DESAFIOS DEL DERECHO A LA INTIMIDAD Y A LA PROTECCION DE DATOS PERSONALES EN LOS ALBORES DEL SIGLO XXI. PERSPECTIVAS DEL DERECHO LATINOAMERICANO, EUROPEO Y NORTEAMERICANO
FORTHCOMING 2009

DEPUTIZING THE PRIVATE SECTOR?
ISPS AS AGENTS OF THE STATE

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RESUME: In this Chapter, the authors describe the changing role of telecommunications service providers (TSPs) from trusted stewards of clients’ personal information to “agents of the state”, from gatekeepers of privacy to active partners in the fight against cybercrime. It is argued that the legislative approach that has been or will soon be adopted in various jurisdictions around the world, including Canada, will lower the threshold of privacy protection and significantly alter the relationship between TSPs and the individuals who have come to depend on them to manage their personal information and private communications. The Chapter begins with an investigation of the role of TSPs as information intermediaries, and then moves to examine a Canadian online search and seizure case, where a TSP acted as an “agent of the state” by sending to the police copies of a client’s personal emails without his knowledge or consent. The Council of Europe’s Convention on Cybercrime is considered next, focusing on the privacy implications of its potential implementation in Canada and the possibility of a challenge to the constitutionality of new cybercrime laws based on the Canadian Charter

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The authors wish to express their thanks to the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council, the Canada Research Chairs program, Bell Canada and the Ontario Research Network in Electronic Commerce for their generous contributions to the funding of the research project from which this chapter derives. Special thanks also to Dr. Hilary Young, Rafal Morek and Jena McGill for their extraordinary efforts, their brilliance, and for the high quality of research support that they so regularly and reliably provide.
of Rights and Freedoms, which protects citizens against unreasonable search and seizure. Finally, we conclude by considering the privacy implications of the evolving roles of TSPs and their shifting technological architectures, arguing that the changing face of our communications infrastructure must be built with safeguards that will not only further the goals of national security and law enforcement but will also preserve and promote personal privacy.

I. INTRODUCTION

In July of 1993, a now famous cartoon was published in the New Yorker magazine. The cartoon depicts a large black pooch with big floppy ears, sitting on an office chair in front of what is, by today’s standards, a rather clunky PC. The pooch – who is talking to a smaller and extremely attentive pup – remarks that, “On the Internet nobody knows you’re a dog.” Besides being humorous, the cartoon demonstrated an important cultural discovery – in 1993, converging communications technologies created the possibility of online anonymity.

There is a less famous but perhaps more telling cartoon that appeared in April of the Year 2000, riffing on the observation made by those two dogs seven years earlier. In the Year 2000 cartoon, one dog opines to the other that, “The BEST thing about the Internet is THEY don’t know you’re a dog.” But, as those words are barked, a voice from within the computer responds to the talking dog: “You’re a four year old German Shepard-Schnauzer mix, likes to shop for rawhide chews, 213 visits to Lassie Web site, chatroom conversation 8.29.99 said third lassie on the right was hottest, downloaded 3rd Lassie 10.12.99, E-mailed them to 5 other dogs whose identities are…”

This response signifies an important shift not only in culture of the Internet but also in its architectures. As the second cartoon illustrates, there is often a commercial interest in knowing who is doing what online. In furtherance of this interest, persistent client state...
http cookies\(^3\), keystroke monitoring\(^4\) and a number of other surveillance technologies have been developed to gather data and otherwise track the movement of potential online customers.\(^5\) Such curiosity, however, is not unique to business. Concerned that computer networks and electronic information may also be used for committing criminal offences (and knowing that evidence relating to such offences may be stored and transferred through these networks), many countries\(^6\) are considering\(^7\) the adoption of or have already enacted legislation that would require telecommunications service providers\(^8\) (TSPs) to build a communications infrastructure which would allow law enforcement agencies to gain access to the entirety of a specific telecommunication transmitted over their facilities.

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3. An http cookie is a simple package of data sent by a server to an Internet browser and then sent back by the browser each time it accesses the server. Cookies are typically used for user authentication, user tracking, and maintaining user-specific information including website preferences and electronic shopping carts, though they can also be used for network attacks. Cookies are a concern for Internet privacy since they can be utilized to unknowingly track the Internet browsing patterns of an individual. Cookies may then be used to compile a profile of a user's preferences that is made available to advertising agencies without the user's permission. Cookies are the subject of legislation in the United States and the European Union (Wikipedia, online at: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Http_cookies).

4. Keystroke monitoring, or 'keylogging', is a diagnostic used in software development that picks up a user's keystrokes, or typing patterns. It can provide access to a user's passwords or encryption keys, bypassing other security measures and making it useful in identifying sources of error in computer systems, and in law enforcement and espionage. However, keyloggers in both hardware and software forms are widely available on the Internet and can be used for these same purposes by individuals who can download another's keystroke data without being traced. The privacy implications of such attacks are plentiful, as the keylogger may be able to record and access passwords for email accounts, online banking and credit cards without the permission of the individual being traced (Wikipedia, online at: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Keylog).


6. The legal blueprint from which many countries will derive such legislation is the Council of Europe’s Convention on Cybercrime Council of Europe, Committee of Ministers, ETS No. 185 (23 November 2001), online: http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/185.htm, which will be discussed further below.

7. Canada is among those countries that have considered adopting such legislation. In fact, the former Government of Canada proposed Bill C-74, the Modernization of Investigative Techniques Act, 1st Sess., 38th Parl., 2004. Although Bill C-74 is no longer under consideration due to a recent change in Government, it is expected that a substantially similar form of legislation will be tabled by the new Government in the near future. In this Chapter, we will use Bill C-74 as a model representative of the sort of approach that Canada is likely to adopt.

