carry out its decisions. The Security Council thus has substantial power on questions of great importance in both the international and domestic political arenas.<sup>2</sup>

Since 1965, the Security Council has consisted of 15 member states. Of these, five of the member states – the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Russia, and China – remain permanently on the UNSC, each having the power to veto any substantive resolution brought before the council. In addition, there are 10 non-permanent members that hold their seats on a rotating basis. Each temporary member serves a staggered two-year term, starting on January 1, after having been elected during the previous year. Elections to the Security Council occur by geographical region. While some argue that states regularly seek out and campaign for a position

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<sup>2</sup> In 2017, the UNSC passed resolutions relating to refugee crises in Africa, the ongoing conflict in the Middle East, and threat of terrorism. The agenda is largely driven by emerging or escalating crises and threats to international security, consistent with its mandate.

on the Security Council (Malone 2000), often a fairly strict norm of rotation governs selection,<sup>3</sup> and there are few consistent political or economic predictors of election to the UNSC (Bueno de Mesquita & Smith 2010).

More interesting is what occurs after election to the UNSC. Recent studies have convincingly demonstrated that UN member nations receive more foreign aid and financial assistance during a rotating membership on the UNSC. A non-permanent member of the council experiences an 8% increase in development aid from the United Nations (Kuziemko & Werker 2006). Aid from major powers similarly spikes when countries rotate onto the UNSC (Vreeland & Dreher 2014). The number of World Bank projects a country receives increases by roughly 10% when the state is a temporary member of the UNSC (Dreher, Sturm & Vreeland 2009a). Additionally, temporary UNSC members are more likely to receive IMF loans and face fewer conditions on said loans while on the UNSC than when they have rotated off the council (Dreher, Sturm & Vreeland 2009b).

The direct and indirect roles of the US in much of this increased assistance has led scholars to ask whether the US provides foreign aid to temporary members of the UNSC in an attempt to buy votes. Vote buying in this context refers to the offer of a payment that is in some way contingent on vote choice (Nichter 2008). The United States, as the predominant security actor in world politics, has a sustained interest in many UNSC decisions, and support from the UN can ease the burden of US action both militarily and financially, providing a rationale for buying votes. Further, since important security questions regarding any threats to international peace come before the UNSC, the Security Council acts as a signal of the legitimacy of any international security action (Hurd 2002). Legitimacy is important both internationally (Claude 1966) and domestically (Finnemore & Sikkink 1998), where UNSC decisions impact the level of domestic support for US military action (Chapman & Reiter 2004, Grieco, Gelpi, Reifler & Feaver 2011).

Voeten (2001) suggests that the United States uses its considerable might to influence Security Council decisions, while Dreher, Nunnenkamp & Thiele (2008) and Carter & Stone (2015) present evidence that the US impacts certain UN general assembly votes successfully

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<sup>3</sup> Politicking to become a member of the UNSC, to the extent that it exists, likewise occurs regionally (Vreeland & Dreher 2014).

through both threats and enticements regarding aid. Kuziemko & Werker (2006) find that a non-permanent member of the Security Council experiences a 59% increase in total aid from the United States during its two-year term, with larger increases in years the authors classify as important. The case that the US is buying influence on the Security Council is made most forcefully by Vreeland & Dreher (2014). In this study, the authors examine the disbursement of foreign aid to UNSC members from a number of countries and international organizations. They offer compelling qualitative evidence that the practice of buying votes on the UNSC is common, at times even explicit. In one such instance, the US cut all of its \$70 million in aid to Yemen because of a “no” vote on the resolution authorizing Operation Desert Storm (pp. 67-69). Empirically, however, while they find that neither allies nor enemies drive the result of increased bilateral aid from the US for UNSC members, they are unable to demonstrate that such countries receive significantly less additional aid from the US than “swing voters” (pp. 175-181).

In explaining the mixed support for their thesis, Vreeland & Dreher remark on a number of difficulties in carrying out the analysis, noting at the outset that it “demands a lot from the data” (p. 175). They concede that their measures of political affinity may be too blunt, suggesting the hypothesis itself may not have been sufficiently detailed to support rigorous testing (p. 176). Further, in Vreeland & Dreher’s analysis, as well as the analysis from Kuziemko & Werker on which it is based, the authors limit themselves to variation in the states elected to the UNSC, rather than exploiting the additional, significant variation created by the rotating on and off of half of the council during each state’s term.

Prior work has mustered substantial quantitative and qualitative evidence that the allocation of aid constitutes vote buying. Yet the authors of these studies recognize the limitations of their analyses and helpfully highlight these issues for those conducting future investigations. Following their cues, in the following section, we isolate findings from the theoretical literature on vote buying, consider the testable implications for this theory in the context of the UNSC, and develop a considerably sharper hypothesis about the pattern of bilateral aid we would expect the US to display if it is, in fact, buying votes on the UNSC.

## Predictions from Vote Buying Theories

When investigating vote buying within the UNSC, we consider not the buying of specific votes or outcomes, but rather affinity. Because of the timing between foreign aid appropriations and individual votes on the UN Security Council, states are likely unable to redirect aid quickly to reflect the outcome of a single vote, and unwilling to undertake such a large bureaucratic effort outside of extreme circumstances. Reactions as swift and pointed as the US response to Yemen in the early 1990s constitute rare events, even if the underlying tendency is present. Instead, states set up flows of foreign aid to temporary members to ensure a pattern of aligned voting during their time on the Security Council. It is instructive to ask how the United States would most cost effectively allocate this aid to members of the United Nations Security Council to procure support. Accordingly, we turn to the theoretical literature on vote buying in legislatures, which takes as its motivation the question of how to cost-effectively trade payments for votes.

Models of both single (Snyder, Jr. 1991) and competing (Dekel, Jackson & Wolinsky 2009) vote buyers in legislatures generate the same prediction regarding the deployment of aid in a deliberative body. These theories take as their premise a vote buyer lacking sufficient support for a proposal she prefers to the status quo. In both the competitive and non-competitive setting, if the vote buyer purchases any votes at all, she will begin with the member that requires the smallest payment to change her vote; she will proceed to buy the votes of increasingly costly members until her proposal has the required level of support.<sup>4</sup>

Applied to US deployment of foreign aid across members of the UNSC, these theories predict payments will increase as the initial propensity to vote against the US rises. Of course, no vote buyer wishes to purchase more support than necessary. Passage of UNSC resolutions

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<sup>4</sup> These theories do not model endogenous agenda formation in the context of vote buying, but it would only alter the frequency – not the pattern – of vote buying. Further, while a state may exaggerate the amount it requires to change its vote in accordance with US preferences, it could only do so in as far as the US could not buy the next most costly state as a substitute. A utility-maximizing state would not forgo a price at or above the value it places on a sincere vote. The literature has not explored these market dynamics in full, and it is beyond the scope of this paper, but the predictions isolated here nonetheless represent an “approximate equilibrium.”

requires nine affirmative votes out of the fifteen members, with no vetoes from permanent members. It has often been the case that Russia and/or China will abstain on an individual resolution, thus requiring up to six votes from rotating members. If the US seeks only a minimal winning coalition, it would procure the six least costly votes. UN scholars, however, emphasize the empirical regularity of unanimity on the Security Council as well as its role in bestowing legitimacy (Dryzek & Niemeyer 2006). If the US desires unanimity, we would predict that aid increases as propensity to vote against the US increases across all ten non-permanent members. We test both of these possibilities below.

