Palgrave's series, *Interreligious Studies in Theory and Practice*, seeks to capture the best of the diverse contributions to the rapidly expanding field of interreligious and interfaith studies. While the series includes a diverse set of titles, they are all united by a common vision: Each volume advocates—explicitly or implicitly—for interreligious engagement, even if this involves a critique of the limits of this work as it is currently defined or embodied. Each volume provides models and resources—textual, theological, pedagogic, or practical—for interreligious dialogue, study, or action. The series models a commitment to religious pluralism by including books that begin from diverse religious perspectives. This does not preclude the publication of books dedicated to a specific religion, but the overall series reflects a balance of various faiths and perspectives.

More information about this series at http://www.springer.com/series/14838
The field of religious peacebuilding reached a turning point in about 2000. Prior to that there were notable cases of religious peacebuilding, including the struggle against Apartheid in South Africa, the religiously motivated civil rights movement in the USA, and Gandhi’s movement in India. But prior to 2000, the focus of the literature relating to religion and conflict focused on religion as a source of conflict. Scott Appleby’s book *Ambivalence of the Sacred* published in 2000 helped mark and stimulate this shift in focus.

This shift was evident in the programming relating to religion at the US Institute of Peace (USIP). Prior to 2000, USIP organized study groups on religion as a source of conflict in places like Israel/Palestine, Sri Lanka, Sudan, and Nigeria. USIP launched its Religion and Peacemaking Program in 2000. Since 2000, USIP has helped stimulate and provide financial support for religious peacebuilding efforts in Israel/Palestine that brought together top Jewish, Muslim, and Christians to advocate for peace. It provided encouragement and financial support for the peacemaking efforts of Rev. James Wuye and Imam Mohammed Ashafa of the Interfaith Mediation Centre in Nigeria to undertake interfaith peacebuilding in places like Yelwa/Nshar, celebrated in the documentary the *Imam and Pastor*, which is mentioned in Chap. 10. This documentary has been widely shown and has had widespread impact in such far-flung places as Kenya, Sudan, Sri Lanka, and Iraq. Training programs in Burma/Myanmar and Sri Lanka brought together Buddhist, Muslim, and Christian leaders to learn how to organize interfaith peacebuilding in those countries. In Indonesia, Philippines, and Pakistan, USIP has helped stimulate and finance the introduction of peace studies in the curricula of Islamic schools, to emphasize the peaceful teachings of Islam.

These efforts of USIP have their counterparts in the programs of many other organizations around the world, principally since 2000.

This book makes a contribution to the burgeoning literature on religious peacebuilding, which has blossomed since 2000. I want to lift up three chapters as making particular contributions. These are Chapter 2 by Peter Phan,
3 by Douglas Irvin-Erickson, and Chapter 10 by Ezekiel Abdullahi Babagari. In his chapter, Phan articulates the warrants for both violence and nonviolence in all the major world religions. Too often in contemporary discourse, Islam is held up as the religion of war and Christianity is praised for being a religion of peace. It is true that most of the contemporary violent extremism is committed in the name of Islam. But teachings about peace and nonviolence are very prominent in the Quran and the Hadith. This is an important lesson that should be promulgated.

In Chapter 10, Babagari makes the very important argument, exemplified in the case of the Middle Belt in Nigeria, that so-called religious conflict is usually not fundamentally religious in character. In the case of Nigeria, what is frequently characterized as conflict between Christians and Muslims is more fundamentally a conflict of identity that has more to do with ethnic, geographic, occupational, and class identities than it does with religion per se. Religious differentiation coincides with differentiation by these other identities and religion is too simply cited as the key difference. But conflicts in the Middle Belt are not about the validity of religious teachings and practices of Islam and Christianity. Conflict is over jobs, political power, scholarships, and land rather than religion. (The case of Boko Haram in the northeast of Nigeria underscores another set of variables that Babagari does not address.)

Because the conflicts in the Middle Belt are caused by these other variables, to resolve the conflicts these other issues need to be addressed. Peacemakers need to promote an equitable share of political power, access to land, a fair distribution of scholarships, and so on. Peace is not going to be achieved by Muslims convincing Christians to convert to Islam or vice versa. But it will be helpful for the peacemakers to lift the warrants for peace and nonviolence in both of these faith traditions. Moreover, the fact that the conflicts are not fundamentally religious in character does not mean that religious leaders and institutions cannot make significant contributions to peace. Although Babagari does not cite them, religious leaders have engaged in productive peacebuilding efforts in the Middle Belt.

