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**ELECTRONIC SUPPLEMENTARY  
 MATERIALS FOR ‘PRESTIGE IN A  
 LARGE-SCALE SOCIAL GROUP PREDICTS  
 LONGITUDINAL CHANGES IN  
 TESTOSTERONE’**

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105 **PARTICIPANTS AND DESCRIPTIVE INFORMATION**

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106 **DESCRIPTIVE SUMMARIES**

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107 Below, in Table S1, we report the participant observables for each gender and the  
 108 combined sample.

109 **TABLE S1. DEMOGRAPHIC DESCRIPTIVE SUMMARY.**

	<b>Gender</b>		<b>Pooled</b>
	<b>Males</b>	<b>Females</b>	
<b>Age</b>			
<b>Mean</b>	19.36	19.55	19.47
<b>SD</b>	1.3	1.75	1.53
<b>Ethnicity</b>			
<b>Caucasian</b>	45	65	110
<b>Hispanic/Latino American</b>	20	16	36
<b>African American</b>	5	3	8
<b>Asian American</b>	6	5	11
<b>Native American</b>	3	4	7
<b>Other</b>	1	1	2
<b>Marching Band Experience (years, including the current)</b>			
<b>Mean</b>	2.23	2.14	2.18
<b>SD</b>	1.22	1.17	1.19
<b>Section Leader (<i>n</i>)</b>	8	11	19
<b><i>N</i></b>	83	94	177
<b>% of sample</b>	46.89%	53.11%	100%

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112 Tables S2 to S7 present the raw frequency counts of talent, advice, coercion,  
 113 popularity, and friendship nominations, respectively, for men and women.

114 **TABLE S2. DESCRIPTIVE SUMMARY OF TALENT NOMINATIONS.**

	<b>Number of Nominations as the Most Talented</b>	<b>Frequency</b>	<b>Percent</b>	<b>Cumulative Percent</b>
<b>Males</b>				
	0	40	48.19	48.19
	1	18	21.69	69.88
	2	9	10.84	80.72
	3	2	2.41	83.13
	4	3	3.61	86.75
	5	1	1.2	87.95
	7	1	1.2	89.16
	9	2	2.41	91.57
	12	2	2.41	93.98
	16	1	1.2	95.18
	23	1	1.2	96.39
	49	1	1.2	97.59
	58	1	1.2	98.8
	65	1	1.2	100
	<b>Total</b>	<b>83</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>-</b>
<b>Females</b>				
	0	49	52.13	52.13
	1	17	18.09	70.21
	2	10	10.64	80.85
	3	5	5.32	86.17
	4	3	3.19	89.36
	5	5	5.32	94.68
	11	1	1.06	95.74
	20	1	1.06	96.81
	21	1	1.06	97.87
	22	1	1.06	98.94
	30	1	1.06	100
	<b>Total</b>	<b>94</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>-</b>

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TABLE S3. DESCRIPTIVE SUMMARY OF ADVICE NOMINATIONS.

	Number of Nominations as an Advisor	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
<b>Males</b>				
	0	21	25.30	25.30
	1	18	21.69	46.99
	2	18	21.69	68.67
	3	8	9.64	78.31
	4	3	3.61	81.93
	5	2	2.41	84.34
	6	1	1.20	85.54
	7	2	2.41	87.95
	10	1	1.20	89.16
	11	1	1.20	90.36
	12	2	2.41	92.77
	15	2	2.41	95.18
	31	1	1.20	96.39
	41	1	1.20	97.59
	47	1	1.20	98.80
	48	1	1.20	100.00
	<b>Total</b>	<b>83</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>-</b>
<b>Females</b>				
	0	25	26.60	26.60
	1	22	23.40	50.00
	2	14	14.89	64.89
	3	6	6.38	71.28
	4	5	5.32	76.60
	5	4	4.26	80.85
	7	2	2.13	82.98
	8	3	3.19	86.17
	9	1	1.06	87.23
	10	5	5.32	92.55
	11	1	1.06	93.62
	12	2	2.13	95.74
	15	1	1.06	96.81
	18	1	1.06	97.87
	22	1	1.06	98.94
	23	1	1.06	100.00
	<b>Total</b>	<b>94</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>-</b>

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TABLE S4. DESCRIPTIVE SUMMARY OF COERCION NOMINATIONS

	<b>Number of Nominations as the Most Talented</b>	<b>Frequency</b>	<b>Percent</b>	<b>Cumulative Percent</b>
<b>Males</b>				
	0	51	61.45	61.45
	1	15	18.07	79.52
	2	6	7.23	86.75
	3	2	2.41	89.16
	4	1	1.2	90.36
	5	3	3.61	93.98
	6	1	1.2	95.18
	12	1	1.2	96.39
	15	1	1.2	97.59
	20	1	1.2	98.8
	38	1	1.2	100
	<b>Total</b>	<b>83</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>-</b>
<b>Females</b>				
	0	59	62.77	62.77
	1	16	17.02	79.79
	2	6	6.38	86.17
	3	4	4.26	90.43
	4	1	1.06	91.49
	5	2	2.13	93.62
	6	1	1.06	94.68
	7	2	2.13	96.81
	8	1	1.06	97.87
	9	1	1.06	98.94
	27	1	1.06	100
	<b>Total</b>	<b>94</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>-</b>

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TABLE S5. DESCRIPTIVE SUMMARY OF POPULARITY NOMINATIONS.

	<b>Number of Nominations as the Most Socially Popular</b>	<b>Frequency</b>	<b>Percent</b>	<b>Cumulative Percent</b>
<b>Males</b>				
	0	47	56.63	56.63
	1	12	14.46	71.08
	2	6	7.23	78.31
	3	3	3.61	81.93
	4	1	1.20	83.13
	5	1	1.20	84.34
	6	1	1.20	85.54
	7	1	1.20	86.75
	8	1	1.20	87.95
	9	1	1.20	89.16
	10	1	1.20	90.36
	11	1	1.20	91.57
	12	1	1.20	92.77
	14	1	1.20	93.98
	35	1	1.20	95.18
	39	1	1.20	96.39
	77	1	1.20	97.59
	94	1	1.20	98.80
	99	1	1.20	100.00
	<b>Total</b>	<b>83</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>-</b>
<b>Females</b>				
	0	40	42.55	42.55
	1	15	15.96	58.51
	2	18	19.15	77.66
	3	3	3.19	80.85
	4	2	2.13	82.98
	5	3	3.19	86.17
	6	2	2.13	88.30
	7	3	3.19	91.49
	8	1	1.06	92.55
	9	1	1.06	93.62
	17	1	1.06	94.68
	22	1	1.06	95.74
	23	2	2.13	97.87
	28	1	1.06	98.94
	30	1	1.06	100.00
	<b>Total</b>	<b>94</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>-</b>



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TABLE S6. DESCRIPTIVE SUMMARY OF FRIENDSHIP NOMINATIONS (IN-COMING).

	Number of Close Friend Nominations Received (In-Coming)	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
<b>Males</b>				
	0	4	4.82	4.82
	1	4	4.82	9.64
	2	8	9.64	19.28
	3	7	8.43	27.71
	4	13	15.66	43.37
	5	6	7.23	50.6
	6	8	9.64	60.24
	7	6	7.23	67.47
	8	7	8.43	75.9
	9	6	7.23	83.13
	10	3	3.61	86.75
	11	3	3.61	90.36
	16	2	2.41	92.77
	18	1	1.2	93.98
	21	3	3.61	97.59
	24	1	1.2	98.8
	33	1	1.2	100
	<b>Total</b>	<b>83</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>-</b>
<b>Females</b>				
	0	1	1.06	1.06
	1	4	4.26	5.32
	2	7	7.45	12.77
	3	9	9.57	22.34
	4	8	8.51	30.85
	5	13	13.83	44.68
	6	7	7.45	52.13
	7	11	11.7	63.83
	8	8	8.51	72.34
	9	6	6.38	78.72
	10	4	4.26	82.98
	11	2	2.13	85.11
	12	3	3.19	88.3
	13	2	2.13	90.43
	14	4	4.26	94.68
	15	1	1.06	95.74
	17	1	1.06	96.81
	18	1	1.06	97.87
	19	1	1.06	98.94
	20	1	1.06	100
	<b>Total</b>	<b>94</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>-</b>

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TABLE S7. DESCRIPTIVE SUMMARY OF FRIENDSHIP NOMINATIONS (OUT-GOING).

	Number of Close Friends Nominated (Out-Going)	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
<b>Males</b>				
	0	3	3.61	3.61
	1	4	4.82	8.43
	2	4	4.82	13.25
	3	9	10.84	24.1
	4	11	13.25	37.35
	5	9	10.84	48.19
	6	4	4.82	53.01
	7	7	8.43	61.45
	8	7	8.43	69.88
	9	8	9.64	79.52
	10	2	2.41	81.93
	11	2	2.41	84.34
	12	3	3.61	87.95
	13	1	1.2	89.16
	14	4	4.82	93.98
	16	2	2.41	96.39
	17	1	1.2	97.59
	19	2	2.41	100
	<b>Total</b>	<b>83</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>-</b>
<b>Females</b>				
	0	1	1.06	1.06
	1	7	7.45	8.51
	2	13	13.83	22.34
	3	9	9.57	31.91
	4	8	8.51	40.43
	5	9	9.57	50
	6	9	9.57	59.57
	7	6	6.38	65.96
	8	6	6.38	72.34
	9	2	2.13	74.47
	10	3	3.19	77.66
	11	2	2.13	79.79
	12	1	1.06	80.85
	13	4	4.26	85.11
	14	2	2.13	87.23
	15	5	5.32	92.55
	16	1	1.06	93.62
	17	3	3.19	96.81
	18	1	1.06	97.87
	19	2	2.13	100
	<b>Total</b>	<b>94</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>-</b>

131 TABLE S8. CORRELATION MATRIX FOR OUR KEY VARIABLES. CORRELATIONS ABOVE  
 132 DIAGONAL ARE FOR MEN, AND BELOW DIAGONAL ARE FOR WOMEN. NOMINATION  
 133 VARIABLES WERE TRANSFORMED USING THE NATURAL LOGARITHM FUNCTION TO  
 134 REDUCE SKEW.

	Talent Nominations	Advice Nominations	Coercion Nominations	Popularity Nominations	Friendship Nominations (In-Coming)	Friendship Nominations (Out-Going)	Testosterone at Time 1	Testosterone at Time 2	Residual Change in Testosterone	Raw Change in Testosterone
Talent Nominations	1	0.5114*	0.3799*	0.3632*	0.3440*	0.2801*	0.1293	0.3669*	0.3232*	0.2776*
Advice Nominations	0.5040*	1	0.2617*	0.3808*	0.3676*	0.2819*	0.1580	0.3761*	0.2984*	0.2442*
Coercion Nominations	0.4553*	0.3347*	1	0.5400*	0.2607*	0.2280*	0.0539	0.1442	0.1236	0.1049
Popularity Nominations	0.5645*	0.3047*	0.3593*	1	0.1925	0.1083	0.0422	0.1131	0.0527	0.0280
Friendship Nominations (In-Coming)	0.3338*	0.4133*	0.2246*	0.3529*	1	0.0555	0.0602	0.1252	0.1243	0.1119
Friendship Nominations (Out-Going)	0.2233*	0.2792*	0.1751	0.2559*	0.8986*	1	0.1353	0.1679	0.0830	0.0474
Testosterone at Time 1	-0.1055	0.0513	-0.2354*	-0.0097	-0.0144	-0.0478	1	0.4437*	-0.2346*	-0.4314*
Testosterone at Time 2	-0.0565	0.1096	-0.1693	-0.0165	-0.0672	-0.0897	0.6374*	1	0.7671*	0.6170*
Residual Change in Testosterone	0.0062	-0.0398	0.0242	-0.0106	-0.0836	-0.0671	-0.2664*	0.5728*	1	0.9782*
Raw Change in Testosterone	0.0268	-0.0851	0.0884	-0.0069	-0.0733	-0.0464	-0.5339*	0.3112*	0.9572*	1

\*  $p < 0.05$

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## SUPPLEMENTAL ANALYSES

137

### REGRESSION MODELS WITH CONTROLS

138 To explore the robustness of our findings, we examined alternative specifications  
 139 based on residual change in T (as the dependent variable). In Tables S9 and S10, Model 1  
 140 shows the baseline model reported in the main text for talent nominations and advice  
 141 nominations, respectively. Models 2 to 9 address the possibility that our findings may be  
 142 driven by dominance, social popularity, friendship ties, age, ethnicity, prior marching band  
 143 experience, or section leader status by including these variables as controls. As can be seen in  
 144 Table S9, coefficients on gender  $\times$  talent interaction remain negative and sizable across  
 145 models, and range from -1.53 to -1.80 (though marginally significant in Models 8 and 9).  
 146 Moreover, as shown in Table S10, coefficients on the gender  $\times$  advice interaction remain  
 147 negative and significant in all specifications, and range from -1.93 to -2.29. These checks  
 148 reveal no qualitative divergences from our baseline findings, suggesting that the prestige

149 effect, as measured using either index, is not driven by between-subject differences in these  
 150 controls.

151 TABLE S9. OLS REGRESSIONS OF TESTOSTERONE CHANGE (INDEXED USING RESIDUAL CHANGE  
 152 SCORES) ON TALENT NOMINATIONS.

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8	Model 9
<b>Talent Nomination</b>	1.7383*** (0.0002)	1.7085*** (0.0006)	1.8263*** (0.0004)	1.8091*** (0.0008)	1.8360** (0.0011)	1.7990** (0.0015)	1.7601** (0.0022)	1.9097** (0.0011)	1.8941** (0.0014)
<b>Gender (1 = Female)</b>	-	-19.2662** 19.1177*** (0.0002)	-18.5660** (0.0030)	-16.0253* (0.0441)	-16.4383* (0.0527)	-14.2069* (0.0965)	-13.1237 (0.1301)	-13.7552 (0.1143)	-13.7805 (0.1150)
<b>Gender × Talent Nomination</b>	-1.7223** (0.0068)	-1.7230* (0.0132)	-1.8032* (0.0180)	-1.7408* (0.0266)	-1.7564* (0.0293)	-1.7559* (0.0302)	-1.6352* (0.0499)	-1.5310* (0.0742)	-1.5396* (0.0739)
<b>Coercion Nomination</b>		0.0917 (0.8574)	0.3802 (0.5157)	0.3697 (0.5343)	0.3899 (0.5214)	0.4494 (0.4726)	0.5916 (0.3529)	0.5590 (0.3808)	0.5421 (0.4003)
<b>Gender × Coercion Nomination</b>		-0.0205 (0.9771)	-0.2973 (0.7012)	-0.2699 (0.7309)	-0.2944 (0.7120)	-0.3089 (0.7025)	-0.4005 (0.6251)	-0.1836 (0.8265)	-0.1779 (0.8324)
<b>Popularity Nomination</b>			-0.5654 (0.3078)	-0.5638 (0.3120)	-0.5730 (0.3091)	-0.6467 (0.2588)	-0.7136 (0.2178)	-0.6130 (0.2949)	-0.6267 (0.2886)
<b>Gender × Popularity Nomination</b>			0.4936 (0.5249)	0.5498 (0.4855)	0.5646 (0.4780)	0.7698 (0.3400)	0.9049 (0.2701)	0.6697 (0.4291)	0.6726 (0.4287)
<b>Friendship Nomination (In-Coming)</b>				0.1375 (0.9073)	0.1142 (0.9239)	0.1550 (0.8967)	0.2316 (0.8497)	0.3081 (0.8019)	0.3102 (0.8013)
<b>Gender × Friendship Nomination (In-Coming)</b>				-1.1576 (0.6038)	-1.7171 (0.7039)	-1.3890 (0.7582)	-1.4063 (0.7595)	-1.3098 (0.7767)	-1.2514 (0.7875)
<b>Friendship Nomination (Out-Going)</b>					-0.2237 (0.8490)	-0.2729 (0.8160)	-0.3384 (0.7766)	-0.4561 (0.7025)	-0.4600 (0.7011)
<b>Gender × Friendship Nomination (Out-Going)</b>					0.8285 (0.8448)	0.0426 (0.9920)	-0.2660 (0.9512)	0.3113 (0.9435)	0.2306 (0.9585)
<b>Age</b>						-1.5565 (0.2672)	-1.6963 (0.2444)	0.0517 (0.9763)	0.0329 (0.9850)
<b>Ethnicity: Other</b>							-1.0534 (0.9555)	4.0375 (0.8319)	4.3495 (0.8203)
<b>Ethnicity: Native American</b>							17.1804 (0.1282)	18.3860 (0.1040)	18.5463 (0.1029)
<b>Ethnicity: Asian American</b>							2.9364 (0.7396)	2.7687 (0.7540)	2.7760 (0.7542)
<b>Ethnicity: African American</b>							-6.5226 (0.5285)	-2.0897 (0.8434)	-1.6817 (0.8760)
<b>Ethnicity: Hispanic American</b>							3.3668 (0.5298)	3.8328 (0.4774)	3.9267 (0.4696)
<b>Marching Band Experience</b>								-4.5860* (0.0565)	-4.6618* (0.0559)
<b>Section Leader (1 = Leader)</b>								1.7628 (0.8247)	1.7628 (0.8247)
<b>R<sup>2</sup></b>	0.121	0.121	0.127	0.129	0.129	0.127	0.147	0.177	0.177
<b>adj. R<sup>2</sup></b>	0.104	0.093	0.088	0.078	0.066	0.057	0.046	0.069	0.063
<b>AIC</b>	1517.1007	1521.0459	1523.9305	1527.6052	1531.5420	1512.8421	1519.1854	1482.0279	1483.9715
<b>BIC</b>	1529.4757	1539.6084	1548.6805	1558.5427	1568.6670	1552.9003	1574.6507	1540.0966	1545.0964
<b>N</b>	163	163	163	163	163	161	161	157	157

*p*-values in parentheses.

