

# Passion, Politics and Violence: A Socio-historical Analysis of Spanish Ultras

Ramón Spaaij and Carles Viñas

*This essay examines the origins, diffusion and spread of organized groups of young football fans (so-called ultras) in Spain. The first Spanish ultra groups emerged after the 1982 World Cup held in Spain. Mainly mimicry of both Italian and English supporter styles, the Spanish ultras separated themselves from the indigenous 'peña' culture emphasizing instead a more active and visible approach to football fandom. This movement, often heavily supported by the clubs, subsequently spread to other clubs in Spain's First and Second Divisions. In the second half of the 1980s, mainly due to the increasing politicization of the ultra groups and the eruption of the skinhead youth subculture, violence became an intrinsic feature of the ultra movement and at times created widespread social panic. The escalation of violence finally resulted in the fragmentation and decline of traditional ultra groups and the emergence of alternative fan groups explicitly opposed to violence. These developments set in motion a complex pattern of rivalries and allegiances strongly influencing contemporary Spanish football culture.*

The Spanish football league is regarded as one of Europe's leading football leagues and has been the subject of a considerable amount of literature in recent times. Highlighting trends in Spanish society in general, its football culture is closely intertwined with regional and political identity, activated in various deep-seated rivalries, and 'has become inseparable from the expression of regional culture'.<sup>[1]</sup> But the involvement of youth in Spanish football and its effects on these identities and rivalries has somehow escaped the attention of writers. More specifically, with the exception of a small number of isolated studies,<sup>[2]</sup> the politics and violence associated with young Spanish supporters have never attracted academic focus. Nor has Spanish social science research on politics and violence in football penetrated the international research community, partly due to linguistic problems.<sup>[3]</sup> This essay argues that the Spanish experience

---

Ramón Spaaij is at the Amsterdam School for Social Science Research, University of Amsterdam, Kloveniersburgwal 48, 1012 CX Amsterdam, Netherlands. Email: R.F.J.Spaaij@uva.nl; rspaij@hotmail.com.

Carles Viñas is at the Department of Modern History, University of Barcelona, Spain.

constitutes an interesting and partly divergent case with various particular features, which contributes significantly to the current debate on the causes and dynamics of football hooliganism, and the historical and cultural embeddedness of football rivalries. In fact, it is a striking example of Dunning, Murphy and Waddington's assertion that 'related differences [in football hooliganism] are likely to arise in relation to the particular trajectories of economic, political and cultural development of different countries and regions'.[4]

The essay examines, more precisely, the origins, spread and diffusion of radical youth groups in Spanish football, better known as 'ultras'. It discusses the meaning of ultra, a way of life for thousands of young Spanish fans. As will be argued throughout the text, the original Spanish ultra spirit, copied from the already-developed Italian fan groups, has changed significantly over the last two decades. In the course of its evolution, the ultra movement has been confronted with several challenges and threats, invariably changing its nature to a large extent.

### The Meaning of 'Ultra'

'What many have pompously called the "ultra movement" is nowadays a complex puzzle in which nothing is what it seems.'[5] The use of the term 'ultra' has its roots in Italy, where in the late 1960s organized groups of young football fans began to emerge in a strongly politicized environment. The Italian ultra movement demonstrates a high degree of autonomy, different to the English hooligan stereotype, and has become an important peer model for various European countries.[6] Spanish youth were among the first to copy the Italian ultra model, interacting with both the English hooligan subculture and some strong native cultural and political features.

In the early years in Spain, the term 'ultra' had a very specific meaning: an ultra is more than an ordinary spectator; it is someone who unconditionally supports the team in an active, constructive but critical manner. Being ultra is not restricted to match days but is fundamentally a way of life, devoting a large part of one's spare time to organizing activities or preparing displays for the next match. The meticulously choreographed displays (*tifos*) – large flags, mosaics, drums, flares, chants, and so forth – in combination with a high degree of spontaneity constitute a fundamental characteristic of the ultra movement:

The duties of a group are based on a loyalty that has no limits, on an authentic maturity that is accompanied by the struggle for certain duties that we, as ultras ... have to fulfil and should not forget. When we formed the first groups, spontaneity was an essential characteristic in order to develop a good organization, and from chaos we moved on to fight for the modernization and effectiveness of the organized *tifo*. [7]

The first generation of Spanish ultras perceived themselves as deeply tied to the colours of the team, rejecting the passive style of support that characterized ordinary spectators. Parallel to the influence of the Italian fan model, many young fans embraced popular English youth subcultures such as the Mods and later the skinheads, which centred on the classical football hooliganism model. Italian and English influences coexist on the Spanish terrace, but with different motivations: whereas ultras emphasize

the creation of a passionate atmosphere by large, choreographed displays, hooliganism is essentially a more aggressive form of football fandom in which actively seeking confrontations with rival hooligans is a fundamental feature. Ideally, ultras should therefore be considered as a form of organized support rather than a form of violence. In reality, however, most ultra groups include cores of violent fans who engage in political or territorial conflict with rival ultras or the police, often influenced by English football hooliganism. Another important difference between the two models is the numbers involved. The ultra groups, partly owing to their organized and institutionalized nature, essentially have more members or affiliates than hooligan groups.[8]

It was not until the mid-1980s, more specifically in 1986, that the word *ultra* first appeared in media reports, which previously preferred the term *socio* (member) when speaking of radical football fans. At the completion of the decade, the increased politicization and radicalization of many ultra groups (which will be analysed in a later section of this essay) and subsequent stigmatization had initiated a profound change in the social definition of *ultra*. More frequently, the media started using the term *ultra* in connection with violence and right-wing politics, as a result of which *ultra* began to serve as an abbreviation for *ultraderecha* (far right wing), giving the term a negative connotation:

I have never been ashamed of being an *ultra*. In university, I used to say: 'Yes, I am an *ultra*'. That provoked a lot of repulsion, people telling me I was violent and fascist. But I have never done such things. I have never considered myself as fascist, and reject any form of violence. But I guess that's people who haven't got a clue what's really going on.[9]

Considering Spain's strongly polarized political culture, this development inevitably caused a marked division in Spanish football and gave rise to two opposite conglomerations. On the one hand, the more right-wing radical groups prided themselves on being true ultras, reaffirming their social identity through the mediated significance of the term – that is, being fascist and extremely violent – whereas other fans publicly rejected this image, favouring a new understanding of passionate fandom. The latter part, primarily consisting of Basque, Galician and some Andalusian and Catalan fan groups, created an 'anti-*ultra*' movement, a campaign in which all ideologically left-wing groups joined forces to combat fascism in Spanish society, often without rejecting the use of violence.[10]

Seemingly, a matter of word-use, the terminology used by radical fan groups is of crucial importance to the understanding of the deep-seated rivalries and violence in Spanish football. The conflicts between ultras and anti-ultras (or *hinchas*, fans) are part of a network of rivalries and allegiances between, and even within, radical fan groups, which is considered highly fragmented and is constantly changing. It is within this complex network that the passion, politics and violence of Spanish ultras take place.

