

Multinationals and the Globalization of Production

Horizontal FDI: I

Penn State // Fall 2017


Administrative things

- ▶ Arkaive.com course code: 84ST
 - ▶ Please sign in
- ▶ Problem set #1: due Thursday September 7, end of class
 - ▶ Available ~~this afternoon~~ now
 - ▶ Print out copy, hand in to folder (no e-submission)
 - ▶ Can discuss with classmates, but turn in your own work
 - ▶ Read “problem set guidelines”


August 2017 Employment Situation

- ▶ Released on Friday // Key data:
 - ▶ Change in payroll — net number of jobs created
 - ▶ Unemployment statistics
- ▶ What happened?
 - ▶ Net change in payroll = 156,000 (expected 180,000 or so)
 - ▶ Unemployment rate about the same = 4.4% = $\frac{\#u}{\#u + \#e}$
 - ▶ Data collected pre-hurricane
- ▶ FOMC meeting September 19–20
 1. “Stable prices”
 2. “Full employment”
- ▶ How will this affect FOMC decisions?

CPI inflation



Nonfarm payroll



Roadmap

- ▶ Past: OLI framework
 - ▶ Identify MNE advantage
 - ▶ High-level analysis
- ▶ Past/present: MNE facts
 - ▶ Lays the foundation for model features
 - ▶ Way to assess model successes
- ▶ Present: Towards a model of horizontal FDI
 - ▶ Introduce a model of competition ✓
 - ▶ The closed economy ✓
 - ▶ Open economy with exporters and MNEs



Horizontal FDI

- ▶ Horizontal FDI: Use affiliates to serve foreign market
- ▶ Relevant facts
 - ▶ More multinational activity in bigger markets
 - ▶ More multinational activity (compared to exports) with distance
- ▶ Important model ingredients
 - ▶ Exporting requires additional costs
 - ▶ Building a foreign affiliate requires a fixed cost
- ▶ Key tradeoff in the model
 - ▶ Saving on transport costs vs. saving on production fixed costs
 - ▶ Called the “proximity-concentration tradeoff”

Model overview

- ▶ A firm would like to serve a foreign market. How?
 - ▶ Should it produce at home and export? (an exporter)
 - ▶ Should it produce abroad? (an MNE)
- ▶ The firm makes an either-or decision
 - ▶ We call these discrete choice models
- ▶ To solve a discrete choice model
 - ▶ Compute the profit from each choice (exporter, MNE)
 - ▶ Choose the one with the highest profit

$$\text{let } w = \$20$$

$$y = 5$$

$$r = 0.1$$

$$\varepsilon_2 = \varepsilon_1 = 2$$

$$P = \frac{w}{y} \frac{c}{\varepsilon_1 - 1} = \frac{20}{5} \frac{2}{2-1} = \$8$$

\$4 \times 2

$$P_e = \frac{w}{y} \frac{\varepsilon_2}{\varepsilon_2 - 1} (1+r) = \frac{20}{5} \frac{2}{2-1} (1.1) = \$8.80$$

Exporters

- ▶ Pay export fixed costs, pay trade cost τ

- ▶ How much profit does the firm earn from exporting?

- ▶ Choose prices p and p_e to maximize profit

$$\pi_1^e(\varphi) = \left(p - \frac{w_1}{\varphi} \right) E_1 p^{-\epsilon_1} + \left(p_e - \frac{w_1}{\varphi} (1 + \tau) \right) E_2 p_e^{-\epsilon_2} - w_1 f^e - w_1 f^p$$

Annotations for the equation:

- p : price in domestic market
- p_e : price in export market
- $\frac{w_1}{\varphi}$: marginal cost
- $(1 + \tau)$: trade cost
- $E_1 p^{-\epsilon_1}$: demand in country 1
- $E_2 p_e^{-\epsilon_2}$: demand in country 2
- $w_1 f^e$: export fixed cost
- $w_1 f^p$: production fixed cost