All nomination variables used in these models have been transformed using the natural logarithm.

The ethnicity dummies use Caucasian as the reference group, so the coefficient on each dummy variable gives effects relative to Caucasian.

+  $p < 0.10$ , \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < .01$ , \*\*\*  $p < .001$

159 TABLE S10. OLS REGRESSIONS OF TESTOSTERONE CHANGE (INDEXED USING RESIDUAL CHANGE  
 160 SCORES) ON ADVICE NOMINATIONS.

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8	Model 9
<b>Advice Nomination</b>	1.8600*** (0.0007)	1.7768** (0.0016)	1.9657*** (0.0009)	1.9516** (0.0017)	1.9963** (0.0022)	2.0593** (0.0016)	2.1929** (0.0011)	2.2805*** (0.0008)	2.2579*** (0.0010)
<b>Gender (1 = Female)</b>	-	-15.9843** 14.6670*** (0.0006)	-14.9564* (0.0145)	-12.8446* (0.1000)	-13.3594 (0.1069)	-11.8622 (0.1564)	-11.7740 (0.1628)	-11.7106 (0.1679)	-11.7852 (0.1666)
<b>Gender × Advice Nomination</b>	-1.9779** (0.0075)	-1.9323* (0.0122)	-2.1136** (0.0083)	-2.0073* (0.0182)	-2.0379* (0.0211)	-2.0985* (0.0173)	-2.2855* (0.0118)	-2.0555* (0.0265)	-2.0629* (0.0265)
<b>Coercion Nomination</b>		0.3232 (0.5150)	0.6645 (0.2515)	0.6560 (0.2692)	0.6876 (0.2610)	0.8496 (0.1759)	1.0061 (0.1145)	0.9688 (0.1298)	0.9317 (0.1498)
<b>Gender × Coercion Nomination</b>		-0.2149 (0.7540)	-0.5455 (0.4762)	-0.5299 (0.4961)	-0.5650 (0.4773)	-0.6930 (0.3885)	-0.7856 (0.3320)	-0.5654 (0.4947)	-0.5556 (0.5037)

Popularity Nomination	-0.6520 (0.2488)	-0.6499 (0.2537)	-0.6653 (0.2486)	-0.8563 (0.1473)	-0.9715 (0.1032)	-0.8785 (0.1474)	-0.9053 (0.1387)		
Gender × Popularity Nomination	0.6203 (0.4038)	0.6725 (0.3746)	0.6948 (0.3652)	0.9969 (0.2013)	1.2772 (0.1084)	1.1514 (0.1596)	1.1379 (0.1661)		
Friendship Nomination (In-Coming)		0.0897 (0.9403)	0.0544 (0.9643)	0.0012 (0.9992)	-0.1203 (0.9230)	0.0349 (0.9777)	0.0354 (0.9774)		
Gender × Friendship Nomination (In-Coming)		-1.0098 (0.6653)	-1.4417 (0.7603)	-1.0875 (0.8170)	-0.4712 (0.9214)	-0.8943 (0.8522)	-0.6782 (0.8734)		
Friendship Nomination (Out-Going)			-0.2879 (0.8090)	-0.4142 (0.7270)	-0.5209 (0.6638)	-0.5604 (0.6406)	-0.5747 (0.6333)		
Gender × Friendship Nomination (Out-Going)			0.7598 (0.8600)	0.1182 (0.9782)	-0.5474 (0.9006)	0.1174 (0.9789)	-0.0244 (0.9956)		
Age				-1.4976 (0.2849)	-1.7487 (0.2274)	-0.0702 (0.9677)	-0.0990 (0.9547)		
Ethnicity: Other					-8.8551 (0.6360)	-4.6200 (0.8070)	-3.9457 (0.8358)		
Ethnicity: Native American					20.6802* (0.0702)	21.0468* (0.0660)	21.4110* (0.0629)		
Ethnicity: Asian American					-1.5592 (0.8618)	-2.6439 (0.7690)	-2.5096 (0.7812)		
Ethnicity: African American					-7.2872 (0.4798)	-3.6132 (0.7316)	-2.7452 (0.7985)		
Ethnicity: Hispanic American					2.6042 (0.6198)	2.6579 (0.6156)	2.9054 (0.5864)		
Marching Band Experience						-4.6011* (0.0604)	-4.7492* (0.0557)		
Section Leader (1 = Leader)							3.3899 (0.6654)		
<i>R</i> <sup>2</sup>	0.109	0.112	0.120	0.121	0.121	0.126	0.154	0.178	0.179
adj. <i>R</i> <sup>2</sup>	0.093	0.084	0.080	0.069	0.057	0.056	0.053	0.071	0.066
<i>AIC</i>	1519.2009	1522.7049	1525.2974	1529.0660	1532.9887	1513.0276	1517.8734	1481.7431	1483.5279
<i>BIC</i>	1531.5759	1541.2674	1550.0474	1560.0035	1570.1137	1553.0858	1573.3387	1539.8118	1544.6528
<i>N</i>	163	163	163	163	163	161	161	157	157

*p*-values in parentheses.

All nomination variables used in these models have been transformed using the natural logarithm. The ethnicity dummies use Caucasian as the reference group, so the coefficient on each dummy variable gives effects relative to Caucasian.

+  $p < 0.10$ , \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < .01$ , \*\*\*  $p < .001$

## SIMPLE EFFECTS FOR MEN AND WOMEN

To investigate the relationship between prestige and T change for each gender separately, we examined the simple slopes for each of the 9 specifications in Tables S9 and S10. These simple slopes are displayed below in Table S11 for talent and Table S12 for advice. As can be seen, across all specifications, talent and advice are both associated with a relatively greater positive change in T over time in men. By contrast, no significant associations emerged for women. These results indicate that our main findings are robust across the board.

176 TABLE S11. SIMPLE EFFECTS OF TALENT NOMINATIONS ON TESTOSTERONE CHANGE  
177 (INDEXED USING RESIDUAL CHANGE SCORES) IN MEN AND WOMEN

	<i>b</i>	<i>SE</i>	<i>t</i>	<i>p-value</i>	<i>.95 CI</i>	
<b>Model 1</b>						
<b>Males</b>	1.7383	0.4591	3.79	< .001	0.8315	2.6451
<b>Females</b>	0.0160	0.4286	0.04	0.970	-0.8304	0.8625
<b>Model 2</b>						
<b>Males</b>	1.7085	0.4907	3.48	0.001	0.7392	2.6778
<b>Females</b>	-0.0144	0.4811	-0.03	0.976	-0.9648	0.9359
<b>Model 3</b>						
<b>Males</b>	1.8263	0.5055	3.61	< .001	0.8278	2.8249
<b>Females</b>	0.0231	0.5599	0.04	0.967	-1.0830	1.1292
<b>Model 4</b>						
<b>Males</b>	1.8091	0.5294	3.42	0.001	0.7633	2.8549
<b>Females</b>	0.0683	0.5692	0.12	0.905	-1.0562	1.1928
<b>Model 5</b>						
<b>Males</b>	1.8360	0.5511	3.33	0.001	0.7472	2.9248
<b>Females</b>	0.0795	0.5778	0.14	0.891	-1.0621	1.2212
<b>Model 6</b>						
<b>Males</b>	1.7990	0.5555	3.24	0.001	0.7012	2.8969
<b>Females</b>	0.0431	0.5770	0.07	0.941	-1.0971	1.1834
<b>Model 7</b>						
<b>Males</b>	1.7601	0.5634	3.12	0.002	0.6464	2.8738
<b>Females</b>	0.1249	0.5961	0.21	0.834	-1.0534	1.3032
<b>Model 8</b>						
<b>Males</b>	1.9097	0.5734	3.33	0.001	0.7758	3.0435
<b>Females</b>	0.3787	0.6184	0.61	0.541	-0.8440	1.6014
<b>Model 9</b>						
<b>Males</b>	1.8941	0.5797	3.27	0.001	0.7478	3.0404
<b>Females</b>	0.3544	0.6300	0.56	0.575	-0.8914	1.6003

178 TABLE S12. SIMPLE EFFECTS OF ADVICE NOMINATIONS ON TESTOSTERONE CHANGE  
179 (INDEXED USING RESIDUAL CHANGE SCORES) IN MEN AND WOMEN

	<i>b</i>	<i>SE</i>	<i>t</i>	<i>p-value</i>	<i>.95 CI</i>	
<b>Model 1</b>						
<b>Males</b>	1.8600	0.5356	3.47	0.001	0.8022	2.9178
<b>Females</b>	-0.1179	0.4961	-0.24	0.812	-1.0978	0.8620
<b>Model 2</b>						
<b>Males</b>	1.7768	0.5531	3.21	0.002	0.6844	2.8692
<b>Females</b>	-0.1555	0.5249	-0.30	0.767	-1.1922	0.8811
<b>Model 3</b>						
<b>Males</b>	1.9657	0.5778	3.40	0.001	0.8244	3.1070
<b>Females</b>	-0.1478	0.5388	-0.27	0.784	-1.2122	0.9166
<b>Model 4</b>						

<b>Males</b>	1.9516	0.6106	3.20	0.002	0.7453	3.1580
<b>Females</b>	-0.0556	0.5778	-0.10	0.923	-1.1972	1.0859
<b>Model 5</b>						
<b>Males</b>	1.9963	0.6416	3.11	0.002	0.7287	3.2639
<b>Females</b>	-0.0416	0.5943	-0.07	0.944	-1.2159	1.1327
<b>Model 6</b>						
<b>Males</b>	2.0593	0.6414	3.21	0.002	0.7917	3.3269
<b>Females</b>	-0.0392	0.5903	-0.07	0.947	-1.2057	1.1273
<b>Model 7</b>						
<b>Males</b>	2.1929	0.6595	3.33	0.001	0.8893	3.4965
<b>Females</b>	-0.0925	0.6047	-0.15	0.879	-1.2878	1.1027
<b>Model 8</b>						
<b>Males</b>	2.2805	0.6671	3.42	0.001	0.9615	3.5994
<b>Females</b>	0.2249	0.6289	0.36	0.721	-1.0185	1.4684
<b>Model 9</b>						
<b>Males</b>	2.2579	0.6710	3.36	0.001	0.9310	3.5849
<b>Females</b>	0.1950	0.6345	0.31	0.759	-1.0596	1.4497

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### ROBUST REGRESSIONS

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Next, we check the robustness of our findings to robust regressions. Ordinary least square estimations, which treat extreme and non-extreme scores equally, are vulnerable to outliers. In contrast, by assigning lower weight to outliers (i.e., observations with large residuals), robust methods are robust against the presence of outliers (Barnett & Lewis, 1994; Rousseeuw & Leroy, 2003). We reran our baseline model (Model 1, from Tables S9 and S10 above, again based on residual change in T) using a version of robust regression that uses a combination of Huber weights and biweights (Hamilton, 1992). Reconfirming our findings based on least squares regressions above, these results show that relative T change is significantly predicted by the interaction between gender and talent [ $b = -1.28$ ,  $t(159) = -2.10$ ,  $p = .038$ , .95 CI(-2.49, -.07)], and between gender and advice [ $b = -1.82$ ,  $t(159) = -2.65$ ,  $p = .009$ , .95 CI(-3.17, -.46)]. Simple effects shown below in Table S13, which remain highly similar in magnitude to those estimated by least square regressions, once

194 again indicate a significant positive predictive effect of advice on relatively greater T  
 195 change in men but a null effect in women. These alternative estimates indicate that our  
 196 primary results are robust to outliers.

197 **TABLE S13. SIMPLE EFFECTS OF TALENT AND ADVICE NOMINATIONS ON**  
 198 **TESTOSTERONE CHANGE (INDEXED USING RESIDUAL CHANGE SCORES) IN MEN AND**  
 199 **WOMEN (ESTIMATED USING ROBUST REGRESSIONS)**

	<i>b</i>	<i>SE</i>	<i>t</i>	<i>p-value</i>	<i>.95 CI</i>	
<b>Talent Nominations</b>						
<b>Males</b>	1.2806	0.4470	2.87	0.004	0.4046	2.1567
<b>Females</b>	-0.0011	0.4172	0.00	0.998	-0.8189	0.8166
<b>Advice Nominations</b>						
<b>Males</b>	1.7184	0.5039	3.41	0.001	0.7308	2.7059
<b>Females</b>	-0.0990	0.4668	-0.21	0.832	-1.0138	0.8159


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201 **SCATTERPLOTS OF TESTOSTERONE CHANGE (INDEXED USING RESIDUAL**  
 202 **CHANGE SCORES) AS A FUNCTION OF PRESTIGE-RELATED NOMINATIONS**

203 Figures S1 and S2 below present a scatterplot of intra-individual relative change in  
 204 T as a function of the number of talent and advice nominations received, separately in men  
 205 and women. The x-axis displays the raw number of nominations received. Zero nomination  
 206 corresponds to the bottom 25<sup>th</sup> percentile for talent nominations, and the bottom 50<sup>th</sup>  
 207 percentile for advice nomination. Five and ten nominations correspond to the 90<sup>th</sup>  
 208 percentile for talent and advice nominations, respectively. Change in T was indexed using  
 209 the unstandardized residuals of Time 2 T regressed on Time 1 T. In each, the line of best fit  
 210 (in gray; 95% confidence intervals in yellow dashed line) shows the positive association  
 211 between each measure of prestige and a higher than expected increase in T over time in  
 212 men, and a null association in women. This trend is consistent with the nonparametric  
 213 lowess curves (in light blue; Cleveland, 1979) shown. Together, these plots confirm our  
 214 conclusion that prestige in men is associated with a rising T profile over time.




215 FIGURE S1. SCATTERPLOT OF CHANGE IN TESTOSTERONE (INDEXED USING RESIDUAL  
 216 CHANGE SCORES) AS A FUNCTION OF THE NUMBER OF TALENT NOMINATIONS RECEIVED  
 217 FOR MEN AND WOMEN. THE LINE OF BEST FIT (IN GRAY), 95% CONFIDENCE INTERVAL  
 218 (IN YELLOW DASH), AND LOWESS CURVE (IN LIGHT BLUE) FOR EACH PANEL ARE  
 219 SHOWN.



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221 FIGURE S2. SCATTERPLOT OF CHANGE IN TESTOSTERONE (INDEXED USING RESIDUAL  
 222 CHANGE SCORES) AS A FUNCTION OF THE NUMBER OF ADVICE NOMINATIONS RECEIVED  
 223 FOR MEN AND WOMEN. THE LINE OF BEST FIT (IN GRAY), 95% CONFIDENCE INTERVAL  
 224 (IN YELLOW DASH), AND LOWESS CURVE (IN LIGHT BLUE) FOR EACH PANEL ARE  
 225 SHOWN.



226

227 EFFECTS OF PRESTIGE, AS APPROXIMATED BY BOTH TALENT AND ADVICE  
 228 NOMINATIONS, ON CHANGE IN TESTOSTERONE (INDEXED USING RESIDUAL  
 229 CHANGE SCORES)

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230 The strong association ( $r = .51, p < .0001$ ) between talent and advice nominations  
 231 suggest that they both tap strongly into perceived prestige within the community. To  
 232 capitalize on the availability of these two indices, we summed together the number of  
 233 nominations an individual received across both domains to create a single prestige  
 234 distribution index that captures an individual's overall level of respect in the community.  
 235 Using this prestige composite, we again reran our baseline model (Model 1, from Tables S9  
 236 and S10 above) using residual change in T as the dependent variable. An interaction  
 237 between gender and prestige again emerges [ $b = -2.14, t(159) = -2.87, p = .005, .95 \text{ CI}(-3.62,$   
 238  $-.67)$ ]. The simple effects (shown below in Table S14) remain virtually identical to the  
 239 coefficients in our original models based on either nomination variable. Prestige  
 240 significantly predicts relative T change in men but not in women.

241 TABLE S14. SIMPLE EFFECTS OF AGGREGATED PRESTIGE-RELATED NOMINATIONS ON  
 242 TESTOSTERONE CHANGE (INDEXED USING RESIDUAL CHANGE SCORES) IN MEN AND  
 243 WOMEN

	<i>b</i>	<i>SE</i>	<i>t</i>	<i>p-value</i>	<i>.95 CI</i>	
<b>Males</b>	2.0733	0.5498	3.77	<.001	0.9874	3.1591
<b>Females</b>	-0.0714	0.5073	-0.14	0.888	-1.0734	0.9305

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245 NO DETECTABLE EFFECT OF DOMINANCE ON CHANGE IN TESTOSTERONE  
 246 (INDEXED USING RESIDUAL CHANGE SCORES)

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247 Our results above suggest that dominance (indexed using coercion nominations)  
 248 does not predict T changes, independent of prestige (see Tables S9 and S10 above, Models  
 249 2-9). While we think this question of whether acquiring dominance by force and force-  
 250 threat triggers greater T production is important and interesting, we emphasize that

251 independent of the results obtained, there is reason to suspect that our ability to detect any  
252 influence of dominance on endocrine responses is impacted by the small sample of  
253 dominant individuals identified using our methodology.

