When you listen, it’s amazing what you can learn.
When you act on what you’ve learned, it’s amazing what you can change.

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1 Introduction

In 1994, President Bill Clinton signed the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act. The Act, the largest of its kind in the United States, had catastrophic effects on African-American communities. In the years since the Act was passed, federal prison populations have doubled, inmates no longer have access to Pell Grant funding for college education, and former inmates are largely barred from access to public housing and employment. All of these effects have disproportionately landed on African-American communities. These communities now face a cycle of prejudicial policing, inability to access resources, and unjust sentencing so extreme that, currently, a black child born in the United States has a 1 in 3 chance of spending time in prison or jail (and a white child has a 1 in 17 chance).²

One of the common political excuses for the 1994 Crime Act is that African-American communities asked for these measures. But this is a truth that tells a lie. As Hinton, et al. point out, these communities’ requests for “tough sentencing and police protection” were conjoined with requests for “full employment, quality education and drug treatment, and criticism of police brutality.” As you might guess, the former requests were emphasized during the Act’s drafting, while the latter were wholly dismissed. In short, African-American voices mattered to legislators only insofar as they were in agreement with white voices: that is, not at all.

The events leading up to the 1994 Crime Act illustrate one species of a phenomenon that Miranda Fricker has termed ‘testimonial injustice’ – a phenomenon wherein prejudice causes a hearer to “give a deflated level of credibility to a speaker’s word,” thereby either ignoring or rejecting the speaker’s testimony.³ This phenomenon is pervasive, extending
far beyond legislators drafting the 1994 Crime Act. Moreover, its instances often are so
systematic that they pass by us without notice. Every day, we see white communities
ignore testimony about racist police brutality, and hear women’s complaints dismissed as
‘hormonal’ or teenagers’ opinions waved away as ‘youthful naivety’.

Undoubtedly, unequal power structures pervade race, gender, sexual orientation, dis-
ability, ethnicity, age, religion, occupation, and on and on. This unjust division of social
power seems inevitably to lead to testimonial injustice: the refusal (or perhaps even inabil-
ity) of a privileged social group’s members to fairly assess or accurately interpret testimony
from an oppressed social group’s members. But just as unjust power structures result in
testimonial injustice, testimonial injustice reinforces these power structures – call this phe-
nomenon reinforcement. (More on reinforcement in §2.) My interest in this paper is both
what (if anything) we can do to prevent reinforcement, as well as what (if anything) we
can do to combat testimonial injustice. One solution, discussed by Fricker, is to develop
the virtue of testimonial justice, or the virtue being able to detect and correct for the influence
of identity prejudice in assigning credibility to speakers. But this solution, as I discuss
in §2, is under described. Read one way, it seems overly optimistic about our ability to
voluntarily (and directly) change our epistemic biases. Read in a more charitable light, it
leaves us with questions about mechanisms for indirectly changing these biases.

In this paper, I hope to outline such a mechanism for indirectly revising our epistemic
biases in greater detail. I argue that, if we hope to prevent reinforcement and revise our
prejudicial attitudes, one way (there may be others) we can do so is through resolving
to have instrumental trust in oppressed speakers under certain conditions. In §3.1, I
motivate and outline this mechanism in greater detail, which recommends adopting a
resolution to act (rather than, say, a resolution to believe) in order to combat reinforcement
and correct epistemic injustice. Though highly pragmatic and admittedly non-ideal, I argue
that is a viable path, given our limited cognitive capacities, to revising our prejudicial
attitudes.

In §3.2, I turn to questions about the scope of instrumental trust. It is not entirely
clear when we should have instrumental trust, given a shared pursuit of social justice.
What types of testimony are apt for instrumental trust? (Some types clearly are not — for
example, matters of taste about ice cream flavors, or whether beagles are cuter than fox
terriers.) And whose testimony should we trust, especially given that oppressed group
members often disagree? Do we trust the majority consensus of an oppressed group?
Individual group member’s testimony? It is not clear that either option would reliably enact social justice. While the scope of this paper prevents me from doing full justice (sorry!) to these questions, I distinguish what I take to be the most viable approach to instrumental trust in oppressed speakers, and discuss benefits and costs.

