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Placing the Border in Everyday Life

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ASHGATE

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
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Chapter 3

Policing Borders, Policing Bodies: The Territorial and Biopolitical Roots of US Immigration Control

Mathew Coleman and Angela Stuesse

Introduction: Lessons from IRCA

In 1981, the bipartisan US Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy (SCIRP)—also known as the Hesburgh Commission—published their much anticipated *US Immigration Policy and the National Interest*. The report detailed the impact of refugee policy, legal immigration quotas, and US-bound undocumented immigration on what lawmakers described as “social, economic, and political conditions in the United States,” “demographic trends,” “the conduct of foreign policy,” and “present and projected unemployment in the United States.” The report makes for strange reading on account of the many interests that were given voice in the document. Martin (1982), for example, described the report shortly after its release as a largely uncommitted “middle position” on what had been said to date by both lawmakers and researchers on the topic of immigration and refugee policy—a problem he attributed to the commissioners’ broad disagreement over key issues such as the demographic and economic consequences of US immigration policy. And yet despite its rehashed and sometimes contradictory nature, the report did maintain a clear focus on global population growth and on what global population pressure could mean for the future of the US as a traditionally white, Anglo-Saxon settler colony. For example, the report dwelled at length on “the fact that we live in a shrinking and interdependent world” and that “tidal movements of people ... propelled by economic forces” necessitate “closing the back door” to undocumented immigration (US Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy 1981b: 3, 11). In order to make the case for “closing the back door,” the report enumerated “serious adverse effects” posed by a growing “fugitive underground class” of undocumented immigrants driven to the US by population-related economic dysfunctionality in Mexico and Central America. These included ethnic tension, cultural enclavism, a possible loss of civic culture and cohesion, job displacement, wage depression, and rising healthcare as well as education costs (US Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy 1981b: 11). Most alarmingly, the report argued that widespread lawlessness was a likely effect of uncontrolled undocumented migration:

The presence of substantial numbers of undocumented/illegal aliens in the United States has resulted not only in a disregard for immigration law but in the breaking of minimum wage and occupational safety laws, and statutes against smuggling as well. As long as undocumented migration flouts U.S. immigration law, its most devastating impact may be the disregard it breeds for other U.S. laws. (US Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy 1981b: 42)

As the commission wrote elsewhere, it was only via a comprehensive legalization program that so-called “shadow” populations of undocumented immigrants and the broader rule of law could be rescued (see “Out of the Shadows: The Rule of Law Applied” in US Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy 1981a: 631–664).

The Hesburgh Commission’s strong language on undocumented immigration played a very important role in setting immigration legislation during the 1980s (Zolberg 2006: 337–381). In particular, the Commission’s endorsement of a three-pronged approach to fending off the impending legal and demographic consequences of US-bound undocumented immigration—enhanced border policing, workplace enforcement, and selective legalization—prompted Senator Alan Simpson (R-WY) and Representative Romano Mazzoli (D-KY) to re-open the immigration reform effort spearheaded by Representative Peter W. Rodino (D-NJ) during the Ford and Carter administrations. The Commission’s triplet of recommendations became the backbone of Simpson and Mazzoli’s Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA), signed into law by President Reagan in November 1986.

IRCA was notable on several grounds. It was the first major immigration law reform bill to move successfully through both the House and the Senate in the wake of the 1952 McCarran-Walter Act, and thus stands as one of the legislative cornerstones of the post-Chinese Exclusion Act period of immigration lawmaking in the US. IRCA was also the first piece of legislation in the US to deal in a substantive fashion with undocumented immigration. But perhaps most remarkable about the law was its nearly singular focus on population as a problem deserving of sustained state intervention. As Chock (1995) argues, the entire IRCA edifice hinged on the problem of population. Population was a catch-all category used broadly by lawmakers during the lead up to IRCA to outline the apparently biological—or asocial and ahistorical—nature of undocumented immigrants’ political, economic, and social practices, as well as the problem of cultural discordance between immigrant and citizen groups and competition between them for scarce resources. Although key lawmakers like Senator Simpson may have championed the merits of race-free, class-free, and gender-free debate about undocumented immigration, Chock shows that their engagement with population in natural history terms, particularly when discussing the problem of immigrant acculturation and lawfulness, provided a proxy vocabulary for an oftentimes explicitly raced, classed, and gendered account of the various social ills and disturbances associated with undocumented immigration. Indeed, as Coleman

(2008) has outlined elsewhere, IRCA was authored on the back of a wide-ranging, mostly conjectural, biopolitical inventory of resident undocumented immigrants’ use of scarce schooling, healthcare, and entitlements resources; resident undocumented migrant populations as potential disease vectors; and, resident undocumented migrants’ ethnic and linguistic separatism as a threat to the so-called “melting pot” approach to citizenship, as well as to core public values and practices associated with “American” culture.

It is now commonplace for both supporters and detractors of amnesty to recall IRCA as an overly generous “clean slate” immigration bill. From this standpoint, IRCA was an indiscriminating, quick fix legalization law whose major policing focus was not on amnesty per se but on increasing the Border Patrol presence along the US–Mexico border so as to prevent future growth in the resident undocumented population. This is true to the extent that IRCA kicked off a period of substantial growth in immigration enforcement budgets, most of which was directed at Border Patrol resources along the US–Mexico border (Dixon and Gelatt 2005, Dávila, Pagán, and Grau 1999). Indeed, IRCA can be understood as an important first major salvo in the militarization of the US–Mexico border under the explicit banner of immigration control. For example, in the spirit of the Hesburgh Commission’s emphasis on expanding Border Patrol resources as a necessary condition of amnesty, IRCA legislated nearly a billion dollars of additional funding for the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) for fiscal years 1986 and 1987 (see budget data in US House of Representatives Judiciary Committee 1986). The bulk of this budget, some 57 percent, was dedicated to border enforcement. This money funded a major expansion in the ranks of the Border Patrol, new helicopters for most Border Patrol sectors, new surveillance equipment at the US–Mexico border, and additional Border Patrol stations, detention facilities, as well as road checkpoint installations across the US Southwest (Meyers 2005).

