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The football laboratory: policing football supporters in the Netherlands

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Abstract

An advanced security assemblage is now at the permanent disposal of authorities in their quest to pre-empt and manage risk at football matches. This chapter proposes the ‘football stadia-as-laboratories’ metaphor as an analytical lens through which to examine the security and risk management technologies that are being used to conduct the behaviour of football supporters in the Netherlands. It is argued that pre-emptive risk management in the policing of football supporters involves a dispersed and fragmented set of state and non-state actors that engage in the process of identifying, categorizing, monitoring and punishing supporters who are seen to pose a threat to public order. The chapter also analyzes the modes of resistance used by football supporters to countervail, weaken or subvert disciplinary matrices, showing the diversity in supporters’ responses to the techniques of pre-emptive risk management.

Introduction

[T]he finality of government resides in the things it manages and in the pursuit of the perfection and intensification of the processes which it directs; and the instruments of government, instead of being laws, now come to be a range of multiform tactics.¹

In February 2012, the Netherlands Minister of Security and Justice, the mayors of municipalities with a professional football club, the Royal Netherlands Football Association (Koninklijke

¹ Foucault, (Michel), ‘Governmentality’. In *The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality*, Burchell, (Graham), Gordon (Colin), Miller (Peter), Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 95.

Nederlandse Voetbalbond, KNVB), the Public Prosecution Service, the police and the Football and Security Audit Team all signed the new National Action Plan Football and Security. The plan contains specific measures aimed at reducing ‘disorder’ at professional football matches in the Netherlands. These measures follow the introduction of the Policy Framework for Football and Safety (2011), which claims to represent a ‘tough approach to hooligans’.² The new action plan and policy framework constitute the next incremental step in a process that spans more than three decades. At the heart of this process is the *dispositif* of precautionary risk, a dominant risk logic in late modern society which seeks to pre-empt and minimize the probability of any undesirable conduct in the future.³ Pre-emptive risk management involves a mode of surveillance that can be termed anticipatory surveillance or ‘systematic predetection’, the objective of which is ‘not to confront a concrete dangerous situation, but to anticipate all the possible forms of irruption of danger’, in order to reduce uncertainty and to control outcomes.⁴ This mode of surveillance seeks techniques for identifying, classifying and managing groups sorted by levels of dangerousness and risk. In relation to football, pre-emptive risk management involves a dispersed and fragmented set of public and private actors that engage in the identification, categorization and close monitoring of risk and ‘risky’ populations.

This chapter explores the nature of the security and risk management technologies that are being used to police football supporters in the Netherlands. The term ‘technologies’ is used to focus attention on the actual mechanisms through which authorities have sought to shape, normalize and instrumentalize the conduct of football supporters in order to achieve the objective they consider desirable.⁵ Drawing on Foucault’s notion of governmentality, which

² Ministry of Security and Justice, ‘Tough approach to hooligans, more room for supporters’, May 23, 2011; Ministry of Security and Justice, *Kader voor beleid: Voetbal en veiligheid*, The Hague: Ministry of Security and Justice, 2011.

³ Aradau, (Claudia), Van Munster, (Rens), ‘Taming the Future: The *Dispositif* of Risk in the War on Terror’. In *Risk and the War on Terror*, Amoore (Louise), de Goede (Marieke), London: Routledge, 2008, 23-40. A *dispositif* is a more or less organized assemblage of practices, techniques and rationalities. For Michel Foucault, a *dispositif* constitutes ‘a thoroughly heterogeneous ensemble consisting of discourses, institutions, architectural forms, regulatory decisions, laws, administrative measures, scientific statements, philosophical, moral and philanthropic propositions’. Foucault, (Michel), ‘The Confession of the Flesh’. In *Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972-1977*, Gordon (Colin), New York: Pantheon Books, 1980, 194.

⁴ Castel, (Robert), ‘From Dangerousness to Risk’. In *The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality*, Burchell, (Graham), Gordon (Colin), Miller (Peter), Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 288.

⁵ Miller, (Peter), Rose, (Nikolas), *Governing the Present*. Cambridge: Polity, 2008, 32. In this chapter, less attention is paid to what Foucault terms the ‘technologies of the self’, i.e. the processes through which the self is constructed or modified by individuals themselves.

views government as the ‘conduct of conduct’,⁶ this chapter will show how the policing of football supporters in the Netherlands features not only direct intervention by means of specialized public and private security apparatuses, but also more indirect and dispersed techniques for directing and controlling supporter behaviour. This approach aligns with that of Bale, who argues that the collective experience of sports spectators has increasingly become one of ‘segmented and panoptical confinement’ characterized by seemingly indispensable technologies and geographies of rationalized order and surveillance (e.g. CCTV, surveillance, security personnel, assigned entrances and seating, and directed spectator traffic flows).⁷ These technologies, it can be argued, are disciplinary matrices that create ‘docile bodies’ (controlled, regulated bodies) which are easy to control by people in authority.⁸ As such, they seek to reshape the ways in which each individual, at some future point, will conduct him- or herself in a space of regulated freedom.⁹ The football stadium and its surroundings can be seen to function as a laboratory in that it has come to constitute a site for the production of knowledge about those under observation, and a place for (scientific) experimentation and training. The ‘football stadium-as-laboratories’ metaphor provides an analytical lens through which to examine the security and risk management technologies that are being used to conduct the behaviour of football supporters in the Netherlands.

The above processes of discipline and their implications for football supporters’ civil liberties and everyday practices should not be over-stated or over-generalized. Not only are they context-dependent (i.e. time and place matter), but, in Foucault’s view, individuals are far from passive victims of the system.¹⁰ Foucault argued that ‘where there is power there is resistance’.¹¹ For Foucault, resistance is present everywhere power is exercised; the network of power relations is paralleled by (and, in fact, depends for its existence on) a multiplicity of forms of resistance.¹² It is possible for football supporters to contest and counter prevailing tendencies in the policing of football. To fully understand the security and risk management technologies in

⁶ Foucault, (Michel), ‘The Subject and the Power’. In *Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics*, Dreyfus (Hubert), Rabinow (Paul), Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982, 208-226; Dean, (Mitchell), *Governmentality: Power and Rule in Modern Society*. London: Sage, 1999.