### **Spanish Ultras: Past and Present**

In the evolution of Spanish *ultra* groups four relatively autonomous phases (albeit, of course, interrelated) can be distinguished: the origins of the *ultra* phenomenon in

Spain in the early 1980s; the diffusion and expansion of the Spanish ultra movement in the second half of the 1980s; the radicalization, politicization and fragmentation of the ultra groups in the late 1980s and 1990s; and the current situation marked by further fragmentation and decline.[11]

### *The Rise of Spanish Ultras: Origins and Influences*

The emergence of a radical youth movement in Spanish football occurred significantly later than it did in, for example, the United Kingdom, Italy, the Netherlands, Germany and Belgium. This delay is related to the particular political history of twentieth-century Spain, in which it suffered two long periods of military dictatorship (under José Antonio Primo de Rivera, 1920s, and Francisco Franco, 1939–75) and a Civil War (1936–39). Regional identity and language, most notably Catalan and Basque, were severely oppressed and the relative isolation, restricted media coverage and firm repression under Franco's military dictatorship seem to have prevented the import of foreign (mainly British) youth subcultures that were already manifest in various other Western European countries in the 1960s.[12]

After Franco's death in 1975, Spanish society slowly opened up to foreign influences and the 1982 World Cup, celebrated in Spain, consolidated the first embryonic core of young football fans that had emerged in the late 1970s. For many young fans this event facilitated their first direct contact with some of the infamous foreign fan groups following their national team during the tournament, above all the English and the Italians, and to a lesser extent the Argentinians and Brazilians. The presence of these foreign fans had a lasting effect on the Spanish supporters in that they witnessed a completely different way of experiencing football, both visually and vocally. Spanish historian and journalist Juan Segura Palomares recalls the admiration felt by native fans:

Thousands of Italians, with their shouting and their flags – red, white and green – answered the thousands of Brazilians who, with yellow shirts and green flags with the globe in the middle, dancing a samba, enervating, sensual and continuous. It was a hallucinating spectacle. Many Espanyol socios who were present cried of emotion observing their beloved Sarria [Espanyol's stadium] transformed into the centre of a global fiesta broadcasted by televisions all over the world.[13]

The year 1982 thus became a landmark in the history of Spanish football culture, as in the wake of the World Cup the emergence of native groups of radical young fans started to take flight. Up until then, a restricted number of such youth groups had existed, mainly at major clubs, separating themselves from traditional Spanish fan clubs (*peñas*) by proclaiming their passion for innovation and an active approach to football fandom. As such, they opted for a new way of experiencing football, in many cases without rejecting the use of violence.

The *peña* has been a central feature in Spanish football culture since the second half of the twentieth century.[14] These local fan clubs started to emerge throughout the country from the 1950s onwards, and with even more rapidity in the 1970s, establishing a sense of commitment, identity and democracy within the clubs' social fraternity.

FC Barcelona, for example, actually totals approximately 1,500 registered *peñas* on four continents, of which 1,000 are fairly active, whereas, in 1944 it only had one (the *Penya Solera*). A basic feature of the traditional *peña* is its social composition, mainly consisting of older fans, men and women alike. Within the fan clubs, the youth were marginalized, which, in a more general sense, reflected the involvement of youth in Spanish football spectatorship before and during the Franco regime. But changes started to occur, albeit slowly, in the mid-1970s, especially after the dictator's death in 1975. During this period the use of small-scale choreographed displays (especially flags) commenced among a number of *peñas* and the first core of young supporters emerged either within traditional *peñas* or as separate entities.

In the early 1980s, these young supporters appeared ready to distance themselves from the traditional pattern of football fandom in order to create an atmosphere similar to what they had experienced during the 1982 World Cup. While older fans tended to view their *peña* as an important social site without paying too much attention to actively supporting the team and creating a passionate atmosphere inside the stadium, young supporters rejected this style of support, heading towards a generational clash which ended with groups of young fans abandoning, if not being expelled from, their *peñas*. These developments culminated in the emergence of the first ultra groups and, rather unforeseen, a substantial increase in football-related violence.

Perhaps unsurprisingly, the first groups of radical young fans emerged in World Cup host cities, predominantly in Madrid, Barcelona, Seville, Bilbao, Gijón and Valencia. But just as importantly, a few of these cities' fan groups had already experienced some kind of direct contact with their English and Italian peers. Young members of Real Madrid *peña* Las Banderas, for instance, had observed West Ham United hooligans during the European Cup Winners Cup tie against Madrid's little brother Castilla in 1980:

We had the opportunity to watch one of the most violent fan groups in the world ... Can you imagine what the future ultras thought when observing these masses enter our stadium? There were no confrontations between both fan groups because the truth is we wouldn't have had the slightest chance. Once inside our stadium, the hooligans ... destroyed everything they could ... The young Real Madrid fans decided to end the shame of being attacked in our own stadium. Never again![15]

The next season, in 1981, on the occasion of a European Cup match between Real Madrid and Inter Milan, the young radical fans interacted with Italian ultras. This had a direct impact on the evolution of youth groups in Spanish football: 'We spent the night talking about football, hooliganism and the organization of *ultra* groups with these experienced Italian ultras, and it was decided to denominate ourselves exactly that: ULTRAS.'[16]

Following these events, in the 1981–82 season, spectator violence occurred during a match between Real Madrid and Sporting Gijón, again involving young members of Las Banderas. Following these incidents, the protagonists were expelled from their *peña*, subsequently founding, though unofficially, their own group called 'Ultras Sur'. In the following season the group established itself in the south stand of the Santiago

Bernabéu stadium. From its foundation, Ultras Sur has been involved in various episodes of violence directed at rival fans, the police or journalists, leading several group members to be judged before the club's disciplinary commission.