8. This chapter refers to “telecommunications service providers” rather than the narrower category of “internet service providers” (ISPs) and thereby reflects the language of Bill C-74. The term “TSPs”, as defined in Bill C-74, includes both Internet Service Providers (ISPs) and providers of other telecommunications services, such as mobile telephone companies. It should be pointed out, however, that the role of ISPs differs from that of other TSPs, particularly those operating solely in the offline environment, in many important ways. For a comprehensive analysis of the role of ISPs and their specific relationship with Internet users, see: Ian R. Kerr, “Personal relationships in the Year 2000: Me and My ISP” in N. des Rosiers, (ed.), No Person Is an Island: Personal Relationships of Dependence and Independence (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2002) 78 [Kerr, Me and My ISP].
In this Chapter, we describe the changing role of TSPs from trusted stewards of clients’ personal information to “agents of the state”, from gatekeepers of privacy to active partners in the fight against cybercrime. We argue that the legislative approach that has been or will soon be adopted in various jurisdictions around the world, including Canada, will lower the threshold of privacy protection and significantly alter the relationship between TSPs and the individuals who have come to depend on them to manage their personal information and private communications.

We begin with a brief investigation of the role of TSPs as information intermediaries. Then we examine a Canadian online search and seizure case, where a TSP acted as an “agent of the state” by sending to the police copies of a client’s personal emails without his knowledge or consent. We suggest that the R. v. Weir decision foreshadows a shift in the regulatory culture wherein TSPs will be expected to assist law enforcement agencies by providing them with expedited access to Internet users’ personal information and private communications.

Next, we briefly examine the Council of Europe’s Convention on Cybercrime, an instrument which calls for state signatories from around the world to ratify and implement provisions that will mandate a new marriage between telecommunications service providers and the police, bringing about a further shift in the landscape. Focusing on its potential implementation in Canada, we argue that recently proposed Canadian cybercrime legislation would lead to a lower threshold of privacy protection: there will be no judicial oversight of law enforcement’s collection of certain kinds of information from TSPs, rendering the constitutional safeguards offered by the traditional “agent of the state” analysis irrelevant. Once these new cybercrime laws are passed in Canada, the only recourse may be to challenge their constitutionality based on the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, which protects citizens against unreasonable search and seizure.

Finally, we conclude by considering the privacy implications of the evolving roles of TSPs and their shifting technological architectures. Privacy invasive practices which used to happen infrequently and with judicial oversight will soon become part of TSPs’ business routine. In our view, the evolving roles of TSPs and the shifting architecture of our communications infrastructure must be built with various safeguards that will not only further the goals of national security and law enforcement but will also preserve and promote personal privacy.

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10. Supra note 7.
II.1. DISINTERMEDIATION

For nearly a decade, scholars have focussed their attention on the Internet as an instrument of disintermediation. Recognizing that intermediaries are valuable to a transaction only if they are as inexpensive as equivalent functions found in an open market, many scholars have in fact predicted that the Internet – which reduces transaction costs by allowing direct interaction between manufacturers and consumers – will have the effect of “killing the man in the middle.” Consider the following typical statement:

Unlike tomatoes or cars, real estate listings, stock quotations, and airline schedules are bits, easily and inexpensively shipped at the speed of light. Bits need no warehousing, and the cost to make more is effectively zero. For this reason, real estate agents, stockbrokers, and travel agents will disappear much more rapidly than food wholesalers or car dealers.

While it is perhaps true that the disintermediation phenomenon occurs in the context of some business transactions, disintermediation is clearly not a universal by-product of Internet communications. In fact, online intermediaries remain quite relevant to other aspects of almost every networked communication. TSPs are the Internet’s “middlemen.” Because TSPs are the pipeline through which all of our telecommunications must flow,
they are in a position of control. As technology improves and storage becomes cheaper, TSPs are increasingly in a position to observe and record everything that we say and do online. Thus we are forced to depend on them, not only to provide quality informational services but also to safeguard our personal information and private communications and to prevent that information from falling into the hands of third parties.\textsuperscript{17} This gives TSPs power and discretion: power to control our online behaviour; and discretion to alter our outcomes.\textsuperscript{18}

The shifting architectures of the networked world currently allow TSPs automatic access to their customers’ and employees’ personal information and private communications in a manner unparalleled by even the most powerful financial institutions or arms of government. As will be further discussed below, one of the central strategies of the Convention on Cybercrime and corresponding legislation likely to be enacted in various jurisdictions around the world is to mandate a communications infrastructure that would allow law enforcement agencies to capitalize on the informational power of TSPs. In this respect, TSPs already play and will continue to play an absolutely critical role as information intermediaries. They are the stewards of our personal information and private communications. This fact is illustrated by a well-known Internet case in Canada: \textit{R v. Weir}.\textsuperscript{19}

\section*{II.2. TSPs AS “AGENTS OF THE STATE”}

Prior to the case of \textit{R. v. Weir}, it was not clear how TSPs’ role as intermediary would be understood in Canadian criminal law. In \textit{Weir}, the defendant’s TSP was found to be an “agent of the state.”\textsuperscript{20} The case therefore represented an important shift in TSPs’ role in the investigation of crime. The facts of this case are as follows.

Having inadvertently exceeded his available disk quota, Mr. Weir was having trouble accessing his e-mail. Trusting his TSP to fix the problem on his behalf, Weir called to request the assistance of a technician and then went off to work. While Weir was at work,

\textsuperscript{17} See Kerr, supra note 8.


\textsuperscript{19} Supra note 9.

\textsuperscript{20} An agent of the state is a person who is authorized to act for or in place of the state. Crown Attorneys and police officers who exercise statutory powers as agents of the government qualify as agents of the state. Canadian courts have been strict in defining and affirming the circumstances under which a person may be considered an agent of the state, requiring an identifiable, direct relationship between the agent and the state that can be found in a statute or clearly shown by convention. The agent of the state doctrine is particularly significant in Canadian criminal law and constitutional law, where it arises frequently with respect to an accused’s right to remain silent, as embodied in section 7 of the \textit{Charter}. See for example: \textit{R v. Broyles}, [1991] 3 S.C.R. 595 [\textit{Broyles}].
the technician discovered the problem. Mr. Weir had too many e-mails with large attachments residing on the host server. The excessive size of these files automatically disabled his account. The technician approached the problem in the standard way. Files were opened so that the attachments could be moved off the server. In so doing, the technician discovered that the names of certain files sent to Mr. Weir that day sounded suspiciously like titles typical of child pornography. The technician informed his manager of his discovery who, in turn, decided to alert the Edmonton police. Without any form of warrant, the police insisted that the TSP forward copies of the files. It further instructed the TSP to re-enable Mr. Weir’s account so that the files that he had been sent (but had not yet received) would come to be in his possession. Weir’s TSP capitulated to the demands of the police.