## **Research Design**

Examining the relationship between the propensity to vote against the US and foreign aid received presents both design and measurement hurdles. Specifically, we must construct a measure of propensity to vote against the US that is not reflective of Security Council behavior potentially related to US aid, isolate exogenous variation in a state's relative propensity to vote against the US, and account for confounding patterns potentially present in cross-sectional data. We begin by clarifying our explanatory variable of interest, which we construct from an estimate of states' propensities to vote against the US. We then specify our identification strategy, which exploits the staggered rotating structure of the non-permanent members of the UNSC, along with fixed effects. Finally, we discuss the outcome measures of interest and controls.

We have argued that evidence supportive of vote buying would entail increases in US foreign aid as propensity to vote against the US increases and thus the aid necessary to change a state's vote increases. An assumption underlying this prediction is that the lower a state's propensity to vote alongside the US on the Security Council, the more aid necessary to change its vote, all else equal. In vote buying theories, we may simply order members of the deliberative body by the size of the payment they would require to change their vote. In the real world, we must take ideological misalignment as a proxy for the costliness of a member's vote. Propensity to vote opposite the buyer need not be related one-to-one with the costliness of the vote, only correlated, to serve as a proxy for costliness, and thus we take propensity to vote against the US

as our quantity of interest.<sup>5</sup>

To obtain a measure of a state's propensity to vote against the US, we must first construct a measure of foreign policy similarity with the United States for each nation. We generate a yearly estimate of the probability that a state votes the same way as the US using voting in the General Assembly (UNGA) (Voeten, Strezhnev & Bailey 2009). Scholars have regarded voting patterns in the UNGA as evidence of the similarity of strategic interests between states both historically (Alker 1964, Dixon 1981) and more recently (Kim & Russett 1996, Gartzke 1998, Voeten 2004), particularly when studying the provision of aid (Alesina & Dollar 2000, Vreeland & Dreher 2014). Importantly, although there is some evidence of vote buying in the UNGA, this evidence is mixed in regards to the conditions under which states can be bought (Lai & Morey 2006, Carter & Stone 2015), and few votes appear to be affected (Wang 1999). Further, despite strategic selection at play in the agenda setting of the UNGA, states can nevertheless demonstrate a wide variety of preferences on the issues considered in the body. In 2016 alone, the UN drafted and voted on resolutions regarding refugees from Georgia, violations of international law on human rights in Syria, and entrepreneurship for sustainable development (United Nations 2017).

We employ UNGA voting from the session before a member's term on the UNSC to measure states' propensity to vote against the US, fixed as the state's propensity to vote against the US for the two years of its membership on the UNSC. The decision to use and hold constant a measure of states' relative agreement with the US from before their UNSC terms begin serves three purposes. First, realizing that vote buying in the UNSC may affect voting in the UNGA, this approach isolates the UNGA-based measure from vote buying that may be occurring on the UNSC, while still approximating a state's inclination to vote with the US. Second, while a state's voting inclinations may not be entirely fixed on a year-to-year basis, there is evidence that voting within the UN is relatively stable (Holcombe & Sobel 1996). Further, in each model we control for systematic factors that may dramatically alter a state's voting inclinations during their time on the council, such government turnover, which would call into question the assumption

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<sup>5</sup> To the extent that a state's propensity to vote against the US is an imperfect gauge of the aid a state requires to change its vote, however, the measure would introduce noise into the analysis. We discuss one way to reduce such noise in our robustness checks.



of a fixed inclination to vote with the US. Finally, the use of a fixed score is fundamental to our identification strategy. We ultimately wish to use a relative measure of states' propensity to disagree with the US, since a change in a rotating member's relative propensity within its UNSC term that resulted from actions it took would raise concerns that the state's relative propensity to vote with the US is endogenous to its receipt of foreign aid.

The estimate itself follows the approach of Fowler & Hall (2016).<sup>6</sup> Specifically, for each year in our sample and across all pairs of states and UNGA resolutions on which the US cast a 'no' or 'yes' vote, we formulate a variable taking the value of 0 if the state voted the same way as the US, 1 if the state voted in opposition to the US, and 0.5 if the state abstained. We regress this variable on state fixed effects, suppressing the constant. The estimated state fixed effects for each year serve as our measure of each state's propensity to vote against the US.

Using each state's individual estimates, we calculate a rotating member's relative propensity to vote against the US by dividing it by the sum of all rotating members' propensities to vote against the US in that year. We call this a rotating member's *Contribution to Disagreement* as it represents a state's share of the overall propensity of all rotating members to disagree with the US on votes in a given year. This captures how unlikely a state is to vote alongside the US without enticement, relative to the other temporary members on the UNSC.

Examining vote buying in this context requires a careful identification strategy. The staggered rotation structure of the UNSC provides a unique source of exogenous variation in relative propensity to vote against the US. Each rotating member serves its entire term with four other rotating members, and serves each half of its term with a different, additional set of five temporary members. Having held fixed each state's propensity to vote against the US for their two-year UNSC term, a member's *Contribution to Disagreement* will shift within their term only from this replacement of five of the temporary members from year to year.<sup>7</sup>

Employing only this source of variation in relative propensity to vote against the US constitutes a fairly conservative test. First, we have only one such rotation to exploit for each

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<sup>6</sup> A summary of the construction of this variable may be found in Appendix A.

<sup>7</sup> Shifts in a state's voting inclinations would therefore not threaten the identification strategy as they are not systematically related to the countries rotating on and off during a member's term.

member, i.e., we only get one shot to observe a change in relative propensity to vote against the US. Second, the new member will be from the same region of the world as the state it replaces, and if there is greater correlation in the ideologies of successive members from the same region than across regions, dramatic changes to the ideological landscape of the UNSC would be unlikely. Empirically, just 20% of the variance in the *Contribution to Disagreement* measure is variation from within each state's term.

