

Multinationals and the Globalization of Production

Vertical FDI 2

Penn State // Fall 2016

Administrative things

- ▶ Arkaive.com course code: 3D0Y
 - ▶ Please sign in
- ▶ Problem set #3
 - ▶ Due end of class, Thursday 10/13
 - ▶ Discuss Q1a today

Roadmap

- ▶ Building a model of vertical FDI
 - ▶ Break up production across countries
 - ▶ FDI to save on factor costs (factors = inputs)
 - ▶ Need a model with multi-stage production

- ▶ Today: how does firm structure depend on transport costs?

Model summary

- ▶ Two stages to final good: components b ; assembly a
 - ▶ b is skilled-labor intensive ($\theta_{ub} = 1, \theta_{sb} = 10$)
 - ▶ a is unskilled-labor intensive ($\theta_{ua} = 5, \theta_{sa} = 1$)
- ▶ Final good cost
$$c(w_u, w_s) = c_a(w_u, w_s) + c_b(w_u, w_s)$$
- ▶ Two countries, $i = 1, 2$
 - ▶ Country 1: $w_u = 10$ (\$/h) and $w_s = 20$ (\$/h)
 - ▶ Country 2: $w_u = 2$ (\$/h) and $w_s = 30$ (\$/h)
- ▶ Two symmetric trade costs
 - ▶ τ_b = cost of shipping good b
 - ▶ τ = cost of shipping final good

Possible firm structures

- ▶ A firm in country 1 wants to sell final good in both countries
 - ▶ Firm wants lowest final good price in each country
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1. **Horizontal FDI.** Produce a and b in each country.
 2. **Export.** Produce a and b in country 1, export final good to country 2.
 3. **Partial fragmentation.** Produce b in country 1, ship some of good b to country 2. Both countries produce a .
 4. **Complete fragmentation.** Produce b in country 1, ship all of good b to country 2. Produce a in country 2 and ship some of the final good to country 1.

Horizontal FDI

country 1



$$c^1 = c_a(w_s^1, w_u^1) + c_b(w_s^1, w_u^1)$$

no trade

country 2




$$c^2 = c_a(w_s^2, w_u^2) + c_b(w_s^2, w_u^2)$$

Export

country 1



country 2



→
final good exports

$$c^1 = c_a(w_s^1, w_u^1) + c_b(w_s^1, w_u^1)$$

$$c^2 = (c_a(w_s^1, w_u^1) + c_b(w_s^1, w_u^1)) (1 + \tau)$$

Partial fragmentation

country 1



$$c^1 = c_a(w_s^1, w_u^1) + c_b(w_s^1, w_u^1)$$


country 2

—————→
good b exports



$$c^2 = c_a(w_s^2, w_u^2) + c_b(w_s^1, w_u^1)(1 + \tau_b)$$

Complete fragmentation



$$c^2 = c_a(w_s^2, w_u^2) + c_b(w_s^1, w_u^1)(1 + \tau_b)$$

$$c^1 = (c_a(w_s^2, w_u^2) + c_b(w_s^1, w_u^1)(1 + \tau_b)) (1 + \tau)$$

Possible firm structures

1. **HFDI.** Do a and b in each country

$$c^1 = c_a(w_s^1, w_u^1) + c_b(w_s^1, w_u^1)$$

$$c^2 = c_a(w_s^2, w_u^2) + c_b(w_s^2, w_u^2)$$

2. **Export.** Do a and b in country 1, export to country 2

$$c^1 = c_a(w_s^1, w_u^1) + c_b(w_s^1, w_u^1)$$

$$c^2 = [c_a(w_s^1, w_u^1) + c_b(w_s^1, w_u^1)] (1 + \tau)$$

3. **Partial fragmentation.** Do b in country 1, both countries do a

$$c^1 = c_a(w_s^1, w_u^1) + c_b(w_s^1, w_u^1)$$

$$c^2 = c_a(w_s^2, w_u^2) + c_b(w_s^1, w_u^1)(1 + \tau_b)$$

4. **Complete fragmentation.** Do b in country 1, do a in country 2 and ship final good to 1

$$c^1 = [c_a(w_s^2, w_u^2) + c_b(w_s^1, w_u^1)(1 + \tau_b)] (1 + \tau)$$

$$c^2 = c_a(w_s^2, w_u^2) + c_b(w_s^1, w_u^1)(1 + \tau_b)$$

Which firm structure?

- ▶ Which production structure would a firm choose?
- ▶ Depends on $w_s^1, w_u^1, w_s^2, w_u^2, \tau_b,$ and τ
- ▶ Hold fixed wages, focus on trading costs

In class problem: Where to produce?

