Automobility, Immobility, Altermobility: Surviving and Resisting the Intensification of Immigrant Policing

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Abstract
In the last five years, immigration enforcement in the United States has changed dramatically. The focus on federal border enforcement and workplace raids of yester-year has been replaced by an intensification of state and local initiatives that rely on the daily policing of immigrant communities deep within the country’s heartlands. Perhaps the most pervasive of these are the 287(g) and Secure Communities programs, which call upon local police and sheriff’s offices to act as foot soldiers for the enforcement of federal immigration law. Fortified by the pervasive rollback by states of immigrant access to driver’s licenses, these programs convert the mundane act of driving into the activity of highest risk for undocumented individuals. Getting pulled over for a minor traffic violation now typically results in detention and often deportation. Yet most immigrants—as most “Americans”—are compelled to drive on a daily basis in order to work, care for their children, and keep up their households. How do people cope with this reality, where driving is at once requisite and forbidden? Our unfolding research in Atlanta reveals the importance of social networks and new communication technologies, including social media, in immigrants’ struggle to maintain a semblance of normalcy amid the intense criminalization of their communities. Through a discussion of the policing of automobility, its resulting immobility, and emerging forms of altermobility, this paper brings into ethnographic relief the recent words of one undocumented activist who declared, “the only secure community is an organized one.” [mobilities, immigration enforcement, undocumented immigrant, Atlanta]
though I had a valid license. But after that I was terrified to drive. And that experience changed my life.

—Rodrigo

All we can do when we walk out the door is put our trust in God. It’s our only recourse. That is the only license we carry. That is why I say that if I’m ever stopped and asked for my license, I’ll tell them I only have God’s license (solamente la de Dios), which is the most important one. There’s no other.

—Anonymous

For most of the twentieth century, U.S. immigration enforcement was nearly exclusively about border enforcement in the U.S. Southwest. This is no longer the case. Although the U.S.-Mexico border remains an important site for federal immigration authorities (Nevins 2010), over the past decade immigration policing has extended deep into the U.S. interior (Coleman and Stuesse 2014). Indeed, today’s landscape is characterized by a complex proliferation and intensification of state and local immigration enforcement initiatives (Varsanyi 2008). As we will later see, some of these operate in partnership with federal immigration authorities, while others do not. Collectively, these initiatives have transformed immigration enforcement from a federally-managed and outward-looking power, located at the territorial margins of the U.S., into an operationally diffuse and inward-looking power focused on resident immigrant populations deep within the country’s heartlands (Coleman and Kocher 2011). As a result, immigrants’ everyday spaces of labor and circuits of social reproduction are now saturated with immigration policing practices unlike at any other time in U.S. history; deportability is now more than ever a possibility for undocumented workers and their families (Coutin 2010; De Genova 2002).

Juana and Rodrigo’s experiences in Atlanta, Georgia, introduced above, are testament to the effects of this shift in policy and practice on immigrant communities across the country. Each came to Georgia from Mexico at the turn of the millennium in hopes of finding work in the rapidly growing agriculture, construction, manufacturing, and service economies of the U.S. South. Their arrival coincided with a deep demographic transformation of the Peach State, as well as of the broader region, as large numbers of Latino newcomers sought similar opportunities (Ansley and Shefner 2009; Murphy et al. 2001; Odem and Lacy 2009; Smith and Furuseth 2006). This demographic phenomenon marks the importance of “non-gateway” or “new destination” sites as Latino settlement areas, in contrast to more traditional “gateway” locations (Durand et al. 2005; Marrow 2013; Suro and Singer 2002).

The shift, sometimes called the “Nuevo New South” (Fink 2003; Mohl 2003), means that today the new immigrant, and specifically Latino, population in the U.S. South is growing much faster than anywhere else in the country (Kochhar et al. 2005). For example, sprawling, majority suburban “auto-dependent metropolises” in the U.S. South,
notably Atlanta, are now among the most important new immigrant settlement locations in the country (Odem 2008; Singer 2008; Singer 2013). Moreover, the U.S. South now far outstrips all other regions in terms of growth in its estimated undocumented population. Seven of the top ten states with the largest growth in undocumented migrants over the 1990–2010 period are in the region. Among these, Georgia and North Carolina house the largest volume, numbering some 750 thousand people (Passel and Cohn 2011).

