

The Eclipse and Resurgence of Modern Orthodoxy in America

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I. Introduction

American Orthodoxy, traditionally a small and embattled sector of the American Jewish community, began to radically transform in the decades after World War II, experiencing exponential growth and newfound confidence. Yet, due to a number of complicated factors which will be discussed below, the ideal of synthesis of tradition and modernity inherent in the philosophy of the Modern Orthodox wing of the Orthodox community began to weaken considerably in the postwar era, leading some to argue that Modern Orthodoxy was permanently on the wane. Reports of the demise of Modern Orthodoxy were premature, however. Developments in recent decades reflect a robust resurgence of Modern Orthodox ideology and institutions.

Changing circumstances in the decades after World War II led to the transformation of American Orthodoxy. The immediate postwar period witnessed the influx of over 130,000 Holocaust survivors to American shores. Many of these survivors were Haredi Jews whose ancestors, on the instruction of their rabbis, had eschewed immigration to the "*treyfe medina*" of America during the massive migration waves of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. When these Jews, together with their *yeshivot* and Hasidic courts, transplanted themselves into American soil, they reinvigorated Orthodox Judaism here with their commitment to punctilious observance of Jewish law and their unapologetic identification with observant Judaism.

Hand-in-hand with these changes came developments in American society that further bolstered the strength of the Orthodox community. As American society became more open to ethnic and cultural difference in the 1960s and 70s, Orthodox Jews became less concerned with fitting into American norms and more confident about displaying their pronounced differences with American society. Orthodox men began to wear their *kippot* in the street, Orthodox parents began to put Hebrew names on their children's birth certificates, and Orthodox families increasingly chose to send their children to Jewish day

schools rather than the public schools so beloved by their parents and grandparents. These trends only intensified after Israel's victory in the Six Day War. No longer did pundits warn of the demise of Orthodox Judaism in America. On the contrary, as the renowned Jewish sociologist Marshall Sklare commented in 1971, "Orthodoxy has transformed its image from that of a dying movement to one whose strength and opinions must be reckoned within any realistic appraisal of the Jewish community."¹

Along with the newfound confidence of American Orthodox Jews, however, came increased insularity. With greater numbers, Orthodox Jews had fewer reasons to integrate into the modern world that surrounded them. Additionally, as the American culture wars of the 1960s and 70s raised ideas that many Orthodox leaders saw as profoundly threatening to traditional Jewish life, those leaders increasingly called upon their flock to distance themselves from the influence of modernity. Out of this new reality for American Orthodoxy emerged four major battlegrounds regarding its future.

Of prime concern was the role secular higher education should play in the Orthodox community. In order to take advantage of the upward mobility America offered, American Jews had always flocked in disproportionately high numbers to institutions of higher learning. But American universities posed great challenges to Orthodox students. On the most basic level, secular university schedules often conflicted with Shabbat and holidays, and obtaining kosher food on campus was difficult if not impossible. Furthermore, the increasingly permissive sexual mores on campus flew in the face of Orthodox values. It was for exactly these reasons that Rabbi Bernard Revel had founded Yeshiva College in 1928. He saw the need for creating a college that would allow students to attain a BA without sacrificing their religious observance or their commitment to an Orthodox social milieu. Indeed, Revel believed that Yeshiva College would allow the best of both worlds, allowing students to continue their Torah studies in an appropriate environment while at the same time obtaining an excellent secular education. Revel celebrated the integration of secular studies into the yeshiva, believing that modern culture contained much of worth to be studied.

¹ Marshall Sklare, *America's Jews* (New York: Random House, 1971), 40.

Haredi Orthodox leaders did not agree with Revel's views however. They feared that the ideas to which Orthodox students would be exposed in secular university lecture halls would corrupt their minds and cause them to question their faith. And, of course, secular education took away precious time from students' commitment to what rabbinic leaders saw as the more important value of Torah study. Increasingly, Haredi Orthodox leaders discouraged their flock from attending secular universities, even maligning Yeshiva College as a place where potentially corrupting secular studies carried too much importance in the curriculum. Instead, these Orthodox leaders directed their followers to attend *yeshivot* such as Ner Israel of Baltimore by day, and take night classes at local colleges or universities with the sole goal of attaining a BA in order to make a living. Such a path, they argued, would ensure that the influence of secular education and the modern mores of American college campuses would be kept at arm's length. The synthesis imagined by Revel was increasingly embattled in the waning decades of the twentieth century.

Likewise, Haredi Orthodox leaders began to shy away from interaction with other Jewish denominations in the postwar era. In 1956, the Council of Torah Sages of the Agudath Israel issued a ban on Orthodox rabbis working with or cooperating in any way with non-Orthodox Jewish leaders. The ban, signed by the revered American *posek* (decisor of Jewish law) Rabbi Moshe Feinstein, as well as other American rabbinic luminaries such as Aaron Kotler and Yaakov Ruderman, forbade Orthodox rabbis from joining organizations such as the New York Board of Rabbis and other inter-denominational bodies. Rabbi Joseph B. Soloveitchik, the Rosh Yeshiva at RIETS, the rabbinical school of Yeshiva University, and Rabbi Dr. Samuel Belkin, the President of Yeshiva University, declined to sign the ban. While most of the members of the Modern Orthodox Rabbinical Council of America stood with Rabbi Soloveitchik in this area, the impact of the ban permeated the Modern Orthodox world.

One potent example of the impact of this ban arose in the context of finding a solution for the *agunah* crisis. In the mid-1950s, the Rav (as Rabbi Soloveitchik was known) and Rabbi Saul Lieberman, the revered professor of Talmud at the Conservative movement's Jewish Theological Seminary, secretly convened to work together to solve the problem of

agunot, women chained to marriages because their husbands refused to issue them a *get*, or writ of Jewish divorce. The two ultimately agreed to insert a mutually-agreed upon arbitration clause into all Conservative and Modern Orthodox *ketubot* (marriage contracts) that would refer couples to an authorized *beit din* (Jewish court) which would be made up of all Orthodox *dayanim* (judges). However, despite the involvement of the Rav, the plan never took effect because the Halacha Commission of the Rabbinical Council of America voted down their proposal, likely due to the Feinstein ban, which had been issued shortly before the vote.²

Together with the fear of interaction with other Jewish denominations came a growing split with respect to Religious Zionism. The Agudath HaRabbanim, the Union of Orthodox Rabbis of the United States and Canada, eulogized Theodor Herzl at his untimely death in 1904 and celebrated the Balfour Declaration in 1917. Yet later in the twentieth century, Zionism would become a more divisive issue in American Orthodoxy. Even before World War II, the more fervently Orthodox in America began to question whether the Zionist movement was "kosher," given its commitment to secularism. In the postwar era, as Haredi Holocaust survivors came to American shores, they brought with them their antipathy toward Zionism, both due to their theological commitment to waiting for the Messiah before resurrecting a Jewish commonwealth in Israel, and due to their opposition to the secular ideals of the Zionist movement and the nascent State of Israel. As Modern Orthodox Jews celebrated the birth of Zionism and supported Religious Zionist parties like Mizrachi, the Haredi community became increasingly vocal about its opposition to Zionism and increasingly insistent that proper Orthodox Jews could not align themselves with Zionism.