While there was a time when most observers would have said that TSPs must protect their client’s privacy interests and, absent a court order, that TSPs have no business handing over personal communications to the police, the facts of the Weir case might be described as prescient of the role that TSPs are being asked to play in law enforcement with increasing frequency on a global scale. On the basis of the transactions that took place between his TSP and the police, a search warrant was obtained and Mr. Weir’s computer was seized. What is so telling about this case is that it was initiated entirely at the discretion of the TSP. Because it was the pipeline through which all of his private communications must flow, Weir’s TSP was in a position to know the content of his and the sender’s online communications and was in a position to choose whether to contact the police or let customers go about their private business. The important point to be gleaned from this case is that, in the context of investigatory information, the architecture of the Internet does not disintermediate. Rather, it has quite the opposite effect. It requires a TSP to intermediate between two potentially conflicting roles: (i) its role as the trusted steward of its clients’ personal information and private communications; and (ii) its role as a party in possession of information that might assist in law enforcement. The TSP is, in other words, the medium and the message.

At trial, defence counsel argued that Weir had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his e-mail, as well as a constitutional right to be secure against unreasonable search and

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[^21]: Note that the files forwarded to the police were not yet in Mr. Weir’s possession, as they had not yet been downloaded to his inbox. This is because his account had been disabled as soon as his available disk quota had been exceeded.

[^22]: Ironically, the warrant upon which the police were authorized to search and ultimately seize Weir’s computer was itself founded on e-mails that he had neither received nor possessed. In fact, it remains unclear whether Weir knew at the time that the e-mails had been sent to him.

[^23]: Needless to say, the role of TSPs is multifaceted. This paper focuses on certain aspects of TSPs’ relations with private citizens and state authorities. It does not address concerns relating to the role of TSPs as independent market players and competitors. Yet it has become apparent that network providers may independently seek to interfere with the free flow of data on the Internet. Some TSPs have engaged in blocking or slowing data coming from competing sites or services. See: Michael Geist, “What Do You Want The Internet To Be?” Toronto Star (7 March 2005), online: <http://www.michaelgeist.ca/resc/html_bkup/mar72005.html>. 
seizure. He argued that the manner in which the police used the TSP to obtain evidence against his client was unconstitutional. The trial court was not persuaded. Although it agreed that the police were constitutionally prohibited from conducting an unauthorized search, it held that the usual constitutional safeguards simply do not apply to searches conducted by a private sector service provider. According to Justice Smith:

…it cannot be said that the [TSP] was performing a governmental function. [TSPs] are private organizations. They are unregulated…

With international agreements, it may come to pass some time in the future that [TSPs] will be regulated … the wish found in Canadian Government documents for such regulation is no more than a ‘pious hope’ today.\textsuperscript{24}

Weir appealed this decision, arguing that the trial court erred in its finding that the TSP was \textit{not} performing a governmental function. Relying on a doctrine in criminal law known as the “Broyles Test,”\textsuperscript{25} Weir argued that his TSP was acting as an “agent of the state.”

The agent of the state argument usually arises in the context of an investigation carried out by a private citizen. The most typical instance occurs when police send an informant rigged with a body pack into a holding cell with the aim of intercepting and recording a confession that is teased out of an accused. Where the accused has already invoked the right to silence and remains in the coercive environment of a jail cell, the agent of the state doctrine will prohibit the police from doing indirectly that which they cannot do directly. In such instances, the court will consider the collection of the evidence to be unconstitutional in spite of the fact that it was obtained not by the police but by a private citizen. Although private citizens do not generally owe the same constitutional duties that are owed by the police, where the informant is carrying out a police-type function, he or she is considered an agent of the state and the evidence is therefore inadmissible. The test

\textsuperscript{24} Supra note 9, at 46 and 49.

\textsuperscript{25} Broyles, supra note 20.
for whether a private informer is acting as an agent of the state in Canadian law is as follows:

...would the exchange between the accused and the informer have taken place, in the form and manner in which it did take place, but for the intervention of the state or its agents?

Applying the above test to the facts in the *Weir* case, the Court of Appeal held that the TSP was acting as an agent of the state when it forwarded, at the request of the police officer, a copy of the messages sent to Mr. Weir. On the basis of this finding, the Court of Appeal held that the police’s subsequent search of Weir’s home was unwarranted.

The application of the “agent of the state” doctrine to TSPs was extremely significant. By treating TSPs who cooperate with law enforcement as state agents, the courts have recognized the shifting role of TSPs. TSPs and other information intermediaries are no longer in a position to promise absolute confidentiality to their clients or to act as the guardians of their informational privacy. Nor are TSPs merely the conduit through which their clients’ personal information and private communications flow. Rather, TSPs are a reservoir of personal information and private communications – a reservoir that can and will be tapped by the state for the purposes of law enforcement.

It is our position that the shifting nature of the relationship between TSPs and the state must be further studied and understood, as it clearly alters the manner in which investigatory information is collected in the context of criminal law in a way that affects personal privacy. Ironically, the importance of the *Weir* decision will be diminished – if not completely eclipsed – by the further shift in this relationship that will follow from the implementation of the *Convention on Cybercrime*, which calls for expedited procedures as well as lower standards of accountability in the collection of private information by TSPs. However, the *Weir* decision remains significant precisely because the proposed cybercrime legislation undermines *Weir*’s privacy-protecting agent of the state analysis.

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26 In both Canadian and US law, the decision about whether a person is “an agent of the state” has been traditionally made by considering all of the circumstances on a case-by-case basis. As Stout notes, under US law, there is no bright-line test that distinguishes government conduct from private conduct. A search by a private individual may fall under the Fourth Amendment if “a government official affirmatively facilitates or encourages an unreasonable search performed by a private person.” Thus, a certain degree of participation is required before a private citizen is transformed into an agent of the state. This participation must be more than incidental contact between the citizen and law enforcement agents before the search will be subject to Fourth Amendment analysis. Two factors that courts consider when determining whether the private person is an agent or instrument of the state are whether the government knew of, and acquiesced in, the intrusive conduct, and whether the party performing the search intended to assist law enforcement efforts or to further his or her own ends. The burden of establishing that the government involvement was sufficient to alter the character of the search is on the party objecting to the search. See generally: Emily Michael Stout, “Bounty Hunters As Evidence Gatherers: Should They Be Considered State Actors Under The Fourth Amendment When Working With The Police?” (1997) 65 U. Cin. L. Rev. 665 at 673-674.