However, if Latinos now comprise a crucial component of the region’s diverse labor markets and, moreover, are newly prominent on the South’s cultural landscape, they are also subject to increasingly intense anti-immigration politics and racialized policing practices (Winders 2007). In other words, the area’s transition is not a straightforward story about immigrant resettlement, incorporation, and subsequent political economic enfranchisement (Winders 2012). This contradictory position in which Latinos find themselves is only beginning to be substantiated through sustained fieldwork. As Winders notes, research on new immigrants in the South has been largely focused on “describing and documenting Latino migration patterns,” and has said too little about the “processes of exclusion worked upon Latinos in many southern communities” (2005:685). The authors’ collaborative work since 2012 in the Atlanta metropolitan area, building on our prior research on immigration enforcement in North Carolina (e.g., Coleman 2012), Texas (e.g., Stuesse 2010a), and Mississippi (e.g., Stuesse 2010b), was designed to address this critique by interrogating the logics, mechanics, and effects of anti-immigrant policy. In so doing, our study responds to the National Research Council’s call for research on site-specific policies that structure migrant mobilities (2010).

Like thousands of others, Juana and Rodrigo expected to work hard and quietly in Georgia in order to create a better life for themselves and their family members back home. But neither could anticipate the radical shift in direction that post-9/11 politics would inflict on immigration enforcement, much less the impacts of post-9/11 immigration enforcement on the lives and livelihoods of undocumented migrants like themselves. Indeed, while in the decade following September 11, 2001 the South became home to the fastest growing Latino population in the country, it also came to boast a disproportionate share of non-federal immigration enforcement initiatives (Coleman 2009). The most pervasive of these are the 287(g) and Secure Communities programs, which call upon state and local police, most notably sheriffs, to enforce federal immigration law (Armenta 2012; Coleman 2012). New anti-immigrant state-level laws, such as Georgia’s H.B. 87, further complicate the enforcement landscape. H.B. 87, following in the footsteps of Arizona’s now-infamous S.B. 1070, criminalizes everyday interactions with undocumented migrants and invests state and local police with the power to ask for immigration documents during routine policing.

As we argue in this article, driving and traffic enforcement rest at the very core of initiatives like 287(g) and Secure Communities. Fortified by
states’ pervasive rollback of immigrants’ access to driver’s licenses, these programs convert the mundane act of driving into a very high risk activity for undocumented immigrants. Getting pulled over for a minor traffic violation, for example, now routinely results in detention and deportation for undocumented drivers. Yet most immigrants—as most “Americans”—are compelled to drive on a daily basis in order to work, care for their children, keep up their households, and engage in leisure activities. Driving, especially in car-centric metropolitan centers such as Atlanta, is hardly an option in order to labor and socially reproduce. New immigrant communities in Atlanta feel this necessity and its accompanying hazards acutely.

How do undocumented residents cope with this contradiction, in which driving is at once requisite and yet a new ground zero for state and local immigration enforcement? How do people go about their daily lives in a climate that can best be described as one of terror? And in what ways are undocumented immigrants not only surviving but organizing their communities in response to the proliferation of state- and local-level immigration enforcement initiatives? In response to these questions, we seek to clarify the policy mechanisms, effects of, and responses to non-federal immigrant policing through a consideration of the twin problems of immigrant mobility and immobilization.

We start the paper by problematizing an emerging so-called “new mobilities paradigm,” and suggest the merits of bringing the concept of “automobility” to bear on the discussion of immigrant mobility. Second, we extend our discussion of automobility by outlining how Secure Communities operate through the surveillance of undocumented immigrants’ use of automobiles to labor and socially reproduce. In a third section, we draw upon our ethnographic research to survey the effects of intensified immigration enforcement on the roads, which we argue has complicated immigrant social reproduction, in some instances making it nearly unworkable. Finally, we consider provocative new forms of what we are calling “altermobility” emerging from within Atlanta’s immigrant communities. We demonstrate in particular the importance of social networks and communication technologies, including new social media, in immigrants’ struggles to survive and resist regimes of non-federal immigration enforcement amid the intense criminalization of their communities.

The findings presented in this paper come from the authors’ ongoing, collaborative research in the 33-county Atlanta metropolitan statistical area. Our work explores the genesis and mechanics of non-federal immigration enforcement in the region, its effects on new immigrant populations there, and the political mobilization of immigrant rights groups in response to heightened policing. We approach the issue bilaterally through police ethnography and political engagement with immigrant rights groups in order to uncover how immigration enforcement works, to what effect, and why it has taken root so strongly in the region. This methodological approach marries the study of individuals and institutions wielding state power with intimate collaboration with those most affected by the exercise of such power.
Coleman has spent the bulk of his time in Atlanta interviewing sheriffs, police chiefs, and county prosecutors, as well as observing federal immigration proceedings, in order to better understand the production and implementation of immigration policy by state actors. Stuesse has focused her research on observant participation and in-depth interviews with immigrant rights organizations and members of undocumented migrant communities in order to interrogate the changing effects of immigration enforcement and immigrant communities’ responses to these practices. Since summer 2012 the authors have collaborated closely with the Georgia Latino Alliance for Human Rights (GLAHR), the only statewide immigrant rights group in Georgia focused on grassroots organizing.