I lift up the case of Nigeria’s Middle Belt not because of the intrinsic significance of this region of Nigeria, but because the dynamics underlying conflict and peacebuilding in the Middle Belt apply to conflicts in many parts of the world. Although the Islamic State has complicated the situation, the conflict between Sunnis and Shia in Iraq is not fundamentally a religious conflict, but a conflict over political power and competition for resources. It is not unlike the conflict between Iraqi Kurds and the Sunnis and Shia, even though the Kurdish identity is based on ethnicity rather than on religion. The Kurds are Sunnis, but they do not identify with the Arab Sunnis in Iraq. While there is a role for religious peacebuilding in Iraq, those promoting reconciliation need to base their efforts on a recognition that religion per se is not the fundamental source of conflict.

Similarly in places like Sri Lanka, Burma/Myanmar, Central Africa Republic, and Israel/Palestine, where the conflicts are often framed in terms of religion,
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This volume developed out of the conference on “Nurturing Cultures of Peace in Context of Violence” held in May 2013 at the New York Theological Seminary. The conference brought together practitioners and scholars in the field of religious peacemaking, who were joined by leaders from faith communities around the world who were actively involved in conflict prevention, conflict management, and peacebuilding in their own communities.

The goal of the conference was to strengthen relationships between religious leaders, peace practitioners, and scholars, and to create a forum for a free exchange of ideas at the nexus of theory, practice, and faith. The result was a transformative three-day event, complete with training workshops for religious leaders facilitated by scholar-practitioners and workshops facilitated by religious leaders for scholars and practitioners to better understand the religious potential for peace. The chapters in this volume are reflective of these interdisciplinary, interfaith, and international conference goals. The contributing authors in this volume are leading and emerging scholars in the field—all of whom have lived, taught, or worked in the areas of conflict they write about.

We are grateful to the many participants and audience members whose comments and contributions helped improve our ideas and thoughts. We extend special thanks to the Henry Luce Foundation for providing the resources that made this conference possible, and to the many co-sponsoring institutions whose delegations, students, scholars, and resources contributed to the success of the conference. The academic and university co-sponsors included:

- Auburn Theological Seminary
- Berkeley Center for Religion, Peace, and World Affairs at Georgetown University
- Boston University School of Theology
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CHAPTER 1

Introduction: Interfaith Contributions to Nurturing Cultures of Peace

Douglas Irvin-Erickson

In 2005, the International Criminal Court issued an arrest warrant for Joseph Kony, the leader of the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA). The warrants brought renewed notoriety to the LRA, which was founded in Uganda in 1986. Yet, most critics seemed more interested in Kony's interpretation of Catholic Christian doctrines and the superstitions of the LRA culture, rather than examining the long-standing struggle for peace and reconciliation in Uganda. Kony was presented by journalists and scholars as a dark and mysterious force—a madman with a fundamentalist personality disorder who convinced a group of followers that he was a spirit medium—whose LRA was not pursuing rational ends and could not be dealt with diplomatically. Kony became a spectacle, a savage figure, a heart of darkness. The work of peacemakers seemed pedestrian in comparison. Yet, if there was a tale of uncommon courage, it rested in the peacemakers such as Betty Oyella Bigumbe or Archbishop John Baptist Odama, who made trips into Kony's strongholds to confront him and who risked their lives proclaiming peace.

Outside of a circle of specialists, little progress has been made during the last decade in understanding the religious contributions to peacemaking—even after scholars around the world, and officials in the US government, proclaimed that world peace could only be won by engaging the world's religions and religious movements. The Iranian Revolution in 1979 was one of the first global events to highlight the fact that academics, policymakers, and statespeople had vastly underestimated the role of religion in global politics in the twentieth century, and that religious peacemakers and conflict mediators were desperately needed. It was not until the end of the Cold War brought a proliferation of intrastate conflicts that interreligious violence became an object

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religion toward violence or peace. Religion is equally capable of serving as an underlying ideology for violent extremists, as well as a source of inspiration for those whom Scott Appleby has called militants for peace. 14

What is interreligious peacemaking and how can religious leaders contribute to cultures of peace in the contemporary world?

The authors in this volume take up this question in various ways, with each presenting a case study on religious contributions to cultures of peace. The chapters in this book were originally written for a conference on Nurturing Peace in Contexts of Global Violence at the New York Theological Seminary in May 2013. The goal of the conference was to promote dialogue between religious leaders of different faiths, practitioners, theologians, and scholars, to help connect the theory and reflective practice of religious peacebuilding. The scope of the contributions to this volume is reflective of the conference goals, and deals with specific case studies from a wide range of disciplinary perspectives. The chapters in the volume—which range from security studies, to sociology, ethics, and ecology, theology, and philosophy—were selected because they are interreligious, intercultural, and global in perspective.