At the same time Real's main local rival, Atlético Madrid, witnessed the rise of a like-minded radical group. Atlético's Peña Fondo Sur, created in the late-1960s, was transformed into the first organized youth group at the club, and in the 1977–78 season the group changed its name to Peña Ruben Cano, in honour of the club's Argentinian player. Finally, in 1982, the group again changed its name to Frente Atlético Ultras, the name by which the group was actually known.

Another city in which the ultra movement has had a lasting effect on local football culture is Barcelona. At the city's two First Division clubs, FC Barcelona and Real Club Deportivo Espanyol,[17] groups of radical young fans emerged: Boixos Nois and Brigadas Blanquiazules, respectively. Boixos Nois was founded in 1981, and together with Ultras Sur the group has become an influential role model for all other Spanish groups. In its first year as a small group of no more than 50 young fans, it strongly identified with pro-independence Catalan nationalism.[18]

In the same year, at the other side of Barcelona's Diagonal Avenue, a group of 13 students founded Peña Juvenil, a fan group which soon became the reference point for Espanyol's youth support. From the start, Juvenil was heavily supported by the club, having access to a storage room within the premises of the stadium and receiving a bonus for every new member. Juvenil soon captured around 800 young *periquitos* and was the precedent for another, more radical, group within the Spanish ultra movement, Brigadas Blanquiazules. This group, founded in the 1984–85 season as a reaction to the aggressions provoked by Boixos Nois, soon obtained notoriety for its neo-fascist connections. In cities like Seville or Gijón similar pioneering ultra groups emerged, the Brigada Norte Biri Biri (better known as Biris Norte) at Seville FC, founded in 1974–75 as a traditional *peña*, and Ultra Boys of Sporting Gijón founded in 1981, formerly known as Hinchada Fondo Sur.

Characteristic of the first phase of the Spanish ultra movement is the very colourful atmosphere created in the stadia, predominated by large flags and sporadically accompanied by pyrotechnical elements like smoke pots or flares. In this period various political tendencies existed among the ultras. Obviously, in many cases the political allegiances of the ultra groups reflected deep-seated regional identities, but with some very particular exceptions such as Espanyol's Brigadas Blanquiazules.[19] At this point often heterogeneous and flexible, these political tendencies would intensify and distort with the passing of time, constituting a key element in the development of the groups and inter-group rivalries.

### *The Diffusion and Expansion of the Ultra Movement*

Once the first ultra groups were established, a rapid process of diffusion took place within the Spanish state. Soon almost every First and Second Division club fostered one or more radical group on its terraces. Among these there were well-known groups such as Peña Mújika (Real Sociedad), Yomus (Valencia FC), Herri Norte Taldea

(Athletic Bilbao), Brigadas Amarillas (Cádiz FC), Ultras Violetas (Real Valladolid), Ligallo Fondo Norte (Real Zaragoza) and Indar Gorri (Osasuna).

The second stage in the evolution of Spanish ultra groups featured a change in the style of support. The traditional use of large flags (on poles) which the groups had copied from the more developed Italian groups was prohibited by the police forcing the ultras to bring British elements into their fan culture, especially chants and the display of scarves, and also *bengalas* (flares) became a familiar sight on the Spanish terraces.[20] But next to the realization of choreographed displays, a less appreciated phenomenon began to take hold of the ultra groups-violence.

The violence provoked by ultras underwent a transformation from mainly isolated incidents in the early 1980s to a phenomenon of seemingly alarming proportions a few years later. The sudden upsurge took security forces by surprise because, until that moment, violence had not been perceived as a serious social problem. In the 1984–85 and 1985–86 seasons, members of Ultras Sur were involved in a sequence of violent incidents, which reaffirmed the group's reputation for being one of Spain's most violent fan groups. But without a doubt the 1986–87 season will be remembered as one of the most violent campaigns in the history of Spanish ultras, again with Ultras Sur at the foreground. During a basketball match between Real Madrid and Estudiantes, members of Demencia, a fan group supporting Estudiantes, were savagely attacked. This incident illustrated another peculiarity of the Spanish ultra movement. The violence provoked by radical football fans spilled over to other sports, albeit to a lesser extent. The diffusion to other sports was partly due to two influential groups, Ultras Sur and Boixos Nois, given the fact that both Real Madrid and FC Barcelona have several professional sports sections, and both groups started to attend some of their club's basketball, handball and indoor hockey matches. The deep-seated rivalries intrinsic to football's ultra movement were thus partly reproduced in other sports.

During the season, both Frente Atlético and Ultras Sur provoked serious disorder in Valladolid. On 12 October 1986, Brigadas Blanquiazules and Boixos Nois clashed outside the Nou Camp stadium following the local derby between FC Barcelona and Espanyol, resulting in seven people getting injured. In the wake of these incidents the Spanish media started to report more frequently on radical fan groups, often with poignant headlines: 'No to the Brigadas!'[21]. As a result of the increased attention given to ultras, the clubs showed their first preoccupation regarding the violent elements within their support, and in many cases took steps to strengthen the control inside the stadium by employing private security companies. Other clubs attempted to decrease the power of the ultra groups, for example, by putting a hold on their support or by banning the most radical fans from the stadium. These measures turned out to be ineffective, save for the occasional, isolated successes. The ultra groups continued to be active, often more cohesive and organized than before.

The failure of the new measures was partly caused by another central feature of the Spanish ultra phenomenon: the close relationship between clubs and ultras. In many cases the ultras were initially supported by the clubs, as many club directors saw in these groups a welcome means of support for the team at both home and away matches, and also as a pressure group, which by creating a hostile atmosphere could

possibly influence refereeing decisions. In return the clubs provided the groups with various favours: an exclusive territory within the stadium (the *grada* or *curva*), often controlled by the ultras themselves; reduced prices or free tickets; the financing of travel to away matches; and an office or storage room within the premises of the stadium to guard material or organize activities. These favours, without doubt, helped the groups expand, being able to attract new members through the exhibition of spectacular displays and by offering them reduced prices or free tickets.[22]

A second reason for clubs to support the ultras involves club politics, especially the presidential elections. Ultras can be a useful resource in times of political insecurity and change, allowing club directors to influence the electoral process. There are various examples of ultra groups promising the club president their support during the elections in exchange for certain forms of aid, especially within Spain's two largest clubs, Real Madrid and FC Barcelona. Sometimes ultra leaders were even employed in club directors' private businesses, mainly as security staff. The ultras vow to vote for the president and do not exclude intimidating electoral opponents. But in reality, fear is perhaps the main reason for the clubs' reluctance to progressively combat the violent elements within the ultra groups. Not only can radical fans cause damage to the public image of the club, they might also turn against the club directors themselves.[23]

### *Radicalization and Response*

During the second half of the 1980s, consolidation took place within the Spanish ultra movement, accompanied by an alarming spiral of violence. By now the ultras were represented in nearly every Spanish city, with every First and Second Division club having its own radical group.[24] Moreover, the amount of violence provoked by these groups increased dramatically, some of the groups having evolved into fairly structured and organized entities with a strong internal cohesion. For some the more aggressive style of support copied from English hooligans became an end in itself, a very fashionable way of life on the terraces. This development was closely related to two other, inter-related elements: the eruption of the skinhead subculture and the increasing politicization of the ultra movement.

