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As second screening becomes more widespread, this study addresses its mediating role on the impact of TV news in political participation online and offline, and how this impact varies across groups. We expand the existing line of research by assessing the moderating role of support for Donald Trump on the established mediated model. Through a cross-lagged autoregressive panel survey design applied to the communication mediation model, our results support the link between second screening and political participation—but the mediating role of second screening is contingent upon attitudes towards Trump. For those who do not view Trump favorably, second screening during news leads to a decrease in political participation, both online and offline. As such, this article adds to the communication mediation model by suggesting that discussion and elaboration may not always be positive antecedents to political participation. When individuals disagree with the message dominating TV news and social media, deliberation via second screening leads to political disengagement.

On August 13, 2015, more 24 million viewers turned to their televisions to watch the first GOP presidential debate featuring Donald Trump. The event was the highest-rated primary debate in television history, and the most watched show in the history of Fox News (Stelter, 2015). As Trump clashed with moderator Megyn Kelly about his past misogynistic comments, second screeners flooded social media chatter with debate posts.

In the following debates, Trump continued to dominate the conversation, drawing millions of viewers with his controversial remarks and confrontational style (Goodin, 2016).

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In this article we assess the mediating impact of second screening for news on political participation, in particular as it may conduit those who watch TV news in an election season to participatory acts online and offline. Specifically, we ask—can online actions during media events influence one's offline political actions? Taking into consideration the hostile and unusual nature of the 2016 presidential U.S. election, particularly as it relates to social media, we assess the conditional effects of support for a candidate who dominated the political information system during the campaign period on the relationship between second screening for news and political participation. As scholars and practitioners attempt to make sense of the 2016 election, we explore the impact of support for Trump on established models of communication. Building on this, our goal is to unravel the ways in which second screening, as a space for political deliberation, leads to different participatory outcomes for groups belonging to opposite sides of the political spectrum.

Second Screening and Political Participation

Second screening has been conceptualized in political communication literature as a purposive act. While watching a television program, individuals second screen by accessing an additional Web-connected device in order to get more information about or to discuss the program (Gil de Zuñiga, Garcia-Perdomo, & McGregor, 2015). This concurrent and purposive act is one example of hybridity in media (Chadwick, 2013; McGregor, Mourao, Neto, Straubhaar, & Angeluci, 2017).

While second screening is emblematic of the increasing connectedness of individuals, it is not simply another form of multi-tasking. Scholars who have studied second screening as a non-purposive act have raised concerns about cognitive abilities regarding multitasking, specifically finding that it may inhibit factual recall and news comprehension (Gottfried, Hardy, Holbert, Winneg, & Hall Jamieson, 2016; Van Cauwenberge, Schaap, & van Roy, 2014). However, researchers interested in the role of second screening in politics (Anstead & O'Loughlin, 2011; Gil de Zuñiga et al., 2015; Vaccari, Chadwick, & O'Loughlin, 2015) have pushed back against this work on two fronts. First, they conceptualize second screening (or dual screening) as purposive, positioning the act as hybrid, rather than separate acts under which multitasking might fall. Secondly, studies evaluating the effects of second screening on pro-democratic outcomes like elaboration, expression, and political participation move the dependent variable beyond simple knowledge retention into real-world acts with real-world implications.

Second screening well fits Chadwick's concept of the hybrid media system, as an emergent act that embodies the tension between new and old media logics (2013). On the one hand, televised programs or events—produced and broadcast largely by legacy media organizations—make up one aspect of second screening. But to this rather top-down media system enters social media whose networked orientation avails a wider range of voices and acts in political conversations (Freelon & Karpf, 2015), providing at least the potential to shift traditional flows of power. Second

screening, as a virtual form of collocation, is an audience-driven aspect of a converged media atmosphere (McGregor et al., 2017)—one that gives more agency to the viewers and is a key development in the emerging role of the audience in media studies.

When understood as a purposive act, second screening provides individuals with additional information, potentially orienting opinions, all in a space where discussion and elaboration are encouraged. Research demonstrates that the mobilizing potential of news media is largely mediated through these very acts—paths theorized as the communication mediation model (McLeod, Scheufele, & Moy, 1999; Shah et al., 2007) and the cognitive mediation model (Eveland, 2001; Eveland, Shah, & Kwak, 2003). These relationships may be especially strong when information seeking and expressive acts are carried out on the Internet or social media (Gil de Zuñiga, Molyneux, & Zheng, 2014). A previous study tested this hypothesis for second screening, finding that second screening during news events conduits the influence of television news to online political participation (Gil de Zuñiga et al., 2015). Likewise, Vaccari et al. (2015) find increased political engagement driven by what they typify as "active" second screening behavior—such as commenting on the news event being broadcast.

In the media effects tradition, under which much TV research was conducted, the audience was usually treated as passive or reactive. While we do not suggest that the audience has always been "passive"—there is no doubt that individuals may now use social media as a tool by which to have a more active role in politics and communication. In fact, this more active role seems to temper the "negative" effects television may have on political attitudes and participatory behavior (Avery, 2009; Cappella & Jamieson, 1997; Mutz & Reeves, 2005).