The new mobilities debate

Despite the fact that human mobility itself is far from new, there has been a proliferation of research on the topic over the past decade (Cresswell 2006; Cresswell 2010; Sheller and Urry 2006). This awakening to the question of mobility is, in large part, a response to Cresswell’s (2006) charge that social science is sedentarist. As Cresswell argues, drawing on Malkki’s anthropological research on refugees (Malkki 1992; Malkki 1995), it is the norm across the social sciences for placelessness (or movement) to be understood as an abnormality against which place (as stability, meaning, and authenticity) is both studied and celebrated (Cresswell 2006:25–56). A corrective to the sedentarist bias began to take shape in the 1990s, for example as migration scholars focused attention on transnationalism, globalization, and deterritorialization (Appadurai 1990; Basch et al. 1994; Kearney 1995; Rouse 1991). However, what sets the new mobilities paradigm apart from this earlier wave of research is its insistence on the fact, as Sheller and Urry (2006:216) review, that “material stuff makes up places, and such stuff is always in motion, being assembled and reassembled in changing configurations.” The key point here is that places are “places of movement,” or are constituted through mobilities to which they are too frequently counterposed. This seems to us a basic but often neglected point in immigration research. For example, the well-documented phenomenon of transnational migration is not the only form of mobility that constitutes undocumented labor. Rather, this specific form of mobility is followed by ongoing place-based mobilities related to the extraction of surplus value, the struggle to socially reproduce, and the desire to maintain social relations in both “sending” and “receiving” communities. As Cravey shows in her work, these creative placed-based mobilities are glossed over in immigration research—perhaps because they seem much more ordinary than the epic border-crossing journeys that migrant laborers make in order to work in the global north in the first place (Cravey 2003).

New mobilities researchers have argued for attention to the differences between various forms of mobility (Ady 2010; Hannam et al. 2006). However, in terms of effective research, the bulk of the new mobilities scholarship concerns the technologically-mediated experience
of human movement and communication from the standpoint of the globe’s elite within the most privileged spaces of global capitalism. As Conlon (2011) has recently argued, much more remains to be said in the new mobilities research about how race, class, gender, nationality, and sexuality underwrite a widespread condition of not being able to move freely, or perhaps at all. Conlon’s specific interest is with enforced migrant (im)mobilities, or what she calls “waiting as a distinct spatial and temporal dimension of stasis for migrants, as a dynamic effect of international geopolitics and a lived facet of social structures” (2011:355). Following Conlon on the importance of “enforced waiting,” we intend our work to contribute to the new mobilities debate by drawing attention to how state-based tactics of immobilization, aimed specifically at undocumented immigrants, have swept inwards, away from state territorial borders, into precisely the same spaces of laboring and social reproduction that constitute undocumented immigrants’ ability to labor.

The concept of “automobility” strikes us as a very good way to understand the problem of immigrant immobilization. For Sheller and Urry (2000:744), the term designates an assemblage of cars, roads, buildings, and other physical infrastructures which allow “users” of cities to “live their lives in particular spatially-stretched and time-compressed ways.” The most important aspect of automobility as an assemblage, for us, is its inequalities. For instance, Sheller and Urry (2000:744) point out that automobility provides both for the dispersion and fragmentation of city life as well as for certain privileged individuals to better “juggle tiny fragments of time in order to put together complex, fragile, and contingent patterns of social life” (see also Urry 2004). Those without automobiles, or those dependent on public transit, will be much less successful at “juggling” this fragmented landscape in order to work and live. From this standpoint, automobility is a deeply contradictory mode of mobility and immobility insofar as it both “frees” and “fixes” populations. This dialectic of freeing and fixing is particularly obvious in major southern U.S. cities, such as Atlanta, which historically are characterized by mass white flight to the suburbs as well as the “secessionist” use of automobility by suburban whites so as to minimize their interaction with non-white urban populations (Henderson 2006; Kruse 2005).

In order to better unpack the contradictions of automobility for migrant labor in the U.S., we must understand new immigrant “destinations” like Atlanta not just as places of movement, but as sites of attempted migrant immobilization. There is now a robust cohort of researchers in the social sciences studying the devolution of immigration enforcement to non-federal law enforcement agencies (Armenta 2012; Decker et al. 2010; Lewis et al. 2013; Varsanyi et al. 2012; Walker and Leitner 2011; Wong 2012). This work focuses on two specific federal initiatives to
enroll state and local police in federal immigration enforcement initiatives: the 287(g) and Secure Communities programs. There are some important differences between 287(g) and Secure Communities, but what these programs have in common is that they allow undocumented individuals specifically to be held by state and local authorities first on criminal grounds and then on civil immigration grounds. As recently as the late 1990s, a strict firewall separated criminal law enforcement, at the local and/or state level, and civil immigration law enforcement, at the federal level, such that local and state authorities could not prolong detention on the basis of federal immigration charges. The erasure of this bright line is a very strong indication of the changing geography of immigration enforcement in the U.S. context (Coleman 2007).

