



CSC Report:

Improving the Credibility of the Food Standards
Australia New Zealand Report Entitled
*Microbiological Risk Assessment of Raw Cow
Milk (2009) Considering New Evidence*

Prepared by: Margaret E. Coleman, Medical Microbiologist
Coleman Scientific Consulting, Groton, NY USA
<http://www.colemanscientific.org/>
text/voice mail 315 729 3995

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1 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

2 The Australian Raw Milk Movement Incorporated (ARMM) requested that Coleman Scientific Consulting
3 (CSC) prepare a critique of the 2009 report by Food Standards Australia New Zealand (FSANZ) entitled
4 *Microbiological Risk Assessment of Raw Cow Milk*, particularly considering new evidence generated in
5 the past decade. FSANZ considered four major pathogens (*Campylobacter* spp.; *E. coli* O157:H7 and
6 related pathogens (STECs/EHECs/VTECs); *Listeria monocytogenes*; *Salmonella* spp.) potentially
7 associated with raw milk.

8 This critique emphasizes scientific evidence available prior to and following the release of the FSANZ
9 report. Of course, significant research has advanced scientific knowledge of the microbiology, benefits,
10 and risks associated with raw milk in more than a decade since finalization of the FSANZ report (2009a).

11 Notably, the FSANZ report preceded major technological advances in development and application of
12 methodology for culture-independent testing using genetic methods (genomic, proteomic, metabolomic
13 or '-omic' methods) for characterizing the dense and diverse natural microbiota associated with sites in
14 the human body (e.g., the Human Microbiome Project), as well as in milks and built and natural
15 environments. The 'microbiome revolution' (Blaser, 2014) fueled explosions of knowledge from -omics
16 research, and profoundly different insights emerged regarding symbiotic partnerships of microbes in
17 mammalian systems.

18 There is now broadening acceptance of the view that *Homo sapiens* are 'human superorganisms,'
19 'completed' by microbial communities (microbiota) as our partners in health (Dietert, 2016), rather than
20 as 'insurgents for eradication' based on germ theory (King et al., 2019). Terms relevant to assessing risk
21 for 'human superorganisms' including 'colonization resistance' (innate protection by the healthy gut
22 microbiota against pathogen growth and infection) were introduced in a glossary of a recent manuscript
23 published in the journal *Risk Analysis* (Coleman et al., 2018; see Appendix C). As understanding of
24 mammalian superorganisms continues to advance (Simon et al., 2019; Bosch and McFall-Ngai, 2021),
25 emerging evidence challenges long held assumptions about microbial communities (microbiomes) of
26 humans and foods (Coleman et al., 2021a,b).

27 One such outdated assumption, now disproven, is the sterility of mammary tissue in humans and cows
28 (Urbaniak et al., 2014; Young et al., 2015; Derakhshani et al., 2018; Metzger et al., 2018; Andrews et al.,
29 2019). By 2015, when the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) prepared its analysis of raw milk risk
30 assessments including FSANZ (2009), this expert body also included a section on the microbial 'flora' of
31 raw milk (now more correctly termed the milk microbiota). EFSA cited an early study on the natural
32 bovine milk microbiota (Quigley et al., 2013). Since then, hundreds of peer-reviewed manuscripts on the
33 bovine milk microbiota are now available, including recent reviews that document the extent of
34 research characterizing the microbes that dominate the natural milk microbiota (Breitenwieser et al.,
35 2020; Oikonomou et al., 2020) previously believed to be sterile. Highlights from recent reviews are
36 provided in the body of this report.

37 Multiple 21st century studies of the microbiota of milks are inconsistent with common assumptions by
38 FSANZ that appear to be based on 20th century science: that milk should be sterile and the microbes
39 present are the result of contamination by feces. For example, a small but elegant study (Wu et al.,
40 2019) concluded that the raw bovine milk microbiota is clearly separated from the bovine fecal
41 microbiota (as well as the microbiota associated with feed, rumen fluid, and water). This finding
42 contradicts the common notion that bacteria present in milk are fecal contaminants. Together with
43 studies supporting the entero-mammary pathway of transfer of microbes in healthy human hosts
44 (Wang, et al., 2020; Zimmerman and Curtis, 2020) and bovine hosts (Young, 2015; Oikonomou et al.,
45 2020), these results challenge 20th-century notions about the milk microbiota and merit further
46 deliberation of the quality and veracity of available evidence for Qualitative Microbial Risk Assessment
47 (QMRA) and decision making that was applied by FSANZ in 2009.

48 As a Fellow of the Society for Risk Analysis (SRA) and a microbiologist who contributed to the consensus
49 document on principles and guidelines for microbial (or microbiological) risk assessment approved by
50 the Codex Alimentarius Commission (CAC 1999), my perspective is that while the FSANZ (2009a) report
51 was organized using a relevant structured approach including Hazard Identification, Exposure
52 Assessment, Dose-Response Assessment (or Hazard Characterization), and Risk Characterization, the
53 FSANZ assessment deviated significantly from the consensus guidance (CAC, 1999).

54 The CAC (1999) included in its consensus document the text below.

55 'Microbiological Risk Assessment should be soundly based upon science.' (first general principle
56 listed in section 4, page 2).

57 'The conduct of a Microbiological Risk Assessment should be transparent.' (fifth general
58 principle, page 2)

59 'Scientific evidence may be limited, incomplete or conflicting. In such cases, transparent
60 informed decisions will have to be made on how to complete the Risk Assessment process. The
61 importance of using high quality information when conducting a Risk Assessment is to reduce
62 uncertainty and to increase the reliability of the Risk Estimate. The use of quantitative
63 information is encouraged to the extent possible, but the value and utility of qualitative
64 information should not be discounted.' (general consideration, page 3)

65 In my opinion, FSANZ did not comply with the consensus principles and guidelines (CAC, 1999) in
66 developing their 2009 approach to assess risks for raw cow milk. FSANZ did not base its raw cow milk
67 assessment on high quality data essential for generating reliable risk estimates. Rather, FSANZ appeared
68 to select studies from an extensive body of evidence available before 2009 that supported preconceived
69 biases articulated in the 2009 report and repeated in 2021 (letter from Mark Booth, Chief Executive
70 Officer, FSANZ to Rebecca Freer dated 16 March 2021, personal communication provided by Ms. Freer
71 and attached in Appendix B).

72 FSANZ could increase transparency regarding potential bias, assess the impacts of new data and
73 alternative assumptions, and engage in deep dialogue with stakeholders by initiating a re-assessment
74 for raw cow milk, consistent with CAC principles and guidelines.

75 This critique highlights studies available prior to 2009 that appeared to be excluded or misinterpreted by
76 FSANZ, as well as recent studies documenting technological and scientific advances of the past decade.
77 For example, FSANZ concluded on page 46 of the report, 'The ability to reduce or minimize risks
78 associated with raw milk is considered to be quite limited'. However, this conclusion appears to exclude
79 considerable portions of the body of evidence that were available at the time, as described in more
80 detail in the body of this critique. Further, the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA, 2015) did not
81 support this view that capabilities to reduce or minimize risks associated with raw milks are 'quite
82 limited'. EFSA (2015) cited critical data limitations for the FSANZ report: i) extrapolating limited data on
83 prevalence and levels of pathogens in feces to simulate prevalence and levels in raw milk without
84 sufficiently rigorous experimental validation; and ii) use of growth models for pure cultures of
85 pathogens in optimal nutrient broth media for direct extrapolation to predict pathogen survival and
86 growth in raw milk, without adjusting for effects of the dense and diverse natural microbiota of raw milk
87 on pathogen survival and growth and similarly without sufficiently rigorous experimental validation. In
88 addition, ESFA concluded that the FSANZ study, despite its limitations, demonstrated that improving on-
89 farm hygiene leads to a decrease in cases simulated for campylobacteriosis, EHEC illnesses, and
90 salmonellosis.

91 Although FSANZ acknowledged the need for spatial and temporal data on the prevalence and levels of
92 pathogens in Australian dairy cows and in raw milk as a data gap (FSANZ, 2009a, page 41), FSANZ is not
93 aware of any validation studies conducted to fill this or any of the seven data gaps (Booth, 2021). Mr.
94 Booth clearly stated the current FSANZ view that 'although such data [as that currently available to fill
95 data gaps identified but not filled by or for FSANZ] would improve risk estimates it would not change the
96 overall assessment of the risk from consumption of raw cow's milk.' Thus, he reiterates the opening
97 statement of the Conclusion of the FSANZ 2009a report (page 42) that states 'Raw cow milk has always
98 presented risks to public health,' a statement that lacks scientific rigor and cites no supporting evidence
99 or peer-reviewed studies. FSANZ attributes this belief to the 'potential presence of pathogenic bacteria'
100 that is not predictive of human health risk. These belief statements do not appear to be based on
101 scientific evidence, since no published studies are cited to support the beliefs. Nor are these beliefs
102 supported by specific data or studies available either prior to or following the release of the 2009 report
103 by FSANZ. Rather, these beliefs appear to be based in ideas from 19th or 20th century science, assuming
104 microbes in milk are contaminating 'germs' that will kill consumers, not the natural microbiota of milks.

105 CSC finds ample room for improvement in both updating the body of evidence included and revising the
106 approach for the analysis conducted by FSANZ in 2009 that is critically flawed, as documented
107 throughout this critique. For example, in 2009, FSANZ chose a qualitative approach for goat milk risk
108 assessment (2009b) and a quantitative approach for cow milk (2009a) despite identifying some identical
109 datagaps (lack of data on pathogen prevalence and levels in Australian raw milk; infectivity, virulence,

110 and dose response models for pathogens; and the relative contribution of risk factors to contamination).
111 Further, the goat milk assessment acknowledges points that are not raised in the cow milk assessment.

112 Another possible approach that FSANZ could consider is generating evidence maps for benefits and risks
113 of raw cow milk. An example of generating evidence maps is available for another related and
114 controversial issue, the policy of pasteurizing donor breastmilk by human milk banks, despite loss of
115 benefits to neonatal intensive care unit (NICU) infants (Coleman et al., 2021b).

116 Whatever approach FSANZ selects for re-assessment, CSC strongly recommends that FSANZ fully and
117 transparently apply the CAC principles and guidelines (CAC, 1999) as illustrated by US FDA/FSIS in its
118 much more extensive QMRA on listeriosis (2003). In fact, it is quite puzzling why FSANZ decided not to
119 cite risk estimates for raw and pasteurized milks from this prior FDA/FSIS report that determined both
120 raw and pasteurized milks high risk for listeriosis. Subsequent studies from academic groups re-assessed
121 the risk of listeriosis for raw milk and estimated very low risk to consumers (LaTorre et al., 2011;
122 Stasiewicz et al., 2014).

123 A re-assessment by an objective and trans-disciplinary team is needed to assess risks that may be
124 associated with consuming raw milk for Australian consumers based on current scientific evidence. The
125 transparency of the FDA/FSIS 2003/2008 QMRA is a model for the re-assessment team to consider
126 regarding the available body of evidence (studies included and excluded), models, assumptions, and the
127 impact of alternative assumptions on risk estimates. The findings should reflect the current 'state of the
128 science' and be coherent across the entire available body of evidence. The re-assessment process would
129 include meaningful dialogue about the data, assumptions and analysis with all major stakeholders in
130 Australia. The quality of the re-assessment process would be increased by engaging multiple external
131 reviews from independent experts from the international QMRA community.

132 The need for FSANZ to incorporate the available body of scientific evidence for re-assessing risk is
133 critical, due to multiple sources of bias described in detail in the body of this report. Many FSANZ
134 assumptions, particularly regarding hygienic practices, test-and-hold programs, and inherent risk, are
135 falsified by the current body of evidence. Strict hygienic controls at Organic Pastures (Fresno, CA)
136 include both a Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Points (HACCP) program and a Test-and-Hold
137 Program for pathogens. Organic Pastures data for the Test-and-Hold Program is provided for 2018-2020
138 in Table 3 of this report.

139 Organic Pastures is licensed to sell raw milk and raw milk products at retail markets in California (CA).
140 The dairy produced **4,280,922 gallons** of raw milk from 2018 to 2020, of which **1,351,684 gallons**
141 (31.5%) was bottled for direct human consumption at retail in California (McAfee, 2021, personal
142 communication). Since no raw milk outbreaks associated with microbial pathogens were reported in
143 California in this period, risk estimates based on available recent data combined with the consumption
144 estimates for children and adults cited in the FSANZ report are that risk of illness is **less than 1 in 9.5**
145 **million servings for children** and **less than 1 in 12.9 million servings in adults** for consumers in
146 California who choose to buy Organic Pastures raw milk at retail markets and consume daily serving
147 sizes selected by FSANZ. These risk estimates are substantially lower than the estimates generated by

148 FSANZ in 2009. The FSANZ estimates are largely based on unvalidated assumptions and extrapolations,
149 are not based on sound science, and are thus indefensible. A substantial body of evidence available in
150 2021 calls into question the assumptions underpinning the QMRA approach designed in 2009. The
151 veracity of the conclusions about raw milk risks made in 2009 appears untenable, considering that
152 substantial numbers of scientific studies undermine many assumptions selected by FSANZ in 2009 due
153 to insufficient data or lack of data required for QMRA.

154 **Thus, recent data do not support the outdated assumptions that raw milk is inherently dangerous and**
155 **that existing hygienic management programs, including HACCP and test-and-hold programs, cannot**
156 **ensure a safe, low-risk product for raw milk consumers.**

157 **Summary of Findings**

158 Much of the recent scientific data relevant for QMRA for the four pathogens considered in the 2009
159 report are summarized herein. Studies that apply to Exposure Assessment, Dose-Response Assessment
160 (or Hazard Characterization), and Risk Characterization are highlighted in the body of this report.

161 Two specific assumptions that FSANZ relied upon in 2009 are falsified by the available data: 1) Test-and-
162 hold programs may be inadequate for protection of consumers from milk-borne pathogens; and 2)
163 pathogens in feces are predictive of pathogen presence and levels in raw milk.

164 The body of this critique provides expanded context for the extensive body of scientific evidence from
165 studies published before and after 2009 that is critically relevant to transparent, unbiased analysis to
166 estimate risk with attendant uncertainty for Australian consumers of raw milk in a manner consistent
167 with the principles and guidelines for QMRA (CAC, 1999). This body of evidence is grossly inconsistent
168 with assumptions made by FSANZ, particularly in the approaches described in the Exposure Assessment
169 and Dose-Response Assessment sections for circumventing three of the major datagaps listed below
170 that were identified in the 2009 report.

171 1. *“Spatial and temporal information on the prevalence and levels of pathogens in Australian*
172 *dairy cows and in raw cow milk using the most sensitive detection methods” (Exposure*
173 *Assessment)*

174 a. A substantial body of evidence now exists regarding the prevalence of
175 pathogens and the natural microbiota of raw milks. Table 1 below summarizes
176 extensive pathogen prevalence data from published studies and a Microsoft
177 Access® database that includes data from US State monitoring (CA, NY, and WA,
178 provided under the US Freedom of Information Act) and independent
179 laboratories (provided by British Columbia Herdshare and Organic Pastures,
180 Fresno, California).

181 b. The independent laboratory Food Safety Net Services (FSNS, Fresno, CA USA) is
182 certified for analysis of foodborne pathogens in a variety of matrices including
183 raw milk. FSNS provided raw data from analyses conducted from 2018 through
184 2020 for Organic Pastures, including data on their Test-and-Hold Program. The

- 185 certified laboratory MB Laboratories (Sidney, BC Canada) conducted analyses of
186 raw milk for BC Herdshare. Readers can review individual laboratory reports for
187 each of 192 samples analyzed to date at
188 <https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/0Bz2kJcZ3EjEleKv1RmRhMmhBQzg>.
- 189 c. In contrast, no study has tested the hypothesis that prevalence and levels of
190 pathogens in raw milk can be reliably predicted from microbial hygiene
191 indicators (e.g., total aerobic plate counts, coliforms) or pathogens in feces. The
192 only potentially relevant study on this topic identified herein (Marshall et al.,
193 2016) did not actually design and test this hypothesis directly and conclusively,
194 nor did the study provide validation of the assumptions as claimed.
- 195 d. In addition, few studies were identified that included quantified levels of
196 pathogens present in positive raw milk samples. Independent research groups
197 (Giacometti et al., 2015a,b; Christidis et al. 2016; Giacometti et al., 2017)
198 subsequently chose not to build on the FSANZ 2009 approach extrapolating
199 levels of pathogens in milk from levels in feces.
- 200 e. Therefore, while substantial data are available on prevalence of potential
201 pathogens in raw milks (including samples from New Zealand), the levels of
202 pathogens in naturally positive raw milk samples are poorly characterized. The
203 data on levels of *L. monocytogenes* used by FSANZ were biased by use of
204 enrichment methods that overestimate actual levels in raw milk (reported as
205 usually <1 CFU/mL, maximum 35 CFU/mL) sampled from 160 dairy farms in
206 Scotland (Fenlon et al., 1995). Prevalence and levels of pathogens in raw milk
207 from Australia remain a significant data gap for QMRA.
- 208 f. Further, FSANZ inappropriately extrapolated growth models of microbes in pure
209 culture media to estimate growth in raw milk. The use of a broth culture model
210 of generic *E. coli* strains as surrogates for EHECs in raw milk is indefensible
211 scientifically and suggests potential bias by FSANZ in excluding a study (Wang et
212 al., 1997) documenting growth of this pathogen in raw milk that was published
213 in the peer-reviewed literature more than a decade prior to 2009. In fact, the
214 study authors noted in 1997 that faster pathogen growth in broth media under
215 optimal conditions may be due to lack of competition from raw milk microbes
216 that outcompeted the pathogen at both refrigeration and higher temperatures.
- 217 A pilot study measuring growth in fresh raw milk for all four pathogens
218 considered by FSANZ in 2009 is underway in an independent laboratory (FSNS,
219 2021) with a design based on that illustrated in Figure 2 (Coleman et al., 2003b).
- 220 g. Qualitative analysis or ‘what if’ analyses may be undertaken for simulating risk
221 for specific scenarios of hypothetical levels of pathogens and negligible growth
222 in raw milk. However, the approach undertaken in 2009 is clearly not science-
223 based, nor did it provide an objective assessment of the evidence available at

224 the time. The 2009 approach is inappropriate for characterizing risk with
225 attendant uncertainty for Australian raw milk consumers, based on the available
226 body of evidence.