⁷ Bale, (John), *Landscapes of Modern Sport*. Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1994, 84.

⁸ Foucault, (Michel), *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison*. New York: Pantheon Books, 1977.

⁹ Rose, (Nikolas), *Powers of Freedom: Reframing Political Thought*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999, 22.

¹⁰ Oksala, (Johanna), *Foucault on Freedom*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005.

¹¹ Foucault, (Michel), *The History of Sexuality: An Introduction*. New York: Vintage Books, 1990, 95.

¹² Smart, (Barry), *Michel Foucault*. London: Tavistock, 1985; Kelly, (Mark), *The Political Philosophy of Michel Foucault*. London: Routledge, 2009.

football, then, it is necessary to also examine the modes of resistance or ‘counter-conduct’ in the everyday practices of football supporters, especially those used to strategically countervail, weaken or subvert disciplinary matrices. Although they work from markedly different theoretical perspectives, scholars such as O’Neill, De Biasi, and Stott and Pearson, have all demonstrated the importance of this approach in their studies of the social interaction between football supporters and police.¹³ In this chapter, I will analyze the issue of resistance in relation to the ways in which football supporters in the Netherlands respond to and anticipate the security and risk management technologies that are being used to conduct their behaviour. First, however, I will examine the nature and historical development of security and risk management technologies in Dutch professional football.

The football stadium as a technological laboratory

Technology plays a major role in risk management at football matches in the Netherlands. Until the late 1980s entrance controls at Dutch football stadia were fairly straightforward: stewards checked paper tickets by hand and spectators who possessed a valid ticket were allowed to stand or sit wherever they pleased on the designated terrace. This began to change in the 1990s, when football stadia became increasingly segmented into different sectors and sections, automatic entrance controls and numbered seats were introduced, CCTV systems and central command posts were set up, and spectators were searched at the entrance. By now, the security gaze was firmly in place.

This development took a new turn with the introduction of a compulsory membership scheme known as the ‘club card’. A first experiment with the scheme was conducted as early as 1989 at five football clubs whose supporters were seen as relatively ‘high risk’. Match tickets were sold only to those supporters holding an electronic identity card issued by their club. On the first day of the pilot many supporters successfully circumvented the new scheme, which led to its postponement. However, due to renewed fears of escalating violence at football matches and further attempts to commercialize the game, a comparable identity card scheme was introduced at all Eredivisie (Premier League) clubs during the 1996/97 season. The club card was marketed as a service card designed to improve the club’s service to its customers, but was

¹³ O’Neill, (Megan), *Policing Football: Social Interaction and Negotiated Disorder*. Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave, 2005; De Biasi, (Rocco), ‘The Policing of Hooliganism in Italy’. In *Policing Protest*, Della Porta (Donatella), Reiter (Herbert), eds., Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1998, 213-227; Stott, (Clifford), Pearson, (Geoff), *Football ‘Hooliganism’: Policing and the War on the ‘English Disease’*. London: Pennant Books, 2007.

viewed by many football supporters as yet another attempt to regulate the behaviour of a ‘violent minority’ at the expense of non-violent football supporters.¹⁴

The controversy surrounding the compulsory membership scheme entered a new phase with the proposed introduction of a club card with photo identification. A number of football clubs opposed this new measure from the outset, arguing that it would decrease the clubs’ revenue from ticket sales as spectators would no longer be allowed to purchase match tickets without a registered electronic identity card. As a result of the resistance of both clubs and supporter associations, the identity card scheme was eventually given a non-compulsory status. Clubs were left to decide whether to issue club cards and, consequently, most clubs only utilized the card scheme to manage ticket sales at fixtures they deemed ‘high risk’. However, five football clubs obliged their supporters to submit their personal details and a photograph to the KNVB, either for away matches or for both home and away matches.

Although the identity card is often viewed as a customer service tool, it should be considered, first and foremost, a security measure. The Centraal Informatiepunt Voetbalvandalisme (CIV; Dutch National Football Information Point) describes its uses as follows: ‘In the longer term the plan was that security aspects could be built into [the card scheme]. An important final phase of the entire policy chain is controlled access control, the aim of which is to enable us to keep undesirable individuals out of the stadium’.¹⁵ Today, supporters at all professional football clubs in the Netherlands are required to have a club card for ‘high risk’ fixtures. For such fixtures, supporters are only allowed to buy one ticket per club card, while no tickets are sold on match day. In addition, all Eredivisie football clubs have established a separate electronic identity card scheme for away matches, with the aim of closely monitoring the behaviour of their traveling contingent.

The recognition that the new regulatory regime was not waterproof led to the introduction of new techniques. A novel instrument in the governing of football supporters in the Netherlands is the use of biometric identification such as fingerprints and iris scans. This approach signals how pre-emptive risk management, obsessed with accurate information and systematic predetection, now sends its surveillance probes under the skin. In the 2005/06 season the KNVB initiated a pilot in which banning orders were policed using biometric identification in combination with electronic entrance controls. The pilot also tested the feasibility of the use of iris scanner and facial recognition technologies to identify banned individuals inside the stadium. Iris scanner and fingerprint technologies were considered viable methods of biometric

¹⁴ Verkamman, (Matty), ‘Slogan “Zonder Club Card zie je geen bal meer” valt verkeerd’. *Trouw*, September 7, 1996.