Coleman’s prior research on 287(g) and Secure Communities suggests three essential traits to these programs (Coleman and Kocher 2011). First, they do not constitute a uniform delegation of power. What they look like on the ground depends very much on how local authorities and stakeholders think these programs should be put to use. Second, whether or not local or state police are formally enrolled in either program is not a good indication of the extent of immigration enforcement in any one particular jurisdiction. This is because many non-enrolled agencies who incarcerate in county jails can engage in “off the radar” immigration enforcement by virtue of knowing that whomever they arrest will have their immigration status checked during the booking process at the county level. Third, these programs rely on the detailed scrutiny of immigrant automobility in order to function.

We want to emphasize the importance of this third overall characteristic of 287(g) and Secure Communities enforcement, regarding the surveillance of immigrant automobility, to non-federal immigration enforcement in the Atlanta region. Several reports have documented that 287(g) and Secure Communities programs in major suburban metro counties in Atlanta, such as Cobb and Gwinnet counties, rely overwhelmingly on racially discrepant traffic enforcement operations by county sheriffs and others who incarcerate in the county lock-ups (Capps, et al. 2011; Shahshahani 2009; Shahshahani 2010). It is also important in the Georgia case to underline changes to state laws regarding driving licenses. By 2013 most states across the country, in a thinly veiled attempt to criminalize undocumented status at the state level, made it impossible for undocumented individuals to obtain licenses. Some states made driving without a license an arrestable offense. The importance of state law is particularly pronounced in Georgia. For example, in May 2008 the Georgia General Assembly passed the Increasing Penalties for Driving Without A License Act (S.B. 350), which mandated a minimum two day imprisonment and fingerprinting for a first “no operator’s license” (NOL) offense. What this means is that if during the course of routine traffic enforcement a driver cannot produce a license, he or she will be booked into a county jail. And even though S.B. 350 makes no explicit mention of immigration, all NOL individuals will be checked for their immigration status at the time of
booking because all county jails in Georgia are enrolled in Secure Communities. More recently, S.B. 350 has been trumped by H.B. 87, the Illegal Immigration Reform and Enforcement Act (Georgia’s version of Arizona’s S.B. 1070). H.B. 87’s “papers please” section authorizes state and local officers to investigate the immigration status of individuals taken into custody who cannot produce adequate documentation of citizenship.

The bottom line is that while driving is a basic requirement in order to work and socially reproduce in Atlanta’s car-based economy it has become a very risky practice for undocumented immigrants. Unfortunately, few immigrants feel they have the option of not driving, and many are forced to assume the risk on a daily basis in order to meet their most basic needs. Every instance behind the wheel becomes an opportunity for scrutiny at the hands of law enforcement, and thus a potential occasion for detention, deportation, and life-shattering family separation. Ironically, the risk involved in driving is simultaneously one that undocumented men and women cannot afford to take and one they must endure. They are caught in an impasse in which many feel compelled to pray each time they leave their homes, as does “anonymous” in the epigraph, that they’ll make it back home at the end of the day. The following section calls upon our ethnographic research with undocumented communities to illustrate how people navigate these dual realities.

Immobility and its effects

The enforcement policies discussed above have resulted in a climate of terror, in which immigrants live in fear that they may be separated from their families every time they step outside their homes. As a result, many undocumented individuals have dramatically altered their lifestyles to decrease the likelihood of this occurring. This includes uprooting their families to counties or areas of town perceived as safer or friendlier to immigrants, curtailing their use of automobiles, altering their driving patterns and schedules, and limiting activities of social reproduction, such as grocery shopping, educational activities, self-care pursuits, community and church participation, and socialization with friends and family to a bare minimum. In essence, the primary effect of new enforcement tactics has been to restrict the mobility of immigrant bodies, and, in essence, entire communities. To illustrate these effects, we highlight the experiences of two members of the immigrant community in Atlanta. While uniquely their own, Juana’s and Rodrigo’s struggles—first introduced in the article’s epigraphs—offer vivid testimony of the depths to which new policing tactics are impacting the lives and livelihoods of the country’s 11 million undocumented people.

Slight in stature, Juana wears her chestnut hair pulled back from her thin face. Her warm, light brown eyes exude a protective, motherly kindness that complements her passionate sense of justice. A few years ago she and her family quietly moved into this peri-urban community in the Atlanta metro area in an effort to escape the intense police presence they had faced in their previous home in a nearby Secure Communities
county. But by 2011, her new neighborhood was facing daily police checkpoints:

Our neighborhood has just one way in and out. People were seriously terrified because we could neither leave nor get in. I would walk to the little corner store and I would see how they stopped people. Many people fell victim to the checkpoints, even my husband. The police officer saw that there was money to be made. They were charging a thousand dollars for driving without a license. One thousand per person! There were days in which they got ten, maybe fourteen people. My neighbors started to leave because they were afraid of the checkpoints. Now many houses around me are empty, abandoned.