27 *Broyles, supra note 20 at 24.*
II.3. THE CONVENTION ON CYBERCRIME AND ITS IMPLEMENTATION IN CANADA

On November 23, 2001, members of the Council of Europe, and several non-member States, signed the *Convention on Cybercrime* [Convention]. The *Convention* is premised on a concern that computers can be used to commit criminal offences and on the fact that information stored or transmitted through computer systems might provide evidence of a crime. Consequently, the *Convention* stresses the need for international cooperation in the detection, investigation and prosecution of criminal offences and the corresponding need for investigatory powers, recognizing “…the need for co-operation between States and private industry in combating cybercrime and the need to protect legitimate interests in the use and development of information technologies.”

Importantly, the *Convention* also emphasizes human rights, including rights to freedom of expression and privacy, and it recognizes the need to protect personal data. The *Convention’s* text demands two broad requirements: (i) measures at a national level to implement the *Convention’s* terms; and (ii) international cooperation to investigate criminal offences.

In Chapter II (“Measures to be taken at the national level”), the *Convention* divides its requirements into substantive and procedural criminal law. The substantive criminal law section asks signatories to create several offences, including unlawful interception, access or interference with a computer system computer-related forgery and fraud, and offences relating to child pornography and copyright. The procedural law section is our current focus. It outlines potentially sweeping new investigatory powers for law enforcement and mandates access to all information stored and transmitted on computer systems. Access to this information will be facilitated by TSPs.

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28 *Supra* note 6. The Convention went into effect on July 1, 2004. Signatory nations as of December 1, 2005: Albania (ratified), Armenia, Austria, Belgium, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria (ratified), Canada, Croatia (ratified), Cyprus (ratified), Czech Republic, Denmark (ratified), Estonia (ratified), Finland, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (ratified), France (ratified), Germany, Greece, Hungary (ratified), Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania (ratified), Luxembourg, Malta, Moldova, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania (ratified), Serbia and Montenegro, Slovakia, Slovenia (ratified), South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Ukraine, United Kingdom and United States.

29 *Supra* note 6 at para. 6, Preamble.

30 *Supra* note 6 at para. 8 -9, Preamble.

31 *Supra* note 6 at para. 7, Preamble.

32 *Supra* note 6 at paras. 10 – 11, Preamble.
While governments call for expedited access to Internet communications and find the Convention useful in their efforts against terrorism\textsuperscript{33}, privacy experts have made their opposition clear. Convention supporters claim that the Convention “provides useful measures to combat attacks by terrorists and other criminals on computer systems, as well as to gather electronic evidence of terrorism and other crimes.”\textsuperscript{34} If the Internet has made terrorist groups more dangerous and more effective,\textsuperscript{35} new international mechanisms for combating terrorism would appear to be necessary.\textsuperscript{36} Privacy advocates, on the other hand, argue that the Convention is contrary to well established universal norms for the protection of the individual (such as the right to privacy of communication\textsuperscript{37}, freedom of expression\textsuperscript{38}, or the right against self-incrimination\textsuperscript{39}), that it improperly extends police

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\textsuperscript{33} Since the most recent terrorist attacks in London in July 2005, Great Britain and certain other countries have been calling for new legislation forcing TSPs to store the details of all e-mail and mobile phone communications for up to three years, so that they can be accessed by the security services when hunting terrorists. See for instance: Simon Freeman, “EU agrees to speed up anti-terror measures" Times Online (13 July 2005), online: <http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,22989-1692393,00.html>. Changes in legislation relating to the ability to monitor e-mails and text messages are also expected in countries that have not been directly affected by terrorism. See for instance: Michael Gordon, “The sum of our fears” The Age (30 July 2005), online: <http://www.theage.com.au/news/war-on-terror/the-sum-of-our-fears/2005/07/29/1122144020660.html?oneclick=true> (citing the Australian Attorney-General Philip Ruddock).

\textsuperscript{34} Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “G8 Recommendations on Counter-Terrorism,” online: <http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/economy/summit/2002/g8terro.html>.


\textsuperscript{36} See for example: Jennifer Stoddart, “Response to the Government of Canada’s “Lawful Access” Consultations: Submission of the Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada to the Minister of Justice and Attorney General of Canada” (5 May 2005), online: <http://www.privcom.gc.ca/information/pub/sub_la_050505_e.asp> (noting that the government argues that the lawful access regime needs to “simply restore a level playing field in the fight against increasingly sophisticated criminals.”)

\textsuperscript{37} The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. res. 217A (III), U.N. Doc A/810 at 71 (1948) [Universal Declaration], speaks directly to the obligations of governments to protect privacy of communication. Article 12 states that “[n]o one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence.”

\textsuperscript{38} Article 19 of the Universal Declaration further states that “[e]veryone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers.”

\textsuperscript{39} Provisions in many constitutions and laws prohibit the government from requiring a defendant to testify or otherwise give evidence against himself. For instance, the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution (U.S. Const. amend. V) states that “[n]o person shall be ... compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.” In Canada, equivalent rights exist under Section 11(c) of the Charter, supra note 11, which provides one cannot be compelled to be a witness in a proceeding against oneself.
authority, and that it will reduce government accountability in future law enforcement conduct.40

Canada signed the Convention on November 23, 2001, and thereby agreed in principle to its provisions. However, the treaty is not legally binding until ratified, and, to that end, Canada began a review of its lawful access41 laws in 2000.42 In 2002, a public consultation document43 was released which contained legislative proposals including: compelling TSPs to build the capability to intercept a specific users’ communications44; compelling the disclosure of subscriber data without a warrant45; and creating specific production orders with a low standard of judicial review for traffic data.46 Response to the proposals was largely negative, with civil libertarians, privacy activists, individual citizens, and even TSPs arguing that the proposed measures went beyond existing lawful access capabilities, violated privacy rights, and that the need for such measures has not been proven.47 Nevertheless, despite concerns raised by privacy groups and members of


41 Neither the Convention itself, nor the Explanatory Report attached thereto, uses the term “lawful access.” However, this term has been commonly used in Canada since the “Lawful Access Consultation” was launched in 2002. As explained by Canada’s Department of Justice, “lawful access” is one of the techniques used by law enforcement and national security agencies, such as the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) and municipal and provincial police forces, as well as the Competition Bureau, when conducting investigations. It involves the lawful interception of communications and the lawful search and seizure of information, including computer data. Communications and information may be intercepted from: wireline technologies (e.g. telephones); wireless technologies (for instance, cellular phones, satellite communications, and pagers); and Internet technology (such as e-mail). See: Department of Justice Canada, “Lawful Access FAQ,” online: <http://canada.justice.gc.ca/en/cons/la_al/summary/faq.html>.

