


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Authentic and Hubristic Pride: The Affective Core of Self-esteem and Narcissism

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Do individuals with high self-esteem enjoy positive interpersonal relationships, or are they aggressive and antisocial? Does narcissism reflect an abundance of self-worth, or inflated self-views driven by an overcompensation for low self-esteem? The present research addresses the apparently two-sided nature of self-esteem and narcissism by distinguishing between two distinct self-regulatory processes (narcissistic self-aggrandizement and genuine self-esteem), and proposing that two distinct facets of pride—authentic and hubristic—form the affective core of each. Specifically, findings demonstrate that when narcissistic and genuine self-esteem are empirically distinguished, genuine self-esteem (along with authentic pride) is positively related to successful social relationships and mental health, whereas narcissistic self-aggrandizement (along with hubristic pride) is positively related to aggression and other antisocial behaviors.

Keywords: Narcissism; Pride; Self-conscious emotions; Self-esteem; Self-regulation.

Arthur Miller's tragic protagonist Willy Loman in *Death of a Salesman* is the quintessential ordinary man striving to achieve extraordinary dreams (Miller, 1949). Willy's search for the "American Dream" of fame, fortune, and admiration is the hallmark of his identity, but like many of his generation he is unable to meet his unrealistic goals. Miller depicts Willy as a man who has failed to become successful, wealthy, or well liked; who treats his wife with cruelty and disrespect; and who has raised one son to follow in his footsteps by cheating and lying his way towards an illusory dream, and another who is homeless, jobless, and aimless at the age of 34. Yet, despite failing to achieve the core goals of his identity, Loman's view of himself and his life cannot be characterized by "low self-esteem". Throughout the play he is

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at times charming, at times patronizing, and almost always arrogant and blindly optimistic. Viewing self-esteem exclusively as a static average level deters a deeper understanding of the intrapsychic processes that produce fluctuations in Willy's self-evaluations.

To understand the processes that influence Willy's contradictory self-views, we must adopt a more complex model of self-esteem regulation, one that distinguishes between genuine high self-esteem and narcissistic self-aggrandizement, and that emphasizes the emotional processes underlying these two forms of "self-favorability" (Paulhus & John, 1998). This distinction, between a "good" and "bad" self-esteem, has previously been described as self-esteem vs. "self-deception" or narcissism (Paulhus, 1984; Robins & John, 1997; Tracy & Robins, 2003), and "genuine vs. fragile" or "defensive vs. non-defensive" self-esteem (Baumeister, Campbell, Kreuger, & Vohs, 2003; Salmivalli, Kaukiainen, Kaistaniemi, & Lagerspetz, 1999).

In this paper we provide evidence for a theoretical model of the distinction between genuine self-esteem and narcissistic self-aggrandizement, with the aim of clarifying the self-regulatory dynamics of individuals such as Willy Loman and how they differ from individuals who also see themselves in a positive light yet are able to accommodate more realistic self-perceptions. We argue that the two forms of self-favorability are fueled by distinct self-conscious emotions: shame and two facets of pride—"authentic" and "hubristic". We have found that these two facets represent distinct components of pride, based on semantic and factor analyses of pride-related concepts and subjective experiences. Authentic pride is the more socially desirable, achievement-oriented facet, associated with accomplishment and confidence. Hubristic pride is the more narcissistic facet, associated with arrogance and conceit (Tracy & Robins, 2004, 2007).

Narcissism as a Self- and Emotion-Regulatory System

Figure 1 portrays a conceptual model of the development of narcissistic self-regulation. The developmental events depicted in the left panel of the figure result in the formation of the intrapsychic system depicted in the right panel. In brief, childhood experiences contribute to the development of the narcissistic personality, which is characterized by defensive self-esteem and dissociated implicit and explicit self-representations (Kernberg, 1975; Kohut, 1971). These defensive processes and dissociated representations contribute to contingent self-esteem, which in turn leads to unstable self-esteem. This system is fueled by feelings of shame and hubristic pride. Below, we discuss each aspect of this model in greater detail.

According to psychodynamic theories of narcissism (e.g., Otway & Vignoles, 2006), the syndrome typically develops during early childhood when parents over-idealize their young children and place unrealistic demands upon them. The child comes to feel that he or she must be perfect, and is made to feel rejected when perfection is not achieved. This rejection may be compounded by social experiences such as being excluded, ridiculed, and humiliated by others, which accentuate the child's feeling of having failed to meet the ideal standards of his or her parents. In response to this internal conflict, the child's positive and negative self-representations may become dissociated, so that a perfectionist view of self can be maintained at an explicit level, with all negative self-images buried at an implicit level (Kernberg, 1975; Kohut, 1971). This structural split in the self-representational system—implicit feelings of inadequacy coexisting with explicit feelings of grandiosity—may make the global self vulnerable to threats to self-worth. This vulnerability may promote a




FIGURE 1 A theoretical model of the development and regulatory processes underlying narcissistic self-aggrandizement. *Note:* The left side of the figure shows the developmental processes theoretically assumed to underlie adult narcissism, and the right side of the figure shows the systemic processes that, in our view, constitute narcissistic self-aggrandizement.

defensive self-regulatory style, characterized by the denial of negative experiences and an overemphasis on positive ones; this defensiveness, reflected in the self-enhancement motive widely noted in narcissistic individuals (John & Robins, 1994; Morf & Rhodewalt, 2001), may result in an inflated and artificial view of self.