TV news has been the focus of much research because of its dominance as a source of information, even with the rise of the Internet as a space for news (American Press Institute, 2014; Pew, 2011). For example, more than half of Americans surveyed by Pew found some form of television news the most helpful source for learning about the 2016 election, with most reporting cable news was most helpful (24%). Just behind cable news, 14 percent reported that social media was most helpful for learning about the election (Pew, 2016).

The role of second screening in political participation has been studied in the U.S. context, but the data were not collected during a politically compelling period in time, like a presidential election (Gil de Zuñiga et al., 2015). As Vaccari et al. point out, second screening (or dual screening) takes on increased relevance for politics during campaign periods where highly mediated events like debates draw strong second screen attention (2015). Gil de Zuñiga and colleagues (2015) suggest that second screening for news during elections may more strongly affect online participation. Based on this literature, this study uses a cross-lagged panel design to test the following hypotheses using data from two time points (T_1 and T_2):

H$_{1a}$: Second screening for news (T_1) will mediate the path between TV news consumption (T_1) and online political participation (T_2).

Furthermore, previous research has not probed the possible effects of second screening on offline participation in the U.S. context. While many studies link social media use to online political acts, some have sought to explore its reach into offline political participation. Using social media to seek political information, one motivation for second screening (Gil de Zuniga et al., 2015), has been linked to offline participation in politics (Gil de Zuniga, Jung, & Valenzuela, 2012; Park, Kee, & Valenzuela, 2009). Others are motivated to second screen during news by a desire to discuss the program they are watching (Gil de Zuniga et al., 2015). Online expression vis-à-vis social media has also been positively related to offline participatory behaviors (Gil de Zuniga, 2009; Gil de Zuniga, Bachmann, Hsu, & Brundridge, 2013; Gil de Zuniga & Valenzuela, 2011). Based on this, we aim to extend our inquiry into the offline realm, hypothesizing that second screening provides a space for information seeking, discussion, and elaboration of TV news that may conduit offline political activities.

H_{1b}: Second screening for news (T_1) will mediate the path between TV news consumption (T_1) and offline political participation (T_2).

Second Screening During Elections, Political Disagreement and Donald Trump

While evidence from the literature suggests a positive impact of second screening to political participation, it would be simplistic to assume this effect is without contingencies. As Valkenburg and Peter (2013) point out, theories of indirect effects, like the communication mediation model, rarely "conceptualize conditional *and* indirect media effects" (p. 225). This is not to dismiss the communication mediation model, but rather to identify the role of non-media variables that may moderate the relationship between media-use behaviors, like second screening for news, and political acts, in our case, both online and offline participation in politics. While there are a host of attitudes or beliefs that may moderate this relationship, in this study we choose to focus on a singular source of political fervor in U.S. politics: support for Republican candidate (and now president) Donald Trump. Building on literature about political discussions, a feature of second screening (Gil de Zuniga et al. 2015; Vaccari et al., 2015), and disagreement in them, we argue that support for Trump, the most divisive figure in recent political memory, may differentially impact the influence that second screening has on political participation.

A sub-field of political communication scholarship has examined the nature of political discussions on social media platforms. More and more, social networking sites like Facebook and Twitter function as news sources (Pew, 2015). During the 2016 presidential campaign, 44 percent of Americans used social media to learn about the campaign (Pew, 2016). There is some debate about the extent to which

social media networks are politically heterogeneous (e.g., Himelboim, McCreery, & Smith, 2013; Lee, Choi, Kim, & Kim, 2014), but individuals disagree about politics with those in their online social networks to a greater degree than they believe (Goel, Mason, & Watts, 2010). This political heterogeneity makes one likely to encounter political disagreement on social media (Barnidge, 2015; Choi & Lee, 2015; Lee et al, 2014), but the literature is divided as to whether this disagreement leads to pro-democratic outcomes.

Some studies suggest that such disagreements relate negatively to political participa-tion (Mutz, 2006; Valenzuela, Kim, & Gil de Zuniga, 2012)—conflicting views in posts may foment ambivalence (Hutchens, Hmielowski, & Beam 2015; Mutz, 2006), increase a fear of isolation (Gearhart & Zhang, 2015; Noelle-Neuman, 1974), stimulate anxiety (Mutz, 2006), or manifest perceived hostile opinion climates (Scheufele & Moy, 2000). Those who often use social media for news and information, one motivation for second screening (Gil de Zuñiga et al., 2015), discuss politics less, which may curtail political participation (Lu, Heatherly, & Lee, 2016). On the other hand, others suggest political disagreement drives participation (Scheufele, Hardy, Brossard, Wasimel-Manor, & Nisbet, 2006; Song & Eveland, 2015), in part by availing alternative perspectives (Price, Cappella, & Nir, 2002; Scheufele et al., 2006) and fostering reflection, learning, and knowledge gains (Jung, Kim, & Gil de Zuñiga, 2011).

In the context of the 2016 U.S. presidential elections, there was perhaps no greater source of disagreement than the candidacy of Donald Trump. Trump supporters and protesters have come to physical blows at his campaign rallies (Associated Press, 2016). Critics claim Trump's inflammatory rhetoric begets this violence (Barbaro, Parker, & Gabriel, 2016), and its riotous effects manifest on social media as well. Trump has a social media following that mirrored his electoral popularity. Trump supporters were more likely to criticize Democratic frontrunner Hillary Clinton's sanity, intelligence, and to sexually excoriate her appearance (Nugent & Pierson, 2016). Trump's campaign was also an unprecedented news media phenomenon, receiving the equivalent of $1.9 billion in TV coverage (Confessore & Yourish, 2016).