Simply performing a cross-state analysis would risk confounding evidence of vote buying with other systematic patterns between states' voting tendencies and the amount of aid they receive. For instance, if poorer states vote in opposition to the US, then their higher receipt of aid would inflate evidence of vote buying. With the addition of state-specific effects and year dummy variables, as well as our battery of controls, we leverage within-state changes in propensity to vote against the US to examine the relationship between propensity to vote against the US and aid across states.<sup>8</sup>

As stated, we are looking for evidence of vote buying in the form of proportional changes in aid. If the US buys a given country's vote in both years, we assume it must pay the same amount, since the state's absolute opposition to the US has not changed. Rather than a change in the absolute amount a country receives, we are looking to uncover the overall pattern of payments, and this emerges from examining relative payments across years. Specifically, we seek to demonstrate that relative payments increase as relative disagreement with the US increases, conditional on payments being made. The example below illustrates this premise and our identification strategy.

**Illustration** Consider the set of 3 states listed in Table I in ascending order of their propensity to vote against the US (*PVAUS*). We assign dollar amounts that the states require to change their vote, correlated with the *PVAUS*. This minimal working example serves to illustrate how we recover the underlying correlation between a state's propensity to vote against the US and the amount of aid it receives by comparing relative changes in explanatory and outcome variables. Though not as straightforward as levels of disagreement and aid received, this

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<sup>8</sup>This also helps mitigate the noise introduced by the imperfect correlation of a state's propensity to vote against the US and the payment it would require to change its vote.

approach is necessary for causal identification.

Table I: State Characteristics for the Example

State ID	PVAUS	Amount required to change vote (\$)
1	1/4	4
2	1/3	5
3	1/2	6

Suppose that in year 1, states 1 and 2 are on the council, and in year 2, state 1 is replaced by state 3. From the US's perspective, state 3's vote is more costly than state 1's. State 2 thus becomes relatively less expensive from year 1 to year 2. The cost of state 2's vote is reflected in absolute levels, but also in the relative shares, the latter of which change by way of exogenous variation in the council membership. When state 2's *Contribution to Disagreement* falls in year 2, its share of the aid given to members of the council falls as well.

Table II: Rotating Council Membership for Example 1

Year	State ID	<i>Contribution to Disagreement</i>	Share of Aid Given
1	1	3/7	4/9
1	2	4/7	5/9
2	2	2/5	5/11
2	3	3/5	6/11

\* \* \*

The US may not seek unanimity, and as such, states may move in and out of the set of cheapest votes required for passage of resolutions on the Council, e.g., the fifth to the seventh cheapest vote. If vote buying dies off for those countries most averse to the positions of the US, the non-monotonicity will hinder the observation of any vote buying that is occurring. To allow for this possibility, we conduct analyses both of the full sample and those states whose vote would be cheapest votes to buy, yet necessary for passage of resolutions. Indeed, this minimal-winning coalition variant of the vote buying hypotheses constitutes a more refined version of

Vreeland & Dreher's (2014) prediction that the US would not reward its closest friends nor its most strident foes, but rather those potentially persuadable countries that are moderately opposed to US positions. Evidence that the pattern of payments reflects vote buying over the six members most likely to vote with the US – but not all members – would be evidence both of vote buying and that the US seeks only a minimal winning coalition rather than unanimity.

## Data

As our dependent variable, we distinguish between flows of both military and economic aid. Military and economic aid are both fungible from the perspective of the recipient (Khilji & Zampelli 1994, Feyzioglu, Swaroop & Zhu 1998), but from the perspective of the donor they may be quite different. From the perspective of the US government, it may be more palatable politically to give economic aid to ideologically distant states. However, there is evidence that, as an instrument of national security, military assistance is more clearly under the purview of the executive (Milner & Tingley 2010). In examining both forms of aid, we can consider such cross-cutting implications.

In some cases, a state may receive neither military nor economic aid during both years of a term on the UNSC, which indicates their lack of necessity for aid, their unwillingness to be bought, or the US's unwillingness to provide them aid. Examinations of the states receiving no aid of any sort during their UNSC term confirms that they are precisely those states most or least inclined to vote with the US as well as wealthier states. This specific sort of targeting and exclusion provides us with a censored dependent variable (Berthélemy & Tichit 2004). As such, we follow the suggestion in the literature in using a Tobit model, which estimates the endogenous selection of aid and therefore allows us to model the data generating process that accounts for the presence of zeroes.<sup>9</sup>

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<sup>9</sup> Tobit models have the drawback of not being consistent under fixed effects (Honoré 1992, Wooldridge 2010). Berthélemy & Tichit (2004) account for this by performing Tobit analysis using random effects. However, Greene (2004) has demonstrated that the incidental parameters problem for Tobit models is not particularly grave, as the coefficients are not biased and the standard errors are only minimally biased even with a relatively short panel, particularly when

Because of the left-skew of the data and the long, sparsely populated right tail, it is important to log-transform the US foreign aid data. Outliers have proven to be a problem in foreign aid data (Burnside & Dollar 2000) and economic data more generally (Choi 2009). We show the distribution of the data before and after this transformation in Appendix B. The transformation dramatically reduces the number of outliers in the data. Given the presence of a substantial number of zeroes in the aid data, we use the inverse hyperbolic sine function (IHS), which is a less *ad hoc* approach to retaining zeroes when taking logs than adding one to each observation (Burbidge, Magee & Robb 1988).<sup>10</sup> Using logged data allows us to analyze proportional changes in aid, which aligns with our focus on relative changes in a state’s disagreement with the US.

The Congressional budgeting process for fiscal year  $t$  occurs throughout the first two-thirds of the previous calendar year, where fiscal year  $t$  runs from October of calendar year  $t - 1$  through September of calendar year  $t$ . The UNSC usually convenes during the latter quarter of calendar years, i.e., the first quarter of fiscal years. Congress would budget in the first part of calendar year  $t - 1$  the aid to be distributed for UNSC votes taken at the start of fiscal year  $t$ . Hence, we match foreign aid from fiscal year  $t$  to explanatory variables reflecting calendar year  $t - 1$ .

We estimate each model with and without a number of control variables. While these factors should not threaten our ability to draw causal inferences given our design, each factor may influence the willingness of the United States to grant aid for reasons other than vote buying, and thus we include these variables to reduce residual noise. First, aid from the United States might vary according to where the foreign government falls along the political spectrum, and thus we control for each state’s Polity score (Marshall & Jaggers 2001). Government turnover in the rotating member state may also influence the level of aid that the US delivers. To measure domestic political changes, we use the *Change in Source of Leader Support* (CHISOLS) data set (Leeds & Mattes 2013), which records whether or not a new leader’s ascent to power is associated with a change in the underlying base of domestic support. The occurrence of a military conflict between a rotating member and the US may also curtail the

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compared to a random effects model in which the unit specific effects are correlated with the independent variables in the model.