The self-conscious emotions of shame and hubristic pride likely play an important role in this developmental process. The dissociation of positive and negative self-representations make the implicit self globally negative, leading to stable, global attributions following failure (e.g., “I failed because I am a bad person, and I’ll always be bad”), as the individual becomes incapable of distinguishing a bad thing done from the global bad self. These stable, global attributions for failure promote feelings of shame (Covington & Omelich, 1981; Niedenthal, Tangney, & Gavanski, 1994; Tracy & Robins, 2006; Weiner, 1985), which is thought to be the “keystone affect” of the narcissistic personality (Wright, O’Leary, & Balkin, 1989). Thus, narcissistic self-esteem regulation (i.e., self-enhancement) can be seen as a defense against excessive shame. Indeed, if narcissists simply felt bad, rather than feeling bad about themselves (i.e., shame), we presumably would not see many of the interpersonal consequences that characterize narcissism; for example, narcissistic hostility and rage might not be so common or virulent if the underlying pain were due to something other than shame following threats to self-worth.

In fact, viewing the hostility associated with narcissism as an outcome of shame regulation clarifies our understanding of the underlying causal mechanism. Why, for example, do women with highly contingent self-esteem, as well as narcissistic college students, respond to threats to their self-worth with anger and aggression (Bushman & Baumeister, 1998; Paradise & Kernis, 1999; Webster & Kirkpatrick, 2006), instead of sadness or shame? Individuals with contingent self-esteem base their self-worth

largely on feedback from others, so insults should reduce self-esteem and promote shame. Similarly, an individual who genuinely feels good about him- or herself should have no need to “blast” others with loud noise or punish them with hot sauce after receiving negative feedback. The fact that narcissistic and contingent individuals respond to such threats in this manner implies a regulatory process. That is, instead of blaming themselves for the insult and consciously experiencing shame, narcissists blame the offender and feel the anger and hostility that follow from an external attribution.

Just as the implicit self becomes globally negative, the narcissist’s dissociated, explicit self becomes globally positive and idealized, leading to stable, global attributions following success (“I succeeded because I am a perfect person, I’m always perfect”) with no distinction made between a good thing done and the good self doing it. The positive self becomes an object of pride, but not simply pride in specific achievements. For the narcissist, positive self-representations are too essential to leave to the whim of actual accomplishments, for they are the only self-representations preventing the individual from being overwhelmed by shame. Instead, narcissistic individuals likely experience a global “hubristic” pride characterized by feelings of superiority and egotism. Indeed, the tendency to attribute positive events to internal, stable, and uncontrollable factors (e.g., “I got an A because I’m really smart”) is positively associated with the experience of the hubristic facet of pride (Tracy & Robins, 2007).

Over the course of development, narcissists may adopt an increasingly defensive self-regulatory style: They minimize shame by keeping their negative self-representations implicit, and maximize hubristic pride by continually inflating their positive self-representations. By adulthood, the narcissist’s positive and negative self-representations may be highly dissociated, such that the positive self is the only representation within the individual’s body of explicit self-knowledge. This dissociation may account for the finding that narcissists endorse explicitly self-aggrandizing items from the Narcissistic Personality Inventory (NPI; Raskin & Terry, 1988), such as “If I ruled the world it would be a much better place”, yet score low on measures of explicit shame (Gramzow & Tangney, 1992) and *implicit* self-esteem (Jordan, Spencer, Zanna, Hoshino-Browne, & Correll, 2003; Sakellaropoulou & Baldwin, 2007; Zeigler-Hill, 2006).

This sharp discrepancy between implicit and explicit self-representations may promote an unstable situation, much like water about to boil, causing shame to bubble toward the surface of awareness. In order to (consciously or unconsciously) regulate these feelings, narcissists may repeatedly seek external indicators of their self-worth (e.g., partner approval, good grades, or even a compliment from a stranger), which are taken as “proof” of the veracity of their positive self-representations. These external indicators have been studied as “contingencies” that become the basis of global self-worth (Crocker & Wolfe, 2001). Thus, contingent self-esteem may derive from the combination of dissociated implicit/explicit self-esteem and defensiveness. Individuals with high genuine self-esteem are not impervious to external contingencies, such as feedback from others, but they are less likely to show major fluctuations in self-esteem level in response to every self-relevant event encountered. Those with highly contingent self-esteem, who do show these fluctuations, come to have unstable self-esteem over time, because contingencies can never be completely stable. When contingencies are present, hubristic pride is experienced and self-esteem rises; when contingencies are absent, shame is experienced and self-esteem falls.¹ Thus, defensive, dissociated, contingent, and

unstable self-esteem form an interrelated system of cognitive-affective regulatory processes which, together, produce the narcissistic self-aggrandizing personality profile.