Finally, in §4, I address two related worries about instrumental trust. First, the political correctness worry: that instrumental trust will prevent reasonable people from challenging oppressed speakers for fear of being perceived as bigoted. And second, the unchecked power worry: that instrumental trust opens floodgates to oppressed groups (or their members) abusing their epistemic power. While I take these worries seriously, I will argue that, though imperfect, instrumental trust is a viable solution to reinforcement and, ultimately, testimonial injustice.

2 Testimonial & Structural Injustice

Injustice comes in many forms. One form recently highlighted by Fricker is testimonial injustice—the injustice that occurs when “prejudice causes a hearer to give a deflated level of credibility to a speaker’s word.” Testimonial injustice no doubt results, at least in part, from broader unjust social structures: when a particular social group is unjustly disempowered, stereotypes and ideologies surrounding others’ conceptions of that group lead to prejudicial attitudes. These prejudicial attitudes, which serve to maintain the social control of empowered groups, manifests in many ways, one of which is deflating the credibility of the disempowered group’s speakers. In this paper, however, I am not particularly concerned with this bridge from unjust social structures to testimonial injustice. The cognitive effects of living in an unjust society are well studied by social psychologists and sociologists, and it seems to me somewhat inevitable that living in these conditions will create prejudicial attitudes in even the most well-intentioned, informed and democratic persons.

Rather, I am concerned with two things. First, correcting testimonial injustice itself. And second, the bridge back — the reinforcing effect that testimonial injustice has on the structures that perpetuate stereotypes and prejudices — and, more specifically, how to disrupt it. Testimonial injustice clearly reinforces (among other things) racism, classism, sexism and ableism. Call these effects reinforcement. The mechanism behind reinforcement.

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Footnote:

3 Fricker (2007). I will follow Fricker in focusing on the case of deflated credibility, though I believe the phenomenon extends to inflated credibility.
ment, as Janack (1997) discusses, is due to the way that epistemic injustice (including testimonial injustice) allows privileged groups to wield social power in a way that serves only the interests of those groups. And this is not simply a claim about interpersonal interactions: it is a claim about the development of social systems. Although members of oppressed groups have different perspectives, interests, and needs than groups in positions of social power, epistemic injustice manifests when dominant groups ignore or reject those groups’ assertions of their perspectives and interests. This leads to the creation and perpetuation of theories, policies and norms that “reflect only the interests and values of those [privileged] groups.” (127) These theories, policies and norms, that is, are enacted and enforced throughout an entire society, even though they stand to benefit only privileged members of that society. For example:

- Theories of leadership, athleticism and success that emphasize stereotypically masculine traits and activities, thereby reinforcing patriarchal social power.
- Building codes or medical policies (or lack thereof) that reflect only the needs of non-disabled persons.
- Norms of sexual or gendered behavior that marginalize and deprecate queer, non-monogamous, and transgender persons.
- Law enforcement and sentencing policies that disproportionately target racial minorities.

The list goes on and on. The upshot is simply this: reinforcement is a real phenomenon. Testimonial injustice (among other things) prevents persons belonging to marginalized groups from influencing social structures, perpetuating power relations of oppression and privilege among self-interested social groups.

The solution to reinforcement is, on Fricker’s account, to eradicate testimonial injustice through hearers developing the virtue of testimonial justice, or the virtue “such that the influence of identity prejudice is detected and corrected for.” However, Fricker does not flesh out the details of what testimonial justice amounts to, or how to achieve it. On one reading, though, testimonial justice comes about through a person’s employing two abilities:

1. The ability to detect what their prejudices are, and when these prejudices cause them to deflate the credibility of a speaker.

5 Or, as Silvers & Francis (2005) puts it, “Falsehoods about biological inferiority have fueled biased beliefs about [oppressed groups’] limited capacities to bargain strategically or to reciprocate contractual benefits.”
6 Fricker (2007)
2. The ability to reverse the effects of these prejudicial attitudes—i.e., re-inflate their credibility assessment of the speaker.

For the purposes of this paper, I will grant the possibility of gaining the prejudice-detection ability described in (1). I am more interested in the ability described in (2) – what does it amount to, and is it plausible to think that everyday hearers could gain this ability?