227 2. *“Data on the extent to which external faecal contamination on the udder and flanks etc. can*
228 *contaminate the milking environment and the milk”* ” **(Exposure Assessment)**

229 a. The elegant study of Wu and colleagues (2019) applied multiple approaches to
230 test for associations that might be statistically significant predictors of
231 relationships between potential sources of microbes in raw milks.

232 b. SourceTracker indicated that milk microbiota was related with airborne dust
233 microbiota.

234 c. Hierarchical clustering and canonical analysis of principal coordinates
235 demonstrated that the milk microbiota was associated with the bedding
236 microbiota, but clearly separated from feed, rumen fluid, feces, and water
237 microbiota.

238 d. Therefore, the 2009 approach to estimate prevalence and levels of pathogens in
239 milk from fecal data is invalid and potentially misleading to regulators and
240 consumers.

241 3. *“Dose response models for pathogens”* ” **(Dose-Response Assessment)**

242 a. The treatment of dose-response data and modeling by FSANZ in the 2009 report
243 is particularly superficial and overly conservative, likely resulting in substantially
244 exaggerated estimates of risk for each of the pathogens, as highlighted
245 separately below. It is puzzling why this is so, when some studies depicting the
246 large uncertainty and variability for the data and models available at the time
247 were excluded from the report.

248 b. FSANZ appears to grossly overestimate risks and underestimate uncertainties
249 for raw milk consumers by applying a series of worst-case assumptions,
250 particularly regarding the shape and position of the dose-response models
251 based on selected data available at the time. Many highly conservative
252 assumptions (e.g., non-threshold, low-dose linear model forms for highest
253 virulence strains and most susceptible humans without innate or adaptive
254 immune protections or the protections of a healthy gut microbiota to low doses
255 of ingested pathogens) impose indefensible confidence in the approaches used
256 for dose-response assessment. Thus, the FSANZ simulation results overstate the
257 robustness and reliability of the analyses due to an extremely weak and indirect
258 basis in scientific data, as well as limited statistical and biological relevance of
259 data and models chosen at the time.

260 c. One recent risk assessment team (Snary et al. 2016, p 445) reported that “it is
261 quite common for QMRAs to overestimate the number of cases,” a systematic

262 error that may be attributed to exclusive use of overly conservative dose–
263 response models that poorly reflect the complexity of host-pathogen
264 interactions.

265
266 For example, Teunis and Figueras (2016) observe opposing biases for different
267 sources of data on estimating dose–response relationships. Human challenge
268 studies appear to be biased towards predicting low infectivity (high infectious
269 doses), perhaps due to loss of infectivity/virulence following repeated
270 laboratory culturing and the use of healthy immunocompetent volunteers with
271 innate resistance to this potential pathogen. In contrast, epidemiologic
272 investigations frequently do not estimate the doses of pathogens ingested, and
273 the numbers of people exposed, infected, and ill are poorly characterized or
274 unknown in outbreaks, making estimation of dose–response relationships
275 problematic and uncertain (Bollaerts et al. 2008; Teunis et al. 2010). Some
276 epidemiologic investigations attempt dose-reconstruction (backcalculating
277 doses causing and not causing illness, describing potential dose-response
278 relationships from estimated ingested doses from suspect lots of foods and
279 estimates of attack rates for outbreaks).

280 The observation by Teunis and colleagues that epidemiologic studies appear to
281 be biased towards predicting high infectivity (low infectious doses) cannot be
282 ignored in objective and transparent QMRAs. Teunis notes that outbreaks may
283 arise from a specific series of system failures, resulting in worst-case scenarios
284 for causing illness, often including both highly infectious or highly virulent
285 pathogen strains and highly susceptible human populations.

286 Therefore, unbiased QMRAs would ideally apply multiple alternative dose-
287 response models (Marks and Coleman, 2017) based on different data sources
288 (human challenge studies, animal and *in vitro* studies, epidemiologic studies on
289 dose-reconstruction). Thus, the body of evidence available in 2021 merits
290 updating of the approaches used for dose-response assessment by FSANZ.
291 Highlights of excluded or recent evidence are summarized by pathogen in the
292 body of this critique.

293 Thus, the evidence presented herein invalidates many assumptions used by FSANZ in its 2009
294 approach to QMRA due to: 1) the absence of data on prevalence and levels of pathogens in raw
295 milk for three of four major foodborne diseases considered (campylobacteriosis, EHEC illnesses,
296 and salmonellosis) and bias of data for levels of *L. monocytogenes*; 2) lack of validation of
297 growth models for surrogate or pathogen growth in culture broth that FSANZ extrapolated to
298 model pathogen growth in raw milk; and 3) unreliable and oversimplified dose-response models
299 applied for each of four major foodborne pathogens considered (see DOSE-RESPONSE
300 ASSESSMENT section).

301

302 **Therefore, FSANZ estimations for the likelihood of human illness for Australian raw milk**
303 **consumers are not based on sound science and are thus indefensible. A substantial body of**
304 **evidence available in 2021 calls into question the assumptions underpinning the QMRA**
305 **approach designed in 2009. The veracity of the conclusions about raw milk risks made in 2009**
306 **appears untenable, considering that substantial numbers of scientific studies undermine many**
307 **assumptions by FSANZ in 2009.**

308 **FSANZ Selection of Quantitative Approach for Cow Milk and not Goat Milk**

309 CSC finds ample room for improvement in both updating the body of evidence included and revising the
310 approach for the analysis conducted for raw cow milk by FSANZ in 2009 that is critically flawed, as
311 documented in subsequent sections of this critique.

312 In 2009, FSANZ chose a qualitative approach for goat milk risk assessment (2009b) and a quantitative
313 approach for cow milk (2009a) despite identifying some identical datagaps (lack of data on pathogen
314 prevalence and levels in Australian raw milk; infectivity, virulence, and dose response models for
315 pathogens; and the relative contribution of risk factors to contamination). Further, the goat milk
316 assessment acknowledges these points, but they are not raised in the cow milk assessment.

317 First, the Executive Summary of the goat milk assessment includes this statement.

318 'Raw goat milk has a mixed microflora which is not dissimilar to that found in raw cow milk, with
319 the microbial diversity the result of multiple factors. However, there is little published
320 information available on the incidence and prevalence of pathogens in raw goat milk in
321 Australia.'

322 Later, FSANZ continued as follows in section 7 of the goat risk assessment, indicating some knowledge of
323 multiple sources of the diverse microbiota of milks, none specifically mentioning feces. Nor did FSANZ
324 choose to simulate the prevalence and levels of pathogens in raw goat milk based on data for feces.

325 'Raw goat milk has a mixed microflora that is derived from several sources including the interior
326 of the udder, exterior surfaces of the goat, the environment, milk-handling equipment and
327 personnel, ... the milking procedure, subsequent packaging, storage and delivery'.

328 FSANZ acknowledged that the majority of assumptions in the goat assessment introduced conservative
329 estimates of risk that account for worst-case scenarios. It seems likely that FSANZ similarly imposed
330 intentionally conservative assumptions that biased the cow milk assessment for worst case scenarios.
331 Such bias would exaggerate likely risk estimates and underestimate uncertainty by intentionally
332 selecting worst-case assumptions that are not based on reliable data for cow milk in Australia.

333 The different approaches call into question the assumption that, despite similar lack of data on
334 prevalence and levels of pathogens in Australian raw milk, prevalence and levels could be reliably
335 simulated from one small correlative study on data in feces extrapolated to cow milk and not to goat
336 milk. It is unclear if both qualitative and quantitative approaches were applied to the cow milk
337 assessment.

338 The outputs of the different approaches have some similarities and differences. For both goats and
339 cows, estimates of listeriosis risks are very low.

340 For goats, despite lack of data for prevalence and levels of these pathogens, risk was estimated by the
341 qualitative method to be low for campylobacteriosis and salmonellosis, and high for EHEC in the general
342 population. Whereas for cows, even with adjustment for removal of servings likely to spoil (and not be
343 consumed), median risks to children consuming 536 mL daily (simulated range 250-1,750 mL) were 20,
344 16, and 15 cases per 100,000 serving for respective illnesses (campylobacteriosis, EHEC, and
345 salmonellosis; FSANZ Table 8) for scenario 1 (bulk milk tank). Thus, similar magnitudes of risk were
346 estimated for these three pathogens by quantitative methods ($\sim 1-2 \times 10^{-4}$), relying primarily on
347 assumptions about prevalence and levels of pathogens in feces. This pattern of similar risks for cow milk
348 is quite different for the qualitative results in goat milk (low risk for campylobacteriosis and
349 salmonellosis, and high for EHEC). For EHEC and salmonellosis, risks increased for scenario 2 (farmgate
350 purchase) and scenario 3 (retail purchase), though these differences appear to be based on assumptions
351 about growth and times and temperatures during storage. However, bias in study selection may cause
352 overestimations, as noted in subsequent sections of this critique. It does not appear that any validation
353 data supports these assumptions for high risk of campylobacteriosis, EHEC, and salmonellosis, or
354 increased risk for retail and farmgate sales for the latter two pathogens.

355 Another possible approach that FSANZ could consider is generating evidence maps for benefits and risks
356 of raw cow milk. An example of generating evidence maps is available for another related and
357 controversial issue, the policy of pasteurizing donor breastmilk by human milk banks despite loss of
358 benefits to neonatal intensive care unit (NICU) infants (Coleman and North, 2021). The evidence map
359 approach is particularly relevant for conveying a visual summary of large bodies of evidence for open
360 and transparent dialogue with stakeholders, including regulators who may have preformed opinions or
361 beliefs about an issue that are inconsistent with the whole body of evidence. Evidence maps are
362 structured as pro- and contra- arguments, supporting and attenuating studies, studies depicting
363 potential mechanisms for benefits and risks, and remaining uncertainties that provide much higher
364 transparency about the 'state of the science' than the applied in the 2009 FSANZ report.

365 **Recent Evidence for Exposure Assessment**

366 Highlights of recent microbial testing program results crucial to rigorous and transparent Exposure
367 Assessment are summarized here and described in more detail in the body of the report.

368 Recent prevalence data are available from raw milk sampling programs around the world (Table 1).
369 Table 1 summarizes data from published studies and a Microsoft Access® database that includes data
370 from US State monitoring (CA, NY, and WA, provided under the US Freedom of Information Act) and
371 independent laboratories (provided by British Columbia Herdshare and Organic Pastures, Fresno,
372 California). Studies included in the table reflect raw milk for direct human consumption except pre-
373 pasteurization milk noted by Marshall et al. (2016) and the second dataset from Berge and Baars (2020).
374 The major pathogens were rarely detected in raw milk samples from multiple sources (generally
375 undetected or <1% positive in the table below).

376 **Table 1.** Recent Prevalence Data for Pathogens in Raw Milk from Samples Collected from 2009 to
 377 Present from Monitoring Programs Conducted around the World.

| Country (Reference) | Dates (State if US) | <i>Campylobacter</i> | <i>E. coli</i> O157:H7 or EHECs | <i>L. monocytogenes</i> | <i>Salmonella</i> |
|--|---|---|--|--|-------------------|
| Canada (Stephenson & Coleman, 2021) | 2015-2021 | 0/192 | 0/192 | 0/192 | 0/192 |
| Poland (Andrzejewska et al., 2019) | 2014-2018 | 0/113 vending machines; 26/221 (12%) <i>C. jejuni</i> , directly from farmers | Not Tested | Not Tested | Not Tested |
| UK (McLaughlin et al, 2020) | 2013-2019 | 18/635 (2.8%) | 0/56 O157; 3/304 EHEC (0%, 1%) | 1/642 (0.2%) | 3/622 (0.5%) |
| US State Monitoring (Stephenson & Coleman, 2021, licensed farms) | 2009-2014 (CA) | 0/122 | 0/122 | 0/122 | 0/122 |
| | 2009-2014 (NY) | 7/1,118 (0.6%) | 2/1,118 (0.2%) | 4/1,118 (0.4%) | 0/1,118 |
| | 2009-2014 (TX) | 4/601 | 0/596 | 4/596 | 11/606 |
| | 2012-2015 (WA) | 0/974 | 0/988 | 0/991 | 0/973 |
| Germany (Berge & Baars, 2020) | 2001-2015 (VZM) | 7/2,352 (0.3%) | 17/2,737 (0.7%) | 30/2,999 (1%) | 0/3,367 |
| Germany (Berge & Baars, 2020) | 2001-2015 (not for direct consumption raw, pre-pasteurized) | 17/2,258 (0.8%) | 82/5,433 (1.5%) | 52/2,355 (2.2%) | 0/1,084 |
| Finland (Castro et al., 2017) | 2013-2015 | Not Tested | Not Tested | 5/105 retail bottles (4.8%) 2/115 bulk tanks (1.7%) | Not Tested |
| Finland (Jaakkonen et al., 2019) | 2014-2015 | 0/789 | 0/789 O157:H7; 2/789 O121:H19 (<1%) | Not Tested | Not Tested |
| US (Del Collo et al., 2017) | 2014 (17 states) | 13/234 culture; 27/234 PCR (6%; 12%) | Not Tested | Not Tested | Not Tested |
| Italy (Trevisani et al., 2013) | Unspecified (prior to 2013; not for direct | Not Tested | 34/200 (17%) PCR; | Not Tested | Not Tested |

| Country (Reference) | Dates (State if US) | <i>Campylobacter</i> | <i>E. coli</i> O157:H7 or EHECs | <i>L. monocytogenes</i> | <i>Salmonella</i> |
|--|---|------------------------|---|--|-----------------------------|
| | consumption raw, dairy silos) | | 12/34 (35%) culture; 27/34 (79%) viable RT-PCR; 1/40 batches PCR EHEC virulence genes | | |
| New Zealand (Marshall et al., 2016) | 2011-2012, (not for direct consumption raw, pre-pasteurized) | 2/400 (0.6%) | 2/400 (0.6%) | 16/400 (4.0%) | 0/400 |
| Italy (Bianchini et al., 2013) | 2010-2012 (pre-pasteurization) | 34/282 (12%) | Not Tested | Not Tested | Not Tested |
| Finland (Ricchi et al., 2019) | 2011 | Not Tested | Not Tested | 1/120 milk samples from individual cows positive | Not Tested |
| Italy (Giacometti et al., 2013) | 2008-2011 (official sampling licensed raw milk farm vending machines) | 53/60,907 (<2.2%) | 24/60,907 (<1.5%) | 83/60,907 (<1.6%) | 18/60,907 (<1%) |
| Italy (Giacometti et al., 2012b) | 2010 (official sampling licensed raw milk farm vending machines) | 0/99 (ISO, 1 PCR, BAM) | 0/99 (ISO; 1 BAM) | 0/99 (ISO; 1 PCR) | 0/99 (ISO, 1 BAM) |
| US Jackson et al., (2012) | 2009-2010 (not for direct consumption raw, regionally representative dairy silos) | Not Tested | 4/184 (2%) | 107/214 (50%) | (45-124)/(211-214) (21-58%) |

378 In contrast to the assumption by FSANZ in 2009, data were provided from a Test-and-Hold Program in
 379 the US. Regular testing is in use for the pathogen *E. coli* O157:H7/EHECs using rapid methods
 380 (polymerase chain reaction or PCR, results available within 18 hours of sampling). In 898 raw milk
 381 samples analyzed by an independent laboratory in 2018 to 2020, none tested positive or was diverted
 382 from sale as raw milk. The enrichment methods and PCR technology for other pathogens required
 383 longer times for analysis and confirmation by the same independent laboratory, and testing is

384 conducted less frequently. In 109 raw milk samples analyzed for *Listeria monocytogenes* and *Salmonella*
385 spp., none tested positive or was diverted from sale as raw milk. For *Campylobacter* spp., 15 positives
386 and 2 presumptives of 123 raw milk samples were detected and diverted from direct retail sale to
387 consumers (sold to pasteurizers). Additional screening of environmental samples was conducted for *L.*
388 *monocytogenes*, and serial screening of composite raw milk samples was conducted for *Campylobacter*
389 in response to presumptive results to identify positive animals and remove them from the herd or divert
390 their milk from direct sale as raw milk at retail.

391 Notably, the outdated assumption stated in the FSANZ report in 2009, that test-and-hold programs are
392 untenable for raw milk producers, has also been proven false due to significant technological advances
393 in molecular and genetic rapid testing methodologies achieved in the past decade. Data falsifying this
394 assumption are provided from a US test-and-hold program in the table above.

395 To put the test-and-hold program data in perspective as to public health, no outbreaks were reported in
396 the state (CA) for this period for any pathogens (including all four major pathogens considered by
397 FSANZ), to our knowledge. Regarding data from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC),
398 National Outbreak Reporting System (NORS) data on US dairy outbreaks, a dataset for 2005-2017 has
399 already been received and analyzed for other projects, and data for 2018 and 2019 was received
400 recently. Data for 2020 is not available from CDC at present, though no raw milk outbreak reports for CA
401 in 2020 were identified in literature searches. From CDC NORS data, two campylobacteriosis outbreaks
402 were reported in the state of CA in the prior decade, one in 2015 that sickened 8 people and one in 2012
403 that sickened 33. The only other outbreak reported in the state in the past decade was for *E. coli*
404 O157:H7/EHECs that sickened 5 people in 2011, none of whom developed the severe complication of
405 hemolytic uremic syndrome or HUS. No deaths were attributed to raw milk in the state in more than a
406 decade. Over the 3-year period of the Test-and-Hold Program (2018-2020), Organic Pastures produced
407 **4,280,922 gallons** of raw milk, of which **1,351,684 gallons** (31.5%) was bottled for direct human
408 consumption at retail in California (McAfee, 2021, personal communication).

409 Since no raw milk outbreaks associated with microbial pathogens were reported in California in this
410 period, estimates based on available recent data combined with the consumption estimates for children
411 and adults cited in the FSANZ report are that risk of illness is **less than 1 in 9.5 million servings for**
412 **children** and **less than 1 in 12.9 million servings in adults** for consumers in California who choose to buy
413 Organic Pastures raw milk at retail markets.