¹⁵ CIV, *Evaluatie seizoen 1998-1999*, Utrecht: CIV, 14.

identification. In 2007 three football clubs, Ajax, Feyenoord and Vitesse Arnhem, began to experiment with the use of fingerprint technology at the stadium entrances in order to keep out banned supporters. At the time, this method was considered 'more reliable, faster, more mobile and more sustainable' than other forms of biometric identification technology.¹⁶

Also in 2007, ADO The Hague Football Club was the first Dutch football club to introduce iris scanner technology to keep out banned supporters. All its supporters are required to purchase a club card which includes a long range RFID (radio-frequency identification) chip, which is also used in the new Dutch passport (as well as, for example, in tickets to the 2006 FIFA World Cup in Germany). During the application process a biometric passport photograph is produced. On matchdays, spectators enter the stadium through a sluice system. The antennas at the gates of the stadium detect the club card and check its validity. In the tunnel a facial photograph is produced, which is compared to the biometric data recorded during the application process. If the authentication process determines that it is the same person, the gate opens automatically. In case the photographs do not match, the gates remain closed and the spectator is forced to go back.

The biometric identification scheme at ADO The Hague FC, which integrates biometrics with existing ticketing and CCTV systems, was designed by a private business, Happy Crowd Control (HCC). HCC describes itself as

a world-leader in safety and security for any crowd at any ground, event centre or high security location. Happy Crowd Control is an innovative system, allowing user-friendly and fast access. Particularly for those locations where large numbers of people have daily access, such as stadium grounds, music centres, airports, high security offices or locations, schools, payment locations, casinos, prisons and so on.¹⁷

HCC prides itself on providing 'safety and security from entrance to exit', arguing that 'the certainty that known troublemakers, or those who misbehave, will be apprehended or prevented from entering the stadium at all, gives a sense of security. ... In case of problems with misbehaviour, troublemakers can easily be recognised and banned'.¹⁸ The Happy Crowd Control

¹⁶ ANP, 'Voetbal: Clubs beginnen proef met vingerafdrukken', *NRC*, July 7, 2006.

¹⁷ Happy Crowd Control, 'Happy Crowd Control: Safety and Security from Entrance to Exit'. Happy Crowd Control. <http://www.happycrowdcontrol.nl/system.html>.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*

system is believed to ‘reduce risk to a minimum, making it almost impossible to get away with undesirable conduct’.¹⁹

The use of biometric identification at football matches in the Netherlands highlights how the bodies of football supporters become informatized. Van der Ploeg’s analysis of how bodily characteristics, once they have been translated into electronically processable data, are amenable to forms of analysis and classification, is highly relevant to the case of Dutch football.²⁰ First, as the above example shows, authentication classifies supporters as either legitimate or illegitimate, wanted or unwanted, low risk or high risk. On a next level, identification categorizes supporters according to the type and purpose of the database against which the biometric signal is checked. Supporters may be identified as someone with a banning order or a criminal record, or as being ‘associated’ with a high-risk fan group. A third level of analysis and categorization consists of the bringing together of biometric information with other types of data, such as that recorded in police and club databases, on an aggregate level to generate profiles that subsequently will be used to assess risk and pre-empt behaviour. This profiling process will be further examined later on in the chapter. First, however, I will address the issue of dataveillance: the systematic use and linking of personal data systems in the monitoring and investigation of spectator behaviour.

Dataveillance and risk management

Sociologist Manuel Castells has argued that the capacity for surveillance is diffused in society: beyond the boundaries of the state, beyond the public/private divide, and beyond national borders.²¹ Although new information technologies might be put to the service of surveillance, control and repression by state institutions, they might also be used for citizens to enhance their control over the state and to access information.²² New information technologies also create opportunities for criminal and terrorist networks to evade or confront state institutions, for example through developing new modes of organization and communication. For Castells, the most important aspect of this development is in the gathering of information on individuals by commercial entities, and organizations of all kinds, and in the creation of a market for this information. He notes: ‘Rather than an oppressive “Big Brother,” it is a myriad of well-wishing

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ van der Ploeg, (Irma), ‘The Politics of Biometric Identification: Normative Aspects of Automated Social Categorization’. Rotterdam: Institute for Healthcare Management & Policy, 2005.

²¹ Castells, (Manuel), *The Power of Identity* (2nd edition). Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010.

²² Ibid., 341.

“little sisters,” relating to each one of us on a personal basis because they know who we are, who have invaded all realms of life’.²³ The extension of surveillance beyond the boundaries of the state is most clearly captured in the notion of ‘surveillance society’, which indicates that

surveillance activities have long since spilled over the edges of governmental bureaucracies to flood every conceivable social conduit. While the state still accounts for much monitoring of everyday life, such government activities are just one of many areas within which surveillance data now flows.²⁴

New opportunities for surveillance show both centralizing and decentralizing tendencies. On the one hand, the opportunities for governments to access and integrate the data that is available from a range of state and non-state actors are increasing. On the other hand, new opportunities for observation and analysis are now within the reach of a growing number of actors, including businesses and individual citizens.²⁵

These general tendencies can also be observed in Dutch professional football. The government has a leading role in security policy, but other parties have become more prominent in the policy process: KNVB, football clubs, private security companies, organizations that specialize in data recording and provision (such as Cotass in the case of the club card and Happy Crowd Control and Tebrona in relation to iris scanner technology)²⁶, and supporter associations. For example, football clubs play an important part in the application of new technologies and in the collection and exchange of general and personal information on supporters. As the organizers of football matches, they are required to do everything in their powers to ensure safety and effective crowd management at the stadium, before, during and after the match. This includes keeping ‘unwanted’ spectators out of the stadium and preventing spectators from bringing prohibited items such as weapons, fireworks or bottles into the stadium. Depending on the severity of the offense, clubs can also impose banning orders on individual spectators.

Datasystems: national and international dimensions

²³ Ibid., 342.

²⁴ Lyon, (David), *Surveillance Society: Monitoring Everyday Life*. Buckingham: Open University Press, 2001, 33.