We spoke with several of Juana’s neighbors, and they concurred:

To put it simply, there came a time in which they learned where the money was. They realized that this community was full of Hispanics, and that they could easily get money from us. They would arrest you at a checkpoint for driving without a license and take you to jail.

They knew you would come up with the money as quickly as possible in order to go home before immigration got to you. They knew you had children to feed, rent to pay, that you will do whatever necessary to get out of jail.

The police were very aggressive. When they saw you were Hispanic, they stopped you. They wouldn’t let you call someone for help until you got to the jail. Then, they’d say “don’t worry, everything will be okay. Call your family so they can come pay and you can leave.”

While Juana and her neighbors believe that their local police were motivated by the prospect of financial gain, they recognize that the consequences of daily checkpoints in their neighborhood go far beyond economics. The financial burdens of checkpoints, with their accompanying fines for driving without a license and auto insurance, are significant for undocumented families whose heads of household typically hold relatively low-paying jobs. But the reality that family members might be detained and deported as a result constitutes a much greater fear. Adding to this climate of terror, while checkpoints became the main cause of immobility in Juana’s community, police do not limit their activities solely to marked checkpoints, as Rodrigo’s story helps to convey.

Rodrigo’s rough hands from years of labor in construction belie his youth, as well as his present occupation. In his early thirties, he now works as a stay-at-home spouse and father to his three young children. He is pensive and emotive as he reflects upon his experiences as an undocumented migrant in Georgia. Rodrigo recounts that after his run in with the officer who ticketed him for driving with a license that wasn’t from Georgia, he was terrified:

I was afraid because I thought maybe I was just lucky. “They could still probably deport me if they wanted to,” I worried. I didn’t even want to go to the corner store. And I was very angry. That officer detained me for nothing. He had no justification. And I said to myself, “how was this
possible, when I didn’t do anything? Well if they don’t want me to drive, I won’t drive.” And after that day I stopped driving for almost a year. I even sold my car.

Shortly thereafter, paralleling Juana’s journey, Rodrigo and his family moved away from that early 287(g) county. But soon after, what they hoped would be their safe haven became governed by 287(g):

When we arrived, we lived in a Hispanic neighborhood where people were always walking to the store and to the laundromat. You always saw people in the streets, out buying things and visiting with their neighbors. On weekends people went out to enjoy themselves in the parks, in the pools. But after 287(g) began, it’s like they’ve created a fear, and it’s not the same. People don’t have the same trust, and there’s not the same kind of movement. With the passing of each day there’s less and less, and the place looks very lonely now.

Rodrigo moved again, but his third Georgia home would also be enveloped by a 287(g) jurisdiction before long, and later would sign on to a Secure Communities agreement as well.

“I realized that wherever we go it will be the same,” he mused aloud. “They are [implementing these policies] everywhere, and we cannot escape them anywhere. We have nowhere to go.” So Rodrigo and his family stopped running from 287(g) and Secure Communities, and instead altered their daily habits in accommodation of the new policing regime:

We moved to an apartment with large stores close by so we could rely less on driving. We also made sure our new place had easy freeway access so that when we had to get around by car it would be safer. It’s more likely that they’ll pull us over on a small city street than on a freeway, so we always try to drive on the bigger streets and get to the freeway as quickly as possible. We try not to drive at night or leave the house after seven o’clock.

But adjusting to life in a police state required much more than calculating the most strategic location of their home or safest time to be on the road. It also entailed a renegotiation of Rodrigo’s and his (also undocumented) wife’s roles within their family:

My wife and I talked, and she said, “I’ll drive, I’ll work.” She really insisted, arguing that she could work cleaning houses in a more limited area compared to my work in construction that took me all over the metropolitan area. I realized that perhaps it was a good idea for her to get more confident driving and working, and in this way be more independent, in case I ever ended up getting deported. So now I am the one who takes care of our children while she works.

Juana and Rodrigo’s experiences offer a small window into some of the paralyzing effects of intensified policing on immigrant communities. Others we interviewed revealed waiting as long as possible between trips to the supermarket, choosing longer routes in their commutes to work in order to avoid the most active immigrant enforcement areas, curtailing
visits to friends and family and other social outings, avoiding children’s schools for fear of encountering authorities, and failing to report incidents of crime and domestic violence in order to avoid the police, resulting in a life lived virtually between work and home, in the shadows, and out of view of the public sphere. The constraints that immigrant policing has imposed on people’s physical mobility are immense, resulting in calculated survival decisions about where to live and when (or if) to drive—decisions with implications for people’s labor opportunities, social relations, and parenting options, including the renegotiation of traditional gender roles. This forced immobilization is negatively impacting immigrant-based economies, social reproduction practices, and social cohesion, as well as efforts at immigrant political mobilization. For these reasons, we contend that, by breeding fear in immigrant communities, these new twenty-first century models of localized immigration enforcement adhere to a social control model of policing.