An important ingredient that helped to propagate the increasing violence and politicization of the Spanish ultra scene has been the eruption of certain British youth subcultures, predominantly the Mods and skinheads, which contributed a more homogeneous element in terms of aesthetics and ideology. The skinhead subculture, with strong National Socialist and neo-fascist connections,[25] became a principal influence for the ultras. It transformed into a fashionable dress code resulting in the loss of heterogeneity that characterized many groups and led to a certain degree of militarization in the clothing of the ultras: shaved heads, bomber jackets with political (Nazi) symbols, Dr Martens boots, and so forth. It also provoked pseudo-politics: the ultras adopted radical political ideologies by osmosis rather than as a result of ideological formation.[26] In many cases this ideology is both superficial and changeable, a fact underlined by the changes that some groups have suffered on an ideological level. Riazor Blues, ultras of Deportivo La Coruña, were transformed from a far right to a

radical left-wing group; by contrast, Boixos Nois evolved from a left-wing pro-independence group towards neo-nazism.[27] These changes may easily have confused new young fans:

When I joined the *boixos*, I thought they were left wing and pro-independence. Then I realized they were the pits, man, that they were extreme right. It was the *boixos* who used to give it all for Barça and for Catalonia, but they are a disgrace now, man, they are Nazis who shit on Catalonia and forget that Barça is above all that – or should be.[28]

The extreme politicization of the ultras was soon translated into episodes of violence both inside (confrontations between rival ultras) and outside the football context (against ethnic rivals, homosexuals and immigrants).[29] An extreme example of such ‘hate crimes’ was the assassination of a transvestite on 6 October 1991, allegedly by skinhead members of Boixos Nois. Such tragic events, widely reported in the Spanish media, created a sense of fear among the general public, mainly because of the supposed irrationality of the acts, often referred to as *violencia gratuita* (senseless violence): ‘They were dressed in paramilitary clothing and nazi symbols, and before they entered the action [the fight] they insistently shouted the name of Hitler and called the Barcelona fans Jews.’[30]

Although various radical political ideologies had existed within the ultra scene from the start, they had now been transformed into a major influence for group identification and, as a result, gave rise to a complex network of rivalries and allegiances between the ultras. Within the national panorama, in which strong local and regional rivalries have always been an essential ingredient, a new element entered the scene: political confrontations. Usually more symbolic than physical, deep-seated conflicts emerged between groups sympathetic to the resurgence of historical nationalisms (either radical left or right-wing pro-independence) on the one hand, and groups supporting the idea of a united Spain (often nostalgic to the Franco regime and related to National Socialism) on the other.

The second half of the 1980s thus formed a critical period in the radicalization of the ultra movement, above all due to the presence of skinhead gangs within the ultra groups. Groups like Brigadas Blanquiazules, Boixos Nois and Ultras Sur were the first to find skinheads within their ranks and in some groups the skinhead element even seized leadership.[31] In his analysis of the Spanish ultra movement, Italian expert Fabio Bruno concludes:

Politics and national rivalries now dominate other, more important aspects. It is useless for Spanish groups to declare themselves ‘non-political’ when for example there are dozens of nazi or communist flags. Many groups seem to promote Che [Guevara] or Franco over their team, and it also seems to me the skinhead movement in Spain has had a very negative effect.[32]

For a long time the violence of the ultras took place in an environment of institutional disorientation. Step by step the seriousness of the violence increased, culminating in the death of Espanyol fan Frédéric Rouquier on 13 January 1991, stabbed to death by members of Boixos Nois. In the wake of this homicide the spiral of violence

existing between both rival groups further intensified. Violent confrontations also occurred outside the football context, in local bars or clubs or characteristically on Spain's National Day (12 October).

On 15 March 1992, another football-related death shocked Spanish society. Guillermo Alfonso Lázaro, a 13-year-old boy, died in the Sarriá stadium after being mortally wounded by a maritime flare launched from the opposite stand during a match between Espanyol and Cádiz FC.[33] The person responsible for the tragic event, however, was an ordinary Espanyol fan and not a member of the ultras. But although on this occasion the ultra groups had nothing to do with the incident, they did suffer the consequences. *Bengalas*, until then massively used by the ultras as part of their displays, were prohibited by the Spanish authorities. This initiative was initially carried out in cooperation with the fan groups, who unanimously and without too many protests gave up their fireworks out of respect for the victim's family. Soon these products were replaced by other items: plastic strips, toilet paper rolls and so forth.

In the aftermath of these tragic events a significant change occurred in the violence provoked by the ultras, slowly developing towards a less physical and more ritual element within the ultra movement. The ritual aggression that had always been embedded in the activities of the ultras in many cases replaced physical confrontations.[34]

The decline of physical violence between rival ultras can partly be explained by the authorities' response following the incidents. In the 1980s Spain's attitude towards football violence had a very passive character. Although in 1987 the Spanish government had signed the European Convention on Spectator Violence and Misbehaviour at Sporting Events, created in the aftermath of the Heysel disaster (1985), very few preventive measures were employed to reduce the violence of the ultras. As it became clear that the safety measures adopted by police and clubs had not had the desired effects, the Spanish authorities proposed a number of initiatives to combat football violence.[35] In 1990 Spain installed the Sports Law, followed by a Royal Decree in 1992. These new laws regulated the creation of the *Comisión Nacional Contra la Violencia en Espectáculos Deportivos* (National Commission against Violence at Sporting Events), which had, among others, the task of investigating the problem of violence in Spanish football and proposing penalties to fans or clubs. Interestingly, on various occasions the Commission emphasized 'the urgent necessity for clubs to give no direct or indirect support to groups which do not have associative status'.[36] Many ultra groups, however, are registered as official *peñas*.