²⁵ Vedder, (Anton), ‘Convergerende technologieën, verschuivende verantwoordelijkheden’. *Justitiële Verkenningen* 34 (2008): 54-66.

²⁶ Cotass stands for Club Orientated Access and Autorization System.

A central component of Dutch policy in the area of football and security is the development and integration of data systems that contain general and personal information on football supporters and groups. The first national database in this field dates back to the mid 1980s. During this period football hooliganism became a more prominent subject on the Dutch political agenda due to a number of high-profile domestic and international spectator incidents. The 1985 Heysel stadium disaster in Belgium further heightened concerns about the potential lethality of football hooliganism and resulted in the introduction of a series of internationally agreed countermeasures, which were also adopted in the Netherlands. The CIV was established in 1986 with the aim to collect, analyze and disseminate information on spectator behaviour. A new data system was created to facilitate this process. Some European countries have developed a similar centralized data management system, for example the Striker database in the United Kingdom.

The national database now contains a module in which police can enter personal information on so-called 'high-risk' supporters. This module includes an overview of what are deemed to be the top 500 high-risk supporters in the Netherlands as well as of the top 10 'hooligans' or 'ringleaders' in individual police districts. These lists are composed on the basis of registered offenses and specific intelligence provided by police and security officials. The objective is for all police forces to be aware who these supporters are in order to enable accurate risk assessment and to anticipate any potential misbehaviour. On previous occasions, such as during the European Championships held in the Netherlands and Belgium in 2000, individuals on the top 500 list received letters warning them that they would be closely monitored during the tournament. Although police continue to play a leading role in dataveillance in the area of football and security, inter-agency cooperation has increased significantly over time. Football clubs are now able to use and enter their own data into the system, such as information on spectator incidents, 'problematic' individuals or groups, expected spectator flows, and safety and security arrangements.

More recently, police and public prosecutors have appealed to the general public using the internet and television in an attempt to identify and arrest suspected supporters. In the aftermath of an incident at a match between Feyenoord and Ajax in 2005, during which 42 police officers were injured, police were able to use information provided by the television audience to identify some of the suspects. In December 2011 police used a similar approach in their search for dozens of supporters of FC Utrecht who were allegedly involved in the incidents after FC Utrecht's home game against FC Twente, which included violent conduct and missile throwing. The police displayed photographs of suspects on the internet and showed them on national television. The photographs were derived from CCTV footage recorded during and

after the match. The program *Opsporing Verzocht* called on the public to provide information that could lead to the arrest of six suspected spectators who had not yet been arrested in relation to the incidents.

As noted earlier, one form of analysis and classification in anticipatory surveillance consists of the bringing together of different types of information on an aggregate level to generate profiles that subsequently will be used to assess risk and pre-empt behaviour. With regard to the data systems discussed above, a key point here is that to be suspected of being a (potential) ‘troublemaker’, it is no longer necessary to exhibit manifest symptoms of dangerousness; instead, it is sufficient to display whatever characteristics police and other specialists have constituted as risk factors. Put differently, it is enough to have the characteristics or profile of a ‘hooligan’ to be treated as if one had committed a football-related crime. Once one is categorized as such, there tends to be little escape. The implications for football supporters’ civil liberties are profound, yet arguably more so in the United Kingdom, where the 2000 Football (Disorder) Act gives police officers the power to detain and ban those seeking to travel abroad if it is *suspected* that they will become involved in disorder. These football banning orders ‘on complaint’ have been criticized for infringing the fundamental rights of supporters who have not been convicted of any offence, and their proportionality and legitimacy has been questioned.²⁷

The Dutch case highlights some of the problematic consequences of anticipatory surveillance. To give one example, encountered during my own research, a Dutch football supporter was arrested during a preventive group arrest aimed at preventing a confrontation between rival supporters outside the stadium after a football match. Although the charges against the individual were subsequently dropped, the five-year banning order that was initially imposed was never revoked. The individual’s personal data and alleged ‘association’ with a group of ‘high-risk’ supporters, which appeared to be entirely coincidental, were never removed from the national data system. As a consequence, he continues to be blacklisted as an unwanted supporter and has not been allowed to attend football matches in the Netherlands. The issue of risk profiling is further discussed later on in this chapter in relation to the risk analysis matrices that are used to categorize and profile football matches and individual supporters.

Security and risk management technologies in football are characterized by a high degree of internationalization. The activities of agencies such as the CIV need to be understood within the wider context of international police cooperation. National Football Information Points and

²⁷ Pearson, (Geoff), ‘Qualifying for Europe? The Legitimacy of Football Banning Orders “On Complaint” under the Principle of Proportionality’. *Entertainment and Sports Law Journal* 3 (2005).

other police units in different European countries cooperate in the collection, analysis and dissemination of information in relation to European Cup matches and international football tournaments, for example through the pan-European network of National Football Information Points. Via these information points, as well as through bilateral communication between individual football clubs and police forces, countries exchange information on the composition, behaviour and travel flows of supporters prior to, during and after international football matches. The CIV and other Dutch police organizations play an important role in this process, for example through updating the EU Handbook of international police cooperation with respect to football matches with an international dimension (EU Handbook), which regulates international information exchange in relation to football matches within the European Union. The EU Handbook recognizes that the ‘timely exchange of accurate information is of the utmost importance in enhancing safety and security and preventing football-related violence and disorder’.²⁸ To enhance the transnational flow of information, the CIV and other National Football Information Points have developed standardized electronic forms for online information exchange. Countries such as the Netherlands, England, Ireland and Denmark are directly connected to these electronic forms, allowing them to access the information online on a continuing basis. There is also a website for international information exchange which includes a knowledge base where countries that are connected to the system can upload and access relevant documents. This website functions as a hub for the international exchange of documentation and information with regard to football spectator behaviour.²⁹

Risk assessment and categorization

Prior to every professional football match in the Netherlands, the municipality, district police corps and football clubs involved draw on the available information to assess the safety and security risks associated with the match. Based on this risk assessment the match is categorized in terms of the level of risk, and risk minimization strategies are put in place. The risk assessment takes into account, among other factors, the presence of supporters who are ‘known’ to be violent, the history of confrontations between opposing supporter groups, the ‘culture’ of the

²⁸ Council of the European Union. ‘Council Resolution of 3 June 2010 concerning an updated handbook with recommendations for international police cooperation and measures to prevent and control violence and disturbances in connection with football matches with an international dimension, in which at least one Member State is involved (2010/C 165)’. *Official Journal of the European Union*, June 24, 2010, 3.