Emerging forms of altermobility

While these newer enforcement practices work to constrain immigrants’ mobility, and therefore their abilities to labor, pursue education, participate in local economies, contribute meaningfully to their communities, and raise families, our research suggests that they also engender creative practices of altermobility, mobilization, and movement-building among immigrant communities seeking ways to survive, resist, and contest heightened immigrant policing. We conceive of the term “altermobility” in reference to the strategies people use to regain their individual and family mobility—physical, social, spiritual. This is distinct from, but often operates in tandem with mobilization, which connotes a more collective and collaborative coming together or organizing in order to affect social and political change—in this case, to contest the criminalization and immobilization of migrant communities.

The ways in which people overcome and resist are many. Here we focus on two of the approaches immigrant communities have embraced to create altermobilities in the face of intensified policing. First, we highlight the myriad ways that the undocumented are drawing upon social networks and reaching out to licensed drivers who can take the wheel in their stead. We then examine how immigrant communities are avoiding police entrapment and mobilizing their communities by creatively using new communication technologies—specifically, cell phone texting and social media.

Given the area’s limited and often laborious public transportation options, undocumented communities in the Atlanta metro area have relied heavily upon social networking in order to secure alternative forms of automobile transportation. They have formed extensive carpool networks, such as those orchestrated by Freedom University, which organizes weekly carpools from across a multi-county area in order to ensure interested undocumented students can safely attend classes without
having to drive themselves. And on several Atlanta-based immigrant rights-centered listservs, emails regularly circulate searching for licensed drivers to chauffeur undocumented youth to events, trainings, and mobilizations, both within the metro area and beyond—even as far as Miami and Washington, DC.

We are also documenting the proliferation of both public and private taxis as a remedy to immigrant immobility. Juana suggests that some documented immigrants have found a niche market amid the scarcity of licensed drivers in undocumented communities:

Now, people who have a driver’s license will buy a van. And they charge five or ten dollars to go to the store. It may seem pricey, but people prefer to pay a taxi to take them somewhere than to pay $685 to $1000 [in fines]. It’s better to just pay ten or twenty dollars to get to the store. At least then you know you’ll get there and back, and you’re not living with the fear that the police might catch you.

Juana’s description was echoed in many other conversations we had in the field, in which individuals within the Latino community who have a license have figured out how to make a small profit while providing needed transportation to get their friends and neighbors to and from places like work, school, or the grocery store. We have also begun to interview taxi drivers and the owners of taxi companies, and our data suggest a potential correlation between the rise of immigrant policing policies and increased demand for taxis in Atlanta’s Latino neighborhoods. We will be exploring this further as the project unfolds.

Going beyond the quest for licensed drivers to transport them, we have also uncovered some innovative and growing strategies undocumented communities are employing as a means of survival and resistance. These rely upon new communications technologies and possess significant potential as organizing tools. Since beginning our work in Atlanta in 2012, we have witnessed the development of elaborate systems that use phone texting to notify people of police checkpoints. We first heard about this early on in our fieldwork when we were told about a Latina businesswoman who ran a restaurant next door to a taxi dispatch. The operators at the dispatch would notify her of checkpoint locations called in by their drivers, and she would then share this information with her customers and other contacts. Soon after, another participant in a different part of the metro area alluded to a similar system: “We all communicate with each other,” he said. “Don’t go this way, there’s road blocks, don’t go the other way, there’s law enforcement, and actually it became very effective, so [we] created a social network from here to Gwinnett County, over an hour away, to protect ourselves.” After this we began inquiring about texting in our interviews.

When the police checkpoints in Juana’s neighborhood became a daily operation that left her community paralyzed, Juana and her comadres devised their own texting alert system:
The owner of the corner store has helped us quite a lot. From her storefront she could see the checkpoints. She would call me and say, “Juana, there’s a checkpoint,” and we’d start. There were three of us. I would call Victoria: “Let people know!” Then Daniela: “Time to get the word out!” Then I would start to send texts to all the people I knew in the neighborhood. Between my group of 100 contacts, Victoria’s list of 80, and Daniela’s list of 120, we quickly got the message about the checkpoint out to everyone in our community. And that’s how it got harder and harder for them to catch our people, and eventually the checkpoints became less frequent until they disappeared altogether.