On an international level, UEFA regulations installed in 1993 required Spanish football clubs to construct numbered seated places for all spectators within a period of five years. This had a major impact on the Spanish ultra movement, because the construction of seats largely obstructed the active involvement the ultras regarded as essential to their activities. Together with various other measures, which consisted, amongst others, of a large police presence and extensive searches at high-profile matches, as well as tougher sentences for those convicted for football-related offences, this created, in the eyes of the ultras, an environment overtly hostile to their activities. Their voice was audible through national fanzines, especially *Superhinchas*, founded in 1993:

You [the National Commission] have a wrong idea, which is the generalization of the concept 'vandal' to any young fan who visits a football stadium with a scarf in order to support his team (...) because you still haven't bothered to search for the true roots of the violence problem, a complete minority within the youth that visits the stadia; because you haven't bothered to solve this problem by trying to discuss it face to face with representatives of groups or *peñas*. [37]

*¡Basta ya! Towards a New Understanding of Football Fandom*

For many years ... the ultras have been prisoners of aesthetics and fashions, of reactionary pseudo-ideologies that have little or nothing to do with football and its universe. [38]

By the early 1990s, the original ultra spirit had largely lost its influence due to the rise of the skinhead subculture and the subsequent politicization of the ultras. The consequences of this development, most notably a spiral of violence and radicalization, inspired groups of like-minded fans to attempt to transform the negative image of the ultras, either by separating themselves from the original ultra groups or by creating new groups. The alternative fan groups which emerged within this framework are deeply connected to the colours of the team, but opposed to the type of violence engaged in by traditional ultras: 'we entirely oppose violence, which is hardly ever justifiable'. [39] Moreover, their negative view of the radical politicization suffered by the ultra groups has led many of these groups to believe that football and radical politics should not be mixed, in order to avoid conflict and violence: 'Politics within the groups and *peñas* divides us without knowing the serious consequences it could have. If someone is interested in political causes it's right to acknowledge them, but not in the stadia! What have Hitler or Stalin done for our clubs? Nothing.' [40]

The first fan group of this character, strongly influenced by the Italian ultra phenomenon, was founded in 1989 at FC Barcelona: Peña Almogávers. Soon, other like-minded groups emerged: Peña Juvenil Espanolista at Espanyol, Orgullo Vikingo at Real Madrid and Gol Gran at Valencia FC. This new movement within Spanish football culture subsequently spread to other parts of Spain, with alternative fan groups emerging within most First Division clubs.

The attitude of the new groups towards the function of violence and politics within the ultra movement allowed a more constructive collaboration between fans, clubs and governmental institutions, acting as intermediates for the more radical and violent factions. [41] At some clubs the authorities launched campaigns to integrate peaceful and radical factions as a means of reducing the violence of the latter. Moreover, various fan groups contributed to conferences, debates or educational programmes which aimed to promote sports' positive social functions. One of the best-known examples is the involvement of Almogávers in the international public debate following the death of Genoa fan Vincenzo Spagnolo on 29 January 1995, murdered before the start of an Italian league match between AC Milan and Genoa. The group launched a campaign to prevent such tragedy in Italy, Spain or any other country in the world. Their manifesto was signed by various Spanish ultra groups, which included Irreducibles (a joint

operation by Brigadas Blanquiazules and Peña Juvenil), Ultras Sur, Frente Atlético, Boixos Nois, Ultra Boys, Biris Norte and Yomus.[42]

The new fan groups have also cooperated with non-governmental campaigns showing the more peaceful and positive side of young supporters in Spanish society. Among their initiatives have been an aid campaign for the children of Bosnia-Herzegovina through the sales of fan material, in which eight Spanish fan groups participated, as well as the collection of food for the poor in Barcelona by members of Espanyol's Juvenil. These campaigns also had an effect on some of the traditional fan groups, lending a hand to beneficiary events, such as the manifestation against racism, xenophobia and violence in football, jointly organized by Herri Norte Taldea, Abertzale Sur and SOS Racism in Bilbao, and other campaigns carried out by Frente Atlético and Ligallo Fondo Norte. The involvement in a variety of activities has helped the new groups create a more positive image: a way of experiencing football without the negative elements of the radical ultras (especially violence and neo-fascist politics). As a consequence, the new fan model has become an important reference point for young fans who are afraid of the small but extremely violent elements in Spanish football. Together with the increased sophistication and efficacy of police control at Spanish football matches, this has led to a safer and more moderate environment, more accessible to young fans, especially young women.

### **Spanish Ultras into the New Millennium**

The various developments described in previous sections of this essay have produced a very complex and fragmented status quo. By the late 1990s many traditional ultra groups had suffered a substantial decrease in their membership and capacities due to processes of radicalization, fragmentation and polarization. These processes, involving a number of elements, shape the contemporary map of conflict and violence in Spanish football.

#### *Political Conflict*

The politicization of the ultra movement in the late 1980s and early 1990s has had a major influence on the network of rivalries and allegiances between ultra groups. The current panorama is highly polarized and fragmented, with three main ideological streams: ultras sympathetic to National Socialism or neo-fascism (Ultras Sur, Brigadas Blanquiazules, Boixos Nois, Supporters Gol Sur, et cetera); groups with a radical left-wing association (for example: Peña Mujika, Herri Norte Taldea, Indar Gorri, Brigadas Amarillas, Sang Culé Cor Català); and largely non-political groups (Gol Gran, Almogávvers, Orgullo Vikingo, Peña Juvenil Españolista, Colectivo 1932, Symmachiarrii, and so forth).

The political antagonism between radical left and right wing fan groups has long been the main source of conflict and violence in the Spanish ultra movement. But largely as a result of the increased efficacy of police control, violent confrontations between rival fan groups have decreased significantly, instead transforming into more ritualized

forms of aggression (mainly threats and gestures). Despite this general trend, occasional confrontations between rival groups kept occurring in the late 1990s and early 2000s and some of these incidents sparked considerable social panic. On 8 December 1998, members of Frente Atlético's neo-fascist section Bastión stabbed Real Sociedad fan Aitor Zabaleta to death after a UEFA Cup return leg between his team and Atlético Madrid. On 7 October 2003, at the conclusion of a Cup game between Compostela and Deportivo La Coruña, a member of Deportivo's Riazor Blues, Manuel Ríos Suárez, died from a fierce kick received from another Deportivo fan, as he tried to stop some Compostela fans being attacked. This incident led to the immediate dissolution of Riazor Blues.