42 Some commentators argue that Canadian legislative amendments concerning lawful access originated in the 1990s, before the Convention was signed. Later, they became more pressing in light of Canada’s implementation of its obligations under the Convention and the perceived heightened threat of terrorism. See: Canadian Internet Policy and Public Interest Clinic, “Canadian government proposals for updating criminal laws and facilitating law enforcement in the electronic age”, online: <http://www.cippic.ca/en/projects-cases/lawful-access/>.


44 Ibid. at 7-9.


46 Ibid. at 11-12. More information on “traffic data” can be found in subsequent sections of this chapter.

47 Both authors participated in this process, one of them filing written submissions. See: “Summary of Submissions to the Lawful Access Consultation” Chapter 4: Comments by Industry (August 2003), online: <http://www.justice.gc.ca/en/cons/la_al/summary/4.html>.
the public\textsuperscript{48}, in November of 2005 the Canadian government proposed Bill C-74, the \textit{Modernization of Investigative Techniques Act}\textsuperscript{49}. The bill largely codifies the Department of Justice’s original proposals with regard to subscriber information, and additional legislation is expected that will set out TSPs’ obligations with regard to other kinds of information. Although the Bill died on the order page with the recent defeat of the minority Liberal government, members of the privacy community speculate that this will likely only delay rather than defeat Canada’s enactment of legislation and the resultant ratification of the \textit{Convention} in Canada.\textsuperscript{50}

\textbf{II.3.1. Investigatory Information}

When the Bill that replaces Bill C-74 is ultimately proposed, there is likely to be significant repercussions for informational privacy. This is in part due to the categorisation of different types of investigatory information in the original \textit{Convention}, which loosely describes three types of information in its various Articles: (i) content data; (ii) traffic data; and (iii) subscriber data.\textsuperscript{51} Though the most recently proposed Canadian model would have adopted a more formal approach to definition that further refines the categories, its general scheme is likely to remain substantially similar to the \textit{Convention}.\textsuperscript{52} The basic approach is to treat different categories of investigatory information differently, supposedly reflecting the varying expectations of privacy that people have with regard to various types of data. In part, this is because the measure of a user’s expectation of privacy in information is crucial to whether a search and seizure of that information requires judicial pre-authorization (through a warrant or intercept order) and is thus constitutionally protected.\textsuperscript{53} The categorization of investigatory information in the \textit{Convention} has important implications for privacy protection and is explored below with specific reference to Bill C-74’s treatment of subscriber data and its implications for informational privacy.

\textbf{II.3.1.1. Gradations of Privacy Protection}


\textsuperscript{49} Supra note 7.

\textsuperscript{50} It remains to be seen whether the newly formed minority Conservative government will increase or diminish the privacy impact of the soon to be proposed Bill.

\textsuperscript{51} Supra note 6.

\textsuperscript{52} These categories were subsequently adopted in Canada in the Department of Justice’s original Lawful Access Consultation paper, the “Lawful Access Consultation Document”, supra note 43.

\textsuperscript{53} In Canada it appears undisputed that users have a constitutionally protected expectation of privacy in the information processed by TSPs. Yet, under US law, it has been argued that individuals “have no reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of records compiled and maintained by entities such as TSPs.” See: Susan W. Brenner, “Distributed Security: Moving Away from Reactive Law Enforcement” (2005) 9 Int’l J. Comm. L. & Pol’y 11.
The three categories of investigatory information described in the *Convention* comprise the various types of information sought by law enforcement during the course of a typical investigation. According to the proposed scheme the highest level of investigatory information, worthy of the greatest privacy protection, is content data. This category would include the text of e-mail messages and might also include the search terms entered into an Internet search engine. The medium level of investigatory information sought by law enforcement is traffic data, defined as:

…any computer data relating to a communication by means of a computer system, generated by a computer system that formed a part in the chain of communication, indicating the communication’s origin, destination, route, time, date, size, duration, or type of underlying service.\(^{54}\)

Conceivably, traffic data would include the information carried in the sender, recipient and subject lines of an e-mail and its size (which would in turn reveal whether there are attachments to the e-mail). They could also include the title of attachments (which might then indicate by the extension whether the files were photographs or video clips), and the Web sites visited by a user and the time spent at each. Traffic data can therefore be understood as a roadmap of a user’s Internet communications as one travels along the information superhighway. Finally, the lowest level of investigatory information, corresponding to the lowest expectation of privacy, is subscriber data. Bill C-74 describes subscriber data as “any information… respecting the name and address of any subscriber to any of the service provider’s telecommunications services and respecting any other identifiers associated with the subscriber.”\(^{55}\) It is obligations concerning subscriber information that are put forward by Bill C-74.

**II.3.1.2. Obligations Concerning Subscriber Data**

If the soon to be proposed Bill is substantially similar to Bill C-74, law enforcement would be empowered to obtain subscriber data in an expeditious manner from TSPs.

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54. *Convention on Cybercrime*, supra note 6, c. I, art.1, definition d.

55. *Supra* note 7, s.17(1).
simply by asking for it. The Bill does not require any judicial authorization. Nor is there a requirement for reasonable grounds to suspect wrongdoing. All that is required under Section 17(1) of the Bill is a written request for subscriber data by a designated individual, and a TSP must turn over the "name and address of any subscriber to any of the service provider’s telecommunications services and respecting any other identifiers associated with the subscriber." In fact, in the expedited process anticipated by Bill C-74, no justification is required whatsoever. An online service, such as Gmail, could be required by law to divulge the local TSP identification of an e-mail user. The local service provider would then be asked to identify the name, address and billing information of its client.