This said, IRCA comprised much more than border enforcement. As Gonzalez-Baker (1997) argues, IRCA struck a balance between the “clean slate” border-centric approach and a “firm equities” approach to legalization, meaning that, in addition to beefing up the border, the law engineered a carefully policed pathway to regularization, and eventually citizenship, for resident undocumented immigrants. In other words, IRCA’s amnesty process was highly selective and corrective, rather than a simple blanket reprieve. For example, the law did not apply to all undocumented immigrants but only those deemed lawful, healthy, and economically productive. IRCA barred legalization as well as employment authorization for immigrants convicted of a crime of moral turpitude, a drug offense, any felony with a term of imprisonment exceeding one year, and/or three misdemeanors at any point in their lifetime. It also excluded a range of immigrants on public health grounds, including HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis and syphilis. And perhaps most importantly, the law was conspicuously shaped by what has been called “balanced budget conservatism” (Calavita 1996). Significant congressional attention was given to ensuring that migrants legalized under IRCA would be

economically productive and not a drain on taxpayers. This took two principal forms. On the one hand, migrants likely to become a public charge—as measured by food stamp and other aid use—were for the most part denied legalization. Lawmakers also ensured that “continuous work documentation preference,” as it was termed, would be a threshold for legalization, which disadvantaged mostly female undocumented workers employed in the underground domestic services industry (Arp, Dantico, and Zatz 1990). Moreover, IRCA made it more or less impossible for migrants, once granted work authorization, to become a ward of the state, as it prohibited—with some exceptions for the elderly, pregnant, and disabled, and in the event of a life-threatening emergency—newly legalized migrants from drawing on aid and services for a five-year temporary residence trial period. In sum, what “firm equities” meant was that even if the initial steps in the legalization process were based on a simple statutory requirement and were thus not per se discretionary, later steps included important regulative caveats and bars-to-admission that first effectively sorted the population of undocumented immigrants into those eligible and ineligible for work permits, and second, closely regulated this population on criminal, health, and economic grounds once admitted.

We start this chapter off with the above brief recap of the Hesburgh report and IRCA on account of how we understand the immigration reform effort during the early 1980s as focused on policing bodies rather than simply borders. For us, IRCA highlights in a particularly clear manner the biopolitical aspects of US immigration control. By biopolitics we mean techniques of government which seek to minimize certain forms of risk or uncertainty at the level of dynamics and exchanges within a population, and not simply territorially. This is not how IRCA, and indeed US immigration control policy throughout the 1990s, is usually interpreted. The dominant critical reading of post-IRCA US immigration policy is that lawmakers, concerned about US borders as sites of uncontrolled undocumented entry, funded their militarization. Political geographer Joseph Nevins makes this point in his groundbreaking account of the rise of the “gatekeeper state” at the US–Mexico border during the 1990s (Nevins 2002). As Nevins puts it, a general consensus regarding the “geographical crime” of undocumented entry—literally, migrants’ disregard for the territorialization of the law—enabled lawmakers, during the late 1980s and 1990s, to gradually militarize the US–Mexico border as well as criminalize undocumented immigration (Nevins 2002: 141). From this general theoretical position (see also Dunn 1996, Andreas 2000), IRCA and the decade-long border build-up that the law helped spur is to be understood primarily in geopolitical terms as a military-territorial partitioning and/or policing of US borders. Geopolitics, as in controlling access to strategically occupied compartments of topographical space, is clearly part of IRCA’s genetic make-up, as well as part of its legacy. For example, as noted above, IRCA reinvigorated a series of externally-oriented interdiction activities at US borders, and specifically at the US–Mexico border. Moreover, that US borders were overwhelmed by unpoliced, undocumented entry was certainly a very common refrain for lawmakers throughout the frenzied period of immigration lawmaking, bookended on the one

hand by the formation of SCIRP and on the other hand by IRCA in 1986. And still more generally, we agree firmly that the perceived sanctity of legal-territorial borders in an abstract rule-of-law sense is an extremely important touchstone for immigration reform lawmakers and their publics (Purcell and Nevins 2005). At the same time, our brief summary of IRCA as concerned with the demographic and legal impact of “out of control” undocumented immigrant populations is meant to point out that less explicitly territorial concerns can be woven into legal-territorial justifications for immigration law reform. Indeed, what strikes us as most important about IRCA is how the law, but certainly US immigration policy more generally, focused on immigration control as doubly a problem of unpoliced borders and unpoliced populations. This leads us to the position that geopolitics and biopolitics, particularly in the context of research on US immigration enforcement, need to be understood as deeply intertwined, as opposed to distinct, technologies of governance.

In this chapter we seek to close the gap between what we see as competing geopolitical and biopolitical analyses of US immigration control policy. We see this debate as reflecting a more general impasse across the social sciences and humanities which insists on biopolitics and geopolitics as opposed models of power. Although both can be understood as mechanisms employed by states to cope with threat and (in)security, geopolitics and biopolitics are usually differentiated on account of their respective concerns for space and time, or what we describe here as topography and topology. For example, whereas geopolitics is typically characterized as a strategy of territorial control focused on the fortification of state-territorial borders (see critique in Agnew 1994), biopolitics is usually defined as an abandonment of spatial or territorial control per se due to its focus on the “everywhere” management of populations. Indeed, in place of the geopolitical focus on partitioning and policing territorial space, biopolitics is usually conceptualized as a way of dealing with an anticipated but never quite known calendar of possibly destabilizing and/or threatening events, anywhere. In other words, whereas geopolitics has been conceptualized as a locational approach to security—in terms of a defensive array of barriers to movement, membership, exchange, circulation, etc.—biopolitics has been conceptualized non-locationally as ensuring that over time certain practices—deemed undesirable—are made less and less viable. We hope to undermine this distinction, and in so doing provide a hybrid geopolitical and biopolitical account of US immigration control today.

Our chapter comprises two basic sections. In a first section, we review two approaches to the study of borders, which we label “topographical” and “topological.” Our goal in this section is to point out that while each approach has its merits they are largely missing out on what the other has to contribute to border studies. In a second section, we focus our argument on present-day immigration control policy in the US. We argue that the growth of interior enforcement, away from US territorial borders such that any number of routine practices and/or encounters can result in detention and deportation for undocumented immigrants, can be described as a form of biopolitics in the sense that its strategic goal is

to destabilize the lived everyday of immigrant laborers to the point that social reproduction is impossible. But this does not mean that geopolitical borders are unimportant to immigration enforcement. Indeed, our argument is that the topographical/geopolitical tactic of making the US–Mexico border increasingly hard to cross is an ongoing precondition for the topological/biopolitical strategy of radically increasing levels of day-to-day uncertainty for immigrant populations.

Theorizing Borders: Topography, Topology, and Biopolitics

Border studies is not a coherent enterprise. One reason why this is the case is because the field is broadly interdisciplinary. As anthropologists Donnan and Wilson suggest in a recent survey, the fact that border studies scholars come from across the humanities and social sciences, and that they bring with them a large variety of disciplinary best practices, has earned border studies a “fashionable branding” in academia. But, as they go on to argue, border studies’ interdisciplinarity has also tended towards “an uncritical accumulation or juxtaposition of different perspectives which in itself did not advance the study of borders very far” (Wilson and Donnan 2012: 15). We would add to this problem that border studies has, until quite recently, been a mostly empirical undertaking that has prioritized a catalogue-style approach to border research at the expense of more theoretically-minded claims about how borders work, and why. There are some notable exceptions to this claim. One very important case in point is Gloria Anzaldúa’s groundbreaking account of borders as infrastructures built from contradictory moments of resistance and reconstruction—and moreover her insistence that borderlands exceed state territorial borders as such (Anzaldúa 1987). We note also Jean Gottmann’s pioneering work on borders as psychosomatic geographies caught between what he described as opposing geopolitical and geoeconomic logics of closure and openness, respectively (Gottmann 1973). More generally, we recognize the significant work of Mexican American/Chicano Studies scholars theorizing the US–Mexico cultural borderlands and the power dynamics that saturate everyday life there, too often overlooked by those ensconced in disciplinary silos (see, for example, Flores 2002, Limón 1994, Paredes 1958, Pérez 1999, Rosas 2012, Saldívar 1997, Trujillo 2009, Vélez-Ibañez 1996). But for the most part border studies has shied away from this sort of theoretical work, and has instead adopted an area studies approach (see discussion in Paasi 2005, Newman 2006, Newman and Paasi 1998, Kolossov 2005).