Often the younger generation uses social media accounts to alert friends and contacts to potential checkpoints, and through 2012 the Facebook pages of immigrant rights organizations regularly included warnings about checkpoints in real time. Then, in early 2013, under one of its common checkpoint posts, the Facebook page of the Georgia Undocumented Youth Alliance announced “#Pase La Voz llamar al 415-815-20-20 para unirse a ‘PaseLaVoz.’” “Pase la voz” translates as “spread the word,” and this post invited people to call a phone number to join PaseLaVoz. In the first quarter of 2013 an estimated 25 thousand people in the northern half of Georgia called and registered for this automated checkpoint notification texting service, which allows an individual with a cell phone to sign up, for free, to receive text alerts about police checkpoints in the vicinity of the zip code they enter. These alerts are generated by PaseLaVoz users who report checkpoints they encounter, which are then circulated to the wider group of subscribers (see Figure 1).

Figure 1. The Georgia Undocumented Youth Alliance uses social media to announce a police checkpoint, 2012.
According to its founder, Information Science specialist and social entrepreneur David Iberkleid, PaseLaVoz began in the Raleigh-Durham area of North Carolina in 2011, and it now boasts nearly 300 thousand subscribers in that state. The service sent out its first Atlanta-area checkpoint text in September 2012, which read simply “Today there was a checkpoint at . . . If you see a checkpoint, please report it.” Not only was the report after the fact, but it was sent to all subscribers within a 127-mile radius and reached a meager 172 people. By January 2014 there were nearly 55 thousand subscribers in the northern half of Georgia, and PaseLaVoz had broadcast real-time reports of over 2,820 checkpoints in that area in its first fifteen months of operation in the state. At the time of this writing, a checkpoint announcement in the city of Atlanta reaches an estimated five thousand people within a two to three mile radius of the zip code in which it is reported. Moreover, the service is growing at a monthly rate of ten percent, with 50 thousand new subscribers in June 2013 alone. In spring 2013, PaseLaVoz launched in English. These subscribers represent the fastest-growing segment of users, suggesting that non-Latino immigrants and even some non-immigrants also see value in knowing the locations of police checkpoints.

There is currently no fee to use PaseLaVoz, though Iberkleid is actively researching and experimenting with ways to monetize it. He hopes to keep providing the service for free by, among other strategies, selling advertising via text to his ever-growing network of Latino immigrants across the Atlanta metro area. To date this has been limited, though the Georgia Latino Alliance for Human Rights (GLAHR) and other immigrant rights organizations have used PaseLaVoz to announce marches and other activities of interest to Atlanta’s Spanish-speaking immigrant community. Indeed, the possibilities of mass texting networks for both altermobilities and for political mobilization are promising and underdeveloped.8

Driven by necessity, immigrant communities have responded creatively to the intensification of policing of their automobility. In a very real sense, localized immigration enforcement practices have resulted in undocumented individuals’ decreased mobility. But at the same time, new strategies for avoiding surveillance and immobility have emerged. In this section, ethnographic and interview data from the Atlanta area illustrate increased use of surrogate drivers—through the use of carpool networks and formal and informal taxis—as well as a groundswell of reliance on social media and texting, most notably the pathbreaking PaseLaVoz, to share information about police checkpoint activity. We think of these in terms of both survival and resistance because they often accompany a growing political sensibility among their actors and because they operate in tandem with a growing immigrant rights movement in Atlanta. Still, the altermobilities highlighted here, on their own, fall short of facilitating a broader, more collective political mobilization in response to heightened immigrant policing.

The possibilities of mass texting networks for both altermobilities and for political mobilization are promising.8

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Conclusions

We have argued that immigrant “destinations” must be reconceived as sites of continual movement and its regulation, or as contested points of tension between undocumented mobility, immobility, and altermobility. Theoretically, the tropes of automobility and altermobility help us frame these practices in ways that bring illegality and other social markers of difference into clearer focus. Indeed, automobility and altermobility illustrate how enforcement of international borders—indeed, national belonging—has collapsed into the everyday spaces of the U.S. interior through the policing of movement at the local and state levels.

On one hand, the surveillance of immigrants’ automobility through non-federal immigration enforcement initiatives such as 287(g), Secure Communities, and H.B. 87 has resulted in a deep and enduring immobility, produced by a fear that works to socially and economically isolate immigrants from one another and from the larger society in ways that are indeed traumatic and inhumane. On the other hand, these same policing practices have generated a new altermobility, a more creative and strategic assessment of when, where, and how to drive, and for what purposes. In general, our research suggests we view these not just as tactics for survival, but as “weapons of the weak” (Scott 1985).

At the same time, we see the security state engendering—and altermobilities cultivating—the proliferation of ancillary business enterprises, as individuals innovate ways to help their neighbors while also helping themselves within the political economy of neoliberalism. Despite this dualism, we argue that altermobilities also hold the potential for innovative forms of community and political mobilization in response, and we close the article with a glimpse of such possibilities.