In the first time period in which our survey was fielded, coverage of Trump largely focused on his anti-Muslim and anti-immigrant statements in the wake of the Paris and San Bernardino terrorist attacks. Later in the winter and spring, when we fielded our second survey wave, election coverage remained focused on Trump (Silver, 2016). Between November and February, the times our survey data were collected, Trump mocked *The New York Times* reporter Serge Kolakeski for his congenital disability, retweeted fabricated statistics about black crime, got into a dispute with Pope Francis, and proposed a total ban on accepting Muslim refugees (Rupar & Dewan, 2016). By the end of February, Trump had won the primaries in New Hampshire, South Carolina, and Nevada. Add to this Pew's finding that, in February, Americans rated cable news as their "most helpful" source of election information, followed closely by social media (2016)—two platforms dominated by coverage of Trump and his messaging.

We theorize second screening as a communicative mediating process (Gil de Zuniga et al., 2015), but posit that this path may be contingent on other factors.

Political disagreement on social media has been shown to both encourage and discourage political participation, so effects driven by perceived disagreement or hostile environments may moderate the effects of second screening for news on participatory action. We take up a timely, politically relevant, and highly divisive attitude—support for Trump—and test its role as a moderator in this relationship.

H_{2a}: Support for Trump (T_1) will moderate the relationship between second screening for news (T_1) and online political participation (T_2).

H_{2b}: Support for Trump (T_1) will moderate the relationship between second screening for news (T_1) and offline political participation (T_2).

Methods

This article adds to the communication mediation model of second screening proposed by Gil de Zuñiga et al. (2015) by probing the contingent effect of Donald Trump attitudes on the increase in political participation between November 2015 and February 2016 (Figure 1).

Sample

This project uses data from a two-wave U.S. national panel study conducted by the Digital Media Research Program at the University of Texas—Austin. The first wave was administered between November 20 and December 18, 2015. The second

Figure 1
Proposed Research Model
Note. The indirect effect of TV News for increase in online/offline political partici-
pation through second screening between December 2015 and February 2016 is
contingent upon levels of support for Trump.

wave was conducted in February 2016. Both waves were administered online via Qualtrics and matched to U.S. Census data.

Participants for the first wave were recruited from a standing panel managed by Survey Sampling International (SSI). To assure national representativeness, quotas were established matching the distribution of demographics (age, gender, and race) to the U.S. Census, following the recommendation from previous research (Bode, Vraga, Borah, & Shah, 2007; Kim & Chen, 2015; Shah et al., 2007). The first wave had a total of 848 completed responses. For the second wave, 426 of the participants completed the questionnaire, yielding a 50 percent retention rate. Appendix I contains the demographics of the sample of participants, compared with the U.S. Census.

Measures

This study assesses the impact of three types of variables on online and offline political participation: 1) demographics, 2) sociopolitical variables, including attitudes towards Trump, and 3) news media use, including TV news use and second screening for news.

Dependent Variables.
Online Political Participation.   This variable refers to the level of political engagement via online-based activities. Participants were asked how often have they been involved in the past 12 months in the following online activities on a 10-point scale (1 = *never* to 10 = *all the time*): "Joined a political meeting in support or against a particular candidate, party or issue," "sent an email or message (Facebook comment, tweet) to a national, state or local government official about an issue," "contributed money online or via text message to a political candidate, party or issue," "created, shared or signed an online petition," "volunteered to help with a political cause or candidate's campaign online," and "sent a letter to the editor to a newspaper or magazine by email or text message." The items were combined into a single scale (α = .95, M = 3.19, SD = 2.61 for time 1, and α = .96, M = 3.21, SD = 2.70 for time 2).

Offline Political Participation.   Levels were measured using six items asking how often participants engaged in the following activities in the last 12 months on a 10-point scale (1 = *never* to 10 = *all the time*): "Attended a political meeting in support or against a particular candidate, party or issue," "contacted a national, state or local government official by telephone, mail or in person about an issue," "contributed money by mailing a check or calling in a credit card number to a political candidate, party or issue," "created, shared or signed a petition," "volunteered to help with a political cause or candidate," and "sent a 'letter to the editor' by regular mail to a newspaper or magazine." The items were combined in a scale (α = .91, M = 3.38, SD = 2.57 for time 1; α = .92, M = 3.45, SD = 2.68 for time 2).

Independent Variables of Interest.[1]

TV News.   Participant's use of television for news was assessed by combining four items measuring how often they got news from: cable news (e.g., CNN, Fox News, MSNBC), broadcast national news (e.g., ABC, CBS, NBC), local news (local affiliate stations), and comedic news programs (e.g., *Daily Show*). The mean for this variable was 5.84 (α = .72, range 1 = *never* to 10 = *all the time, SD* = 2.19).