414 **Thus, recent data for Exposure Assessment do not support the outdated assumptions that raw milk is**
415 **inherently dangerous and that existing hygienic management programs, including HACCP and test-**
416 **and-hold programs, cannot ensure a safe, low-risk product for raw milk consumers.**

417 **Exploring Alternative Assumptions and Reassessing Risk**

418 FSANZ appeared to grossly overestimate risks and underestimate uncertainties for raw milk consumers
419 by applying a series of worst-case assumptions in their 2009 report. The gross overestimation of public
420 health risks purportedly associated with raw milk consumption merits reassessment, based on: i) recent
421 evidence of rare detection and low levels of pathogens in hygienic raw milks reported herein; ii)

422 overestimated growth; and iii) nearly exclusive use of overly conservative non-threshold dose-response
423 models by regulatory organizations around the world that ignore principles of microbial ecology
424 (Coleman et al., 2003a) and thresholds of host resistance, including innate protections of healthy gut
425 microbiota (Buchanan et al., 2017; Coleman et al., 2018; Collineau et al., 2019). Extensive evidence
426 regarding the third point above is described in detail in the body of this critique.

427 FSANZ has not complied with the long-established principles and guidelines for QMRA (CAC, 1999), in
428 our view. FSANZ's assumptions are at best weakly supported and largely unvalidated by independent
429 experimental evidence. The impacts of alternative assumptions are not provided, thus limiting
430 transparency for the data and models and confidence in the outputs of the models.

431 Considerable evidence that was available at the time from the discipline of predictive microbiology
432 (Wang et al., 1997; Coleman et al., 2003a,b) was not cited by FSANZ. These and other predictive
433 microbiology studies documented statistically significant differences in growth for pathogens in pure
434 culture broth systems and raw and pasteurized milks. Inappropriate assumptions applied by FSANZ
435 about growth parameters for potential bacterial pathogens at temperatures typical of refrigeration and
436 temperature abuse are crucial to consider along with growth parameters for the dense, diverse natural
437 microbiota of milks in updating the 2009 report.

438 A subsequent analysis by the EFSA (2015, pg. 4) provided the following perspective for listeriosis in
439 monitoring programs for raw milk.

440 'Although *L. monocytogenes* is not considered to be one of the main hazards associated with
441 RDM [raw drinking milk] in the EU, the reviewed QMRAs from outside the EU do show that the
442 risk associated with *L. monocytogenes* in raw cow's milk can be mitigated and reduced
443 significantly if the cold chain is well controlled, the shelf-life of raw milk is limited to a few days
444 and there is consumer compliance with these measures/controls.'

445 The statement above from EFSA is also true for the remaining major pathogens (*Campylobacter* spp.,
446 EHECs, and *Salmonella* spp.) that cannot outcompete the natural microbiota at refrigeration
447 temperatures (Coleman et al., 2003a). Although this manuscript reported simulations of potential
448 pathogen growth for risk assessment in ground beef, the data available at the time for all four
449 pathogens, growth of pure cultures in rich nutrient broth at various temperatures, was simulated in
450 scenarios with and without suppression by the microbiota of ground beef, also dominated by non-
451 pathogenic pseudomonads as demonstrated for refrigerated retail raw milk stored (Liu et al., 2020).

452 Further, Coleman and colleagues (2003b) documented statistically significant differences in growth
453 parameters for the pathogen *E. coli* O157:H7 in broth cultures based on two variables in predictive
454 microbiology experiments that are of high relevance to raw milks: i) agitation or still culture; and ii)
455 initial inoculum density (high density, ~1,000 cfu/mL; low density ~1 cfu/mL). An independent growth
456 study is underway (FSNS, 2021) that will measure growth of all four pathogens at high (1,000 cfu/mL)
457 and low (1-10 cfu/mL) in raw milk at 4.4°C that fills a significant gap in evidence required for QMRA
458 noted by FSANZ in 2009.

459 FSANZ applied a model published in the same year (Ross et al., 2003) that relied on broth cultures of a
460 surrogate non-pathogen (generic *E. coli*) and appeared to include these conditions (high initial density
461 inoculum and agitation in culture broth) that would overpredict growth. Neither Ross and colleagues
462 (2003) nor FSANZ provided any scientific support for direct extrapolation of the generic *E. coli* model for
463 optimal culture conditions in nutrient broth to raw milk that includes a dense and diverse competing
464 natural microbiota. However, Ross and colleagues (2003) cited the 1997 study of Wang documenting
465 significantly lower growth for the actual pathogen in raw versus pasteurized milks. Notably, FSANZ
466 (2009) did not cite the Wang study (1997) or apply alternative models or seek additional studies to
467 validate the selection of a growth model for a non-pathogenic surrogate that is not representative of the
468 pathogen or the microbial ecology and storage conditions of raw milk.

469 Data is needed to evaluate the current consumption of raw milk by dairy farm families in Australia, as
470 well as the benefits and risks of continuing the prohibition on access to raw milk for other potential
471 consumers in Australia. Further, the effectiveness of current zero-tolerance policies for potential
472 pathogens in reducing raw milk risks, as well as documentation of their costs, warrants study if the
473 prohibition on access to raw milk is lifted in Australia.

474

475 KEY SCIENTIFIC ADVANCES IN 21ST CENTURY

476 In the first decade of the 21st century when FSANZ prepared its assessment of raw milk risks, the human
477 microbiome project was just beginning. Research using culture independent methods (genomics,
478 proteomics, metabolomics or -omics) revealed unanticipated complexities in mammalian milk
479 ecosystems and unimagined tools to probe specific hypotheses concerning the composition,
480 interactions, and functions of microbes in milks. Within another decade of the FSANZ report, the
481 ‘microbiome revolution’ (Blaser, 2014) was dispelling long held assumptions about microbial
482 communities (microbiomes) of humans and foods. Three assumptions challenged by -omics research
483 include:

- 484 1. the sterility of mammary tissue in humans and cows (Urbaniak et al., 2014; Young et al., 2105;
485 Derakhshani et al., 2018; Metzger et al., 2018; Andrews et al., 2019; Oikonomou et al., 2020);
- 486 2. the sterility of mammalian milks, both human (Fitzstevens et al. 2017; Lyons et al. 2020;
487 Oikonomou et al. 2020; Zimmerman and Curtis 2020; Carr et al. 2021) and cow (Quigley et al.,
488 2013; Wu et al., 2019; Breitenwieser et al., 2020; Liu et al., 2020; Oikonomou et al., 2020); and
- 489 3. microbes in milks as fecal contaminants (Wu et al., 2019; Wang et al., 2020; Zimmerman and
490 Curtis, 2020; Oikonomou et al., 2020; Boudry et al., 2021).


491 Fear and dread of many (or all) microbes as ‘germs’ that will kill us appear to factor strongly into the
492 policy requiring pasteurization of bovine milks in Australia, judging from the FSANZ memo (Booth, 16
493 March 2021) and statements in the conclusion of the 2009 report. The fear of microbes as ‘germs’
494 appears to entrench well-meaning scientists and regulators in misconceptions of 20th century science,
495 and wall them off from any consideration of the tremendous advances in knowledge about the
496 microbiota of milks, particularly the rich body of evidence for both benefits and risks of raw milks from
497 both humans and cows. At present, the pasteurization policy of Australia appears inconsistent with the
498 available evidence and the ‘state of the science’ in the 21st century.

499 Similarities and differences are noted in the composition and abundance of major microbes detected in
500 milks from mammals. The figure below illustrates the major genera of the milk microbiota shared
501 between humans and ruminants in red and orange from the recent review by Oikonomou and
502 colleagues (2020). This work is cited by an interdisciplinary study conducted with collaborators in
503 medical microbiology and decision science entitled Examining Evidence of Benefits and Risks for
504 Pasteurizing Donor Breastmilk (Coleman and North, 2021), currently under review for publication in the
505 journal Human and Ecological Risk Assessment.

506

507

508 **Figure 1.** Major genera for the milk microbiota of various mammalian species (Oikonomou et al., 2020;
 509 authors Figure 2, page 4).



510

511 Notably, even in 1999, well before the ‘microbiome revolution’, the CAC included the ‘competing
 512 microflora’ (now termed ‘competing microbiota’) of foods as a relevant factor to be included in
 513 Exposure Assessment for QMRA in its principles and guidelines document (CAC, 1999, pg. 4). By 2015
 514 when the EFSA prepared its analysis of raw milk risk assessments including FSANZ (2009), this expert
 515 body also included a section on the microbial ‘flora’ of raw milk (now termed ‘milk microbiota’) and
 516 cited a 2013 study on the natural bovine milk microbiota (Quigley et al., 2013). Hundreds of peer-
 517 reviewed manuscripts on the bovine milk microbiota are now available, including recent reviews and
 518 studies that document the extent of research characterizing the microbes that dominate the milk
 519 microbiota (Wu et al., 2019; Breitenwieser et al., 2020; Liu et al., 2020; Oikonomou et al., 2020)
 520 previously believed to be sterile, including milks from humans and bovines.

521 The small but elegant study conducted by Wu and colleagues (2019) explored relationships between
522 microbiota of the bovine rumen and GI tract (feces), milk, and the cowshed environment (airborne dust,
523 bedding, feed, water). The cows were housed in freestall barns (not pastured) and fed mixed ration
524 silage. Samples were analyzed by quantitative real-time PCR to the bacterial family level for major taxa
525 (present at $\geq 1\%$ in at least two different samples). Results comparing total population and bacterial
526 composition between two farms were assessed by analysis of variance. Analysis of the relationships
527 between potential sources of microbes was conducted using a published SourceTracker algorithm,
528 hierarchical clustering and heat mapping, and canonical analysis of principle coordinates methods.
529 Results of study reported in the abstract are provided in Text Box 1, motivated by the intention to
530 impose minimal filtering of the authors' results based on our own perspectives of this evidence. Further,
531 the gut-associated microbiome assessed from fecal samples was not a primary risk factor for mastitis on
532 the two farms studied.

Text Box 1. Results reported by Wu and colleagues (2019) in study abstract (directly quoted).

- The most abundant bacterial taxa (family level) in feed, rumen fluid, feces, bedding, and water were *Lactobacillaceae*, *Prevotellaceae*, *Ruminococcaceae*, *Ruminococcaceae*, and *Lactobacillaceae*, respectively, at both farms.
- *Aerococcaceae* was the most abundant taxon in milk and airborne dust microbiota at farm 1, and *Staphylococcaceae* and *Lactobacillaceae* were the most abundant taxa in milk and airborne dust microbiota at farm 2.
- The three most prevalent taxa (*Aerococcaceae*, *Staphylococcaceae*, and *Ruminococcaceae* at farm 1 and *Staphylococcaceae*, *Lactobacillaceae*, and *Ruminococcaceae* at farm 2) were shared between milk and airborne dust microbiota.
- Indeed, SourceTracker indicated that milk microbiota was related with airborne dust microbiota.
- Meanwhile, hierarchical clustering and canonical analysis of principal coordinates demonstrated that the milk microbiota was associated with the bedding microbiota but clearly separated from feed, rumen fluid, feces, and water microbiota.

533 Wu and colleagues (2019) concluded that the raw bovine milk microbiota is clearly separated from the
534 fecal microbiota (as well as the microbiota associated with feed, rumen fluid, and water). This finding
535 contradicts the common notion that bacteria present in milk are fecal contaminants. Together with
536 studies supporting the entero-mammary pathway of transfer of microbes in healthy hosts
537 (Breitenwieser et al., 2020; Liu et al., 2020; Oikonomou et al., 2020), these results challenge 20th-century
538 notions about the milk microbiota and merit further deliberation for evidence-based decision making.
539 Clearly, systematic research studies are needed to determine how generalizable these results are to
540 other dairy farms, breeds, farm management systems including pasture-based herds, and other factors
541 influencing the microbiota of milks.

542

543 EXPOSURE ASSESSMENT

544 The FSANZ approach of extrapolating data for presence and levels of pathogens in feces for
545 campylobacteriosis, EHEC illnesses, and salmonellosis does not represent sound science. Nor is the
546 position to model growth for all four pathogens in raw milk by extrapolating from pure culture pathogen
547 growth in sterile culture broth, without the competing microbiome that limits or prevents pathogen
548 growth, as discussed in more detail below. No studies were identified that provided verification of the
549 prevalence, levels, and growth of pathogens in raw milks extrapolated by FSANZ, nor did any study
550 validate the models developed with definitive results from independent experimental evidence.

551 This recent body of evidence on prevalence depicted in Tables 1-3 merits updating of the exposure
552 assessment for all four major pathogens as will be explained further below. The recent scientific opinion
553 by the EFSA (2015) supports the need to update the Exposure Assessment for the FSANZ 2009 report,
554 citing important data limitations for i) extrapolating data on prevalence and levels of pathogens in feces
555 to milk; and ii) lack of validation of growth models derived from optimal nutrient broth and extrapolated
556 to raw milk without adjusting for effects of the dense and diverse natural microbiota of raw milk.

557 Prevalence

558 Recent prevalence data are available from raw milk samples collected from 2009-2021 from programs
559 around the world (Table 1). Table 1 summarizes data from published studies and a Microsoft Access®
560 database that includes data from US State monitoring (CA, NY, and WA, provided under the US Freedom
561 of Information Act; Andras, 2015 personal communication) and independent certified laboratories (MB
562 Laboratories, Sidney, BC Canada) conducted analyses of raw milk for BC Herdshare. Individual laboratory
563 reports for each of 192 raw milk samples analyzed to date are available for review at
564 <https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/0Bz2kKcZ3EjEleKv1RmRhMmhBQzg>.

565 Studies included in the table reflect raw milk for direct human consumption except pre-pasteurization
566 milk noted by Marshall et al. (2016) and the second dataset from Berge and Baars (2020). The major
567 pathogens were rarely detected in raw milk samples produced for direct human consumption from
568 multiple sources (generally undetected or <1% positive in the table above), with the exception of the UK
569 reporting 2.8% positives (18/635) for *Campylobacter* (McLauchlin et al., 2020). The methods
570 incorporated enrichment for pathogens and thus impose a bias for detection in raw milk.

571

572 **Table 1.** Recent Prevalence Data for Pathogens in Raw Milk from Samples Collected from 2009 to
 573 present from Programs around the World.

| Country (Reference) | Dates (State if US) | <i>Campylobacter</i> | <i>E. coli</i> O157:H7 or EHECs | <i>L. monocytogenes</i> | <i>Salmonella</i> |
|--|---|---|--|--|-------------------|
| Canada (Stephenson & Coleman, 2021) | 2015-2021 | 0/192 | 0/192 | 0/192 | 0/192 |
| Poland (Andrzejewska et al., 2019) | 2014-2018 | 0/113 vending machines; 26/221 (12%) <i>C. jejuni</i> , directly from farmers | Not Tested | Not Tested | Not Tested |
| UK (McLaughlin et al, 2020) | 2013-2019 | 18/635 (3%) | 0/56 O157; 3/304 EHEC (0%, 1%) | 1/642 (0.2%) | 3/622 (0.5%) |
| US State Monitoring (Stephenson & Coleman, 2021, licensed farms) | 2009-2014 (CA) | 0/122 | 0/122 | 0/122 | 0/122 |
| | 2009-2014 (NY) | 7/1,118 (0.6%) | 2/1,118 (0.2%) | 4/1,118 (0.4%) | 0/1,118 |
| | 2009-2014 (TX) | 4/601 | 0/596 | 4/596 | 11/606 |
| | 2012-2015 (WA) | 0/974 | 0/988 | 0/991 | 0/973 |
| Germany (Berge & Baars, 2020) | 2001-2015 (VZM) | 7/2,352 (0.3%) | 17/2,737 (0.7%) | 30/2,999 (1%) | 0/3,367 |
| Germany (Berge & Baars, 2020) | 2001-2015 (not for direct consumption raw, pre-pasteurized) | 17/2,258 (0.8%) | 82/5,433 (1.5%) | 52/2,355 (2.2%) | 0/1,084 |
| Finland (Castro et al., 2017) | 2013-2015 | Not Tested | Not Tested | 5/105 retail bottles (4.8%) 2/115 bulk tanks (1.7%) | Not Tested |
| Finland (Jaakkonen et al., 2019) | 2014-2015 | 0/789 | 0/789 O157:H7; 2/789 O121:H19 (<1%) | Not Tested | Not Tested |
| US (Del Collo et al., 2017) | 2014 (17 states) | 13/234 culture; 27/234 PCR (6%; 12%) | Not Tested | Not Tested | Not Tested |
| Italy (Trevisani et al., 2013) | Unspecified (prior to 2013; not for direct | Not Tested | 34/200 (17%) PCR; | Not Tested | Not Tested |

| Country (Reference) | Dates (State if US) | <i>Campylobacter</i> | <i>E. coli</i> O157:H7 or EHECs | <i>L. monocytogenes</i> | <i>Salmonella</i> |
|--|---|------------------------|---|--|-----------------------------|
| | consumption raw, dairy silos) | | 12/34 (35%) culture; 27/34 (79%) viable RT-PCR; 1/40 batches PCR EHEC virulence genes | | |
| New Zealand (Marshall et al., 2016) | 2011-2012, (not for direct consumption raw, pre-pasteurized) | 2/400 (0.6%) | 2/400 (0.6%) | 16/400 (4.0%) | 0/400 |
| Italy (Bianchini et al., 2013) | 2010-2012 (pre-pasteurization) | 34/282 (12%) | Not Tested | Not Tested | Not Tested |
| Finland (Ricchi et al., 2019) | 2011 | Not Tested | Not Tested | 1/120 milk samples from individual cows positive | Not Tested |
| Italy (Giacometti et al., 2013) | 2008-2011 (official sampling licensed raw milk farm vending machines) | 53/60,907 (<2.2%) | 24/60,907 (<1.5%) | 83/60,907 (<1.6%) | 18/60,907 (<1%) |
| Italy (Giacometti et al., 2012b) | 2010 (official sampling licensed raw milk farm vending machines) | 0/99 (ISO, 1 PCR, BAM) | 0/99 (ISO; 1 BAM) | 0/99 (ISO; 1 PCR) | 0/99 (ISO, 1 BAM) |
| US Jackson et al., (2012) | 2009-2010 (not for direct consumption raw, regionally representative dairy silos) | Not Tested | 4/184 (2%) | 107/214 (50%) | (45-124)/(211-214) (21-58%) |

574 The study by Jaakkonen and colleagues (2019) cited in Table 1 above is particularly relevant because i) it
575 is a longitudinal study sampling milk, feces, drinking troughs, and milk filter from three Finnish dairy
576 farms over time; and ii) it applied both culture-dependent and culture-independent (PCR) methods for
577 estimating prevalence of STECs; and iii) it applied culture-dependent methods for estimating prevalence
578 of *C. jejuni*.