An Alternative Regulatory Style: Genuine Self-esteem

One possible interpretation of the model presented in Figure 1 is that positive self-views are always problematic, resulting from defensive self-regulation, and that there is no pride without shame. However, there is an alternative: an adaptive way of experiencing self-favorability, which is empirically distinct from narcissism. Individuals who are not burdened by low implicit self-esteem and shame do not behave in the same defensive manner as individuals high in narcissism. For example, when faced with an ego threat, only individuals with dissociated implicit and explicit self-views and, specifically, low implicit and high explicit self-esteem, respond to the threat defensively and engage in compensatory self-enhancement (Bosson, Brown, Zeigler-Hill, & Swann, 2003; Jordan et al., 2003; McGregor & Marigold, 2003). Individuals who do not show such dissociations between implicit and explicit self-views have more stable self-esteem (Zeigler-Hill, 2006), do not become defensive in the face of threat, and are less likely to self-enhance (Bosson et al., 2003). In addition, individuals with non-contingent self-esteem show fewer decreases in self-esteem in response to negative life events (Crocker, Karpinski, Quinn, & Chase, 2003), and individuals with high self-esteem, controlling for narcissism (i.e., genuine self-esteem), tend not to display aggressive or antisocial behaviors (Donnellan, Trzesniewski, Robins, Moffitt, & Caspi, 2005; Paulhus, Robins, Trzesniewski, & Tracy, 2004). Genuine self-esteem thus seems to allow for positive self-evaluations without the host of interpersonal and mental health problems associated with narcissism. Individuals can acknowledge their failures and limitations without defensiveness or anger, and can integrate positive and negative self-representations into a complex but coherent global self-concept. Thus, despite the small-to-moderate sized positive correlation that typically emerges between self-esteem and narcissism, these two variables have divergent effects on a range of important life outcomes relevant to everyday social behavior and mental health.

How Can We Explain the Distinction Between Narcissism and Genuine Self-esteem?

Given these empirical findings, the self-evaluative system characterizing individuals high in genuine self-esteem must be quite different from the narcissistic system. In particular, these individuals may differ in their emotional responses to success and failure. Rather than responding to successes with hubristic pride, individuals high in genuine self-esteem tend to experience the more "authentic" pride, marked by confidence, productivity, and self-worth (Tracy & Robins, 2007). This emotional response, which is positively correlated with the socially desirable personality traits of extraversion, agreeableness, and conscientiousness, is attainable because the integration of positive and negative self-representations allows for more nuanced self-evaluations. If success occurs, it need not be attributed to a falsely inflated, stable, global self; credit can instead be given to specific actions taken by the self (e.g., hard work). In fact, attributing success to unstable, controllable aspects of the self, such as effort, promotes authentic and *not* hubristic pride (Tracy & Robins, 2007).

Likewise, when failures occur, individuals need not succumb to the shame-destined trap of blaming the stable, global self; negative events, too, can be attributed to specific actions. Within the context of overall self-liking and self-competence, mistakes are not self-destructive agents of demoralization, but rather can be agents of change, pointing to areas of future improvement. Attributing failure to unstable, specific, controllable aspects of the self promotes the negative self-conscious emotion of guilt, rather than shame (Covington & Omelich, 1981; Niedenthal et al., 1994; Tracy & Robins, 2006; Weiner, 1985); and guilt, in turn, promotes a range of positive social behaviors, from apology and confession to empathy and altruism (Batson, 1987; Baumeister, Stillwell, & Heatherton, 1994; Tangney & Dearing, 2002). Furthermore, guilt-proneness is positively related to self-esteem, but generally unrelated to narcissism (Gramzow & Tangney, 1992; Tangney & Dearing, 2002). Thus, distinct self-conscious emotions, both negative and positive, play a critical role in determining whether individuals engage in the world as self-aggrandizing narcissists or as genuine self-accepters. These emotions are both the outcomes and the origins of reciprocal cognitive regulatory processes (i.e., attributions) geared toward maintaining a positive view of self.

Thus, several lines of previous research point to three conclusions: (1) genuine self-esteem and narcissistic self-aggrandizement are marked by distinct regulatory processes and associated with divergent outcomes; (2) the self-conscious emotions of shame, guilt, and authentic and hubristic pride play a key role in these processes; and (3) both the “good” and “bad” forms of self-favorability are outcomes of a complex system of interrelated causal attributions, self-conscious emotions, and regulatory strategies. However, several questions remain. First, to what extent do the two facets of pride have distinct consequences that parallel those of genuine self-esteem and narcissistic self-aggrandizement? Initial evidence supports the conceptual uniqueness of the facets (Tracy & Robins, 2007), but more work is needed to construct a theoretically rich nomological network around the constructs. We do not know, for example, whether the facets have divergent consequences for antisocial behavior, interpersonal relationships, and mental health that parallel those of genuine self-esteem and narcissism.

Second, can authentic and hubristic pride be discriminated from genuine self-esteem and narcissism? If the correlates of the facets mirror those of self-esteem and narcissism, might this be due to the shared variance among these measures? If the facets are simply state versions of the larger personality dispositions, then controlling for narcissism and self-esteem should reduce the effect that each facet of pride has on other variables. However, the pride facets may each represent only one component of the larger constructs; perhaps the unadulterated subjective feeling experience that drives and emerges from the self-regulatory systems constituting genuine self-esteem and narcissism. Self-esteem and narcissism are complex and relatively stable personality processes, comprised of affect, motives, cognitions, and specific life histories; it is unlikely that these systems can be reduced to a simple feeling state—or even a chronic proneness to that state.