Border studies’ general neglect of theory is, of course, now very much in question. Although the descriptive approach to borders remains an important part of the field, border studies began to engage in much more theoretically-minded research in the late 1990s (Newman 2002). A major theme during this period was on the importance of borders as “socially constructed” by groups as well as crucial to individual and group identity formation (e.g. Paasi 1996). As a result, it is now much more commonplace for border studies scholars to draw on a range

of theories regarding power, political economy, and social difference to generalize about borders. It is also commonplace for border scholars to be at the forefront of exciting new theoretical innovations on these topics, and moreover for border theory to be at the center of broader debates about empire, law, neoliberalism, and so on. What interests us specifically about the recent theoretical turn in border studies is the disagreement that it has spawned about borders, which as objects of academic scrutiny are arguably more in question today than they were during the reign of descriptive research. Indeed, in the wake of its largely empiricist as well as idiographic past, borders themselves have emerged as “essentially contested concepts” (Connolly 1974) in border studies scholarship.

Our point in raising the problem of borders as “essentially contested” is not to clear ground in the name of a new general theory of borders, or to take sides. Rather, we see the complexity and openness of the current debate around borders (Jones 2009, Rumford 2006) as an opportunity to engage in creative work across competing schools of thought concerning specifically how borders work, and crucially *where* we might go about finding them (see various viewpoints on offer in Johnson et al. 2011). Perhaps too crudely we see two primary theoretical approaches to borders in border studies today. The first approach is topographical. By this we mean that borders are theorized as territorially concrete and identifiable measures of space. From this standpoint, borders are geopolitical-territorial lines of division that describe units of space (or territories) in relation to one another, which are themselves characterized by some form of measurable spatial extent or reach. This is not to say that a topographical account of borders treats the latter, or the spaces that they divide, as quasi-natural realities (Fall 2010). Rather, to approach borders topographically is to insist that spaces of differentiation and segmentation, if social as well as political economic, are nonetheless materially locational in some robust sense. Indeed, a topographical approach to borders would conceptualize them as relatively durable architectures without succumbing to the “territorial trap” of seeing them as the fixed outer edges of some apparently natural social, political, and/or economic container (Agnew 2008).

This important distinction between topography and spatial fixity reflects a larger concern for the production of place inherent in the concept of topography. For example, Katz explains topography as a way of conceptualizing the local and non-local aspects of place-making as well as the ongoing conflicts integral to this process—which, as she sees it, allows for a dynamic theorization of place amidst a larger uneven geography of flows and connections (Katz 2001: 1214, for a similar appreciation of topography, see Staeheli and Nagel 2006, Nagar et al. 2002, Martin 2005). In this sense, topography does not embrace the idea of place as an essential location, in contrast to the abstract place-spanning force field called space (see Massey 1991). Nonetheless, in the border studies context, we would argue that the topographical approach tends to conceptualize borders as some of the most located, most concretized, and most durable of social geographies. Even as this literature in general problematizes borders as “social constructions” of “insiderness” and “outsiderness” rather than as natural entities and some have

insisted we recognize the hybridity and heteroglossia of borderlands, borders are on the whole understood from the topographical standpoint in terms of a relatively straightforward territorial ontology of inside/outside—and as such are remarkably muscular “social constructions.” Moreover, the significant majority of the topographical border studies research has, in our opinion, proceeded much too narrowly in terms of what counts as a border. The focus in this work has been overwhelmingly on one particular category of border and its affirmation of the inside/outside binary: the geopolitical, and sometimes also geophysical, borders separating states.

We understand the topographical tendency to see borders as constructed and yet enduring points of division (and connection) between specifically state territories as, in large measure, a knock-on effect of the critical geopolitics and critical international relations revolutions, which started during the mid-1980s (see overview in Kuus 2010). Critical geopolitics and critical international relations, despite some considerable differences of opinion, collectively urged a rethinking of, first, the state as a uniform and bounded space, and second, state power as a rational enterprise. Although the emphasis in this debate was on upsetting established models of state power in mainstream political geography and international relations theory, the problem of state borders was always at hand. For example, critical geopolitics and critical international relations scholars pushed for borders to be recast not as simple pedagogic givens in the international space “between” states but, crucially, as part of the performative infrastructure of states (Newman 2003). Or, as Agnew noted in the aftermath of the critical geopolitics revolution, borders “are not simply practical phenomena that can be taken as a given. They are complex human creations that are perpetually open to question” (Agnew 2008: 2). And yet, if we look at political geography and political science literature on borders authored in response to these post-Cold War theoretical innovations, we see very familiar objects of analysis rather than geographies “open to question.” A good example of this is the theoretically-minded research identified with the “Territory, Identities, Movement” as well as “Identities, Borders, Orders” research groups (Brock 1999, Albert and Brock 1996, Agnew 1999, Albert, Jacobson, and Lapid 2001). This scholarship very usefully undermined conventional approaches to the state and its borders by insisting, among other things, that borders are socially created and maintained. At the same time, this body of research re-centered our attention on precisely inter-state landscapes as preeminently important locations for thinking through the precarious materialization of “world-constituting distinctions ... such as inside/outside, anarchy/hierarchy, domestic/foreign, self/other, here/there, and so on” (Lapid 2001: 11). Put slightly differently, although this literature allowed us to shake loose both an essentialist and primordialist approach to borders by querying the unthought inside/outside ontology at the heart of disciplines like political geography and international relations, its focus on criticizing this “territorialist” ontology paradoxically led to a repetition of borders in terms of the problem of state spatiality, albeit under the decidedly less glorious rubric

of “social construction.” Moreover, we note more generally that some of the most important work today in border studies theorizes borders primarily in terms of the external bounding processes constitutive of state spatiality (Diener and Hagen 2010, Donnan and Wilson 2010, Brunet-Jailly 2007). This is, to be clear, not to underplay the importance of borders as locationally robust infrastructures which claim, rather than simply represent, an inside/outside threshold. For example, in the US–Mexico case, which we know better than other cases, the border between these two countries is without doubt a very significant marker of social difference, belonging, and political economic privilege. But it is not the only border at work in terms of the US–Mexico relationship. Moreover, we would argue that the US–Mexico border is matched in its intensity and violence by other sorts of more mobile borders “on the inside” of the US. We will look in more detail at the US–Mexico case study in the following section.