²⁹ Groenevelt, (Henk), ‘Internationale samenwerking bestrijding voetbalvandalisme’. *Het Tijdschrift voor de Politie* 70 (2008): 30-35.

supporter groups to be policed, and any circumstances likely to impact on the behaviour of, or risk posed by, football supporters or other groups.³⁰ If a supporter group has previously been involved in incidents of spectator violence then there is a tendency to define the group as ‘high risk’ regardless of the actual levels of risk posed.³¹

In the 2005/06 season the CIV, in cooperation with the KNVB and representatives of clubs and police, introduced a ‘risk analysis matrix’ and attendant checklist to enable systematic assessment of the security risks of football matches. Both police and clubs enter a part of the matrix with information on risk factors and planned security and safety arrangements. Clubs collect a range of information on supporters through data systems (season ticket holders, club card holders, biometric identification, etc.) and through their safety and security organization (security coordinator, fan coordinator, stewards, etc.). This information is shared with police and local government. The grading of football matches into risk levels (A, B or C), as summarized in Table 1, is based on the information recorded in the risk analysis matrix. A football match is labeled a ‘risk match’ (category B or C) if the analysis of the available information and experiences suggests the need for extra attention for public order disturbances. During the 2010-2011 season, 48% of matches were classified as A, 47% as B, and 5% as C.³² The risk analysis matrix is used by police to advise the mayor of the municipality where the game is to be played on the appropriate security arrangements, such as the deployment of police officers, ticketing and travel restrictions, and restrictions on the sale of alcohol at the stadium. The football clubs involved use the matrix to determine the deployment of security personnel. Information recorded in the matrix is also used to develop more or less specific and detailed profiles of the supporter groups involved.

Table 1: Risk categorization of football matches in the Netherlands

Risk level	Description	Features
A	Low risk	No extra risk of damage to persons or property compared to non-football events of a similar scale
B	Medium risk	Elevated risk of damage to persons or property due to poor spectator behaviour or other circumstances

³⁰ See for example: CIV, *Jaaroverzicht seizoen 2010-2011*, Utrecht: CIV, 2011; Ministry of Security and Justice, *Kader voor beleid: Voetbal en veiligheid*. The Hague: Ministry of Security and Justice.

³¹ Stott, (Clifford), Adang, (Otto), *Understanding and Managing Risk: Policing Football Matches with an International Dimension in the European Union*. Slagelse: Bavnepresse, 2008.

³² CIV, *Jaaroverzicht seizoen 2010-2011*, Utrecht: CIV, 2011, 13.

C	High risk	Potential danger to public order due to collective supporter behaviour and/or extra risk due to special circumstances
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One significant restriction that can be imposed on football supporters attending matches that are classified as medium or high risk is the so-called *combiregeling*, a compulsory travel arrangement. This policy instrument was first introduced nationwide in 1984, and obliges away supporters to travel collectively to away matches by train, coach or car under close surveillance. Match tickets are sold only to those away supporters who comply with the travel arrangement. The CIV describes this travel restriction as an important measure to control and plan the flow of away supporters to and from the stadium. From a spectator's perspective, however, this measure diminishes supporters' freedom of movement. The *combiregeling* is now a standard travel restriction for category C matches, and can also be imposed for category B matches if deemed appropriate by the authorities. The restriction is not used for category A matches since these are understood as posing a low security risk. The number of compulsory travel arrangements has remained fairly stable in recent years: from 354 in the 2007-2008 season and 372 in the 2008-2009 season, to 357 and 354 in the 2009-2010 and 2010-2011 seasons, respectively.³³

The categories A, B and C are also used in the Netherlands to categorize supporter groups and individual supporters. This means of categorization has come to be almost universally adopted across Europe.³⁴ The vast majority of supporters are understood as category A whereby they pose no abnormal risk to public order, while category B supporters are seen to pose a risk since they are understood to be liable to become involved in disturbances should they occur. Category C supporters are typically considered supporters who organize or actively seek out 'disorder'. As noted earlier, being classified as a category C supporter can have very real and practical consequences for individual supporters despite research showing the fallacies of this approach to policing football supporters.³⁵

At a European level, the risk categories A, B and C have been replaced by a dichotomous categorization of football supporters: risk versus non-risk supporters. A risk supporter is defined as 'a person, known or not, who can be regarded as posing a possible risk to public order or anti-

³³ Ibid., 14.

³⁴ Stott, (Clifford), Adang, (Otto), *Understanding and Managing Risk: Policing Football Matches with an International Dimension in the European Union*. Slagelse: Bavnbank Press, 2008.

³⁵ Garland, (Jon), Rowe (Mike), 'The "English Disease": Cured or in Remission? An Analysis of Police Responses to Football Hooliganism in the 1990s'. *Crime Prevention and Community Safety: An International Journal* 1 (1999): 35-47; Stott, (Clifford), Pearson, (Geoff), *Football Hooliganism: Policing the War on the 'English Disease'*. London: Pennant Books, 2007.

social behaviour, whether planned or spontaneous, at or in connection with a football event'.³⁶ In contrast, a non-risk supporter is a person who does not pose a risk to public order at or in connection with a football event. The EU Handbook definition's reference to persons who pose a *possible* risk, as opposed to an *actual*, 'known' risk, is problematic because of the serious infringement of the targeted individual's civil rights and liberties.³⁷ Again, we see here that central to pre-emptive risk management is the minimization of an undesirable event happening in the future, and that within this *dispositif* of precautionary risk any level of risk is considered unacceptable, or should at least be pre-empted and closely monitored.