Other modern ideologies also proved challenging to American Orthodoxy. As second-wave feminism shaped new attitudes toward women's roles in American society in the 1960s and 70s, Orthodox Jews split over the impact that these new attitudes should have on Orthodox Jewish life. Some Orthodox women, recognizing the growing dichotomy

² Mark B. Shapiro, *Saul Lieberman and the Orthodox* (Scranton: University of Scranton Press, 2006), 46.

between women's increasing integration into the public sphere in the secular world and their unchangingly passive roles inside the Orthodox community, looked for ways to enhance their participation in synagogue and ritual life while still adhering to *halacha*. They started women's prayer groups, instituted ceremonies for the naming of baby girls and for bat mitzvah, and held women's *megillah* readings on Purim. Such women also began openly criticizing the Orthodox rabbinate for not doing enough to help *agunot*.

While feminist critiques of Orthodoxy sometimes fell on compassionate rabbinic ears, most Orthodox rabbis, whether Haredi or Modern Orthodox, deemed any feminist critique of Orthodox life to be inappropriate, dangerous and patently in contradiction with Torah values. In a 1990 *Jewish Observer* article, Rabbi Yissochar Frand, a senior rabbi at Ner Israel Yeshiva in Baltimore, for example, labeled feminism a "subtle and insidious threat" to Judaism. Chastising those who would seek change in light of new norms for women in the modern world, he stated, "What was *assur* (forbidden) yesterday, remains *assur* today, and what is *mutar* (permitted) today was always *mutar*... Halacha is not an amorphous area wherein changing social needs can be legislated."³ Women who sought greater equality in Orthodox Judaism increasingly found themselves labeled as subversive and dangerous to Jewish tradition.

These central ideological divides took their toll on Modern Orthodoxy. Indeed, over recent decades, multiple manifestations of a "decline" in Modern Orthodoxy may be documented. For one thing, a subtle but significant change in nomenclature occurred. The term "Modern Orthodoxy," suggesting a bold synthesis of the values of Torah and those of modern culture, was eclipsed by the more neutral appellation of "Centrist Orthodoxy." The latter term connoted a rather vague midpoint situated somewhere between the Haredi world and the left wing of Orthodoxy championed by Dr. Yitz Greenberg. To his credit, at the close of his career, Yeshiva University President Dr. Norman Lamm, who had coined the term "Centrist Orthodoxy," conceded that it had likely been an error and the term "Modern Orthodox" perhaps was more suitable in delineating a value system rather than a

³ Yissocher Frand, "Where There's A Rabbinic Will, There's a Halachic Way: Fact or Fiction," *The Jewish Observer*, October 1990, 6-11.

spot on the geographical map.⁴

Similarly, Orthodox leaders spared no effort to eliminate the term "pluralism" from their vocabulary. Since "pluralism" connoted the absence of monolithic truth and a corrective to extremist perspectives, Orthodox leaders insisted that pan-communal bodies such as Federation invoke "diversity" and "inclusivity" rather than pluralism. "Pluralism" connoted legitimacy of the non-Orthodox movements. By contrast, "inclusivity" and "diversity" acknowledged the existence of non-Orthodox groupings but did not extend to them any mantle of legitimacy. Significantly, Dr. Norman Lamm in 1988 acknowledged the Conservative and Reform movements as "valid groupings and, indeed in granting that if they are sincere in their convictions, they possess spiritual dignity." However, when confronted with considerable pushback from Orthodox sources, Lamm backtracked quickly, incongruously claiming he meant "valid" in the Latin sense of the term, i.e., strong groupings, not necessarily legitimate ones. Few, however, believed that Lamm actually had expected his popular audience even to have recognized the Latin word "validus," let alone understood that it connoted strength rather than legitimacy.⁵

A second barometer was the decline in coeducation within Orthodox day schools, especially on the secondary school level. Following the leadership of Rabbis Joseph B. Soloveitchik at Maimonides in Boston and Joseph Lookstein at Ramaz in New York City, Modern Orthodox educators long had believed that separate education for men and women could never be equal. Such a view, of course, was anathema in Haredi circles. Indeed, Rabbi Moshe Feinstein at one point had forbidden teaching in coed secondary schools. In that context, coeducation had differentiated Modern from Haredi Orthodox Judaism. Yet, by the early twenty-first century, coeducation had faded from the secondary Orthodox day school system, with the notable exceptions of such flagship institutions as Maimonides, Ramaz, SAR, Shalhevet, and several others nationally who emulated their model. A significant number of Orthodox day schools, including some

⁴ Norman Lamm, *Seventy Faces*, Vol. 1, (Hoboken: KTAV, 2002), 1.

⁵ Ari Goldman, "Jewish Moderate Urges Believers to Take Stand," *New York Times*, March 24, 1988 accessed April 5, 2016, <http://www.nytimes.com/1988/03/24/us/jewish-moderate-urges-believers-to-take-stand.html>. For Lamm's subsequent backtracking see *Jewish Observer*, vol. XXI, no. 5 (summer 1988), 13-16.

claiming to be "Centrist Orthodox," were single gender, and those that did house boys and girls on the same premises tended to separate by gender at least for Judaic studies.

Some of the shift, to be sure, could be attributed to a Haredi demographic ascendancy and the growing assertiveness that accompanied it. By 2013 the Pew study reported that two-thirds of American Orthodox Jews claimed to be Haredi, and only one-third identified as Modern Orthodox.⁶ Measured against the 1950s, when conventional wisdom forecast the disappearance of Haredi Orthodoxy in America, the Haredi resurgence was little short of astounding. Aside from those who self-identified as Haredi were an undetermined number of non-Haredi Orthodox who effectively became fellow travelers, occupying, as one observer put it, "the right of the center."