579 Results for EHECs differed by culture-dependent and culture independent methods. Zero raw milk of
580 789 samples were culture-positive for *E. coli* O157:H7, and two of 789 were culture-positive for non-
581 O157 STECs, both serotype O121:H19). Despite 0% and <1% culture positives for STECs, PCR testing for
582 virulence genes alone yielded 52/789 (7%) raw milk samples positive for the Shiga toxin gene and
583 32/789 (4%) positive for both the Shiga toxin gene and the *eae* gene (associated with the capability for
584 STECs to form attaching and effacing lesions), necessary but not sufficient for infectivity and virulence.

585 Jaakkonen reported zero raw milk samples among 785 that tested positive for *C. jejuni* (see Table 1)
586 although feces of milking cows (115/164, 70%), juvenile cows (21/93, 23%), drinking troughs (10/199,
587 5%), and milk filters (1/631, <1%) were positive.

588 The Jaakkonen study (2019) conclusively demonstrates that none of the potential factors included in the
589 study design (feces, drinking troughs, and milk filters) are predictive of prevalence of pathogens in raw
590 milk. Neither are PCR tests for Shiga toxin genes or the combination of Shiga toxin and *eae* genes
591 predictive of the prevalence of viable EHEC/STECs in raw milk.

592 Thus, the Jaakkonen study directly falsifies the incorrect assumption of FSANZ that fecal positives are
593 predictive of milk positives.

594 Trevisani and colleagues (2013) reported results on STEC prevalence (STEC serogroups O26 and O157) as
595 well as enteropathogenic *E. coli* (EPEC) and non-pathogenic *E. coli* in 200 samples of raw milk obtained
596 from 40 batches at an industrial processing plant in Northern Italy. Five incremental samples were
597 obtained from each batch of milk during transfer of bulk milk from tankers to collection silos. Raw milk
598 samples were enriched and analyzed by multiple methods, a PCR-based screening method for serogroup
599 for 200 samples and two methods for each of 40 batches, a real-time PCR method including viability and
600 a culture-based method. Potential virulence genes were also characterized in this study, and some
601 putative positives in screened samples included non-viable microbes (potentially viable but non-
602 culturable). The authors concluded that PCR positive but culture negative results should be interpreted
603 as pathogen negative, and that the distribution of pathogens in comingled milk was not uniform.

604 The PCR results of these studies included in Table 1 (Trevisani et al., 2013; Del Collo et al., 2017;
605 Jaakkonen et al., 2019) merit additional context regarding future decisions to include or exclude PCR and
606 culture-based results for prevalence in an updated QMRA. A substantial body of scientific evidence now
607 exists on use of whole genome sequencing (WGS) in risk management around the world (FAO, 2016;
608 Lambert et al., 2017; Pightling et al., 2018; Matthews et al., 2018; Brown et al., 2019; Apruzzese et al.,
609 2019). Recent peer-reviewed studies document that before 2019, 10 developed nations including the US
610 applied WGS in regulatory surveillance and outbreak investigations (Apruzzese et al., 2019; Brown et al.,
611 2019; Pightling et al., 2018). US regulators in Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS) use WGS for all
612 STECs (adulterant and non-adulterant serotypes) detected in foods. Note that none of the risk
613 management studies cited above advocate regulatory action based on PCR detection of virulence genes
614 alone. Clearly, the presence of potential pathogens or their virulence genes in foods are NOT predictive
615 of the likelihood and severity of human illness as documented in multiple QMRA studies (Pielaat et al.,
616 2015; Teunis et al., 2016; Njage et al., 2019b). Particularly significant is the finding of Njage and

617 colleagues (2019b) that the presence of Shiga toxins and the *eae* gene for the STEC adherence factor
 618 intimin are NOT predictive of health outcome. Rather, the top 21 predictor proteins for STEC human
 619 clinical outcomes include multiple factors that can promote survival in the host gut, adherence and
 620 attachment including biofilm formation, as well as various regulators and secretion systems for
 621 transferring microbial products into the host cell (Njage et al., 2019).

622 Thus, data for updating the Exposure Assessment in FSANZ QMRA should include studies that
 623 characterize not only the genus and species and strain of the potential pathogen, but also its virulence
 624 gene profile. Studies applying methods that overestimate prevalence of pathogens by including non-
 625 viable pathogens or non-pathogens should be excluded.

626 Historical prevalence data are available from raw milk samples collected prior to 2009 from programs
 627 around the world (Table 2). The studies included in Table 2, all peer-reviewed studies in the published
 628 literature, reported pathogen prevalences ranging from 0 to 12%. One study (D’Amico et al., 2008)
 629 sampled raw milk for farmstead cheese operations. It is uncertain if any of the remaining studies were
 630 generated on farms licensed to sell raw milk or that applied HACCP programs.

631 **Table 2.** Some Prevalence Data for Pathogens in Raw Cow Milk Samples Collected Prior to 2009 from
 632 Programs around the World

| Country (Reference) | Dates (State if US) | <i>Campylobacter</i> | <i>E. coli</i> O157:H7 or EHECs | <i>L. monocytogenes</i> | <i>Salmonella</i> |
|---------------------------------|-----------------------------|----------------------|---------------------------------|-------------------------|-------------------|
| New Zealand (Hill et al., 2012) | 2007-2008 (pre-pasteurized) | 1/296 (0.3%) | 0/296 | 2/295 (0.7%) | 0/294 |
| Canada (Medeiros et al., 2008) | 1999-2001 | 0/126 | Not Tested | Not Tested | Not Tested |
| US D’Amico et al. (2008) | 2006 (VT, farmsteads) | Not Tested | 0/62 | 3/62 (2%) | 0/62 |
| US Jayarao et al. (2006) | 2001-2002 (PA) | 5/248 (2%) | 6/248 (2%) | 3/248 (1%) | 15/248 (6%) |
| US Van Kessel et al. (2004) | 2002 (21 States) | N/A | N/A | 56/861 (7%) | 22/861 (3%) |
| US Rohrbach et al. (1992) | 1990 (TN, VA) | 36/292 (12%) | Not Tested | 12/292 (4%) | 26/292 (9%) |
| Canada Steele et. al. (1997) | 1995-1996 | 8/1720 (0.5%) | 15/1720 (0.9%) | 47/1720 (3%) | 3/1720 (0.2%) |

| Country (Reference) | Dates (State if US) | <i>Campylobacter</i> | <i>E. coli</i> O157:H7 or EHECs | <i>L. monocytogenes</i> | <i>Salmonella</i> |
|--------------------------------|-------------------------------------|----------------------|---------------------------------|---|-------------------|
| Scotland (Fenlon et al., 1995) | (unspecified, assume prior to 1995) | Not Tested | Not Tested | Zero bulk milk from 135 of 160 farms (84%); 25 farms with positives (16%) periodically from longitudinal sampling, three farms positive all four main samplings | Not Tested |

633 The data used by FSANZ in 2009 for prevalence (and levels) of *L. monocytogenes* were from a study of
 634 pre-pasteurization milk produced in Scotland at an unspecified year (Fenlon et al., 1995). Note that the
 635 prevalence data reported in the study have some consistencies with more recent data in Table 1, in that
 636 raw milk from 135 of 160 farms was negative on all occasions, with only 7 farms positive on three or
 637 four occasions. However, these data were generated using enrichment methods, thus reflecting an
 638 overestimation bias. Thus, these data are not appropriate for use in estimating risk for Australian
 639 consumers of raw milk in 2021.

640 Prevalence Data for Test-and-Hold Program

641 In contrast to the assumption by FSANZ in 2009 that test-and-hold programs were not possible,
 642 technological advances in rapid testing for pathogens have enabled use of test-and-hold programs.
 643 Table 3 includes results on pathogens in raw milk documented by Food Safety Net Services (FSNS,
 644 Fresno, CA USA) for a US raw milk producer for 2018-2020 (Organic Pastures, Fresno, CA; McAfee, 2021).
 645 These data are also available in the previously mentioned Microsoft Access® database compiled by
 646 Stephenson & Coleman (2021).

647 **Table 3.** Pathogen Data for Raw Milk Samples Collected from 2018-2020 from a US Dairy under a Test-
 648 and-Hold Program (California; McAfee, 2021)

| Country (Reference) | Dates (State if US) | <i>Campylobacter</i> | <i>E. coli</i> O157:H7 or EHECs | <i>L. monocytogenes</i> | <i>Salmonella</i> |
|---|---------------------|--|---------------------------------|-------------------------|-------------------|
| US Test-and-Hold Program (Stephenson & Coleman, 2021) | 2018-2020 (CA) | 15 positives, 2 presumptives diverted of 123 (13.8%) | 0 diverted of 898 | 0 diverted of 109 | 0 diverted of 109 |

649 The Test-and-Hold Program focuses primarily on *E. coli* O157:H7 that is tested by PCR BAX RT for every
 650 lot, and results are generally available within 18-24 hours. Other pathogens are analyzed by PCR BAX RT
 651 for *Campylobacter*, PCR-BAX AOAC 2003.09 for *Salmonella*, and PCR BAX or AOAC-RI 070702 for *L.*
 652 *monocytogenes*. These analyses require longer periods before results are available and are tested less
 653 frequently.

654 Over the 3-year period for the Test-and-Hold Program of Organic Pastures, no raw milk among 898 lots
 655 tested for *E. coli* O157:H7 were positive. For *Campylobacter*, raw milk was diverted from the holding

656 tanks for 17 of 123 lots that tested positive, including two lots testing as presumptive positives. These 17
657 lots were diverted from human consumption as raw milk (sold to pasteurization plants). No raw milk
658 samples among 218 lots were positive for *L. monocytogenes* or *Salmonella* (109 lots each).

659 Regular testing was conducted for the pathogen *E. coli* O157:H7/EHECs using rapid methods
660 (enrichment, culture, and confirmation by polymerase chain reaction or PCR, results available within 18
661 hours of sampling). In 898 raw milk samples analyzed by an independent laboratory in 2018 to 2020,
662 none tested positive or was diverted from sale as raw milk. The rapid testing methodology for other
663 pathogens (enrichment, culture, and PCR confirmation) required longer times for analysis and
664 confirmation by the same independent laboratory, and testing is less frequent. In 109 raw milk samples
665 analyzed for the pathogen *Listeria monocytogenes* and the genus *Salmonella*, none tested positive or
666 was diverted from sale as raw milk. For the genus *Campylobacter*, 15 positives and 2 presumptives of
667 123 raw milk samples were detected and diverted from sale to consumers. Additional screening of
668 environmental samples was conducted for *L. monocytogenes*, and serial screening of composite raw
669 milk samples was conducted for *Campylobacter* in response to presumptive results to identify positive
670 animals.

671 Note that the Test-and-Hold data are NOT appropriate for estimating human exposure or risk because
672 the enrichment step imposes a bias for higher detection, particularly for *Campylobacter* spp. that do not
673 grow in raw milk at refrigerated temperatures or in competition with the natural microbiota. The US
674 regulatory agency that conducts regular microbial testing for these four pathogens records only direct
675 plating results (FSIS, 2014). Further, the rapid test methods identify *Campylobacter* and *Salmonella* only
676 to genus, and characterization of pathogenicity and virulence of isolates would be needed for use in risk
677 assessment. Even for the pathogen *L. monocytogenes*, high variability between strains in pathogenicity
678 and virulence noted in multiple studies (FDA/FSIS, 2003; Chen et al., 2003, 2006; Bertrand et al., 2016;
679 Stout et al., 2019) point to the need for incorporating additional evidence in QMRAs for Dose-Response
680 Assessment, rather than applying another worst-case assumption that all strains in raw foods have
681 infectivity and virulence equal to outbreak strains. Also, any positive lot from the Test-and-Hold Program
682 is diverted from sale to consumers, reducing the public health risk further by preventing human
683 exposures to lots that may contain viable and infectious microbes that could, at sufficient dose, have
684 caused human illnesses among consumers.

685 Certainly, because *Campylobacter* is sampled less frequently compared to STECs (123 samples vs 898
686 over the 3-year period), it is possible that a percentage of retail raw milk samples screened for STECs but
687 not for *Campylobacter* could be positive and result in exposure to California raw milk consumers. It is
688 possible that if the screened 123 samples (17 positive of 123, 13.8%) were representative of other lots
689 of raw milk that were not screened for *Campylobacter*, the rate of *Campylobacter* positives in
690 unscreened lots could be 13.8%. However, no campylobacter cases associated with raw milk were
691 reported in this time-period in the state. Thus, these data falsify the assumption by FSANZ that presence
692 of pathogens in raw milk renders it inherently dangerous.

693 **Levels of Pathogens**

694 While extensive recent data on pathogen prevalence are available from studies conducted in raw milks
 695 around the globe (see Table 1 above), data on levels of pathogens in naturally contaminated raw milk
 696 samples are sparse and may be insufficient for reliable distribution fitting for application in robust
 697 simulation exercises by QMRA teams. None of the US'S states that responded to the FOIA requests
 698 summarized in Table 1 (Stephenson and Coleman, 2021) generated any data that quantified counts of
 699 pathogens in raw milk, merely data on qualitative presence or absence of pathogens. Table 4 below
 700 summarizes available data for pathogen levels in raw milk samples.

701 **Table 4.** Pathogen levels (cfu/mL or MPN/mL) reported in recently published studies using enrichment
 702 methods for detection and enumeration.

| Country (Reference) | Dates (State if US) | <i>Campylobacter</i> | <i>E. coli</i> O157:H7 or EHECs | <i>L. monocytogenes</i> | <i>Salmonella</i> |
|---|--------------------------------|---------------------------------|---------------------------------|---|-----------------------------|
| Finland (Castro et al., 2017) | 2013-2015 | Not Tested | Not Tested | 1, 13 cfu/mL retail bottles 1 cfu/mL bulk tanks | Not Tested |
| Italy (Trevisani et al., 2013) | Unspecified (prior to 2013) | Not Tested | <0.3, 1.4 MPN/mL | Not Tested | Not Tested |
| Finland (Ricchi et al., 2019) | 2011 | Not Tested | Not Tested | 90, 200, and >300 cfu/mL reported, single cow with subclinical mastitis in one quarter (culled after 3 rd positive sample) | Not Tested |
| New Zealand (Hill et al., 2012) | 2007-2008 (regional farm vats) | 1 cfu/21 mL (0.047 MPN/mL) | 1 cfu/21 mL (0.047 MPN/mL) | Two samples at 1 cfu/4 mL (0.24 MPN/mL) | Not detected in 294 samples |
| Scotland (Fenlon et al., 1995) | (Unspecified, prior to 1995) | Not Tested | Not Tested | <1 CFU/mL, maximum 35 CFU/mL) | Not Tested |
| UK (Humphrey & Beckett, 1987) | 1984-1986 | Four <0.05 MPN/mL, One 1 MPN/mL | Not Tested | Not Tested | Not Tested |

703 Castro et al. (2017) assessed not only the prevalence, but also the levels of *L. monocytogenes* in 105
 704 retail raw milk bottles and 115 bulk tanks from Finnish dairies. Reported levels were 1 and 13 cfu/mL.

705 The Ricchi study (2019) of a Finnish dairy herd reported levels of *L. monocytogenes* in raw milk from a
 706 single cow that was observed to be mastitic in one quarter. Before the cow was culled from the herd,
 707 reported levels of the pathogens were 90, 200, and >300 cfu/mL.

708 Levels of *Campylobacter* spp. in raw milk samples were reported for two studies included in a systematic
709 review (Christidis et al., 2016), citing: i) a New Zealand study (Hill et al. 2012) reporting a single positive
710 sample at 0.047 MPN/mL (95% CI 0.0069-0.33 MPN/mL; and ii) an older UK study (Humphrey and
711 Beckett, 1987) reporting 0.16 ± 0.30 MPN/mL. Both studies used enrichment methods that bias
712 enumeration results and are thus inappropriate for use in QMRA.

713 The Hill study (2012) of New Zealand dairy herds reported estimates of pathogen levels in raw milk
714 collected in 2007-2008 from regional farm vats. Levels were reported at 0.047 MPN/mL for
715 *Campylobacter* and STEC (one sample each of 296 total samples) and 0.24 MPN/mL in 2 of 296 for *L.*
716 *monocytogenes*. The authors conclude that 'the prevalence and concentration of pathogens including in
717 the study were relatively low'.

718 The Fenlon study (1995) that FSANZ used for estimating levels of *L. monocytogenes* in raw milk samples
719 reported raw data for multiple samplings of the 25 positive farms in Scotland. The authors' Table 1
720 (Fenlon et al., 1995, page 58) included some results reported qualitatively (presence/absence only) and
721 other results with quantitative estimates (1 – 35 cfu/mL) after enrichment for the pathogen. It appears
722 that FSANZ combined the qualitative and quantitative data by censored regression (FSANZ, 2009, page
723 28), however the reported mean (0.196 log cfu/mL) was greatly exceeded by the reported standard
724 deviation (0.677 log cfu/mL). It is unclear if FSANZ conducted further statistical analysis on these data
725 from a longitudinal study where bulk milk from 160 farms was predominantly pathogen-negative (84%
726 negative farms). It is also unclear how appropriate data generated from dairies in Scotland in the 1990s
727 is for extrapolation to predict potential levels of *L. monocytogenes* positive raw milk samples for
728 Australian consumers of raw milk in 2009 (or in 2021).

729 The Humphrey and Beckett study (1987) reported levels of *Campylobacter* at <0.05 MPN/mL for four
730 samples of raw milk and 1 MPN/mL for one sample.

731 Although FSANZ acknowledged the need for spatial and temporal data on the prevalence and levels of
732 pathogens in Australian dairy cows and in raw milk as a data gap (FSANZ, 2009, page 41), no validation
733 studies were apparently conducted to fill this or any of the seven data gaps identified in the 2009 report
734 (letter from Mark Booth, Chief Executive Officer, FSANZ dated 16 March 2021).

735 Raw milk samples containing detectable foodborne pathogens (*Campylobacter coli/jejuni*; *E. coli*
736 O157:H7 (EHECs/EHECs/VTECs); *Listeria monocytogenes*; *Salmonella*) may cause disease if present at
737 sufficient levels to overwhelm innate human defenses including the gut microbiota or adaptive
738 immunity (via specific antibodies) present from prior infections.

739 Further, no data are available to verify assumptions made about possible levels of pathogens naturally
740 present in raw milks from the FSANZ report (1999) and more recent QMRAs (Giacometti et al., 2015a,b;
741 Giacometti et al., 2017).