Perpetrator and group profiling

In recent years, a significant development in the policing of football in the Netherlands has been the application of a perpetrator-orientated approach. The *Hooligans in Beeld* ('Focus on Hooligans') approach was first developed within the Gelderland-Midden district police corps in relation to supporters of Vitesse Arnhem, and has since been applied nationwide by both the police and the KNVB. This method uses targeted intelligence to monitor and control supporters whose behaviour is considered 'problematic'.³⁸ The methodology consists of mapping fan groups and individual supporters, and to link the information obtained from different data systems. The collection of information focuses on the identity, role and behaviour of individuals within supporter groups, as well as on the linkages (if any) between different groups. Attention is paid not only to their behaviour on match days, but also to possible offenses and disorderly behaviour at other moments and locations. The collected information is analyzed and cross-checked using existing police data systems, enabling police to enhance their insight into the behavioural patterns and social networks of suspected supporters. The information from the different sources is integrated and recorded in public order dossiers, which can be accessed by the municipality and public prosecutor. District police use the dossiers to develop a profile of the top 10 'hooligans' and other 'ringleaders' in their district. The most significant benefit of the method is believed to be the improved knowledge and information position of the police and

³⁶ Council of the European Union. 'Council Resolution of 3 June 2010 concerning an updated handbook with recommendations for international police cooperation and measures to prevent and control violence and disturbances in connection with football matches with an international dimension, in which at least one Member State is involved (2010/C 165)'. *Official Journal of the European Union*, June 24, 2010, 21.

³⁷ Tsoukala, (Anastassia), 'Combating Football Crowd Disorder at the European Level: An Ongoing Institutionalisation of the Control of Deviance'. *Entertainment and Sports Law Journal* 7 (2010).

³⁸ Ferwerda, (Henk), Adang, (Otto), *Hooligans in beeld: Van informatie naar aanpak*. Zeist: Kerkebosch, 2005.

relevant partners, enabling early, targeted intervention.³⁹ For example, police visit 'high risk' supporters at home or at work, communicating to them that their every move is being closely watched. Police can also impose football and area banning orders on these individuals.

The perpetrator-orientated approach has important consequences for the autonomy and privacy of those supporters who are labelled 'ringleaders' or 'high risk'. These can be individuals with a significant record of convictions for football-related offenses, or supporters who are deemed 'members' of a known hooligan formation that engages in violent confrontations at football matches or in criminal activities outside of the football context. Some of these individuals have developed counter-strategies in reaction to their being targeted by police. For example, in some localities an unanticipated consequence of the perpetrator-orientated approach has been the deterioration of the relations between supporters and police, to the point where individual police officers have been intimidated or assaulted. On a few occasions supporters have vandalized the homes of police officers in retaliation for being targeted by these officers.⁴⁰ Such actions can be viewed as a mode of resistance against security and risk management technologies. This issue is further discussed in the next section.

Modes of resistance

Having discussed the dispersed character of surveillance and its implications for the civil liberties of football supporters, it is important to consider the modes of resistance or 'counter-conduct' in the everyday practices of football supporters. Below I consider some of the ways in which football supporters respond to the security and risk management technologies that are being used to conduct their behaviour.

Football supporters are increasingly controlled and disciplined, and generally have less freedom to set their own behavioural norms (i.e. the explicit or implicit rules specifying what behaviours are acceptable within a society or group). The behavioural norms imposed by the government, KNVB and football clubs are accepted, internalized and communicated (to a degree) by official supporter associations that generally share the authorities' concern about 'disorderly' conduct by fellow supporters. At a national level, supporter coalitions usually dismiss generic security measures based on the view that the well-behaved majority (i.e. category A supporters) should not suffer the adverse consequences of a 'bad' minority of supporters. At the same time, however, they typically applaud more targeted, perpetrator-orientated measures.

³⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁰ Author interviews with senior police officers, 2006-2007.

Many of the existing security measures are seen as being too generic, targeting all supporters and, specifically, all away fans. Instead, policy measures ought to be tailor-made, with restrictions and punishments being imposed on ‘violent’ supporters only.

This argument was voiced by the Samenwerkende Organisaties Voetbal Supporters (SOVS), the national umbrella organization of supporter associations in the Netherlands, until its recent disbandment. The SOVS supported the basic assumption of *Hooligans in Beeld*: repressive policy needs to be targeted at ‘hooligans’, based on hard evidence, and if such policy is effective, more room can be given to well-behaved supporters. The SOVS encouraged perpetrator-orientated counter-measures, such as individual banning orders and reporting obligations, which punish those who ‘misbehave’ while sparing ‘orderly’ supporters. The SOVS sought to intervene in the policy process by means of advocacy and lobbying. Its objective was to play a major role in policy and advocacy networks in order to be able to present its views on policy proposals, to propose alternatives and to highlight the adverse consequences of proposed policy measures at an early stage in the policymaking process, at both a national and a local level.⁴¹ However, in practice the SOVS struggled with its role and status. The organization has noted that it is difficult for supporter associations and individual supporters to keep track of policy developments and their implications for supporters’ match-day experience and civil liberties. The SOVS felt that it often had limited access to decision-making structures due in part to a lack of trust between the authorities and supporter associations, and to the classified nature of the information shared by network partners. Where football clubs have increased access to classified police information, this information is often deliberately and effectively kept from supporter associations.

Although the overall influence of the SOVS has been limited, its activities do underline the decentralizing tendency noted earlier: football supporters and supporter organizations use new opportunities for the collection, analysis and dissemination of information in order to increase their influence on policy and to critically monitor the practices of the authorities. As will be seen below, this tendency is visible not only at the level of official supporter associations, but also in the different types of informal collection action instigated by football supporter groups.

