

Amour-Propre and Seeing Others as Persons

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1. Introduction

At times it can seem that there are three different Jean-Jacques Rousseaus. First, there is Rousseau as a philosopher of *nature*. This is the philosopher notable for his contributions to botany and anthropology, for his interest in looking to the conditions of an organism's health or flourishing as a guide to a characterization of its nature, and for his interest in 'naturalness' as a term of normative evaluation. Second, there is Rousseau as a philosopher of the *passions*. This is the philosopher concerned with tracing the contributions that certain passions make to human psychology and to present social conditions. Most prominent among these passions in Rousseau's writing is the kind of self-love that he calls *amour-propre*, or the desire for consideration from others. Finally, and perhaps most obviously, there is Rousseau as a philosopher of *freedom*. This is the philosopher who counted freedom as among the 'constitutive elements of [our] being' (*DI*, 176/*OC* 3:181); who said that 'to renounce one's freedom is to renounce one's status as a man' (*SC* I.4.6); and who made the preservation of the freedom of all citizens in a republic one of the central concerns of his political thought.

It can be hard to keep in view all at once these three strands of Rousseau's thinking. Indeed, even when these strands are not treated as incompatible with one another, they are at best given distinct places in readings of Rousseau. Thus, on a common understanding of how his political writings fit together, Rousseau's investigation of humankind under primitive conditions

(the so-called ‘original state of nature’ discussed in the *Discourse on the Origins of Inequality*, or Second Discourse) invites an investigation of that passion, *amour-propre*, responsible for bringing humankind out of those conditions. Moreover, on this understanding, the enslavement and domination characteristic of *amour-propre* demand the introduction of a Social Contract whereby ‘each, uniting with all, nevertheless obey[s] only himself and remain[s] as free as before’ (SC I. 4.6). In other words, on this crude understanding of Rousseau, the themes of *nature*, the *passions*, and *freedom* fit together, but at most sequentially. We lack much of a sense of how they work together at any one of moment in Rousseau’s thinking.

The tendency to treat some number of these themes as relatively separate also characterizes even the most sophisticated recent writing on *amour-propre*, and even the writing that complicates the above picture by insisting that *amour-propre* cannot be an altogether bad or unhealthy passion. This is particularly true insofar as these readings are under pressure to provide a ‘normatively neutral’ characterization of *amour-propre*: one whereby that passion is not in its nature good or bad. As I hope to show here, any characterization of *amour-propre* that does not take into account its characteristic goodness—namely, the role it plays in our acknowledging others as free persons—risks severing important connections between Rousseau’s sense of what it is to investigate something’s nature, his application of that method to *amour-propre*, and the role that freedom plays in his investigation of the latter.

For example, according to Frederick Neuhouser’s reading of Rousseau, ‘*amour-propre* is a “neutral” feature of human beings, not intrinsically a force for good [...] but also not only, or

necessarily, bad in its consequences.’¹ Thus, in evaluating instances of *amour-propre* as good or bad, healthy or unhealthy, Neuhouser looks not to criteria internal to the nature of *amour-propre* (as one would look to the nature of what a knife is or does in order to determine which knives are good or bad), but rather to criteria apparently external to that nature. For Neuhouser, an instance of *amour-propre* is good only to the extent that it is compatible with the terms of a ‘civil association governed by a general will’: that is, only to the extent that its satisfaction ‘can coexist with the basic requirements of the *happiness* [...] and *freedom* of all our fellow beings.’² These criteria are certainly important in evaluating instances of *amour-propre*, but it is noteworthy that none of them figures, on Neuhouser’s reading, in a definition of what *amour-propre* is. Here again, an investigation of the nature of *amour-propre* is conducted relatively separately from an investigation of its characteristic goodness, and from the relationship between such goodness and values such as a freedom.

We can better understand the pressure to provide a normatively neutral characterization of *amour-propre* once we understand that, on recent readings of Rousseau, that passion is asked to play a role in both Rousseau’s optimism (his sense of the positive good it could potentially bring about) and his pessimism (his sense of the misery it is in fact responsible for). Since treat-

¹ Frederick Neuhouser, *Rousseau’s Theodicy of Self-Love* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 15.

² Ibid. 50-51. In addition, Neuhouser specifies a number of goods to which *amour-propre* may give rise, such as love and friendship, as well as ‘a variety of cognitive and conative capacities without which such ‘spiritual’ goods as rationality, morality, and self-determination would not be possible’ (ibid. 53). But though these goods may constitute the positive potential of *amour-propre*, they do not obviously figure in a characterization of the ‘nature’ of *amour-propre*, and thus to that extent appear ‘external’ to that nature. In contrast, according to the reading offered here, the acknowledgment of others as free persons is an ineliminable feature of any characterization of that nature, and is thus ‘internal’ to it.

ing *amour-propre* as intrinsically good or bad would, so the thought goes, render either such pessimism or such optimism unintelligible, we have no choice but to characterize *amour-propre* in normatively neutral terms. Or, as Niko Kolodny puts it, in motivating his own ‘normatively neutral’ characterization of *amour-propre*:

Spell out the principles that would permit men to be good, and it becomes a mystery why men should ever have become bad. Spell out the principles that explain why men are bad, and it seems impossible that they could ever be otherwise.³

But as I will aim to show here, this problem—i.e., that if we characterize *amour-propre* as intrinsically good, then we render unintelligible its bad instances—arises only if we do not keep in view, together with our characterizations of *amour-propre*, the role that its characteristic goodness plays in an investigation of its nature, and the connections between such contributions and human freedom.

Neuhouser and Kolodny are surely correct to insist, against familiar readings of Rousseau, that *amour-propre* is not an altogether unhealthy passion.⁴ But they are incorrect in

³ Niko Kolodny, ‘The Explanation of Amour Propre’, *Philosophical Review* 119 (2010), 166.