### *Waves of Violence*

Apart from these tragic incidents of football-related violence, the Spanish authorities responded to certain 'strings' or 'waves' of violence over short periods of time in which a number of seemingly serious incidents occurred. To a certain degree the seriousness of these incidents are more imaginary than real; the media tended to exaggerate their reporting on football violence dramatically during these periods, thereby creating feelings of insecurity. But nevertheless, action is required on the part of the authorities to reduce these feelings. A recent example of these dynamics occurred in May 2002, with the football season coming to an end and a lot being at stake. A number of incidents resulted in the media sporting catchy headlines: 'Fear of Confrontation between Rival Fans',<sup>[43]</sup> 'The Cancer of Football',<sup>[44]</sup> 'Football, hit by Violence',<sup>[45]</sup> and 'Fear in Football'.<sup>[46]</sup> Within days of the first media reports Spanish vice president and Home Office minister Mariano Rajoy announced a series of measures to reduce the sudden increase in football-related violence.

### *Derbies*

Deep-seated local and regional rivalries have been vital elements in Spanish football since its foundation.<sup>[47]</sup> Among the main local rivalries are those between Real Madrid and Atlético Madrid, Seville FC and Real Betis, FC Barcelona and Espanyol, and Real Sociedad and Athletic Bilbao. Of the regional rivalries, the one between Real Oviedo and Sporting Gijón has been of particular importance. Strangely, Spain's biggest 'derby', as the Spanish call it, between Real Madrid and FC Barcelona has less to do with regional rivalry but more with politics. Confrontations between these teams evoke deep-seated feelings of mutual hatred, fuelled with historical accounts of political conflict. The strong political connotations of this derby have not infrequently resulted in incidents both on and off the pitch.<sup>[48]</sup> But local and regional derbies have also been accompanied by serious outbreaks of violence. In the 1920s and 1930s, for instance, various matches between FC Barcelona and Espanyol were marred by pitched battles involving rival players and fans alike.

Local and regional rivalries still play an important part in contemporary Spanish football culture and outbreaks of violence at derbies, although to a lesser extent, still

take place. For example, Seville FC's ground was closed four times in less than two years following violent disturbances, two of which, on 12 October 1999 and 6 October 2000, occurred during a Sevillian derby. On 17 April 2004, serious disorder occurred before the start of a derby between Atlético Madrid and Real Madrid, resulting in 28 people being injured and 15 hospitalized.[49]

### *High-profile Matches*

Other influential incidents of violence are those that occur in international matches, usually broadcast live in various countries, with the UEFA or FIFA particularly sensitive about possible unruly fan behaviour. In particular, a number of Champions League games marred by ultra violence have had serious, albeit short-term, consequences for the clubs involved, often damaging the club's image. One of the most striking examples of damage done to a club's reputation has been the Champions League match between Real Madrid and Borussia Dortmund in April 1998. Shortly before the start of the match, members of Ultras Sur pulled down one of the goals live on international television, resulting in a long kick-off delay and a large fine imposed on the club.

### *Intra-group Conflict*

The process of radicalization has also had serious consequences for the internal structure and dynamics of the fan groups. The last decade has witnessed an increase in the conflicts and violence between radical fans of the same club, either between members or affiliates of the same group or between the different groups existing at the same club. Not infrequently, factions with opposing political ideologies within radical groups have fought on or off the terraces, usually resulting in fans separating themselves from the main group and displacing their activities to a different section of the stadium, sometimes in the form of a new, independent fan group. The following excerpt typifies the situation at various Spanish clubs:

This season the incidents between the leftist members of the group and a reduced group of Biris with a right-wing ideology were continuous from the first game ... One of the most tense moments occurred when the group Riazor Blues visited the Sánchez Pizjuán [stadium of Seville FC]. The friendship between both groups, mainly because of similar political ideas, is well known. At the end of the game, the extreme right-wing section of Biris attacked both groups with stones ... But the most serious incident occurred last January 24, when members of the right-wing group exhibited a Spanish flag and the main group of opposite ideology rushed towards them. The fight that followed resulted in various injuries among the right-wing side, three arrests on the opposite side, and four more people involved.[50]

But politics is not the only factor that has undermined the cohesion of Spanish ultra groups. Another important source of conflict is the power struggle among ultras. With the emergence of new fan groups in many of the original ultra groups, a sense of betrayal and injustice emerged, as these new groups threatened their status within the

ultra movement. Furthermore, it endangered their relationship with the clubs and the various forms of support they received. This has led to various traditional ultra groups – especially neo-fascist elements – defending their status by intimidating or viciously attacking members of the alternative groups. On several occasions, fear of the ultras has stopped members of the new groups from attending matches:

Especially away matches can be very dangerous. You have to watch your back continuously, because you never who might have a go at you: rival groups, the police or your own fans. That's madness. Some of the things I've seen are unbelievable, people of the same team fighting each other on the terraces. That's the main reason why I don't travel to away games anymore.[51]

## **Conclusions**

In this essay we have attempted to provide a socio-historical analysis of the ultra movement in Spain. This analysis, in part, is an affirmation of Dunning, Murphy and Waddington's assertion that: '[P]rocesses of diffusion rarely involve slavish adoption. Rather, they almost invariably entail modification and adaptation by the receiving group or groups as they merge the adopted patterns with their own distinctive cultural forms.'[52]

With regard to Spanish football fandom we have shown how foreign fan models (Italian ultras and English hooligans) have mixed with some strong native cultural elements, reflecting predominantly the close intertwinement between football and politics. An interesting illustration of this interplay between foreign and indigenous cultural features is perhaps the eruption of the skinhead subculture in Spain. Whereas the English skinheads of the 1960s were mainly apolitical, in Spain the skinhead movement became a focus for National Socialism and neo-fascism. At a later stage it also attracted radical left wing or communist variations.

A second feature of the Spanish ultra movement is the internal conflict present within many groups. On many occasions, violence emerges not out of the hooligan-type (though often politically fuelled) confrontations between rival groups, but as a result of political antagonism or power struggles between radical fans of the same club. Such conflicts within a group or between groups from the same club have led many ordinary fans to experience unpleasant scenes of intimidation, threat or even physical violence.