When one considers that Canada’s Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act (PIPEDA) currently empowers TSPs to refuse such requests unless accompanied by judicial authorization, one begins to see a significant alteration in the procedural safeguards against excessive fishing expeditions by law enforcement agencies. By removing this option and thereby forcing TSPs to engage in active partnerships with the police, the proposed Bill would leave TSPs with no choice but to turn over subscriber names and addresses in response to specific requests by police. The police would become

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56 In accordance with section 17(3) of Bill C-74, the request would have to be made by a person “designated” by the RCMP Commissioner, the Director of CSIS or the chief of a police service. Section 17(3) of Bill C-74 defines designated persons as including, “[t]he Commissioner of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, the Director of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, the Commissioner of Competition and the chief or head of a police service constituted under the laws of a province may designate for the purposes of this section any employee of his or her agency, or a class of such employees, whose duties are related to protecting national security or to law enforcement.” Section 17(2) of the Bill specifies that a designated person will only make a request for subscriber information in performing “a duty or function a) of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service under the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act; b) of a police service, including any related to the enforcement of any laws of Canada, or a province or of a foreign jurisdiction; or c) of the Commission of Competition under the Competition Act.” See Bill C-74, supra note 7.

57 Supra note 7, s. 17(1).

58 Section 17(2) of Bill C-74 requires that designated persons (police officers, for example) be acting in the course of their duties and 17(6) sets out that records must be maintained of the information requested, but otherwise the ability of designated parties to request subscriber information is almost unlimited.

59 In 2002, the government raised the possibility of a national subscriber information database. This proposal was not repeated in the 2005 proposal, nor in Bill C-74.

60 Pursuant to section 7(3)(c.1) of the Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act, R.S.C. 2000, c.5. [PIPEDA], "an organization may disclose personal information without the knowledge or consent of the individual only if the disclosure is made to a government institution or part of a government institution that has made a request for the information, identified its lawful authority to obtain the information and indicated that (i) it suspects that the information relates to national security, the defence of Canada or the conduct of international affairs; (ii) the disclosure is requested for the purpose of enforcing any law of Canada, a province or a foreign jurisdiction, carrying out an investigation relating to the enforcement of any such law or gathering intelligence for the purpose of enforcing any such law; or (iii) the disclosure is requested for the purpose of administering any law of Canada or a province.” This has been construed as a discretionary authority such that law enforcement agencies cannot compel production without a warrant or a court order.
entitled to an all-you-can-eat investigatory smorgasbord. In addition to the fact that it
remains unclear who would pay for all of this, it is worth noting that the legislation would
also enable a secret binge-fest. In other words, TSPs could be prevented from disclosing
to their customers the fact that such requests have been made, that information was
provided, and would be precluded from disclosing any other information regarding the
request, unless specifically required by law.

II.3.1.3. Privacy Implications of Increased Access to Subscriber Data

While subscriber data may carry a lower expectation of privacy than other types of
investigatory information (it has been likened to information that is available in a
television directory), its significance and potential privacy implications must not be
underestimated. Name and address are keys to acquiring other personal information,
including highly sensitive data such as health or financial records. For example, in the
United States, research at the Laboratory for International Data Privacy has shown that
87% of the US population can be uniquely identified with just a few pieces of personal
information, for example, zip code, gender and date of birth. In other words, by using
subscriber data fields, easily accessible under Bill C-74, content and traffic data can be
determined. Information collected and stored for one purpose can be combined with
information collected and stored for a completely different purpose through data
mining and two pieces of seemingly innocuous information might prove damning in
combination—an effect which is illegitimate in its failure to respect the original purpose
behind the collection of each piece of data. The conclusions possible through data
mining might also reveal something more akin to ‘content’. Similarly, the information
revealed by the roadmap of traffic data could itself be considered content. Queries to an

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61 Latanya Sweeney, “Comments to the Department of Health and Human Services on Standards of
Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information” (26 April 2002), online: <http://privacy.cs.cmu.edu/dataprivacy/HIPAA/HIPAAcomments.html> See also: Latanya Sweeney,
“Protecting Job Seekers from Identity Theft” (2006) 10(2) IEEE Internet Computing 74, and Latanya Sweeney, “AI Technologies to Defeat Identity Theft Vulnerabilities” AAAI Spring Symposium: AI
idangel/idangel1.pdf, describing Sweeney’s Identity Angel, a technology that searches the internet
and notifies “people for whom information, freely available on the Web, can be combined
sufficiently to impersonate them in financial or credentialing transactions.”

62 ‘Data mining’ is defined as “the intelligent search for new knowledge (such as personally identifiable
11 Alb. L.J. Sci. & Tech. 105. See also generally: Data Mining and Knowledge Discovery, Usama
2002); Lee Tien, “Privacy, Technology and Data Mining” (2004) 30 Ohio N.U.L. Rev. 389; and Tal Z.
Zarsky, “Desperately Seeking Solutions: Using Implementation-Based Solutions for the Troubles of
Internet search engine are a good example. It might also be said that the size of an e-mail and the names and extensions of attachments, especially when combined with other data, provide information that is just as revealing as content data.

These examples serve to blur the illusory bright-lines presupposed by the three levels of investigatory information laid out in the Convention. Although subscriber data may appear less revealing, and is therefore deemed less worthy of strong privacy protections, in combination it can be just as, or even more revealing than content or traffic data. Bill C-74’s creation of expedited, warrantless procedures for accessing subscriber information is based on the mistaken assumption that subscriber data is somehow a lesser form of investigatory information, and C-74’s procedures threaten individual privacy in a serious way. By erecting false distinctions between different kinds of data, and treating these categories of information differently, the government is in fact seeking enhanced search power through expedited processes and lower standards, thereby slashing privacy safeguards and expectations.