⁴ In this respect Neuhouser’s and Kolodny’s readings are similar to those of Joshua Cohen, *Rousseau: A Free Community of Equals* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010); N.J.H. Dent, *Rousseau: An Introduction to His Psychological, Social and Political Theory* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1988), *A Rousseau Dictionary* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1992); and John Rawls *Lectures on the History of Political Philosophy*, ed. Samuel Freeman (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2007). Formulations of the more familiar reading, of *amour-propre* as altogether bad or unhealthy, include Allan Bloom’s introduction and notes to *Emile* (*E* 10, 484, n. 17) and Ernst Cassirer, *The Question of Jean-Jacques Rousseau* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989).

thinking that the best, or mandatory, alternative to those readings is a normatively neutral characterization of *amour-propre*. Thus, I will argue that we can characterize *amour-propre* in intrinsically normative terms, in terms of the positive contribution it makes to human psychology, without ruling out its central unhealthy instances: and, indeed, while providing the beginnings of an account of the latter. That is, there is a good internal to our being subject to *amour-propre*—namely, that in our being so subject, we acknowledge others as persons, as opposed to mere things—and it is exactly this good involved in our being subject to *amour-propre* that can explain that passion’s perversions. In particular, it is in response to some of the characteristic difficulties involved in being subject to another’s free evaluation that one may be motivated to efface that other’s dimension as a free being: that is, to engage in some of the paradigmatic instances of unhealthy *amour-propre*, such as the domination or subjugation of another.

Thus, there are four ideas at the center of this paper. (1) For Rousseau, others appear to us as persons, as opposed to things, insofar as they appear to us as free beings: that is, as limits on what we can will, force, or extract (in ways that things are not). (2) It is in the nature of *amour-propre* to make visible or salient to us others’ dimensions as free, and specifically as beings capable of unforced evaluation. (3) This characterization of *amour-propre* is at once a generic characterization of its nature and an intrinsically normative characterization of that passion, one yielding criteria for its healthy as well as its unhealthy instances. (4) Once we understand some of the difficulties involved in being subject to another’s evaluation, this characterization also plays an important role in explaining why individuals are motivated to engage in bad instances of *amour-propre*. Thus, on this reading, we have not only a more thoroughly normative understand-

ing of *amour-propre*, but also one that can help to unite the otherwise seemingly disparate strands of Rousseau's thinking on nature, the passions, and freedom.

2. The Original State of Nature

Rousseau is well-known for offering a comparatively placid picture of early humans' existence in the original state of nature, and one instance of this is his idea that all objects of early humans' needs were 'ready to hand' (*'aisément sous sa main'*, *DI* 143/*OC* 3:144). That is, the early human (or, as Rousseau calls him, the '*sauvage*') was subject to no desire that could not be satisfied in principle.⁵

Man's first sentiment was that of his existence, his first care that of his preservation. The Earth's products provided him with all necessary support, instinct moved him to use them (*DI* 161/*OC* 3:164).

According to Rousseau, the desire (or, alternatively, passion or need) that principally governed the life of the *sauvage* was the desire for self-preservation, or what he calls *amour de soi*. And

⁵ Throughout I will follow Rousseau in using male pronouns to refer to the *sauvage*. Here I use the French '*sauvage*' since the English 'savage' does not capture the full range of connotations it is reasonable to think Rousseau is drawing on: including not only cruelty and primitiveness but also solitariness, asociality, and even a connection to uncultivated plants ('Sauvage', *Litttré*, www.littre.org/definition/sauvage). I say that the *sauvage* 'comes into' (as opposed to 'reaches' or 'achieves') the status of a social human in order to avoid the suggestion that the movement from the status of *sauvage* to that of social human (or, equivalently, member of nascent society) is in any way teleological or progressive. It is rather a change from one nature to another (whose respective goods are, by certain measures, incommensurable with one another), in a sense to be elaborated on in Section 5 below.

we can distinguish two senses in which all objects of his desires (all of which are manifestations of *amour de soi*) were within the reach of his will: a physical sense and a metaphysical sense. In a physical sense there were no, or at least relatively few, impediments to the *sauvage*'s satisfying his *amour de soi* in that he enjoyed an abundance of resources: human industry had not yet spoiled the Earth's 'natural fertility' (*DI* 134/*OC* 3:135). But even without such abundance (which was, in any case, fleeting) the *sauvage's* resources were, in a metaphysical sense, at his command: whatever the *sauvage* desired, its attainability, and the satisfactoriness it provided him, depended on nothing but the exercise of his will and the contingent limitations of his abilities. That is, the satisfactoriness of the bare objects of sustenance (such as food and drink) are not spoiled by their being acquired through force. Indeed, *sauvage* or not, our typical way of relating to such objects is through acts as blatantly forceful, and no less satisfying for that, as grabbing. And even when as a matter of fact there is no food about, there is nothing in the nature of what we seek such that we cannot be satisfied by taking the right, and sufficiently forceful, steps toward it.

Furthermore, the life of the *sauvage* was not only easygoing, but also solitary, and here again we must distinguish between a physical sense and a more interesting metaphysical sense in which Rousseau understood this to be the case. In the former sense, early humans were sufficiently dispersed, and sufficiently provided for on their own, not to require anything more than occasional interaction with their conspecifics. According to Rousseau, 'it is impossible to imagine why, in that primitive state, a man would need another man any more than a monkey or a Wolf would need his kind' (*DI* 149/*OC* 3:151). Thus, the *sauvage's* physical conditions ensured his independence. But also, and more interestingly, the nature of the *sauvage's* relations with

others of his kind were no different from his relations with things, at least in the sense that every form of satisfaction he sought from other humans could, in principle, be arrived at through force. Seen just as instruments for or physical impediments to his food, sex, and shelter, other humans were to be pushed around, and the objects of *amour de soi* were no less satisfying for having been arrived at in this way. That is, the *sauvage* was ‘solitary’ also in the sense that he could not see even those of his kind as anything more than instruments or things.