A second, much less dominant, approach to the theoretical study of borders foregrounds the problem of topology. Topology, broadly, refers to non-planar, non-linear, non-territorial, and non-distance based accounts of space and place, and their production (Belcher et al. 2008). A topological approach to the problems space and place—the former usually interpreted as general and intrusive, and the latter as grounded and bounded—de-differentiates the two such that the inside/outside ontology at the heart of the space/place distinction dissolves. As Amin explains it, topology concerns “geographies constituted through ... folds, undulations, and overlaps that natural and social practices normally assume, without any a priori assumption of relations nested in territorial or geometric space” (Amin 2002: 389, see also Allen 2009). The concept of topology boils down to three basic claims. First, the usual priority placed on propinquity, or nearness, when it comes to understanding what happens in a certain site is replaced by an emphasis on non-metric connectivity (Amin 2004). Second, topology draws attention to the transductive or in-formation quality of social relations in specific sites (Dodge and Kitchin 2005). Indeed, topology has been at the center of recent debates in political geography on the relationship between power and space, largely on account of the ascendancy of Actor Network Theory’s insistence on the contingencies of socio-spatial practice in particular locations (Latour 2005, Thrift 2008). Third, and most important for us, topology throws borders into question as precisely located infrastructures. The basic point of the topological approach, especially for those interested in the coupled problems of power and bordering, is that there is indeed no necessary coupling. The concept of topology suggests that there is no static and stable material domain called “the social” which can be meaningfully divided into units or chunks of space, either vertically in terms of “scale” or horizontally in terms of “regions,” and which can then be used to theorize either the deployment of power or its effects (Woodward 2010, Marston, Jones, and Woodward 2005).

We note too that there has been an explosion of work on biopolitics in border studies which has tried to destabilize borders in terms of state-based tactics of areal differentiation and the practice of territorial capture. This trend is obviously of a

piece with the research on topology, as above, even if the latter is not always cited. For example, borrowing heavily from Michel Foucault's work on the governance of sexuality, scholars have sought to shift the problem of state power away from the surveillance and policing of territory to the mass surveillance and policing of mobile populations. Some of this work uses population alongside territory, in the sense that the governance of populations can be understood as a proxy for territorial control and yet as a different way of calculating space (see, for example, Elden 2007). But by far the bulk of the biopolitics research has posed territory as a disappearing object of governance, and territorial control as an outmoded art of governance. Dillon, to pick one of many possible scholars working in this area, has argued, for example, that Foucault's work on biopolitics "opens up an entirely different spatial configuration of security" based on the problem of circulation rather than interdiction or distribution (Dillon 2007: 11). As Dillon explains, whereas "distribution signals a world to be divided between sovereign territorial political subjects and their competing hegemonies, circulation concerns a world understood in terms of the biological structures and functions of species existence together with the relations that obtain between species life and all of its contingent local and global correlations" (Dillon 2007: 11). Dillon concludes by noting that biopolitics has effected a "shift in the referent object of security from sovereign territoriality to life" (Dillon 2007: 11).

This basic Foucault-inspired distinction between power in terms of territory and power in terms of population, as well as the similarly-spirited move noted above towards topology in border studies, has fueled a range of research on the changing spatial strategies of immigration enforcement, particularly in the US and European contexts. This work points away from borders in terms of states' territorial edges and to the proliferation of "everyday" borders and immigrant policing within states (Walters 2006b, Walters 2006a, Vaughan-Williams 2009, Huysmans 2000, Bigo 2002, Amooore 2005, Parker and Vaughan-Williams 2009). In Bigo's (2001) very provocative turn of phrase, border control has become like a Möbius strip in the sense that it is no longer simply located at states' inside/outside interface, which itself is increasingly difficult to locate. Importantly, the shift from topography to topology, or from territory to population, does not imply a softening of borders; this is not a cousin of the so-called "borderless worlds" research that emerged in the immediate post-Cold War context. If anything, border studies scholars working from the topological and/or biopolitical standpoints have theorized borders as, unlike state-territorial borders, constantly consequential in their prosaic, topological-biopolitical guise. However, it is certainly the case that this research de-emphasizes states' so-called "hard" borders. And here we note a difficult logic of substitution at work in much of the topological-biopolitical work on borders. In our opinion too much of the topological research, in trying to carve out room against a strictly topographical and/or geopolitical-territorial approach to borders, replaces rather than supplements borders qua state-territorial "edges" with the less located problem of topological and/or biopolitical division. We see this logic of substitution more generally in the human geography literature insofar

as topographical space is seen more or less calendrically as an antiquated mode of analysis for a now mostly defunct period of socio-spatial reality (see discussion in Coleman 2011, Elden 2011, Latham 2011, Paasi 2011). Rather than overdraw the distinction between the topological and the topographical, and the territorial and the biopolitical, we propose instead investigating their combination. This seems an important move given that, despite the proliferation of new forms of borders and bordering, topographical-territorial borders are far from obsolete (Jones 2012). As Rosière and Jones argue (2012), the "hard" barrier function of borders is arguably now more than ever at work both between and within states, in the form of walls and fences along international borders as much as around gated communities.

Our attempt to tack between a topographical tradition focused intently on problematizing state-territorial borders and a topological tradition focused on elucidating how biopolitical borders work beyond those topographical parameters has been deeply influenced by the new mobilities turn in human geography. In general this literature has insisted on theorizing the problem of enforced immobilization and borders through both topographical and topological lenses, or as a problem of geopolitics and biopolitics (Turner 2007). Rather than rehearse that field and its debates (see Stuesse and Coleman 2014), we want to briefly note here our debt on this question to Sandro Mezzadra and Brett Neilson's work on the precarity of immigrant labor. We are particularly drawn to Mezzadra and Neilson's understanding of immigrant policing as a geographically complex strategy which blends external qua exclusive and internal qua modulating modes of immigration control. The first thing to note is Mezzadra and Neilson's attention to immigrant policing as an obviously geopolitical-topographical problem of state-territorial borders and interdiction practices. For example, Mezzadra and Neilson (2008) emphasize state borders as exclusion-oriented legal-territorial barricades which in a very real sense restrict the movement of laboring bodies between still importantly territorialized labor markets. At the same time, Mezzadra and Neilson note throughout their work that there has been a comprehensive "multiplication of borders," and that as a result immigrant policing cannot be reduced to a geography of walls and fences. Indeed, in addition to what we might think of as their more traditional geopolitical function as spatial barricades, Mezzadra and Neilson allow that borders work biopolitically, at the level of the population, and then topologically, as in unevenly across space and time.