Much could be attributed to Haredi birth rates, which far exceeded the Modern Orthodox norm of three children per family. But, as the late Charles Liebman noted over a decade ago, Haredi leaders had succeeded by refusing to modify their message so as to suit the market and instead had waited patiently until the market was prepared to hear their message, much of which resonated as a counter-voice to prevailing post-modernist currents of materialism, excessive individualism, and absence of universal truths.⁷

Accompanying this demographic resurgence was greater Haredi willingness to challenge Modern Orthodoxy for leadership of the Orthodox world. Agudat Israel, for one, created a Washington office lobbying on behalf of Orthodox Jewry. But more significant than defending the status quo were Haredi efforts to transform the face of Orthodox Jewry. Outreach initiatives in particular often became the stock-in-trade of the Haredi world. Haredi educators willingly accepted employment in Centrist Orthodox schools thereby impacting significantly upon school culture. Young Israel synagogues, once the province of Modern Orthodoxy, began appointing rabbis to their pulpits from Haredi *yeshivot* in addition to the time-honored practice of engaging Yeshiva University alumni.

⁶ Pew Research Center, *A Portrait of Jewish Americans*, Washington D.C., 2013, 47-48.

⁷ Charles Liebman, "Post-War American Judaism: From Ethnic to Privatized Judaism," in *Secularism, Spirituality, and the Future of American Jewry*, ed. Elliot Abrams and David Dalin (Washington DC: Ethics and Public Policy Center, 1999), 7-17.

But perhaps the most visible expression of Modern Orthodoxy's decline was the marginalization of Rabbi Dr. Yitz Greenberg within Modern Orthodox circles. An icon of Modern Orthodoxy in the 1960s, Greenberg had then enjoyed enormous esteem and popularity at Modern Orthodoxy's flagship institution, Yeshiva University where twice he was voted "Professor of the Year." He also served as rabbi at a leading Modern Orthodox congregation and had established the SAR Academy, a cutting-edge Modern Orthodox day school that met with near-universal acclaim. As if this was not sufficient, he regularly electrified audiences at programs sponsored by Yavneh, the organization of Orthodox college students he had helped found. In the 1960s many perceived Greenberg as the potential successor to Dr. Samuel Belkin at the helm of Yeshiva University, a post that would have enabled Greenberg to shape the Modern Orthodoxy of the twenty-first century. Yet within a brief span of less than a decade, Greenberg became an outlier, if not an outcast in Modern Orthodox precincts. He delivered his last public address at Yeshiva University in 1973. *Roshei yeshiva* almost universally proclaimed his exile from "Centrist Orthodoxy." Gradually Greenberg turned his attention elsewhere serving as de facto rabbi of Jewish Federations; to this day many Federation leaders claim he transformed them as Jews. Conversely, the Rabbinical Council of America went so far as to consider - and thankfully reject - proposals for his expulsion from the organization.

To be sure, Greenberg's own views were evolving significantly through his theological dialogues with Christians, his calls for limited changes in *halacha*, his openness to modern Biblical scholarship, and his embrace of theological pluralism both within and without the Jewish faith. Yet the distancing between Greenberg and Modern Orthodox leadership reflected how Orthodoxy increasingly had become cloistered, closing itself off from viewpoints that challenged inherited sacred cows and dogmas. Where Greenberg had been willing to engage with the major challenges of modernity confronting well-educated Orthodox Jews - gender equality, Biblical criticism, intra-Jewish relations, etc. - by contrast the response of the Modern Orthodox establishment was to embrace ArtScroll commentaries that pretended challenges simply did not exist.

Interestingly, Orthodox feminism resisted these currents and, notwithstanding outspoken criticism, persevered in staying the course with respect to its agenda. To take one

example, in 1985, five noted Yeshiva University Talmud faculty members issued a broadside prohibiting women's prayer groups. The latter had originated in the early 1970s particularly with respect to Purim and readings of the Book of Esther as well as Simchat Torah celebrations. By the early 1980s approximately a dozen such women's prayer groups were convening regularly, usually on a monthly basis. Given the general rightward drift within Orthodoxy, and particularly the growing authority of *roshei yeshiva*, the declaration of the RIETS Five, as it came to be known, ought to have signaled the demise of women's *tefillah*.

Yet rather than forfeit their verve - as their male counterparts were all too often guilty of doing - leaders of women's *tefillah* stood their ground and refused to retreat.

Notwithstanding noted attacks upon them as "Modern Jezebels" (ironically, the Jezebel depicted in the Bible would have been horrified to learn that her heirs were observant women who worshiped a monotheistic Deity), the leaders of Orthodox feminism refused to fold their tents. Over the next two decades women's prayer groupings multiplied at least eightfold. Arguably, this constituted the sole case study in which the modern vision of Orthodoxy prevailed in a climate of ever-increasing authority of *roshei yeshiva*. In turn, demonstrating that perseverance and pushback were keys to success, the experience of Orthodox feminists inspired a reawakening of the Modern Orthodox vision in other spheres of Jewish life.⁸

II. Why the Decline?

Several factors account for Modern Orthodoxy's retreat and loss of verve. As noted above, Haredi educators, encouraged by their mentors, began filling teaching positions in Modern Orthodox day schools. The Modern Orthodox, by contrast, fell into a catch 22. Having encouraged their children to pursue high quality secular education at the nation's finest universities, Modern Orthodox parents rarely saw the field of Jewish pedagogy as a potential career for those children. Yet as those progeny became adults, busy launching

⁸ Yehuda Turetsky and Chaim Waxman, "Sliding to the Left? Contemporary American Modern Orthodoxy", *Modern Judaism*, 31, 2 (May 2001): 120-1.

careers in medicine and law, they found their own children receiving instruction from Haredi educators who by no means shared their Modern Orthodox ideology. The latter were by no means so naïve as to believe that their students would become Haredi. Rather, they sought to influence the Modern Orthodox home gently, pushing it towards a more right- of-center and isolationist position.