Second Screening for News.   For this item, participants were asked how often they second screened in the last 12 months during the following: live political speeches or debates, live election coverage, and live news broadcast on a 10-point scale (1 = *never* to 10 = *all the time*). The three items were combined in a single scale (α = .93, *M* = 5.51 *SD* = 2.75).

Trump Attitudes.   Our analysis includes the moderating impact of attitudes towards Donald Trump. To measure this item, participants were asked to what extent do they agree with the statement: "Donald Trump is going to make America great again" on a 10-point scale where 1 = *strongly disagree* and 10 = *Strong Agree* (*M* = 4.35, *SD* = 3.20).

Independent Variables as Controls.

Demographics.   This study controls for the following demographic characteristics of the participants: age (*M* = 43.67, *SD* = 13.99), gender (female = 50.7%), education[2] (*M* = 3.57, *SD* = 1,31, range: 1 = *less than high school* to 6 = *Postgraduate or professional degree, including master's, doctorate, medical or law degree*), income (*M* = 4.40, *SD* = 1.53, range: 1 = *Less than $10,000* to 8 = *$200,000 or more*) and race (white = 63.1%).

Discussion Network Size.   This item was a combination of two questions: How many people have you talked to about politics or public affairs a) online, and b) offline (*M* = 5.90, *SD* = 9.62).

Political Knowledge.   For this variable, participants were asked to respond the following open-ended questions, which were recoded into "right" or "wrong": "What job or office does Joe Biden hold?," "for how many years is a United States senator elected?," "what job or political office does John Roberts currently hold?," "which party has the most members in the U.S. House of Representatives?," "who has the final responsibility to determine if a law is constitutional or not?," "which organization's documents did Edward Snowden release?," "the U.S. recently announced that it would be re-establishing diplomatic relations with which country?," "to comply with the health care law, most Americans need to have health insurance coverage when they:," and "John Boehner recently retired from what job or office?" The average number of correct responses was *M* = 5.47(*SD* = 1.44).

Strength of Partisanship.   This item was a folded scale of questions asking "Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, or an Independent," "On social issues, where would you place yourself on a scale of 0–10, where 0 = *Strong conservative* and 10 = *Strong liberal*" and "On economic issues, where would you place yourself on a scale of 0–10, where 0 = *Strong conservative* and 10 = *Strong liberal*." The items were folded and averaged, with the final scale ranging from 1 = *weak partisanship* to 5 = *strong partisanship* (α = .87, M = 3.05, SD = 1.44)

Efficacy.   Six items measured levels of efficacy on a scale from 1 to 10 where 1 = *strongly disagree* and 10 = *strongly agree*: "People like me can influence government," "I consider myself well qualified to participate in politics," "I have a good understanding of the important political issues facing our country," "No matter whom I vote for, it won't make a difference," "Parties are interested in people's votes rather than their opinions," and "People like me don't have any say in what the government does." (α = .70, M = 5.42, SD = 1.48). The last three items were reverse coded.

Data Analysis

Our hypotheses were tested using a two-wave panel data design consisting of three steps. First, mediation models were run using Hayes PROCESS macro model 4 for both online and offline political participation to test research H_{1a} and H_{1b}. Then, the full moderated mediation model (Figure 1) was tested using Hayes's PROCESS macro Model 14 (Hayes, 2013), which allows for the assessment of indirect effects contingent upon the levels of a third variable (in this case, support for Trump). All moderated mediation models were auto-regressive; that is, we accounted for the levels of political participation in time 1 in predicting participation in time 2.

Finally, we zoom in on the moderation effect of Trump attitudes via a set of regressions assessing the relationship between second screening for news and online/offline political participation. The indirect effects by groups were then graphed using Hayes PROCESS macro model 1. All tables presented have the three relations proposed by Kenny (2005) for a cross-lagged panel design: a) synchronous or cross-sectional, b) simple lagged, and c) autoregressive controlling for stability relations. The cross-sectional regression assesses the impact of second screening for news on time 1 to online/offline participation on time 1. The simple cross-lagged model analyzes the impact of second screening for news on time 1 to online/offline participation on time 2. Then, autoregressive cross-lagged models between second screening for news on time 1 and participation on time 2 were run with a term for political participation on time 1 entered as an independent variable. The goal is to control for stability relations between the outcome variable at T1 and T2. Autoregressive cross-lagged models, such as the ones presented here, allow for the

assessment of the influence of the predictor on the outcome beyond the previous level of that same outcome, which can indicate causal patterns (Kenny, 2005).

Results

Before delving into the full models, bivariate correlations reveal that second screening for news is strongly associated with online (Time 1: $r = .586$, $p < .001$; Time 2: $r = .471$, $p < .001$) and offline political participation (Time 1: $r = .546$, $p < .001$; Time 2: $r = .460$, $p < .001$) in both times 1 and 2. Support for Trump, our moderating variable, is also positively associated with political participation online (Time 1: $r = .396$, $p < .001$; Time 2: $r = .378$, $p < .001$) and offline (Time 1: $r = .384$, $p < .001$; Time 2: $r = .355$, $p < .001$).

Online Political Participation

Figure 2 shows the mediation model for the indirect impact of TV news on online political participation through second screening. The coefficient paths among independent (TV news), presumed mediator (second screening for news) and dependent variable (online political participation) are all significant, and the direct effect of TV news on online political participation is fully mediated (c' not significant). The 95% bootstrap confidence intervals for the indirect effects do not contain zero; therefore, mediating effects were evident [H_{1a} supported].