In order to unpack the problem of biopolitical-topological borders, as a supplement to borders in a more straightforward sense, Mezzadra and Neilson draw a parallel between the current detention and deportation regime in Fortress Europe and so-called "benching" in labor market "body shops." The latter refers to a process whereby Indian hi-tech workers abroad are held in reserve by labor market brokers for a period of time so as to raise the price of labor and thereby increase demand (Mezzadra and Neilson 2013: 131–166). Importantly, "benching" is a temporary condition—a "time of forced suspension" or "controlled withdrawal"—which applies to select laborers rather than to an entire

population or cohort of workers (Mezzadra and Neilson 2013: 136–137). Indeed, Mezzadra and Neilson characterize benching as a form of “differential inclusion” which selectively excerpts and then reinserts laborers into specific labor markets, in order to manipulate demand. As they note: “Inclusion, in this perspective, is not an unambiguous social good, but a differential system of filtering and stratification that functions as a means of hierarchization and control” (Mezzadra and Neilson 2008: no page numbers). Mezzadra and Neilson’s overall point in comparing immigrant policing in Europe with labor market “benching” is twofold. First, they use the example of labor withdrawal at the heart of the “body shop” phenomenon to propose that the practice of detention and deportation does not necessarily contradict the demand for undocumented labor (see also Mezzadra and Neilson 2003 on detention as a “decompression chamber” which places controls on labor market incorporation in the context of widespread capital mobility). This recalls Nevins’ earlier analysis of US–Mexico border enforcement as a sort of demographic mop-up in the wake of the US-imposed neoliberalization of Mexican labor markets post-NAFTA (Nevins 2002, see also Calavita 1992), and as such suggests an uneasy intimacy—rather than a stark opposition—between economy and security regarding the policing of borders and immigration more generally. Second, and for our purposes perhaps most important, Mezzadra and Neilson build on the example of “body shops” to propose a model of immigrant labor control deployed *within* the most privileged spaces of global capitalism, or otherwise in places typically (mis)understood as migrant destinations. As they suggest, detention and deportation is a topological system of forced withdrawal from national labor markets which mimics the dis-locating border-crossing geographies of migrants rather than simply the legal-territorial geography of the Westphalian state system (see also Mezzadra and Neilson 2003: 8). Indeed, in the spirit of Balibar’s analysis of borders as shifting zones rather than unbroken lines (Balibar 2002: 75–103), Mezzadra and Neilson characterize borders as “cut[ting] across and exceed[ing] existing political spaces.” This emphasis on the dis-location of border policing away from states’ territorial edges leads to a further suggestion that immigrant policing transcends a simple inside/outside logic of interdiction, or of capture and geographic removal. To make this specific point, Mezzadra and Neilson develop the notion of “temporal borders,” which is essentially the “body shop” equivalent of labor market withdrawal but in the realm of detention and deportation (Mezzadra and Neilson 2013: 131–166). Temporal borders are not about uniform and enduring interdiction practices and infrastructures at states’ territorial fringes which systematically sort migrating populations according to what has elsewhere been called an “international police of aliens” (Walters 2002). Rather, temporal borders are, like the temporary withdrawal characteristic of “body shops,” fitful in their enforcement, or not always turned on. In sum, the comparison with “body shops” allows Mezzadra and Neilson to model immigrant policing as, first, variously located “on the inside,” and second, as intermittent. The result is an on-and-off patchwork configuration of immigrant policing aimed at resident immigrant populations which is broadly

consistent with the geopolitical policing of borders, even if thoroughly different in its implementation.

Immigration Control Policy in the US, Post-9/11

In August 1994 the Border Patrol announced a new border control strategy in the US Southwest. The approach, dubbed “prevention through deterrence,” expanded the use of fencing, vehicle barriers, lighting, and surveillance technology along the US–Mexico border in order to deter would-be undocumented migrants from crossing into the US between official border ports of entry (Nevins 2002, Dunn 1996, Cornelius 1998, Andreas 2000). The “prevention through deterrence” strategy was in large part the product of a 1993 Sandia National Laboratories report commissioned by the White House Office on National Drug Control Policy. The White House had asked the Lockheed Martin subsidiary to complete a “systematic analysis of the security along the United States/Mexico border between the ports of entry and to recommend measures by which control of the border could be improved” (cited in US Government Accountability Office 1995: 11). In their report, Sandia recommended that the Border Patrol build and manage a multiple barrier fence along the most densely urbanized sections of the US–Mexico border in order to discourage would-be border crossers as well as channel border crossers to less built-up sites along the border where the Border Patrol could then engage in mass detention and deportation operations. The Sandia study itself was not entirely novel. For example, in 1990 the San Diego Border Patrol sector, in conjunction with the Department of Defense, built a 14 mile steel fence along the most urbanized section of the California border in order to funnel undocumented migrants away from San Diego. Similarly, in 1993, the El Paso Border Patrol sector refocused its efforts on so-called “linewatch” duty directly at the US–Mexico border. The El Paso strategy was the outcome of a lawsuit against the Border Patrol by students and teachers at Bowie High School, near the Bridge of the Americas linking El Paso and Ciudad Juárez. The lawsuit alleged that Border Patrol officers were using racial profiles to detain suspected undocumented migrants in working class Latino neighborhoods adjacent to the border. As part of the settlement between the Border Patrol and the school, the sector chief ended the practice of neighborhood patrols and focused his resources on deterrent policing directly at the geopolitical border between the US and Mexico (Dunn 2010).

The new “prevention through deterrence” strategy marked a major break with past Border Patrol practice. With the exception of the small-scale experiments in San Diego and El Paso, noted above, the US–Mexico border had not been a priority enforcement site for the Border Patrol. For example, the wall and fence infrastructure that is now all-pervasive at the border was more or less non-existent when the Sandia report was published. Moreover, the Border Patrol’s primary enforcement focus had been on apprehending undocumented immigrants in the US interior; preventive enforcement based on the massing of Border Patrol

officers and resources between ports of entry on the US–Mexico border was a relatively untested strategy. Indeed, in addition to policing neighborhoods and bus stops near the border for suspected undocumented migrants, the Border Patrol's primary focus had been on inspecting vehicles and passengers during roving traffic enforcement operations away from the border, as well as at fixed and temporary traffic checkpoints on key highways leading north from the US–Mexico border (this continues to be an important aspect of Border Patrol strategy, see Stuesse 2010a, Heyman 2010). The rationale for traffic enforcement-based border control was that there were far fewer miles of road to patrol than miles of border, and that the Border Patrol could concentrate its officers at strategic transportation chokepoints north of the border, which a majority of undocumented crossers would be forced to use in order to reach destinations in the US interior.

Other factors also encouraged the traffic enforcement approach to border control. For example, the Border Patrol had been awarded an exceptionally broad authority to stop cars and ask drivers as well as passengers about their legal status. This power was rooted in a series of Supreme Court rulings in the mid-1970s which significantly reinterpreted Fourth Amendment protections against unreasonable search and seizure for drivers and passengers throughout a so-called “border region” defined by the court as a 100-mile-deep swath of land adjacent to the US–Mexico border. In the landmark case *United States v. Brignoni-Ponce*, the court allowed Border Patrol officers to use “Mexican appearance” as a key factor in deciding whether or not to stop a vehicle and ask the driver as well as passengers about their legal status. The Border Patrol had been granted this authority on account of their claim that traffic enforcement north of the US–Mexico border was the lynchpin of US border control policy and that without race-based criteria for making traffic stops—on the basis of an apparent correlation between “looking Mexican” and legal status—US border control policy would effectively collapse.