To address these issues, we examined the interrelations among self-esteem, narcissism, and authentic and hubristic pride proneness, and the relations of these constructs to three major domains of psychological functioning: antisocial behavior, interpersonal relationships, and mental health. Further, we also examined the construct validity of the authentic and hubristic pride-proneness scales by correlating them with related variables: implicit self-esteem, narcissistic personality disorder, and two indirect measures of narcissism.

Method

A sample of 2327 undergraduate students (65% female) completed an on-line questionnaire in exchange for course credit. All participants completed the Rosenberg Self-Esteem scale (Rosenberg, 1965; $\alpha = .90$); the Narcissistic Personality Inventory (Raskin & Terry, 1988; $\alpha = .85$); the Authentic and Hubristic Pride-Proneness Scales (Tracy & Robins, 2007; α s = .91 and .91); the Experience in Close Relationships Scale (Brennan, Clark, & Shaver, 1998) assessing avoidant ($\alpha = .94$) and anxious ($\alpha = .91$) attachment; the Dissociative Experiences Scale (Bernstein & Putnam, 1986; $\alpha = .96$) assessing a tendency toward feeling separated from one's self; the Social Phobia Scale (Mattick & Clarke, 1998; $\alpha = .93$); and the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory Trait subscale (Spielberger, 1983; $\alpha = .88$).

A subsample of participants ($n = 698$) completed the Authenticity Inventory Version 3 (Goldman & Kernis, 2004; $\alpha = .71$); the Aggression Questionnaire (Buss & Perry, 1992; $\alpha = .71$); Elliott and Ageton's (1980) measure of misbehavior ($\alpha = .94$); the Dyadic Adjustment Scale (Spanier, 1976; $\alpha = .89$); the Relationship Measure (Rusbult, Martz, & Agnew, 1998; $\alpha = .95$); the Rejection Sensitivity Questionnaire – Short (Downey & Feldman, 1996; $\alpha = .70$); and the Center for Epidemiological Studies Depression Scale (Radloff, 1977; $\alpha = .74$).

A second, non-overlapping, subsample of participants ($n = 137$) completed the Narcissistic Personality Disorder Scale (Ashby, 1978; $\alpha = .71$); a measure of perceived social consensus regarding personal beliefs about value-laden issues (McGregor, Zanna, Holmes, & Spencer, 2001), used as an indirect measure of narcissism; the Over-claiming Questionnaire (Paulhus, Harms, Bruce, & Lysy, 2003; $\alpha = .90$) assessing self-enhancement bias (a second indirect measure of narcissism); the Mach-IV (Christie & Geis, 1970; $\alpha = .73$) assessing Machiavellianism; and two versions (attractiveness and liking) of the name-letter task assessing implicit self-esteem (Bosson, Swann, & Pennebaker, 2000; Dijksterhuis, 2004). The presentation order of the two name-letter tasks was counterbalanced, and scores were computed by ipsatizing each participant's rating of his/her own initials by their ratings of other letters, and by the average rating of their initials across participants whose initials do not contain those letters (see Baccus, Baldwin, & Packer, 2004). These participants also completed the Interpersonal Support Evaluation List (Cohen & Hoberman, 1983; $\alpha = .90$) assessing perceptions of social support. Results are reported across samples, with sample sizes for each effect indicated in the tables.

Results

Construct Validity of Two Facets of Pride

We first sought to verify the convergent validity of the two facets of pride by examining their correlations with the closely related constructs of self-esteem and narcissism. Consistent with previous findings, the two pride scales were largely independent (r s = .12 in the total sample; .09 in subsample 1, and $-.01$ in subsample 2), so we did not partial out shared variance between the scales in their correlations with other variables. First, replicating previous findings, both scales were positively related to narcissistic self-aggrandizement (i.e., narcissism controlling for self-esteem), with a significantly stronger relation for hubristic pride

($r_s = .40$ vs. $.25$, t -test for the difference between dependent correlations = 5.97, $p < .05$). Second, we replicated the finding that authentic pride is positively ($r = .51$), and hubristic pride negatively ($r = -.24$, both $ps < .05$), related to genuine self-esteem. It is noteworthy that this pattern emerges only when shared variance between self-esteem and narcissism is statistically removed (indicating a suppressor situation, cf. Paulhus et al., 2004), highlighting the importance of assessing genuine self-esteem and narcissistic self-aggrandizement in this manner.²

Third, we found that the two pride facets had predicted relations with theoretically relevant variables. Individuals high in hubristic pride should have low implicit self-esteem, given our expectation that hubristic pride is experienced as part of a regulatory process through which globally positive explicit self-views are maintained while globally negative implicit self-views are suppressed. In fact, hubristic pride was negatively related to implicit self-esteem (assessed as name-letter liking), whereas authentic pride was positively related to implicit self-esteem (assessed as name-letter attractiveness; see Table 1). Also consistent with our model, genuine self-esteem was positively related to implicit self-esteem (name-letter attractiveness).