742 The data selected by FSANZ in 2009 (Fenlon et al., 1995) for prevalence and levels of *L. monocytogenes*
743 were from a study of pre-pasteurization milk produced in Scotland at an unspecified year prior to 1995

744 publication of the study. Note that the prevalence data reported in the study has some consistencies
745 with more recent data in Table 1 in that raw milk from 135 of 160 farms was negative on all occasions,
746 with only 7 farms positive on three or four occasions. The reported pathogen levels were low (<1
747 CFU/mL for 638 of 727 samples, ≤ 10 CFU/mL in 32 samples from 25 farms, and ≤ 35 CFU/mL in 13
748 samples from 5 farms). However, these data were generated using an enrichment method, thus
749 reflecting an overestimation bias. Thus, these data are not appropriate for use in estimating risk for
750 Australian consumers of raw milk in 2009 or in 2021.

751 Trevisani and colleagues (2013) reported very low levels of STECs (<0.3 or 1.4 MPN/mL) in 200 samples
752 of raw milk obtained from 40 batches at an industrial processing plant in Northern Italy. Five
753 incremental samples were obtained from each batch of milk during transfer of bulk milk from tankers to
754 collection silos.

755 No studies were identified that estimated levels for *Salmonella* spp in raw milk samples. Data on levels
756 of pathogens in raw milk samples when positive is clearly sparse. However, no data was identified that
757 verified the FSANZ assumptions about levels of pathogens in raw milk for direct human consumption in
758 Australia.

759 **Growth/Survival**

760 Considerable evidence is available from the discipline of predictive microbiology via studies conducted
761 in pure broth cultures and food matrices that estimate experimentally optimum pathogen growth
762 parameters in the absence of competing microbes. Predictive microbiology experiments may also be
763 designed to estimate limits for growth/no-growth boundaries in bacterial pathogens at temperatures
764 typical of refrigeration and temperature abuse. While many extrinsic and intrinsic factors influence
765 microbial growth in foods, this report emphasizes studies on temperature and inoculum density to
766 predict the likelihood and magnitude of pathogen growth in foods.

767 Many predictive microbiology studies were available to FSANZ in 2009, including studies of Wang and
768 colleagues (1997), Tamplin and colleagues (2002) and Coleman and colleagues (2003a,b) that modeled
769 growth of *E. coli* O157:H7 (a pathogen classified in different studies as an EHEC, STEC, or VTEC) in raw
770 and pasteurized milk, ground meat, and pure broth cultures. These studies were apparently excluded by
771 FSANZ; at best, these 4 key studies were available but not cited by FSANZ. The exclusion of these studies
772 is consistent with potentially intentional overestimation bias in the approach that FSANZ selected to
773 model growth in raw milk for the 2009 report. All these peer-reviewed studies noted overprediction bias
774 for broth culture models or pasteurized milk at typical initial densities (1,000 cfu/mL) of pathogens as
775 particularly significant when extrapolating to a non-sterile food without adjustment for the effects of
776 the dominant microbes in the indigenous 'microflora', now termed microbiota.

777 FSANZ chose to apply broth culture models for a related surrogate (generic *E. coli* strains; Salter et al,
778 1998; Ross et al., 2003) and extrapolate from growth of pure cultures of non-pathogenic strains to
779 predict growth of the related pathogen *E. coli* O157:H7 (an EHEC) in raw milks. Of further concern is the
780 incorrect statement by Salter and colleagues (1998) that the generic *E. coli* model sufficiently described

781 growth rate data for milk when the study that they cited (Wang et al., 1997) concluded that *E. coli*
782 O157:H7 grew significantly more slowly ($p < 0.01$) in unpasteurized milk compared to pasteurized milk.

783 Although Tamplin and colleagues (2002, 2005) did not examine growth of *E. coli* O157:H7 in pasteurized
784 and raw milks (only the latter including the naturally dense and diverse microbiota), the study did
785 document differential growth of 10 food isolates of O157:H7 in sterile (irradiated) and raw ground beef
786 and compared predictions to broth-based growth models. Tamplin and colleagues (2002) articulated the
787 statements below relevant to modeling pathogen growth in raw milk.

788 ‘In conclusion, these results demonstrate that existing broth-based models must be validated
789 for food. In addition, new models are needed that consider the influences of the food matrix,
790 the competitive microflora, and potential strain variation.


791 Further, Coleman and colleagues (2003a) reviewed available studies depicting growth at refrigeration
792 temperatures in culture broth, noting as did FSANZ that *Campylobacter* spp. cannot grow at
793 refrigeration temperatures or below 30°C. The study concluded the following.

794 ‘Validation of portions of exposure assessment models is both possible and essential for
795 describing variability and uncertainty. ... unadjusted predictive microbiology models could lead
796 to biased exposure assessment models, a situation incongruent with a primary goal of risk
797 assessment: Generation of unbiased predictions of risk with attendant uncertainty based on
798 science. More basic research is needed in this area to support development of dynamic and
799 stochastic models that address the complex abiotic and biotic effects for the interacting
800 microbial populations in foods.’

801 Coleman et al. (2003b) reported results on significant influences of low initial density (~1 cfu/mL), strain
802 variability, and stationary refrigeration of broth cultures (without agitation) of *E. coli* O157:H7 at 10°C.
803 Significant effects were observed for low initial inoculum and agitation for broth cultures of *E. coli*
804 O157:H7 (Coleman et al., 2003b, page 149).

805

806 **Figure 2.** Impact of low initial inoculum and agitation on growth characteristics at 10°C in broth cultures
 807 (Coleman et al., 2003b, authors Figure 1C).



808

809 Coleman and colleagues (2003b) concluded the following.

810 ‘Predictive microbiologists expect that broth culture models are likely to be conservative, “fail-
 811 safe” systems that overpredict growth under more typical conditions of foods. Two major
 812 effects in broth culture protocols that might lead to overestimation bias were tested in this
 813 study, low initial densities typical of fresh ground beef and agitation (pg. 148).

814 ‘It is possible that exposure assessments for *E. coli* O157:H7 in ground beef based on kinetics of
 815 growth from fail-safe culture broth models without adjustment for food matrix effects may
 816 calculate biased predictions of growth for this pathogen in ground beef. Therefore, the current
 817 studies were designed to address four factors that may bias exposure assessment models for
 818 this pathogen: temperature, initial density of the pathogen, agitation or aeration, and strain.’
 819 (pg. 148)

820 ‘The magnitude of overprediction is consistent with 16,000–135,000% overestimation of static
 821 growth potential for low initial densities.’ (pg. 157)

822 ‘In conclusion, the effects of agitation, initial density, pH, and strain were significant for growth
 823 kinetics near the boundaries of the growth/no growth interface for *E. coli* O157:H7 [between 8
 824 and 10°].’ (pg. 158)

825 'Microbial risk assessment processes are evolving to incorporate more science to replace
826 judgements that do not hold up to hypothesis testing in controlled scientific experiments.' (pg.
827 158)

828 'The analytic-deliberative process described for risk analysis by the National Research Council
829 (1996) is consistent with systematic analysis of the available bodies of evidence, such as kinetic
830 data for broth cultures and nonsterile food matrices, to support microbial exposure assessment
831 modeling.' (pg. 158)

832 'Adjustments appear to be needed to account for suboptimal growth kinetics in nonsterile
833 foods.' (pg. 159)

834 Clearly, the broth culture models for growth as measured by Coleman et al. (2003b) illustrated in the
835 figure above cannot be extrapolated to raw milk or to other pathogens without additional data. A
836 growth study for all four pathogens of interest in raw milk at a typical refrigeration temperature (8°C) is
837 in the planning stages to replicate the results of the figure above for the raw milk substrate. The low and
838 high inoculum levels (1 cfu/mL and 1,000 cfu/mL) will be included. The microbiota of the raw milk will
839 also be determined since competition with the natural microbiota has been demonstrated to reduce
840 pathogen growth in non-sterile foods. Results from this study will be made available to the FSANZ team
841 if the decision is made to update the 2009 QMRA.

842 The characteristics of some of the available growth studies on pathogens are summarized in Table 5
843 below. A pilot study on growth in fresh raw milk for all four pathogens considered by FSANZ in 2009 is
844 underway in an independent laboratory (FSNS, 2021) with a design based on that illustrated in Figure 2
845 (Coleman et al., 2003b). Cocktails of each pathogen will be inoculated into raw milk at initial densities of
846 approximately 1 cfu/mL and 1,000 cfu/mL without agitation. The samples will be incubated at the
847 refrigeration temperature recommended by US regulators, 4.4°C (40°F), for 14 days. Pathogens will be
848 enumerated at multiple time points over the course of the pilot study. Results from the pathogen
849 growth study will be shared with FSANZ so that uncertainty and variability in pathogen growth are based
850 on the raw milk matrix and proper refrigeration in order to properly characterize growth in the
851 recommended FSANZ reassessment.

852

853 **Table 5.** Experimental designs of studies estimating growth of pathogenic and non-pathogenic bacteria.
 854 Studies available prior to publication of FSANZ 2009 report are bolded.

| Reference | Initial Inoculum Density (log cfu/mL) | Single Strains or Cocktails (pathogens or non-pathogens) | Test Matrix (culture broth, raw or heated milk) | Refrigeration Temperatures (degrees C) | Abuse Temperatures (degrees C) |
|---------------------------------|---|---|---|--|--|
| Doyle & Roman (1982) | ~10 ⁷ | <i>Eight C. jejuni</i> strains surviving | Raw milk, sterile milk (heated 121° 15 min), brucella broth | 4° | Not tested |
| Wang et al. (1997) | 10 ³ , 10 ⁶ | cocktail of five <i>E. coli</i> O157:H7 strains | raw and pasteurized milks | 5°, 8° | 15°, 22° |
| Salter et al. (1998) | 10 ³ - 10 ⁵ | Ten <i>E. coli</i> strains, including 9 STECs and non-pathogenic M23 | Culture broth (comparison with meat, fruit, milk studies) | 4° to 51° range tested | |
| Pitt et al. (2000) | 10 ⁴ | <i>L. monocytogenes</i> , <i>Staphylococcus aureus</i> , <i>Salmonella enteritidis</i> | Raw milk | Not tested | 37° |
| Tamplin et al. (2002) | 10 ¹ , 10 ² , 10 ³ | Nine individual <i>E. coli</i> O157:H7 strains, cocktails of 5 or 10 strains | Raw, sterile (irradiated) ground beef, +/- supplementation of native microbes | 10° | Not tested |
| Coleman et al. (2003b) | 10 ⁰ , 10 ³ | Nine <i>E. coli</i> O157:H7 strains | Culture broth | 10° | 19°, 37° |
| Ross et al. (2003) | | Generic (non-pathogenic) <i>E. coli</i> strains M23, SB1 | Culture broth | 8° to 47° | |
| Tamplin et al. (2005) | 10 ³ - 10 ⁴ | Ten individual <i>E. coli</i> O157:H7 strains, cocktails of 5 or 10 strains | Sterile (irradiated) ground beef | 5° to 46° range tested | |
| Giacometti et al. (2012a) | 10 ² | Cocktails of three strains for each: <i>C. jejuni</i> , <i>E. coli</i> O157:H7, <i>L. monocytogenes</i> , <i>S. typhimurium</i> | Raw milk | 4°C as 'best-case' scenario | 7°C (5 hr) 11°C (22.5 hr) 30°C (0.5 hr) 12°C (68 hr) as 'worst-case' scenario |
| Castro et al. (2017) | 10 ⁰ , 10 ¹ , 10 ² | <i>L. monocytogenes</i> | Raw milk | 6°, 8°, 10° | Not tested |
| Leclair et al. (2019) | 10 ² , 10 ⁶ | <i>E. coli</i> O157:H7, <i>L. monocytogenes</i> | Raw milk | 5°, 8° | 15°, 22° |

855 Fail-Safe (Biased) Designs for Predictive Microbiology Models

856 What is clear from evidence summarized in Table 5 is that many of the designs of predictive
857 microbiology experiments intended to model pathogen growth for food safety applications
858 oversimplified the microbial ecology of foods, particularly those with a natural, indigenous microbiota.
859 The factors intentionally contributing to biased predictive microbiology for applications to food safety
860 include use of the following simplifications.

- 861 1. Related non-pathogenic organisms for pathogens are likely to grow faster since the non-
862 pathogens may be better adapted and do not have to invest energy to maintain virulence genes.
- 863 2. A cocktail of pathogen strains, such that the fastest growing dominates the growth, overpredicts
864 growth of the sub-dominant strains, and underestimates strain variability.
- 865 3. Growth of pure cultures in nutrient broth is likely to exceed growth of the same strains in
866 competition with the natural microbiota in foods.
- 867 4. The rate and magnitude of pathogen growth is dependent on these four factors as major
868 drivers:
 - 869 i. Initial inoculation level, particularly important to consider when many experiments were
870 conducted at high pathogen levels exceeding 10^3 log cfu/mL or 1,000 cfu/mL. Levels of
871 pathogens in raw milk, when detected by enrichment methods, are typically 100 times
872 lower, <1 to 10 cfu/mL. Extensive experimental evidence supports high initial levels in
873 challenge experiments as a factor inducing overprediction bias.
 - 874 ii. Presence of natural microbiota of foods that limit pathogens by direct antagonism
875 (production of bacteriocins or other anti-bacterial compounds) and indirect mechanisms
876 (competition for nutrients, production of metabolites such as organic acids, induction of
877 host defenses against pathogens, niches for colonization or infection). Extensive
878 experimental evidence documents suppression of growth or direct killing of pathogens
879 by natural microbiota in many foods, and extrapolation of growth models for pathogens
880 in pure culture broths, sterile foods, or foods treated to reduce the microbiota is a
881 factor inducing overprediction bias.
 - 882 iii. Temperature is obviously an important factor in predicting growth, but variability and
883 uncertainty is highest at the boundary of the growth/no-growth interface. At this
884 interface, strain variability is also higher than at temperatures supporting optimal
885 growth. Extensive experimental evidence documents that interactions of cocktails of
886 strains (under estimating strain variability), matrix (sterile broth, sterile food, or foods
887 with natural microbiota intact), and sub-optimal temperatures are significant and can
888 induce overprediction bias.
 - 889 iv. Agitation or aeration of cultures can stimulate growth of aerobes (or retard growth of
890 micro-aerophilic and anaerobic microbes) and induce overprediction bias, especially for

891 liquid foods that are stored in stationary conditions. Extensive experimental evidence
892 supports culture agitation as a factor that may induce overprediction bias.

893 The extent of experimental design bias illustrated in Table 5 are put in deeper context below with some
894 results and conclusions of the authors.

895 Wang et al. (1997) incubated a cocktail of 5 strains of *E. coli* O157:H7 at 10³ or 10⁶ cfu/mL in raw and
896 pasteurized milks at (5°, 8°, and 15°) and abuse temperatures (22°). The authors reported significantly
897 lower growth in raw versus pasteurized milk.

898 Salter et al. (1998) inoculated broth cultures with nine STECs (including O157:H7 and O11:H-) and non-
899 pathogenic *E. coli* M23 at a large range of temperatures (see Table 5 for details). Comparisons were
900 made between growth parameters for broth with those reported in other studies of various foods
901 (meat, fruit, and milk) inoculated with *E. coli* O157:H7 at 10³ - 10⁵ log cfu/mL or /gram). The authors
902 Table 6 only lists results for growth of the pathogen in raw milk at 15° for the Wang study (1997).
903 Notably, the authors reported that the non-pathogenic *E. coli* M23 growth model was 'purposely
904 conservative and intended to predict the fastest growth rate probable' (fail-safe) and overpredicted
905 STEC growth by up to 2-fold under the conditions tested. The authors also note that multiple
906 independent studies documented that broth culture models 'deviate markedly' from growth rates
907 estimated in foods.

908 Giacometti et al. (2012a) inoculated each of the four pathogens considered by FSANZ into raw milk at
909 ~100 cfu/mL (10² log cfu/mL) and stored inoculated milk for 96 hours (4 days) under 'best case'
910 (refrigeration at 4°C) and 'worst case' (prolonged periods of temperature abuse; see Table 5 for details).
911 The methods incorporated enrichment and thus impose a bias on pathogen growth. For three
912 pathogens (*C. jejuni*, *E. coli* O157:H7, and *S. Typhimurium*), no growth was observed under refrigeration
913 at 4°C, and only *C. jejuni* did not grow under temperature abuse. For *L. monocytogenes*, levels increased
914 from 2.2 to 2.6 cfu/mL under refrigeration at 4°C and to 3.25 cfu/mL under temperature abuse.

915 Castro et al. (2017) assessed not only the prevalence and levels of *L. monocytogenes* in 105 retail raw
916 milk bottles and 115 bulk tanks, but also growth in raw milk inoculated with 2, 20 or 200 cfu/mL and
917 stored at refrigeration temperatures (6°, 8°, and 10°).

918 Leclair et al. (2019) growth *E. coli* O157:H7 or *L. monocytogenes* at two high inoculation levels (10² or
919 10⁶cfu/mL), for simulation of possible consumer handling, including refrigeration temperatures (4°,
920 8°, and 15°), abuse temperatures (20°, 30°, 40°), and various freeze-thaw conditions. The authors did not
921 provide growth curves or parameters for both high inoculation levels, but reported estimated marginal
922 means and statistical results for main parameters and interactions. The authors note that further
923 research is needed to estimate strain variability, clearly influential in both predictive microbiology and
924 QMRA.

925 The few QMRAs available that estimate risks that might be associated with raw milks appear to apply
926 biased growth models (intentionally 'fail-safe' models that overpredict rates and magnitude of pathogen
927 growth in foods. By applying a series of worst-case assumptions like biased growth models, these

928 QMRAs grossly overestimate risks and underestimate uncertainties for raw milk consumers, particularly
929 true of the FSANZ approach for the 2009 report. The EFSA (2015, pg. 4) observed the following regarding
930 listeriosis risk for raw milk.

931 'Although *L. monocytogenes* is not considered to be one of the main hazards associated with RDM
932 [raw drinking milk] in the EU, the reviewed QMRAs from outside the EU {including FSANZ, 2009} do
933 show that the risk associated with *L. monocytogenes* in raw cow's milk can be mitigated and reduced
934 significantly if the cold chain is well controlled, the shelf-life of raw milk is limited to a few days and
935 there is consumer compliance with these measures/controls.'