The importance of the “prevention through deterrence” strategy is hard to overestimate. As Nevins has explored in detail in his research, the shift away from interior enforcement to border enforcement per se in the mid-1990s meant that the earlier site-specific border control experiments in San Diego and El Paso quickly morphed into officially sanctioned show-of-force operations in all major urban centers along the US–Mexico border. This entailed a huge increase in the annual US border control budget, which more than doubled during the 1990s (Dixon and Gelatt 2005). One important knock-on effect of this change in policy was a “balloon effect” in which undocumented migrants were forced away from urban areas into more rugged terrain (Madsen 2007, Cornelius 2001). Indeed, by the end of the 1990s undocumented immigrants crossing the US–Mexico border were far more likely to do so at remote locations away from more traditional urban crossing points, and moreover were far less likely to attempt repeat entries during their first 12 months in the US due to the hardships associated with crossing away from more built-up areas along the border (Fernández-Kelly and Massey 2007). Another predictable outcome of the new strategy was a significant increase in border deaths due to exhaustion and dehydration, which by some accounts tripled

as a result of the new policy (Eschbach, Hagan, and Rodríguez 2003, Massey, Durand, and Malone 2002, Androff and Tavassoli 2012).

Despite the significant changes in border control policy brought about by the mid-1990s “prevention through deterrence” strategy, this period of border militarization was arguably but an opening act for a more recent round of fence and wall construction at the US–Mexico border. Indeed, what happened during the 1990s at the US–Mexico border pales in comparison to the fence- and wall-building spree that happened at the border in the wake of the September 11 terrorist attacks, which, among other things, suggests that state borders as such are hardly relics of some bygone era (O’Dowd 2010, Anderson 2002).

The Border Patrol has, since 2001, opted for a risk-based approach to border control in the US Southwest. This strategy has focused on human resources, and in particular on intelligence gathering as well as the mobile deployment of special operations teams to manage challenges at the border as they develop (see, for example, US Border Patrol 2012a, US Government Accountability Office 2012). The Border Patrol’s new risk-management approach in part reflects its now cautious endorsement of “prevention through deterrence.” For example, there is now compelling evidence that, on the whole, the primary impact of “prevention through deterrence” has been to increase the costs and dangers of undocumented entry rather than reduce undocumented entry as such (Massey et al. 2002, Cornelius 2001). Moreover, studies suggest that the strategy actually decreased the odds of being apprehended by the Border Patrol, as a result of the increased use of professional smugglers as well as the remoteness of passable parts of the border for both undocumented migrants and Border Patrol officers (Massey and Singer 1995, Massey 2005, Spener 2009). Nonetheless, the focus on preventive infrastructure started as a result of the 1994 strategy, initially part of the glossy-format packaging of Border Patrol strategy in the US Southwest (see, for example, Andreas 1998), is perhaps more now than ever central to overall Border Patrol strategy.

Since 2005 and the launch of the so-called “Secure Border Initiative” (SBI) in the US Southwest, tactical infrastructure appropriations for fence- and wall-building have reached historic highs (Rosenblum 2013: 15–16). As a result, since 2005 the number of miles of pedestrian fences and vehicle barricades at the US–Mexico border has more than quadrupled and tripled respectively (US Government Accountability Office 2009, US General Accountability Office 2010). Some version of a border wall or fence—from simple vehicle barriers and the traditional “landing mat” fencing to comprehensive bollard-style walls and triple layer Sandia-style fences (for an inventory, see Madsen 2011)—is now virtually continuous across California, Arizona, and New Mexico, where the bulk of the now nearly 700 miles of fencing and barriers has been installed. In other words, whereas “prevention through deterrence” was mostly an urban practice during the 1990s, it now has a much broader geographical reach. It is also important to note that the ranks of the Border Patrol have grown massively since 2006 in order to deal with unfenced and unwalled sections of the border. For example, Border Patrol staffing in the US Southwest has roughly doubled since 2005, with the

large majority of this increase targeted for the Texas–Mexico border where border fencing is not widely used (18,500 of 21,100 agents are assigned to the nine US Southwest Border Patrol sectors, as of 2012; 7,700 of 14,700 agents stationed in the US Southwest are based in Texas; see US Border Patrol 2012b).

The newest component of “prevention through deterrence” at the US–Mexico border is a practice that a recent comprehensive review of US Border Patrol strategy refers to as “consequences enforcement” (Meissner et al. 2012: 31–33). The goal of this new program is to reduce future undocumented entry by increasing the financial, psychological, and legal costs as well as social hardships associated with apprehension by the Border Patrol in the US–Mexico border zone. The key components of the new “consequences enforcement” approach include: the criminal prosecution of repeat undocumented entrants as felony offenders in the federal court system (Slack et al. 2013); mandatory detention for non-Mexicans caught at the border while they wait for a first immigration hearing; the expanded use of expedited removal (which allows for the extra-judicial removal of undocumented migrants caught within 100 miles of the border) (Coleman 2012a); increased use of repatriation flights to Mexico; and among other aspects, so-called “alien transfer” for first-time entrants (which allows undocumented Mexican nationals to be deported through border ports of entry far removed from where they were apprehended) (De León 2013). The major shift here is away from the practice of so-called “voluntary return”—whereby those caught by the Border Patrol in the US–Mexico border region are allowed to return to their countries of origin, usually Mexico, without legal or other consequences if they waive their right to appear before an immigration judge. In place of “voluntary return,” which is now increasingly limited to humanitarian cases and/or for unaccompanied minors, the new “consequences enforcement” model makes expanded use of detention and typically enforces the maximum discretionary legal penalties associated with undocumented entry. “Voluntary return” cases have all but disappeared over the past decade, from 77 percent of all border region enforcement cases in 2005 to 14 percent in 2012. Similarly, the percentage of border region enforcement cases involving formal criminal charges, formal deportation, as well as lateral or remote repatriation jumped from 23 percent of all cases in 2005 to 86 percent of all cases in 2012 (Rosenblum 2013: 6–10).

US immigration control strategy is still very much about the practice of border control at the US–Mexico border, an important reminder that the regulation of migrant mobility is an enduring component of states’ geopolitical-territorial authority. Yet, we should not assume a simple identity between border enforcement and immigration enforcement in the US case. Indeed, a geopolitical-territorial focus on the border and the problem of border control cannot come at the expense of an analysis of what we see as perhaps the most important trend in US immigration strategy since 2001: the implosion of immigration policing into the US interior as well as its dispersal across an uneven patchwork of state and local law enforcement agencies (LEAs) (Coleman 2007b, Coleman 2007a, Coleman 2009, Chavez and Provine 2009, Gilbert 2009, Golash-Boza 2013,

Heyman 2010, Hiemstra 2010, Manges Douglas and Sáenz 2013, Nuñez and Heyman 2007, Varsanyi 2008a, Varsanyi 2008b, Wells 2004, Stuesse 2010b, Walker and Leitner 2011). This development mirrors a similar de-bordering (or re-bordering) of immigration enforcement in the European context (e.g. Bigo and Guild 2005, Castañeda 2010), and in general demonstrates that everyday spaces away from state borders are increasingly important sites of immigrant surveillance and regulation by immigration authorities.