Figure 2
Mediation Autoregressive Model of TV News Impact on Online Political Participation

Note. Unstandardized regression coefficients are reported with standard errors in parentheses. The effects of demographics, sociopolitical variables, and online political participation on Time 1 were controlled. *$p < .05$. **$p < .01$. ***$p < .001$.

Figure 3 depicts the full model for the moderated mediation of TV News' impact on online political participation via second screening. The model reveals that the impact of the mediation is contingent upon levels of Trump attitudes. Figure 3 shows the coefficients and standard errors for each path.

Then, we zoom in on the relationship between second screening and online participation to understand how the interaction with support for Trump manifests. Table 1 shows the linear regression models for online political participation using a cross-lagged autoregressive model. As indicated by the cross-sectional regression (Model 1), those who are male (β = -.097, p < .05), younger (β = -.115, p < .05), with larger discussion networks (β = .143, p < .01), lower levels of political knowledge (β = -.216, p < .001), and higher levels of support for Trump (β = .274, p < .001) were more likely to participate online on T1. TV news and second screening for news were also positively associated with higher levels of political participation (β = .112, p < .05; β = .296, p < .001, respectively). The interaction term between second screening and Trump attitudes was not statistically significant at T1 (F-tests not

Figure 3
Moderated Mediation Autoregressive Model of TV News Impact on Online Political Participation Through Second Screening

Note. The indirect effect is contingent upon support for Trump. Unstandardized regression coefficients are reported with standard errors in parentheses. The effects of demographics, sociopolitical variables, and online political participation on Time 1 were controlled. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.

Table 1.
Cross-sectional (Model 1), Lagged (Model 2) and Autoregressive (Model 3) Linear Regression Models Testing the Moderating Effect of Attitudes Towards Trump on the Relationship Between Second Screening News Use and Online Political Participation

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3	
	β	β	β	β	β	β
Block 1: Demographics						
Gender (F = 1)	-0.097*	-0.1*	-0.064	-0.071	0.018	0.012
Age	-0.115*	-0.115*	-0.208***	-0.206***	-0.115**	-0.116**
Education	0.066	0.074	0.053	0.069	0.013	0.024
Income	-0.01	-0.013	0.025	0.019	0.034	0.03
Race (white = 1)	-0.02	-0.005	-0.04	-0.012	-0.039	-0.018
ΔR^2 (%)	9%***		11.8%***		11.6%***	
Block 2: Sociopolitical controls						
Discussion network size	0.143**	0.14**	0.133*	0.128*	0.02	0.018
Political Knowledge	-0.216***	-0.217***	-0.254***	-0.255***	-0.067	-0.07
Strength of partisanship	0.09#	0.086#	0.123*	0.117*	0.057	0.052
Efficacy	0.091#	0.094#	0.071	0.077	-0.002	0.004
Trump attitudes	0.274***	0.126	0.268***	-0.054	0.057	-0.151#
Online political participation T1	-	-	-	-	0.793***	0.781***
ΔR^2 (%)	35.2%***		29.2%***		59.9%***	

(continued)

Table 1.
(Continued)

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3	
	β	β	β	β	β	β
Block 3: News media use						
TV news	0.112*	0.105*	0.105#	0.089	0.017	0.008
Second screening for news	0.296***	0.208*	0.133*	-0.058	-0.107*	-0.231**
ΔR² (%)	9.5%***		3%**		0.6%#	
Block 4: Interaction						
Second screening X Trump attitudes	-	0.209	-	0.459**	-	0.301**
ΔR² (%)	0.4% N.S.		1.9%**		0.8%**	
Total R²	54.1%***		45.9%***		73%***	

Note. Cell entries are final-entry OLS standardized Beta (β) coefficients. #p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, ***p < .001

significant, revealing a poor model fit). The whole model explained 54.1 percent of the variance observed in online political participation in time 1.

Model 2 in Table 1 shows the simple lagged regression models with independent variables from T1 and outcome from T2. Those who are younger (β = -.208, p < .001), with larger discussion networks (β = .133, p < .01), lower levels of political knowledge (β = -.254, p < .001), more strongly partisan (β = .123, p < .05), and have more positive Trump attitudes (β = .268, p < .001) were more likely to participate online. Second screening for news was still positively associated with online political participation in time 1, but this effect was contingent upon support for Trump (interaction term β = .459, p < .01). This model explained 45.9 percent of the variance in online political participation.

Model 3 in Table 1 shows the auto-regressive models for online political participation in time 2, controlling for time 1. As expected, the strongest predictor of participation in T2 was participation on T1 (β = .793, p < .001). As a whole, second screening for news was *negatively* associated with online political participation (β = -.12, p < .01), but this effect was contingent upon levels of support for Trump (β = .301, p < .01). The full auto-regressive model explained 73 percent of the variance. For those who strongly disagree with Trump's statement, the impact of second screening on online political participation was negative (B = -.19, p < .01). For those in the middle, second screening also led to less participation (B = -.09, p < .05). For Trump supporters, second screening had a positive effect on online participation, although it was not statistically significant (B = .004, n.s.). Table 2 shows the conditional indirect effects by group, and the graph in Figure 4 depicts the interaction.