And we can understand this as the application of a broader idea, namely that *anything* treated as an instrument for or physical impediment to the satisfaction of *amour de soi* is, to that extent, seen as a thing. After all, we cannot give much sense to the idea that the objects of *amour de soi*, including objects of sustenance such as water, are satisfactorily within the reach of the will unless whatever serves us to get water, or stands in our way of it, is similarly, and without compromising its satisfactoriness, subject to force or manipulation. If water indeed presented itself to the *sauvage* as a thing in the relevant sense, then whatever forceful means he took to get it could not thereby spoil its satisfactoriness. And this included forceful conduct toward other humans.⁶

Strikingly, for Rousseau, the *sauvage* related to others of his kind as things, as sources of satisfaction available to exercises of his will, even when attributing some sort of mindedness to them. According to Rousseau, with increased industriousness (relying on the capacity to modify

⁶ Of course, *amour de soi* is not the only passion governing the *sauvage*’s conduct toward others; alongside it is also his capacity for *pitié* (or compassion). But Rousseau seems to understand *pitié* as a merely mechanical response to others’ pain, or to its imminence, and thus also as something ‘so Natural that even the Beasts sometimes show evident signs of it’: he adds, ‘one daily sees the repugnance of Horses to trample a living Body underfoot’ (*DI* 152/*OC* 3:154). Thus, it seems, in responding to another with *pitié* the *sauvage* is not responding to the other’s personhood, or dimension as a free being, but rather manifesting the effect of a mechanical (or animal) force.

and improve their own abilities, what Rousseau calls *perfectabilité*), humans came to interact more frequently with others of their kind, and were consequently motivated to develop some understanding of the behavior of others.

[Seeing] that [others of his kind] all behaved as he would have done in similar circumstances, he concluded that their way of thinking and feeling fully corresponded to his own, and this important truth, once it was firmly settled in his mind, made him follow, by a premonition as sure as Dialectics [logic] and more rapid, the best rules of conduct to observe with them for his advantage and safety (*DI 163/OC 3:166*).⁷

For all that Rousseau says here, the *sauvage* may have developed, again through considerations of self-preservation, a very sophisticated understanding of the psychology of others, or ‘theory of mind’. Nevertheless, though his understanding of others may have been richer in content than it earlier had been, his relations with others were not fundamentally different from anything previous in the history of his species. That is, he indeed came to see others as minded, but, as we might put it, as ‘things with minds’. Even in seeing others as minded, the *sauvage* saw others as sources of satisfaction in principle available to exercises of his will, including exercises of force.

3. Amour-Propre and Limits on the Will

⁷ The genders of nouns in the original French make it unambiguous that the phrase ‘observe with them’ (*garder avec eux*) refers to ‘others of his kind’ (*semblables*).

We have seen that the *sauvage*'s relations with others, however frequent and however informed by an incipient 'theory of mind', were nevertheless (from his perspective) yet further relations with things. They thus resist an easy application of the description 'social relations'. But after time, as Rousseau puts it, 'Everything begins to change in appearance' (*DI* 165/*OC* 3:169).⁸

As ideas and sentiments succeed one another, as the mind and the heart grow active, [Humankind] continues to grow tame, contacts expand and bonds tighten. It became customary to gather in front of the Huts or around a large Tree: song and dance, true children of love and leisure, became the amusement or rather the occupation of idle men and women gathered together. Everyone began to look at everyone else and to wish to be looked at himself, and public esteem [became prized]. The one who sang or danced the best; the handsomest, the strongest, the most skillful, or the most eloquent came to be the most highly regarded, and this was the first step at once toward inequality and vice: from these first preferences arose vanity and contempt on the one hand, shame and envy on the other; and the fermentation caused by these new leavens eventually produced compounds fatal to happiness and to innocence (*DI* 166/*OC* 3:169-70).⁹

⁸ Rousseau refers to this historical moment as 'nascent society' at *DI* 167, 172 (*OC* 3:170, 176).

⁹ Here I have changed Gourevitch's translation of '*l'estime publique eut un prix*' ('public esteem acquired a price') in order to avoid conveying notions of commodification at this stage of the Second Discourse, especially when the social conditions necessary for commodification have not yet appeared in Rousseau's narrative. I have also throughout this paper changed Gourevitch's uses of 'mankind' to 'humankind' wherever Rousseau himself uses the gender-neutral '*Genre-humain*'.

Though it is only several pages later that Rousseau describes the kind of desire introduced in this passage as ‘*amour propre*’, it should be evident that this moment (when ‘men [began] to appreciate each other and the idea of consideration [took] shape in their mind’) marks a significant change in humans’ mutual relations.¹⁰ That is, humans no longer saw others principally as instruments for their own self-preservation; they also came to care about what others thought of them, for reasons independent of what promoted their self-preservation, and indeed for its own sake.

An immediately striking feature of Rousseau’s examples of the first manifestations of *amour-propre* is that they are all desires to be seen as having some superlative trait: among them, desires to be seen as ‘[t]he one who sang or danced the best; the handsomest, the strongest, the most skillful, or the most eloquent [...]’ As several recent commentators on Rousseau have noted, it would be overreaching to let this feature of these examples define *amour-propre* as such.¹¹ Indeed, even in desiring to be esteemed for some differential trait one need not desire to be esteemed as the best along some dimension. (One may just want to be seen as a good dancer, or as

¹⁰ In later characterizing nascent society Rousseau describes it as a moment when ‘*amour propre* [became] interested’ (*DI* 170/*OC* 3:174). This moment should be distinguished from the first appearance of ‘pride’ (‘*orgueil*’), earlier in the Second Discourse, which was manifested in the *sauvage*’s feelings of superiority over the other animals (*DI* 162/*OC* 3:166). In this context, *orgueil* is unlike *amour-propre* in that it does not take satisfaction in others’ thoughts about oneself, but rather in subordinating creatures who may serve as food or as competitive threats (in the pursuit of objects of *amour de soi*). This is not to deny some genetic or developmental connection between *orgueil* and *amour-propre*.

¹¹ This is a consequence of those readings of Rousseau that understand healthy manifestations of *amour-propre* as taking satisfaction only in some kind of equal standing (for example, Cohen, *Rousseau: A Free Community of Equals*; Dent, *Rousseau*; and Rawls, *Lectures on the History of Political Philosophy*). And Neuhausser articulates a view of *amour-propre* according to which that desire can take satisfaction in one’s evaluation as something less than the best in some respect (*Rousseau’s Theodicy of Self-Love*, 102).

an adequate singer.) And it seems that desiring consideration from others, placing significance in what they think of one, may at times manifest itself in little more than caring to be noticed, to be considered as deserving attention, among all the items that fill a space.