- ▶ The solution is a mark-up over marginal cost

$$p = \frac{w_1}{\varphi} \frac{\epsilon_1}{\epsilon_1 - 1}$$

$$p_e = \frac{w_1}{\varphi} \frac{\epsilon_2}{\epsilon_2 - 1} (1 + \tau)$$

- ▶ Price rises to offset export costs (similar to having smaller φ)

doesn't change

trade cost

$$f^e < f^p$$

Lawyers
DISTRIBUTION
SALES

ad valorem cost
TARIFFS

SHIPPING
INSURANCE

Exporting firms

- ▶ Substitute prices back into profit function

$$\pi_1^e(\varphi) = \frac{1}{\epsilon_1} \left(\frac{\epsilon_1}{\epsilon_1 - 1} \frac{w_1}{\varphi} \right)^{1-\epsilon_1} E_1 + \frac{1}{\epsilon_2} \left(\frac{\epsilon_2}{\epsilon_2 - 1} \frac{w_1}{\varphi} (1 + \tau) \right)^{1-\epsilon_2} E_2 - w_1 f^p - w_1 f^e$$

domestic profit

- ▶ How do profits change with productivity?
- ▶ How does τ impact profit?

$$\uparrow \tau \rightarrow p_e \uparrow \rightarrow \text{sales} \downarrow \rightarrow \pi \downarrow$$

Multinational firms ←

- ▶ Pay export production fixed cost abroad; avoid τ and f^e
- ▶ How much profit does the firm earn from affiliate sales?
- ▶ Choose prices p and p_m to maximize profit

$$\pi_1^m(\varphi) = \underbrace{\left(p - \frac{w_1}{\varphi}\right) E_1 p^{-\epsilon_1}}_{\text{Domestic sales}} + \underbrace{\left(p_m - \frac{w_2}{\varphi}\right) E_2 p_m^{-\epsilon_2}}_{\text{Export sales}} - \underbrace{w_1 f^p}_{\text{Domestic fixed cost}} - \underbrace{w_2 f^p}_{\text{Export fixed cost}}$$

- ▶ The solution is a mark-up over marginal cost

$$p = \frac{w_1}{\varphi} \frac{\epsilon_1}{\epsilon_1 - 1} \quad p_m = \frac{w_2}{\varphi} \frac{\epsilon_2}{\epsilon_2 - 1}$$

- ▶ Marginal cost now $\frac{w_2}{\varphi}$ "ownership advantage"

Firm transfers its technology, φ , to other plant

Multinational firms

- ▶ Substitute price back into profit function

$$\pi_1^m(\varphi) = \frac{1}{\epsilon_1} \left(\frac{\epsilon_1 w_1}{\epsilon_1 - 1 \varphi} \right)^{1-\epsilon_1} E_1 + \frac{1}{\epsilon_2} \left(\frac{\epsilon_2 w_2}{\epsilon_2 - 1 \varphi} \right)^{1-\epsilon_2} E_2 - w_1 f^p - w_2 f^p$$

- ▶ How do profits change with productivity?
- ▶ How does this compare to export profit?

f^p rather than f^e

no (1+z)

marginal cost is $\frac{w_2}{\varphi}$ rather than $\frac{w_1}{\varphi}$

Exporting vs. multinational production

► Exporter

$$\pi_1^e(\varphi) = \frac{1}{\epsilon_1} \left(\frac{\epsilon_1 w_1}{\epsilon_1 - 1 \varphi} \right)^{1-\epsilon_1} E_1 - \frac{1}{\epsilon_2} \left(\frac{\epsilon_2 w_1 (1+\tau)}{\epsilon_2 - 1 \varphi} \right)^{1-\epsilon_2} E_2 - \cancel{w_1 f^p} - w_1 f^e$$

► MNE

$$\pi_1^m(\varphi) = \frac{1}{\epsilon_1} \left(\frac{\epsilon_1 w_1}{\epsilon_1 - 1 \varphi} \right)^{1-\epsilon_1} E_1 + \frac{1}{\epsilon_2} \left(\frac{\epsilon_2 w_2}{\epsilon_2 - 1 \varphi} \right)^{1-\epsilon_2} E_2 - \cancel{w_1 f^p} - w_2 f^p$$

$$\text{is } \pi_1^m(\varphi) \stackrel{>}{\stackrel{<}{\approx}} \pi_1^e(\varphi)$$

► Which method delivers the greatest profit?