We also expected a positive correlation between hubristic pride and other measures of narcissism. As predicted, hubristic pride was positively correlated with narcissistic personality disorder (NPD), a more unhealthy form of narcissism than that assessed by the NPI. Authentic pride and genuine self-esteem were negatively correlated with NPD, but narcissistic self-aggrandizement was not significantly related. Together, these results suggest that hubristic pride may represent a less psychologically healthy aspect of narcissism than the overall personality process assessed by the NPI. The negative correlation between hubristic pride and implicit self-esteem is particularly noteworthy because researchers have long sought similar relations between implicit self-esteem and the NPI (Campbell, Bosson, Goheen, Lakey, & Kernis, 2007).³

In contrast, one of the indirect measures of self-aggrandizement examined—a bias toward over claiming one's knowledge—was positively correlated with narcissistic self-aggrandizement and *authentic* pride, but not with hubristic pride or genuine self-esteem. Thus, only narcissistic self-aggrandizers (and individuals high in authentic pride), are willing to self-enhance by risking over claiming. The other indirect measure of narcissism, the tendency to overestimate social consensus with one's beliefs, was positively correlated with both narcissistic self-aggrandizement and hubristic pride, but not with genuine self-esteem or authentic pride.

Finally, we examined correlations with authenticity—a construct representing insight into one's emotions and motives and a tendency to behave according to one's beliefs. Authentic pride was positively associated and hubristic pride negatively associated with authenticity (see Table 1), consistent with our expectation that authentic pride reflects a relatively genuine, non-biased view of self whereas hubristic pride reflects a relatively distorted, aggrandized self. In addition, both genuine self-esteem and, surprisingly, narcissistic self-aggrandizement, were positively correlated with authenticity. The positive correlation with narcissistic self-aggrandizement may reflect narcissists' (possibly distorted) feelings of self-reliance and power, given items on the authenticity scale such as, "What I do is all me . . .".

Overall, these findings support the conceptual and empirical distinction between genuine self-esteem and narcissistic self-aggrandizement, and between authentic and hubristic pride. Next, we examined the external correlates of the four variables.

TABLE 1 Correlations of Genuine Self-esteem, Narcissistic Self-aggrandizement, Authentic Pride, and Hubristic Pride with Theoretically Related Constructs

	Genuine self-esteem	Narc. self-agg.	<i>t</i> -value	Authentic pride	Hubristic pride	<i>t</i> -value
Implicit self-esteem ^a						
Implicit self-attractiveness	.24*	.02	1.60	.26*	-.10	2.64*
Implicit self-liking	.07	.01	0.43	.05	-.18*	1.66
Narcissistic personality disorder ^a	-.28*	-.07	-1.55	-.34*	.22*	-4.26*
Over-claiming bias ^b	.02	.14*	-1.96*	.08*	-.05	2.11*
Perceived social consensus ^a	-.10	.22*	-2.33*	.01	.24*	-1.68
Authenticity ^b	.38*	.10*	4.85*	.46*	-.11*	10.16*

Note: Narc. self-Agg. = Narcissistic Self-Aggrandizement. Shared variance between self-esteem and narcissism was removed from each of these variables (by regressing self-esteem on narcissism, and vice-versa, and saving the standardized residuals) to create variables representing genuine self-esteem and narcissistic self-aggrandizement. Implicit self-attractiveness was measured with the name-letter attractiveness task and implicit self-liking was measured with the name-letter liking task. *t*-values represent the results of *t*-tests evaluating the difference between each pair of dependent correlations. ^a*n* = 137; ^b*n* = 698; **p* < .05.

Outcomes of Genuine Self-esteem, Narcissistic Self-aggrandizement, and Pride

We first examined the relations of genuine self-esteem, narcissistic self-aggrandizement, and the facets of pride with antisocial behavior. Narcissistic self-aggrandizement and hubristic pride were positively related, and genuine self-esteem and authentic pride negatively related, to aggression (see Table 2). Narcissistic self-aggrandizement and hubristic pride were also positively related to misbehavior—measured as the frequency of 51 specific deviant behaviors (e.g., fighting, theft) over 5 years. Both genuine self-esteem and authentic pride had negative relations with misbehavior, but only significantly so for genuine self-esteem. A similar pattern emerged for Machiavellianism: both narcissistic self-aggrandizement and hubristic pride were positively related, and both genuine self-esteem and authentic pride showed a (non-significant) negative trend. Overall, then, narcissistic self-aggrandizement and hubristic pride are associated with antisocial personality tendencies, whereas authentic pride and genuine self-esteem may promote the avoidance of antisocial behaviors.

We next examined correlations with interpersonal relationship functioning. Overall, narcissistic self-aggrandizers and individuals high in hubristic pride demonstrated poor relationship functioning, though this pattern was somewhat more consistent for hubristic pride. In contrast, individuals high in genuine self-esteem and authentic pride tended to have adaptive, secure relationships with friends and relationship partners. Specifically, both genuine self-esteem and authentic pride were positively correlated with dyadic adjustment, relationship satisfaction, and feeling supported by others; and negatively with rejection sensitivity and anxious and avoidant attachment. Narcissistic self-aggrandizement was negatively related to relationship satisfaction, but also to rejection sensitivity. Hubristic pride was negatively related to dyadic adjustment and feeling supported by others, and positively related to anxious and avoidant attachment. Thus, hubristic pride may be more problematic for relationships than is narcissistic self-aggrandizement. Narcissism does not appear to promote positive relationships, but it is not clear whether these individuals are anxious or unhappy with their unsatisfying relationships.