254         Of the 83 male band members studied, 51 men (61.45%) did not receive a single  
255 nomination from the community as having a coercive and forceful disposition. 32 men  
256 (38.55%) were nominated by at least one peer, and only a very small group of 17 men  
257 (20.48% of all men) were nominated by at least two peers. By direct comparison, the talent  
258 and advice nomination data were much more evenly distributed. Only 21 men (25.30%)  
259 had zero advice nomination, and a more sizable group of 62 men (74.7 %) and 44 men  
260 (53.01%) received at least 1 and at least 2 advice nominations, respectively. Thus, our  
261 coercion nominations yielded a heavily skewed distribution at zero, in conjunction with a  
262 very small sample of individuals identified as possessing any degree of dominance (i.e.,  
263 who were considered forceful by at least one other person in the group).

264         This pattern undermines the effectiveness of our dominance variable, by adding to  
265 the challenge of capturing the distribution of dominance ranks (i.e., variation in perceived  
266 formidability) within the group. Although we cannot definitive determine whether this  
267 restricted pool of dominant men in the group reflects an anomaly of our marching band  
268 community, or our peer nomination methodology deployed, or some combination of these  
269 factors, it is clear that this pattern can skew our results and work against the detection of  
270 any measurable effects of dominance on T. Thus, it is unsurprising we obtained a null effect  
271 for dominance. In sum, these issues suggest caution in interpreting the current results  
272 regarding the predictive effects of dominance on T as providing conclusive insights into the  
273 nature of endocrine responses.

274 Notwithstanding these issues, we sought to further examine the data for any  
275 evidence of dominance in influencing T concentrations, by testing the predictive power of  
276 coercion nominations on relative degree of T change, without controlling for prestige.  
277 Paralleling our efforts above for our primary analyses testing the effects of prestige, we ran  
278 a series of regression models using only dominance-based rank and the same set of  
279 demographic controls as above to predict residual change in T, without including talent,  
280 advice, or other nominations as simultaneous predictors. These results, shown in Table S15  
281 below, confirm those obtained above when the effects of dominance was unconfounded  
282 from prestige. In the baseline model (with no controls; parallels Model 1 in Tables S9 and  
283 S10), the coefficient on the gender  $\times$  coercion nomination interaction [ $b = -.63$ ,  $t(159) = -$   
284  $.93$ ,  $p = .356$ ,  $.95$  CI(-1.9598, .7092)] is non-significant. Simple slopes revealed no significant  
285 effect of coerciveness on relative T change in men [ $b = .69$ ,  $t(159) = 1.40$ ,  $p = .165$ ,  $.95$  CI(-  
286  $.2868$ ,  $1.6664$ )] or women [ $b = .06$ ,  $t(159) = .14$ ,  $p = .889$ ,  $.95$  CI[-.8449, .9740]}. The other  
287 specifications yield the same qualitative conclusions.

288 These results suggest that dominance has no detectable effects on T production over  
289 time, at least in this social context. However, given the restricted range of measurable  
290 dominance in this social group (at least using the methods we deployed), we caution that  
291 this pattern may be in part merely an artifact of our dataset and study context. Thus, we  
292 cannot definitively conclude whether dominance has any general effects on T release in  
293 most other social groups in which greater dominance asymmetries exist. In the future, we  
294 plan to further examine the interplay between dominance and T by exploring these links  
295 more directly in other large-scale field social groups in which extensive within-group  
296 distributions of dominance have been empirically documented and shown to affect

297 resource and influence allocation. This includes, for example, small-scale forager societies  
 298 (von Rueden, Gurven, & Kaplan, 2008, 2011), athletic and sports teams (Cheng, Tracy, &  
 299 Henrich, 2010), children and adolescent social communities (Hawley, 1999; Redhead,  
 300 2016), and networks of competitive Master of Business Administration students  
 301 (McClanahan, Maner, & Cheng, 2017).

302 **TABLE S15. OLS REGRESSIONS OF TESTOSTERONE CHANGE (INDEXED USING RESIDUAL**  
 303 **CHANGE SCORES) ON COERCION NOMINATIONS.**

	<b>Model 1</b>	<b>Model 2</b>	<b>Model 3</b>	<b>Model 4</b>	<b>Model 5</b>
<b>Coercion Nomination</b>	0.6898 (0.1650)	0.6817 (0.1793)	0.7526 (0.1442)	0.8476 (0.1060)	0.7519 (0.1644)
<b>Gender (1 = Female)</b>	-14.9080* (0.0149)	-14.0283* (0.0235)	-14.1374* (0.0239)	-13.3353* (0.0361)	-13.4944* (0.0343)
<b>Gender × Coercion Nomination</b>	-0.6253 (0.3562)	-0.5762 (0.3976)	-0.5727 (0.4043)	-0.3902 (0.5785)	-0.3795 (0.5897)
<b>Age</b>		-1.0690 (0.4249)	-1.0420 (0.4499)	0.5436 (0.7396)	0.5299 (0.7463)
<b>Ethnicity: Other</b>			-5.1541 (0.7844)	0.1921 (0.9920)	1.0179 (0.9577)
<b>Ethnicity: Native American</b>			15.4429 (0.1698)	17.1801 (0.1297)	17.6819 (0.1202)
<b>Ethnicity: Asian American</b>			2.4872 (0.7757)	2.2660 (0.7963)	2.2096 (0.8016)
<b>Ethnicity: African American</b>			-8.4202 (0.4153)	-4.1884 (0.6932)	-2.9384 (0.7849)
<b>Ethnicity: Hispanic American</b>			3.3591 (0.5238)	3.4630 (0.5150)	3.8536 (0.4718)
<b>Marching Band Experience</b>				-4.3540+ (0.0626)	-4.7205* (0.0489)
<b>Section Leader (1 = Leader)</b>					5.6207 (0.4639)
<b>R<sup>2</sup></b>	0.053	0.052	0.072	0.094	0.097
<b>adj. R<sup>2</sup></b>	0.035	0.028	0.017	0.032	0.028
<b>AIC</b>	1529.1686	1510.1884	1516.7405	1481.1302	1482.5472
<b>BIC</b>	1541.5436	1525.5954	1547.5545	1514.7489	1519.2222
<b>N</b>	163	161	161	157	157

304 *p*-values in parentheses.  
 305 The dominance nomination variable used in these models has been transformed using the natural logarithm.  
 306 The ethnicity dummies use Caucasian as the reference group, so the coefficient on each dummy variable gives  
 307 effects relative to Caucasian.  
 308 + *p* < 0.10, \* *p* < 0.05, \*\* *p* < .01, \*\*\* *p* < .001

SOCIAL POPULARITY AND FRIENDSHIPS DO NOT PREDICT CHANGE IN  
TESTOSTERONE

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311 Our central hypothesis concerns how the experience of prestige calibrates the up-  
312 regulation of testosterone. Theoretically, the skill, expertise, and success of prestigious  
313 individuals (which are precisely the same attributes that generate their prestige in the first  
314 place) attract a coterie of loyal followers who willingly pay deference to their prestigious  
315 model and desire to hang around them, in exchange for access and increased opportunity  
316 to acquire the valuable skills, know-how, and information that these models possess  
317 (Henrich, Chudek, & Boyd, 2015; Henrich & Gil-White, 2001). Indeed, these patterns are  
318 well supported by ethnographic observations (e.g., Radcliffe-Brown, 1964; Sahlins, 1963)  
319 and existing empirical work by our team and others, which converge to indicate that highly  
320 prestigious individuals receive increased social popularity and support from other  
321 members of the community (e.g., Cheng, Tracy, Foulsham, Kingstone, & Henrich, 2013;  
322 Cheng et al., 2010; von Rueden et al., 2011). Might this greater social popularity or support  
323 enjoyed by prestigious individuals be responsible for our key prestige finding? To address  
324 this possibility, we conducted additional analyses to examine our effects after controlling  
325 for who in the community is socially popular and has large networks of friends.

326 We first began by examining the association between social popularity and T  
327 change, we ran a regression model similar to our primary analysis, in which we regressed  
328 residual change in T on the main and interactive effects of the natural logarithm of  
329 popularity nominations and gender. Results (shown in Table S16) indicate that, in contrast  
330 to talent, popularity was not associated with relative T change. There was no significant  
331 gender  $\times$  popularity nomination interaction [ $b = -.30$ ,  $t(159) = -.47$ ,  $p = .639$ , .95 CI(-1.58,  
332 .97)]. As expected, popularity had a non-significant effect on relative T change in both men

333 [b = .28, t(159) = .59, p = .555, .95 CI(-.64, 1.20)] and women [b = -.03, t(159) = -.06, p =  
 334 .952, .95 CI(-.91, .85)].

335 TABLE S16. OLS REGRESSIONS OF TESTOSTERONE CHANGE (INDEXED USING RESIDUAL  
 336 CHANGE SCORES) ON POPULARITY NOMINATIONS.

	<b>Model 1</b>	<b>Model 2</b>	<b>Model 3</b>	<b>Model 4</b>	<b>Model 5</b>
<b>Popularity Nomination</b>	0.2757 (0.5547)	0.1639 (0.7306)	0.1470 (0.7601)	0.2670 (0.5902)	0.1458 (0.7746)
<b>Gender (1 = Female)</b>	-12.4807* (0.0189)	-10.9635* (0.0405)	-10.5393+ (0.0517)	-11.1870* (0.0407)	-11.3735* (0.0376)
<b>Gender × Popularity Nomination</b>	-0.3028 (0.6391)	-0.1338 (0.8368)	-0.0048 (0.9942)	0.0108 (0.9873)	-0.0026 (0.9969)
<b>Age</b>		-0.8666 (0.5248)	-0.8213 (0.5574)	0.5964 (0.7180)	0.5970 (0.7176)
<b>Ethnicity: Other</b>			-7.8138 (0.6799)	-3.9805 (0.8357)	-2.0976 (0.9133)
<b>Ethnicity: Native American</b>			13.6243 (0.2241)	14.5119 (0.1990)	15.5576 (0.1703)
<b>Ethnicity: Asian American</b>			1.8855 (0.8305)	1.2097 (0.8917)	1.4944 (0.8664)
<b>Ethnicity: African American</b>			-8.9268 (0.3930)	-5.6891 (0.5946)	-3.4801 (0.7494)
<b>Ethnicity: Hispanic American</b>			2.9580 (0.5768)	3.0148 (0.5736)	3.6459 (0.4989)
<b>Marching Band Experience</b>				-3.8660+ (0.0953)	-4.4060+ (0.0639)
<b>Section Leader (1 = Leader)</b>					8.0806 (0.2993)
<b>R<sup>2</sup></b>	0.044	0.041	0.059	0.077	0.084
<b>adj. R<sup>2</sup></b>	0.026	0.017	0.003	0.014	0.014
<b>AIC</b>	1530.8088	1511.9733	1518.9412	1483.9994	1484.8288
<b>BIC</b>	1543.1838	1527.3803	1549.7553	1517.6181	1521.5037
<b>N</b>	163	161	161	157	157

337 *p*-values in parentheses.

338 The popularity nomination variable used in these models has been transformed using the natural  
 339 logarithm.

340 The ethnicity dummies use Caucasian as the reference group, so the coefficient on each dummy variable  
 341 gives effects relative to Caucasian.

342 + *p* < 0.10, \* *p* < 0.05, \*\* *p* < .01, \*\*\* *p* < .001

343

344 Moreover, results using both in-coming (Table S17) and out-going friendship

345 nominations (Table S18) as predictors confirm the null results obtained above for social

346 popularity nominations. Neither form of friendship nominations were associated with

347 relative T change in men. We also found no evidence of significant gender × in-coming

348 friendship nomination interaction or gender × out-going friendship nomination interaction.  
 349 Combined, results across all three of these indices of social popularity—nominations of  
 350 popularity and friendship (both in-coming and out-going)—indicate that, in contrast to  
 351 prestige, which predicts individual differences in T change profiles in men, social  
 352 popularity is unrelated to systematic changes in T.

353 TABLE S17. OLS REGRESSIONS OF TESTOSTERONE CHANGE (INDEXED USING RESIDUAL  
 354 CHANGE SCORES) ON IN-COMING FRIENDSHIP NOMINATIONS.

	<b>Model 1</b>	<b>Model 2</b>	<b>Model 3</b>	<b>Model 4</b>	<b>Model 5</b>
<b>Friendship Nomination (In-Coming)</b>	1.5689	1.5164	1.6378	1.8090	1.7079
	(0.1623)	(0.1789)	(0.1548)	(0.1204)	(0.1430)
<b>Gender (1 = Female)</b>	-7.5947	-6.7574	-6.7233	-8.3241	-8.2220
	(0.1419)	(0.1951)	(0.2064)	(0.1288)	(0.1331)
<b>Gender × Friendship Nomination (In-Coming)</b>	-2.4280	-2.5348	-2.6175	-2.0196	-2.2544
	(0.2484)	(0.2322)	(0.2236)	(0.3576)	(0.3061)
<b>Age</b>		-1.0731	-0.9521	0.5546	0.4472
		(0.4213)	(0.4863)	(0.7422)	(0.7909)
<b>Ethnicity: Other</b>			-7.4887	-4.2936	-1.9353
			(0.6894)	(0.8209)	(0.9191)
<b>Ethnicity: Native American</b>			13.4897	13.7515	15.3803
			(0.2222)	(0.2165)	(0.1700)
<b>Ethnicity: Asian American</b>			4.2910	3.9218	3.8765
			(0.6272)	(0.6598)	(0.6631)
<b>Ethnicity: African American</b>			-8.3979	-5.2777	-3.0496
			(0.4167)	(0.6185)	(0.7768)
<b>Ethnicity: Hispanic American</b>			3.3923	3.4605	4.0838
			(0.5197)	(0.5163)	(0.4455)
<b>Marching Band Experience</b>				-3.7198	-4.3817 <sup>+</sup>
				(0.1090)	(0.0668)
<b>Section Leader (1 = Leader)</b>					8.6144
					(0.2447)
<b>R<sup>2</sup></b>	0.055	0.054	0.072	0.088	0.097
<b>adj. R<sup>2</sup></b>	0.037	0.029	0.017	0.026	0.028
<b>AIC</b>	1528.9257	1509.9130	1516.6801	1482.0226	1482.5519
<b>BIC</b>	1541.3007	1525.3201	1547.4941	1515.6413	1519.2269



355  $N$  163 161 161 157 157  
 356  $p$ -values in parentheses.  
 357 The in-coming friendship nomination variable used in these models has been transformed using the  
 358 natural logarithm.  
 359 The ethnicity dummies use Caucasian as the reference group, so the coefficient on each dummy variable  
 360 gives effects relative to Caucasian.  
 +  $p < 0.10$ , \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < .01$ , \*\*\*  $p < .001$

361 TABLE S18. OLS REGRESSIONS OF TESTOSTERONE CHANGE (INDEXED USING RESIDUAL  
 362 CHANGE SCORES) ON OUT-GOING FRIENDSHIP NOMINATIONS.

	<b>Model 1</b>	<b>Model 2</b>	<b>Model 3</b>	<b>Model 4</b>	<b>Model 5</b>
<b>Friendship Nomination (Out-Going)</b>	1.0519	0.9857	0.9951	1.0024	0.8643
	(0.3518)	(0.3811)	(0.3832)	(0.3835)	(0.4539)
<b>Gender (1 = Female)</b>	-8.5203 <sup>+</sup>	-7.6438	-7.8126	-9.3381 <sup>+</sup>	-9.2841 <sup>+</sup>
	(0.0917)	(0.1340)	(0.1309)	(0.0815)	(0.0828)
<b>Gender × Friendship Nomination (Out-Going)</b>	-1.7216	-1.8756	-1.8978	-1.2241	-1.4479
	(0.4052)	(0.3683)	(0.3679)	(0.5743)	(0.5075)
<b>Age</b>		-0.9120	-0.8129	0.6170	0.4736
		(0.4979)	(0.5576)	(0.7210)	(0.7842)
<b>Ethnicity: Other</b>			-8.1476	-5.2796	-2.7101
			(0.6653)	(0.7821)	(0.8876)
<b>Ethnicity: Native American</b>			13.5018	13.5361	15.3517
			(0.2249)	(0.2275)	(0.1748)
<b>Ethnicity: Asian American</b>			1.7148	1.3028	1.3727
			(0.8450)	(0.8831)	(0.8767)
<b>Ethnicity: African American</b>			-8.7606	-6.0327	-3.5762
			(0.4007)	(0.5725)	(0.7421)
<b>Ethnicity: Hispanic American</b>			2.6474	2.6051	3.3606
			(0.6178)	(0.6280)	(0.5342)
<b>Marching Band Experience</b>				-3.3809	-4.0838 <sup>+</sup>
				(0.1444)	(0.0876)
<b>Section Leader (1 = Leader)</b>					8.8977
					(0.2338)
<b>R<sup>2</sup></b>	0.048	0.047	0.065	0.078	0.087
<b>adj. R<sup>2</sup></b>	0.030	0.023	0.009	0.015	0.018
<b>AIC</b>	1530.1266	1511.0392	1518.0413	1483.8063	1484.2659
<b>BIC</b>	1542.5016	1526.4463	1548.8554	1517.4250	1520.9408
<b>N</b>	163	161	161	157	157

363  $p$ -values in parentheses.  
 364 The out-going friendship nomination variable used in these models has been transformed using the  
 365 natural logarithm.  
 366 The ethnicity dummies use Caucasian as the reference group, so the coefficient on each dummy variable  
 367 gives effects relative to Caucasian.  
 368 +  $p < 0.10$ , \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < .01$ , \*\*\*  $p < .001$   
 369  
 370  
 371

## COMPARISONS ACROSS DISCRETE LEVELS OF PRESTIGE IN MEN

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372  
373 To complement the analyses above and in the main text on residual change, in which  
374 levels of prestige (as indexed by talent and advice nominations) were treated as a  
375 continuous variable (after applying a natural logarithmic transformation), we ran additional  
376 analyses by treating prestige as discrete categories of raw nomination counts. We created  
377 three ordinal bins of subjects by grouping together the talent and advice nomination count  
378 data as follows: 0 nomination, 1-4 nominations, and 5 or more nominations. These groups  
379 were defined on the basis of our reasoning that 0 nomination corresponds to the absence of  
380 group-wide recognition, and, descriptively, receiving 5 or more prestige nominations puts  
381 an individual in the top 10 percentile of the group's prestige hierarchy. It's important to  
382 note, however, that although this "discretizing" approach may generate useful insights for  
383 understanding the link between prestige and relative T change, this procedure leads to the  
384 loss of information in our prestige measures and thus should be deemed as tentative and  
385 supplemental to our more suitable primary analyses based on continuous measures.