In his contribution to this volume, Sungtae Kim presents a critical analysis of how the Neo-Confucian vision of harmony can be used as a source of interreligious peacebuilding in the contemporary world. Along similar lines, Hans Harmakaputra's chapter on religiously motivated violence and forgiveness in the case of one Indonesian church examines the theological and sociological basis of love and forgiveness, while charting a theology of reconciliation that can be used by peacemakers in the Indonesian context and beyond. Both authors work with an implicit definition of cultures of peace that underscored the conference theme, defining cultures of peace as social values, attitudes, and behaviors that reflect and inspire social interaction based on the principles of justice, tolerance, and solidarity, that reject violence as a means of resolving conflicts and endeavor to resolve conflicts constructively through dialogue and negotiation.

Several authors take up the question of whether or not interreligious peace work could promote peace even in the context of war. Matthew Ridout, who served in a counterinsurgency mission in Afghanistan with the US Navy, evaluates the US military's efforts to engage in dialogue with local religious leaders, providing a timely analysis of how religious leaders can be engaged in peacebuilding efforts that has implications for ongoing conflicts in Iraq and the Levant region and beyond, now and into the foreseeable future. Ezekiel Abdullahi Babagari's chapter likewise draws on his experience in Muslim-Christian interfaith dialogue—as well as his experience as a veteran of the Nigerian Air Force and a theologian—discussing the practical lessons of religious contributions to nurturing cultures of peace in Jos, Nigeria. Both chapters demonstrate that violent religious militants are members of movements that are, above all, social organizations with leaders who act in accordance with their own interests, and followers who are not impervious to calls for peace and justice on the grounds of the same religious traditions that motivated them toward violence.

of extensive scholarship and interreligious peacebuilding became a project for activists and practitioners. After 2001, interfaith peacemaking was once again championed in public by many governments. In practice, however, these same governments subordinated religious peacebuilding initiatives to counterterrorism initiatives, and supported top-down approaches to peace that privileged state institutions and treaties. In the meanwhile, religious peacemakers on the ground continued to do their work, bringing about real and lasting change in their own societies and among enemies. 4

Why are religious contributions to cultures of peace overshadowed by the overwhelming focus on religious violence? One reason for this neglect is that peacemakers themselves often prefer that their work remains anonymous. A second reason is that violence carries a broad cultural and symbolic significance, as either traumatic or honorable, but nevertheless something that should be remembered. Peace, on the other hand, is mundane. The overwhelming majority of human beings never engage in deadly violence in their entire lives, while those who do engage in violence or experience violence spend most of their lives living peacefully. 9

Violence is rare. Yet, it occupies a special place in our memories, our religion, our laws, and the stories we tell. Thus, we tell stories of how Agamemnon killed his daughter in sacrifice to the Gods before the Greeks could set sail to rape and pillage the Trojans. Burgundy in Shakespeare's Henry V speaks of "that the naked, poor and mangled Peace," while King Henry speaks of "the blast of war" that leads men to "imitate the action of the tiger." 10 And we celebrate when Russia is saved when Napoleon's armies freeze to death in Tolstoy's War and Peace. Social scientists and journalists also help perpetuate the assumption that violence is at the core of the human experience. Consider Edward Said's argument in Covering Islam, for example, and it is clear that journalists, scholars, and politicians have participated in a collective act of producing cultural narratives that reduce the condition of millions of human beings from the so-called Islamic world into a monolithic experience of violence and conflict. 11 The law is also guilty of spinning such narratives, too. As Walter Benjamin argued, the legitimization of violence stands at the core of the law, so that violence is seen as the source of peace in both the natural law and positive law traditions. 12 This collective tendency to privilege violence in our stories and histories, and to place violence at the center of explanations of the human condition, shapes the way religion, violence, and peace are studied and conceptualized. Because religion is often thought about in reductionist terms as a closed-off belief system that explains the cosmos through circular logic, religious violence is usually presented as something that cannot be prevented through rational means. Interreligious peacemakers, moreover, are often presented as trying to unite what cannot be unified, trying to resolve conflicts among groups of people who have incompatible belief sets that fare them toward violence. Yet there is no empirical or social scientific evidence to demonstrate that religion is no more or no less a source of violence than the law, or cultural narratives, or stories. And there is nothing inherent in religion and religious belief that fates
Adeeb Youssef, in his chapter on religious violence and the interreligious potential for peace in Sudan, comes to a similar conclusion. He argues that “Political Islam” in Sudan is not a mass movement inspired by religious ideology, but rather operates very much like a political party that has seized control over state and civic institutions to solidify their single-party rule over the country, and perpetuate a divide-and-rule strategy toward maintaining power in Sudan.