The final domain we examined was mental health. Narcissistic self-aggrandizers tended toward dissociation but were not chronically anxious. In contrast, individuals high in hubristic pride tended to dissociate and be socially phobic and chronically anxious. Individuals high in genuine self-esteem and authentic pride presented a relative picture of mental health; they did not dissociate or show anxiety or depression. Thus, hubristic pride seems to underlie several distinct forms of dysfunction; narcissistic self-aggrandizement is, for the most part, unrelated to mental health; and genuine self-esteem and authentic pride may promote a clean bill of mental health.

On the whole, these results support previous findings of a divergence between genuine self-esteem and narcissistic self-aggrandizement (e.g., Paulhus et al., 2004), and suggest that authentic and hubristic pride, to a large extent, show a similar pattern. There were, however, several exceptions: authentic pride was less consistently related to socially desirable behavior and adaptive interpersonal functioning than was genuine self-esteem, and hubristic pride was more consistently related to problematic interpersonal functioning and psychopathology than was narcissistic self-aggrandizement. These discrepancies suggest that the pride facets are not simply alternate ways of assessing the broader self-regulatory systems of self-esteem and narcissism, but are at least somewhat empirically distinct. However, to

TABLE 2 Correlations of Genuine Self-esteem, Narcissistic Self-aggrandizement, Authentic Pride, and Hubristic Pride, with Antisocial Behavior, Interpersonal Relationship Functioning, and Mental Health

	Genuine self-esteem	Narc. self-agg.	<i>t</i> -value	Authentic pride	Hubristic pride	<i>t</i> -value
Antisocial behavior						
Aggression ^a	-.33*	.25*	-10.05*	-.20*	.26*	-7.76*
Misbehavior ^a	-.15*	.28*	-2.20*	-.05	.20*	-4.11*
Machiavellianism ^b	-.15	.21*	-2.60*	-.15	.28*	-3.15*
Interpersonal relationship functioning						
Dyadic adjustment ^a	.24*	-.09	5.48*	.24*	-.11*	5.82*
Relationship satisfaction ^a	.08	-.08*	2.60*	.09*	-.07	2.60*
Perceived social support ^b	.30*	-.14	3.23*	.22*	-.39*	4.66*
Rejection sensitivity ^a	-.34*	-.13*	-3.60*	-.41*	.05	-7.99*
Attachment avoidance ^c	-.31*	.00	-9.55*	-.29*	.15*	-13.59*
Attachment anxiety ^c	-.42*	.04	-14.69*	-.31*	.13*	-13.63*
Mental health						
Dissociative experiences ^c	-.31*	.22*	-16.63*	-.09*	.39*	-15.19*
Social phobia ^c	-.38*	-.31*	-2.32	-.48*	.05*	-17.36*
Trait anxiety ^c	-.59*	.02	-21.22*	-.54*	.19*	-24.99*
Depression ^a	-.43*	.05	-8.40*	-.34*	.03	-6.28*

Note: Narc. Self-Agg. = Narcissistic Self-Aggrandizement. Shared variance between self-esteem and narcissism was removed from each of these variables (by regressing self-esteem on narcissism, and vice-versa, and saving the standardized residuals) to create variables representing genuine self-esteem and narcissistic self-aggrandizement. Perceived social support was assessed with the Interpersonal Support Evaluation List. Depression was assessed with the Centre for Epidemiological Studies – Depression Scale. *t*-values represent the results of *t*-tests evaluating the difference between each pair of dependent correlations. ^a*n* = 698; ^b*n* = 137; ^c*N* = 2327; **p* < .05.

better address this issue, we re-examined these effects controlling for shared variance among the predictors.

Are the Two Facets of Pride Independent of Genuine Self-esteem and Narcissism?

We ran a series of regression equations on all of the theoretically relevant variables, entering self-esteem, narcissism, and authentic and hubristic pride as simultaneous predictors. Findings showed that, first, the positive relation between authentic pride and name-letter attractiveness was reduced to non-significance, but the negative relation between hubristic pride and name-letter liking remained significant (see Table 3). Similarly, the zero-order negative correlations of genuine self-esteem and authentic pride with the NPD became non-significant, but hubristic pride remained a significant, positive predictor. In addition, although narcissism was still a positive predictor of the over claiming bias, authentic pride was not, and hubristic pride was a negative predictor. Thus, the over claiming bias represents a case where narcissists and individuals high in hubristic pride show opposing tendencies, with narcissists exaggerating their knowledge and individuals high in hubristic pride avoiding doing so. In contrast, all of the zero-order correlations with authenticity held in the regressions. These results indicate that the zero-order relations that emerged for genuine self-esteem and authentic pride with constructs theoretically relevant to narcissism and hubristic pride were largely due to shared variance in narcissism and hubristic pride. Importantly, however, the zero-order relations between hubristic pride and these variables cannot be accounted for by shared variance with narcissism.

We next ran regression equations on each of the variables relevant to antisocial behavior, relationship functioning, and mental health, again entering self-esteem, narcissism, and authentic and hubristic pride as simultaneous predictors. In most cases, the zero-order effects held. Specifically, each predictor had an independent effect on measures of aggression and misbehavior (see Table 3). For misbehavior, the negative relation with genuine self-esteem was reduced to non-significance, but a significant negative relation emerged for authentic pride. Authentic pride also became a negative predictor of Machiavellianism.