386 The descriptive means for relative change in T in these three categories of  
387 nomination frequency among men are displayed below in Figures S3 (for talent  
388 nominations) and S4 (for advice nominations). Note that these two figures parallel Figure 2  
389 shown in the main text, which instead depicts mean raw changes in T (indexed using  
390 simple difference scores) across the same nomination count categories. We next conducted  
391 one-way ANOVAs to examine how relative T change varied as a function of level of prestige.  
392 This analysis indicates that mean relative change in T differed significantly across the three  
393 groups for both talent [ $F(3, 72) = 4.05, p = .0101, R^2 = .1445$ ] and advice [ $F(3, 72) = 5.80, p =$   
394  $.0013, R^2 = .19$ ]. Follow-up comparisons revealed the same pattern of results as in the


395 continuous analyses. For the talent measure, compared to men who received 0 nomination  
396 and on average experienced a decline in T, a significantly higher rise in T was found in men  
397 who received 1-4 nominations [ $F(1, 72) = 4.39, p = .0396$ ] or 5+ nominations [ $F(1, 72) =$   
398  $8.20, p = .0055$ ]. Most critically, the level of relative T increase was significantly higher  
399 across the average of the two latter groups involving 1-4 and 5+ talent nominations than  
400 the group of men who did not receive any talent nomination [ $F(1, 72) = 9.68, p = .0027$ ].

401 A similar pattern of results were obtained for our advice measure. Men who  
402 received 0 nomination on average experienced relatively less change in T. Relative to this  
403 group, a marginally significant greater change in T was found in men who received 1-4  
404 nominations [ $F(1, 72) = 3.29, p = .0739$ ], and significantly greater T change was found in  
405 men with 5 or more nominations [ $F(1, 72) = 14.70, p = .0003$ ]. Finally, the degree of T  
406 increase was significantly higher across the average of the two latter groups involving 1-4  
407 and 5+ advice nominations than the group of un-nominated men [ $F(1, 72) = 11.09, p =$   
408  $.0014$ ].

409 Importantly, these results demonstrate that our key findings do not hinge on the use  
410 of ordinary least square analytic methods, nor do they reflect trends arising from the  
411 effects of one or two highly prestigious individuals in the community. As evidenced by the  
412 stepwise pattern visible in these bar graphs, the amount of T change relative to others  
413 tracks the experience of prestige, as we go from individuals at the bottom of the prestige  
414 hierarchy to those in the middle ranks, and from there to those who earned the most  
415 prestige. In sum, these results based on discretized levels of prestige reveal the same basic  
416 findings as our analyses based on continuous data. Both sets of results indicate that men


417 who are recognized as prestigious in their community show a relatively greater rise in T  
418 compared to men who lack prestige.

419 FIGURE S3. BAR GRAPH DEPICTING CHANGE IN TESTOSTERONE (INDEXED BY RESIDUAL  
420 CHANGE SCORES) AS A FUNCTION OF RAW TALENT NOMINATION COUNT ACROSS THREE  
421 LEVELS IN MEN.



422  
423  
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426 FIGURE S4. BAR GRAPH DEPICTING CHANGES IN TESTOSTERONE (INDEXED BY RESIDUAL  
 427 CHANGE SCORES) AS A FUNCTION OF RAW ADVICE NOMINATION COUNT ACROSS THREE  
 428 LEVELS IN MEN.



429

#### 430 MEASURING CHANGE USING SIMPLE DIFFERENCE SCORES

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431 The results presented above and in the main text focus primarily on the use of  
 432 residual change scores to measure change, with a brief discussion of supplemental results  
 433 using raw change scores (i.e., Time 2 T minus Time 1 T) as a robustness check (for a similar  
 434 approach that combines both indices, see: Knight & Mehta, 2017; Mehta & Josephs, 2006).  
 435 Before reporting and discussing a suite of additional statistical checks using the raw change  
 436 measure below, however, it is beneficial to expand upon the presentation in the main text  
 437 and remind readers how the interpretations differ for these two measures of change (also  
 438 see Hand & Taylor, 1987).

439           As noted briefly in the main text, in the present research residual gain scores  
440 express Time 2 T as a deviation from the regression line predicting Time 2 T from Time 1 T.  
441 This means that the part of between-person variability in Time 2 T is partialled out,  
442 creating a “base-free measure of change” that is unconfounded by between-person  
443 differences in Time 1 T (Cronbach & Furby, 1970; Rogosa, Brandt, & Zimowski, 1982).  
444 Positive values on the residual change variable are thus interpreted as positive deviations  
445 from expectation (Time 2 T is higher than expected given Time 1 T), whereas negative  
446 values are negative deviations from expectation (Time 2 T is lower than expected given  
447 Time 1 T; Griffin, Murray, & Gonzalez, 1999). Because this measure captures a given  
448 individual’s deviation (i.e., degree of change) from expectation *relative* to other individuals  
449 (rather than a person’s *absolute* change, as indexed by raw change), it provides “a way of  
450 singling out individuals who changed more (or less) than expected” (Cronbach & Furby,  
451 1970, p. 74). Consequently, residual scores are deemed most suitable for testing whether a  
452 trait of interest (such as status, as in our focus) is associated with change, which is  
453 precisely the kind of question in which we are interested.

454           Complicating interpretations, however, residual scores can be negative (reflecting a  
455 relatively weaker increase than expected) when the actual change in T from Time 1 to Time  
456 2 is positive, and vice-versa.<sup>1</sup> Interpretation-wise, a positive association between residual  
457 change scores and prestige would indicate that highly prestigious individuals show a  
458 *relatively* larger increase in T, compared to their less prestigious counterparts. This  
459 association on its own, however, provides no clear direct indication of how the T of

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<sup>1</sup> We thank the reviewer for the helpful suggestion to clarify the interpretation of the different measures of change employed.

460 relatively more and less prestigious individuals changed precisely. This question instead  
461 requires exploring the effect based on raw change scores.

462         By comparison, raw change scores (also called simple difference scores), which  
463 express change as the arithmetic difference between Time 2 T and Time 1 T, is more  
464 straightforward both in computation and interpretation. Intuitively, positive values on  
465 simple difference scores indicate an absolute rise in T from Time 1 to Time 2, whereas  
466 negative values indicate an absolute drop in T. Unlike the residual score approach, it  
467 indexes precisely how much an individual's T changed over time. However, despite its  
468 appeal in ease of interpretation, difference scores are less suitable than residual scores for  
469 exploring how change relates to other variables (i.e., what covaries with change, as in our  
470 interest here), given their lower reliability under many conditions, potential in confounding  
471 change with one or both variables that comprise the discrepancy index (i.e., Time 1 or Time  
472 2 T), and vulnerability to ceiling effects (Cohen, Cohen, West, & Aiken, 2003; Cronbach &  
473 Furby, 1970; Griffin et al., 1999; John & Robins, 1994; Johns, 1981; Lord, 1956; McNemar,  
474 1958; Schultheiss et al., 2005; Tucker, Damarin, & Messick, 1966). This raw change  
475 measure, on the other hand, is preferable when comparing mean change between two  
476 discrete groups (i.e., is there a difference in average change between the two populations).  
477 Given that both of these widely used approaches to capturing change have their own  
478 limitations (Burt & Obradović, 2013), although we think it is important to perform  
479 additional analyses using raw difference as robustness checks, the conclusions we draw are  
480 based on examining the convergence across both measures of change.

481 Our first set of analyses using raw change scores follow the same procedure  
482 deployed above for residual change scores, and is aimed at testing the predictive effect of  
483 each prestige index on raw change in T (as the dependent variable). We ran a series of 9  
484 models (baseline and with controls). In all specifications, we used the natural logarithm of  
485 talent nomination or advice nomination, as in the main analyses. These regression results  
486 and their corresponding simple effects are summarized in Tables S19 to S22. These results  
487 suggest that overall our qualitative conclusions about the association between prestige and  
488 T change remain robust when change is assessed using difference scores rather than  
489 residual scores. For men, each logged talent nomination predicts a significant absolute  
490 increase of roughly 1.58 to 1.84 pg/mL in T, and each logged advice nomination predicts a  
491 significant increase of 1.56 to 2.00 pg/mL in T. For women, however, models predict a  
492 much weaker and non-significant change of roughly -.05 to +.49 pg/mL for talent, and -.42  
493 to +.01 pg/mL for advice. These analyses indicate that for men, going from 0 (the 50th  
494 percentile in the community in terms of nominations received) to 5 talent nominations (the  
495 90<sup>th</sup> percentile) predicts an absolute increase in T of roughly 20.79 to 24.19 pg/mL, which  
496 is comparable to the estimated higher than expected increase of 22.81 pg/mL in the  
497 baseline model using residual change scores. Similarly, going from 0 (the 25<sup>th</sup> percentile in  
498 terms of nominations received) to 10 advice nominations (the 90<sup>th</sup> percentile) predicts a  
499 change in T of roughly 21.56 pg/mL to 27.65 pg/mL, also comparable to (though slightly  
500 weaker than) the estimated higher than expected increase of 25.70 pg/mL in the baseline  
501 model based on residual change scores.

502



503  
504

TABLE S19. OLS REGRESSIONS OF TESTOSTERONE CHANGE (INDEXED USING SIMPLE DIFFERENCE SCORES) ON TALENT NOMINATIONS.

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8	Model 9
<b>Talent Nomination</b>	1.6090** (0.0018)	1.5842** (0.0040)	1.7226** (0.0024)	1.6970** (0.0042)	1.7676** (0.0041)	1.7475** (0.0050)	1.6947** (0.0073)	1.8435** (0.0041)	1.8293** (0.0049)
<b>Gender (1 = Female)</b>	-2.7413 (0.6247)	-1.8606 (0.7825)	-1.0785 (0.8742)	1.8715 (0.8301)	0.7553 (0.9352)	3.1575 (0.7367)	4.0302 (0.6727)	2.9270 (0.7594)	2.9040 (0.7621)
<b>Gender × Talent Nomination</b>	-1.5302* (0.0288)	-1.6294* (0.0332)	-1.6834* (0.0448)	-1.6073* (0.0627)	-1.6517* (0.0624)	-1.6666* (0.0618)	-1.5283* (0.0964)	-1.3499 (0.1523)	-1.3578 (0.1518)
<b>Coercion Nomination</b>		0.0763 (0.8921)	0.4153 (0.5196)	0.3998 (0.5423)	0.4529 (0.4991)	0.4653 (0.5005)	0.5972 (0.3957)	0.5929 (0.3990)	0.5776 (0.4162)
<b>Gender × Coercion Nomination</b>		0.2133 (0.7865)	-0.0993 (0.9075)	-0.0649 (0.9403)	-0.1279 (0.8843)	-0.0970 (0.9134)	-0.2112 (0.8154)	-0.0434 (0.9625)	-0.0383 (0.9671)
<b>Popularity Nomination</b>			-0.6643 (0.2774)	-0.6619 (0.2819)	-0.6860 (0.2693)	-0.7366 (0.2440)	-0.7886 (0.2175)	-0.6341 (0.3254)	-0.6465 (0.3204)
<b>Gender × Popularity Nomination</b>			0.5027 (0.5571)	0.5649 (0.5158)	0.6020 (0.4924)	0.7791 (0.3816)	0.9151 (0.3125)	0.6251 (0.5029)	0.6278 (0.5026)
<b>Friendship Nomination (In-Coming)</b>				0.2044 (0.8753)	0.1430 (0.9135)	0.1738 (0.8951)	0.2540 (0.8507)	0.3150 (0.8160)	0.3169 (0.8155)
<b>Gender × Friendship Nomination (In-Coming)</b>				-1.3438 (0.5849)	-2.6406 (0.5959)	-2.3163 (0.6420)	-2.4342 (0.6315)	-2.4930 (0.6244)	-2.4398 (0.6335)
<b>Friendship Nomination (Out-Going)</b>					-0.5882 (0.6496)	-0.6363 (0.6232)	-0.6680 (0.6121)	-0.8397 (0.5237)	-0.8432 (0.5235)
<b>Gender × Friendship Nomination (Out-Going)</b>					1.9975 (0.6685)	1.2419 (0.7925)	1.0667 (0.8242)	2.0434 (0.6733)	1.9700 (0.6865)
<b>Age</b>						-1.4978 (0.3332)	-1.5290 (0.3417)	0.7027 (0.7139)	0.6857 (0.7218)
<b>Ethnicity: Other</b>						0.0492 (0.9981)	6.1724 (0.7685)	6.4564 (0.7596)	6.4564 (0.7596)
<b>Ethnicity: Native American</b>							15.0843 (0.2259)	16.6950 (0.1797)	16.8408 (0.1784)
<b>Ethnicity: Asian American</b>							1.9581 (0.8409)	2.1662 (0.8239)	2.1729 (0.8240)
<b>Ethnicity: African American</b>							-11.4846 (0.3156)	-6.0873 (0.6018)	-5.7161 (0.6305)
<b>Ethnicity: Hispanic American</b>							3.7885 (0.5221)	4.7954 (0.4201)	4.8808 (0.4149)
<b>Marching Band Experience</b>								-5.4840* (0.0388)	-5.5530* (0.0390)
<b>Section Leader (1 = Leader)</b>									1.6037 (0.8549)
<i>R</i> <sup>2</sup>	0.066	0.068	0.075	0.077	0.079	0.082	0.102	0.136	0.136
adj. <i>R</i> <sup>2</sup>	0.048	0.038	0.033	0.023	0.012	0.008	-0.005	0.023	0.016
<i>AIC</i>	1549.4777	1553.1707	1555.8500	1559.5049	1563.1744	1544.6851	1551.1803	1512.5621	1514.5237
<i>BIC</i>	1561.8527	1571.7332	1580.6000	1590.4424	1600.2994	1584.7434	1606.6455	1570.6308	1575.6486
<i>N</i>	163	163	163	163	163	161	161	157	157

*p*-values in parentheses.

All nomination variables used in these models have been transformed using the natural logarithm.  
The ethnicity dummies use Caucasian as the reference group, so the coefficient on each dummy variable gives effects relative to Caucasian.

\*  $p < 0.10$ , \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < .01$ , \*\*\*  $p < .001$ 505  
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TABLE S20. SIMPLE EFFECTS OF TALENT NOMINATIONS ON TESTOSTERONE CHANGE (INDEXED USING SIMPLE DIFFERENCE SCORES) IN MEN AND WOMEN

	<i>b</i>	<i>SE</i>	<i>t</i>	<i>p-value</i>	<i>.95 CI</i>	
<b>Model 1</b>						
<b>Males</b>	1.6090	0.5071	3.17	0.002	0.6075	2.6104
<b>Females</b>	0.0788	0.4733	0.17	0.868	-0.8560	1.0136
<b>Model 2</b>						
<b>Males</b>	1.5842	0.5416	2.93	0.004	0.5145	2.6538
<b>Females</b>	-0.0453	0.5310	-0.09	0.932	-1.0940	1.0035
<b>Model 3</b>						
<b>Males</b>	1.7226	0.5575	3.09	0.002	0.6213	2.8239
<b>Females</b>	0.0392	0.6175	0.06	0.949	-1.1806	1.2591
<b>Model 4</b>						

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<b>Males</b>	1.6970	0.5838	2.91	0.004	0.5437	2.8503
<b>Females</b>	0.0897	0.6277	0.14	0.887	-1.1504	1.3298
<b>Model 5</b>						
<b>Males</b>	1.7676	0.6072	2.91	0.004	0.5679	2.9674
<b>Females</b>	0.1160	0.6367	0.18	0.856	-1.1420	1.3739
<b>Model 6</b>						
<b>Males</b>	1.7475	0.6133	2.85	0.005	0.5355	2.9594
<b>Females</b>	0.0809	0.6370	0.13	0.899	-1.1779	1.3397
<b>Model 7</b>						
<b>Males</b>	1.6947	0.6223	2.72	0.007	0.4647	2.9247
<b>Females</b>	0.1664	0.6584	0.25	0.801	-1.1350	1.4678
<b>Model 8</b>						
<b>Males</b>	1.8435	0.6320	2.92	0.004	0.5939	3.0932
<b>Females</b>	0.4936	0.6815	0.72	0.470	-0.8540	1.8411
<b>Model 9</b>						
<b>Males</b>	1.8293	0.6389	2.86	0.005	0.5659	3.0928
<b>Females</b>	0.4715	0.6944	0.68	0.498	-0.9017	1.8447

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514 TABLE S21. OLS REGRESSIONS OF TESTOSTERONE CHANGE (INDEXED USING SIMPLE DIFFERENCE  
515 SCORES) ON ADVICE NOMINATIONS.