Of perhaps even greater influence was the near-universal norm of a post-high school gap year at an Israeli *yeshiva*. Prior to 1967, the one-year programs at Israeli *yeshivot* appealed to very few. Far more attractive was the idea of a junior year abroad at the Hebrew University. However, following Israel's eye-popping victory in the 1967 Six Day War, a new trend blossomed of devoting a full year immediately following high school to the study of Talmud in an Israeli *yeshiva*. Within a decade a new norm virtually had been established. So effective were the gap year programs that students often wrote to their parents requesting a second year or "*shana bet*" at the yeshiva they attended. The consequences of this change were momentous for Modern Orthodoxy. Day schools almost unanimously and unreservedly praised the yeshiva programs as an invaluable year of full- time Jewish learning prior to experiencing the secular influences of the university. Parents seemed to value the "independence training" the year in Israel provided. The community as a whole welcomed the attachment to Israel the program embodied.

Yet few anticipated how transformative the program would become or fathomed how it would change the face of American Orthodoxy. Once in Israel, many students found themselves attending institutions whose faculty by no means valued the distinctive synthesis embodied by Modern Orthodoxy. As a result, the dominant intellectual influences at these institutions emanated largely from the Orthodox Right. In the minds of their students, *roshei yeshiva* exercised far greater intellectual influence than secular university professors. Eventually Yeshiva University became de facto a three-year institution, reducing the quantity of college courses taken by a full 25%. More generally, alumni of these programs began looking at college primarily in instrumentalist terms - useful for earning a living but not as a source of values. Thus the "learner-earner" replaced the goal of "synthesis" within Modern Orthodox higher education.

To be sure, only in a relatively small number of cases did "flipping out" occur. Most students continued to dress in multi colors rather than the black and white favored by the Haredi community. Attachment to Israel deepened as had been anticipated.⁹ Rather, what occurred was a more subtle cultural shift distancing Modern Orthodoxy from its intellectual roots in favor of yeshivish behavior patterns and the ascendancy of roshei yeshiva as chief intellectual influence. Rabbi Soloveitchik himself, in the late 1970s, was cited as questioning whether taking teenagers out of their Modern Orthodox homes and immersing them in the world of full-time yeshiva study created unnecessary and undesirable generational rifts.¹⁰

At the same time, Modern Orthodoxy was losing a key demographic: Charles Liebman had referenced the "Residual Orthodox," those who were non-observant yet identified as members of Orthodox institutions. Once a dominant component in Orthodoxy - even as late as the 1980's Steven M. Cohen and Samuel C. Heilman identified these non-observant Orthodox as a critical dimension within American Orthodoxy - by the twenty-first century this group had largely evanesced.¹¹ Most found their way into Conservative and Reform synagogues. Few remained active members within Orthodox institutions. The defection of this group, in turn, facilitated the demographic ascendancy of Haredi Orthodox at the expense of their Modern Orthodox brethren.

The net effect of these changes resulted in a loss of nerve among the Modern Orthodox and their leaders. Fearful of being delegitimized and somewhat overawed by a growing Haredi presence, Modern Orthodoxy itself began its slow "slide to the right." Gone were the aspirations for a Modern Orthodoxy that truly synthesized two cultures, that sought cooperation with non-Orthodox clergy, and that defined Israel as an unprecedented opportunity to demonstrate the meaning of a modern Jewish and democratic state. Even

⁹ Shalom Berger et. al., *Flipping out? Myth or Fact: The Impact of the "Year in Israel"* (New York: Yashar Books, 2007), 51-7.

¹⁰ Alvin Schiff, *Beyond the Melting Pot* (New York: Devora Publishing, 2009), 575-6.

¹¹ Charles Liebman, "Orthodoxy in American Jewish Life", *American Jewish Yearbook*, 66 (1995), 31. Samuel C. Heilman and Steven M. Cohen, *Cosmopolitans and Parochials: Modern Orthodox Jews in America*, (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1989).

as the specter of assimilation threatened the collective Jewish future, Centrist Orthodox leaders spared no efforts in delegitimizing those to their Left.

III. A Modern Orthodox Resurgence

However, while Modern Orthodoxy as a whole experienced decline, seeds of renewal were being sowed. Most potently, as mentioned earlier, Orthodox feminism did not wither away in the face of opposition from Orthodox rabbis. Indeed, it only became stronger. Women's *tefillah* groups around the country organized themselves into the Women's Tefillah Network in the early 1980s, an organization that held national conferences and published a newsletter. *Agunah* rights activists founded organizations that centralized and enlarged the fight on behalf of *agunot*.

The birth and subsequent success of JOFA, the Jewish Orthodox Feminist Alliance, signaled a resurgence of Modern Orthodoxy. In late 1996, a group of Orthodox feminist activists including Blu Greenberg, Belda Lindenbaum and others decided that the time was ripe to convene a conclave to discuss issues of feminism in Orthodoxy. Calling their endeavor, scheduled for Presidents' Day Weekend 1997, the First International Conference on Feminism & Orthodoxy, the women hoped to attract a crowd of 300. A few weeks prior to the conference, the Vaad HaRabbonim of Queens issued a statement forbidding Orthodox women in Queens from participating in women's *tefillah* groups. The story was covered by Jewish newspapers across the country, and was even picked up by the *New York Times*. The outcry from Modern Orthodox women was immediate and deafening. As the morning of the first day of the International Conference on Feminism & Orthodoxy dawned, the conference organizers found themselves scrambling to set up extra chairs and find extra food. Instead of 300 people, the conference had attracted 1000 attendees.

Following the incredible success of the conference, the organizers set about founding an organization with a mission of expanding the "spiritual, ritual, intellectual and political

opportunities for women within the framework of halakha (Jewish law)."¹² In February of 1998, just as the Second International Conference on Feminism & Orthodoxy convened in New York City, JOFA was born. In the ensuing eighteen years, JOFA has become a force to be reckoned with inside the Orthodox Jewish world. Its eight international conferences have each attracted at least 1000 attendees, including rabbinic and scholarly luminaries of the Modern Orthodox world in America and Israel. Thousands read its myriad publications, and its support of women's scholarship and leadership in the Orthodox community has had a decisive impact on the expansion of those roles. While some Centrist and Modern Orthodox leaders have decried the existence of JOFA, privately they acknowledge that JOFA is a force that cannot be ignored.