Indeed, religious peacemaking often entails existential processes of coming to terms with worldly conflicts and suffering. But it can also involve matters of so-called “track two” diplomacy, where religious leaders and other citizens participate with representatives of states and armed groups to negotiate settlements that are very much a part of “this world.”

Or, it may involve faith-based third-party nonviolent intervention, and religiously motivated activism designed to support communities enduring and resisting violent conflict. As Sarah MacDonald points out in her chapter on short-term international peacemaking delegations, at their best, such educational group trips may exceed a tourism rubric to become expressions of global peacemaking solidarity. Offering insights from her experience with Christian Peacemaker Teams in Colombia, MacDonald charts a path for peacebuilders that is built on an ethics of friendship, fostering hospitality and vulnerability between the visiting delegates and their hosts.

Religious peacemaking can also involve locally respected religious leaders who make moral and ethical appeals to actors in a wide range of conflicts, from appeals to violent members of a community to put down their guns, to neighbors quarreling verbally over which schools their children can attend. Yet, above all, religious peacemaking is about articulating a vision of what counts as peace, how to achieve it, and why. Jeff Benvenuto’s chapter in this volume deals with the United Church in Canada, the role the church played in facilitating genocide against Native Americans, and the legacy of this genocide. Evaluating the United Church’s approach to reconciliation, Benvenuto argues that reconciliation should be approached from the perspective of promoting ecological justice and promoting paths toward decolonization.

Elizabeth Whiting Pierce likewise conceptualizes peacebuilding from an ecological perspective. She argues that building ecological and economic peace often requires a reconfiguration of a society’s collective memory. Pierce argues for three key elements in collective memory change—historical, gestural, and mythical memories—and highlights Roman Catholic Wangari Maathai’s reforestation work in Kenya as an example religious peacebuilders may follow in influencing their own society’s collective memories.

**What Is Peace?**

Peace, when it is defined as the absence of violence of any kind, is usually referred to as negative peace. However, peace is commonly understood as more than simply the absence of violence, but the presence of conditions that make peace sustainable, ensure security from physical harm, and promote a common respect for shared notions of basic inviolable human rights. This second definition of peace, often called positive peace, includes equal access to economic necessities and education, or the pursuit of more just social and political conditions. The concept of positive peace originates partly in Immanuel Kant’s famous essay *Perpetual Peace*. Neither Kant nor later theorist of positive peace used the term to signify a state of utopian harmony free of conflicts. Rather, for Kant, perpetual peace was defined not by the absence of war, but as the presence of certain social conditions—namely, a republican political system that respected universal individual rights and prevented governments from waging war, and a cosmopolitan and tolerant society that was welcoming of others and saw no need to resort to war and violence to solve conflicts and political problems. Following Kant, positive peace for these social theorists generally refers to the nonviolent and creative transformation of conflicts where, ideally, conflicting groups resolve disputes nonviolently, thereby allowing conflicts to form the basis of collaborative and supportive relationships.

Studying positive peace from the perspective of individual societies, Johan Galtung created the concept of structural violence to describe and speak about the violent or unjust conditions in negative peace that prevent individuals from being able to live healthy lives or fulfill their human potential, and thereby prevent positive peace from being realized. The Brazilian liberation theologian Leonardo Boff gave the concept of structural violence a theological form, which he termed originating violence. Originating violence, for Boff, signifies the structural violence that maintains systems of oppression without elites having to resort to the explicit use of organized violence and state terror. This violence has roots in elite institutions of power and established social systems, Boff writes, and is used to protect the interest of dominant groups, such as the extreme right in Latin America. The pursuit of nonviolent struggle is therefore a moral imperative to Boff because nonviolent resistance to originating violence has the ability to create a just society by transforming social systems built around originating violence into systems of peaceful political contention. Galtung believed that religion is a social institution that—along with many other similar types of institutions—could shape normative expectations for both peace and/or violence within a society, or perpetuate either structural violence or more just social systems. For Boff, however, originating violence appears to people to be beyond the ability of humans to influence or change—as the source and foundation of the social and political world, and therefore intrinsic to the human condition and the very source of our social lives. Yet, for Boff, religion and religious belief offer activists an alternative vision of the human cosmos, allowing people imagine a human condition where an ethics of reciprocity and love is the source and foundation of human society, not structural violence. In such a way, Boff argues, religion provides people with the criteria necessary for judging social systems, the moral reference points necessary for denouncing originating violence and guiding appropriate actions to change such social systems, and a basic knowledge of how to act in order to prevent direct and structural violence.
and for the individuals who are in conflict. When seeking peace, “there is no need to worry about the past or the future,” the monk implored, employing Buddhist idioms: “The secret of happiness is to be entirely with what is in front of you, to live fully at the present moment … This is the only moment we can control … Take care of the present, and the future will be well.” This interpretation of Buddhist perspectives establishes a spiritual mandate for people in conflict to focus on the present factors of a conflict over considerations about the past. In addition to providing a way for parties in conflict to discuss the interests that propel conflict over religious beliefs, this approach also provides a way for peacemakers to prevent parties in conflict from allowing contested memories of the past, and past cycles of violence and revenge, from standing in the way of peace.