936 The statement above regarding adequacy of cold chain as a mitigation for growth of *L. monocytogenes*
937 also applies to the remaining 3 pathogens that cannot grow at refrigeration temperatures even in
938 optimal nutrient conditions lacking microbial competitors (Coleman et al., 2003a).

939 **Microbial Ecology of Foods**

940 FSANZ excluded then available studies documenting the importance of including data on the microbial
941 ecology of non-sterile foods in QMRAs (e.g., Tamplin et al., 2002; Coleman et al., 2003a; Tamplin et al.,
942 2005).

943 Data on bacterial levels for non-pathogenic hygiene indicators (e.g., standard plate counts (SPCs) and
944 coliforms) for milk quality provided by states under FOIA are also included in the Microsoft Access®
945 database (Stephenson and Coleman, 2021) but are not summarized herein. These hygiene indicators can
946 be useful to predict time to spoilage or process control, but multiple studies report that these counts are
947 not correlated to or predictive of specific pathogens that may cause disease. Recent studies quantified
948 100,000 total aerobic bacteria for raw bulk tank milk samples from two farms in Germany (Breitenwieser
949 et al., 2020) and 1,000 total aerobic bacteria in retail raw milk in California (Liu et al., 2020), the latter
950 study also applying culture-independent methods. None of the four genera of the major foodborne
951 pathogens considered by FSANZ were detected in multiple milk microbiota studies (Quigley et al., 2013;
952 Breitenwieser et al., 2020; Liu et al., 2020; Oikonomou et al., 2020). The total aerobic plate counts thus
953 appear likely to dominate the microbial ecology of raw milks, as demonstrated for meat and poultry
954 products (Coleman et al., 2003a).

955 More information on hygienic indicators for raw milk quality is described below.

956 □ Standard plate counts (SPCs) or total aerobic plate counts (APCs or TACs) or heterotrophic plate
957 counts (HPCs) provide estimates of the total number of viable aerobic bacteria that can grow on
958 a rich, unrestrictive nutrient media (plate count agar) at defined times and temperatures. A vast
959 array of bacteria from many families and genera can grow on these plates. Bacteria requiring
960 absence of oxygen (anaerobic) or lower levels of oxygen (micro-aerophilic), conditions typical of
961 the gastrointestinal tract niches with limited oxygen, do not grow. Neither do microbes with
962 more fastidious nutrient requirements grow on these plates, nor those less capable of
963 outcompeting competitors. SPCs can be useful to predict time to spoilage, but these counts are
964 not correlated to or predictive of specific pathogens that may cause disease.

965 □ The coliform group is defined by growth of Gram-negative bacterial rods capable of fermenting
966 lactose (including 19 genera, predominantly *Aeromonas*, *Citrobacter*, *Enterobacter*, *Escherichia*
967 including *E. coli*, *Hafnia*, *Klebsiella*, *Raoultella*, and *Serratia*) and quantified on specific nutrient
968 media (typically brilliant green lactose bile broth, violet red bile agar, or MacConkey's agar)
969 under aerobic conditions (in the presence of oxygen) at 32-35°C. Coliforms are detectable in
970 various environmental sources (soil, water, air, vegetation including vegetables and silage,
971 insects, feces). Many bacterial genera and species can grow on these plates, but these counts
972 are not correlated to or predictive of specific pathogens that may cause disease.

973 Generic *E. coli* are non-pathogenic Gram-negative bacterial rods typically present in the gut of
974 mammals, in feces, and various environmental sources. The importance of the microbial ecology of non-
975 sterile foods is illustrated in the figure below from Coleman et al. (2003a) depicting levels of pathogens
976 when present in broilers and ground beef and the indigenous microbiota of similar in magnitude to
977 those estimated in raw milk.

978 Microbial indicators have been used in the dairy industry for nearly a century as evidence to evaluate
979 adherence to proper hygiene and sanitation in food (and water) quality and adequacy of refrigeration.
980 High levels of indicators may be indicative of poor sanitation or inadequate refrigeration. While
981 indicators may be correlated with low food quality and the presence of non-pathogenic genera
982 predominating the milk microbiota (e.g., pseudomonads that dominate the spoilage microbiota of many
983 foods including milk and meats), indicators are not necessarily predictive of public health concerns or
984 food safety. From extensive epidemiologic evidence of foodborne outbreaks across diverse foods,
985 suspect foods containing detectable pathogens may also contain low numbers of microbial indicators.

986 The figure below (Coleman et al., 2003a, Figure 1, page 217) illustrates the numerical dominance of the
987 indigenous microbiota of broilers and ground beef relative to levels of pathogens when detected in US
988 FSIS monitoring studies.

989

990 **Figure 3.** Microbial ecology of broiler and ground beef systems from US FSIS microbial baseline data.




Fig. 1. Initial densities of three pathogens and Aerobic Plate Counts representing the indigenous microbiota at geometric mean densities of positive samples from FSIS baseline studies:⁽²⁹⁾ (A) chicken broilers, $n = 1,297$, mean counts per 100 mL rinsate; (B) ground beef, $n = 563$, mean counts per 100-g serving, ND = not detected.

991

992 The predominant non-pathogens in meat (Coleman et al., 2003a) and raw milk (Liu et al., 2020;
993 Oikonomou et al., 2020) are pseudomonads that also grow faster at refrigeration (Liu et al., 2020;
994 Oikonomou et al., 2020) were pseudomonads that outcompete the foodborne pathogens considered by
995 3- to 10-fold rates (Coleman et al., 2003a, Table 1, page 218).

996 Coleman and colleagues (2003a, page 227) concluded the following.

997 ‘Without consideration of the impact of microbial ecology of foods, the variability and
998 uncertainty associated with the likelihood and kinetics of growth and decline in the intentionally
999 “conservative” predictive microbiology models will be understated in exposure assessment
1000 models. Furthermore, the true effects of food production and processing interventions to

1001 reduce exposure maybe confounded by the current exposure assessment approaches lacking
1002 experimental validation.'

1003 Further, a recent study in the Journal of Dairy Science (Reuben et al., 2020) illustrates the importance of
1004 incorporating data on microbial ecology of raw milks including the dense and diverse microbiota into
1005 QMRAs. The authors demonstrated not merely suppression of growth of all pathogens tested (including
1006 *E. coli* O157:H7, *L. monocytogenes*, and *Salmonella Enteritidis* and *Typhimurium*) by 4 lactic acid
1007 bacterial strains isolated from raw cow milk, but also competitive exclusion of these pathogens at both
1008 10^3 and 10^6 cfu/mL. Clearly, the natural milk microbiota influences growth of pathogens. The FSANZ
1009 report (2009) excluded consideration of the raw milk microbiota and then-available experimental data
1010 on microbial ecology and predictive microbiology in raw milk and other foods, imposing overestimation
1011 bias that renders the analyses invalid.

1012

1013 DOSE-RESPONSE ASSESSMENT

1014 Models of ingested doses of pathogens likely to cause illness (dose-response models) are used by risk
1015 assessors in combination with results of exposure assessments (the likelihood and level of pathogen
1016 positives per serving) to estimate risk. A rich body of evidence exists for modeling dose-response
1017 relationships for the major foodborne pathogens considered by FSANZ. Human and animal clinical trials
1018 administering pathogens, epidemiologic evidence (e.g., dose-reconstruction from outbreaks), and
1019 characterization of virulence properties of pathogen strains via whole genome sequencing and other
1020 genomic methods are relevant to both Dose-Response Assessment and Risk Characterization phases of
1021 QMRA. Thus, risk is NOT estimated by potential exposure alone (presence of pathogens in foods); both
1022 QMRA and qualitative risk assessment require fully transparent consideration of additional bodies of
1023 scientific evidence in order to characterize risk with attendant uncertainty.

1024 Although the **belief** that very low doses of pathogens can cause human illness is **common** in the media
1025 and even peer-reviewed journal articles about foodborne risks, the **available data from clinical studies**
1026 **and epidemiologic outbreak investigations are typically insufficient** for reliable prediction of dose-
1027 response relationships, particularly at low pathogen doses (Coleman et al., 2018; Schmidt et al., 2019).
1028 Further, tremendous variability and uncertainty exists along each aspect of the disease triangle that
1029 influences rates and severity of human illness (host resistance, pathogen virulence, environmental
1030 factors, as well as interactions). For pathogen strains, mechanistic data on the presence and expression
1031 of pathogenicity and virulence genes essential to causing foodborne illness, especially emerging strains
1032 that acquire new combinations of virulence genes, is expanding to explain why foodborne strains often
1033 differ from those strains implicated in human illness.

1034 For example, dose-reconstruction exercises from EHEC foodborne outbreaks (Teunis et al., 2004; Perrin
1035 et al., 2015) and inferences from surrogate dose-response models based on data from shigellosis human
1036 challenge studies (Marks et al., 1998; FSIS, 2001) are **biased in different directions** (Teunis et al., 2016).
1037 Teunis and Figueras (2016) considered *Aeromonas* spp. that like EHECs, may include a variety of Shiga
1038 toxins in their genomes. The study is relevant to this critique because the authors describe different
1039 biases that influence perceptions about infectivity (the likelihood of infection or illness) and 'infectious
1040 dose'. This study defines ID₅₀ (an estimate of the ingested dose associated with infection or illness in
1041 50% of those exposed) and describes natural infections of *Aeromonas* typically observed only in more
1042 susceptible subpopulations (young children and immunocompromised patients).

1043 The study considered conflicting data from different sources. On one hand, in challenge studies with 57
1044 healthy adult volunteers administered known doses ($\sim 10^4$ - 10^{10}) of one of 5 pathogen strains, only 2 of
1045 57 volunteers (ID_{0.04}) at very high administered doses of 2 different strains became ill. The ID_{0.04} at
1046 extremely high doses represents a very low infectivity and very low virulence. In contrast, data from
1047 companion samples of suspect foods contaminated with one of 4 pathogen strains identified in outbreak
1048 investigations suggested high infectivity (1% median infective dose for illness of ~ 1 CFU).

1049 The authors observe that this (and other) human challenge studies appear to be biased towards
1050 predicting low infectivity (high infectious doses), perhaps due to loss of infectivity/virulence following

1051 repeated laboratory culturing and the use of healthy immunocompetent volunteers with innate
1052 resistance to this potential pathogen. In contrast, epidemiologic investigations appear to be biased
1053 towards predicting high infectivity (low infectious doses), perhaps due to a series of system failures
1054 resulting in a worst-case scenario for causing illness, including highly virulent pathogen strains and
1055 highly susceptible human populations.

1056 Certainly, it is also possible that the pathogen strains cited in this study actually differ in the presence
1057 and/or expression of putative virulence genes, a hypothesis that could be verified by Whole Genome
1058 Sequencing (WGS) and other analyses. Data from challenge studies and outbreaks are both likely biased,
1059 though in opposite directions, each potentially representing an extreme in the continuum of possible
1060 dose-response relationships. Whether QMRAs generate dose-response models from human challenge
1061 studies that may underestimate risk or epidemiologic outbreak studies that may overestimate risk,
1062 sources of bias, variability, and uncertainty are important to acknowledge and test using feasible
1063 alternative dose-response models consistent with mechanisms of pathogenesis and virulence (Holcomb
1064 et al., 1999; Rahman et al., 2018).

1065 One recent risk assessment team (Snary et al. 2016, p 445) reported that “it is quite common for QMRAs
1066 to overestimate the number of cases,” a systematic error that may be attributed to exclusive use of
1067 overly conservative dose–response models that poorly reflect the complexity of host-pathogen
1068 interactions.

1069 Specific points on dose-response data and modeling for the four major pathogens considered by FSANZ
1070 in 2009 are provided below.

1071 **Campylobacteriosis**

1072 For campylobacteriosis, FSANZ relied upon one human clinical study that administered two
1073 *Campylobacter* strains (Black et al., 1988). Even though a peer-reviewed analysis (Coleman et al., 2004)
1074 was available prior to 2009, FSANZ did not: cite this work, address the limitations of the data from the
1075 1980s human trial, test the impact of alternative model forms, or acknowledge the significance of strain
1076 effects for human infectivity and virulence. The FSANZ report is not transparent about how the data
1077 from the two strains administered in the Black study were actually used in modeling dose-response
1078 relationships for campylobacteriosis in the 2009 report.

1079 Since the FSANZ report was published, a substantial body of evidence exists demonstrating not just
1080 strain variability, but also innate and adaptive immunity in humans (Havelaar et al., 2009; Tribble et al.,
1081 2010; Havelaar and Swart, 2014; Teunis et al., 2018). Further studies demonstrate protection of the
1082 human gut microbiota that affects immunity and colonization resistance to campylobacteriosis for
1083 travelers’ diarrhea and poultry abattoir workers frequently exposed to low levels of *Campylobacter*
1084 strains (Dicksved et al., 2014; Kampmann et al., 2016). No recent scientific evidence exists, to our
1085 knowledge, that demonstrates conclusively that raw milk is inherently dangerous even though the
1086 presence of *Campylobacter* spp. is possible in raw milk.

1087 **EHEC illness**

1088 For *E. coli* O157:H7/EHEC/STEC, FSANZ cited Marks and colleagues (1998, including Coleman as second
1089 author), yet ignored this manuscript's cautions about applying human clinical data for invasive *Shigella*
1090 strains as a surrogate for non-invasive EHECs that do share genes for Shiga toxin, but do not share the
1091 same mechanisms of pathogenicity. The points quoted below from the Future Research Needs section
1092 on dose-response assessment by Marks et al. (1998) remain even greater concerns for the inappropriate
1093 use of the shigellosis model by FSANZ in light of more than a decade of research on the pathogenicity,
1094 virulence, and dose-response relationships for EHECs.

1095 'there is uncertainty of the actual functional form of the surrogate dose-response model and
1096 estimates of associated components of variability due to serotype or strain. However, our
1097 analysis for the *Shigella* data indicated that the extreme-value function, sometimes referred to
1098 as the Gompertz function, provides an equally good fit as the Beta-Poisson. ... Moreover, outside
1099 the data range the predictions using the Beta-Poisson and the Gompertz functions differ greatly.
1100 For example, for a dose of a single pathogen cell, the predicted probabilities differed by a factor
1101 of approximately 50.'

1102 'The two-parameter Beta-Poisson model, without variance components, appears insufficient for
1103 describing the complexity of dose-response interactions and inadequate as a potential "default"
1104 model form for microbial risk assessment, especially for cooked foods. Tissue culture, other in
1105 vitro test systems, and animal models may be useful to develop information on thresholds, low
1106 dose extrapolation, and scaling factors for sensitive subpopulations.'

1107 'Another major uncertainty for our example is the appropriateness of the surrogate dose-
1108 response model {invasive shigellosis}. ... no mechanistic theory exists for derivation of
1109 appropriate surrogates. Thus, the model building has no biological basis, but is strictly a
1110 statistical exercise with surrogate data of questionable relevance to the pathogen of interest.'

1111 FSANZ did not mention the alternative dose-response models for EHECs developed by Marks et al.
1112 (1998), nor other approaches by relevant peer-reviewed manuscripts on EHEC dose-response modeling
1113 published before 2009 (Powell et al., 2000; FSIS, 2001; IMNA, 2002; Teunis et al., 2004). The dose-
1114 response envelope approach utilized in a US FSIS QMRA (Powell et al., 2000; FSIS, 2001; IMNA, 2002) is
1115 depicted below.

1116

1117

1118 **Figure 4.** Dose-response envelope model for *E. coli* O157:H7/STECs used by US FSIS (Powell et al., 2000;
 1119 FSIS, 2001).




FIGURE 4-5 Derived dose-response curves from combining output of hazard characterization and exposure assessment. Curves represent percentiles of uncertainty distribution (ranging from 5th to 95th percentile) about the *E. coli* O157:H7 dose-response function. The thick line is the median dose-response curve. The dashed lines are boundary dose-response functions fit to *Shigella dysenteriae* and enteropathogenic *E. coli* (EPEC). The rectangle in the lower left represents the combined range of uncertainty of the dose and response derived from the 1994 outbreak in the northwestern United States. Source: Bell et al. 1994.

1120

1121 FSANZ instead selected a model from academic researchers lacking QMRA expertise (Strachan et al.,
 1122 2005) as the basis for modeling dose-response for shigellosis as a surrogate for EHECs and epidemiologic
 1123 data from outbreaks associated with foods other than raw milk in its 2009 report.

1124 In addition, more recent studies point to the need to update the approach for dose-response
 1125 assessment for this pathogen. For example, knowledge of the mechanisms of pathogenicity and
 1126 virulence of STECs and differential potency of Shiga toxin subtypes (Teunis et al., 2004; Croxen et al.,
 1127 2013; Kaper and O’Brien, 2014; Pielaat et al., 2015; Baba et al., 2019; Boisen et al., 2019; Cherubin et al.,
 1128 2019; EFSA, 2019; Montero et al., 2019; NACMCF, 2019; Njage et al., 2019; Petro et al., 2019; Schmidt et
 1129 al., 2019). Notably, Shiga toxin genes (the only commonality to shigellosis pathogenicity) was not found
 1130 to be predictive to the likelihood and severity disease in EHECs (Njage et al., 2019). Pielaat and
 1131 colleagues (2015) conducted an early Genome Wide Association Study (GWAS) linking genomic
 1132 sequences for 38 O157 strains with phenotypic behavior (attachment to *in vitro* cultures of human
 1133 epithelial cells). They demonstrated the utility of coupling genomic data for O157:H7 with *in vitro*
 1134 adherence to human epithelial cells to overcome the practical limitations of genomic data alone without
 1135 demonstration of gene function or expression.

1136 The US government QMRA (FSIS, 2001) developed a dose-response envelope based on shigellosis and
1137 EPEC human clinical data is consistent with epidemiologic data. Neither the risk analysts (FSIS, 2001) nor
1138 independent peer reviewers (IMNA, 2002) assessed the epidemiologic data alone (nor data from
1139 shigellosis or EPEC human challenge studies alone) as sufficient for predicting human health risk for *E.*
1140 *coli* O157:H7. A significant data gap in predicting the likelihood and severity of risk to public health for
1141 reliable prediction of risks of EHECs is the dose-response relationship causing asymptomatic infection,
1142 illness, and mortality, particularly uncertain at low doses less than 1,000 pathogens, the inflection region
1143 for the median dose-response curve applied in a US government QMRA (FSIS, 2001). The US Institute of
1144 Medicine of the National Academies acknowledged in an independent peer review (IMNA, 2002) that
1145 the FSIS analysts developed an elegant approach from limited data available prior to 2001 to
1146 characterize an ‘envelope’ of uncertainty for modeling a feasible dose-response relationship. When FSIS
1147 considered the evidence for modeling the dose-response for non-O157:H7 STECs, the envelope method
1148 was applied without modification. Although the belief that very low doses of EHECs can cause human
1149 illness is common in the media and even peer-reviewed journal articles about foodborne risks, the
1150 available data from epidemiologic outbreak investigations are insufficient for reliable prediction of dose-
1151 response relationships for STECs (Schmidt et al., 2019).