In fact, if we focus too much on certain features typical of superlative standing, we may miss how the passage above introduces a desire categorically different from what characterized the life of the *sauvage*. Acclaim as the best dancer or singer may bring about residual benefits, among them greater access to food, sex, shelter, and other objects of *amour de soi*. Thus, one's satisfaction in this acclaim may be entirely derivative from one's satisfaction in these benefits, benefits that (at least for the *sauvage*) are no less satisfying for their being arrived at through force. But taking satisfaction in another's opinion of oneself on its own, and independent of these residual benefits, requires seeing it as the exercise of that other's freedom: that is, as the exercise of that other's capacity to form an independent view of oneself. Thus, I want to introduce the following principle:

Differential Consideration Principle: For any subject manifesting (healthy) *amour-propre*, receiving another's evaluative consideration of one's differential

traits is satisfying (of *amour-propre*) only to the extent that it is seen as the exercise of that other's capacity to form attitudes freely.¹²

To get at this connection between *amour-propre* and acknowledging another as free, we must look to how, in desiring consideration from another, we desire something that is not merely the product of our own agency, but rather comes essentially from another's point of view.¹³ In his study of early-modern treatments of the 'desire for approbation', including Rousseau's, Arthur O. Lovejoy characterizes such a desire as seeking in another a 'thought not [one's] own'.¹⁴ This is suggestive, but as a formulation of *amour-propre* it does not adequately distinguish the latter from the ways of relating to others as 'things with minds' characteristic of the *sauvage*. Insofar as they serve his private purposes (as instruments), the *sauvage* could very well care about the thoughts of others, and even care greatly about how he himself is taken in by them. (Such 'scorekeeping' of others' opinions is very familiar in instances of both competition and coopera-

¹² This principle concerns 'differential' consideration, as opposed to the non-differential consideration owed another in virtue of their status as, say, a citizen or a human being. (For a similar distinction, see Stephen Darwall, 'Two Kinds of Respect', *Ethics* (1977): 36-49.) I choose to focus on the former because the latter is not yet in play in Rousseau's account of nascent society (as, for him, it requires some kind of civil or political association not yet in existence). But more importantly, not every instance of non-differential consideration is unavailable to exercises of the will in the sense relevant here. For example, we can demand or claim the respect owed us as citizens or human beings without spoiling the satisfactoriness of that respect.

¹³ The notion of acknowledgment I draw on here owes much to the writing of Stanley Cavell, especially his 'Knowing and Acknowledging', in *Must We Mean What We Say?* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1969). It also owes much to Cavell's observations about how the so-called 'problem of other minds' is taken up in Rousseau, in *The Claim of Reason* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979), 467.

¹⁴ Arthur O. Lovejoy, *Reflections on Human Nature* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1961), 92.

tion for the sake of independent ends.) But, however much the *sauvage* may care about the thoughts of others, he cannot be expected to care about how they arrive at those thoughts (that is, whether as products of his own agency or not), just so long as they serve as instruments for his private purposes. Indeed, as we have seen, there is nothing in the nature of the ends the *sauvage* seeks such that their satisfactoriness eludes his exercising his will to arrive at them. And this even includes the thoughts of others.

In contrast, what is distinctive about *amour-propre*, and the attitudes of others valued in being subject to it, is that those attitudes are valued not just for whatever purposes they might serve, but for how they are expressive of an independent point of view on oneself. This means that the satisfaction one takes in such a view is (unlike the satisfaction the *sauvage* might take in the thoughts of others as instruments for his ends) entirely sensitive to one's understanding of how, and for what reasons, it comes about in the other. Thus, if such an attitude is somehow arrived at through one's exercising force on that other, then it is principally expressive of one's own will, rather than expressive of an independent point of view. Moreover, making sense of any instance of *amour-propre* where someone takes satisfaction in their own force or will, as opposed to another's independently formed attitude, seems to require understanding that instance as unhealthy. (Familiarly, another's love of oneself brought about by pill or potion should not be satis-

fyng, and if it ever were, we would have trouble seeing such satisfaction as anything other than perverse.¹⁵)

Therefore, to get at what is distinctive of *amour-propre* among ways of relating to others, we must understand it as indeed valuing *a thought of oneself not one's own*, but, most importantly, as valuing such a thought *arrived at independently of exercises of force on that other*. And here it is important to note that at one point Rousseau defines freedom, among the several different senses he distinguishes, as 'not being subject to someone else's' will (*LWM* 260/*OC* 3: 841). A reasonable corollary of this definition of freedom is that seeing another as free (at least in some respect, such as their capacity to form attitudes about oneself) requires seeing them (in that same respect) as not subject to one's own will. Thus, being subject to *amour-propre* requires acknowledging another as free in at least that sense: as a source of value whose satisfactoriness depends on its being left up to them, or up to their own independent abilities to form a point of view on oneself. Whereas the *sauvage* was subject to no desire that could not be satisfied in principle by his taking the right (and sufficiently forceful) steps toward its object, the bearer of *amour-propre* must acknowledge limits on what they can satisfactorily achieve, limits whose acknowledgment amounts to an acknowledgment of the freedom of that other whose consideration they seek. Of course, there is much more to seeing another as a free being than seeing them as a source of consideration. (Indeed, for Rousseau, any exercise of judgment or the will ought, in

¹⁵ Cf. Jean-Paul Sartre, *Being and Nothingness*, trans. Hazel E. Barnes (New York: Washington Square Press, 1956), 478ff. Someone's taking satisfaction in love brought about pill or potion is usually thought of as the stuff of fantasy, but an important ambition of Rousseau's social criticism, as I understand it, is to show that this perversity (taking satisfaction in the consideration of someone under one's control) is pervasive throughout such very real relationships as those between master and servant, employer and employee, as well as benefactor and beneficiary.

some sense, to be free; *E* 270-271, 280/*OC* 4:570-73, 585-86). But by imagining what it would be for *amour-propre* first to emerge, Rousseau suggests that it is through our finding value in what others think of us that their dimensions as free beings become salient to us. That is, for us to see others as more than ‘things with minds’, more than instruments for the satisfaction of our *amour de soi*, their freedom must come to matter to us. And it does so as a distinctive source of (healthy) satisfaction, of the sort sought in (healthy) *amour-propre*.