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8	Model 9
<b>Advice Nomination</b>	1.6403** (0.0062)	1.5608* (0.0115)	1.7703** (0.0061)	1.7363* (0.0109)	1.8295* (0.0106)	1.8667** (0.0095)	1.9728** (0.0078)	2.0014** (0.0077)	1.9754** (0.0089)
<b>Gender (1 = Female)</b>	0.8526 (0.8549)	1.2871 (0.8437)	2.3791 (0.7219)	4.2565 (0.6198)	3.1576 (0.7285)	4.9823 (0.5896)	5.0121 (0.5910)	4.6463 (0.6210)	4.5600 (0.6286)
<b>Gender × Advice Nomination</b>	-1.9277* (0.0180)	-1.9829* (0.0196)	-2.1769* (0.0135)	-2.0738* (0.0268)	-2.1416* (0.0278)	-2.1764* (0.0255)	-2.3042* (0.0218)	-1.9865* (0.0529)	-1.9950* (0.0526)
<b>Coercion Nomination</b>		0.3089 (0.5725)	0.6873 (0.2820)	0.6668 (0.3084)	0.7328 (0.2772)	0.8409 (0.2258)	0.9851 (0.1630)	0.9719 (0.1706)	0.9291 (0.1953)
<b>Gender × Coercion Nomination</b>		0.0787 (0.9171)	-0.2784 (0.7414)	-0.2526 (0.7685)	-0.3249 (0.7107)	-0.4005 (0.6523)	-0.5098 (0.5698)	-0.3398 (0.7115)	-0.3284 (0.7216)
<b>Popularity Nomination</b>			-0.7229 (0.2463)	-0.7178 (0.2532)	-0.7498 (0.2382)	-0.9021 (0.1677)	-0.9990 (0.1305)	-0.8420 (0.2105)	-0.8729 (0.1979)
<b>Gender × Popularity Nomination</b>			0.6596 (0.4208)	0.6952 (0.4053)	0.7398 (0.3818)	0.9983 (0.2474)	1.2710 (0.1493)	1.1125 (0.2205)	1.0968 (0.2287)
<b>Friendship Nomination (In-Coming)</b>				0.1425 (0.8699)	0.1067 (0.9152)	0.0092 (0.9365)	0.1702 (0.9947)	0.1708 (0.9023)	0.1708 (0.9022)
<b>Gender × Friendship Nomination (In-Coming)</b>				-0.9069 (0.7247)	-1.6789 (0.7473)	-1.3551 (0.7944)	-0.9718 (0.8544)	-1.5946 (0.7647)	-1.4489 (0.7866)
<b>Friendship Nomination (Out-Going)</b>					-0.6008 (0.6474)	-0.7014 (0.5933)	-0.7711 (0.5619)	-0.8318 (0.5326)	-0.8483 (0.5259)
<b>Gender × Friendship Nomination (Out-Going)</b>					1.4548 (0.7593)	0.8209 (0.8640)	0.3517 (0.9423)	1.3589 (0.7825)	1.1950 (0.8092)
<b>Age</b>						-1.4326 (0.3551)	-1.5789 (0.3253)	0.4708 (0.8069)	0.4376 (0.8209)
<b>Ethnicity: Other</b>							-6.6991 (0.7467)	-1.5761 (0.9402)	-0.7970 (0.9699)
<b>Ethnicity: Native American</b>							18.8030 (0.1369)	19.3165 (0.1277)	19.7373 (0.1217)
<b>Ethnicity: Asian American</b>							-1.7958 (0.8565)	-2.4230 (0.8084)	-2.2678 (0.8211)
<b>Ethnicity: African American</b>							-12.0526 (0.2925)	-7.7898 (0.5055)	-6.7868 (0.5697)
<b>Ethnicity: Hispanic American</b>							2.8080 (0.6295)	3.3251 (0.5715)	3.6111 (0.5425)
<b>Marching Band Experience</b>								-5.1907* (0.0563)	-5.3619* (0.0516)
<b>Section Leader (1 = Leader)</b>								3.9172 (0.6525)	3.9172 (0.6525)
<b>R<sup>2</sup></b>	0.054	0.059	0.067	0.068	0.070	0.076	0.102	0.125	0.126
<b>adj. R<sup>2</sup></b>	0.036	0.029	0.025	0.013	0.002	0.001	-0.005	0.011	0.005
<b>AIC</b>	1551.5432	1554.6391	1557.2063	1561.0732	1564.8087	1545.7192	1551.1727	1514.5009	1516.2677
<b>BIC</b>	1563.9182	1573.2016	1581.9563	1592.0107	1601.9337	1585.7774	1606.6379	1572.5696	1577.3926
<b>N</b>	163	163	163	163	163	161	161	157	157

516

p-values in parentheses.

517 Both the advice and popularity nomination variables used in these models have been transformed using the  
 518 natural logarithm.  
 519 The ethnicity dummies use Caucasian as the reference group, so the coefficient on each dummy variable gives  
 520 effects relative to Caucasian.  
 521 +  $p < 0.10$ , \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < .01$ , \*\*\*  $p < .001$   
 522

523 TABLE S22. SIMPLE EFFECTS OF ADVICE NOMINATIONS ON TESTOSTERONE CHANGE  
 524 (INDEXED USING SIMPLE DIFFERENCE SCORES) IN MEN AND WOMEN

	<i>b</i>	<i>SE</i>	<i>t</i>	<i>p-value</i>	<i>.95 CI</i>	
<b>Model 1</b>						
<b>Males</b>	1.6403	0.5915	2.77	0.006	0.4722	2.8084
<b>Females</b>	-0.2874	0.5479	-0.52	0.601	-1.3695	0.7947
<b>Model 2</b>						
<b>Males</b>	1.5608	0.6100	2.56	0.011	0.3560	2.7656
<b>Females</b>	-0.4221	0.5789	-0.73	0.467	-1.5655	0.7213
<b>Model 3</b>						
<b>Males</b>	1.7703	0.6372	2.78	0.006	0.5116	3.0289
<b>Females</b>	-0.4067	0.5942	-0.68	0.495	-1.5805	0.7672
<b>Model 4</b>						
<b>Males</b>	1.7363	0.6736	2.58	0.011	0.4055	3.0671
<b>Females</b>	-0.3375	0.6374	-0.53	0.597	-1.5968	0.9218
<b>Model 5</b>						
<b>Males</b>	1.8295	0.7074	2.59	0.011	0.4319	3.2271
<b>Females</b>	-0.3121	0.6553	-0.48	0.635	-1.6068	0.9827
<b>Model 6</b>						
<b>Males</b>	1.8667	0.7100	2.63	0.009	0.4636	3.2697
<b>Females</b>	-0.3098	0.6534	-0.47	0.636	-1.6009	0.9814
<b>Model 7</b>						
<b>Males</b>	1.9728	0.7313	2.70	0.008	0.5272	3.4184
<b>Females</b>	-0.3314	0.6705	-0.49	0.622	-1.6568	0.9940
<b>Model 8</b>						
<b>Males</b>	2.0014	0.7404	2.70	0.008	0.5374	3.4654
<b>Females</b>	0.0149	0.6980	0.02	0.983	-1.3653	1.3951
<b>Model 9</b>						
<b>Males</b>	1.9754	0.7448	2.65	0.009	0.5026	3.4481
<b>Females</b>	-0.0196	0.7042	-0.03	0.978	-1.4122	1.3729

525  
 526 Next, we conducted further analyses to examine how T changes, as indexed by  
 527 simple difference scores, varied across discretized categories of raw nomination data.  
 528 These analyses, aimed at clarifying how absolute T change (increase or decrease) varies as  
 529 a function of non-transformed nomination counts, mirror our analyses conducted above on

530 residual change scores. The means based on this measure of change are depicted in the  
531 main text in Figure 2. One-way ANOVAs reveal that mean change in T differed significantly  
532 across the three groups for both talent [ $F(3, 72) = 5.48, p = .0019, R^2 = .186$ ; shown in Panel  
533 A] and advice [ $F(3, 72) = 6.88, p = .0004, R^2 = .223$ ; shown in Panel B]. Men who received  
534 zero nomination experienced an absolute decline in T over time ( $M = -23.20$  pg/mL for  
535 talent;  $M = -28.22$  pg/mL for advice), whereas men who received 5 or more nominations  
536 experienced an increase in T ( $M = 7.26$  pg/mL for talent;  $M = 11.87$  pg/mL for advice).  
537 Follow-up mean comparisons confirmed that these means differ significantly from each  
538 other [ $F(1, 72) = 5.67, p = .0199$  for talent;  $F(1, 72) = 10.42, p = .0019$  for advice]. Taken  
539 together, our qualitative conclusions converge across the residual score and simple  
540 difference score approach to assessing change.

#### 541 MEASURING PRESTIGE USING RANKINGS

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542 In the results reported above and in the main text, position in the community's  
543 prestige-based status hierarchy as a whole was measured using the total number of  
544 nominations received. An alternative approach, which we present here, is to create a direct  
545 measure of relative rank in the community. The application of this ranking method,  
546 commonly deployed in the study of dominance relationships in non-human primate social  
547 groups living in the wild (e.g., baboons, chimpanzees; Alberts & Altmann, 1995; Archie,  
548 Altmann, & Alberts, 2012; Sapolsky, 1983), more closely maps onto the notion of a linear  
549 status hierarchy—that is, an asymmetric, connected, and transitive “pecking order”. To  
550 pursue this, we constructed a rank version of our nomination data, by sorting the number  
551 of nominations received for being the most talented and then assigning ranks, placing the

552 top ranking person first. In the case of ties—that is, two or more individuals receiving the  
553 same number of nominations—an average rank is assigned. For ease of interpretation, we  
554 then reversed this variable by multiplying by -1 so that higher scores (i.e., negative scores  
555 closer to zero) reflect highest prestige according to the community’s perception. The same  
556 procedure was repeated for all the other nomination domains (dominance, social  
557 popularity, and in-coming and out-going friendship) to create a ranking-based measure of  
558 each.

559         This ranking approach offers several advantages. First, using actual talent and  
560 advice rankings as predictors allows a direct exploration of the quantitative effect of each  
561 additional rank on testosterone changes (as opposed to the effect of each additional  
562 nomination), which renders a more readily interpretable metric. Second, it also addresses  
563 the prickly analytical challenge discussed above stemming from potential outliers—top-  
564 ranking individuals who receive an exceptionally high number of nominations.<sup>2</sup> The  
565 conversion of nomination count data into relative ranks provides an analytical workaround  
566 by making these extreme scores less extreme. Note, however, that a (potentially less than  
567 ideal) assumption introduced by rankings is that the distance between each subsequent  
568 rank is presumed equal, regardless of the actual difference in nominations received. For  
569 example, a difference of 1 nomination, or of 30 nominations (as in the case of extreme  
570 scores), can both be assigned a 1-rank difference. By contrast, rather than treat the distance  
571 between ranks as not meaningful, our nomination tally approach above emphasizes the

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<sup>2</sup> Note, however, that far from being identified in error by a few peers, individuals who receive a large number of nominations reliably reflect the community’s consensus regarding who is actively respected and admired. That is, though in a statistical sense the individual(s) with unusually high total nominations are statistical outliers, they may be considered meaningful, legitimate data points, and their inclusion is crucial for our examination of how prestige predicts endocrine responses.

572 distance between individuals. As such, given that all approaches to assessing status  
573 relationships among members within a social group have important—but different—  
574 limitations (Bernstein, 1981), we believe that our conclusions are best drawn in light of  
575 evaluating evidence emerging from different methods.

576         To examine convergence with our primary findings, we re-estimate the baseline  
577 model (i.e., Model 1 in Tables S9, S10, S19 and S21) using prestige-based rankings (instead  
578 of tallied nominations). In each case, we regress change in T on the prestige index, gender,  
579 and the interaction between prestige and gender. We present analyses for four models to  
580 explore robustness across our two ways of measuring change (residual change or raw  
581 change as the dependent variable) and two indices of prestige (talent and advice as the  
582 predictor of interest): (1) talent rank predicting residual change, (2) talent rank predicting  
583 raw change, (3) advice rank predicting residual change, and (4) advice rank predicting raw  
584 change. Results, displayed in Table S23, show that across all four specifications, the  
585 coefficient on the prestige index (which captures the simple slope in men) is positive and  
586 significant across the board, ranging from 0.14 to 0.22. Note that the coefficients denote the  
587 effect of each additional rise in rank in the community on T. As such, A 10-rank increase in  
588 prestige is associated with a higher than expected T increase of roughly 1.74 to 2.25 pg/mL  
589 (residual change), and an absolute increase of 1.39 to 2.07 pg/mL (raw change). The  
590 scatterplots for talent rank and advice rank are displayed below in Figures S5 and S6.  
591 Taken together, these analyses indicate that our primary results based on nomination  
592 count are robust to this alternate approach of mapping prestige relationships using  
593 absolute relative ranks.

594 TABLE S23. OLS REGRESSIONS OF TESTOSTERONE CHANGE (INDEXED USING EITHER  
 595 RESIDUAL OR SIMPLE DIFFERENCE SCORES) ON PRESTIGE RANKS (INDEXED USING  
 596 EITHER TALENT OR ADVICE NOMINATION RANKS).


	DV = Residual Change Prestige Index = Talent Nomination Rank (Model 1)	DV = Raw Change Prestige Index = Talent Nomination Rank (Model 2)	DV = Residual Change Prestige Index = Advice Nomination Rank (Model 3)	DV = Raw Change Prestige Index = Advice Nomination Rank (Model 4)
Prestige Index	0.2245*** (0.0003)	0.2073** (0.0023)	0.1742** (0.0045)	0.1392* (0.0385)
Gender (1 = Female)	-30.8808*** (0.0002)	-12.8681 (0.1584)	-26.7887** (0.0011)	-8.1400 (0.3628)
Gender × Prestige Index	-0.2336** (0.0054)	-0.2037* (0.0273)	-0.1835* (0.0245)	-0.1464 (0.1028)
$R^2$	0.118	0.063	0.089	0.033
adj. $R^2$	0.101	0.046	0.072	0.015
AIC	1517.6483	1549.9527	1522.8257	1555.0906
BIC	1530.0233	1562.3277	1535.2007	1567.4656
N	163	163	163	163

*p*-values in parentheses.

597 The prestige index is either talent nomination relative rank or advice nomination relative rank (indicated in  
 598 the header). That is, in Models 1 and 2, the prestige index is talent nomination rank, and in Models 3 and 4,  
 599 the prestige index is advice nomination rank. Both of these indices were computed from raw nomination  
 600 counts and reversed by multiplying by -1 so that higher values indicate higher prestige.


+  $p < 0.10$ , \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < .01$ , \*\*\*  $p < .001$

604 FIGURE S5. SCATTERPLOT OF CHANGE IN TESTOSTERONE (INDEXED USING RESIDUAL  
 605 CHANGE SCORES) AS A FUNCTION OF TALENT RANK FOR MEN AND WOMEN. THE LINE  
 606 OF BEST FIT (IN GRAY), 95% CONFIDENCE INTERVAL (IN YELLOW DASH), AND LOWESS  
 607 CURVE (IN LIGHT BLUE) FOR EACH PANEL ARE SHOWN.



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612 FIGURE S6. SCATTERPLOT OF CHANGE IN TESTOSTERONE (INDEXED USING RESIDUAL  
 613 CHANGE SCORES) AS A FUNCTION OF ADVICE RANK FOR MEN AND WOMEN. THE LINE OF  
 614 BEST FIT (IN GRAY), 95% CONFIDENCE INTERVAL (IN YELLOW DASH), AND LOWESS  
 615 CURVE (IN LIGHT BLUE) FOR EACH PANEL ARE SHOWN.



616

### 617 DOES CHANGE IN PRESTIGE PREDICT CHANGE IN TESTOSTERONE?

618 A key prediction that may be derived from the influential biosocial model of status (Mazur,  
 619 1985), which proposes that primate physiology is highly reactive to and influences status  
 620 allocation, is that changes in prestige may be associated with corresponding changes in  
 621 testosterone. The current dataset, however, does not afford an optimal test of this question, because  
 622 minimal changes in prestige standing were observed in the community. The number of nominations  
 623 received at Time 1 and Time 2 were almost perfectly correlated for both talent ( $r = .99, p < .0001$ )  
 624 and advice nominations ( $r = .97, p < .0001$ ). This indicates almost perfect stability in prestige  
 625 ranking (as assessed using the methodology employed here) across time, in that highly prestigious  
 626 individuals at Time 1 retained high prestige at Time 2. This finding is consistent with existing field  
 627 studies on groups and communities in humans and other primates, which also indicate that once  
 628 emerged status differences generally remain highly stable overtime (Anderson, John, Keltner, &  
 629 Kring, 2001; Bernstein, 1969; Bramblett, Bramblett, Bishop, & Coelho, 1982).



630 Nevertheless, while necessarily tentative given the limited changes in prestige ordering  
631 observed, we performed analyses to explore this prediction about the covariation between change  
632 in prestige and change in T. Paralleling the analyses reported in the main text, we regressed change  
633 in T on change in prestige ordering, also indexed using residual change scores that capture  
634 variation in Time 2 talent or advice nominations that are unexplained by Time 1 talent or advice,  
635 respectively. Either talent or advice nomination change was entered as the predictor in each of the  
636 two models, not together within the same model, given their moderate correlation ( $r = .27, p =$   
637  $.0005$ ). In the two models, neither the coefficient on change in talent [ $b = .33, t(156) = .22, p = .827,$   
638  $.95 \text{ CI } (-2.63, 3.29)$ ] nor that on change in advice [ $b = -.26, t(156) = -.25, p = .800, .95 \text{ CI } (-2.26, 1.74)$ ]  
639 is significant. Subsequent models additionally using gender and its interaction with indices of  
640 prestige as predictors also yield non-significant coefficients on the change in talent  $\times$  gender term  
641 [ $b = -2.73, t(154) = -.89, p = .372, .95 \text{ CI } (-8.75, 3.30)$ ] and the change in advice  $\times$  gender term [ $b = -$   
642  $.10, t(154) = -.05, p = .960, .95 \text{ CI } (-4.16, 3.96)$ ], indicating a lack of evidence for gender difference in  
643 the (null) effect of prestige change on T change.