1152 Schmidt and colleagues (2019) identify serious mathematical problems that invalidate the model based
1153 on outbreak data (Teunis et al., 2004) for reliable applications in microbial risk assessment. The model
1154 based on outbreak data was determined to be subjective and misleading due to its use of weak
1155 epidemiologic data that are too uninformative for rigorous statistical inference (Schmidt et al., 2019).

1156 Further, a recent independent peer-reviewed QMRA (Giacometti et al., 2017) concluded that even their
1157 sophisticated model oversimplifies the complexity of raw milk consumption scenario, and that overall
1158 relevance of EHECs in raw milk as a public health hazard ‘is likely to have subsided’. No recent scientific
1159 evidence exists, to our knowledge, that demonstrates conclusively that raw milk is inherently dangerous
1160 even though the presence of *E. coli* O157:H7 is possible in raw milk.

1161 **Listeriosis**

1162 For listeriosis, FSANZ excluded the most relevant government risk assessment to date for listeriosis,
1163 notably including both raw and pasteurized milks! The QMRA was conducted in the US in the early
1164 2000s, with a report finalized in 2003 and updated in 2008 (FDA/FSIS, 2003; FDA 2008). It is puzzling why
1165 FSANZ excluded the most extensively documented QMRA on listeriosis from its 2009 report on raw milk.

1166 In addition, more recent updates on listeriosis QMRA (Latorre et al., 2011; Stasiewicz et al., 2014) and
1167 threshold dose-response relationships (Pouillot et al., 2015; Buchanan et al., 2017; Rahman et al., 2018),
1168 and outbreaks associated with pasteurized dairy (Pouillot et al., 2016; Hanson et al., 2019) provide
1169 evidence for low, perhaps negligible risk of listeriosis for raw milks and higher risk of more severe
1170 outcomes for pasteurized milk products.

1171 Notably, the FSANZ report failed to acknowledge the likelihood and severity of foodborne illnesses in
1172 both raw and pasteurized milks. Recent deaths in North America were attributed to *L. monocytogenes*

1173 contaminated **pasteurized** milk products (Pouillot et al., 2016; Hanson et al., 2019), yet no deaths have
1174 been attributed to listeriosis or other foodborne pathogens from raw milk in recent decades.

1175 Further, EFSA (2015, pg. 4) observed that the available QMRAs demonstrated that *L. monocytogenes* risk
1176 for raw milk 'can be mitigated and reduced significantly if the cold chain is well controlled, the shelf-life
1177 of raw milk is limited to a few days and there is consumer compliance with these measures/controls.'
1178 Given appropriate hygienic programs, no recent scientific evidence exists, to our knowledge, that
1179 demonstrates conclusively that raw milk is inherently dangerous though the presence of *L.*
1180 *monocytogenes* in raw milk is possible.

1181 **Salmonellosis**

1182 For salmonellosis, FSANZ ignored peer-reviewed studies from human clinical trials available prior to
1183 2009 (Coleman and Marks, 1998; Latimer et al. 2001; Oscar 2004; Coleman et al., 2004) that
1184 documented significant strain variability and uncertainty for salmonellosis dose-response modeling
1185 based on 13 *Salmonella* strains administered to humans. Instead, FSANZ relied upon a model of
1186 outbreak attack rates that underestimates or ignores uncertainty and variability in infectivity and
1187 virulence (FAO/WHO 2002). An update of this model (Teunis et al., 2010) is now available that considers
1188 additional sources of data and uncertainty. Reported prediction intervals span more than seven orders
1189 of magnitude, from an average count per serving of 1–13 million based on a 90% prediction interval
1190 (0.69 to 1.26×10^7 CFU), an extremely high degree of uncertainty that makes use of the approach using
1191 outbreak attack rates in risk assessment questionable.

1192 Further, recent studies (Coleman et al., 2017; Marks et al. 2017; Coleman et al., 2018) document
1193 advances in understanding of the mechanisms of susceptibility and resistance to salmonellosis,
1194 particularly protection of the normal healthy gut microbiome (colonization resistance). No recent
1195 scientific evidence exists, to our knowledge, that demonstrates conclusively that raw milk is inherently
1196 dangerous even though the presence of *Salmonella* spp. in raw milk is possible.

1197

1198 RISK CHARACTERIZATION

1199 Multiple types of studies, including traditional QMRA studies cited previously, studies depicting
1200 exposure in foods from particular regions and the burden of public health cases reported for the same
1201 period (Chen et al., 2003; Gombas et al., 2003), and studies attributing public health impacts of
1202 foodborne pathogens to particular foods are relevant in this section.

1203 Evidence from QMRAs

1204 The QMRA studies cited in previous sections point to the need to re-assess the modeling approach and
1205 the body of evidence for all four pathogens considered by FSANZ in 2009.

1206 Regarding Exposure Assessment, the actual prevalence of pathogens in raw milk (Table 1) from recent
1207 studies is consistently low, generally non-detectable, and lack of growth of all four pathogens at 4°C
1208 (recommended refrigeration temperature) documented by Coleman et al. (2003a). The assumptions
1209 used by FSANZ in the absence of exposure data from Australia likely overestimated exposure and did not
1210 test influences of alternative assumptions about prevalence, levels, and growth of the four pathogens in
1211 the absence of validation data to fill datagaps identified by FSANZ in the 2009 report.

1212 Regarding Dose-Response Assessment, the following studies merit updating the dose-response models
1213 for each pathogen and Risk Characterization.

1214 *Campylobacter* may pose negligible risk for raw milk consumers in Australia, based on the body
1215 of evidence available in 2021, including strain variability (Coleman et al., 2004) and immunity
1216 and colonization resistance against campylobacteriosis (Havelaar et al., 2009; Tribble et al.,
1217 2010; Havelaar and Swart, 2014; Teunis et al., 2018).

1218 EHEC may pose low risk for raw milk consumers in Australia, based on the body of evidence
1219 available in 2021, including immunity and colonization resistance against EHECs and a large body
1220 of evidence on alternative dose-response models that more appropriately reflect the medical
1221 microbiology and mechanism of non-invasive pathogenesis (Marks et al., 1998). Multiple dose-
1222 response studies available before 2009 (Powell et al., 2000; FSIS, 2001; IMNA, 2002; Teunis et
1223 al., 2004) and more recent studies (Teunis et al., 2004; Croxen et al., 2013; Kaper and O'Brien,
1224 2014; Pielaat et al., 2015; Baba et al., 2019; Boisen et al., 2019; Cherubin et al., 2019; EFSA,
1225 2019; Montero et al., 2019; NACMCF, 2019; Njage et al., 2019; Petro et al., 2019; Schmidt et al.,
1226 2019) merit updating of the dose-response model for EHEC by FSANZ.

1227 *L. monocytogenes* may pose negligible risk for raw milk consumers in Australia, based on the
1228 body of evidence available in 2021, including thresholds for listeriosis (Buchanan et al., 2017).


1229 *Salmonella* may pose negligible risk for raw milk consumers in Australia, based on the body of
1230 evidence available in 2021 due to serotype/strain variability, immunity and colonization
1231 resistance, and alternative sources of data for dose-response relationships for salmonellosis
1232 (Teunis et al., 2010; Coleman et al., 2017; Marks et al. 2017; Coleman et al., 2018).

1233 The Risk Characterization results for listeriosis (FDA/FSIS, 2003) linked estimated ingested doses per
 1234 serving from the Exposure Assessment via an animal dose-response model for mortality, anchored
 1235 by human epidemiologic data in the Dose-response Assessment. This assessment provides the most
 1236 transparent documentation to date for estimated risks with attendant uncertainty for pasteurized
 1237 and raw (unpasteurized) dairy products, in direct contrast to the superficial and oversimplified
 1238 approach included in the FSANZ report.

1239 The FDA/FSIS assessment ranked BOTH pasteurized and unpasteurized milks as high risk, as noted in
 1240 the summary figure below. A subsequent academic study (Latorre et al., 2011) applied a specific
 1241 growth model for *L. monocytogenes* in raw milk and estimated very low risk for unpasteurized milk
 1242 (~2x10⁻¹⁵ per serving or 2 cases in 1,000,000,000,000,000 exposures). In addition, other academic
 1243 studies documented increasing growth rate for *L. monocytogenes* as heating temperature for
 1244 pasteurization increased (Stasiewicz et al., 2014; Castro et al., 2017), suggesting a mechanism that
 1245 explains high risks to immunocompromised populations and recent deaths for listeriosis linked to
 1246 consumption of pasteurized products. The latter study states that '*L. monocytogenes* grew markedly
 1247 better in pasteurised milk than in raw milk, which indicated that results of *L. monocytogenes* growth
 1248 studies in heat-treated milk should not be extrapolated to growth predictions in raw milk.'

1249

1250 **Figure 5.** Summary figure on listeriosis relative risks in ready-to-eat foods including raw and
 1251 pasteurized milks (FSA/FSIS, 2003, authors' Summary Figure 1, page 23 of Interpretive Summary).



1252

1253 **Evidence from Studies Comparing Foodborne Exposures and Concurrent**
1254 **Clinical Illness for Defined Geographical and Temporal Scenarios**

1255 Multiple studies are available that compare data on microbiology of foods with concurrent isolates from
1256 human clinical cases from the same geographical and temporal environment. These studies provide
1257 independent scientific evidence for incorporation into QMRAs.

1258 Simulations from QMRAs, on the other hand, reflect hypothetical or possible scenarios based on
1259 assumptions and extrapolations to fill data gaps. Simulation results do not offer the same robustness of
1260 actual observational scientific studies that definitively link data estimated in foods with concurrent
1261 isolates that actually caused human clinical disease for the same place and time.

1262 At least one set of such companion studies (Chen et al., 2003; Gombas et al., 2003) were available to
1263 FSANZ prior to the 2009 report. The Gomas study (2003) generated data on presence and levels of *L.*
1264 *monocytogenes* in 31,705 samples of ready-to-eat foods including dairy products, meats, and leafy
1265 greens. Foods were collected from retail markets within active surveillance sentinel sites in the US
1266 (FoodNet) during the timeframe when the US CDC was conducting a listeriosis case-control study
1267 through FoodNet sites (2000-2001). The Chen study (2003) fitted dose-response models consistent with
1268 the estimated prevalence and levels of *L. monocytogenes* in foods and the clinical cases. Listeriosis risk
1269 was very low at low doses, less than 1 in a billion for people at increased risk. Approximately 99% of the
1270 cases were associated with >1,000 cfu per serving, and lower doses accounted for a miniscule fraction of
1271 listeriosis cases. These data are also consistent with the FDA/FSIS listeriosis risk assessment (2003).
1272 None of the results from these studies were considered by FSANZ in 2009.

1273 Recently, Organic Pastures (Aaron McAfee, 2021) provided raw data from analyzes conducted by Food
1274 Safety Net Services (FSNS, Fresno, CA USA) for the Test-and-Hold program. Over the 3-year period, no
1275 raw milk among 898 lots tested for *E. coli* O157:H7 were positive. For *Campylobacter*, raw milk was
1276 diverted from the holding tank for 17 of 123 lots that tested positive, including two lots testing as
1277 presumptive positives. These 17 lots were diverted from human consumption as raw milk (sold to
1278 pasteurization plants). No raw milk samples among 218 lots were positive for *L. monocytogenes* or
1279 *Salmonella* (109 lots each).

1280 To put the Test-and-Hold program data for 2018-2020 in perspective as to public health, no outbreaks
1281 were reported in the state (CA) for this period for any of the four major pathogens tested in the interval
1282 of testing, to our knowledge. Regarding data from the CDC NORIS data on US dairy outbreaks, a dataset
1283 for 2005-2019 is under analysis by CSC. Data for 2020 is not available from CDC at present. From CDC
1284 NORIS data in house, two campylobacteriosis outbreaks were reported in the state of CA in the prior
1285 decade, one in 2015 that sickened 8 people and one in 2012 that sickened 33. The only other outbreak
1286 reported in the state in the past decade was for *E. coli* O157:H7/EHECs that sickened 5 people in 2011,
1287 none of whom developed the severe complication of hemolytic uremic syndrome or HUS.

1288 No deaths were attributed to raw milk in California in the past decade, unlike the situation in Australia
1289 (Jamieson, 2014). *E. coli* O157:H7 cases were associated with raw dairy in the US. Of 32 *E. coli* O157:H7

1290 outbreaks associated with raw dairy in this time-period, HUS cases were reported in 14 outbreaks. All 31
1291 HUS cases recovered. HUS did not develop in cases from 18 outbreaks in this time-period.

1292 Over the 3-year period of the Test-and-Hold Program (2018-2020), Organic Pastures produced 4,280,922
1293 gallons of raw milk for human consumption on the retail market, including 1,351,684 gallons of fluid raw
1294 milk sold in retail markets in California. Using the consumption estimates for children and adults cited in
1295 the FSANZ report, recent data from CA is consistent with no illnesses in 9.5 million servings for children
1296 or no illnesses in 12.9 million servings for adults.

1297 FSANZ may consider context provided by the EFSA (2019) on application of WGS to epidemiologic
1298 investigations, source attribution, and QMRA. The excerpt quoted below is from page 20 of this
1299 document.

1300 'Furthermore, the association of *L. monocytogenes* clones with different virulence potential with
1301 various food products (Maury et al., 2016; Njage et al., 2018) and different clinical outcomes
1302 (Njage et al., 2019) has been uncovered with the use of WGS. For STEC, associations between
1303 genetic markers and (1) adhesive properties to human intestinal cells (Pielaat et al., 2015) and
1304 (2) clinical outcomes (Njage et al., 2019) have also been demonstrated.'

1305 A more recent application of WGS to microbial risk assessment (Njage et al., 2020) provides yet another
1306 advancement in QMRA using -omics data. The researchers conclude that neglecting genetic and
1307 phenotypic heterogeneity of foodborne pathogens (as in the FSANZ 2009 approach) limits reliability of
1308 Exposure Assessment and Risk Characterization. The bias demonstrated by FSANZ likely overestimates
1309 risks by assuming no variability in pathogen strains or selecting outbreak strains for worst-case or fail-
1310 safe scenarios rather than accurately representing biological variability and constraints to pathogen
1311 growth.

1312 **Evidence from Attribution Studies**

1313 Since publication of the FSANZ report, the human epidemiologic evidence for the four pathogens
1314 includes the following, with attribution to suspect foods if known.

1315 Similarly, a recent world-wide systematic review (Cody et al., 2019) identified chicken as the main
1316 source of human campylobacteriosis infection, with some included studies listing ruminants or cattle
1317 (though not a food commodity) as a secondary source. In addition, a recent world-wide meta-analysis of
1318 prevalence of *Campylobacter* in animal foods (Zbrun et al., 2020) concluded that broiler meat is the
1319 main contamination source for human campylobacteriosis. Raw milk does not appear to significantly
1320 contribute to foodborne campylobacteriosis.

1321 A recent world-wide systematic review and meta-analysis for EHECs/STECs (Devleesschauwer et al.,
1322 2019) identified beef and chicken as most significant foods with case-control studies linked with illness.
1323 Raw milk does not appear to significantly contribute to human EHEC foodborne illness.

1324 For listeriosis, no recent worldwide systematic review was identified.

1325 A world-wide systematic review and meta-analysis (Ferrari et al., 2019) identified *Salmonella* serotypes
1326 associated with presence in poultry, pork, beef, and seafood (not milk), while only some serotypes were
1327 associated with human cases or outbreaks.

1328 From US data, IAFSA (2020) reported the attribution of numbers of outbreaks from 1998 through 2013,
1329 but not numbers or rates of cases, hospitalizations, and deaths to food commodities or food groups.
1330 Although IAFSA did not distinguish between fluid milk and other dairy products, nor between
1331 pasteurized and raw milks, these data are publicly available for more detailed analysis.

- 1332 84% of non-dairy associated campylobacteriosis outbreaks were attributed to chicken, seafood,
1333 turkey, and other meat and poultry. Data were not provided for dairy commodities.
- 1334 75.8% of outbreaks associated with EHECs were attributed to vegetable row crops (e.g., leafy
1335 greens) and beef. All dairy commodities accounted together for only 6.5% of outbreaks.
- 1336 42.7% of listeriosis outbreaks were attributed to the dairy group. The authors note the rarity of
1337 listeriosis outbreaks and do not specify if any of the 19 outbreaks reported for the dairy group
1338 over the 7-year period were attributed to fluid raw milk.
- 1339 87.2% of salmonellosis outbreaks were attributed to chicken, seeded vegetables, pork, fruits,
1340 other produce, eggs, turkey, beef, and sprouts. All dairy commodities together accounted for
1341 only 4.2 of outbreaks.

1342 One recent study (Whitehead and Lake, 2018) compares numbers and rates of outbreaks, illnesses,
1343 hospitalizations, and deaths for US CDC data from 2005 – 2016. For all pathogens combined, fluid raw
1344 milk was associated with more respective outbreaks and hospitalizations (152 and 176 versus 6 and 20
1345 for pasteurized milk), but fewer respective illnesses and deaths (1,735 and 2 versus 1,903 and 4 for
1346 pasteurized milk). The rates of deaths per 1,000 illnesses were lower (1.2 for raw and 2.1 for pasteurized
1347 milks). For context, the grouping of all dairy commodities for this period were associated with 232
1348 outbreaks, 4,986 illnesses, 7,297 hospitalizations, 23 deaths, and 4.6 deaths per 1,000 illnesses. These
1349 researchers reported a decreasing trend since 2011 for outbreak rates adjusted for population, despite
1350 indirect evidence for increasing consumption. Further, no association was found between rates of
1351 outbreaks and legal status of type of access to raw milk (retail, farm gate, cow share or herd share, pet
1352 food) over this 12-year period. The supplementary data provided by the researchers indicated no
1353 listeriosis outbreaks were associated with raw milk over this period. These data are publicly available
1354 and could be further analyzed to document attribution to specific pathogens.