At the same time as JOFA was being founded, a group of rabbis, laity, intellectuals and communal leaders joined forces to form a grassroots organization called Edah, which was dedicated to revitalizing Modern Orthodoxy in America. The organization's founding conference in February 1999 attracted over 1500 participants. Edah, headed by Rabbi Saul Berman, sought to address issues such as the challenge of feminism and women's equality, the pursuit of secular education as a value in itself rather than purely for utilitarian reasons, and the continuing need for cooperation with the non-Orthodox religious movements and their leaders. Edah's agenda included working toward solving women's inequality in Jewish divorce law, encouraging and training Modern Orthodox educators, and nurturing an atmosphere of open dialogue and freedom of exchange that was so sorely lacking in the Orthodox world. While Edah helped to launch and centralize the new Modern Orthodox renewal, it ultimately closed its doors in 2006. Nonetheless, by that time, Edah had held four national conferences and several regional conferences, and had published five issues of the *Edah Journal*, containing impressive scholarship and dialogue on critical issues, such as the halakhic basis for *aliyot* for women.

As JOFA and Edah were being founded, Rabbi Avi Weiss wrote a seminal article in *Judaism* magazine that gave ideological voice to this Modern Orthodox resurgence. Called "Open Orthodoxy! A Modern Orthodox Rabbi's Creed," the article outlined a vision for

¹² "Who We Are," Jewish Orthodox Feminist Alliance, accessed April 5, 2016, http://jofa.org/Who_We_Are/Mission.

Modern Orthodoxy which reaffirmed the centrality of strict adherence to halacha, but also focused on the philosophical areas in which Modern Orthodoxy differed from the Orthodox Right. Rabbi Weiss identified five such areas. First he argued that Modern Orthodoxy maintains an ideological commitment to the holiness of secular education. Second, he articulated the respect that should underlie treatment of the other, whether non-Jews or non-observant Jews. Third, he contended that Modern Orthodoxy views the founding and existence of the State of Israel to be imbued with religious significance. Fourth, he affirmed Modern Orthodoxy's commitment to the expansion of women's roles within the bounds of Jewish law. Fifth, he contended that Modern Orthodoxy acknowledges that there are areas in which it can and should work with - and learn from - the liberal movements of Judaism. Last, he professed a Modern Orthodox commitment to public protest and advocacy for oppressed Jewry around the world.¹³

Following his articulation of a Modern Orthodoxy unashamed of its adherence to certain central ideals of modernity and unwilling to compromise on these allegiances in the face of pressure from the right, in 2000, Rabbi Weiss founded Yeshivat Chovevei Torah, a rabbinical seminary designed to train rabbis committed to these ideals. YCT has prospered notwithstanding the unstinting opposition of both Orthodox Right and Center, ordaining over 100 rabbis since its inception, and placing many of its graduates in prestigious Orthodox pulpits and educational institutions around the United States and Canada. YCT grew out of the Meorot Fellowship, which Rabbi Weiss founded to serve as a learning and discussion forum for a group of RIETS students dissatisfied with the rightward drift of the Orthodox rabbinate, especially as articulated by Yeshiva University's Talmud faculty. Over time the Fellowship became the seeding ground for the new yeshiva, one designed to train rabbis who were truly Modern Orthodox.

Structurally, YCT is patterned more along the lines of West European rabbinical seminaries than the classical East European *yeshivot*. The Talmud faculty is both stellar and forward-looking, open to diverse approaches both methodologically and substantively. Students also take electives generally alternating between text-based courses and

¹³ Avraham Weiss, "Open Orthodoxy! A Modern Orthodox Rabbi's Creed" *Judaism*, 46, 4 (1997): 409.

courses in Jewish thought. Most important, students are taught to think for themselves rather than rely only on the opinions and perspectives of their mentors. Thus it is not uncommon for students to take positions to the right or to the left of the school's leadership. Last, YCT has hit its stride in terms of finding its constituency. Some alumni have returned to the college campus, where a more open intellectual approach is particularly effective. Others have risen to leadership positions within Jewish education and Jewish communal service. Still others have assumed pulpits, building synagogues that are welcoming to all, intellectually challenging, and spiritually uplifting.

Less than a decade after the founding of YCT, in 2009, Rabbi Weiss founded Yeshivat Maharat, a seminary designed to ordain Orthodox women as spiritual leaders. Maharat, an acronym standing for *manhiga hilchatit, ruchanit, Toranit* -- leader in Jewish law, spirituality and Torah, was a title created for Hebrew Institute of Riverdale's female spiritual leader, Sara Hurwitz, and was conferred upon her by Weiss in a ceremony in early 2009 after she completed a course of study that matched that of male Orthodox rabbis. Yeshivat Maharat, the first institution to train women for the Orthodox rabbinate, is younger than YCT and therefore less established, although it continues to grow. As of June 2016, Yeshivat Maharat will have ordained 14 women, many of whom are serving in Orthodox pulpits across North America.

Maharat faces fierce opposition from the Right, the core of which focuses upon the very idea of ordaining women as rabbis. Surprisingly, the discussion has often centered on use of particular titles, especially titles that resemble "rabbi" - as if titles could give meaning to people rather than people giving meaning to titles. When Sara Hurwitz took on the title "rabba," a feminized version of rabbi, the firestorm from Centrist and Haredi Orthodoxy was powerful and zealous. Most recently, critics of Maharat have gone so far as to advocate reevaluation of women studying Talmud as comprising a slippery slope towards the ordination of women.

Yet the real significance of Maharat is twofold: First, it reflects the fact that many Orthodox women today indeed are well-educated Jewishly and can more than hold their own with male counterparts. Limiting the role of such women would prove highly

frustrating, and would shine uncomfortable light on the gender discrimination that continues to permeate American Orthodoxy. Second, ordaining women as rabbis enriches the talent pool of individuals eager to serve the Jewish people.

Rabbi Shlomo Riskin has been a parallel builder of Modern Orthodoxy in Israel at a time when others retreated and moved their institutions toward a more Haredi sensibility. Before making *aliyah*, Rabbi Riskin built New York City's Lincoln Square Synagogue in the 1960s with a firm commitment to reach out and include nonobservant Jews, while its architecture gave equal sound and sight lines to women. The first women's *tefillah* group in America was held under Rabbi Riskin's auspices at Lincoln Square. In Israel, the schools that make up his network of Ohr Torah Stone Institutions are unabashedly modern Orthodox in their philosophy. Continually focusing on inclusivity rather than exclusivity, Rabbi Riskin has trained rabbis to serve in diaspora communities with a welcoming and inclusive halachic approach and has reached out for connection to his Arab neighbors in Efrat. In recent years, he set up the Center for Jewish and Christian Understanding and Cooperation (CJCUC). The Center - whose academic director is Rabbi Dr. Eugene Korn, another notable Orthodox participant in Jewish Christian dialogue- has particularly focused on learning and cooperation in support of Israel with evangelical Christians. From his earliest years in Israel, Rabbi Riskin created important institutions for women's advanced learning, including training them to be *toanot* in the Israeli rabbinic court system. Now he has extended this training to enable women to serve as spiritual leaders in Israeli communities.