Offline Political Participation

Research H_{1b} inquires about mediating effect of second screening for news in the relationship between TV news and offline political participation. Figure 5 shows that the paths among the mediating variable and outcome are not statistically significant when treating the sample as a uniform group (H_{1b} rejected). The second set of hypotheses (H_{2b}) inquires about a moderated mediation model on the impact of

Table 2.
**Conditional Effect of Second Screening on Online Political Participation at Values of the Moderator**

Support for Trump	b	SE	p-value	Bootstrap 95% CI [LL, UL]
Low	-.189	.061	.00	[-.309, -.069]
Middle	-.092	.045	.05	[-.181, -.003]
High	.004	.054	.93	[-.102, .111]

Figure 4
Interaction Effect of Attitudes Towards Trump on the Relationship Between SecondScreening News Use and Online Political Participation (Autoregressive Models)


Figure 5
Mediation Autoregressive Model of TV News Impact on Offline Political Participation
Note: Unstandardized regression coefficients are reported with standard errors in parentheses. The effects of demographics, sociopolitical variables, and offline political participation on Time 1 were controlled. $*p < .05$. $**p < .01$. $***p < .001$.

Figure 6
Moderated Mediation Autoregressive Model of TV News Impact on Offline Political Participation Through Second Screening

*Note.*The indirect effect is contingent upon support for Trump. Unstandardized regression coefficients are reported with standard errors in parentheses. The effects of demographics, sociopolitical variables, and offline political participation on Time 1 were controlled. $*p < .05.$ $**p < .01.$ $***p < .001.$

TV News on offline political participation via second screening, and how it is contingent upon support for Trump for the autoregressive models. Figure 6 depicts this interaction, revealing a significant interaction between second screening and support for Trump—H_{2b} is supported. Table 3 isolates these relationships via three models: cross-sectional (Model 1), simple lagged (Model 2) and autoregressive (Model 3).

For the cross-sectional model, those who are younger ($\beta = -.09$, $p < .05$), have a bigger discussion network ($\beta = .12$, $p < .05$), and higher levels of efficacy ($\beta = .112$, $p < .05$) are more likely to participate offline. Perhaps surprisingly, those with *lower* political knowledge participated more ($\beta = -.287$, $p < .001$). A positive view of Trump is positively and strongly associated with offline political participation ($\beta = .286$, $p < .001$). Those who second screen for news more are also participating offline more ($\beta = .248$, $p < .001$). The interaction term was marginally significant, but the *F*-test for R-squared change was not, revealing a poor model fit for the last block in the cross-sectional data. Once again, at time 1, the impact of second screening on

Table 3.
Cross-Sectional (Model 1), Lagged (Model 2) and Autoregressive (Model 3) Linear Regression Models Testing the Moderating Effect of Attitudes Towards Trump on the Relationship Between Second Screening News Use and Offline Political Participation

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3	
	β	β	β	β	β	β
Block 1: Demographics						
Gender (F = 1)	-0.094*	-0.1*	-0.022	-0.03	0.043	0.034
Age	-0.077	-0.078	-0.184**	-0.184**	-0.127**	-0.131**
Education	0.074	0.082	0.055	0.073	-0.016	-0.005
Income	-0.005	-0.007	0.047	0.04	0.073	0.071
Race (white = 1)	-0.056	-0.038	-0.075	-0.04	-0.03	-0.008
ΔR^2 (%)	8.7%**		10.8%***		11.5%***	
Block 2: Sociopolitical controls						
Discussion network size	0.12*	0.116*	0.104#	0.097	0.013	0.009
Political Knowledge	-0.287***	-0.286***	-0.213**	-0.214***	0.002	-0.002
Strength of partisanship	0.055	0.052	0.066	0.055	0.031	0.025
Efficacy	0.112*	0.116*	0.082	0.092#	0.009	0.019
Trump attitudes	0.286***	0.088	0.257***	-0.144	0.066	-0.198#
Online political participation T1	-		-		0.704***	0.683***
ΔR^2 (%)	35.8%***		25.2%***		52.9%***	
Block 3: News media use						
TV news	0.095#	0.083	0.146*	0.128*	0.073	0.062
Second screening for news	0.248***	0.131	0.135*	-0.1	-0.033	-0.188*
ΔR^2 (%)	6.5%***		4.2%***		0.4% N.S.	

Block 4: Interaction

Second screening X Trump attitudes	0.28#	0.566**	0.381**
	-	-	-
ΔR^2 (%)	0.7% N.S.	2.9%**	1.3%**
Total R^2	51.80%	43.10%	66.00%

Note. Cell entries are final-entry OLS standardized Beta (β) coefficients. #$p < .10$, * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, ***$p < .001$

participation is not contingent upon support for Trump. The full model explained 51.8 percent of the variance in offline political participation.

For the simple cross-lagged regression (Model 2), age (β = -.184, $p < .01$), lower levels of political knowledge (β = -.213, $p < .01$), positive Trump attitudes (β = .257, $p < .001$), TV news use (β = .146, $p < .05$), and second screening for news (β = .135, $p < .05$) were associated with higher levels of offline political participation. The interaction term Trump attitudes*second screening was significant, suggesting that the importance of support for Trump in this relationship increased between November 2015 and February 2016 (β = .566, $p < .01$). This simple cross-lagged model explained 43.1 percent of the variance in offline political participation.