#### 644 EXPLORING INTERACTIONS BETWEEN TESTOSTERONE AND CORTISOL

645 Much recent work has focused on the joint effects of T and cortisol (C) in  
646 coordinating dominant behaviors. This empirical phenomenon has received support in  
647 studies demonstrating that the effects of T in motivating and responding to social behavior  
648 vary across different levels of C (i.e., a T  $\times$  C interaction), typically in acute contexts  
649 spanning minutes or hours (Mehta & Josephs, 2010; Mehta, Welker, Zilioli, & Carré, 2015;  
650 Ponzi, Zilioli, Mehta, Maslov, & Watson, 2016; Sherman, Lerner, Josephs, Renshon, & Gross,  
651 2015; Zilioli & Watson, 2012), though not in some others (Mazur & Booth, 2014; for a  
652 review, see Mehta & Prasad, 2015). Our study, however, diverges from this work not only  
653 in its focus on the behavior-to-hormone link (rather than the hormone-to-behavior link),

654 but also by addressing the long-term, cumulative effect of prestige over months, which may  
 655 involve distinct processes. Moreover, theoretically, it is not clear that the effect of prestige  
 656 on changes in basal T is expected to be C-dependent. Thus, our analytic efforts focus on  
 657 isolated T effects.

658 Nevertheless, to supplement these analyses, we conducted a series of other  
 659 regression models to tentatively explore associations that may be anticipated by this  
 660 existing work on the joint effects of T and C. The first set of models explore whether T and C  
 661 interact to predict emergent prestige within the community. Table S24 below show 6  
 662 regression models using the main and interactive effects of T, C, and gender to predict our  
 663 prestige measures concurrently (hormones at Time 1 predicting prestige at Time 1, or  
 664 hormones at Time 2 predicting prestige at Time 2) or prospectively (hormones at Time 1  
 665 predicting prestige at Time 2). In all cases, except Model 2 (which predicts advice  
 666 nomination at Time 1), the coefficients on T × C and Gender × T × C terms did not reach  
 667 significance. However, even so, further analyses conducted separately on men and women  
 668 to probe the Gender × T × C interaction in Model 2 do not produce clear results. In these  
 669 subsequent models, no significant T × C interaction emerged in men [ $b = .04$ ,  $t(79) = 1.38$ ,  $p$   
 670  $= .171$ , .95 CI(-.02, .12)] or women [ $b = -.06$ ,  $t(89) = -1.60$ ,  $p = .113$ , .95 CI(-.13, .01)].

671 TABLE S24. OLS REGRESSIONS OF PRESTIGE ON TESTOSTERONE, CORTISOL, AND  
 672 TESTOSTERONE × CORTISOL INTERACTION.

	Model DV					
	Talent Nomination Time 1 (Model 1)	Advice Nomination Time 1 (Model 2)	Talent Nomination Time 2 (Model 3)	Advice Nomination Time 2 (Model 4)	Talent Nomination Time 2 (Model 5)	Advice Nomination Time 2 (Model 6)
Testosterone at Time 1	0.0367 (0.6116)	0.1140 <sup>+</sup> (0.0767)	0.0467 (0.5280)	0.0984 (0.1510)		
Log(Cortisol at Time 1)	-2.6336 (0.6125)	-6.6515 (0.1506)	-2.7425 (0.6120)	-5.9778 (0.2317)		
Testosterone at Time 1 × Log(Cortisol at Time 1)	-0.0023	0.0475	0.0028	0.0382		

	(0.9522)	(0.1717)	(0.9435)	(0.3001)		
<b>Gender (1 = Female)</b>	18.6129	24.1440*	17.7271	15.5501	45.8948	56.3581
	(0.1028)	(0.0176)	(0.1414)	(0.1619)	(0.3020)	(0.1678)
<b>Gender × Testosterone at Time 1</b>	-0.1434	-0.2114*	-0.1001	-0.0861		
	(0.1570)	(0.0194)	(0.3665)	(0.3995)		
<b>Gender × Log(Cortisol at Time 1)</b>	6.4985	11.5547*	4.0459	6.3497		
	(0.2633)	(0.0259)	(0.5038)	(0.2562)		
<b>Gender × Testosterone at Time 1 × Log(Cortisol at Time 1)</b>	-0.0375	-0.1073*	0.0200	-0.0301		
	(0.5134)	(0.0361)	(0.7438)	(0.5934)		
<b>Log(Testosterone at Time 2)</b>					8.5415	11.4183
					(0.2912)	(0.1249)
<b>Log(Cortisol at Time 2)</b>					-3.2049	-17.7731
					(0.8635)	(0.2997)
<b>Log(Testosterone at Time 2) × Log(Cortisol at Time 2)</b>					0.2714	3.9366
					(0.9471)	(0.2947)
<b>Gender × Log(Testosterone at Time 2)</b>					-9.1999	-13.1369
					(0.3587)	(0.1540)
<b>Gender × Log(Cortisol at Time 2)</b>					-0.7224	19.5817
					(0.9728)	(0.3141)
<b>Gender × Log(Testosterone at Time 2) × Log(Cortisol at Time 2)</b>					0.7533	-4.7521
					(0.8762)	(0.2852)
<b>R<sup>2</sup></b>	0.050	0.053	0.074	0.024	0.088	0.044
<b>adj. R<sup>2</sup></b>	0.010	0.014	0.031	-0.022	0.046	-0.000
<b>AIC</b>	1153.2545	1111.2752	1030.0865	1004.6452	1034.4224	1007.0685
<b>BIC</b>	1178.6184	1136.6391	1054.5873	1029.1460	1058.9736	1031.6198
<b>N</b>	176	176	158	158	159	159

*p*-values in parentheses.

The talent and advice nomination variables in these models as outcomes have been transformed using the natural logarithm.

+  $p < 0.10$ , \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < .01$ , \*\*\*  $p < .001$

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678 Our second set of models parallel those directly above and examine whether T and C  
679 interact to predict social popularity and success in building alliances, as indexed by peer-  
680 reported popularity and friendship nominations (in-coming), both of which are  
681 conceptually and empirically overlap with prestige-based status (see Table S6). As shown  
682 in Table S25 below, across all models the coefficients on T × C and Gender × T × C terms are  
683 non-significant, except for Model 2 (which predicts friendship nomination at Time 1), in  
684 which a significant T × C interaction emerged (but no gender interaction). However, further  
685 analyses conducted separately on men and women indicate only a marginally significant T  
686 × C interaction in men [ $b = .03$ ,  $t(79) = 1.59$ ,  $p = .116$ , .95 CI(-.01, .06)] but not in women [ $b$   
687 = -.004,  $t(89) = .40$ ,  $p = .692$ , .95 CI(-.02, .02)]. Note that this T × C interaction reaches  
688 statistical significance only in the combined sample (but not in either gender separately),

689 on only 1 of our 2 measures of social popularity, and has a very weak estimated effect size.

690 Given the lack of clear results here, further examination in future research is needed to

691 draw any conclusions.

692 **TABLE S25. OLS REGRESSIONS OF SOCIAL POPULARITY ON TESTOSTERONE, CORTISOL, AND**  
693 **TESTOSTERONE × CORTISOL INTERACTION.**

	<b>Model DV</b>					
	<b>Popularity Nomination Time 1 (Model 1)</b>	<b>Friendship Nomination (In-Coming) Time 1 (Model 2)</b>	<b>Popularity Nomination Time 2 (Model 3)</b>	<b>Friendship Nomination (In-Coming) Time 2 (Model 4)</b>	<b>Popularity Nomination Time 2 (Model 5)</b>	<b>Friendship Nomination (In-Coming) Time 2 (Model 6)</b>
Testosterone at Time 1	0.0115 (0.8759)	0.0613* (0.0209)	-0.0101 (0.8955)	-0.0016 (0.9170)		
Log(Cortisol at Time 1)	-2.1641 (0.6818)	-4.6681* (0.0147)	1.1746 (0.8341)	0.4586 (0.6795)		
Testosterone at Time 1 × Log(Cortisol at Time 1)	-0.0076 (0.8480)	0.0288* (0.0447)	-0.0286 (0.4894)	-0.0051 (0.5307)		
Gender (1 = Female)	12.8921 (0.2646)	11.0811** (0.0082)	15.2553 (0.2220)	0.4931 (0.8415)	35.0757 (0.4584)	12.6903 (0.1618)
Gender × Testosterone at Time 1	-0.0152 (0.8823)	-0.0605 (0.1020)	-0.1860 (0.1067)	0.0045 (0.8424)		
Gender × Log(Cortisol at Time 1)	3.5324 (0.5487)	4.8543* (0.0228)	4.9036 (0.4350)	-0.4719 (0.7040)		
Gender × Testosterone at Time 1 × Log(Cortisol at Time 1)	0.0227 (0.6970)	-0.0247 (0.2392)	-0.0628 (0.3226)	0.0118 (0.3464)		
Log(Testosterone at Time 2)					0.6112 (0.9433)	2.5058 (0.1293)
Log(Cortisol at Time 2)					4.2570 (0.8302)	-4.7207 (0.2150)
Log(Testosterone at Time 2) × Log(Cortisol at Time 2)					-0.7114 (0.8702)	1.0535 (0.2070)
Gender × Log(Testosterone at Time 2)					-9.1454 (0.3914)	-2.6094 (0.2018)
Gender × Log(Cortisol at Time 2)					7.9325 (0.7249)	3.7813 (0.3810)
Gender × Log(Testosterone at Time 2) × Log(Cortisol at Time 2)					-2.2131 (0.6675)	-0.6820 (0.4891)
<i>R</i> <sup>2</sup>	0.054	0.061	0.063	0.035	0.031	0.061
adj. <i>R</i> <sup>2</sup>	0.014	0.022	0.019	-0.010	-0.014	0.018
<i>AIC</i>	1158.5811	798.4085	1041.7183	529.8131	1054.3901	528.4633
<i>BIC</i>	1183.9450	823.7723	1066.2190	554.3138	1078.9413	553.0145
<i>N</i>	176	176	158	158	159	159

*p*-values in parentheses.

The popularity and friendship nomination variables in these models as outcomes have been transformed using the natural logarithm.

+ *p* < 0.10, \* *p* < 0.05, \*\* *p* < .01, \*\*\* *p* < .001

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699 In a third set of models, we investigated the joint effects of initial T and C at Time 1

700 in predicting relative change in T from Time to Time 2 and whether these effects may vary

701 for relatively more versus less prestigious individuals. These questions are motivated by  
702 recent laboratory studies pointing towards differential patterns of acute T change among  
703 winners and losers in competitive interactions, such that individuals with a unique high T  
704 low C profile rise in T following a win (Zilioli & Watson, 2012), and those with a high T high  
705 C profile decline in T following a defeat (Mehta & Josephs, 2010). To explore this, we  
706 regressed Time 2 T on the main effects of Time 1 T, Time 1 C, prestige-based status  
707 (indexed either by talent or advice nomination), gender, and the interaction among these  
708 variables.<sup>3</sup> Importantly, the inclusion of Time 1 T as a covariate in these models allows us  
709 to directly examine the effect of these other predictors in explaining *relative change* in T  
710 from Time 1 to Time 2 (i.e., their effects on residual T change from Time 1 to Time 2).

711 Table S26 contains the regression models examined using talent nominations, and  
712 Table S27 using advice nomination index. What is of greatest relevance here is the  
713 estimated coefficient on the Talent Nomination  $\times$  T  $\times$  C term and the Gender  $\times$  Talent  
714 Nomination  $\times$  T  $\times$  C interaction term, both of which are estimated in Model 4 in Tables S26  
715 and S27. Neither of these coefficients reached significance in the model using talent  
716 nomination ( $ps = .5450$  and  $.2177$ , respectively), whereas the model using advice  
717 nomination estimated a significant Advice Nomination  $\times$  T  $\times$  C effect [ $b = -.1428$ ,  $t(147) = -$   
718  $2.45$ ,  $p = .015$ ,  $.95$  CI $(-.26, -.03)$ ]. However, subsequent follow-up analysis aimed at further  
719 investigating this interactive effect separately for individuals with relatively high and low  
720 advice nominations (grouped in relation to the median, or the top vs. bottom 50% on this

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<sup>3</sup> Inspection reveals that raw C concentrations were skewed, and thus log-transformed. Raw T concentrations were used. To facilitate model interpretation, T and C (both at Time 1) and the prestige index (talent nomination or advice nomination) were grand-mean centered before entry into models.

721 variable) did not produce any clear, conclusive results.<sup>4</sup> We regressed Time 2 T on Time 1 T  
722 (again to capture residual change in T), Time 1 C, and the Time 1 T × Time 1 C interaction,  
723 separately for prestigious individuals in the top 50% or bottom 50% of advice nominations  
724 received. Among those who received many advice nominations, the model estimated a non-  
725 significant T × C interaction term [ $b = -.1537$ ,  $t(120) = -1.48$ ,  $p = .143$ , .95 CI(-.36, .05)].  
726 Similarly, among those who received few advice nominations, the T × C interaction term [ $b$   
727 = .0441,  $t(35) = .23$ ,  $p = .819$ , .95 CI(-.34, .43)] did not reach significance. These follow-up  
728 analyses suggest that the significant Advice Nomination × T × C interaction effect lacks  
729 robusticity.

730         Also relevant here is whether receiving prestige deference might produce variable  
731 degrees of change in T at different levels of C. A test of this question is provided by the  
732 prestige × C interaction term in the specification in Model 3. Across both indices of prestige,  
733 we found no consistent pattern indicating that C modulates the effect of perceived talent or  
734 being sought for advice on T change. As shown in Model 3 in Tables S26 and S27 below, the  
735 coefficient on neither the Time 1 C × prestige term ( $ps = .277$  and  $.091$ ) nor the gender ×  
736 Time 1 C × prestige term ( $p = .346$  and  $.372$ ) reached conventional levels of significance.  
737 This suggests that the effect of winning prestige contests on increasing testosterone in  
738 men, as reported in the main text, does not reliably vary at different levels of C.

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<sup>4</sup> Though prior work has primarily focused on acute T changes following victory and defeat in men only (e.g., Mehta & Josephs, 2010; Zilioli & Watson, 2012), the small coefficient estimated here for the Gender × Advice Nomination × Time 1 Cortisol × Time 1 T term and its non-significance suggest that in this dataset the effect of gender is minimal. Thus in our follow-up analysis presented here, we combined men and women for greater statistical power. In analyses not shown, however, we also examined T × C effects separately for men and women, and found no consistent evidence for T and C interactions in either gender.

739 TABLE S26. OLS REGRESSIONS OF TESTOSTERONE AT TIME 2 ON TESTOSTERONE AT TIME 1,  
 740 CORTISOL AT TIME 1, TESTOSTERONE × CORTISOL INTERACTION, AND TALENT NOMINATIONS.  
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	<b>Model 1</b>	<b>Model 2</b>	<b>Model 3</b>	<b>Model 4</b>
Testosterone at Time 1	0.7509*** (0.0000)	0.5055*** (0.0000)	0.4541*** (0.0000)	0.3974*** (0.0001)
Talent Nomination	0.8507* (0.0100)	1.8718*** (0.0000)	2.0701*** (0.0000)	2.1206** (0.0042)
Gender (1 = Female)		-25.8010*** (0.0000)	-30.5854*** (0.0000)	-31.7950*** (0.0000)
Gender × Talent Nomination		-1.9205** (0.0019)	-2.1536*** (0.0007)	-1.9639+ (0.0827)
Log(Cortisol at Time 1)			11.6030+ (0.0923)	16.0657 (0.1213)
Talent Nomination × Log(Cortisol at Time 1)			1.1272 (0.2767)	0.3129 (0.8519)
Gender × Log(Cortisol at Time 1)			-9.9342 (0.2059)	-9.4995 (0.4746)
Gender × Talent Nomination × Log(Cortisol at Time 1)			-1.1775 (0.3461)	-1.6168 (0.4590)
Talent Nomination × Testosterone at Time 1				-0.0033 (0.8321)
Gender × Testosterone at Time 1				0.1304 (0.4372)
Gender × Talent Nomination × Testosterone at Time 1				0.0027 (0.9178)
Log(Cortisol at Time 1) × Testosterone at Time 1				-0.0112 (0.9550)
Talent Nomination × Log(Cortisol at Time 1) × Testosterone at Time 1				0.0198 (0.5450)
Gender × Log(Cortisol at Time 1) × Testosterone at Time 1				0.1725 (0.5286)
Gender × Talent Nomination × Log(Cortisol at Time 1) × Testosterone at Time 1				-0.0553 (0.2177)
<i>R</i> <sup>2</sup>	0.606	0.666	0.676	0.684
adj. <i>R</i> <sup>2</sup>	0.601	0.658	0.659	0.652
<i>AIC</i>	1529.2946	1506.1513	1509.4752	1519.2418
<i>BIC</i>	1538.5759	1521.6201	1537.3190	1568.7418
<i>N</i>	163	163	163	163

742 *p*-values in parentheses.

743 The talent nomination and cortisol variables have been transformed using the natural logarithm and  
 744 subsequently grand-mean centered. Raw testosterone (without transformation) is also grand-mean centered.