The battle continues. When JTS began ordaining women in 1985, Blu Greenberg was quoted as saying she expected to see female Orthodox rabbis within her lifetime. Yeshivat Maharat has fulfilled that prediction. At the same time, the Rabbinical Council of America has urged Orthodox institutions to refuse to hire women who utilize the title "Maharat" or any other "title implying rabbinic ordination." Thus far the leadership of Maharat, like that of YCT, has resisted the pressure to retreat. The institution's survival, again, testifies to the importance of perseverance in pursuit of Modern Orthodox goals and

agenda rather than surrender to external criticism.¹⁴

Yet a third signal of Modern Orthodox resurgence has been the growth of partnership *minyanim* - Orthodox prayer services which grant women maximum opportunities for participation and leadership through reading of Torah, *aliyot* and leading selective portions of the *tefilla* deemed halachically permissible for women to lead. The initial partnership *minyana* originated in "Shira Hadasha" in Jerusalem in 2002 under the leadership of Tova Hartman and Adina Ravitsky. Since that time two things have occurred in almost an exact parallel with the controversy over women's *tefilla* of three decades previously: Halachic authorities almost unanimously condemned the partnership *minyanim* as forbidden, especially with respect to the public Torah reading. One student at RIETS, who facilitated a partnership *minyana* in his home, was threatened with denial of ordination unless he apologized and vowed never to do so again. Conversely, however, the phenomenon of partnership *minyanim* has spread widely to Modi'in, Ra'anana, New York, Boston, Washington, D.C., and elsewhere. Again, rather than retreat in the face of the Centrist Orthodox drift rightward, in this case the Modern Orthodox retained their verve and independence, relying upon halachic authorities who permitted the partnership *minyanim*.¹⁵

Similarly, other signals point to a resurgence of Modern Orthodoxy. Orthodox rabbis report considerable evolution in their positions with respect to inclusion of gays and lesbians in the Orthodox community. The film "Trembling Before God" released a short decade ago had enormous impact because it portrayed gays and lesbians who wished to live lives committed to *halacha*, yet found themselves ostracized by their families and

¹⁴ Blu Greenberg, "Will There Be Orthodox Women Rabbis?" *Judaism* 33 (Winter 1984), 23-33; "2015 Resolution: RCA Policy Concerning Women Rabbis," accessed April 26, 2016, <http://www.rabbis.org/news/article.cfm?id=105835>

¹⁵ See Steven Bayme, "Modern Orthodoxy at a Crossroads," *New York Jewish Week*, March 3, 2014, accessed April 5, 2016, <http://www.thejewishweek.com/editorial-opinion/opinion/modern-orthodoxy-crossroads>, and subsequent response by David Berger, "Determining the Movement's Parameters," *New York Jewish Week*, March 23, 2014, accessed April 5, 2016, <http://www.thejewishweek.com/editorial-opinion/opinion/determining-movements-parameters>. On partnership minyanim more generally, see Elana Maryles Sztokman, *The Men's Section* (Waltham: Brandeis University Press, 2011).

communities. Rabbi Steven Greenberg's sensitive memoir *Wrestling with God* depicted the trials of an Orthodox rabbi struggling with his own sexual orientation while worshiping among congregants who routinely disparaged gay and lesbian relationships. In 2010, some 800 students attended a forum sponsored by Yeshiva University on "Being Gay in the Orthodox World" suggesting that a critical mass existed that was sympathetic to the plight of gay Orthodox Jews, and eager to hear how to cope with the tensions between homosexual orientation and the demands of living within the parameters of Orthodoxy. Unfortunately, the forum was condemned by virtually every Y.U. *rosh yeshiva*, and university leadership effectively apologized for its occurrence. Yet subsequently some 225 Orthodox rabbis and educators signed a statement of principles, which, while upholding halachic prohibitions on homosexual behaviors, urge an end to gay-bashing and a much greater sensitivity to the personal status of gays within the Orthodox world. Most importantly, the statement of principles called for welcoming of gays and lesbians as full members of synagogues and school communities and "full embrace of the...biological children of homosexually active Jews in the...school setting" a recommendation adopted thus far by at least one if not several Modern Orthodox day schools. To be sure, the issue of homosexual sex and *halacha* remains divisive and unresolved. Yet the release of the statement points to an Orthodox leadership willing to substitute an attitude of inclusion for the traditional one of disdain and ostracism often so prevalent within Orthodox circles.

Perhaps most controversial, albeit less noticeable, has been the quiet attention some Modern Orthodox thinkers have given to the issue of academic Bible scholarship. Half a century ago the late Charles Liebman predicted an explosion within Orthodoxy over the question of Biblical criticism. Liebman argued that Modern Orthodox Jews were deeply challenged by the virtual unanimity of academic Biblical scholars in assigning multiple sources, late authorship, and historical errors to the text of the Torah. Put another way, the claims of the Modern Orthodox to be "modern" entailed some sort of engagement with the findings of critical Biblical scholarship that so contradicted mainstream Orthodox thinking.¹⁶

¹⁶ Liebman, *American Jewish Yearbook*, 46-7.

Initially, as in other areas, the Modern Orthodox retreated. The ArtScroll Biblical commentary series, which ignored modern scholarship, largely replaced the longstanding Hertz commentary inside Orthodox synagogues, and its well-illustrated volumes became the predominant literature for lay readers of Scripture. Some Modern Orthodox intellectuals engaged in apologetics, invoking only the findings of archeology that corroborated the Biblical record. These apologetics, however, ran the risk of sounding hollow in the face of archeological research that seemed to contradict the Biblical narrative. Modern Orthodox Jews interested in the broadest intellectual study of the Bible had to choose between ignoring academic scholarship and preserving traditional belief or accepting the findings of academic scholarship and struggling with the meaning of "Torah MiSinai."