I will soon (in Section 5) explain more fully what I mean by ‘healthy’ *amour-propre*, but it is important to note that this acknowledgment of another’s freedom is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition on healthily desiring consideration from another. In fact, it reveals how fundamental a condition this should be for our understanding of *amour-propre* that even manifestations of this desire we may think of as unhealthy, in other respects, betray some concern with another’s dimension as a free being. For example, certain kinds of vanity (desiring consideration that one takes oneself not to deserve, or for traits one takes oneself not to possess in fact) essentially seek satisfaction in another’s free evaluation. It may be a false or exaggerated opinion that our vanity desires in another, but it is an opinion, and thus an expression of that other’s capacity to appraise us freely, nonetheless.¹⁶ And even desiring to make one’s vices known, either masochistically or through some desire for notoriety, betrays a concern for others’ evaluation of oneself, and for their dimensions as free beings at the very least.

¹⁶ Thus, it will take more than this observation, that in manifesting *amour-propre* we seek an exercise of another’s freedom, to articulate what is unhealthy or paradoxical about vanity: for example, the paradox that Nietzsche remarks on in saying that vain people often ‘end up *believing* this good opinion [that they have instilled in others] themselves’, Friedrich Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, trans. Walter Kaufman (New York: Random House, 1966), 261.

Finally, in making clearer the idea that being subject to *amour-propre* involves acknowledging limits on one's will, it might help to note how different this idea is from other philosophical ideas of volitional limits. Twentieth-century philosophers have spoken of "grammatical" or "conceptual" or "logical" limits on the will: ends whose willing is somehow, in some sense, unintelligible.¹⁷ (We might count, among these, willing to bring about a true contradiction.) We can also imagine some sense, perhaps 'metaphysical', in which we cannot will to change the past, or to continue our projects after death. In other contexts, Rousseau may be committed to countenancing some such limits on the will, and perhaps with good reason. But whatever these limits are, they should not be understood as limits specifically on the *satisfactory* exercise of the will: that is, even if (*per impossibile*) one could continue one's projects after death, carrying this out would (we expect) not be any less satisfying for its being willed.

In contrast, if one could bring about another's good opinion of oneself through will or force, one should not, insofar as one manifests *amour-propre*, thereby take satisfaction in that other's opinion. Such consideration would be formed on the basis of something (namely one's own will or force) other than this person's evaluation of oneself, and it should not be seen as anything more than one's own doing. Thus, willing, in some sense, *spoils* the satisfactoriness of receiving another's consideration, just as it would not, in the same sense, spoil some fantastic abili-

¹⁷ For considerations in favor there being 'logical' or 'grammatical' limits on the will, see Rogers Albritton, 'Freedom of Will and Freedom of Action', *Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association* 59 (1985), 239-251; and Brian O'Shaughnessy, *The Will: A Dual Aspect Theory* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), vol. 1, 2nd ed., 53-72.

ty to change the past or to continue one's projects after death.¹⁸ And I think this helps in part to account for the special salience and difficulty of being subject to *amour-propre*. Whereas before the *sauvage*'s possibilities of willfully acquired satisfaction were in a sense unlimited, now the member of nascent society faces limits on satisfaction with every person he encounters, limits in a sense even more curtailing of the possibilities of willful satisfaction than his own spatiotemporal boundaries.

4. Being Confronted by the Personhood of Another

We are now in a position to see how, for Rousseau, being subject to *amour-propre*, and thus acknowledging those limits on one's will that I just discussed, amounts to having another's personhood be visible to oneself. That is, another's dimension as a free being first comes to matter to us through our seeing this other as a source of that peculiar kind of satisfaction that cannot be achieved through force or exercises of the will. For example, throughout his autobiographical writings Rousseau depicts moments of solitariness, or apparent solitariness, somehow interrupted by the appearance of another person. In his isolation, and especially in his trancelike 'reveries', Jean-Jacques could entertain the fantasy that his powers were limitless: that, as Rousseau puts it, 'he could extend [his] existence over the entire universe' (*RSW* 81/*OC* 1:1056).¹⁹ But the sudden

¹⁸ It might seem that I am entitled to a stronger formulation than that willing 'spoils' the satisfactoriness of that consideration valued in being subject to *amour-propre*: namely, that what willing brings about cannot be consideration at all. After all, it might seem, any attitude brought about in that way is formed for the 'wrong kind of reason' for it to count as consideration. Even if this is the case, I will rely on the weaker formulation, especially when contrasting the objects of *amour-propre* (whose satisfactoriness is spoiled by willing) with the objects of *amour de soi* (whose satisfactoriness is not so spoiled).

¹⁹ Here I follow most Rousseau scholarship in distinguishing between the author of the autobiographical writings ('Rousseau') and their protagonist ('Jean-Jacques').

appearance of another person constitutes the appearance of a limit: specifically, a limit on one's powers of satisfaction, and a limit that becomes salient through one's placing significance in another's free evaluation.

If we describe these moments as ones of being 'confronted by the personhood of another', then the idea that being subject to *amour-propre* may involve being confronted by another's personhood should help to allay the impression that this passion, as 'the desire for consideration from others', must involve actively seeking another's consideration, and also that it must involve desiring consideration from someone of one's antecedent acquaintance. In fact, *amour-propre* may be manifested in an encounter as passive and impersonal as being confronted by a stranger, something vividly brought out when one is caught doing something shameful. Essential to the peculiar character of being overwhelmed by shame is that one cannot help but be concerned with what this other thinks of oneself (even if they are a stranger) and the fact that this person's evaluation is outside one's (satisfactory) control only further informs what is often a feeling of helplessness. In feeling shame, one is, perhaps just for a moment, experientially confronted by this other in her dimension as a person.²⁰

I would now like to introduce an additional principle to this discussion.

Person Principle: For any subject manifesting (healthy) *amour-propre* (and thus subject to the Differential Consideration Principle), anything seen, under some aspect, as a source of evaluative consideration of one's differential traits is, under that aspect, seen as a person.

²⁰ Cf. Sartre, 347-350ff.