Galtung has written that Buddhist-inspired epistemology offers theorists of peace and peace workers distinct advantages because, at first, it conceives of empirical reality as not final, but created and recreated all the time. And, second, the social world according to Buddhist epistemology is the product of the mental state of human beings. Because peace and conflict are not distinct states of being in Buddhist cosmology, but interrelated processes rooted in the minds of conflicting individuals, Buddhist thought sees conflicts as grounded in the consciousness of the present. Where Western social scientists have tended to look to long-standing competitions and eternal hatreds as the basis of violent conflict, an approach based on Buddhist philosophy recognizes that the cause of violent conflict is not long-standing animosities, but the belief that the animosities are real. The Buddha’s teaching of the paticca-samuppāda seeks to show people how the mind builds meaning and establishes social reality. When conflict is seen as essentially a mental process, then “peace acquires a new meaning: it is the transformation of that process.” Buddhism, of course, has a long history of inspiring violence. Galtung’s point, however, is that in Buddhist cosmology there is always the potential for a new reality, unforeseen by present empirical reality, which makes little room for dogmatisms such as “peace can never be achieved because violence is inherent in human nature.”

As Sungae Kim points out in his chapter, so-called Eastern religions are often romanticized as providing ancient wisdoms that can mystically inform modern conflicts. Rather than romanticizing Buddhism in such a way, it is important to point out that human history is filled with examples of religiously motivated efforts to resist violence and structural violence and promote peaceful and just societies. In the history of European colonialism in Latin America, for instance, indigenous communities employed nonviolent methods and mass noncooperation to resist forced assimilation and subordination for centuries that drew on indigenous religious traditions and, later, Christian traditions. By the end of the nineteenth century, religious beliefs, symbols, rituals, and practices—from traditional religious and Christianity, or a fusion of both—became primary idioms of resistance across Latin America because they provided communities with a sense of social and cultural cohesiveness, as well as a discourse of resistance that could provide a baseline from which
people could understand how to act together. While some of these movements were millennial and militant, many drew on folk Catholicism and hybrid forms of indigenous religious beliefs to structure nonviolent resistance against the state, transform violent intergroup conflicts among groups below the national state, or even resist state terror. By 1968, the Latin American bishops' conference in Medellin, Colombia, refocused the attention of the Catholic Church in Latin America toward the social and political concerns of the poor. While state terror in Argentina through the late 1960s and 1970s occurred with the blessing of the Argentine Catholic Church, individual Argentine religious figures organized resistance. At the same time, Brazilian Catholic bishops had begun to emphasize the importance of using parishes as conduits for creating local communities and mobilizing people toward social transformation. And, later, the Catholic Church in Chile played a major role in delegitimizing the violence of the Pinochet regime.

The history of colonialism has also shaped the African experience of religion, violence, and peace. The work of Bishop Desmond Tutu in South Africa is, perhaps, the most well-known case of religious peacebuilding and reconciliation. Beyond the Anglican Christian tradition, and beyond South Africa, there are several aspects of African religions that have contributed to peacebuilding initiatives that range from ending armed conflict between groups to working through religious traditions to transform structural violence in entire societies. In Nigeria, the legacy of British colonialism privileging Christians over Muslims has had lasting impacts on the religious conflicts that Babagari discusses in his chapter in this volume. The experience of colonialism, however, also generated a strong sense among religious communities in Africa that peace and economic and social justice were inextricably linked. These themes surface in several chapters in this Babagari and Youssif's chapters, both of whom point to the importance of dealing with lingering colonial religious paradigms and the legacies of colonial rule which divided colonized populations along religious lines in order to make it impossible for colonized subjects to create a shared society.