745 + *p* < 0.10, \* *p* < 0.05, \*\* *p* < .01, \*\*\* *p* < .001

746 TABLE S27. OLS REGRESSIONS OF TESTOSTERONE AT TIME 2 ON TESTOSTERONE AT TIME 1,  
 747 CORTISOL AT TIME 1, TESTOSTERONE × CORTISOL INTERACTION, AND ADVICE NOMINATIONS.

	<b>Model 1</b>	<b>Model 2</b>	<b>Model 3</b>	<b>Model 4</b>
Testosterone at Time 1	0.7461*** (0.0000)	0.4948*** (0.0000)	0.4431*** (0.0000)	0.4631*** (0.0000)
Advice Nomination	0.8020* (0.0370)	2.0963*** (0.0001)	2.4657*** (0.0000)	2.8447*** (0.0007)
Gender (1 = Female)		-26.8580*** (0.0000)	-30.8479*** (0.0000)	-27.7432*** (0.0002)
Gender × Advice Nomination		-2.0319** (0.0044)	-2.2598** (0.0033)	-3.5933* (0.0198)
Log(Cortisol at Time 1)			2.9760 (0.6704)	3.9968 (0.6917)
Advice Nomination × Log(Cortisol at Time 1)			2.4503+ (0.0912)	7.2704** (0.0022)
Gender × Log(Cortisol at Time 1)			-0.8070 (0.9207)	1.2324 (0.9270)
Gender × Advice Nomination × Log(Cortisol at Time 1)			-1.4648 (0.3716)	-7.5553* (0.0259)

Advice Nomination × Testosterone at Time 1				-0.0048 (0.8194)
Gender × Testosterone at Time 1				0.1245 (0.4748)
Gender × Advice Nomination × Testosterone at Time 1				-0.0201 (0.5989)
Log(Cortisol at Time 1) × Testosterone at Time 1				0.0680 (0.7395)
Advice Nomination × Log(Cortisol at Time 1) × Testosterone at Time 1				-0.1428* (0.0154)
Gender × Log(Cortisol at Time 1) × Testosterone at Time 1				0.0408 (0.8867)
Gender × Advice Nomination × Log(Cortisol at Time 1) × Testosterone at Time 1				0.1155 (0.1289)
<i>R</i> <sup>2</sup>	0.600	0.663	0.674	0.698
adj. <i>R</i> <sup>2</sup>	0.595	0.655	0.657	0.667
<i>AIC</i>	1531.6275	1507.5018	1510.0763	1511.9488
<i>BIC</i>	1540.9087	1522.9705	1537.9201	1561.4488
<i>N</i>	163	163	163	163

748 *p*-values in parentheses.  
749 The advice nomination and cortisol variables have been transformed using the natural logarithm and  
750 subsequently grand-mean centered. Raw testosterone (without transformation) is also grand-mean centered.  
751 \*  $p < 0.10$ , \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < .01$ , \*\*\*  $p < .001$   
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754 Together, across these three sets of analyses, no reliable evidence of T × C  
755 interactions were obtained in predicting the effective acquisition of prestige-based status,  
756 social popularity, or inter-individual change in T from Time 1 to Time 2. However, in  
757 performing these analyses, we were concerned about statistical power and our ability to  
758 accurately estimate and detect any interactive effects in the current data, including any T ×  
759 C effects. Despite our sample size being relatively sizable for field studies of T and C, these  
760 data still afford relatively limited statistical power for tests of interactions, especially in the  
761 models that contain up to 15 predictors. In this respect, the limitation of small samples,  
762 which bedevils existing work on T and status (Geniole, Bird, Ruddick, & Carré, 2017;  
763 Salvador & Costa, 2009; van Anders & Watson, 2006), also applies to this and other studies  
764 that examine T × C effects (e.g., Mehta & Josephs, 2010; Zilioli & Watson, 2012). In future  
765 work we aim to conduct more well-powered tests of T and C interactions with these  
766 considerations in mind.



## EFFECTS OF DISAGGREGATED INDIVIDUAL TESTOSTERONE MEASURES.

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768 As described in our main text, we obtained two saliva samples at Time 1, one  
769 directly before the band rehearsal at approximately 3pm, and one immediately after the  
770 rehearsal at approximately 6pm. This procedure was repeated roughly 2 months later, at  
771 Time 2. This design yields 4 salivary T measures: Time 1 pre-rehearsal, Time 1 post-  
772 rehearsal, Time 2 pre-rehearsal, and Time 2 post-rehearsal. For the main theoretical  
773 findings in the main text and above, we examined T change using the within-day aggregate  
774 T measure (i.e., the mean across pre- and post-rehearsal T) from Time 1 to Time 2.

775 Use of this daily average measure rather than individual (pre- and post-rehearsal)  
776 assays is justified on the grounds of measurement accuracy and reliability. In terms of  
777 accuracy, our composite measure, which aggregates T release over two sampling times that  
778 span several hours, averages out noise introduced by T's diurnal rhythm. Although T  
779 follows a general rhythm that peaks in the morning and declines over the course of the day  
780 (dramatically before noon and more slowly in the afternoon and evening), individuals  
781 differ, however, in their specific rate of decline. This means that T concentrations at 3pm  
782 imperfectly predicts levels at 6pm, and each measurement provides some amount of  
783 unique, non-overlapping information. Thus, the average of T release at 3pm and 6pm ought  
784 to provide a more accurate picture of people's T release than each individual value. In  
785 addition, by aggregating pre- and post-rehearsal, we also average out noise resulting from  
786 the experience of events that occur. For example, we suspect that a variety of factors and  
787 events that occur during our band rehearsal context—be it the mere act of being a part of a  
788 social group, interactions with peers, engagement with the marching and musical activities,  
789 competitive mindset whilst rehearsing for an upcoming marching competition or

790 performance, or the mere anticipation of these events—may modulate T release. Past work  
791 has, in fact, shown that simply attending a sports event as a spectator and vicariously  
792 observing competition can lead to changes in T (Bernhardt, Dabbs Jr, Fielden, & Lutter,  
793 1998). This suggests that relying on a single sample of either pre or post-rehearsal T levels  
794 might introduce noise and skew results.

795         In terms of reliability, existing research in neuroendocrinology indicates that,  
796 compared to single sample disaggregated analytic methods, the aggregation approach  
797 should be used whenever possible to derive more reliable assessments of inter-individual  
798 variation in endocrine activity (and by implication, hormone change; Dariotis, Chen, &  
799 Granger, 2016; Gunnar, 2001; Hellhammer et al., 2007; Pruessner et al., 1997). Given that it  
800 is these measures of T at each time point from which our measure of change in T  
801 subsequently derive, we expect reliability to be an especially crucial consideration here  
802 given that, complicating matters even further, change scores are critiqued for being  
803 generally less reliable than the component variables (i.e., Time 1 and Time 2 T; Allison,  
804 1990; Kessler, 1977; Rogosa & Willett, 1983). This means that using reliable Time 1 and  
805 Time 2 T measures is crucial for obtaining the most reliable T change measure possible.  
806 Thus, as in a number of studies of T (e.g., Cadoux-Hudson, Few, & Imms, 1985; Granger et  
807 al., 2003; Granger, Shirtcliff, Booth, Kivlighan, & Schwartz, 2004; Johnsen & Zuk, 1995;  
808 Welling et al., 2008), we used T aggregates by averaging pre- and post-rehearsal  
809 concentrations to maximize the reliability of our Time 1 and Time 2 measures of T, with the  
810 aim of increasing the reliability of the Time 1 to Time 2 change in T measure that we are  
811 ultimately seeking to explain.

812           Nevertheless, with these limitations of single time-point assessments in mind, we  
813 explored patterns of prestige-dependent changes in T based on individual T assays by  
814 performing regression analyses parallel to those above using 5 additional ways of  
815 examining T change (using disaggregated T measures): (1) pre- to post-rehearsal at Time 1  
816 (acute changes in T during band practice at Time 1; no Time 2 data); (2) pre- to post-  
817 rehearsal at Time 2 (acute changes in T during band practice at Time 2; no Time 1 data);  
818 (3) pre-rehearsal at Time 1 to pre-rehearsal at Time 2 (longitudinal change; no post-  
819 rehearsal data); (4) post-rehearsal at Time 1 to post-rehearsal at Time 2 (longitudinal  
820 change; no pre-rehearsal data); and relatedly (5) post-rehearsal at Time 1 (controlling for  
821 pre-rehearsal) to post-rehearsal at Time 2 (controlling for pre-rehearsal). In all models, the  
822 specified form of T change is regressed onto our prestige index, gender, and the prestige ×  
823 gender interaction, and the suite of control variables deployed above. For brevity, we  
824 present and discuss the specification with the full set of controls (the specification in Model  
825 9 from Tables S9, S10, S19, and S21).

826           Tables S28-S32 show, for each of the 5 change time points modeled (1-5 described  
827 above, in order), a series of regression models using the prestige index (either talent or  
828 advice, and either nomination count or rank) to predict residual or raw change scores. In  
829 the models addressing same-day, relatively acute T changes from pre- to post-rehearsal  
830 (outcomes 1 and 2), no prestige effects were significant at conventional levels for any  
831 specification using outcomes (1) and (2), which address prestige-dependent acute changes  
832 in T occurring over the course of band practice, with two exceptions. That is, in Table S29  
833 Models 3 and 4, advice nomination counts significantly predicts both residual and raw  
834 change from pre- to post-rehearsal at Time 2 (outcome 2; *ps* = .010 and .031), but this

835 effect is far from reaching significance in the other specifications using the talent  
836 nomination count index or any of the prestige nomination count indices (talent or advice).  
837 Together, these results indicate that acute T responses occurring over the course of the  
838 band rehearsal is unlikely to be responsible for our major findings.

839         In models addressing longitudinal T changes from Time 1 to Time 2, a clear and  
840 consistent pattern of results emerged in the models predicting post-rehearsal T (outcome  
841 4; Table S31). In all specifications, the coefficient on prestige was significant and significant  
842 across the board (the only exception was the marginal effect in Model 8,  $p = .121$ ). These  
843 results are consistent with our primary findings reported in the main text and above based  
844 on aggregate measures of T. Outcome 5 (in Table S32) is similar to outcome 4 but differs in  
845 that here pre-rehearsal levels were partialled from post-rehearsal levels at both Time 1 and  
846 Time 2. This measure of longitudinal change allows us to conduct a preliminary exploration  
847 of whether our major finding can be alternatively explained by an acute within-day T  
848 increase from pre- to post-rehearsal that might be stronger among more prestigious  
849 individuals at Time 2 compared to Time 1—a question not addressed by outcome 4  
850 because the post-rehearsal T longitudinal change measure examined there partly reflects  
851 any ongoing T activity pre-rehearsal. Results across models using outcome 5 show that the  
852 prestige effect largely evaporates when pre-rehearsal inter-individual variability is  
853 removed. The coefficient on prestige (indicating the simple slope in men) reaches  
854 significance in only 1 of the 8 specifications examined. Model 3 gives the prestige  
855 coefficient as 1.62 ( $p = .032$ ), but in the remaining specifications the coefficient ranges from  
856 .01 ( $p = .891$ ) to 1.33 ( $p = .186$ ). The absence of a consistent significant effect of prestige in  
857 these models predicting outcome 5, combined with the null effects in models predicting

858 outcomes 1 and 2 above, suggests that within-day acute changes in T and how they change  
859 longitudinally over time are unlikely to be responsible for our pattern of results.

860 Finally, in the models predicting pre-rehearsal T change across time (outcome 3;  
861 Table S30), however, the coefficient on prestige, despite being positive, did not reach  
862 significance. The models estimate the coefficient on our prestige index to be 0.89 and 0.68  
863 ( $ps = .137$  and  $.237$ ) for the talent and advice nomination count measures, respectively, in  
864 predicting residual change.

865 Overall, these analyses indicate that, using single time-point T assessments, the  
866 pattern of results was strongest for longitudinal (i.e., Time 1 to Time 2) post-rehearsal  
867 change and consistent with our primary results based on aggregated T measures. Though  
868 the results for pre-rehearsal change were in the expected direction, they are weaker and  
869 did not reach conventional levels of significance.

870 Note that, in our view, although these associations and comparisons of change  
871 across different time points are interesting, we emphasize that, independent of these  
872 results, as mentioned above there are reasons to expect the lowered accuracy and  
873 reliability of these single time-point T assessments (and the resultant T change measure) to  
874 work against the detection of trends. It is interesting to note, however, that the absence of a  
875 robust association between prestige and pre- to post-rehearsal T change at either Time 1  
876 or Time 2 provides suggestive evidence that acute, same-day changes are unlikely to  
877 explain our general findings. Nevertheless, our view is that these results should be treated  
878 as tentative. Future work should examine these effects (i.e., same-day acute T changes)  
879 using multiple hormone assessments to better capture endocrine activity.

880 TABLE S28. OLS REGRESSIONS OF TESTOSTERONE CHANGE FROM PRE- TO POST-  
 881 REHEARSAL AT TIME 1-ONLY ON PRESTIGE. THESE MODELS INCLUDE ADDITIONAL  
 882 CONTROL VARIABLES (OTHER NOMINATION VARIABLES—COERCION INDEX,  
 883 POPULARITY INDEX, FRIENDSHIP IN-COMING INDEX, FRIENDSHIP OUT-GOING INDEX—  
 884 AND EACH OF THEIR INTERACTION WITH GENDER, AND AGE, ETHNICITY, MARCHING  
 885 BAND EXPERIENCE, AND SECTION LEADERSHIP STATUS).

	DV = Residual Change Prestige Index = Talent Nominations Received (Model 1)	DV = Raw Change Prestige Index = Talent Nominations Received (Model 2)	DV = Residual Change Prestige Index = Advice Nominations Received (Model 3)	DV = Raw Change Prestige Index = Advice Nominations Received (Model 4)	DV = Residual Change Prestige Index = Talent Nomination Rank (Model 5)	DV = Raw Change Prestige Index = Talent Nomination Rank (Model 6)	DV = Residual Change Prestige Index = Advice Nomination Rank (Model 7)	DV = Raw Change Prestige Index = Advice Nomination Rank (Model 8)
Prestige Index	-0.1178 (0.8752)	-0.5010 (0.6464)	0.5494 (0.5384)	-0.0989 (0.9393)	-0.0813 (0.4596)	-0.1338 (0.4041)	-0.0470 (0.7213)	-0.1331 (0.4888)
Gender (1 = Female)	-33.2631** (0.0034)	2.2928 (0.8879)	-31.5885** (0.0041)	4.2791 (0.7865)	-42.4672** (0.0034)	4.1920 (0.8406)	-43.2788** (0.0026)	2.7514 (0.8939)
Gender x Prestige Index	-0.1128 (0.9179)	0.6801 (0.6691)	0.4939 (0.6740)	1.8048 (0.2913)	0.0153 (0.9245)	0.1227 (0.6021)	-0.0464 (0.7944)	0.1204 (0.6430)
N	165	165	165	165	165	165	165	165

886 *p*-values in parentheses.  
 887 Index variables (derived from nominations) are either nomination counts received or relative ranking, and in  
 888 all cases are consistent with the prestige index deployed in that model. That is, in Models 1-4, all indices  
 889 derived from nomination data are log-transformed nomination counts, and in Models 5-8, all indices used are  
 890 assigned relative ranks (reversed) computed from raw nomination counts. All nomination count received  
 891 variables were log-transformed to reduce skew, and all relative ranking variables were reversed by  
 892 multiplying by -1 so that higher values indicate higher prestige.  
 893 The ethnicity dummies use Caucasian as the reference group, so the coefficient on each dummy variable gives  
 894 effects relative to Caucasian.  
 895 +  $p < 0.10$ , \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < .01$ , \*\*\*  $p < .001$

896 TABLE S29. OLS REGRESSIONS OF TESTOSTERONE CHANGE FROM PRE- TO POST-  
 897 REHEARSAL AT TIME 2-ONLY ON PRESTIGE. THESE MODELS INCLUDE ADDITIONAL  
 898 CONTROL VARIABLES (OTHER NOMINATION VARIABLES—COERCION INDEX,  
 899 POPULARITY INDEX, FRIENDSHIP IN-COMING INDEX, FRIENDSHIP OUT-GOING INDEX—  
 900 AND EACH OF THEIR INTERACTION WITH GENDER, AND AGE, ETHNICITY, MARCHING  
 901 BAND EXPERIENCE, AND SECTION LEADERSHIP STATUS).