<sup>10</sup> Letting  $y$  denote aid, the inverse hyperbolic sine of  $y$  is given by  $\ln \left( y + \sqrt{(y^2 + 1)} \right)$ .

amount of aid the US is willing to send. We therefore control for the onset of a militarized interstate dispute (MID) with the United States for each year using the Correlates of War (COW) Militarized Interstate Disputes dataset (Jones, Bremer & Singer 1996). If a potential recipient forms an alliance with the United States, the terms of the agreement may lead to a higher baseline propensity for aid. We consider whether a rotating member has a defensive or offensive alliance with the US during a given year using the Alliance Treaty Obligations and Provisions (ATOP) dataset (Leeds, Ritter, Mitchell & Long 2002). This variable estimates only for the full sample, as there are no states that join or leave a US alliance during their UNSC term that are within the six closest member states. Lastly, we control for whether the rotating member is in its first or second year on the UN Security Council, since previous scholars demonstrated that the benefits of UNSC membership are strongest in the second year (Dreher, Sturm & Vreeland 2009a).

## Results

We begin with a descriptive overview, demonstrating how many of the states in our sample display changes in the share of aid they receive that aligns with our theoretical predictions based on the change they experienced in *Contribution to Disagreement*. Tables dividing our entire sample into those whose *Contribution to Disagreement* decreased and increased appear in Appendix Section C. Two-thirds of the sample demonstrates behavior consistent with theory, as summarized below.

For non-permanent UNSC member states whose *Contribution to Disagreement* decreases from the first to the second year of their term, vote-buying theory predicts that they receive a relatively lower share of payments made to UNSC rotating members or that, having been relatively more expensive than other votes, they received zero in the first (and possibly second) year of their term. In our sample, 70 states become relatively less expensive. With respect to military aid, 23 receive relatively more assistance in their second year, and 22 receive no assistance in their second year, meaning 64% of the sample comports with theory. With respect to economic aid, 24 receive relatively more assistance in their second year, and 18 receive no assistance in their second year, constituting 60% of the sample that receives payments following

the predictions of vote-buying theory.

For non-permanent UNSC member states whose *Contribution to Disagreement* increases from the first to the second year of their term, vote-buying theory predicts that they receive a relatively higher share of payments made to UNSC rotating members or that, having become too expensive relative to other votes, they receive zero in the second (and possibly first) year of their term. In our sample, 125 states become relatively more expensive. With respect to military aid, 51 receive relatively more assistance in their second year, and 35 receive no assistance in their second year, meaning just under 70% of the sample comports with theory. With respect to economic aid, 55 receive relatively more assistance in their second year, and 25 receive no assistance in their second year, such that 64% of the sample receives payments that follow the predictions of vote-buying theory.

Turning to our empirical analysis, if vote buying is occurring, we are most confident that the relationship between propensity to vote against the US and US aid will manifest itself over the six states contributing least to the UNSC's propensity to vote against the US. If the relationship holds over the entire UNSC, a desire for unanimity leads to the persuasion of all rotating members rather than just those necessary for passage of a US-supported resolution. Accordingly, after examining the six states whose propensity to vote with the US is highest, we extend the analysis to all rotating members. Our analysis covers the years 1966-2006,<sup>11</sup> with our unit of analysis as the state-year. For analyses of just the six states most likely to vote with the US in a given year, we accordingly lose 40% of our observations. This leaves us with nearly 240 observations for these regressions and roughly 400 observations for regressions including all UNSC rotating members.

Tables III and IV present our main results. Columns 1 and 2 include only the members with the six lowest propensities to vote against the US in a given year ("Rank  $\leq 6$ ") – those most easily bought. We observe a statistically and substantively significant positive relationship between *Contribution to Disagreement* and both military and economic aid received. Of the members most amenable to voting with the US that constitute a near-minimal winning

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<sup>11</sup> This is the period in which the UNSC had 10 non-permanent members and for which we have data for our control variables.

Table III: Analyses of the Effect of *Contribution to Disagreement* with the US on Military Aid Received from the US

	Rank $\leq$ 6	Rank $\leq$ 6	All Non-Permanent Members	All Non-Permanent Members
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Contribution to Disagreement	71.292*** (22.143)	86.313*** (18.250)	23.639 (38.007)	36.746 (44.999)
Ruling Coalition Shift		-2.573*** (0.936)		-0.002 (0.866)
Polity Score		-0.292 (0.321)		0.043 (0.075)
MID with US		0.699 (4.735)		3.148* (1.611)
Second Year		0.494 (0.343)		-1.503*** (0.447)
Alliance with US				1.423* (0.774)
Constant	2.504 (5.833)	-0.932 (7.543)	-12.617*** (3.969)	-14.488*** (3.140)
Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	239	237	395	384

Notes: Robust standard errors appear in parentheses below the estimated coefficients of all models.

\*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$

Table IV: Analyses of the Effect of *Contribution to Disagreement* with the US on Economic Aid Received from the US

	Rank $\leq$ 6	Rank $\leq$ 6	All Non-Permanent Members	All Non-Permanent Members
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Contribution to Disagreement	93.472*** (29.054)	91.736*** (30.533)	-1.342 (17.780)	-6.752 (20.643)
Ruling Coalition Shift		0.126 (2.278)		0.483 (0.653)
Polity Score		-0.090*** (0.030)		-0.124 (0.141)
MID with US		-2.151 (2.520)		-1.444** (0.679)
Second Year		-3.176*** (0.286)		-1.455*** (0.194)
Alliance with US				0.271 (0.378)
Constant	-21.187*** (6.066)	-33.964*** (6.799)	15.930*** (2.017)	13.463*** (2.785)
Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	239	237	395	384

Notes: Robust standard errors appear in parentheses below the estimated coefficients of all models.

\*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$



coalition, those relatively more prone to vote against the US receive a higher proportion of the US military and economic assistance budget doled out to UNSC members. A shift in *Contribution to Disagreement* equal to one standard deviation of the within group variance (0.009) results in a 77.68% change in military aid and an 82.56% change in economic aid. For the median state (receiving \$558,953 in military aid), a 77.68% increase in military aid amounts to a \$434,194 increase in military aid. Meanwhile, for the median state (a state receiving \$24,900,000 in economic aid), an 82.56% increase in economic aid amounts to a \$20,557,440 increase in economic aid. These are substantial dollar amounts, particularly since much of this aid goes to lower and lower-middle income countries. It should be noted, however, that these estimates include states whose receipt of aid goes from zero to some strictly positive quantity. The estimates reduce somewhat in size when restricting the sample to only those states always receiving aid, though they maintain the same patterns of statistical significance.