In a broader African context, while Christian and Islamic perspectives have often portrayed traditional African religious as evil and sinful, peacebuilding between Christianity, Islam, and traditional African religions have succeeded in many African societies and countries because local forms of Christian and Islamic practice often share symbols and beliefs with local forms of religiosity. Values emphasizing tolerance and harmony within communities, and between communities, are near-universal aspects of African religiosity. Such worldviews have been criticized by Western scholars as subordinating individual well-being and individual rights to the interests and rights of social groups. However, African scholars have pointed out that the belief sets actually establish universal ethical obligations toward other beings because the entire universe is seen as an organic whole composed of supra-sensible participants, bringing individual people into an intimate relationship with other people and fellow beings.

**What Is Religion?**

Some have argued that religion is a manufactured construct that emerged in the modern period as Western colonial processes categorized non-Western populations and societies. Whether religion is a manufactured construct or not, the legacies of colonial essentializing of differences through the concept of religion linger on. For several hundred years, Europeans categorized the world into four parts: Christians, Jews, Mohammedans, and the rest who consisted of heathens, pagans, idolaters, and polytheists. By the nineteenth century, religion became a scientific field of inquiry in Europe. The faith traditions of the world were recategorized into two groups, prophetic religions and wisdom religions, while the origins of these religions were attributed to the three geographical regions that corresponded to nineteenth-century scientific theories of the world's three distinct language groups (and, later, racial groups): the Semitic, the Aryan, and the Turanian (or, oriental). As Tomoko Masuzawa argues, as European modernity began to imagine its genealogical origins in ancient Greece and Proto-Indo-European traditions, European Christianity increasingly saw itself as not as having Semitic origins, but Hellenic. This attempt to Hellenize Christianity was accompanied by a corresponding attempt to distance Christians from the worshipers of Judaism and Islam—collapsing Judaism into a worldwide monolith and presenting the people who worshiped the religion of Mohammed in stereotypes of Arabs, no matter where in the world Islamic peoples lived.

In the twentieth century, the concept of world religions emerged as an egalitarian term that tried to turn away from Eurocentric conceptions of the world. Yet, this the appeal to pluralism could not displace essentializing tendencies, given that the term has been used as a code word for all religions except the so-called European religions (i.e. Christianity and sometimes Judaism). When it comes to understanding the religious contributions to peace, there are two consequences of the widely held belief that Islam and other religions supposedly exist outside of the Western tradition. The first is that these "world religions" are often coded by Western scholars and government officials as an inherent source of conflict and impediment to modern progress. The second is that the people who belong to these faiths, and the actions they undertake in the name of their faith, are frequently not recognized as being capable of creating a peaceful and just world.

Studying religious contributions to nurturing cultures of peace requires setting aside provincial and parochial biases about various faith traditions, for pragmatic reasons and as a matter of principle. This can be achieved by studying religion and peace from an ecumenical or cosmopolitan vantage point, or through a disinterested and scientific approach. Regardless, there are two ways that religion is usually studied, which fall into two camps that Scott Appleby has termed the "strong religion" and "weak religion" approaches. The strong religion interpretative approach sees the phenomenology and history of religion itself as sufficient to inspire and authorize human actions, from deadly
violence to acts of nonviolent resistance and peacemaking. The weak religion approach sees religion as one of many worldviews and habits of mind that structure human actions, along with other politicized social movements and ideologies. These interpretative camps are not mutually exclusive. Scholars and critics in the strong religion approach acknowledge that those who participate in religious movements do so for a wide variety of reasons. Likewise, the weak religion approach acknowledges that religious movements include pure believers and that religion is not merely an ideology or a form of false consciousness. As such, both interpretative approaches tend to agree that modernity has not brought about the much expected secularization, as religion has done anything but retreat from public life.

In terms peace between nations and states, the practice and study of international relations has generally assumed that religion was removed from the spheres of political power and social authority in the modern world, as secularization relegated religious belief from the public realm to the private. In the social sciences, for nearly a century, even the theorists such as Emile Durkheim who were sympathetic to the virtues of religion in the modern world predicted that the role of religion in society would slowly recede. For Durkheim, religion's function of integrating society would be overcome as specialized professionals replaced the church at the head of social institutions, moving religion to ever smaller spheres of the organic modern society. In Max Weber's thesis on the disenchantment of modernity, the Protestant Reformation and the Enlightenment brought about a rise in rationalism that challenged church doctrines and established traditions, while Calvinist work ethics became a secular ethic that encouraged people to participate in private enterprise. Talcott Parsons amended Weber's view to argue that Christian values formed the ethical core of the modern, capitalist social system. For the better part of a century, the secularization thesis in these various forms was the orthodox position among social scientists and theorists who either believed that religion was disappearing from human societies, or being absorbed into other spheres of social life—but nevertheless "weakening," to adapt Appleby's terminology.