Most recently, however, Modern Orthodox Jews in North America and in Israel have begun to engage and grapple with modern academic scholarship regarding the Bible. A new initiative, *TheTorah.com*, an online weekly publication, has sought to demonstrate how critical scholarship may enhance appreciation of the text rather than diminish it. Now in its third year of publication, the online weekly prints original essays situating the text of the Torah within the culture of the ancient world, drawing on contemporary research, and providing readers with analysis of the text through historical, comparative, and literary methods. To be sure, issues of faith do remain. Some Modern Orthodox readers believe that certain essays on *TheTorah.com* cross the line, taking them out of realm of appropriate Orthodox discourse about the Bible. Others point out that critical study distances the reader from the text, and with distance often comes loss of reverence. *TheTorah.com* is not likely to become an organ for mass readership. More likely it will attract at most several thousand subscribers for a free weekly subscription. But as a document, *TheTorah.com* again illustrates how Modern Orthodoxy is recovering its verve, dialoguing with findings that are intellectually compelling even if intuitively non-traditional. While Orthodoxy will not give up its central and core belief in Torah MiSinai, the fact that a sector of the community is choosing to grapple with compelling academic scholarship and explore its meaning for traditional faith rather than sweeping it under the rug is emblematic of a revival of Modern Orthodoxy.

Yet a further signal of the Modern Orthodox resurgence relates to Jewish-Christian dialogue. The year 2015 marked the fiftieth anniversary of Vatican II's *Nostra Aetate* declaration absolving the Jewish people collectively from the charge of deicide. The declaration signaled the removal of the "teaching of contempt" from Catholic textbooks and the inauguration of a new era in Jewish-Christian relations. More recent statements have affirmed the eternity of the Jewish people and the ongoing validity of God's covenant with the Jews. By no means the least fruit of this new relationship has been Vatican recognition of the State of Israel.

Generally the Orthodox world had been slow to respond to such changes in the Christian world. Long accustomed to leaving the field of Jewish-Christian relations to Reform and Conservative colleagues, Orthodox rabbis initially viewed the prospect of dialogue with suspicion, possibly even as a cover or ruse for missionary attempts to convert Jews. In the 1960s, Rabbi Soloveitchik legitimized Jewish-Christian dialogue, provided it was restricted to social and political questions. Theological exchange, the Rav maintained, would prove demeaning to both faiths by undermining the theological integrity of each. The RCA in turn adopted the Rav's position as its official stance on dialogue.¹⁷

A few Modern Orthodox rabbis, at considerable personal risk, defied the strictures of the RCA. They maintained that social and political issues could not be separated from theological ones, and theological exchange would enhance mutual respect and understanding rather than undermine theological integrity. Rabbis Yitz Greenberg and David Hartman, among very few others, persevered in this endeavor and were often ostracized for doing so.

With the commemoration of the fiftieth anniversary of *Nostra Aetate*, surprisingly, a larger number of Modern Orthodox rabbis, both in Israel and the U.S. (with a smattering from Europe) issued a groundbreaking statement on Christianity, affirming its positive theological status and appreciating its religious value. Greenberg now hardly stood alone in delineating a "common covenantal mission" shared by Jews and Christians. Leading

¹⁷ Soloveitchik, "Confrontation," *Tradition* 6, 2 (Spring 1964): 5-29.

Modern Orthodox figures such as Rabbis Marc Angel, David Bigman, Yehudah Gilad, Daniel Landes, Binyamin Lau, Asher Lopatin, Shlomo Riskin, David Rosen, and Daniel Sperber, among others, joined in a public statement advocating Jewish-Christian partnership. Unsurprisingly, no individual identified with the Centrist Orthodox establishment signed the statement. To the contrary, and again to no one's surprise, leading figures of that establishment criticized the statement as dissonant with Rabbi Soloveitchik's pronouncement of five decades previously. Nonetheless, a serious grouping of Modern Orthodox rabbis, including figures of international renown, declared their independence and willingness to issue a statement that had been inconceivable for Orthodox rabbis just a short time in the past.¹⁸

Other signs exist of institutional resurgence within Modern Orthodoxy. In 2002, Rabbis Marc Angel and Avi Weiss established the International Rabbinic Fellowship as an organization of rabbis in the field dedicated to decentralization of rabbinic authority locally in order to better serve the needs of the Orthodox communities they served. For Rabbi Angel, the critical motif was the RCA's insistence upon the most rigid of guidelines for conversion to Judaism, guidelines which effectively closed the door to willing converts not as yet prepared to undertake full religious observance. For Rabbi Weiss the primary stimulus was the refusal of the RCA to accept graduates of Yeshivat Chovevei Torah as members, even as the RCA had no difficulty accepting as members alumni of rabbinical seminaries far to the right of Yeshiva University.

Since that time the IRF has grown into an organization of over 250 rabbis serving communities in all parts of the country. It now accepts female spiritual leaders for membership, thereby including graduates of Yeshivat Maharat. Its existence as an organization challenges the Orthodox establishment by pointing to a critical mass of Orthodox rabbis dismayed by the RCA's rightward turn and willing to defend principles of inclusion and openness to diverse viewpoints within the parameters of Orthodoxy.

¹⁸ "Orthodox Rabbis Issue Groundbreaking Statement on Christianity," accessed April 5, 2016, http://en.radiovaticana.va/news/2015/12/10/orthodox_rabbis_issue_groundbreaking_statement_on_christians/1193458. For Greenberg's more detailed views, see his *For the Sake of Heaven and Earth* (Philadelphia: JPS, 2004).

On the intellectual level, Rabbi Angel also established the Institute for Jewish Ideas and Ideals, designed to foster an intellectually vibrant, compassionate, and inclusive Orthodox Judaism. Its website features *Jewish Ideas*, regular essays on Jewish tradition and contemporary issues of Jewish life. Its published journal, *Conversations*, generally is dedicated to a single topic per issue, e.g. Jewish education, Sephardic experience and culture, spirituality, conversion to Judaism, and the like. *Conversations* enhances the intellectual discussion within Modern Orthodox circles and serves as a forum for diverse expressions encouraging independent thought grounded in classic Jewish teachings and heritage.

Perhaps most interesting has been the emergence of "Social Orthodoxy" as a subset of Modern Orthodoxy. Social Orthodoxy comprises more a phenomenon than a movement, but it possibly gives voice to thousands of Orthodox Jews. In pronounced contrast to the "Residual Orthodox" identified by Liebman half a century ago, the Social Orthodox demonstrate a very high level of halachic observance. They identify with Orthodox institutions and are deeply committed to Jewish peoplehood. Concern for Israel comprises a core component of their Jewish identity. In turn their high degree of religious observance across generations strengthens family ties and enhances feelings of community.