II.3.2. Interception Capabilities

The Convention requires TSPs to build and maintain an infrastructure specifically designed to assist law enforcement, in the form of a global intercept capability. It also provides that state parties should compel TSPs to collect and record traffic and content data in real-time. In addition, TSPs would also be obliged to keep confidential both the fact of, and any information about, the collection. Accordingly, the Canadian government had proposed, in Bill C-74, that all telecommunications service providers be required to integrate intercept capabilities into their networks. TSPs would also be subject to several other obligations, for example a requirement to remove any compression, encryption or other treatment of intercepted information that the TSP

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63 While some might describe search terms as steps towards accessing Internet content, it is worth noting that these queries could well be indicative of the content of a user’s time surfing on the Internet, similar to the content of an e-mail. In 2005, a new feature was launched by Google, the Internet’s most popular search engine, which allows users to see all of their past searches. The engine is also able to personalize and monitor previous searches to refine future results. See: Elinor Mills, “Google automates personalized search” ZDNet News (28 June 2005), online: <http://news.zdnet.com/2100-9588_22-5766899.html>. According to Chris Hoofnagle of the Electronic Privacy Information Center, by integrating more and more diverse online services, Google is “becoming one of the largest privacy risks on the Internet.” For instance, Google offers massive free storage for e-mail messages (Gmail) and has acknowledged plans to scan messages being sent and stored in order to deliver relevant text advertising alongside them. The existence of such huge databases “under a single digital roof” – makes e-businesses, such as Google, “a prime target for abuse by overzealous law enforcers and criminals alike.” See: “Quality overriding privacy?” Sauk Valley Newspapers, online: <http://www.saukvalley.com/news/2838138811387.bsp>.

64 Supra note 6, arts. 20 and 21.

65 Supra note 6, art. 20 s.3 and art. 21 s.3.

66 More precisely, TSPs would be required to maintain existing intercept capabilities, and to build in intercept capability as they make upgrades to their networks. See: Supra note 7, s.7.
applies. Only small TSPs (e.g. TSPs who provide telecom services ancillary to their core functions as educational institutions or hotels) and TSPs who do not provide telecom services to the public would be partially exempt from these requirements. As at least one commentator has observed, the benefits of this regulation in terms of effective law enforcement are questionable given that “criminals will logically migrate to small TSPs exempt from the requirements.” Before “downloading” responsibility for law enforcement onto private actors, the government should therefore provide clear and compelling evidence that the benefits of such a reconstruction are worth the cost – in terms of both dollars and, more importantly, constitutionally protected values. Yet several commentators have argued that Canada’s government “has not produced any evidence that existing rules under the Criminal Code are inadequate for fighting cybercrime.”

II. 3.3. Interpretation and Implementation of the Convention

Signatory states are left with considerable discretion in implementing the Convention. It is not unusual for international treaties to be vague in application, given the array of legal systems that must adopt its provisions. It would have been helpful, however, if the Convention had outlined in greater detail the nature of the interests affected by the contemplated measures. While privacy is specifically contemplated in the introductory preamble to the Convention as an interest to be balanced, it is not referenced in the text of the Articles. How should signatories factor privacy or other human rights concerns into the standard for the various orders envisioned? Can or should a State assume that the Convention’s failure to emphasize privacy rights is indicative of lowered value, when balanced against the international threat of cybercrime?

67 Supra note 7, s.7.

68 The types of TSPs that are completely or partially exempt from the proposed Act are set out in Bill C-74, supra note 7, Sch.1 and II.


70 Canadian Civil Liberties Association, “Cyber Snooping”, online: <http://www.ccla.org/privacy/cybersnoop.html> (citing the former Federal Privacy Commissioner George Radwanski). Even with the release of Bill C-74, no new arguments have been made to justify the need for new cybercrime legislation. See Michael Geist’s comments on this at: http://www.michaelgeist.ca/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=1009&Itemid=85. This chapter does not attempt to address all of the major issues arising from the Convention and proposed lawful access legislation. Additional topics that need to be considered in the lawful access debate include: preservation and production orders, tracking and ancillary warrants, new and revised offences, etc.

71 The Preamble to the Convention refers to both “privacy” and “personal data”: “(…) Mindful of the need to ensure a proper balance between the interests of law enforcement and respect for fundamental human rights, (…) which reaffirm the right of everyone to hold opinions without interference, as well as the right to freedom of expression, including the freedom to seek, receive, and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, and the rights concerning the respect for privacy: Mindful also of the protection of personal data, as conferred e.g. by the 1981 Council of Europe Convention for the Protection of Individuals with Regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data (…)” supra note 6 at paras 10-11.
There are good reasons to favour a restricted application of the Convention’s measures, in keeping with an overarching framework that values privacy as a fundamental human right. In our view, the Convention’s terms must be implemented cautiously. Law enforcement should be made to justify requests for access to information at a high standard before judicial authorization is granted. These orders should not be available for anticipated crimes, for example, but only when authorities believe that an offence has been committed. Law enforcement should be made to demonstrate that there are reasonable grounds for requesting data, and the scope of authorization should be construed as narrowly as possible, on a standard of necessity, not relevance to the investigation. In keeping with our observation that advances in data-mining techniques present significant danger in creating different standards of protection for different categories of investigatory information, we suggest that the justificatory standard for all categories of investigatory information should be treated the same. Our concern is that the proposal to create newly expedited means of obtaining subscriber information will almost certainly lower the threshold of protection to individuals since the so-called lower forms of investigatory information can easily be combined with other known information to build a data profile on an individual capable of revealing as much about that person as would the more highly protected information that would require a search warrant.

III. CONSTITUTIONALITY

One possible barrier to the enactment of Bill C-74 or similar legislation implementing the Convention on Cybercrime in Canada is the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Concerns over the lack of conformity of the Convention’s lawful access regime with fundamental human rights have been raised not only in Canada, but also in several other jurisdictions. In Canada, the Charter sets out the right to be free from unreasonable

72 Arguably, such standards should be established with due consideration given to requirements concerning other types of investigatory information, which currently exist in Canadian criminal law. For instance, Section 487.05 (1) of the Criminal Code sets out the threshold of “reasonable grounds to believe” in relation to information for warrant to take bodily substances for forensic DNA analysis. In that case, a judge must be “satisfied by information on oath that there are reasonable grounds to believe: (a) that a designated offence has been committed, (b) that a bodily substance has been found or obtained (i) at the place where the offence was committed, (ii) on or within the body of the victim of the offence, (iii) on anything worn or carried by the victim at the time when the offence was committed, or (iv) on or within the body of any person or thing or at any place associated with the commission of the offence, (c) that a person was a party to the offence, and (d) that forensic DNA analysis of a bodily substance from the person will provide evidence about whether the bodily substance referred to in paragraph (b) was from that person.”