Model 3 shows the results of auto-regressive lagged models for offline participation, which control for offline participation in T1. In this model, previous participation is the strongest predictor of participation in time 2 (β = .704, $p < .001$), and those who were younger were also more likely to participate (β = -.127, $p < .01$). The interaction term between Trump attitudes and second screening for news was also significant (β = .381, $p < .01$). This model explained 66 percent of the variance observed.

The analysis by group show that for those who strongly disagree with Trump's message, second screening for news leads to *less* political participation offline (B = -.118, $p < .07$)—see Table 4 and Figure 7. While these results are only marginally significant, the evidence is clear: in November, the impact of TV news for offline participation via second screening was not significant. Then, by February, this interaction became strong and significant. The assessment of the increase in participation between the two times (autoregressive models) indicates that the change happened only among those who strongly disagree with Trump's message, whom started participating less after watching TV news and second screening during it.

Discussion

As second screening becomes a more widespread practice of news consumption, it's increasingly important to understand its role in hybrid media systems and its potential effects on politics. This study sought to expand this emerging line of research in several ways. First, we assess the potential for second screening to

Table 4.
Conditional Effect of Second Screening on Offline Political Participation at Values of the Moderator

Support for Trump	B	SE	p-value	Bootstrap 95% CI [LL, UL]
Low	-.118	.067	.07	[-.249, .013]
Middle	.007	.058	.90	[-.107, .1215]

Figure 7
Interaction Effect of Attitudes Towards Trump on the Relationship Between Second Screening News Use and Offline Political Participation (Autoregressive Models)

conduit offline political engagement. Second, we examine the mediating role of second screening for news on participation in a politically relevant time period, testing the assumption that second screening's effects may be stronger in such times. Finally, we further probe the relationship between second screening and political participation accounting for a source of political disagreement in the 2016 U.S. presidential election: support for Donald Trump.

Previous studies have documented second screening for news provides a space for discussion and deliberation, mediating the relationship between TV news and online political participation (e.g., Gil de Zuñiga et al., 2015). Our findings also support the communication mediation model (McLeod et al., 1999; Shah et al., 2007) and cognitive mediation model (Eveland, 2001; Eveland et al., 2003), but suggest that discussion and elaboration may not always be positive antecedents to political participation. As previously posited, this effect was stronger in an election period, but unlike previous studies, we found this relationship to be negative for some groups. We also provide a foundation on which to further probe these models in communication research—answering the call to conceptualize effects that are both conditional and indirect (Valkenburg & Peter, 2013).

Taking into consideration the extent of political disagreement fomented by the candidacy of Donald Trump, we find the link between second screening and

political participation is contingent upon support for the candidate. That is, for those who do not support the candidate, second screening for news leads to a decrease in online political participation. In the cross-sectional and simple lagged models, second screening relates positively to participatory acts, but when we control for participation in time 1, the relationship becomes negative. We posit that the dominance of Trump coverage in the campaigning period between our two waves of data collection explains this dramatic shift. When those who do not view Trump favorably second screen during news, like political debates, this leads to a decrease in their political participation.

While participation is certainly a normative democratic ideal, we do not view this finding as entirely deterministic. Those who do not support Trump may indeed be affected by the levels of disagreement they encounter when they second screen, but our second wave of data was collected eight months before the national election. Individuals with anti-Trump attitudes may have simply opted out of politics briefly to avoid the divisive rhetoric, but our study cannot point to the duration of this decrease and whether it impacted voter turnout in the general election.[3]

From a broader perspective, our findings do suggest that ensuing encounters with political disagreement have the potential to disrupt previously identified pathways by which hybrid media uses may lead to political participation. At the time of our surveys, polls suggested that the candidates were locked in a tight race, but both television coverage of the election and social media posts about it were dominated by Trump. Although social media and news coverage do not mirror polls (Jungheer, 2015), television remains a dominant source of information about politics, with social media serving as an important second source for many as well (Pew, 2016). Our study hints at some of the implications for this dual reliance on television and social media, and future studies should continue this vein of research. Future research should also examine the content of these information streams in conjunction, especially as we show their dual consumption may depress political activity for those who don't support the dominantly covered candidate.

In regard to offline political participation, we do not find that second screening for news conduits TV news viewers to participate in politics as a whole. In our cross-sectional and simple lagged analysis, second screening does relate positively to offline participation, but when controlling for previous levels of engagement, our auto-regressive conditional effects model suggests that this relationship is contingent on support for Trump—similar to our findings regarding online participation: second screening leads those who do not support Trump to participate less.