1355

1356 **SUMMARY OF DEVIANCES FROM QMRA PRINCIPLES AND GUIDELINES**

1357 The CAC (1999) included in its consensus document on principles and guidelines for microbial risk
1358 assessment the paragraph below that was not followed by FSANZ in its 2009 assessment of raw cow
1359 milk.

1360 'Scientific evidence may be limited, incomplete or conflicting. In such cases, transparent
1361 informed decisions will have to be made on how to complete the Risk Assessment process. The
1362 importance of using high quality information when conducting a Risk Assessment is to reduce
1363 uncertainty and to increase the reliability of the Risk Estimate. The use of quantitative
1364 information is encouraged to the extent possible, but the value and utility of qualitative
1365 information should not be discounted.' (CAC, 1999, page 3)

1366

1367 As a microbiologist who contributed to this consensus document adopted by CAC member countries on
1368 the principles and guidelines for microbial risk (1999), I find that the FSANZ approach specifically
1369 deviated from the CAC document regarding the following points:

- 1370 i) it was not soundly based on then current science in 2009, nor is currently available science
1371 supportive of the assumptions imposed in the FSANZ approach;
- 1372 ii) documentation of the bodies of evidence available at the time was incomplete and selective,
1373 rather than systematic, objective, and unbiased;
- 1374 iii) it did not transparently address the impact of alternative assumptions on the risk estimate and
1375 attendant uncertainty where direct data were lacking;
- 1376 iv) it was based on frequency and levels of pathogens in feces, not raw milk samples, for
1377 *Campylobacter* spp.; EHECs, and *Salmonella* spp;
- 1378 v) pathogen growth was modeled for a surrogate of EHEC (generic *E. coli*) growing in culture broth,
1379 not raw milk and its naturally dense and diverse microbiota;
- 1380 vi) pathogen growth for campylobacteriosis, listeriosis, and salmonellosis was modeled using
1381 culture broth, not raw milk and its naturally dense and diverse microbiota;
- 1382 vii) it did not consider the presence of competing microbes (microbiota or microflora previously)
1383 that influences survival and growth (factors influencing Exposure Assessment), as well as
1384 infectivity and virulence (factors influencing Dose-Response Assessment), for any of the
1385 enteropathogens;
- 1386 viii) it did not account for virulence and infectivity of pathogens (factor influencing Dose-Response
1387 Assessment);
- 1388 ix) it did not account for immune status of human hosts (factor influencing Dose-Response
1389 Assessment);
- 1390 x) it has not been re-assessed by comparison with independent human illness data or other
1391 surveillance data; and
- 1392 xi) it did not fully estimate the degree of confidence, variability, uncertainty, and impact of
1393 alternative assumptions, but overstated weakly supported opinions.

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1405

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- 1843
- 1844

1845 **APPENDIX A. Coleman Expertise in Medical Microbiology and QMRA**

1846

1847 **Margaret (Peg) Coleman** is a medical microbiologist and microbial risk assessor who was selected as a
1848 Fellow of the Society for Risk Analysis (SRA) in 2020, following 25 years of research and professional
1849 service in quantitative microbial risk assessment (QMRA). She began serving in the US federal
1850 government (USDA/FSIS) in 1988 and by the early 1990s, joined a new FSIS Risk Assessment and
1851 Epidemiology Division. Ms. Coleman served as her Agency representative on the Codex Alimentarius
1852 Commission (CAC) committee of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations and the
1853 World Health Organization. She contributed to the development of the document *Principles and*
1854 *Guidelines for the Conduct of Microbiological Risk Assessment* in the international arena that was
1855 adopted as a CAC consensus document in 1999 under expedited review (CAC, 1999).

1856 Ms. Coleman founded the woman-owned small business Coleman Scientific Consulting in upstate New
1857 York, USA in 2010. Her extensive interdisciplinary work in QMRA is widely published in risk and
1858 microbiology journals, including QMRA manuscripts for each of the four major foodborne diseases
1859 (campylobacteriosis, EHEC illnesses, listeriosis, and salmonellosis) considered by FSANZ in their 2009
1860 report. She contributed to the first QMRA study in the journal *Risk Analysis* (Marks et al., 1998) on the
1861 bacterial pathogen *Escherichia coli* O157:H7 in ground beef and the subsequent USDA/FSIS QMRA report
1862 on *E. coli* O157:H7 in ground beef (2001). Ms. Coleman received the FDA Group Award as a member of
1863 the *Listeria monocytogenes* Risk Assessment Group for outstanding contributions to the FDA and
1864 USDA/FSIS public health protection through the development of the *Listeria monocytogenes* risk
1865 assessment. Her innovative work in QMRA for salmonellosis over the years includes 21 peer-reviewed
1866 manuscripts. She continues to serve in leadership roles in professional organizations, including SRA. Ms.
1867 Coleman is a founding member and Past-President of the SRA Microbial Risk Analysis Specialty Group, a
1868 Past-President of the SRA Dose-Response Specialty Group, and current President of Upstate NY SRA.

1869 For nearly a decade, her work focused on benefits and risks associated with microbiota of raw milks and
1870 the 'human superorganism' (*Homo sapiens* plus microbes as partners in health). Readers can view her
1871 recent SRA webinar entitled *Resilience and the Human Superorganism: Give Us This Day Our Daily*
1872 *Microbes* at this link ([https://www.sra.org/webinar/resilience-and-the-human-superorganism-give-us-
1873 this-day-our-daily-microbes/](https://www.sra.org/webinar/resilience-and-the-human-superorganism-give-us-this-day-our-daily-microbes/)). Ms. Coleman was invited to contribute manuscripts for a special
1874 collection on the influence of the microbiota on health, and two invited manuscripts are currently under
1875 review in the journal *Applied Microbiology*. Her clients recognize her as a senior level microbiologist and
1876 key member of interdisciplinary teams, a trusted advisor, an invited expert and educator, and a
1877 thorough peer-reviewer for methodology and case studies that assess microbial and chemical risks.

1878 Her unique interdisciplinary knowledge of predictive microbiology and medical microbiology were
1879 essential for interdisciplinary teams to develop coherent models that reflect biologically relevant data
1880 and the uncertainties for determining the significant factors contributing to the underlying causal
1881 mechanisms for human health risks. Many assessments incorporated her insights from environmental
1882 and food chain exposures to pathogens from scenarios for intentional bioterror attacks and natural farm
1883 to fork food systems. Her work continues to raise challenges to use of outdated conservative

1884 assumptions inconsistent with advancing genomic knowledge of microbiota in foods and ‘human
1885 superorganisms’.

1886 Innovative recent projects apply knowledge emerging from culture-independent studies of microbial
1887 genes or molecules produced by microbes to assess predictable effects of the complex communities of
1888 microbes in foods and humans, both benefits and risks. Her recent manuscripts in the prestigious
1889 journals *Applied Microbiology*, *Human and Ecological Risk Assessment*, and *Risk Analysis* challenge
1890 outdated assumptions for each aspect of QMRA (hazard identification, exposure assessment, hazard
1891 characterization, and risk characterization) for microbial pathogens.

1892 Contact Ms. Coleman by email at peg@colemanscientific.org or text her at 1 315 729 3995 to set up an
1893 audio or video call. Her resume and a supplemental list of publications and presentations are attached
1894 to this report. Ms. Coleman’s most recent academic training was in the graduate program for medical
1895 microbiology at the University of Georgia’s College of Veterinary Medicine in Athens, GA USA.

1896

1897 **APPENDIX B. Letter from M. Booth, FSANZ Chief Executive Officer, to**
1898 **R. Freer dated 16 March, 2021**
1899



PO Box 5423
KINGSTON ACT 2604
Australia
Tel + 61 2 6271 2222
www.foodstandards.gov.au

Office of the Chief Executive Officer

Ms Rebecca Freer
australianrawmilkmovement@gmail.com

Dear Ms Freer,

Thank you for your letter of 5 March 2021 regarding the Food Standards Australia New Zealand (FSANZ) 2009 risk assessment for raw cow's milk.

Standard 4.2.4 – Primary Production and Processing standard for Dairy Products, within the Food Standards Code (the Code), contains food safety standards for milk and milk products that apply nationally. This is an Australia-only standard and includes requirements for implementing documented food safety programs for dairy primary production, milk collection, transportation and processing requirements that protect public health and safety. Implementation and enforcement of Standard 4.2.4 is the responsibility of dairy and food regulators in the states and territories.

In developing Standard 4.2.4, a risk management framework was developed to assess raw milk products and the level of risk determined for each product category, including the additional control measures that would be required for the production of raw milk products. Category 3 products, the highest risk products that include raw cow's milk, have been defined as 'those products where intrinsic characteristics and/or production and processing factors are likely to allow for the survival of pathogens that may have been present in the raw milk and may support the growth of these pathogens'.

The Code requires that milk is pasteurised, or equivalently processed, to eliminate pathogenic bacteria that may be present.

To my knowledge there has not been any further research to fill the data gaps and areas for additional research identified in the risk assessment. It is FSANZ's view that although such data would improve risk estimates it would not change the overall assessment of the risk from the consumption of raw cow's milk. In addition, FSANZ is currently unaware of any estimates of the number of raw milk consumers in Australia. The various State and Territory dairy and food authorities may be able to help you with such statistics.

I hope that the information provided is of assistance.

Yours sincerely



Mark Booth
Chief Executive Officer

16 March 2021

1900

1901 APPENDIX C. List of Acronym Definitions and Glossaries of Risk Terms**1902 Acronym List**

| | | |
|------|-------|---|
| 1903 | ARMM | Australian Raw Milk Movement Incorporated |
| 1904 | CAC | Codex Alimentarius Commission of two international organizations: the Food and |
| 1905 | | Agriculture Organization of the United Nations and the World Health Organization |
| 1906 | | (FAO/WHO; http://www.fao.org/fao-who-codexalimentarius/en/) |
| 1907 | CFU | Colony Forming Unit, a count of numbers of colonies that grow in or on culture media |
| 1908 | CSC | Coleman Scientific Consulting, Groton, NY USA |
| 1909 | EHEC | Enterohemorrhagic <i>E. coli</i> , pathogenic strains of <i>E. coli</i> |
| 1910 | EFSA | European Food Safety Authority (https://www.efsa.europa.eu/en) |
| 1911 | FDA | US Health and Human Services Department, Food and Drug Administration |
| 1912 | FSANZ | Food Standards Australia New Zealand |
| 1913 | FSNS | Food Safety Net Services, Fresno, CA USA |
| 1914 | FSIS | US Department of Agriculture, Food Safety and Inspection Service |
| 1915 | HACCP | Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Point program |
| 1916 | PCR | Polymerase Chain Reaction, a molecular technique to amplify DNA, used in genetic |
| 1917 | | testing, research, and identification and quantification of microbes independent of |
| 1918 | | traditional culture-based methods |
| 1919 | QMRA | Quantitative Microbial Risk Assessment |
| 1920 | SRA | Society for Risk Analysis (http://www.sra.org/) |
| 1921 | STEC | Shiga Toxigenic <i>E. coli</i> , pathogenic strains of <i>E. coli</i> |
| 1922 | VTEC | Vero Toxigenic <i>E. coli</i> , pathogenic strains of <i>E. coli</i> |

1923

1924 SRA Glossary Link

1925 Definitions of terms commonly used in risk analysis (risk assessment, communication, and management)
1926 are available from the Society for Risk Analysis (SRA) at the link below.

1927 <https://www.sra.org/risk-analysis-introduction/risk-analysis-glossary/>

1928 **Glossary for Microbial Risk Analysis**

1929 Definitions of relevant terms used in microbial risk analysis are listed below from a recent manuscript in
1930 the SRA journal *Risk Analysis* (Coleman et al., 2018).

- 1931 • Adaptive (acquired) immune system: Host defenses produced in response to invasion by specific
1932 infectious agents involving humoral immunity with antibodies formed by B-lymphocytes and cell-
1933 mediated immunity through T-lymphocytes and activated macrophages.
- 1934 • Antagonist: Describes a substance that acts in opposition to another substance, thus cancelling out
1935 its effect.
- 1936 • Autochthonous: Indigenous or resident in a given environment such as a body region
- 1937 • Bloom: Expansion of pathogen growth to high levels in abnormal microbiota (dysbiosis) potentially
1938 triggered by administration of antibiotics or other drugs, major changes in diet, and a variety of
1939 infectious and inflammatory diseases.
- 1940 • Colonization resistance: Process by which the indigenous gut microbiota generates conditions that
1941 disfavor colonization by enteric pathogens and protects a host from infectious microbes.
1942 Mechanisms include: Competition for space and nutrients along the mucosa and in the gut lumen;
1943 production of antimicrobial chemicals (e.g., short chain fatty acids, reactive oxygen species,
1944 bacteriocins); enhancement of epithelial barrier function; and stimulation of innate and adaptive
1945 immune systems. Dose-dependent interaction of microbiomes that protect hosts from low levels of
1946 pathogens ingested, inhaled, or contacting the skin or mucosal surfaces; healthy diverse gut
1947 microbiota disfavor enteric infections by inhibiting colonization and overgrowth of gastrointestinal
1948 tract by small numbers of ingested pathogens, whereas large numbers of pathogens or perturbation
1949 of the microbiota (e.g., by antibiotic administration) can overcome colonization resistance and cause
1950 disease.
- 1951 • Commensals: Microbes that live in or on a host without causing damage or disease during normal
1952 conditions.
- 1953 • Competitive exclusion: Two species competing for the same resource cannot coexist at constant
1954 population values, if other ecological factors remain constant, therefore, one will be excluded.
- 1955 • Dysbiosis: Disruption of host-microbe homeostasis associated with microbial imbalances
1956 characterized by loss of mucosal barrier function and microbial diversity; activates host immune and
1957 inflammatory process by enhancing proinflammatory cytokines (TNF- α , IFN- γ , IL-1, IL-8) and
1958 contributes to extent, severity, and duration of mucosal injury; can be caused by stressors such as
1959 changes in diet, disease, and pharmaceuticals including antibiotics and chemotherapy; causes
1960 metabolic abnormalities; can result in blooms of potential pathogens that cause, contribute to, or
1961 sustain diseases of the gastrointestinal systems and other organ systems.

- 1962 • Gnotobiotic animals: Animals raised in sterile environments that have no bacteria in or on them;
1963 used for infection models of disease.
- 1964 • Homeostasis: The ability to maintain a constant internal environment in response to environmental
1965 changes; the tendency of biological systems to maintain relatively constant conditions in the internal
1966 environment while continuously interacting with and adjusting to changes originating within or
1967 outside the system.
- 1968 • Humanized animals: Gnotobiotic animals inoculated with human microbiota.
- 1969 • Innate immune system: Host defenses always present and effective against low doses of most
1970 infectious agents, including: Physical barriers (e.g., skin and mucous membranes, intestinal barrier
1971 function); complement and other proteins that mark invaders for phagocytic removal; natural killer
1972 cells; phagocytic cells (macrophages and monocytes, neutrophils); pattern recognition proteins
1973 including Toll Like Receptors that bind pathogen-/microbe-associated molecular patterns (flagellin,
1974 peptidoglycans, lipopolysaccharides) for removal/tolerance; and washing and enzymatic actions of
1975 bodily secretions (e.g., tears, saliva, gastric juice, bile). High doses of pathogens can overwhelm the
1976 innate immune system and cause disease in healthy and dysbiotic hosts.
- 1977 • Microbiome: A collection of genes and genomes within the microbiota; an ecosystem of microbes
1978 that engage in a physiological network of cooperation and competition; an interdependent network
1979 of microbes influencing pathogen invasion that maintains a reciprocal relationship with IgA and
1980 antimicrobial peptides during homeostasis.
- 1981 • Microbiota: A collection of microorganisms inhabiting a defined environment such as a body site or
1982 a food.
- 1983 • Mucosa: Epithelial tissues and associated mucus that protect exposed surfaces such as the
1984 gastrointestinal, respiratory, and urogenital tracts.
- 1985 • Opportunistic pathogen: A potentially infectious microorganism that is a commensal (colonizes but
1986 does not harm) healthy, immunocompetent hosts but can cause disease in dysbiotic, hospitalized, or
1987 immunocompromized hosts.
- 1988 • Pathobiont: Any potentially pathological (disease-causing) organism which, under normal
1989 circumstances, lives as a commensal symbiont in normal healthy hosts, but can adversely affect the
1990 mucosal immune system, drive autoimmunity, and contribute to clinical disease. Examples are
1991 proinflammatory pathobionts *Enterobacter cloacae*, *Yersinia enterocolitica*, *Raoultella orinthinolytica*,
1992 *Klebsiella pneumoniae*.
- 1993 • Pathogen: Microorganism capable of colonizing a host and causing disease, when administered in
1994 adequate amounts.
- 1995 • Prebiotics: Non-viable food components that confer a health benefit on the host associated with
1996 modulation of the microbiota.

- 1997 • Probiotics: Live microorganisms which, when administered in adequate amounts, confer a health
1998 benefit on the host.
- 1999 • Superorganism/Supraorganism/Holobiont: A communal group of host and microbial cells working in
2000 symbiosis; multiple species hybrid, host genome and microbiome (second genome); contrast with
2001 pre-20th century biology that assumed that (i) humans are better off free of microbes and (ii)
2002 human (mammalian) genome is the most important biological factor in creating a better future for
2003 humans; mammals devoid of microbiome partners are 'incomplete' and fail to thrive.
- 2004 • Symbiosis: a close, interdependent, and often long-term interaction between different organisms or
2005 species. A symbiont is an organism in a symbiotic relationship. Symbioses are classified as to benefit
2006 and harm: In commensalism, the microbe neither benefits nor harms the host (and vice versa); in
2007 mutualism, benefits result for both microbe and host; in parasitism, the microbe benefits, and the
2008 host is harmed.
- 2009 • Systems biology approach: the computational and mathematical modeling of complex biological
2010 systems. An emerging engineering approach applied to biological scientific research, systems biology
2011 is a biology-based inter-disciplinary field of study that focuses on complex interactions within
2012 biological systems, using a holistic approach to biological research. Simple linear kinetics are
2013 insufficient to describe emerging complexities of systems biology because biological systems (and
2014 ecosystems) have emergent properties, that is, their sum is greater than their individual
2015 components.
- 2016 • Toll Like Receptors (TLRs): Class of proteins that play a key role in the innate immune system.