It is a consequence of this principle, together with the Differential Consideration Principle, that persons are seen as sources of a kind of satisfaction whose satisfactoriness depends on its being an expression of freedom: and thus, depends on its not being willed. It is also a consequence that seeing another as a person, under some aspect, excludes seeing them as merely a thing, under that same aspect. After all, seeing another as a person under some aspect should *not* exclude seeing them as a thing under a different aspect (notably, as a possible instrument for the promotion of one's self-preservation). But even if that is the case, it does not follow that another's aspects as person and as thing are always equally salient to some subject, or that our seeing someone under one aspect never informs how we see them under another. In fact, it is tempting to think that another's aspect as a person is not just one aspect among many, but rather a principle that organizes how we see them in all their dimensions. When it dawns on us that what we took to be a statue is in fact a living person (when we are confronted by another's personhood in *that* way), we are not suddenly made blind to the aspects this person shares with statues, though how we see those aspects is surely informed and animated by our understanding that what we have before us is another free being, with an independent point of view on us.²¹

5. Healthy and Unhealthy *Amour-Propre*

So far I have focused on those manifestations of *amour-propre* that seek consideration of one's differential traits, and thus, according to the Differential Consideration Principle, consider-

²¹ In his play *Pygmalion* Rousseau explores themes associated with coming to see as a person what one had previously taken as inanimate (*P* 230-36/*OC* 2:1224-31).

ation that is satisfying only to the extent that it is seen as an exercise of another's free evaluative judgment. But, while introducing that principle, I have wanted to grant that someone may manifest *amour-propre* while nevertheless violating it: that is, while nevertheless taking satisfaction in consideration of one's differential traits that is, somehow, forced or extracted. (As I have noted, one of the characteristic responses to the difficulties of being subject to *amour-propre* is the effacing of another's dimension as a free being.) But how can being subject to *amour-propre* motivate one to efface another's dimension as a free being when it is in the nature of this passion, as I have argued so far, that being subject to it requires acknowledging exactly that: another's capacity to form evaluative attitudes freely?

Thinking this through will require understanding what it is for *amour-propre* to have a 'nature';²² how it is that, in examining its nature, we can arrive at constitutive principles such as the Differential Consideration Principle and the Person Principle; and why it should matter to some subject that they are in violation of those principles, and, thus, somehow, less than fully subject to *amour-propre*. Ultimately, I want to follow other recent commentators on Rousseau in thinking that *amour-propre* admits of healthier and unhealthier manifestations, while also making clearer what role seeing others as free persons plays in healthy *amour-propre*: that is, in those instances of *amour-propre* that more fully manifest the nature of that passion.²³ And in examin-

²² Rousseau refers to *amour-propre* as having a 'nature' at *DI* 218/*OC* 3: 219.

²³ Neuhausser speaks of 'healthy *amour-propre*', usually in contrast with 'inflamed' *amour-propre* (Neuhausser, *Rousseau's Theodicy of Self-Love*, 16-18, 95-99). Rawls distinguishes between 'natural' and 'unnatural', or 'perverted' *amour-propre* (Rawls, *Lectures on the History of Political Philosophy*, 198-199). And Dent says that *amour-propre* can take on a 'deformed character' (Dent, *A Rousseau Dictionary*, 35).

ing these matters, I should note that Rousseau begins the Second Discourse with an epigraph from Book Two of Aristotle's *Politics*:

What is natural has to be investigated not in beings that are depraved, but in those that are good according to nature (*DI* 113/*OC* 3:109).²⁴

There are several ways we might understand this epigraph to organize the themes of the Second Discourse, but I want to focus on two ways it might bear on Rousseau's investigation of the nature and good of *amour-propre*. And both of these are elaborations of the idea that an investigation of the nature of *amour-propre* is somehow coeval with an investigation of its good. First, I will look at how an investigation of the *good* of *amour-propre* (how it contributes to the flourishing of social creatures like us) contributes to an investigation of its *nature*. This will require taking seriously the idea that though social humans stand in a lineal relation to *sauvages*, they are nevertheless subject to different constitutive standards, and are thus of a different nature than their ancestors. Second, in something of a reverse direction, I will look at how an investigation of the *nature* of *amour-propre* contributes to an investigation of its *good* (as well as its bad): that is,

²⁴ The original formulation appears in Aristotle, *Politics*, in *The Complete Works of Aristotle*, trans. Benjamin Jowett (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), vol. 2, 1254a35-37.

how examining its nature can yield standards against which we can understand its healthier and unhealthier manifestations.²⁵

Rousseau suggests in several places that nascent society was a time of human flourishing. Thus, he refers to it as ‘the happiest and the most lasting epoch’, as well as ‘the state [which was] best for man’, and he says that ‘[Humankind] was made always to remain in it’, and that our movement out of it constituted ‘the decrepitude of the species’ (*DI 167/OC 3:171*). Since this is the stage of human development that marked the first appearance of *amour-propre*, any account of how *amour-propre* contributes to human flourishing should begin with an account of the good characteristic of that stage. At the same time, we should be careful in what we mean by ‘human flourishing’, since, as Rousseau says, ‘the goodness suited to the pure state of Nature was no longer the goodness suited to nascent Society [...]’ (*DI 167/OC 3:170*). That is, the *savage*, in lacking the features of a member of nascent society (such as being subject to *amour-propre*, or possessing a language) should no more be considered deficient, for lacking those features, than should a non-human animal. Otherwise, we would be comparing creatures of two different natures or kinds. And indeed, Rousseau also suggests that the movement out of the state of nature and into nascent society marked a change in the nature of humankind: he says, ‘the [Humankind] of one age is not the [humankind] of another age’ (*DI 186/OC 192*).

²⁵ This way of approaching the nature and good of *amour-propre* is circular only if we assume that understanding the good of the whole organism requires already understanding the good of the part under investigation. But even if it is circular, it is no more viciously circular than any attempt to understand the role that some part plays in an organic system. Kant later articulated what we might call a ‘virtuously circular’ conception of what it is to investigate the parts of an organism. For Kant, a living thing’s parts are ‘combined into a whole by being reciprocally the cause and effect of their form’; and ‘each part is conceived as if it exists only through all the others’, Immanuel Kant, *Critique of the Power of Judgment*, trans. by Paul Guyer and Eric Matthews (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000) 5:373-74.

If this is correct, then what is the distinctive good that being subject to *amour-propre* contributes to members of nascent society, and without which they should be understood as deficient, at least when examined according to their natures as social humans? I think we should now understand that at least part of this distinctive good is the ability to see others as persons, an ability we can exercise more or less fully, but one entirely unavailable to the *sauvage*. (In seeing others of his kind as at most ‘things with minds’, the *sauvage* was not deficient according to some standard; that was the only way of seeing others proper to his nature.) And it should hardly be surprising that Rousseau characterizes the period in which social humans first came to acknowledge each other as persons—that is, the period in which society, in a recognizable sense, first took shape—in terms of flourishing. After all, nascent society was a moment in which the difficulties of being subject to *amour-propre*, though hardly absent, did not yet manifest themselves in violence or subjugation. Indeed, this period of having others’ dimensions as free beings made visible and salient was ‘best for man’, as Rousseau puts it, exactly because it allowed the human’s character as social its fullest expression (an expression unimpeded by violence or subjugation).