Another peculiarity is the close relationship between ultras and clubs and the active role that most clubs have played in the expansion of the ultra phenomenon. Although the clubs have slowly adopted a more passive relationship with their ultras, many continue to support or tolerate the radical fans in one way or another. It was not until September 2003 that the first real effort was made to reduce ultra violence, with an ambitious campaign launched by the new FC Barcelona president Joan Laporta. So far only Real Madrid president Florentino Perez has followed the example set by Laporta, although in a far more moderate manner.

While examining the origins, diffusion and spread of the Spanish ultras in a more general way this essay excludes, or only briefly considers, certain important features of

the Spanish ultra movement. These features include the social aspects of group membership, the absence of a clear-cut relationship between violence and class, the role of the Spanish mass media in the amplification and de-amplification of football-related violence, and so forth.[53] Furthermore, the analysis does not always take into account the very particular trajectories or specific historical rivalries between individual Spanish football clubs. A need for more specific studies therefore remains to be undertaken. We sincerely hope that this essay will put Spanish football culture and hooliganism on the international research agenda as well as spur others to repair omissions to augment the present effort.

## Notes

- [1] P. Ball, *Morbo: The Story of Spanish Football* (London: WSC Books, 2001), p.16. On Spanish football culture see, for example: C. Fernández Santander, *El fútbol durante la guerra civil y el franquismo* (Madrid: Editorial San Martín, 1990); J. García Candau, *Madrid-Barça: Historia de un desamor* (Madrid: El País Aguilar, 1996); J. García Candau, *El fútbol sin ley* (Madrid: Penthalón, 1980); J. García Castell, *Història del fútbol català* (Barcelona: Aymà, 1968); D. Shaw, *Fútbol y Franquismo* (Madrid: Alianza Editorial, 1987); G. Colomé, 'Conflictos e Identidades en Catalunya', in S. Seguro (ed.), *Fútbol y pasiones políticas* (Madrid: Debate, 1999); P. Unzueta, 'Fútbol and nacionalismo vasco', in S. Seguro (ed.) *Fútbol y pasiones políticas* (Madrid: Debate, 1999).
- [2] For example: J. Durán Gonzalez, *El Vandalismo en el Fútbol. Una reflexión sobre la violencia en la sociedad moderna* (Madrid: Gymnos, 1996); T. Adán Revilla, *Ultras y skinheads: la juventud visible. Imágenes, estilos y conflictos de las subculturas juveniles en España* (Oviedo: Ediciones Nobel, 1996). An interesting non-academic comparative study is D. Brimson, *Eurotrash. The Rise and Rise of Europe's Football Hooligans* (London: Headline, 2003).
- [3] A few interesting exceptions are J. Walton, 'Basque Football Rivalries in the Twentieth Century', in G. Armstrong and R. Giulianotti (eds), *Fear and Loathing in World Football* (Oxford and New York: Berg, 2001); J. Burns, *Barça: A People's Passion* (London: Bloomsbury, 2000).
- [4] E. Dunning, P. Murphy and I. Waddington, 'Towards a Global Programme of Research into Fighting and Disorder at Football', in E. Dunning, P. Murphy, I. Waddington and A.E. Astrinakis (eds), *Fighting Fans. Football Hooliganism as a World Phenomenon* (Dublin: University College Dublin Press, 2002), p.223.
- [5] *El jugador*, 12 (Oct. 1997), 42.
- [6] C. Bromberger, 'Formes et sens de la passion partisane chez les ultras du football', in M. Comeron (ed.), *Quels supporters pour l'an 2000?* (Bruxelles: Labor, 1997), p.19. On Italian ultras, see C. Podaliri and C. Balestri, 'The Ultras, Racism and Football Culture in Italy', in A. Brown (ed.), *Fanatics! Power, Identity and Fandom in Football* (London and New York: Routledge, 1998); A. Dal Lago, R. Moscati and P. Gaggianese, *Regalateci un sogno. Miti e realtà del tifo calcistico in Italia* (Milán: Bompiani, 1992); A. Roversi, *Calcio, tifo e violenza. Il teppismo calcistico in Italia* (Bologna: Il Mulino, 1992); A. Roversi and C. Balestri, 'Italian Ultras Today: Change or Decline?', in E. Dunning, P. Murphy, I. Waddington and A.E. Astrinakis (eds), *Fighting Fans. Football Hooliganism as a World Phenomenon* (Dublin: University College Dublin Press, 2002).
- [7] *Superhincha*, IV, 33 (1996), 6.
- [8] The size of ultra groups varies greatly, depending on the club's success, the facilities offered by the club, the amount of internal and external conflicts, and so forth. Over the years, the main Spanish ultra groups have numbered between 500 to 1,000 on average, with the exception of Frente Atlético which currently has, depending on the game, approximately 4,000 affiliates.