Columns 3 and 4 include all rotating members. *Contribution to Disagreement* does not predict the outlay of military or economic aid in the full sample. This suggests that the US may be unwilling to provide assistance to those states that display the least affinity towards it. Thus, evidence that UNSC decisions are often unanimous does not result from vote buying, but rather a combination of the true voting preferences of states and seeing little value in going against the majority.<sup>12</sup>

In Appendix D, we present robustness checks, placebo tests, and extensions of our baseline analyses. First, our results are not highly sensitive to allowing for slightly greater than the six states least likely to vote against the US using military aid, but they are when examining economic aid. This result is somewhat surprising in light of the belief that delivering military aid to a highly disparate state would be more costly for the leader. This could potentially reflect

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<sup>12</sup> The counterintuitive finding of a positive and significant coefficient for a military dispute with the US in column 2 of the military assistance regressions is driven by a single observation: Panama in 1976. In this dispute, a Panamanian gunboat held two US vessels in response to illegal fishing. This was a minor altercation in a time of significant diplomatic negotiations regarding future control over and defense of the Panama Canal, for which the US increased its aid to Panama. Our results are robust to the exclusion of this variable, though it is theoretically important to include, and the variable only achieves significance in this single regression.

uncertainty over individual votes. Further, the effect weakens but remains significant for both military and economic aid if we examine only the five closest states, suggesting that the US may indeed seek to account for the possibility of an abstention by Russia or China, though not in every instance. Tables VII and VIII present these findings.

Propensity to disagree with the United States is, of course, a proxy for how amenable a state would be to selling its vote to the US. Other factors that may influence how expensive it is to buy a state's vote include its economic health. As such, in Tables IX and X, we measure US aid as a percentage of a state's GDP as our dependent variable. The pattern in the baseline results holds in these models, demonstrating that our results are not an artifact of other factors behind the cost of a country's vote besides its likelihood to vote with the US.

As a placebo test in Tables XI and XII, we match aid from year  $t + 2$  to explanatory variables from year  $t$ . Our identification holds only for within-term changes in relative disagreement with the US, so the aid distributed after a state's UNSC term is unrelated to our predictions. We are testing for false positives, and the null results provide evidence that our main results are neither spurious nor do they arise from some factor outside the UNSC rotation. This test therefore serves a different purpose than the Kuziemko & Werker (2006) test that finds that aid returns essentially to the pre-election baseline when states exit the council. While some tests regarding economic aid display statistical significance, the estimates are in the opposite direction of what vote buying theory would predict and implausibly large. Not finding evidence in favor of vote buying in this context allays concerns that our results are unrelated to the proposed mechanism.

We also consider the possibility that the strategic nature of aid has changed over time. In particular, the foreign aid literature has suggested aid has become less geopolitical and more specifically conditional since the end of the Cold War (Dunning 2004, Bermeo 2011). We therefore examine the allocation of military aid in the Cold War period and the post-Cold War period. Tables XIII and XIV present these findings. We find consistent and similar effects for the Cold War period. Although we see the effect trends in the same direction for the six closest states, we see little in the way of significant results for the post-Cold War period. This would be consistent with the previous literature. However, the post-Cold War models reduce our sample by nearly two-thirds. Since we are leveraging only a small amount of variation to guard

against possible problems of endogeneity, this is a substantial decrease, as the standard errors for the model demonstrate. Thus, it is difficult to fully evaluate whether this result is driven by post-Cold War dynamics or a lack of sufficient data. Further following this literature, we find some evidence of disparate results when separately examining democratic and non-democratic states in Tables XV and XVI. The US appears to be more willing to use foreign aid to buy votes on the UNSC from non-democratic states.

Closely following the predictions of vote buying theory, we find substantial evidence that the United States uses foreign aid to buy votes from rotating members on the UNSC. While the effects we uncover are large, we note that they are similar to effects reported in the related analyses of Kuziemko & Werker (2006) and Vreeland & Dreher (2014), while overcoming some of the limitations in this previous work.

## **Discussion**

Previous studies establish a connection between membership on the United Nations Security Council and receipt of foreign assistance, particularly from the United States. These studies argued that this pattern suggested attempts by the US to buy influence, but they stop short of supplying conclusive causal analyses of this claim. We substantiate this claim by presenting causally-identified evidence that the allocation of military and economic aid from the US to UNSC members reflects a core prediction of vote buying theory. We observe a statistically and substantively significant positive relationship between a rotating member's relative propensity to vote against the US and military and economic aid received from the US in procurement of a minimal winning coalition. We see little evidence that the US disperses aid to persuade the rest of the UNSC rotating members in service of procuring unanimity.

Our findings also constitute evidence that patterns of political behavior present in domestic politics are present at the level of international institutions. Future scholarly work might examine the role the other permanent members play in vote buying on the UNSC. This is especially interesting in light of the increasing role of China as both an emerging donor of foreign aid (Woods 2008) and as a global counterweight to the United States, as well as President Donald Trump's proposed cuts to the foreign aid budget. Further, this methodology

can be used to analyze whether other forms of international aid, such as IMF loans and World Bank development aid, constitute attempts at vote buying.

The effect identified above entails substantial sums of money. The finding that a state's receipt of bilateral aid from the United States may increase by over 75% relative to what it may have otherwise expected reflects a substantial shock to that state's resources.<sup>13</sup> Yet this is perhaps the most trivial of the ways in which we may gauge the role of vote buying. Perhaps most importantly, these findings call into question how we should view UNSC decisions.

As discussed, collective legitimization is one the major political functions of the United Nations more generally (Claude 1966) and specifically the UNSC (Hurd 2002). Security Council decisions often dictate the global system's political approval or disapproval regarding the policies and actions of states. If the US is capable of buying votes on the UNSC, this calls into question the United Nations as an independent actor capable of exercising collective authority for the international community. Evidence of vote buying undermines the success of multilateral governance more generally, as this form of multilateralism does not reflect multilateral decision making.<sup>14</sup> While scholars had previously noted the minimal voting power of temporary members (O'Neill 1996), we find that these members are willing to sell what little power they have to the dominant states in the system. This is particularly alarming evidence in light of the finding that despite this increased foreign assistance, the rotating members on the UNSC have lower levels of economic growth and democracy following their time on the Security Council (Bueno de Mesquita & Smith 2010). Thus while their vote is important for the legitimacy of international action, temporary members are both unable to exert political influence in the international community and unable to leverage their vote towards improving the health of their nation.

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<sup>13</sup> This increase is above and beyond the increase due to serving on the UNSC.

<sup>14</sup> Indeed, even in the UNSC's most recent strong rebuke of US foreign policy, their refusal to support the US invasion of Iraq, it was the permanent members of the UNSC, rather than the rotating members, that prevented a resolution backing the use of military force.