What distinguishes the Social Orthodox is the question of theological belief. Whether influenced by contemporary Biblical scholarship or by other factors, they tend to be more questioning of rabbinic authority and admit absence of complete certainty with respect to Divine origin of the entire Torah. In limited areas they prefer greater rabbinic initiatives to prevent abuses, such as the International Beit Din and its efforts to eliminate the problem of *agunah*. Last, they largely do not attribute misfortune or tragedy to Divine retribution refusing to believe in a Deity who punishes human beings for their misdeeds.

The primary criticism of Social Orthodoxy as a phenomenon lies in the question of its sustainability and transmittal. The Pew study reports that 83% of Orthodox Jews under 30 have grown up Orthodox and identify as such as adults. To be sure, that is an impressive statement of Orthodox retention. But it also means that 17% - one in every six - of

Orthodox Jews have defected.¹⁹ The defections have occurred primarily among the ranks of the Modern Orthodox notwithstanding a spate of books detailing more sensationalist Haredi defections. Centrist Orthodoxy, and certainly Haredi Orthodoxy, transmit clear messages of firm belief. The Socially Orthodox display greater theological doubt and ambivalence. Intellectually they prefer tentativeness of belief and struggle with ultimate questions to statements of "you must believe!" More concretely, Social Orthodox Jews likely have great difficulty believing in resurrection; they struggle with ethical imperatives in the Torah such as Amalek, and at times question the historical accuracy of Scripture.²⁰ These are critical intellectual questions, ones that Centrist Orthodox rabbis largely ignore. But the questions also presuppose greater distance from the text, viewing it as an historical document rather than as Divine Revelation in any literal sense of the word.

The Social Orthodox uphold the Torah as the inheritance of the Jewish people to be preserved and transmitted, doubts and all. Whether their progeny will continue to so value it, however, remains unknowable. In the meantime, they hope the quest for community, love of Jewish learning, and commitment to Jewish people will transcend individual theological doubts.

IV. Where are we?

Today Modern Orthodoxy appears to be at a crossroads: Precisely at a moment when the community needs to hear its distinctive voice, it struggles over its self-definition, who speaks on its behalf, and what comprises its core values.

Briefly put, the facts are straightforward: The 2013 Pew Report indicates that the Modern Orthodox number fewer than half the numbers of the Haredi Orthodox. Where the latter's demographic is burgeoning due to high birth rates, the Modern Orthodox do increase but are by no means keeping pace. As a result, Modern Orthodox Jewry may

¹⁹ Pew Research Center, 49-50.

²⁰ J. Lefkowitz, "The Rise of Social Orthodoxy," *Commentary*, 137, 4 (April 2014): 37-42, and responses, *ibid.*, 138, 2 (Sept. 2014), 6-16.

claim the allegiances of at most 3% of the total American Jewish population.²¹ Yet the significance of Orthodoxy in Jewish communal affairs appears to be on the rise. The Haredi Orthodox largely have found their voice and are asserting it in public discourse. They are least likely however, to assume responsibility for the overall agenda of Jewish public affairs. The Modern Orthodox, historically the bridge with the liberal religious movements, are likely to maintain a high level of Jewish activism, and together with the Haredim, probably will constitute a majority of Jewish communal activists in the next generation.

Yet Modern Orthodoxy, although well-positioned to assume the mantle of communal leadership, faces its own internal crisis: Tensions between so-called "Centrist Orthodox" and "Modern Orthodox," particularly, but not exclusively, with respect to the prospect of female Orthodox rabbis, augur schism within the ranks of Orthodoxy. The Centrist Orthodox retain a preponderance of Modern Orthodox constituents and are represented by strong institutions in the RCA, OU, and YU. The Modern Orthodox, by contrast, possess great intellectual power and appeal, but they find themselves increasingly marginalized within more mainstream Orthodox institutions and communities.

One scenario is that of schism: The Centrist Orthodox, increasingly dominated by *roshei yeshiva*, will move closer to the Haredi right. The latter, concerned about future economic sustainability, may begin to coalesce with the Centrist Orthodox. Touro College, for example, in large measure has succeeded because its founder understood the necessity for the Haredi population to acquire skill sets necessary for earning a living. Similarly, historical differences between Haredi and Centrist Orthodoxy over Zionism in recent years have waned.²²

The alternate possibility is that Orthodoxy adopts a posture of "live and let live" permitting its

²¹ Pew Research Center, 48.

²² Norman Lamm forecast such a development over two decades ago. See Norman Lamm, "The Jewish Jew and Western Culture: Some Fallible Predictions for the Turn of the Century" in *Jewish Identities in the New Europe*, ed. Jonathan Webber (London and Washington: Littman Library of Jewish Civilization, 1994), 105.

different wings to coexist with one another in the battle of ideas. Centrist Orthodox spokesmen may object to female rabbis, partnership minyanim, liberalized standards for conversion, and the embrace of academic study of Biblical texts - and offer their reasons for doing so while allowing room for those who have differing perspectives of tradition and requirements of Halacha. Many of these trends already have found their niche in Modern Orthodox circles. Others remain controversial, even radioactive, such as Biblical criticism and the meaning of Revelation. Orthodoxy as a whole is challenged as to where its red lines lie and what leeway exists within its ranks for dissent. A more liberal and inclusive outlook, however, will both avert the prospect of schism, and strengthen Orthodoxy collectively precisely at a moment of its ascending importance communally.

What Modern Orthodoxy cannot do, however, is retreat so as to mollify critics. Some issues, to be sure, are negotiable; others may be deferred to a future time. But on key battlegrounds, particularly conversion to Judaism, cooperation with the liberal movements, religious Zionism, and gender equality, the positions staked out by Modern Orthodoxy remain central to its identity and should not be diluted in the name of unity. In previous decades, Modern Orthodoxy chose the route of retreat and surrender of independence and verve to the detriment both of its own integrity and to its critical function as bridge between the religious movements. Its only real options today are coalescence with the forces to its right or building upon the signs of resurgence delineated above. Clearly its leaders prefer the latter course. Whether they will have the fortitude, perseverance, and dedicated constituency to travel that rocky road is the question yet to be answered.