Thus, I am arguing that, in examining Rousseau’s descriptions of nascent society as a period of flourishing, and in examining a way in which *amour-propre* can be understood as contributing to the flourishing of social humans (namely, as a vehicle for seeing others as persons), we can draw conclusions about the nature of this passion. That is, the feature of *amour-propre* under investigation, its character as a passion that seeks satisfaction in others’ expressions of freedom, is not an accidental or contingent feature of this passion, and not just a feature of some peculiar class of its manifestations, but rather central to the contribution this passion makes to the

metabolism, as we might put it, of social humans. And here it is important to recall the natural-historical character of much of Rousseau's writing, especially his anthropological notes to the Second Discourse, as well as his contributions to botany (evidently very influential in the period after his death). Thus, Rousseau frequently draws conclusions about the nature of humans on the basis of what contributes to our health or flourishing.²⁶ And, unsurprisingly, Rousseau defines parts of plants in terms of the roles they play in the well-functioning of their entire organisms.²⁷

Whatever we think of these particular considerations, or the particular conclusions Rousseau draws from them, we can nevertheless recognize in them a kind of natural-historical thinking central to understanding Rousseau's elaborations on *amour-propre*. Social humans, the kinds of humans our ancestors became upon entering nascent society, flourish when seeing others of their kind as more than 'things with minds', but as persons: that is, they flourish when seeing others as limiting the satisfactory execution of their wills. Moreover, the nature of what we might think of as a 'part' essential to the social human, their desire for consideration from others (*amour-propre*), should be understood in terms of the contribution that passion makes to the

²⁶ It would seem that Rousseau rejects any such thinking in his arguments against Locke's view that humans are naturally monogamous, particularly in Rousseau's statement that 'although it may be advantageous to the human species that the union between man and woman be permanent, it does not follow that it was so established by Nature' (*DI* 213/*OC* 3:215-16). But here Rousseau is rejecting the principle that something's being 'natural' follows from its contributing to the flourishing of some organism. (He adds, 'otherwise it would have to be said that Nature also instituted Civil Society, the Arts, Commerce, and everything that is claimed to be useful to man.') This is different, and much less plausible, than the principle that features of an organism (taking for granted their naturalness) can be defined in terms of their contribution to its flourishing.

²⁷ This is characteristic of the definitions in the 'Fragments for a Dictionary of Terms of Usage in Botany' (F 100-129/*OC* 4:1831-50). Alexandra Cook disputes Rousseau's authorship of this dictionary in her *Jean-Jacques Rousseau and Botany* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 298-308. It is nevertheless striking that a dictionary bearing such definitions would be attributed to Rousseau. (And Cook's position is a minority one, as she herself acknowledges: *ibid.* 298.)

flourishing characteristic of their kind (its coming to see others as persons). And if all of this is correct, then we should have a better sense of how to read the two principles concerning *amour-propre* I proffered above, namely the Differential Consideration Principle and the Person Principle. These principles, taken together, state that, for someone manifesting (healthy) *amour-propre*, persons are seen as sources of a kind of satisfaction whose satisfactoriness depends on its being an expression of freedom. Since seeing others as free, in this sense, is essential to the flourishing of social humans (as I have been arguing), these principles provide some understanding of the nature of *amour-propre*.

When I introduced those principles, I specified that they concerned *amour-propre* in its healthy manifestations. But we may now be in a position to see how that specification was, in a way, unneeded (at least depending on the context). That is, these principles both state something about the nature of *amour-propre* and, in virtue of that, state criteria for the healthy instances of that passion.²⁸ It is a familiar philosophical idea, one we should not be surprised to find Rousseau following in a natural-historical investigation of social humans, that an investigation of something's nature may yield principles regulating its flourishing.²⁹ Thus, if we take the Differential Consideration and Person Principles to characterize the nature of *amour-propre*, then a desire for consideration from others is more fully an instance of that passion, and, correlatively, a healthier

²⁸ Thus, as I understand it, the label 'healthy *amour-propre*' exemplifies what Anton Ford calls 'essential generality' in his 'Action and Generality', in A. Ford, J. Hornsby, and F. Stoutland (eds.), *Essays on Anscombe's Intention* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2011).

²⁹ Rawls says, 'The correct regulative principle for anything depends on the nature of that thing', *A Theory of Justice* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971), 29. More recently, Philippa Foot has argued that we can derive norms regulating human goodness from considerations about 'what kind of a living thing a human being is', *Natural Goodness* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 51.

instance of it, to the extent that it involves an acknowledgement of others' dimensions as free beings. This should be apparent not only from looking at the internal standards for *amour-propre* that those two principles yield, but also from the reasons, which we just examined, for understanding these principles to characterize the nature of that passion as such. If seeing others as free beings contributes to the flourishing of social humans, then that is only further reason to consider manifestations of *amour-propre* as healthy to the extent that they involve just that: acknowledging others as free beings.

Moreover, an unhealthy manifestation of *amour-propre* (paradigmatically, domination, subjugation, and other varieties of effacing others' dimensions as free beings), should not be understood as an instance of an altogether different passion; indeed, the tendency to efface others' dimensions as free beings should be understood as motivated by the characteristic difficulties of being subject to *amour-propre* (together, on Rousseau's account, with certain artificial social conditions, such as the appearance of private property; *DI* 161, 168-170/*OC* 3:164, 171-74). In other words, such an instance should be understood as failing to meet the standards constitutive of being the kind of passion that it is. We might classify some manifestation of *amour-propre* as unhealthy by looking only to the standards internal to *amour-propre* (however we might have arrived at those standards, or at a definition of that passion). But since our understanding of that passion derives from the role it plays in the flourishing of social humans, considerations about the latter (about what it is for a social human to do well) should only further inform our sense of what it is to manifest *amour-propre* badly. When our ability to see or to treat others as persons is compromised, so is our condition as social humans.