► Domestic profits are the same in each case, so we can ignore them

Exporting vs. multinational production

$$\varphi = 1.5$$
$$\varphi = 2.0$$

► Exporter: $p_e = \frac{w_1}{\varphi} \frac{\epsilon_2}{\epsilon_2 - 1} (1 + \tau)$

$$\Delta \pi_1^e(\varphi) = \frac{1}{\epsilon_2} \left(\frac{\epsilon_2}{\epsilon_2 - 1} \frac{w_1}{\varphi} (1 + \tau) \right)^{1 - \epsilon_2} E_2 - w_1 f^e$$

↙ extra profit if export.

► MNE: $p_m = \frac{w_2}{\varphi} \frac{\epsilon_2}{\epsilon_2 - 1}$

$$\Delta \pi_1^m(\varphi) = \frac{1}{\epsilon_2} \left(\frac{\epsilon_2}{\epsilon_2 - 1} \frac{w_2}{\varphi} \right)^{1 - \epsilon_2} E_2 - w_2 f^p$$

↙ extra profit if MNE

In class problem: exporting vs. MNE

- ▶ 5-10 min, work with those around you
 - ▶ $w_1 = w_2 = 2, E_2 = 50, \epsilon_2 = 3, f^p = 1.7, f^e = 0.6, \tau = 0.3$
1. Should a firm with $\varphi = 1.5$ export to serve the foreign market or use a foreign affiliate?
 2. Should a firm with $\varphi = 2.0$ export to serve the foreign market or use a foreign affiliate?

In class problem: exporting vs. MNE

► $w_1 = w_2 = 2, E_2 = 50, \epsilon_2 = 3, f^p = 1.7, f^e = 0.6, \tau = 0.3$

1. Should a firm with $\varphi = 1.5$ export to serve the foreign market or use a foreign affiliate?

$$\Delta \pi_i^e(1.5) = \frac{1}{3} \left(\frac{3}{3-1} \frac{2}{1.5} 1.3 \right)^{-2} 50 - \underbrace{2 \times 0.6}_{1.2} = 1.27$$

$P_e = 2.6$

$$\Delta \pi_i^m(1.5) = \frac{1}{3} \left(\frac{3}{3-1} \frac{2}{1.5} \right)^{-2} 50 - \underbrace{2 \times 1.7}_{3.4} = 0.768$$

$P_m = 2.0$

In class problem: exporting vs. MNE

► $w_1 = w_2 = 2, E_2 = 50, \epsilon_2 = 3, f^p = 1.7, f^e = 0.6, \tau = 0.3$

2. Should a firm with $\varphi = 2.0$ export to serve the foreign market or use a foreign affiliate?

$$\Delta \pi_1^e(2.0) = \frac{1}{3} \left(\frac{3}{3-1} \frac{2}{2.0} (1.3) \right)^{-2} 50 - \underbrace{2 \times 0.6}_{1.2} = 3.183$$

4.38 [vs. 2.47 if $\varphi=1.5$]

$$\Delta \pi_1^m(2.0) = \frac{1}{3} \left(\frac{3}{3-1} \frac{2}{2.0} \right)^{-2} 50 - \underbrace{2 \times 1.7}_{3.4} = 4.01$$

7.41 [vs. 4.17 if $\varphi=1.5$]

Larger sales, the more hurtful is τ

$\Delta\pi_1^m(\varphi)$ vs. $\Delta\pi_1^e(\varphi)$