There is not the space to go into great detail about these developments, so instead we offer a quick bird’s eye view of this process over the past two decades or so. The growth of US immigration enforcement in formally non-border spaces can be traced to federal laws passed in the 1990s, co-terminus with the growth in prison-building in the US, which restructured civil immigration penalties for convicted non-citizens. By the end of the 1990s lawmakers mandated detention and deportation for a range of non-citizen felony, misdemeanor, and minor infraction offenders newly defined in immigration statute in the aggregate as “aggravated felons.” The result was a significant growth in the number of non-citizen administrative detainees and a spike in deportations in the late 1990s. However, much more important for the expansion of interior immigration enforcement has been the post-2001 devolution of immigration authority to non-federal law enforcement agencies. Prior to 2001, even if localities enforced the criminal provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) (i.e. crimes triggering deportation by federal authorities), the civil aspects of the INA (i.e. relating to immigration status) were deemed off-limits to non-federal authorities (Seghetti, Viña, and Ester 2006). This is no longer the case. For example, a range of programs now allow non-federal officers to act as proxy immigration enforcement agents in the interior on behalf of federal immigration authorities. The two most important are the 287(g) and the Secure Communities programs. Although hard detention and deportation data on these programs is difficult to nail down, the data that is available suggests that since 2002, but for the most part since 2006, millions of individuals have been identified as deportable under these programs and that, of this total, several hundred-thousand individuals, at a minimum, have been formally deported (Immigration and Customs Enforcement 2013b, Rosenblum 2012, Immigration and Customs Enforcement 2013a). The 287(g) authority, available in theory since 1996 but implemented only as of 2002, allows state and local police to investigate immigration cases and make immigration arrests on behalf of federal authorities. Since 2002, 287(g) has taken two basic forms: roving operations in which police ask for immigration status during the course of routine patrolling or, more commonly, an interview procedure for suspected undocumented immigrants booked into state and/or local jails as a result of routine police work. The Secure Communities program is a variation on this second form of 287(g) policing in that it allows non-federal police to run a biometric status check on suspected undocumented immigrants booked into custody.

There are some important differences between the 287(g) and Secure Communities programs. The biggest operational difference is that the Secure

Communities program does not ensure that identified undocumented individuals will be deported; the 287(g) program, in contrast, more or less guarantees a closed custody chain between local and/or state police and federal officials. Another important difference is coverage. For example, the 287(g) program is currently operative in just 36 jurisdictions, which represents approximately a 50 percent reduction from the program's high point several years ago (Coleman 2009). In contrast, the Secure Communities program is now operational in each of the 3,144 counties in the US, mostly via sheriff's offices. But despite these differences there are some important consistencies between the two programs. We will emphasize three. First, what is important about both the 287(g) and Secure Communities programs is that they allow local authorities to hold an individual so that even when local charges run their course the individual in question is not released. Indeed, an important operational characteristic shared by 287(g) and Secure Communities is that they allow individuals to be held by the state continuously, in relation to first, criminal charges, and second, civil immigration charges, in a way that was literally unheard of 10 years ago.

A second important characteristic that links the two programs is their focus on non-criminal arrests. This is apparently contradictory in the sense that both programs now require some form of criminal suspicion and arrest on local or state charges, i.e. not on immigration grounds alone, before an immigration investigation can be started. However, being booked into custody by local and/or state police with either 287(g) or Secure Communities authority should not be confused with conviction or criminality per se. For example, since 2006 regularly more than 50 percent of the deportee population arrested under the 287(g) program has not had any criminal charges pending when they were deported. Moreover, if we were to include other lesser offenses such as public order crimes, illegal entry, false citizenship claims, non-payment of alimony, resisting arrest, driving without a license, and such, we would see that those charged with serious crimes rarely exceeds 35 percent of the 287(g) program's total deportee population (Rosenblum 2012: 32). This trend holds also for Secure Communities, although given its nationwide operability far more individuals are affected. For example, cumulative data for 2008 through 2012 shows that less than 50 percent of the individuals deported under Secure Communities can be characterized as serious offenders. Moreover, nationwide nearly 25 percent of the program's deportees are removed under non-criminal grounds (Immigration and Customs Enforcement 2013b).

Third, and for us by far most important, 287(g) and Secure Communities partners regularly use traffic violations and traffic enforcement to stop individuals and ask about their status (Coleman 2012b). This represents a return, but in a much more spatially extensive way, to the Border Patrol's traffic-based enforcement in the US-Mexico border region prior to the "prevention through deterrence" policy, as discussed above. Indeed, it is while undocumented immigrants are on the move, between non-work spaces (shops, churches, homes, child care centers, recreational facilities, etc.) and worksites, that programs like 287(g) and

Secure Communities make their largest impact (Stuesse and Coleman 2014, Coleman and Kocher 2011). Accordingly, we characterize the focus on immigrant "automobility" under both 287(g) and Secure Communities enforcement as an "entrapment" strategy (Nuñez and Heyman 2007, Ortiz 2000, Stuesse 2010a) focused on immigrant social reproduction, and with class/race stratification as an outcome. By entrapment we mean that traffic enforcement is saturated in immigrant neighborhoods over long periods of time, deployed on feeder roads connecting significant immigrant communities to larger cross-town arteries during commuting hours, and is more concerned with alienage than motoring infractions. As a result, simple social reproduction—the unpaid work required to literally stay alive, which in most US cities today is intimately dependent on automobile use—is recast as an increasingly risky set of practices, with detention and deportation by local and/or state proxies an ever-present possibility. Gilbert refers to this sort of re-bordering away from state borders per se, we think productively, as a strategy of "incapacitation" (Gilbert 2009, see also Coutin 2010b on the increasing "inviability" of immigrant life in the US); De Genova refers to this problem slightly differently as the everyday grind of deportability for resident undocumented communities (De Genova 2002).

Our overall point in this overview is that contemporary US immigration control is constituted through two important sets of practices. On the one hand, since the mid-1990s, border control in a topographical sense has become an important part of overall US immigration control strategy, with the US-Mexico border a particular point of focus. It should be stressed that this is a recent development, which is indeed part of a global trend towards hardened geopolitical territories since the end of the Cold War (Jones 2012). On the other hand, in the wake of the militarization of the US-Mexico border, brought about by the "prevention through deterrence" doctrine, US immigration control has also become a much more general topological, or unlocatable, problem focused on everyday immigrant life in the US interior. As we hinted at briefly above, this is suggestive of earlier policing tactics by the Border Patrol in the US-Mexico border zone, but taking place at an unprecedented scale.