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## A Construction of the Explanatory Variable

Our measure of states' propensity to vote against the US, which we call the Probability of Voting Against the US (PVAUS), results from the following regression. The dependent variable takes the value of 0 if a state voted the same way as the US, 1 if the state voted the opposite as the US, and 0.5 if a state abstained but the US cast a yes or no vote. We regress this outcome, for all combinations of states,  $i$ , and General Assembly resolutions,  $j$ , in a given year,  $t$ , on which the US did not abstain, on state-specific fixed effects. Our PVAUS measure is simply the estimated coefficients for the state fixed effects, as this represents the state's latent propensity to vote against the US.

$$\mathbb{I}(\text{vote}_{i,j,t} \neq \text{vote}_{US,j,t}) = \text{PVAUS}_{i,t} + \eta_{i,j,t}^{15} \quad (1)$$

As discussed, if state  $i$ 's two-year term on the UNSC consists of years  $t$  ( $SC_1$ ) and  $t + 1$  ( $SC_2$ ), its USVP from the year preceding  $i$ 's term,  $t - 1$ , comprises the fixed, lagged PVAUS, which is denoted by  $\overline{\text{PVAUS}}$ .

$$\overline{\text{PVAUS}} := \text{PVAUS}_{SC_1, SC_2} = \text{PVAUS}_{t-1} \quad (2)$$

We then obtain the relative propensity of a state on the UNSC to vote against the US in a given year based on their PVAUS relative to the PVAUS of all other members of the UNSC, as specified in equation 3. We refer to this as a state's *Contribution to Disagreement*, as discussed in text.

$$\text{Contribution to Disagreement}_{i,t} = \text{PVAUS}_{i,t} \left/ \sum_{k \text{ on UNSC in year } t} \text{PVAUS}_{k,t} \right. \quad (3)$$

and perform the regression analysis specified by equation 4,





$$\ln(\text{AID}_{i,t+1}) = \alpha_i + \gamma_t + \varphi_{i,t} \text{Contribution to Disagreement}_{i,t} + \mathbf{X}_{i,t} \beta + \epsilon_{i,t}. \quad (4)$$

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<sup>15</sup> In fact, the LHS may take values of 0.5 in the case of state  $i$ 's abstention on resolution  $j$ . Note also, we suppress the constant such that PVAUS takes values between 0 and 1.



# B Distribution of the Dependent Variable



## C Descriptive Analysis of the Data

Table V: States Whose *Contribution to Disagreement* Decreased

Non-Permanent UNSC Member State	Second Year	↓ Military Aid	Zero Military Aid in First Year	↓ Economic Aid	Zero Economic Aid in First Year	Non-Permanent UNSC Member State	Second Year	↓ Military Aid	Zero Military Aid in First Year	↓ Economic Aid	Zero Economic Aid in First Year
Algeria	2005					Japan	1972	x		x	
Argentina	1972	x			x	Japan	1993		x		x
Argentina	1995			x		Japan	1998		x		x
Austria	1992	x				Kenya	1998				
Belgium	1972	x			x	Kuwait	1979	x		x	
Belgium	1992	x				Mauritius	1978		x		
Benin	2005		x			Morocco	1993				
Bolivia	1979	x		x		Nepal	1970				
Brazil	1994			x		New Zealand	1994		x	x	
Brazil	2005					Nicaragua	1971				
Bulgaria	1987		x		x	Nigeria	1979	x		x	
Burundi	1971		x			Nigeria	1995	x		x	
Cabo Verde	1993		x		x	Oman	1995			x	
Canada	1978		x		x	Pakistan	1994		x	x	
Chile	1997					Philippines	2005				
Colombia	1970					Poland	1971		x		x
Congo	1987	x		x		Poland	1997				
Costa Rica	1998					Portugal	1998				x
Cuba	1991		x	x		Rep. of Korea	1997	x			x
Czech Republic	1995	x		x		Romania	1991		x	x	
Czechoslovakia	1979	x		x		Romania	2005				
Dem. Rep. of Congo	1991	x		x		Rwanda	1995	x		x	
Djibouti	1994					Sierra Leone	1971		x		
Ecuador	1992	x				Somalia	1972	x			x
Egypt	1997	x				Spain	1970				x
Finland	1970				x	Spain	1994			x	
Gabon	1979		x	x		Sweden	1998		x		x
Germany	1978		x		x	Syria	1971		x		
Ghana	1987			x		UAE	1987		x		x
Guinea-Bissau	1997	x		x		Venezuela	1978	x			x
Hungary	1993					Venezuela	1987				
India	1978					Venezuela	1993				
India	1992	x				Yemen	1991	x		x	
Italy	1972		x		x	Zambia	1970		x	x	
Ivory Coast	1991		x	x		Zimbabwe	1992	x			

*Notes:* For non-permanent UNSC member states whose *Contribution to Disagreement* decreases from the first to the second year of their term, vote-buying theory predicts that they receive a relatively lower share of payments made to UNSC rotating members or that, having been relatively more expensive than other votes, they received zero in the first (and possibly second) year of their term. In our sample, 70 states become relatively less expensive. With respect to military aid, 23 receive relatively more assistance in their second year, and 22 receive no assistance in their second year, meaning 64% of the sample comports with theory. With respect to economic aid, 24 receive relatively more assistance in their second year, and 18 receive no assistance in their second year, constituting 60% of the sample that receives payments following the predictions of vote-buying theory.