- ▶ $\theta_{ua} = 5$ and $\theta_{sa} = 1$; $\theta_{ub} = 1$ and $\theta_{sb} = 10$
- ▶ $w_u^1 = 10, w_s^1 = 20, w_u^2 = 2, w_s^2 = 30, \tau_b = 0.05, \tau = 0.05$
- ▶ How should the firm structure itself?

In class problem: Where to produce?

1. **HFDI.** Do a and b in each country

$$c^1 = c_a(w_s^1, w_u^1) + c_b(w_s^1, w_u^1) = 280$$

$$c^2 = c_a(w_s^2, w_u^2) + c_b(w_s^2, w_u^2) = 342$$

2. **Export.** Do a and b in country 1, export to country 2

$$c^1 = c_a(w_s^1, w_u^1) + c_b(w_s^1, w_u^1) = 280$$

$$c^2 = [c_a(w_s^1, w_u^1) + c_b(w_s^1, w_u^1)] (1 + \tau) = 294$$

3. **Partial fragmentation.** Do b in country 1, both countries do a

$$c^1 = c_a(w_s^1, w_u^1) + c_b(w_s^1, w_u^1) = 280$$

$$c^2 = c_a(w_s^2, w_u^2) + c_b(w_s^1, w_u^1)(1 + \tau_b) = 260.5$$

4. **Complete fragmentation.** Do b in country 1, do a in country 2 and ship final good to 1

$$c^1 = [c_a(w_s^2, w_u^2) + c_b(w_s^1, w_u^1)(1 + \tau_b)] (1 + \tau) = 273.5$$


$$c^2 = c_a(w_s^2, w_u^2) + c_b(w_s^1, w_u^1)(1 + \tau_b) = 260.5$$

In class problem: Where to produce?


- ▶ Now increase τ_b
- ▶ $\theta_{ua} = 5$ and $\theta_{sa} = 1$; $\theta_{ub} = 1$ and $\theta_{sb} = 10$
- ▶ $w_u^1 = 10, w_s^1 = 20, w_u^2 = 2, w_s^2 = 30, \tau_b = 0.15, \tau = 0.05$

- ▶ How should the firm structure itself?


Final good cost in country 1



Final good cost in country 2



Determining firm structure ($\tau = 0.05$)



τ_b and firm structure

- ▶ When $\tau_b \in [0, 0.07]$
 - ▶ Complete fragmentation
 - ▶ Costs of trading b and the final good are low
- ▶ When $\tau_b \in (0.07, 0.21]$
 - ▶ Partial fragmentation
 - ▶ Trading b too expensive for roundtrip from country 1
 - ▶ Still worth sending b for the country-2 market
- ▶ When $\tau_b > 0.21$
 - ▶ Export from country 1
 - ▶ Gain from $w_u^1 > w_u^2$ no longer overcomes cost of trading b


Final good trading costs

- ▶ Our analysis held τ fixed
- ▶ What happens to firm structure for different τ ?

τ_b cutoff values

	Complete frag.	Partial frag.	Export	HFDI
$\tau = 0.05$	[0,0.07]	(0.07,0.21]	>0.21	—
$\tau = 0.15$				
$\tau = 0.25$				

Determining firm structure ($\tau = 0.15$)



Final good trading costs


- ▶ Our analysis held τ fixed
- ▶ What happens to firm structure for different τ ?

τ_b cutoff values

	Complete frag.	Partial frag.	Export	HFDI
$\tau = 0.05$	[0, 0.07]	(0.07, 0.21]	>0.21	—
$\tau = 0.15$				
$\tau = 0.25$				

- ▶ As τ increases, complete fragmentation disappears

Determining firm structure ($\tau = 0.25$)



Final good trading costs


- ▶ Our analysis held τ fixed
- ▶ What happens to firm structure for different τ ?

τ_b cutoff values

	Complete frag.	Partial frag.	Export	HFDI
$\tau = 0.05$	[0, 0.07]	(0.07, 0.21]	>0.21	—
$\tau = 0.15$				
$\tau = 0.25$				

- ▶ As τ increases, complete fragmentation disappears
- ▶ As τ increases, exporting disappears

How trade costs shape firm structure



Takeaways

- ▶ Model admits 4 firm structures:
 1. horizontal FDI
 2. exporting
 3. partial fragmentation
 4. complete fragmentation
- ▶ When both τ and τ_b are low \Rightarrow complete fragmentation
- ▶ When τ is low and τ_b is high \Rightarrow export
- ▶ When τ is high and τ_b is low \Rightarrow partial fragmentation
- ▶ When both τ and τ_b are high \Rightarrow horizontal FDI