For relationship functioning, a few differences from the zero-order effects emerged. For genuine self-esteem and authentic pride, positive effects on dyadic adjustment and relationship satisfaction held, as did negative effects on rejection sensitivity, avoidance, and anxiety. In contrast, the positive zero-order correlations of genuine self-esteem and authentic pride with feelings of support were reduced to non-significance. For narcissistic self-aggrandizement and hubristic pride, all findings held; this may have resulted from the fact that the two variables showed fairly distinct (from each other and from self-esteem and authentic pride) zero-order correlational patterns with most of the interpersonal functioning measures.

Similarly, all zero-order effects predicting mental health held, except for the negative relation between authentic pride and dissociation, which was likely due to shared variance with self-esteem. In addition, one new finding emerged: narcissism positively predicted depression, suggesting that partialling out variance due to self-esteem *and* authentic pride may reveal some of the maladjustment assumed to lurk beneath the well-defended narcissistic shell.

Overall, these findings suggest that, for the most part, correlations between two facets of pride and antisocial behavior, relationship functioning, and mental health are independent of the facets' correlations with narcissism and self-esteem. However,

TABLE 3 Regression Analyses Predicting Constructs Theoretically Related to Genuine Self-esteem and Narcissistic Self-aggrandizement

Dependent variable	Self-esteem	Narcissism	Authentic pride	Hubristic pride
Implicit self-attractiveness ^b	.16 (.12)	.02 (.11)	.12 (.13)	-.08 (.09)
Implicit self-liking ^b	.00 (.13)	.11 (.12)	-.00 (.14)	-.22* (.10)
Narcissistic personality disorder ^b	-.16 (.12)	-.17 (.11)	-.14 (.13)	.26* (.09)
Over-claiming bias ^a	-.01 (.05)	.21* (.05)	-.01 (.05)	-.13* (.04)
Perceived social consensus ^b	.00 (.13)	.19 (.12)	-.09 (.14)	.19* (.10)
Authenticity ^a	.23* (.05)	.10* (.04)	.28* (.05)	-.15* (.04)
Antisocial behavior				
Aggression ^a	-.20* (.05)	.25* (.05)	-.22* (.05)	.17* (.04)
Misbehavior ^a	-.06 (.05)	.30* (.05)	-.16* (.05)	.09* (.04)
Machiavellianism ^b	.08 (.12)	.23* (.11)	-.33* (.13)	.21* (.09)
Interpersonal relationship functioning				
Dyadic adjustment ^a	.13* (.06)	-.11 (.06)	.20* (.07)	-.08 (.05)
Relationship satisfaction ^a	-.00 (.06)	-.11* (.05)	.13* (.06)	-.04 (.05)
Perceived social support ^b	.15 (.12)	-.03 (.11)	.12 (.13)	-.36* (.09)
Rejection sensitivity ^a	-.21* (.05)	-.11* (.04)	-.23* (.05)	.08* (.04)
Attachment avoidance ^c	-.18* (.03)	-.02 (.02)	-.19* (.03)	.16* (.02)
Attachment anxiety ^c	-.36* (.03)	.02 (.02)	-.11* (.03)	.10* (.02)
Mental health				
Dissociative experiences ^c	-.24* (.03)	.10* (.02)	-.02 (.03)	.33* (.02)
Social phobia ^c	-.26* (.02)	-.34* (.02)	-.19* (.02)	.16* (.02)
Trait anxiety ^c	-.41* (.02)	.03 (.02)	-.32* (.02)	.17* (.02)
Depression ^a	-.37* (.05)	.12* (.04)	-.15* (.05)	-.03 (.04)

Note: Values in the table are standardized coefficients (i.e., beta weights) from a multiple regression analysis in which self-esteem, narcissism, authentic pride, and hubristic pride were entered simultaneously. Standard errors for standardized regression coefficients are presented in parentheses. Implicit self-attractiveness was measured with the name-letter attractiveness task and implicit self-liking was measured with the name-letter liking task. Over-claiming bias was measured with the Overclaiming Questionnaire. Perceived social support was assessed with the Interpersonal Support Evaluation List. Attachment avoidance and attachment anxiety were assessed with the Experience in Close Relationships Scale. Depression was assessed with the Centre for Epidemiological Studies – Depression Scale. ^a $n = 698$; ^b $n = 137$; ^c $N = 2327$; * $p < .05$.

in several cases controlling for shared variance between authentic pride and self-esteem did reduce the effect of one of the two variables—though which effect remained (that of self-esteem or authentic pride) was not consistent. In contrast, hubristic pride and narcissism emerged quite clearly as distinct constructs. Both play

key roles in the narcissistic self-regulatory system, but, as the pure subjective feeling component, hubristic pride seems more maladaptive. This distinction has important implications for measurement; researchers who seek to uncover the “dark” side of narcissism may want to consider assessing hubristic pride.