Table VI: States Whose *Contribution to Disagreement* Increased

Non-Permanent UNSC Member State	Second Year of Term	↑ Military Aid	Zero Military Aid in Second Year	↑ Economic Aid	Zero Economic Aid in Second Year	Non-Permanent UNSC Member State	Second Year of Term	↑ Military Aid	Zero Military Aid in Second Year	↑ Economic Aid	Zero Economic Aid in Second Year
Algeria	1969		x			Japan	1976		x		x
Algeria	1989				x	Japan	1982	x			x
Angola	2004	x				Japan	1988		x		x
Argentina	1988			x		Japan	2006	x		x	
Argentina	2000					Jordan	1983			x	
Argentina	2006	x		x		Kenya	1974	x		x	
Australia	1974	x		x		Libya	1977		x	x	
Australia	1986	x		x		Madagascar	1986	x		x	
Austria	1974	x		x		Malaysia	1990		x		
Bahrain	1999			x		Malaysia	2000				
Bangladesh	1980					Mali	2001	x		x	
Bangladesh	2001	x		x		Malta	1984		x	x	
Belarus	1975	x		x		Mauritania	1975	x		x	
Benin	1977		x	x		Mauritius	2002	x			
Botswana	1996					Mexico	1981			x	
Brazil	1968					Mexico	2003			x	
Brazil	1989					Namibia	2000				
Brazil	1999					Nepal	1989				
Bulgaria	2003					Netherlands	1984		x	x	
Burkina Faso	1985	x		x		Netherlands	2000		x		x
Cameroon	1975	x		x		Nicaragua	1984		x		x
Cameroon	2003					Niger	1981			x	
Canada	1968		x		x	Norway	1980		x		x
Canada	1990	x			x	Norway	2002	x			x
Canada	2000				x	Pakistan	1969				
Chile	2004	x				Pakistan	1977			x	
Colombia	1990	x				Pakistan	1984			x	
Colombia	2002	x				Pakistan	2004	x			
Costa Rica	1975	x		x		Panama	1973				
Dem. Rep. of Congo	1983	x		x		Panama	1977			x	
Denmark	1968		x		x	Panama	1982	x			
Denmark	1986	x		x		Paraguay	1969				
Denmark	2006	x		x		Peru	1974	x		x	
Egypt	1985	x		x		Peru	1985			x	
Ethiopia	1968					Philippines	1981			x	
Ethiopia	1990		x			Poland	1983	x			
Finland	1990	x			x	Portugal	1980				
GDR	1981		x	x		Romania	1977		x	x	
Gabon	1999	x				Senegal	1969				
Gambia	1999		x		x	Senegal	1989				
Germany	1988		x		x	Singapore	2002	x			x
Germany	1996		x		x	Slovenia	1999				x
Germany	2004					Spain	1982	x			
Greece	2006			x		Spain	2004		x	x	
Guinea	1973		x			Sudan	1973		x		x
Guinea	2003					Sweden	1976		x		x
Guyana	1976		x			Syria	2003		x	x	
Guyana	1983		x			Tanzania	1976		x		
Honduras	1996					Tanzania	2006	x		x	
Hungary	1969		x	x		Thailand	1986			x	
India	1968					Togo	1983	x		x	
India	1973	x				Trinidad and Tobago	1986	x		x	
India	1985	x		x		Tunisia	1981	x		x	
Indonesia	1974	x		x		Tunisia	2001	x		x	
Indonesia	1996					Uganda	1982	x			
Iraq	1975	x		x		Ukraine	1985	x		x	
Ireland	1982	x			x	Ukraine	2001	x		x	
Ireland	2002			x		Yugoslavia	1973		x		x
Italy	1976		x			Yugoslavia	1989		x		x
Italy	1988		x		x	Zambia	1980		x		
Italy	1996		x		x	Zambia	1988		x		
Jamaica	1980	x				Zimbabwe	1984			x	
Jamaica	2001	x		x							

Notes: For non-permanent UNSC member states whose *Contribution to Disagreement* increases from the first to the second year of their term, vote-buying theory predicts that they receive a relatively higher share of payments made to UNSC rotating members or that, having become too expensive relative to other votes, they receive zero in the second (and possibly first) year of their term. In our sample, 125 states become relatively more expensive. With respect to military aid, 51 receive relatively more assistance in their second year, and 35 receive no assistance in their second year, meaning just under 70% of the sample comports with theory. With respect to economic aid, 55 receive relatively more assistance in their second year, and 25 receive no assistance in their second year, such that 64% of the sample receives payments that follow the predictions of vote-buying theory.

## D Robustness Checks, Placebo Tests & Extensions

Table VII: Robustness Check: Analyses of the Effect of *Contribution to Disagreement* with the US on Military Aid Received from the US with Varying Rank Cutpoints

	Rank $\leq$ 5	Rank $\leq$ 7	Rank $\leq$ 8
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Contribution to Disagreement	76.150*** (22.060)	97.194*** (23.668)	82.148*** (30.748)
Ruling Coalition Shift	-3.638*** (1.145)	-0.639 (1.087)	1.307 (1.288)
Polity Score	-0.410 (.)	-0.214 (.)	0.787 (0.549)
MID with US	-0.010 (.)	-0.066 (.)	13.010 (8.330)
Second Year	5.034 (.)	-0.752*** (0.234)	-1.114 (0.712)
Alliance with US		1.960*** (0.377)	2.298*** (0.572)
Constant	18.036 (.)	-10.459* (5.920)	-0.367 (11.354)
Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	200	276	313

Notes: Robust standard errors appear in parentheses below the estimated coefficients of all models.

\*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$

Table VIII: Robustness Check: Analyses of the Effect of *Contribution to Disagreement* with the US on Economic Aid Received from the US with Varying Rank Cutpoints

	Rank $\leq$ 5	Rank $\leq$ 7	Rank $\leq$ 8
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Contribution to Disagreement	74.626*** (17.251)	19.696 (22.806)	-22.850 (29.582)
Ruling Coalition Shift	-2.923 (3.323)	0.010 (1.574)	0.395 (1.159)
Polity Score	-0.102 (0.210)	-0.160*** (0.022)	-0.207*** (0.029)
MID with US	0.722 (0.617)	-3.096* (1.837)	-4.187*** (1.401)
Second Year	-6.372*** (0.204)	-2.983*** (0.173)	-2.125*** (0.178)
Alliance with US		0.925** (0.363)	0.035 (0.486)
Constant	-43.165*** (5.819)	-21.865*** (5.288)	-14.361** (6.276)
Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	200	276	313

Notes: Robust standard errors appear in parentheses below the estimated coefficients of all models.

\*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$

Table IX: Robustness Check: Analyses of the Effect of *Contribution to Disagreement* with the US on Military Aid Received from the US as a % of GDP

	Rank $\leq$ 6	Rank $\leq$ 6	All Non-Permanent Members	All Non-Permanent Members
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Contribution to Disagreement	16158.326*** (2475.056)	16302.455*** (2500.071)	3950.344 (5181.631)	9332.800 (5779.896)
Ruling Coalition Shift		-34.639 (156.180)		18.707 (73.752)
Polity Score		-63.420*** (10.415)		83.186 (66.934)
Second Year		-172.802*** (22.170)		186.551 (150.125)
MID with US				2144.684** (1011.639)
Alliance with US				354.264*** (95.859)
Constant	-1368.316** (536.498)	-2655.342*** (597.286)	-2638.614*** (445.588)	-2202.798*** (638.380)
Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	217	215	347	340

Notes: Robust standard errors appear in parentheses below the estimated coefficients of all models.