However, there is far more to this than simply two discrete undercurrents to US immigration control. Indeed, we propose that the geopolitical and biopolitical, or topographical and topological, aspects of US immigration control together constitute a condition that might be best referred to as "borders behind a border" (Leerkes, Leach, and Bachmeier 2012). For example, the geopolitical fortification of the US-Mexico border has a generally "hard" carceral function: in making the border much more dangerous, the "prevention through deterrence" strategy has effectively turned the US into a "zone of confinement" (Coutin 2010a) which is both difficult to enter and exit (if re-entry is intended). It is within this generally geopolitical or territorial mode of immigration control qua confinement that we think the more recent turn to interior enforcement is best theorized. Here we think the appropriate analogy is to the relationship between border control and legalization during the early 1980s, as we explored briefly in our introduction,

in which amnesty was understood as dependent on border enforcement. But today this relationship is turned inside out and upside down in the sense that the very immigrant enclave communities that laws like IRCA sought to regularize are now being created by the confluence of border and interior enforcement working together. Indeed, we see the relatively new turn to interior enforcement, as benchmarked by programs like 287(g) and Secure Communities, as promoting irregularization. The 287(g) and Secure Communities programs encourage the growth of what was referred to during the lead-up to IRCA as “shadow populations”—that is undocumented communities cut off in social reproduction terms from the rest of the US, and as such largely invisibilized, even as they remain confined in the US as a crucial constituent of the contemporary American workforce. In this sense, we see the growth of “shadow populations” largely as an instance of immigrant social control, rather than, for example, a concerted attempt to reach down into the social ganglia of the US population and deport all undocumented migrants—and then keep them out via fortified geopolitical borders. Much has been made of the apparent US strategy to deport 100 percent of the resident undocumented immigrant population (see, for example, the so-called “Endgame” strategy sketched out in Department of Homeland Security 2010), but for us this is a rhetorical flourish.

What we understand is transpiring today at the crossroads of geopolitical and biopolitical immigration control is the production of a “softer” form of social, economic, and political deportation within the US interior—at least in relation to the “hard” cement and steel of the US–Mexico border. We are not saying that deportation no longer takes the classic form of territorial banishment, but that interior enforcement in the main works by using the looming threat of territorial banishment as a result of traffic enforcement and other social reproduction-specific policing, in conjunction with the specter of lethal geopolitical infrastructures like the US–Mexico border, to regulate the ways in which resident undocumented immigrant communities learn to socially reproduce as well as work. Insofar as the result is a form of deportation within which targets immigrant social reproduction, this is a paradoxical mode of deportation without the usual emphasis on physical territorial removal. In sum, the geopolitical and biopolitical designs at the heart of US immigration control come together to produce a sort of exteriorized inside rather than a simply exteriorized outside.

Conclusion: Borders are Not Everywhere

In this chapter, we have argued that topography and topology, as well as geopolitics and biopolitics, should not be read as opposed and antithetical “rule sets” for modeling how borders work, and why. We have explored this question theoretically, with reference to the split between topographical and topological research on borders, but also empirically in terms of the US–Mexico case study, which shows that US immigration control leans heavily on both geopolitical and biopolitical,

or topographical and topological, borders. Moreover, the increased reliance on enforcement of topological borders in the current era depends crucially upon the continued enforcement and escalating militarization of the topographical border. In a phrase, US immigration control since at least IRCA has policed both borders and bodies, operating interdependently in the US–Mexico borderlands and beyond.

We want to conclude by cautioning against what we see as a now relatively common refrain in the humanities and social sciences literature on borders and border control: that borders are, now, everywhere. This refrain is obviously more germane to the topological approach to borders studies. Balibar, for example, notes provocatively that borders “are being thinned out and doubled, becoming border zones, regions, or countries where one can reside and live” (Balibar 2002: 92). Balibar suggests, usefully, that the “quantitative relation between border and territory is being inverted” (Balibar 2002: 92). To be clear, our reading is not that Balibar substitutes the topological for the topographic, or the biopolitical for the geopolitical. Rather, his point is to explore borders not as perimetrical limit points but also as spaces of (policed) residence. In terms of immigration control, this suggests very usefully that border patrol is a police of “things” and “people” as much as it might be a police of “edges.” This is indeed why we use the phrase immigrant policing rather than immigration enforcement in our research—in order to signal that in addition to border control in a narrow topographical sense, immigration control is also about policing what immigrants do (in the interior), and how. But Balibar’s provocation nonetheless risks becoming a simple “rule set” about how to see and understand borders—and indeed we have seen multiple instances of the “borders are everywhere” trope used as a somehow commonsensical shorthand to talk about borders generally at our national conferences.

The challenge here is twofold. First, we see in the “borders are everywhere” approach a tendency, no doubt unintended, to forget about the now hypermilitarization of state territorial borders. For example, we note that the topographical and topological approaches to borders are too often explained calendrically, as if the era of border militarization was an immediate post-Cold War phenomenon and that now we are on to something new. The big problem here is that a border such as the militarized interface between the US and Mexico cannot simply be folded into a general “borders are everywhere” narrative (here we are inspired by the work of Anzaldúa 1987, Lugo 2000, and Rosaldo 1989, among others). That border is very much not everywhere in the sense that it is exceptionally locationally robust and, we would add, lethal in its territorial rootedness. Indeed, this border is entirely unlike interior borders—such as traffic checkpoints in immigrant neighborhoods by sheriffs enrolled in the Secure Communities program—in the sense that it is a permanent feature of the landscape whose primary goal is to blockade and control entry, in a classical, geopolitical-territorial or topographical sense. To insist that this border be seen as one among other kinds of borders, to us, underplays what it means to cross this international boundary. Second, any generalized claim about interior borders being “everywhere” is fundamentally incorrect. If the US–Mexico border is resolutely somewhere, interior borders are, as Mezzadra

and Neilson note in their work, both temporally and spatially intermittent; their overall goal is to modulate in fits and starts rather than to permanently scrutinize. This means that interior borders are sometimes not in play; they are not everywhere, but sometimes everywhere. This is not to suggest that interior borders are somehow less meaningful than geopolitical-territorial borders. Indeed, we see the intermittent and patchwork-like quality of interior borders as posing very serious challenges to resident undocumented immigrant communities in the sense that they can loom over social reproduction practices and spaces, and in this way can, as above, be described as social control governance. We also want to stress that interior borders, in their fitfulness, are far from totalizing; the capture performed by interior borders, and the constant social reproduction threat they pose, is far from complete. In particular, there are ample opportunities for creative acts by immigrant communities in the face of these borders (Nelson and Hiemstra 2008, Cravey 2003, Ridgley 2008, Lewis et al. 2013, Marrow 2009, Stuesse and Coleman 2014, Stuesse (under review), Stuesse, Grant-Thomas, and Staats (under review)), and we would add that the local and state apparatus which directs these borders is far from a coherent machinery (see, more broadly, Soguk 2007, Campbell and Heyman 2007).

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