73 Charter, supra note 11.

74 For example, the international signatories of an open letter to Council of Europe Secretary General Walter Schwimmer and Council of Europe Committee of Experts on cybercrime have contended that Articles 14 and 15 of the Convention are incompatible with Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights. Likewise, in light of the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, Article 18 is inconsistent with Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights. See: “Global Internet Liberty Campaign Member Letter on Council of Europe Convention on Cyber-Crime” (18 October 2000), online: <http://www.gilc.org/privacy/coe-letter-1000.html>.
search and seizure in section 8. The Supreme Court of Canada has equated this prohibition with the existence of a reasonable expectation of privacy. Should Bill C-74 or similar legislation be passed, it could be constitutionally challenged on the grounds that the law authorises unreasonable searches and seizures of personal information. Although the Charter does not apply to private parties such as TSPs, an argument can be made that because the legislation would require TSPs to conduct unconstitutional searches, it would formalise their role as agents of the state and TSPs' actions could therefore be subject to Charter scrutiny.

Courts are wary of striking down laws passed by democratically elected governments on constitutional grounds, and even if a court determines that the law violates section 8, that is not the end of the matter: a section 1 analysis would follow, whereby the government would attempt to persuade the court that the breach of Charter rights is justified in a free and democratic society. Only if the breach is not justified in a free and democratic

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75 The wording of section 8 of the Charter is: "[e]veryone has the right to be secure against unreasonable search and seizure". Section 7 of the Charter, stating that "[e]veryone has the right to life, liberty and security of the person and the right not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice," is also relevant to this discussion in that its right to liberty has been interpreted to include: “a narrow sphere of personal autonomy wherein individuals may make inherently private choices free from state interference" (Godbout v. Longueuil (Cit ofy) [1997] 3 S.C.R. 844). Although new cybercrime laws could be challenged as violating section 7, it is more likely that a challenge based on section 8, which is more directly applicable to informational privacy, would be tried.


Because of the relative nature of a reasonable expectation of privacy, it should be noted that the proposed cybercrime legislation, which would lower the current standard of privacy protection, will almost certainly have the effect of lowering the expectation of privacy that one can reasonably have in one's personal information. That is, the less privacy protection one has in a particular context, the less one is entitled to expect privacy in the same context.

The reasonable expectation of privacy test appears to be a universal means (existing in many civil-law and common-law jurisdictions), of delimiting private and public spheres of life. For example, as observed by Gomez-Arostegui, while Canada has adopted the reasonable expectation approach to interpreting section 8 of the Charter, the Constitutional Court of South Africa has used the test to interpret the right to privacy contained in section 14 of its Constitution. In addition, a court in Australia has used the concept of reasonable expectation to analyze the legality of drug testing police officers, and Israeli legislation has used the test to evaluate the secret monitoring of conversations. See: H. Tomas Gomez-Arostegui, “Defining Private Life Under the European Convention on Human Rights by Referring to Reasonable Expectations” (2005) 35 Cal. W. Int'l L.J. 153 at 164. For a comprehensive analysis of the reasonable expectation test in the United States, and particularly the role of the Katz decision, which has influenced many courts outside the United States, see: Susan Freiwald, “Online Surveillance: Remembering the Lessons of the Wiretap Act” (2004) 56 Ala. L. Rev. 9 at 38.

77 See discussion of Weir at 6, above.
society will the law be declared unconstitutional. Although the outcome remains uncertain, given that the aim of the proposed legislation is merely to modernize investigatory techniques, it is difficult to imagine that the new regime would be justified if it does result in significantly reduced privacy safeguards.

IV. CONCLUSION

In this chapter we have said that law enforcement must maintain high standards of privacy protection in its extension of “lawful access” to Internet communications. There are two underlying rationales. First, there is significant value in preserving the integrity of Internet communications, especially as the Internet becomes increasingly prominent as a mode of communication. Individuals use e-mail, voice-over Internet protocol and other forms of online discourse to communicate with friends, transact with trading partners, and participate in democracy. Citizens should be able to expect such interactions to be secure and private. Privacy safeguards must therefore be built into cybercrime legislation out of respect for individual autonomy and in recognition of the power of technology to create relationships of dependence.

Second, it is a trite observation that once lost, privacy cannot be regained. By treating TSPs as reservoirs of personal information, we fundamentally shift the relationship between these private entities and those who use them. There is an increasing tendency to shift “much of the responsibility for controlling crime from a cadre of designated professionals to the individuals and entities who use cyberspace.” The new approach calls for easy and expedited access to personal data and private communications. In this chapter, we suggest that the proposed legislation not only creates new powers for law enforcement, it also requires TSPs to exercise new discretion and to exercise state-like powers. This shift in the regulatory oversight from the public to the private sphere is unprecedented, complex, and is potentially mired with unforeseen consequences.

Section 1 of the Charter, supra note 11, states, “[t]he Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees the rights and freedoms set out in it subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.” The section 1 test is well established in Canadian law and was set out in the case of R. v. Oakes ([1986] 1 S.C.R. 103). It consists of two parts: the first asks whether the legislation infringes a Charter right. If not, it is constitutional. If it does infringe a Charter right, the second stage of the Oakes test comes into play. Here the court must determine whether the legislation infringes a Charter right. If not, it is constitutional. If it does infringe a Charter right, the second stage of the Charter test comes into play. Here the court must determine whether the legislation infringes a Charter right.

Technology is Janus-faced. Just as a stethoscope can be used to hear a beating heart in crisis or to crack a safe, Internet technologies can be used to breathe life into our global village, or to trample on individual rights. In our view, privacy considerations are a first-order concern that must be adequately accommodated in any proposed cybercrime legislation. Such is not the case with the recent Canadian proposal. Lesser intrusions or better justifications for increased interception capability and expedited access to investigatory information are necessary in order for an implementation of the Convention to satisfy constitutional scrutiny. TSPs have, until recently, helped preserve personal privacy by acting as the stewards of our personal information and private communications. With the Convention on Cybercrime and its implementation in Canada, TSPs will likely be required to shift allegiance to the State, assisting law enforcement by building and maintaining systems of interception and preservation that could result in damaging incursions into individual privacy. Our right to privacy is a fundamental human right, one that allows us to define our individuality free from unjustified interference by the State and its agents, and the value of which must not be trampled by technology or the law.

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80 Janus was a Roman god who protected doors and gateways. The god is typically represented in art with two faces looking in different directions, symbolic of entrances and departures through the gateway. Janus also represented beginnings, thus the first month of our year is named ‘January’.