The social media discussion about the election consistently focused on Trump (Schultheis, 2016), and it was rife with political disagreement and uncivil rhetoric (Nugent & Pierson, 2016). Overall, the more individuals second screened during news, like the six Republican debates that aired during our two-wave survey collection, the less they engaged in participatory acts, but this effect is conditional upon the extent to which one supports Trump. It may be that the near non-stop coverage of Trump, coupled with his dominance of social media, created an atmosphere of disagreement for those not in favor of his candidacy, leading to a negative

relationship with political participation. An alternative explanation is that anti-Trump individuals are active participants in politics, so a decrease between our surveys may indicate they are regressing to more typical levels of participation. The fact that those who do not support Trump in our sample are more educated and report higher levels of political knowledge, timeworn predictors of political engagement, offers support for this argument. It should be noted that our sample might be slightly more educated than the general population, so caution should be taken in drawing strong conclusions regarding the role of education.

One of the limitations of this study is precisely the uniqueness of Trump's candidacy. At this point, it is impossible to know if these findings stem from his controversial persona and the divisiveness of his campaign and presidency, or if presidential campaigning and elections in the United States have changed altogether. Our results show that second screening during political debates has a positive impact on participation for those whose candidate leads coverage and conversation, but leads to disengagement for others.

Another limitation of this study is our use of agreement with Trump's slogan as a measure of support. At the time the survey administration (November 2015 for Wave 1 and December 2015 for Wave 2), more than ten candidates were still in the race for the Republican nomination. Because this study was part of a larger survey on social media and political participation, we had limited space to include more nuanced scale thermometer questions about the Republican race. Since our goal was to assess if the impact of second screening for political participation was contingent upon how much the respondent agreed with the message dominating television and social media coverage, we selected the Trump slogan for two reasons. First, Trump was the clear candidate dominating traditional and social media narratives during the primary debates at the time of our data collection (Gold, 2015; Stepheson, 2015). Second, Trump's slogan was the most clearly divisive message during the campaign, to which we could better infer disagreement with a certain degree of validity. We do, however, recognize that our measure does not capture the full complexity of support for Trump. We urge scholars interested in the topic to further probe how these relationships have evolved once the two major party candidates were selected and conversations on social media became more evenly split. Similarly, we also encourage future papers to use more sophisticated scales of support for a candidate.

Another limitation of this study comes from not necessarily knowing whether people who agree or disagree with Trump's message actually encountered opinions that they agree or disagree with on social media while second screening. This would require a more comprehensive and in-depth study with questions focusing on specific moments of second screening and the frequency at which users encountered disagreement on social media during those events. Yet, we believe this study provides a starting point to understanding how different groups are affected by second screening, the role of disagreement in these processes, as well as a glimpse of the impact of Donald Trump on political communication processes.

Methodologically, we employ a two-wave nationally representative panel survey to test our hypotheses, allowing us to generalize to the broader population and suggest some causal order. Our second wave of data collection came about three months after the first wave, ensuring a high retention rate (50%). Previous studies have found relationships between political discussion and participation in similar periods of time (Gil de Zuniga et al., 2015; Shah et al., 2007), but the short period between waves may for some raise doubts about our ability to draw clear causal conclusions. Along this same line of thinking, one of the limitations of this article refers to the two-wave cross-lagged design and our ability to trace clear cause and effects in a mediation model where data from three time periods or an experiment would be more conclusive. Yet, the findings presented here strongly suggest a moderating role of political attitudes and disagreement in the communication mediation process.

Future research should explore the relationship between second screening and political participation across additional attitudinal and political differences. Examining differences across groups may be central to moving the communication mediation model and the cognitive mediation model forward, providing more nuance to the role of discussion, particularly on social networking sites.

In sum, we conclude that online discussion and deliberation vis-à-vis second screening does impact political participation, but the effects are not consistent across the population. The unique and timely case of Trump provided an optimal variable for exploring discussion disagreement in politics. When individuals with anti-Trump attitudes second screen in a highly Trumpified space, they participate less in politics, while second screening has the opposite impact for those with whom Trump's message resonated. So far, for those who don't support Donald Trump, deliberation via second screening leads to political disengagement.

Acknowledgments

Funding

Appendix 1

Demographic Profile of the U.S. Survey and U.S. Census

	Authors' Study, U.S. Survey, Nov. – Dec. 2015	U.S. Census American Community Survey 2014 (1-year Estimate)	Pew Research Center's Internet, Science & Technology Project (July 2015)
	(%)	(%)	(%)
Age:			
18-24	13.6	12.6	13
25-44	38.5	31.7	33
45-64	36.2	33.9	34
65 or more	11.8	19.3	18
Gender:			
Male	48.2	49.2	49
Female	51.8	50.8	51
Race/Ethnicity:[1]			
White	63.8	63.8	65
Hispanic	15.7	16.9	15
African American	12.6	12.6	12
Asian	5.2	5.0	4.0
Education:			
High school or less	21.9	41.6	40
Some college	32.6	29.1	32
Bachelor's degree	26.4	18.3	15
Graduate degree	18.6	11.0	13
Household Income:			
Less than $49,999	48.7	46.9	55
$50,000 to $99,999	32.8	30.0	27
$100,000 or more	18.5	23	19

[1]"Mixed race" or "Other" not included.

Notes

1. For the independent variables, the measures are from time 1.
2. The sample is slightly more educated than the general U.S. population. See Appendix I.
3. Though post-election analysis suggests turnout was a problem among Democrats. See https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/voter-turnout-fell-especially-in-states-that-clinton-won/ and https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/20/opinion/sunday/the-democrats-real-turnout-problem.html

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