How, then, do individual supporters react to the security and risk management technologies that are being used to combat and prevent public disorder at football matches in the Netherlands? My own research stresses the *diversity* in football supporters’ responses to the techniques of pre-emptive risk management, and indicates that football supporters are far from

⁴¹ SOVS, *Zonder supporters zijn we nergens: beleidsplan SOVS 2007-2009*. Nijmegen: SOVS, 2006.

passive victims of governmentality.⁴² Some supporters accept and surrender to the imposed security measures and behavioural norms based on a sense of security and justice ('I have nothing to hide'), indifference or defeatism ('There is no escape'). These supporters are relatively likely to act as voluntary guinea-pigs for new techniques, such as the biometric identification scheme discussed earlier.

In contrast, there are supporters who are critical of, and counter-act, security and risk management technologies. Some supporters actively seek to circumvent surveillance by police, clubs and private security. The identity card scheme discussed above is a case in point. In 1998 the CIV noted that the identity card system exhibited 'an enormous amount of leaks and pollution', an observation that is still valid today.⁴³ Supporters are creative in acquiring match tickets outside of the regulated identity card scheme, with some of them having obtained multiple club cards using the personal details of family members, friends or a fake identity. One supporter possessed as many as 52 club cards. As noted earlier, new counter-measures were introduced to target identity card fraud, such as the personalized electronic identity card scheme for away matches. All top-tier football clubs in the Netherlands now work with a club card system for away matches, and for medium- and high-risk matches only those travelling supporters who possess such a card can enter the stadium.⁴⁴ Supporters who have been issued a banning order in past or present are ineligible, at least in theory. Yet these measures have not gone unchallenged. Some supporters have successfully acquired the card despite being banned, while others have been able to purchase tickets for home sections of the stadium using their social networks (e.g. fellow supporters at other clubs, sponsors, players). In some cases banned supporters have struck informal agreements with local police or club officials allowing them to attend matches as long as they refrain from any form of undesirable behaviour. This type of negotiation suggests that street-level interactions between football supporters and police officers produce more informal and unofficial sets of rules than the formal ones known publicly.⁴⁵ These informal rules co-exist with, and can contradict, formal policies.

⁴² van der Torre, (Edward), Spaaij, (Ramón), Cachet, (Eduard), *'Hoeveel wordt het vandaag?' Een studie naar de kans op voetbalgeweld en het veiligheidsbeleid bij voetbalwedstrijden*, The Hague: Elsevier, 2008; Spaaij, (Ramón), 'De voetbalsupporter in de technologische proeftuin'. In *In de greep van de technologie*, Van den Berg (Marguerite), Ham (Marcel), Prins (Corinne), Amsterdam: Van Genneep, 2008, 99-119.

⁴³ CIV *Evaluatie seizoen 1997-1998*, Utrecht: CIV, 1998.

⁴⁴ Auditteam Voetbalvandalisme, *Eindrapport Auditteam Voetbalvandalisme seizoen 2005-2006*. The Hague: Ministry of the Interior, 2006.

⁴⁵ O'Neill, (Megan), *Policing Football: Social Interaction and Negotiated Disorder*. Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave, 2005.

Circumventing security

The introduction of modern security and risk management technologies has diminished the opportunities for collective violence in and around football stadia. Dedicated ‘hooligans’ are nevertheless inventive in circumventing security measures and now operate in a more calculated and goal-orientated way. A major consequence of the imposition of controls and punishments has been to displace confrontations between rival supporters into areas where the controls are seen as weak or non-existent.⁴⁶ This process is best understood as a cycle of displacement involving several phases, culminating, in some cases, in the emergence of pre-arranged encounters between opposing supporters outside match days and far removed from football stadia. Each phase in the process has been followed by a widening of controls and surveillance, first to the immediate vicinities of football grounds and then to the major points of entry into the locales where matches were played and to public transport routes to and from the stadium.

In the Netherlands, rival supporters have sought to evade police by means of alternative modes of transport and, at times, by orchestrating confrontations through direct communication with the opposition.⁴⁷ Supporters who actively seek out violent confrontation typically assess when to refrain from violence and how to prevent arrest, and develop new tactics in order evade or mislead police. An example of such tactics is the hit-and-run method: brief, targeted confrontations following which the perpetrators flee the scene. Recognition by CCTV is avoided as much as possible, for example by covering one’s face with a hood or balaclava. These supporters may also seek to shield certain (criminal) information from outsiders or collect counter-intelligence on police tactics. They may tap police scanners or gather classified documents. For example, in 2004 a group of Feyenoord supporters obtained the police operational plan for a match between historic rivals Feyenoord and Ajax. They also found out where and how plain-clothes officers would be deployed. On the day of the match, the supporters laid in wait for the plain-clothes officers, took their pictures and made videorecordings. Some of the supporters used their knowledge of police tactics to circumvent security and get to groups of Ajax supporters, sparking a physical confrontation with their archrivals.

⁴⁶ Dunning, (Eric), *Sport Matters*. London: Routledge, 1999.

⁴⁷ Spaaij, (Ramón), ‘Football Hooliganism in the Netherlands: Patterns of Continuity and Change’. *Soccer & Society* 8 (2007): 316-334.

As noted earlier, modern information and communication technologies can be used to counter-act governmental techniques of risk management. The potential use of the internet as a means of inter-group communication or to orchestrate violent confrontation is well documented.⁴⁸ For example, a media account entitled ‘Rampage of the cyberthugs’ reports how ‘hooligans used the Internet to set up bloody battle’ and ‘the Internet is fuelling a terrifying resurgence in football violence’.⁴⁹ Not surprisingly, then, supporter sites are subject to police surveillance. Although virtual threats and provocations between rival supporters are usually unlikely to result in physical confrontation, police recognize that pre-match conversations or provocations on the internet may give an indication of supporters’ intentions and expectations. This information is used to assess risk and feeds into the risk analysis matrices discussed above. In response to this development, an increasing number of online football supporter chat rooms and message boards are now accessible only to registered members. Furthermore, some supporters interviewed by the author argue that the internet has become too susceptible to police surveillance, and that it is more appropriate to discuss supporter tactics by means of face-to-face communication at other locales, such as a party, community football club, school or at home.