- Two main reasons for the group's strength are its area within the ground and the fact that Atlético Madrid only has one main ultra group. Other major Spanish clubs all have more than one youth support group, which has led to a certain degree of fragmentation.
- [9] Former vice-president of a Spanish ultra group. Personal interview, 12 May 2004.
- [10] See, for example, *Torcida Antifeixista*, (Sept. 1994).
- [11] For a slightly different stage model see C. Feixa, 'Cultures de pau i cultures de guerra: Fútbol, joventut i violència', paper presented at the Prevention of Football Violence Conference at Barcelona Football Club, Barcelona, 4–5 Dec. 2003.
- [12] A similar conclusion is drawn by Duke and Slepíčka with regard to communist regimes. V. Duke and P. Slepíčka, 'Bohemian Rhapsody: Football Supporters in the Czech Republic', in E. Dunning et al. (eds), *Fighting Fans*, pp.53, 60.
- [13] J. Segura Palomares, *Cent anys d'història del RCD Espanyol de Barcelona* (Barcelona: Fundació Privada RCD Espanyol de Barcelona, 2000), p.351.
- [14] Among the social activities organized by *peñas* are coach trips to home and away games (depending on the distances) and a clubhouse where their members gather to chat or to watch the club's matches broadcast on television.
- [15] *En el fondo hay sitio*, Fanzine Ultras Sur, I, 5 (1991).
- [16] Ibid.
- [17] The name of the club was changed in 1994 from Castillian Real Club Deportivo Español to Catalan Real Club Deportivo Espanyol, as part of the club's policy to change the public image of the club. For the sake of consistency, we have chosen to use the latter form. Nevertheless, the previous club name and its image within Catalonia offer important explanations for the emergence of a neo-fascist youth element at the club.
- [18] For a detailed analysis of the ultra phenomenon in Barcelona, see C. Viñas, *Skinheads a Catalunya* (Barcelona: Columna, 2004).
- [19] The case of Espanyol is very complex and largely the result of the historical image of the club as being a non-integrated, anti-Catalan club, often seen within Catalonia (especially in FC Barcelona circles) as 'the enemy at home'. Hence a fierce rivalry developed with FC Barcelona, representative of Catalan nationalism, ever since its foundation. For further details see, for example, G. Colomé, 'Fútbol i identitat nacional a Catalunya: FC Barcelona i RCD Espanyol', *L'Avenç*, 211 (1997), 32–5; and G. Colomé, *Le RCD Español de Barcelona: du lieu commun au stade* (Barcelona: Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, 1995).
- [20] Among the first groups to use flares as a means of supporting the team was Gijón's Ultra Boys. Its proliferation can be explained by the fact that Gijón is a port city, which enabled the obtaining of flares, usually utilized for maritime activities.
- [21] *Sport*, 15 Oct. 1986.
- [22] J. Durán González, 'Hinchadas radicales en el fútbol', in *Temas para el debate*, XIV, 1 (1996), 37–40.
- [23] A. Salas, *Diario de un skin. Un topo en el movimiento neonazi español* (Madrid: Temas de Hoy, 2003).
- [24] For example, Ultra Naciente (UD Las Palmas), Celtarras (Celta de Vigo), Supporters Gol Sur (Real Betis Seville), Juventudes Verdiblancas (Racing Santander), and Frente Bokerón (Málaga CF).
- [25] As a reaction to neo-fascist skinheads emerged SHARP (Skinheads Against Racism Prejudice) and red skins (communist skinheads). Usually with the same dress code (only the political symbols changed), these left-wing skinheads opposed the stigmatization of the subculture as being overtly racist and fascist. Soon, SHARP emerged on the terraces of many Spanish football clubs, especially in the Basque Country and Galicia.
- [26] T. Adán Revilla, 'Ultras e hinchas: política y violencia en el fútbol en España (1982–1997)', in Consejo Superior de Deportes, *Política y violencia en el fútbol* (Madrid: Ministerio de Educación y Cultura, 1998), p.123; C. Fernández Villanueva (ed.), *Jovenes violentos* (Barcelona: Icaria, 1998), pp.24–33.

- [27] In his analysis of neo-nazi skinheads in Spain, political scientist Xavier Casals locates these radical youths within the periphery of politics, where ‘converges what we could entitle “lumpenpolitics” – the conduct of small groups and minute entity acronyms – juvenile marginality (the world of confrontations and rivalries between rival fans and youth gangs) and *violencia gratuïta* [senseless violence]’. See X. Casals, *Neonazis en España. De las audiciones wagnerianas a los skinheads (1966–1995)* (Barcelona: Grijalbo, 1995), p.269.
- [28] Burns, *Barça: A People’s Passion*, p.21.
- [29] J. Pallarés, C. Costa and C. Feixa, ‘Okupas, makineros, skinheads. Ciudadanía y microculturas juveniles en Cataluña’, in C. Feixa, C. Costa and J. Pallarés (eds), *Movimientos juveniles en la Península Ibérica* (Barcelona: Ariel, 2000), p.104.
- [30] *El País*, 14 Oct. 1986.
- [31] On the evolution of skinheads within the ultra groups, see Viñas, *Skinheads a Catalunya*, pp.226–45.
- [32] F. Bruno, ‘Evolución ultra española’, *Superhinch*, 1, 4 (Oct. 1993), 30–2.
- [33] See for an extensive analysis of the incident ABC, 17 March 1992, pp.91–3; Segura Palomares, *Cent anys d’història del RCD Espanyol de Barcelona*, pp.480–5.
- [34] T. Adán Revilla, ‘Rituales de agresión en subculturas juveniles urbanas: Hooligans, Hinchas y Ultras’, *Cuadernos de Realidades Sociales*, 45/46, 1 (1995), 51–73.
- [35] Senado, *Dictamen de la Comisión especial de investigación de la violencia en los espectáculos deportivos, con especial referencia al fútbol* (Madrid, 1990).
- [36] Council of Europe, *Respect by Spain of the European Convention on Spectator Violence at Sports Events* (Luxembourg, 1998).
- [37] *Superhinch*, 1, 1 (May 1993), 6.
- [38] *El jugador*, 12 (Oct. 1997), 43.
- [39] ‘Penya Almogàvers: Fanatics del Barça, sense necessitat de violencia’, *Gent Culé*, 14 (Dec. 1991), 11. All groups of this character oppose the hooligan-type violence, but in some cases they have a different view of violence as ‘self defence’: ‘We reject violence as a way of life, but if we must react to aggressions provoked by rival groups or the police, we will not hesitate to do so.’ (Member of a Spanish ultra group. Personal interview held on 4 June 2004).
- [40] *Superhinch*, 3, 19 (March 1995), 8.
- [41] E. Jareño Ruíz, ‘La comunicación al servicio de la prevención social de los grupos de seguidores ultras’, paper presented at the ‘Seminario Internacional sobre la Gestión del hooliganismo y las estrategias de prevención en Europa’, Lieja, 1998.
- [42] *Manifiesto de las peñas juveniles contra la violencia* (Barcelona, 3 Feb. 1995).
- [43] *Marca*, 3 May 2002.
- [44] *El Periódico*, 5 May 2002.
- [45] *Diario AS*, 7 May 2002.
- [46] *El Periódico*, 7 May 2002.
- [47] The origins and diffusion of these rivalries are discussed, for example, in a special issue of *L’Avenç*, 211 (1997).
- [48] On the Madrid-Barcelona rivalry, see, for example, J. García Candau, *Madrid-Barça: Historia de un desamor* (Madrid: El País Aguilar, 1996).
- [49] *Diario AS*, 18 April 2004; *La Vanguardia*, 19 April 2004; *El País*, 19 April 2004.
- [50] *Superhinch*, 4, 30 (March 1996), 33.
- [51] Member of a Spanish ultra group. Personal interview, 5 May 2004.
- [52] Dunning, Murphy and Waddington, ‘Towards a global programme of research into fighting and disorder at football’, in Dunning et al. (eds), *Fighting Fans*. p.223.
- [53] Elsewhere these features are treated extensively. See, for example, R.F.J. Spaaij, *Club Cultures and Subcultures: Football Hooliganism in Western Europe* (forthcoming); C. Viñas, *El mundo ultra en España* (forthcoming).