	DV = Residual Change Prestige Index = Talent Nominations Received (Model 1)	DV = Raw Change Prestige Index = Talent Nominations Received (Model 2)	DV = Residual Change Prestige Index = Advice Nominations Received (Model 3)	DV = Raw Change Prestige Index = Advice Nominations Received (Model 4)	DV = Residual Change Prestige Index = Talent Nomination Rank (Model 5)	DV = Raw Change Prestige Index = Talent Nomination Rank (Model 6)	DV = Residual Change Prestige Index = Advice Nomination Rank (Model 7)	DV = Raw Change Prestige Index = Advice Nomination Rank (Model 8)
Prestige Index	0.6455 (0.3254)	0.4454 (0.5110)	1.8911* (0.0104)	1.6478* (0.0312)	0.0007 (0.9939)	-0.0240 (0.8048)	0.1312 (0.2158)	0.1064 (0.3341)
Gender (1 = Female)	-14.9945 (0.1223)	-8.6184 (0.3886)	-15.1956* (0.0937)	-9.1121 (0.3321)	-18.7250 (0.1138)	-10.4254 (0.3947)	-17.9160 (0.1222)	-9.8241 (0.4138)
Gender x Prestige Index	-0.3939 (0.6779)	-0.1712 (0.8613)	-0.4967 (0.6230)	-0.2404 (0.8189)	-0.0382 (0.7781)	-0.0076 (0.9571)	-0.0518 (0.7270)	-0.0194 (0.9001)
N	148	148	148	148	148	148	148	148

902 *p*-values in parentheses.  
 903 Index variables (derived from nominations) are either log-transformed nomination counts or relative  
 904 ranking, and in all cases are consistent with the prestige index deployed in that model. That is, in Models 1-4,  
 905 all indices derived from nomination data are log-transformed nomination counts, and in Models 5-8, all  
 906 indices used are assigned relative ranks computed from raw nomination counts.  
 907 The ethnicity dummies use Caucasian as the reference group, so the coefficient on each dummy variable gives  
 908 effects relative to Caucasian.  
 909 +  $p < 0.10$ , \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < .01$ , \*\*\*  $p < .001$

910

911 TABLE S30. OLS REGRESSIONS OF TESTOSTERONE CHANGE PRE-REHEARSAL FROM TIME  
 912 1 TO TIME 2 ON PRESTIGE (NO POST-REHEARSAL DATA). THESE MODELS INCLUDE  
 913 ADDITIONAL CONTROL VARIABLES (OTHER NOMINATION VARIABLES—COERCION  
 914 INDEX, POPULARITY INDEX, FRIENDSHIP IN-COMING INDEX, FRIENDSHIP OUT-GOING  
 915 INDEX—AND EACH OF THEIR INTERACTION WITH GENDER, AND AGE, ETHNICITY,  
 916 MARCHING BAND EXPERIENCE, AND SECTION LEADERSHIP STATUS).

	DV = Residual Change	DV = Raw Change	DV = Residual Change	DV = Raw Change	DV = Residual Change	DV = Raw Change	DV = Residual Change	DV = Raw Change
	Prestige Index = Talent Nominations Received (Model 1)	Prestige Index = Talent Nominations Received (Model 2)	Prestige Index = Advice Nominations Received (Model 3)	Prestige Index = Advice Nominations Received (Model 4)	Prestige Index = Talent Nomination Rank (Model 5)	Prestige Index = Talent Nomination Rank (Model 6)	Prestige Index = Advice Nomination Rank (Model 7)	Prestige Index = Advice Nomination Rank (Model 8)
Prestige Index	0.8887 (0.1368)	0.7772 (0.2367)	0.6813 (0.3244)	0.4212 (0.5792)	0.1369 (0.1224)	0.1308 (0.1770)	-0.0092 (0.9299)	-0.0580 (0.6113)
Gender (1 = Female)	-7.1822 (0.4191)	8.1107 (0.4075)	-6.6883 (0.4380)	8.1796 (0.3887)	-6.6507 (0.5652)	14.5375 (0.2517)	-6.6066 (0.5661)	14.0690 (0.2642)
Gender × Prestige Index	-0.6184 (0.4769)	-0.4136 (0.6656)	-1.3316 (0.1676)	-1.2283 (0.2467)	-0.0755 (0.5610)	-0.0442 (0.7555)	-0.0622 (0.6720)	-0.0205 (0.8983)
N	147	147	147	147	147	147	147	147

917

*p*-values in parentheses.

918

918 Index variables (derived from nominations) are either log-transformed nomination counts or relative  
 919 ranking, and in all cases are consistent with the prestige index deployed in that model. That is, in Models 1-4,  
 920 all indices derived from nomination data are log-transformed nomination counts, and in Models 5-8, all  
 921 indices used are assigned relative ranks computed from raw nomination counts.

922

922 The ethnicity dummies use Caucasian as the reference group, so the coefficient on each dummy variable gives  
 923 effects relative to Caucasian.

924

+  $p < 0.10$ , \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < .01$ , \*\*\*  $p < .001$

925 TABLE S31. OLS REGRESSIONS OF TESTOSTERONE CHANGE POST-REHEARSAL FROM  
 926 TIME 1 TO TIME 2 ON PRESTIGE (NO PRE-REHEARSAL SAMPLE). THESE MODELS  
 927 INCLUDE ADDITIONAL CONTROL VARIABLES (OTHER NOMINATION VARIABLES—  
 928 COERCION INDEX, POPULARITY INDEX, FRIENDSHIP IN-COMING INDEX, FRIENDSHIP  
 929 OUT-GOING INDEX—AND EACH OF THEIR INTERACTION WITH GENDER, AND AGE,  
 930 ETHNICITY, MARCHING BAND EXPERIENCE, AND SECTION LEADERSHIP STATUS).

	DV = Residual Change	DV = Raw Change	DV = Residual Change	DV = Raw Change	DV = Residual Change	DV = Raw Change	DV = Residual Change	DV = Raw Change
	Prestige Index = Talent Nominations Received (Model 1)	Prestige Index = Talent Nominations Received (Model 2)	Prestige Index = Advice Nominations Received (Model 3)	Prestige Index = Advice Nominations Received (Model 4)	Prestige Index = Talent Nomination Rank (Model 5)	Prestige Index = Talent Nomination Rank (Model 6)	Prestige Index = Advice Nomination Rank (Model 7)	Prestige Index = Advice Nomination Rank (Model 8)
Prestige Index	2.4936** (0.0011)	2.5332** (0.0044)	3.3448** (0.0002)	3.0037** (0.0041)	0.3148** (0.0043)	0.3469** (0.0074)	0.2776* (0.0327)	0.2370 (0.1209)
Gender (1 = Female)	-26.4960* (0.0167)	-1.0332 (0.9355)	-23.7155* (0.0258)	1.4407 (0.9081)	-35.4224* (0.0109)	-3.7535 (0.8163)	-32.1235* (0.0209)	-0.1275 (0.9937)
Gender × Prestige Index	-1.9674* (0.0729)	-1.7863 (0.1615)	-2.5185* (0.0325)	-2.5257* (0.0695)	-0.3062* (0.0549)	-0.2933 (0.1170)	-0.1538 (0.3799)	-0.0675 (0.7437)
N	154	154	154	154	154	154	154	154

931

*p*-values in parentheses.

932

932 Index variables (derived from nominations) are either log-transformed nomination counts or relative  
 933 ranking, and in all cases are consistent with the prestige index deployed in that model. That is, in Models 1-4,  
 934 all indices derived from nomination data are log-transformed nomination counts, and in Models 5-8, all  
 935 indices used are assigned relative ranks computed from raw nomination counts.

936

936 The ethnicity dummies use Caucasian as the reference group, so the coefficient on each dummy variable gives  
 937 effects relative to Caucasian.

938

+  $p < 0.10$ , \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < .01$ , \*\*\*  $p < .001$

939

940 TABLE S32. OLS REGRESSIONS OF TESTOSTERONE CHANGE POST-REHEARSAL FROM  
 941 TIME 1 TO TIME 2 ON PRESTIGE (CONTROLLING FOR PRE-REHEARSAL TESTOSTERONE).  
 942 THESE MODELS INCLUDE ADDITIONAL CONTROL VARIABLES (OTHER NOMINATION  
 943 VARIABLES—COERCION INDEX, POPULARITY INDEX, FRIENDSHIP IN-COMING INDEX,  
 944 FRIENDSHIP OUT-GOING INDEX—AND EACH OF THEIR INTERACTION WITH GENDER,  
 945 AND AGE, ETHNICITY, MARCHING BAND EXPERIENCE, AND SECTION LEADERSHIP  
 946 STATUS).

	DV = Residual Change	DV = Raw Change	DV = Residual Change	DV = Raw Change	DV = Residual Change	DV = Raw Change	DV = Residual Change	DV = Raw Change
	Prestige Index = Talent Nominations Received (Model 1)	Prestige Index = Talent Nominations Received (Model 2)	Prestige Index = Advice Nominations Received (Model 3)	Prestige Index = Advice Nominations Received (Model 4)	Prestige Index = Talent Nominations Rank (Model 5)	Prestige Index = Talent Nominations Rank (Model 6)	Prestige Index = Advice Nominations Rank (Model 7)	Prestige Index = Advice Nominations Rank (Model 8)
Prestige Index	0.4974 (0.4471)	1.0747 (0.2083)	1.6217* (0.0317)	1.3282 (0.1861)	0.0126 (0.8912)	0.1547 (0.2149)	0.0921 (0.3846)	0.0973 (0.4980)
Gender (1 = Female)	-9.6437 (0.3095)	18.2682 (0.1404)	-9.6840 (0.2786)	19.4429 (0.1052)	-13.2463 (0.2620)	19.2364 (0.2278)	-12.2406 (0.2914)	21.3241 (0.1761)
Gender × Prestige Index	-0.1032 (0.9125)	-0.2729 (0.8236)	-0.3606 (0.7229)	-0.4936 (0.7170)	-0.0217 (0.8712)	-0.0790 (0.6620)	0.0084 (0.9548)	0.0997 (0.6187)
N	144	144	144	144	144	144	144	144

947 *p*-values in parentheses.  
 948 Index variables (derived from nominations) are either log-transformed nomination counts or relative  
 949 ranking, and in all cases are consistent with the prestige index deployed in that model. That is, in Models 1-4,  
 950 all indices derived from nomination data are log-transformed nomination counts, and in Models 5-8, all  
 951 indices used are assigned relative ranks computed from raw nomination counts.  
 952 The ethnicity dummies use Caucasian as the reference group, so the coefficient on each dummy variable gives  
 953 effects relative to Caucasian.  
 954 +  $p < 0.10$ , \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < .01$ , \*\*\*  $p < .001$   
 955

## 956 EXTENDED DISCUSSION

### 957 PRIOR EVIDENCE SUPPORTS NOTION THAT A HORMONAL PROFILE OF HIGH- 958 RANK (I.E., A STRONG TESTOSTERONE-SOCIAL RANK LINK) IS UNLIKELY

959 A review of the relevant empirical literature reveals that, as in the present dataset,  
 960 the association between T and indices of emergent rank (whether imposed through force,  
 961 merit, or a mix of the two) tends to be weak or null in most studies, casting serious doubt  
 962 on any robust and straightforward link between the two. Despite some early findings that T  
 963 is positively (albeit weakly) correlated with rank in many species, including non-human  
 964 male primates (Rose, Holaday, & Bernstein, 1971), most subsequent studies have  
 965 generated conflicting results (Eaton & Resko, 1974; Gordon, Rose, & Bernstein, 1976; for a  
 966 review, see Sapolsky, 1991). Most studies of humans have similarly produced null



967 associations. In personality research, T is found to be uncorrelated with trait dominance,  
968 assertiveness, competitiveness, and other status-relevant traits that serve as proxies to  
969 individuals' rank experiences in their everyday social relationships (Akinola, Page-Gould,  
970 Mehta, & Lu, 2016; Dabbs Jr., Hopper, & Jurkovic, 1990; Johnson, Burk, & Kirkpatrick, 2007;  
971 Josephs, Sellers, Newman, & Mehta, 2006; Slatcher, Mehta, & Josephs, 2011; van der Meij,  
972 Buunk, van de Sande, & Salvador, 2008). Moreover, confirming these findings, a recent  
973 meta-analysis reveals the lack of any straightforward effect of T on trait dominance and  
974 rank and power in real-world situations (van der Meij, Schaveling, & van Vugt, 2016).

975         In perhaps the most relevant study that assessed actual rank distributions in small  
976 laboratory groups (Mazur, Welker, & Peng, 2015), groups of three men took part in a  
977 leaderless, unguided 10-minute conversation. Emergent rank and leadership—as  
978 measured by a combination of variables including speaking time and group members'  
979 nominations of who led the group—was not found to be significantly associated with basal  
980 T assessed either pre- or post-interaction, even in groups for which high rank is rewarded  
981 with monetary incentives (paralleling the evolutionary incentives to high-ranking  
982 individuals). Finally, in a field study of male executives, similarly no straightforward  
983 associations emerged between T and rank; those who manage and supervise a greater  
984 number of subordinates, which indicates achieving higher rank in the modern workplace,  
985 were not found to have a higher basal T, though they appear to possess a unique hormonal  
986 profile of high T and low cortisol (Sherman et al., 2015).

987         In light of this existing evidence, our finding in this dataset—that at Time 1 (that is,  
988 in the initial weeks of the group's formation) the observed associations between T and our  
989 measures of prestige, despite being in the positive direction, were modest and did not

990 reach conventional levels of significance ( $r_s = .13$  and  $.16$  for talent and advice nominations,  
991 respectively)—is not only non-surprising, but in fact anticipated by prior work. Our results  
992 add to and complement this existing body of evidence, which together challenge the folk  
993 wisdom and notion that there exists a single, robust physiological determinant (or a set of  
994 determinants) of rank in primates (Eisenegger, Naef, Snozzi, Heinrichs, & Fehr, 2010;  
995 Knight & Mehta, 2017; Sapolsky, 1991; Whitten, 2000).

996 **WHY HAS TESTOSTERONE AT TIME 1 NOT RISEN IN RESPONSE TO**  
997 **CONCURRENT OR PRE-EXISTING PRESTIGE STANDING?**

---

998 Our results reveal that, consistent with our primary finding of a rising T profile  
999 among highly prestigious men, prestige standing at Time 1 prospectively predicts T  
1000 concentrations at Time 2 in men, but is not concurrently associated with T at Time 1  
1001 (though it trends in the predicted positive direction) in either men or women. This pattern  
1002 opens up the question of why, prestige-based rank in the initial weeks of the group's  
1003 formation is capable of modulating T reactivity patterns two months later, but its effect on  
1004 T is not already detectable in these initial weeks? That is, why hasn't prestige experience in  
1005 the first weeks already led to spikes in T to produce a correlation between Time 1 prestige  
1006 and T? One potential explanation for these observed results is the issue of (lack of) time. In  
1007 this large organization of over 200 individuals, figuring out the one's position in the local  
1008 prestige hierarchy requires, among many other things, the time and opportunity to  
1009 repeatedly interact with other group members, observe the deference signals directed from  
1010 others toward the self, and refine and update one's assessment of the broader distribution  
1011 of deference in the local group and one's position vis-à-vis this hierarchy. Thus, in these  
1012 initial weeks during which individuals are still likely accumulating information about the

1013 emerging prestige hierarchy and performing cognitive assessments of their own standing  
 1014 within, any endocrine changes in response to experiences at this time are expected to be  
 1015 minimal.

1016 A related question is whether, among the returning band members (who constitute  
 1017 approximately 62% of our sample; see Table S19 below for frequency breakdown of  
 1018 marching band experience), T at the start of the current season (i.e., Time 1) has already  
 1019 risen among the more prestigious men, who might have also enjoyed high prestige in their  
 1020 former community in the year prior (perhaps as a result of their superior musical skills,  
 1021 knowledge, talent, or other relatively stable, locally valued attributes). We find no evidence  
 1022 that this is the case; among returning male members ( $n = 49$ ), Time 1 T is uncorrelated  
 1023 with talent ( $r = .10$ ;  $p = .4831$ ) or advice ( $r = .15$ ;  $p = .2913$ ) nominations. Note, however,  
 1024 that this test only makes sense if prestige at Time 1 in the current community indeed tracks  
 1025 prestige in the community prior, an empirical question that we lack data from prior band  
 1026 seasons to evaluate. Thus, any interpretation of these results must remain tentative.

1027 TABLE S33. DESCRIPTIVE SUMMARY OF MARCHING BAND EXPERIENCE (IN YEARS) IN  
 1028 POOLED SAMPLE.

<b>Marching Band Experience (years, including the current)</b>	<b>Frequency</b>	<b>Percent</b>	<b>Cumulative Percent</b>
1	61	34.46	34.46
2	50	28.25	62.71
3	37	20.9	83.62
4	13	7.34	90.96
5	7	3.95	94.92
6	2	1.13	96.05
Unknown (not reported)	7	3.95	100
<b>Total</b>	<b>177</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>-</b>

1029

1030

1031           We suspect that, even if continuity exists in men's prestige from year to year (and by  
1032 implication, band to band), elevations in T experienced by returning members who earned  
1033 substantial prestige in the previous community are expected to have largely waned in the  
1034 summer months prior to our study, when the organization disbanded. That is, when  
1035 experiences (and reminders) of social victory and deference ceased, the elevated T of these  
1036 previously prestigious individuals is expected to return to their baseline levels, an  
1037 individual difference that is underlain in part by genetic components (Crabbe et al., 2007).

1038           This flexibility has advantages over a persistently elevated T profile, given the  
1039 significant costs associated with maintaining high androgen levels, including increased  
1040 energetic demands, depressed immune function, and increased risk of parasitic infestation  
1041 (and associated mortality; see Wingfield, Lynn, & Soma, 2001). This means that, just as T  
1042 should rise in response to perceiving a prestige-status asymmetry in one's favor, T should  
1043 also wane when this asymmetry is no longer reinforced or the local environment ceases to  
1044 present opportunities for status-advancement (such as when the community disbands, as  
1045 in our sample). In one study that demonstrates this cost-benefit trade-off for T, male  
1046 baboons showed elevated T levels during critical periods when high rank was being  
1047 contested, counterbalanced by decreased T levels during non-critical periods (Beehner,  
1048 Bergman, Cheney, Seyfarth, & Whitten, 2006; also see Knight & Mehta, 2017). Thus, the lack  
1049 of a significant positive association between prestige and T at Time 1 in our subsample of  
1050 men is not entirely surprising. The logic above suggests that, if anything, it may reflect the  
1051 dampening and return of T to baseline in previously high-ranking men, consistent with the  
1052 hallmark of an adaptive system.

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