In the last twenty decades, the critique of secularization theory has centered around the claim that religion has neither disappeared nor ceased to play a role in modernity. Some have claimed that the very concept of secularization is largely meaningless to most peoples around the world because it is built on the premise that religion is a distinct entity that can be separated from public and social life, a premise that is not shared by many cultures around the world. Other opponents of the secularization theory argue that one of the foundational myths of Western society is that religion is a transhistorical phenomenon that is nonrational and prone to violence, which legitimizes the use of state violence against non-Western people. This perspective has its merits, for it calls attention to the cultural process by which state violence is concealed under idioms of progress and reason, while the (post)colonial and religious targets of state violence are presented as the sources of violence in modernity, whether religion taken in terms of "strong" or "weak" religion.

A second tendency in the history of Western philosophy and social theory has tended to reduce violence to a calculation of human nature—not the product of specific social and historical conditions. Regardless of whether religion is taken as strong or weak, this second approach sees violence as an unavoidable part of human nature that can be only be dealt with through social institutions that can constrain human actions. In Kant's words, the crooked timbers of humanity can never be made straight, but many straighten themselves in the civil union and social institutions the way trees in a forest force each other to grow upward. Following Kant, liberal theories of religion and peacebuilding tend to emphasize religion's role as a social institution that can educate people away from violence, while mitigating conflicts and reducing violence by providing nonviolent means of conflict resolution. Such theories, however, once again take it for granted that violence rests at the core of human interaction—as a sort of baseline for how human beings treat each other. Peace is therefore something that must be achieved through human work and labor, or even an ethical ideal to which humanity must strive. For these theorists who follow in this tradition, religion, strong or weak, is presented as a social force that can help humanity achieve positive peace.

Religious Experience, Religious Institutions, and Interreligious Peace

The vast majority of work in the social sciences is heavily indebted to longstanding traditions with Western political thought. Indeed, current social science tends to take what philosophers and political theorists call the state of nature as a concrete state—whether it is a historical state, a social state, or a political state. However, the first philosophers who employed the term used it as a hypothetical construct in order to hypothesize about the influence of the state, religion, and society upon people. The question of religion in motivating violence and peace was at the very center of this philosophical inquiry. The tradition of using the so-called state of nature to discuss human violence and peace began with Thomas Aquinas's discussions on natural law in De Veritate and in Summa Theologica. Aquinas followed Aristotle to discuss a primitive state of innocence, which he did not intend to signify a temporally or historically prior state. The Enlightenment philosophers, from Jean-Jacques Rousseau and Charles Montesquieu to Thomas Hobbes and John Locke, followed Aquinas and considered the state of nature to be a hypothetical question that allowed them to imagine how the social and political institutions might shape human actions, violence, and peace. In this conception, especially as it was expressed by Hobbes, religion is not seen as a basic determinant of human thought and action, but a formal principle and a condition that shapes public behavior and politics. Over the last century, however, the state of nature has not been taken as a hypothetical state by social scientists, but is increasingly seen as an actual state of being, denoting types of societies that existed (or exist) before entering into the modern state. These studies, especially in the fields of
sociology and international relations, either cast entire societies as premodern and prone to religious extremism, or study religion as an independent or intervening variable that interacts with a basic human nature and can therefore be measured scientifically to predict whether or not violent conflict or peace can be expected in certain situations. The tradition of European social and political theory tended to view violence and human nature in two ways. Kant—in arguing that human kind was not fated toward violence—saw violence as an inherent aspect of human nature that could be educated away through social institutions, much like Locke and Hobbes. The opposing position, typified by Rousseau’s theory of the noble savage, argued that human beings were peaceful in the state of nature and corrupted toward violence by the institutions of civilization. Both schools, while taken as opposites, however, are mirror images of each other in that they both see violence as inherent in the human condition—whether it is created by nature or by social conditions. This divide in the history of ideas has been reproduced in the arguments over religion and violence. One school of thought, typified by the philosophy of René Girard and the sociology of Durkheim, sees religion as a form of social organization or a type of (emotional and psychological) experience that can authorize violence among otherwise peaceful people. The second school of thought does not take people as inherently peaceful, and sees religion and religious experience as counteracting the peace-inducing institutions of modern society or the secular state, activating a premodern form of social or human consciousness that is inherently irrational and violent.