Unfortunately, it is beyond the scope of this paper to examine Rousseau's views on domination or subjugation in much detail. But we are in a better position to see how, in order to understand how domination is an unhealthy instance of *amour-propre*, we do not need to look to standards outside the nature of *amour-propre*, but rather principally to the constitutive standards of that very passion. In other words, determining just why domination has its characteristically unhealthy character does not require, as on Neuhouser's reading, looking to the terms of a 'civil association governed by a general will';³⁰ it only requires an account of what *amour-propre* is, in its connection with acknowledging others as free. (This also means that the norms informing a critique of domination should be relevant to anyone in virtue of their being subject to *amour-propre*, and not just in virtue of their being possible members of such a civil association.) Moreover, looking to the constitutive standards of *amour-propre* in order to determine its healthy and unhealthy instances renders less significant the problem that Kolodny formulated in motivating his own 'normatively neutral' account of *amour-propre*: that in treating that passion as intrinsically good, we make unintelligible its bad instances. Once we understand a characterization of the nature of *amour-propre* as yielding its constitutive standards, standards to which its manifestations may more or less fully live up, then we can define that passion in terms of its good without ruling out (and indeed, while providing an account of) some of its central bad instances.

In summary, an investigation of the *good* of *amour-propre* (how it contributes to the flourishing of social creatures like us) contributes to an investigation of its *nature*. Furthermore, an investigation of the *nature* of *amour-propre* (particularly one informed by the latter investigation) contributes to an investigation of its *good* (as well as its bad): that is, its healthier and un-

³⁰ Neuhouser, *Rousseau's Theodicy of Self-Love*, 50.

healthier manifestations. Of course, the normative terms I have used to characterize Rousseau's understanding of *amour-propre*, ones of health and unhealth, normally have their homes in talk of organisms. And in applying these terms to *amour-propre* and the social human, I have not meant this as a departure (or too much of a departure) from their normal usage. After all, *amour-propre* is, I have argued, a 'part' of a specific organism, the social human, a part that contributes centrally to the latter's health. But we social humans (who are capable of reason and reflection) are distinctive among organisms in that notions of health and unhealth not only apply to us, but also may be applied *by us*, including to ourselves and others of our kind. And I hope these observations can help us better understand Rousseau's own terms of criticism, including his engagement with notions of pathology, and especially what has come to be known as 'social pathology'.³¹ After all, if restricting another's freedom is a core manifestation of unhealthy *amour-propre*, and if the latter idea has the sense I have given it here, then the characterization as 'pathological' or 'unhealthy' of social conditions that systematically render persons as things may be more than merely figurative.

Finally, I want to return to a point I made earlier in this paper, namely that the acknowledgment of another's freedom is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition on healthily desiring consideration from another. (There I pointed out that certain manifestations of *amour-propre* we might think of as unhealthy, such as vanity, or a desire for notoriety, nevertheless betray some such acknowledgment.) And I think I can now put this point in a slightly different way: for all I

³¹ Some recent writings in this connection include Axel Honneth, 'Pathologies of the Social: The Past and Present of Social Philosophy', in Honneth, *Disrespect: The Normative Foundations of Critical Theory* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2007), 4-11; and Neuhauser, 'Rousseau: The Idea of Social Pathology' (unpublished manuscript).

have said here, there may be vicious manifestations of *amour-propre* whose character as vicious cannot be derived from that passion's constitutive standards (including the Differential Consideration Principle and the Person Principle), and which must be understood according to different normative criteria.³² At the same time, there may also be standards constitutive of *amour-propre* other than those I have examined here, including ones that can be derived from the conditions for the social human's flourishing. But these concessions only further underscore the centrality of acknowledging another as a free being for Rousseau's understanding of *amour-propre*, a centrality exhibited in the persistence with which he turns to concerns about effacing others' dimensions as free beings in his social criticism. And we can now approach that social criticism with an eye, not just to how *amour-propre* figures in it, but also to how it weaves together Rousseau's thinking about nature, the passions, and freedom.³³

³² Thus, I do not expect these principles to yield every criterion for 'inflamed' *amour-propre* that Neuhausser lists (*Rousseau's Theodicy of Self-Love*, 90-92).

³³ I have benefited from feedback on earlier versions of this paper from Olivia Bailey, James Bondarchuk, Matthew Boyle, Sandy Diehl, Jeremy Fix, Juliet Floyd, Cécile Guédon, Chandler Hatch, Rusty Jones, Christine Korsgaard, Doug Kremm, Jeff McDonough, Richard Moran, Frederick Neuhausser, Thomas Pendlebury, Iago Ramos, Ronni Sadovsky, Marc Shell, Alison Simmons, Kyle Stevens, Aleksy Tarasenko-Struc, and Ariel Zylberman, as well as participants in the Harvard Philosophy Department's Workshop in Moral and Political Philosophy and the Panaesthetics Colloquium at Harvard University's Mahindra Humanities Center. Conversations with Doug Lavin helped to shape this paper in its early stages.

Abbreviations

- DI* *Discourse on Inequality (Discourse on the Origin and Foundations of Inequality among Men)*, in *The 'Discourses' and Other Early Political Writings*, trans. Victor Gourevitch (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 111-222.
- E* *Emile, or on Education*, trans. Allan Bloom (New York: Basic Books, 1979).
- F* 'Fragments for a Dictionary of Terms of Usage in Botany', in *The Collected Writings of Rousseau*, trans. Alexandra Cook (Hanover, N.H.: University Press of New England, 2000), vol. 8, 100-129.
- LWM* *Letters Written from the Mountain*, in *The Collected Writings of Rousseau*, trans. Judith R. Bush and Christopher Kelly (Hanover, NH: University Press of New England, 2001), vol. 9, 131-306.
- OC* *Oeuvres Complètes*, ed. Bernard Gagnebin and Marcel Raymond (Paris: Gallimard, Bibliothèque de la Pléiade, 1959-69), 4 vols.
- P* *Pygmalion*, in *The Collected Writings of Rousseau*, trans. Christopher Kelly (Hanover, N.H.: University Press of New England, 2004), vol. 10, 230-36.
- RSW* *The Reveries of the Solitary Walker*, trans. Charles E. Butterworth (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1992).
- SC* *On the Social Contract*, in *The Social Contract and Other Later Political Writings*, trans. Victor Gourevitch (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 39-152. 'SC I.4.6.' refers to book I, chapter 4, paragraph 6.