Fan activism

Another important form of counter-conduct in Dutch professional football is fan activism. Fan activists are supporters who protest against aspects of security and risk management technologies in football. Their protests take a variety of shapes: on the streets, in fanzines, online, as members of supporter associations, on banners displayed in the stadium, in press releases, in face-to-face contacts with club representatives and police officers, through legal complaints or lawsuits, and so forth. Fan activists are often supported by a significant section of the wider fan base and occasionally also by other actors, such as journalists, lawyers and advocacy groups. Examples of well-informed and persistent fan activists in the Netherlands are the editors of *De Rat*, *Lunatic News*, *De Trouwe Honden* and *In The Winning Mood*, the independent fanzines and supporter sites of NAC Breda, Feyenoord, NEC Nijmegen and Sparta Rotterdam, respectively.

Fan activists can not only target governments or clubs as a whole, but also individuals representing these institutions, for example police officers who are accused of illegitimate

⁴⁸ Fafinski, (Stefan), ‘In the Back of the Net: Football Hooliganism and the Internet’. In *Crime Online*, Jewkes (Yvonne), ed., Cullompton: Willan, 2006, 109-127.

⁴⁹ Gysin, (Christian), Camber, (Rebecca), ‘Rampage of the cyberthugs: How veteran hooligans used the internet to set up bloody battle’. *Daily Mail Online*, August 27, 2009.

conduct. In 2004, the official supporter association of FC Utrecht used its website to launch a ‘naming and shaming’ campaign against heavy-handed policing by the Amsterdam-Amstelland district police corps before a match between Ajax and FC Utrecht. It displayed a photograph of a riot police officer who it held responsible for the police’s use of violence against their supporters, asking the public for information that could lead to the identification of the officer. The website also published a letter sent to the Amsterdam-Amstelland district police corps by the supporter association’s lawyer. The letter requested that the police reveal the identity of the officer and demanded financial compensation for the victims. Although the photograph was soon removed for legal reasons, in September 2004 the Commission for Police Complaints ruled in favour of a group of FC Utrecht supporters who had lodged a formal complaint about the police’s disproportionate use of force.

The information position of fan activists in Dutch professional football has improved over time. A growing number of supporters are familiar with the legal backgrounds and implications of public policy in the area of football and security, and are willing to stand up for their rights. In recent times supporters have acted on their grievances by filing formal complaints or lawsuits, sometimes with successful outcomes. For example, in March 2006 a group of 193 Roda JC supporters were arrested after a cup match between their club and Ajax in Amsterdam. In the aftermath of the mass arrest, 107 supporters received a banning order from the KNVB. The supporters disagreed with the arrest and banning orders and filed a lawsuit against the KNVB. The board of Roda JC sided with the supporters on this matter, and their protest was supported by a leading sports journalist. On 1 April 2006 the major national newspaper *De Volkskrant* published a column which criticized the authorities’ ‘amateuristic’ handling of the incident.⁵⁰ The column was well received by Roda JC supporters and widely discussed on supporter websites. The column lamented not only the mass arrest (for no apparent reason) of 193 well-behaved supporters, but also the ‘disproportional violence’ by police against supporters during previous football matches. It quotes at length the stories of two Roda JC supporters who were arrested on the day, one a retired classical languages teacher and the other a senior newspaper editor, thereby challenging some of the dominant stereotypes surrounding football supporters.

Conclusion

⁵⁰ Onkenhout, (Paul), ‘Kafka in Amsterdam, of: het lot van 193 Roda supporters’. *De Volkskrant*, April 1, 2006.

This chapter has drawn on the ‘football stadia-as-laboratories’ metaphor to examine the security and risk management technologies that are being used to conduct the behaviour of football supporters in the Netherlands. It was shown how pre-emptive risk management in the policing of football supporters involves a dispersed and fragmented set of actors and technologies. The recent developments in the policing of football in the Netherlands, and supporters’ reactions to these developments, indicate the pluriform nature of the influence of technology. With the availability and application of new technologies, power has diffused. Although the government, and particularly police, continue to play a central role in the networked approach to preventing and controlling public ‘disorder’ at football matches, new actors have become more prominent in this process, most notably football clubs, the KNVB and private businesses. Furthermore, information and technology are used by football supporters *against* the government.

The techniques of risk calculation and risk management discussed in this chapter penetrate the life world of football supporters, with important implications for supporters’ civil liberties and basic rights. Supporters are increasingly controlled and disciplined, and have less freedom to set their own behavioural norms. Situations in which football supporters will be confronted with precautionary measures against them, without their having actively contributed to this process and without there being any manifest signs of ‘dangerousness’, will probably proliferate in the future. However, the diversity in supporters’ reactions to security and safety arrangements indicate that, within this broader trend, there is no uniform trend toward either increasing or decreasing autonomy. Rather, there is a pluralization of instruments of power, whereby football supporters and supporter associations are able to contest and counter prevailing tendencies in the policing of football, or at least to partially resist top-down imposed behavioural norms. Supporters who, for whatever reason, resign to the security and risk management technologies are characterized by increased disciplining and internalization of the imposed behavioural norms. For others, such as fan activists, it is more accurate to speak of a partial disciplining which goes hand in hand with a collectively questioning of imposed behavioural tolerance levels and the construction of alternative social norms. These supporters recognize the value of collective action and the uses of modern technologies therein, and use this mode of resistance as part of their action repertoires in order to strategically countervail, weaken or subvert disciplinary matrices.

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