\*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$

Table X: Robustness Check: Analyses of the Effect of *Contribution to Disagreement* with the US on Economic Aid Received from the US as a % of GDP

	Rank $\leq$ 6	Rank $\leq$ 6	All Non-Permanent Members	All Non-Permanent Members
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Contribution to Disagreement	1.34e+05*** (37762.340)	1.36e+05*** (37809.168)	-8526.146 (29314.473)	3863.859 (29763.935)
Ruling Coalition Shift		92.718 (543.869)		2944.656*** (1010.315)
Polity Score		98.827 (72.505)		139.964 (90.602)
Second Year		-709.959 (.)		-738.980*** (152.245)
MID with US				-1466.297** (675.950)
Alliance with US				396.455 (541.203)
Constant	-1.75e+04** (7600.301)	-2.01e+04** (8000.271)	2281.016 (3072.087)	2592.280 (3226.049)
Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	217	215	347	340

Notes: Robust standard errors appear in parentheses below the estimated coefficients of all models.

\*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$

Table XI: Placebo Test: Analyses of the Effect of *Contribution to Disagreement* with the US on Military Aid Received from the US During Following Year

	Rank $\leq$ 6	Rank $\leq$ 6	All Non-Permanent Members	All Non-Permanent Members
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Contribution to Disagreement	7.079 (21.015)	-7.336 (22.583)	-56.815 (57.777)	-43.013 (69.498)
Ruling Coalition Shift		2.491* (1.349)		0.811 (0.635)
Polity Score		-0.109 (0.193)		-0.074 (0.088)
MID with US		-5.418* (2.811)		-3.212** (1.532)
Second Year		0.420 (0.442)		-0.027 (0.371)
Alliance with US				-0.387 (1.151)
Constant	19.443*** (5.741)	22.812*** (7.289)	-2.887 (4.966)	-4.268 (5.376)
Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	239	237	395	384

Notes: Robust standard errors appear in parentheses below the estimated coefficients of all models.

\*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$

Table XII: Placebo Test: Analyses of the Effect of *Contribution to Disagreement* with the US on Economic Aid Received from the US During Following Year

	Rank $\leq$ 6	Rank $\leq$ 6	All Non-Permanent Members	All Non-Permanent Members
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Contribution to Disagreement	-230.445*** (82.989)	-226.410*** (84.837)	54.336 (43.065)	65.746 (48.630)
Ruling Coalition Shift		-1.675 (2.067)		-0.790 (0.776)
Polity Score		0.088 (0.083)		-0.044 (0.060)
MID with US		2.628 (2.663)		0.103 (0.487)
Second Year		1.368* (0.763)		0.283** (0.135)
Alliance with US				1.477 (0.894)
Constant	32.562** (14.193)	37.819** (15.548)	10.525*** (3.768)	10.043** (4.215)
Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	239	237	395	384

Notes: Robust standard errors appear in parentheses below the estimated coefficients of all models.

\*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$

Table XIII: Extension: Analyses of the Effect of *Contribution to Disagreement* with the US on Military Aid Received from the US During the Cold War

	Rank $\leq$ 6	Rank $\leq$ 6	All Non-Permanent Members	All Non-Permanent Members
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Contribution to Disagreement	79.518*** (19.649)	79.846*** (19.533)	82.960** (36.607)	94.113** (42.174)
Ruling Coalition Shift		-2.815*** (0.004)		0.514 (2.771)
Polity Score		-0.311 (.)		0.102 (0.095)
MID with US		0.657 (.)		3.523 (3.943)
Second Year				-1.747*** (0.505)
Alliance with US				-52.023*** (4.219)
Constant	0.927 (5.585)	-1.932 (5.529)	-20.231** (8.682)	-21.471*** (3.651)
Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	149	148	245	236

Notes: Robust standard errors appear in parentheses below the estimated coefficients of all models.

\*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$

Table XIV: Extension: Analyses of the Effect of *Contribution to Disagreement* with the US on Military Aid Received from the US After the Cold War

	Rank $\leq$ 6	Rank $\leq$ 6	All Non-Permanent Members	All Non-Permanent Members
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Contribution to Disagreement	-142.023 (115.180)	274.935 (325.647)	-138.353* (79.844)	-198.214 (129.991)
Ruling Coalition Shift		-2.744* (1.607)		-0.081 (0.937)
Polity Score		0.000 (.)		-0.267 (.)
MID with US		0.000 (.)		0.000 (.)
Second Year				0.398 (.)
Alliance with US				-2.464 (2.164)
Constant	39.160** (18.260)	-26.942 (51.626)	16.789*** (3.952)	25.222 (.)
Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	90	89	150	148

Notes: Robust standard errors appear in parentheses below the estimated coefficients of all models.

\*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$



Table XV: Extension: Analyses of the Effect of *Contribution to Disagreement* with the US and Democracy on Military Aid Received from the US

	Rank $\leq$ 6	Rank $\leq$ 6	All Non-Permanent Members	All Non-Permanent Members
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Contribution to Disagreement	16.464 (50.038)	33.618 (48.263)	47.743 (31.028)	47.903 (35.329)
Democratic state (Polity $\geq$ 6)	9.881* (5.322)	5.295 (4.815)	3.782 (2.453)	3.107 (.)
Contribution to disagreement $\times$ dem. state	-135.708** (58.285)	-124.708** (57.617)	-68.910** (26.871)	-68.863** (28.800)
Ruling Coalition Shift		-2.201** (1.011)		0.038 (0.880)
MID with US		-1.379 (.)		-0.710 (.)
Second Year		0.852** (0.423)		-1.668*** (0.282)
Alliance with US				0.032 (1.032)
Constant	16.432 (11.666)	16.355 (12.718)	-13.833 (.)	-15.211*** (3.610)
Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	239	237	395	386

Notes: Robust standard errors appear in parentheses below the estimated coefficients of all models.

\*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$

Table XVI: Extension: Analyses of the Effect of *Contribution to Disagreement* with the US and Democracy on Economic Aid Received from the US

	Rank $\leq$ 6	Rank $\leq$ 6	All Non-Permanent Members	All Non-Permanent Members
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Contribution to Disagreement	93.952*** (30.158)	93.826*** (31.360)	21.065 (21.488)	21.647 (22.314)
Democratic state (Polity $\geq$ 6)	-1.434 (2.031)	-0.238 (3.308)	3.670*** (1.126)	4.876*** (1.643)
Contribution to disagreement $\times$ dem. state	23.106 (22.220)	22.986 (23.332)	-28.812** (12.191)	-30.834** (12.857)
Ruling Coalition Shift		0.105 (2.279)		0.740 (0.666)
MID with US		1.080 (0.768)		-0.810 (0.663)
Second Year		-3.026*** (0.233)		-1.439*** (0.172)
Alliance with US				0.024 (0.360)
Constant	-21.794*** (6.811)	-33.885*** (7.855)	14.438*** (2.294)	12.977*** (2.391)
Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	239	237	395	386

Notes: Robust standard errors appear in parentheses below the estimated coefficients of all models.

\*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$