Concluding Thoughts

The findings from the present research point to several tentative conclusions. First, genuine self-esteem and narcissistic self-aggrandizement are distinct constructs. Some researchers have suggested that low self-esteem and narcissism are opposite ends of the same continuum (e.g., Baumeister, Smart, & Boden, 1996), but this conceptualization obscures the important distinction between genuine self-esteem and narcissistic self-aggrandizement. As Rosenberg (1965) explained, “. . . with self-esteem, we are asking whether the individual considers himself adequate—a person of worth—not whether he considers himself superior to others” (p. 62). As our results demonstrate, these two ways of seeking and maintaining positive self-views have divergent effects on several major domains of real-world functioning: antisocial behavior, interpersonal relationships, and mental health. Although the NPI and RSE tend to be positively correlated, statistically removing their shared variance reveals two very different forms of self-favorability. Our model may help address questions and generate hypotheses about the underlying developmental and systemic processes that distinguish these constructs.

Second, authentic and hubristic pride play a key role in this distinction. Authentic pride showed predicted relations with genuine self-esteem and all of its correlates. Correspondingly, hubristic pride showed predicted positive relations with narcissism, regardless of whether it was measured using the NPI, the NPD, or as a tendency to overestimate social consensus with one’s beliefs. Hubristic pride also showed predicted relations with a range of outcomes theoretically relevant to clinical narcissism, including aggression, low perceived social support, rejection sensitivity, poor relationship quality, attachment insecurity, trait anxiety, social phobia, and Machiavellianism. In fact, one of the major findings of the present research is that hubristic pride is a more explicitly maladaptive component of narcissism than the overall trait assessed by the NPI.

Indeed, a third implication of these findings is that hubristic and authentic pride cannot be reduced to state forms of narcissism and self-esteem. Hubristic pride showed a divergent pattern of correlates from the NPI, and in many cases was related to variables theoretically relevant to narcissism but which are not related to the NPI (e.g., low implicit self-esteem, perceived social support). This divergence may be due to the relatively psychologically healthy functioning (or, possibly, defensiveness) of individuals who score high on the NPI, or, more parsimoniously, to unreliability in the measure (the hubristic pride scale has higher internal consistency). In general, although hubristic individuals report a tendency toward feelings of arrogance and egotism, they are also socially uncomfortable, anxious about relationships, and insecure about being liked. One question for future research, then, is why assessing hubristic pride allows us to uncover these aspects of narcissism, long presumed to underlie the personality process but not typically found using the NPI. What is the distinction between individuals who report that “If I ruled the world it would be a much better place” and those who report everyday experiences of arrogance? Regardless of the answer, the present findings highlight the importance of assessing hubristic pride; measuring this distinct emotional experience

allows us to break through the NPI's defensive shell and uncover a less well-defended, more maladjusted personality process.

Authentic pride, in contrast, is more consistently similar to genuine self-esteem. This is not always the case, however; and the discrepancies highlight a broader distinction. Although both authentic pride and genuine self-esteem reflect prosocial personality tendencies that likely promote adaptive functioning, they may have differential links to the two primary components of self-esteem (Tafarodi & Swann, 2001). Specifically, genuine self-esteem may be more strongly related to self-liking, whereas authentic pride may more closely approximate feelings of self-competence. Future studies are needed, however, to examine this issue.

Overall, our model provides several insights into the narcissistic personalities of individuals like Willy Loman. From a developmental perspective, we can formulate hypotheses about Loman's childhood; we know that his older brother Ben was his parents' favorite, and that young Willy idealized Ben but could never achieve the same acceptance. These ideals may have combined with social rejection during Willy's childhood to promote the development of dissociated positive and negative self-representations, and Willy's lifelong need to suppress his shame. From a systemic perspective, Loman's narcissistic personality may contribute to the cognitive-affective processes that influence his behavior throughout the play. Loman never acknowledges feelings of shame, but shame seems to motivate his major decisions and life pursuits (Ribikoff, 2000). To suppress these feelings, Loman self-aggrandizes and self-promotes, striving desperately for hubristic pride. He teaches his sons to be proud of global, stable aspects of themselves, such as "being well-liked" (e.g., Miller, 1949, p. 23), but not of specific accomplishments such as graduating from high school. Similarly, he refuses to explicitly acknowledge his sons' shame, even when Biff is reduced to stealing a pen. When his self-defensiveness fails, Loman's self-worth suffers, resulting in unstable self-esteem. In fact, Loman's final act of suicide results from a powerful confrontation that shatters his illusory contingencies. His implicit shame can no longer be suppressed, and, never having developed any means of integrating positive and negative self-representations, he is forced to sacrifice one self for the other.

Notes

1. Although contingencies are typically unstable specific events (e.g., a good grade) that should lead to authentic pride, these contingencies can nonetheless be attributed to stable global factors (e.g., intelligence), which would lead to hubristic pride. Our model suggests that narcissists would be particularly likely to make these hubristic-oriented appraisals.
2. In all of the correlational analyses presented, shared variance between self-esteem and narcissism was statistically removed by computing residualized versions of each variable. Specifically, the RSE was regressed onto the NPI and standardized residuals were saved, creating a self-esteem-free version of narcissism (i.e., narcissistic self-aggrandizement); and the NPI was regressed onto the RSE and standardized residuals were saved, creating a narcissism-free version of self-esteem (i.e., genuine self-esteem).
3. The long-held theory that narcissism involves implicit feelings of low self-worth predicts a negative correlation between narcissism and instruments designed to assess uncontrolled evaluations of self, such as the Implicit Association Test (IAT; Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998). Using the IAT, however, researchers have found no simple relation between narcissism and implicit self-esteem (Jordan et al., 2003; Zeigler-Hill, 2006).

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