This second vantage point, which views religion as fanning the natural violence of humanity, was especially prominent in circles of US policymakers and academics over the last decade. Steven Simon and Daniel Benjamin, two directors for counterterrorism in the Clinton administration, argued that the end of the twentieth century was an age of “sacred terror.” This “new terrorism” was supposedly employed by religious groups whose religious belief led them to desire the destruction of the international system and the modern social and political order. Because the new terrorist movements were believed to be apocalyptic and millennial, it was assumed that states and governments could not negotiate with them. Collapsing religious experience into a “natural,” “pre-society” state of being had grave consequences in US foreign policy and led to shortsighted practices of governments and peacemakers around the world.

With the new terrorism debates—which have since been rebranded as “combating violent extremism” in recent years— religion was cast (again) as an inherently destabilizing factor in world affairs, a source of irrational behavior that worked against a peaceful and rational social order. Those who argued against this position simply inverted the basic premise, and argued that religion was a source of peace that mitigated against the violent inclinations of human beings. In so doing, the policy and academic debates fell back into the familiar terms of the old state-of-nature debate in Western thought, outlined above. Social scientists have found no empirical evidence to prove that human beings are fated toward violence—or that violence is a predetermined outcome of social conditions. The study and practice of religious peacebuilding therefore does not have to assume that human beings have a natural state of being one way or the other—either violent or peaceful. As such, religion does not have to be seen as an intervening variable that conditions people toward violence or peace. Unmoored from this structure of thought, religious contributions to cultures of peace can be studied in and of themselves.

There are, of course, many scholars and practitioners who have believe religion and religious experience can be a source for peace, while being careful not to reduce their study of religion and violence to state of nature arguments. Chandra Muzaffar, for instance, has argued that religiously motivated strife can be overcome by the universalizing potential of religious experience to see all of humanity as sharing a singular spiritual and moral purpose. Along similar lines, Marc Gopin’s works, which are derived from his experience as a practicing peacemaker, do more than simply argue that religion is a social institution that can take violent people and make them peaceful, mitigate conflicts, or prevent violence by providing nonviolent channels of social interaction. Gopin—while rejecting absolute universalism in terms of the construction of moral standards—has argued that the world’s religious traditions all share common sets of lived values that can form the basis of critical interfaith solutions to conflicts. Gopin does not call for a developing a kind of overlapping consensus that John Rawls famously called for, but rather to forge these common values through the active practice of interfaith peace work. This perspective has formed the basis of an entire school of thought on religious peacebuilding from the “strong religion” approach, as articulated by other scholars who suggests that religious experience provides people with a source of knowledge about how to act, and can stand as an emotional and social bulwark against a violent external world—with some applying this perspective to the field of international relations, and other to interventions with troubled teens and gang violence.

Over the last decade, there have been several other major theories that have helped transcend reductionist explanations of religion, violence, and peace that treat religion as a static variable. The following chapters in this volume engage these theories, demonstrating that religion can motivate people toward peace and peacebuilding by articulating ethical and moral claims, and can provide an institutional basis to unite and motivate people to act toward peace. This volume does not view religion as an irrational holdover from a past age, anachronistically existing in modernity as a source of irrationality and conflict. Nor does this book view religion as a variable that can be added or subtracted when interpreting human action. Rather, some authors in this volume look at religion as a sociological phenomenon that provides people with a way of knowing the material and social world. This perspective recognizes that religion structures the way people interpret and make meaning out of the world and the actions of others, and structures the way people know how to act in the world. For other authors, religion is taken as a spiritual or
theological phenomenon that must be understood on this basis in order for peacebuilders to successfully engage religion in peacebuilding. In either case, the volume contributes to the fields of peace studies and religious studies by presenting much needed case studies that build on existing scholarship while drawing on each author’s research, firsthand experience, or participant observation, connecting the theory and practice of religious peacebuilding in interreligious perspective.

NOTES

3. For a recent account, see P.J. Zwier (2013), pp. 302–312.
10. William Shakespeare, Henry V, Act 5, Scene 2; Act 3, Scene 1.
25. Ibid.
28. Ibid., p. 32.
34. See, for instance, Khadduri (1984).
42. Magesa (1997).
43. Mbiti (1990); Shutte (2001).
45. On this point, see Appleby, (2012), p. 4. For an argument that religion is a social construct that emerged with modern and colonial processes, see Schubrack (2010), pp. 1112–1138.
49. Ibid., p. xii–xv.
50. Ibid., p. 13.
62. See Wolin (2009), pp. 18–21.
74. See Brenneman (2012); Flores (2012), pp. 113–132, 113–133; Gerrard-Burnett (1998); Hettier and Johnston (2009), pp. 101–118; McConnell, Mindful Mediation.
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