It is these opportunities for unity, these possibilities for growing collectivities, and the potential they hold for helping us all recognize our common humanity and strive for full citizenship for all that Juana and Rodrigo insist we keep in sharp focus. Today both are active participants in the Georgia Latino Alliance for Human Rights (GLAHR), the only statewide immigrant rights group focused on organizing at the “grassroots.” They are also key leaders in their communities.

Rodrigo belongs to an Atlanta-based “people’s committee” (comité popular) associated with GLAHR (aptly nicknamed the GLAHRiadaores, which, in Spanish, sounds like “gladiators”) and coordinates a weekly radio show in which he and a dozen others talk about immigrant justice, share their experiences, and work to bring more people into the movement. The radio show has been among those advertising through PaseLaVoz. When asked why he has become so involved in the GLAHRiadaores popular theater troupe and radio show, he shares, “I feel the need to do something. For everything this country has given me, I have to give something back. And I’d like to do something that matters. First we need to fight—not for our rights, because we already have them, but so that they may be respected and not exploited.”
Juana was walking to her neighborhood’s corner store one day when she came across a GLAHR flyer. She picked it up, took it home, and shared it with her compadres as they struggled to figure out next steps in their fight against the over-policing of their community. They told her calling GLAHR was a waste of time, but she did it anyway. Soon after, with GLAHR’s support she formed a people’s committee (comité popular) in her neighborhood:

Thank God the first meeting was a great success. More than one hundred people showed up and we conducted a peace march to the police station. Everyone wore white t-shirts. We were accompanied by pregnant women, children, people of all ages. We made signs and banners. But when the police said that our reports about the checkpoints weren’t true, we started to document the checkpoints in order to provide evidence. It was very risky. I would take my cell phone, my camera, and I would record the checkpoints. One time an officer told me that I should take two steps back because I was getting too close to him. I obeyed him, but I kept recording. And then we took our evidence of how they were treating us back to the police chief. It was really an amazing process, and that’s how we began to come together as a community.

And in this way, Juana and her neighbors began to organize. Since their committee took action, police checkpoints in their community have diminished substantially. Her story and that of Rodrigo before her suggest that undocumented altermobilities, while tactical and often individual responses, can link together, forming the basis for strategic, collective, politicized challenges to the over-policing of immigrant communities. “You know,” Juana says, with a glint of hope in her eye, “More than anything, I just want to call on all of our people to unite. La unión hace la fuerza.”

Notes

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1For critiques of the utility of the notion of a Nuevo New South, see Weise 2012; Winders 2013.
2On “crimmigration,” see, for example, Guia, et al. 2013; Romero 2006; Stumpf 2006.
3Our research team consists of the authors, who spent the summer of 2012 in Atlanta, and two graduate student research assistants who spent a collective 15 months in the field between 2012 and 2013. In preparation
for fieldwork we undertook a detailed media analysis of major print media in Atlanta in the preceding decade, as well as a policy analysis of all immigration-related bills introduced into the Georgia legislature since 2004. We also compiled county-level data on 287(g) and Secure Communities arrests and deportations and on demographic change data for the 33 counties in the Atlanta metropolitan statistical area. Once in Atlanta, we completed over 125 distinct instances of participant observation at nonprofit organizations, government agencies, coalition meetings, and in immigrant communities, as well as observed over 200 immigration hearings at the federal immigration court in downtown Atlanta and visited the Stewart Detention Center, a federal immigration jail run by the Corrections Corporation of America. Using the dual, multi-disciplinary approach outlined earlier, we conducted interviews with the following: 50 undocumented immigrants, 30 law enforcement officials, 30 representatives of immigrant rights organizations, 15 immigrant “allies,” ten immigration attorneys, and ten elected officials. Interviews were conducted in Spanish and English, based upon the preferred language of the interviewee, and were recorded in most cases, per interviewee consent.

These reports corroborate others by immigrant and civil rights groups from across the country which show that profiling and non-criminal traffic enforcement are at the core of the non-federal immigration enforcement toolkit (Gardner and Kohli 2009; Kohli et al. 2011; Rodríguez et al. 2010; Shahani and Greene 2009; Weissman and Headen 2009). We note too that similar findings about 287(g) and Secure Communities, at a general level, have been published by reporting agencies within the federal government (Department of Homeland Security 2010; U.S. Government Accountability Office 2009).

Such impacts are corroborated by other research on living undocumented in the United States today (Gomberg-Muñoz 2010; Smith et al. 2009).

For more anthropological scholarship on immigrant policing as a form of terror and social control see Rosas 2012.

For more on Freedom University, see www.freedomuniversitygeorgia.com.

Scholars are increasingly interested in the potential roles new media might play in social movements. See Berger et al. 2011; Downing 2008; Funke and Wolfson forthcoming; Juris 2012; Mattoni 2012.

For more on the work of the Georgia Latino Alliance for Human Rights (GLAHR) see www.glahr.org.

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