The task of saying what (2) amounts to has been taken up by Karen Frost-Arnold, who describes it as “corrective trust.”7 When a speaker suffers injustice, because her testimony is ignored or rejected due to prejudice, Frost-Arnold suggests that hearers ought to trust the speaker by “revising the credibility upwards to compensate for the prejudice.”8 To illustrate this point, Frost-Arnold draws from a scene in The Talented Mr. Ripley where a lead male character, Greenleaf, dismisses a female character's views, saying, “There's female intuition, and there there are facts.”9 In this situation, Frost-Arnold suggest, Greenleaf should “reflect on the prejudice behind his assessment”–that is, employ the abilities in (1)–and “consciously choose to trust Marge.”10 Later, she goes on to describe ‘trusting’ a speaker as taking their testimony “as part of [one's] adjusted cognitive background,” where this amount to including the propositions they assert among the propositions that are taken for granted in practical reasoning in the given context.11

Although Frost-Arnold does not flag this, I take it as obvious that a hearer’s attitudes about the credibility of a speaker can comes apart from whether or not they take a speaker’s testimony as part of their adjustable cognitive background. Given this, I read Frost-Arnold as advocating the idea that our ‘ability’ to reverse the effects of one’s prejudice is indirect. Rather than meaning that we are able to voluntarily revise our prejudicial attitudes about a speaker, it means that we can control what we take as given in practical reasoning, in hopes that this will influence our epistemic attitudes toward to speaker. This line of thought seems promising, particularly given that evidence from the neuroscience of prejudice and stereotyping suggests that we do not have this latter ability—or, at the very least, that it would be extremely difficult. As David Arnodio notes in his summary of recent findings in the neuroscience of prejudice, social prejudices result from a fundamental capacity to discern ‘us’ from ‘them’, and are scaffolded by “basic-level neurocognitive structures.”

11Throughout this paper, I will use ‘they’ as a third-person singular pronoun when the subject’s gender is non-specified, or the subject’s pronoun preferences are not known.
Given this, on the picture he describes, unwanted social biases are automatic, often unconscious, resistant to extinction and “particularly difficult to change in a cultural milieu that constantly reinforces [them].” (679) Moreover, he notes, there is no evidence that awareness of one’s prejudices enables persons to correct these prejudices – in fact, the brain activity of white persons primed to be aware of biases while comparing white and black faces suggests that we are unable to directly prevent prejudicial attitudes.

Rather, the evidence suggests that when the brain detects a conflict between one’s goal to act without bias and one’s prejudices, cognitive control is focused on prevented the expression (not the existence) of prejudicial attitudes. That is, rather than attempt to eliminate prejudice, which may be cognitively impossible, the brain’s response to a conflict between one’s egalitarian goals and one’s biases is response inhibition—cognitive energy is focused on curbing “the unwanted influence of implicit stereotypes and prejudices on behavior.” (677) In light of this evidence, Arnodio encourages those who wish to prevent the harms of bias to focus on behavioral control, rather than direct change in first-order prejudicial attitudes:

> Although attempts to undo learned intergroup associations are laudable, such strategies may be ineffective for reducing the expression of bias in behavior outside the laboratory. Instead, interventions that enhance the cognitive control of behavior should be more effective. Such control-based strategies may not reduce prejudice in the mind, but they can prevent its effect on potential victims.

In other words, Arnodio advocates for a more indirect process for changing one’s prejudicial attitudes. Like Fricker, he emphasizes the need for strategies that enhance our ability to monitor and identify unwanted prejudices.13 But, in order to correct these attitudes, he does not suggest that we should try to directly eliminate our prejudiced assessment of others—we may well be incapable of such voluntaristic control over our prejudicial attitudes. Rather, Arnodio (like Frost-Arnold, on my reading) suggest that we focus on “top-down control of behavior” by developing pre-planned responses to conditions where prejudices are likely to influence behavior.

In the following section, I expand on this idea and critique Frost-Arnold’s ‘adjusted cognitive background’ picture, developing instead an account of an attitude I call instru-

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13These strategies, according to Arnodio, include “interventions that increase people’s awareness of the potential for bias, increase attention to specific cues indicating that control may be needed...and increase the sensitivity of conflict monitoring systems”. (679)
mental trust. One interesting upshot of this proposal, if successful, is that instrumental trust (or if you prefer, faith) is not in stark conflict with doxastic accounts of trust (or faith) as has been supposed, since adopting the stance of instrumental trust toward a person’s testimony is consistent with and may be an effective tool for achieving belief in the testimony.

3 Instrumental Trust

3.1 Instrumental Trust Toward Social Justice

For the reason discussed in §2, I am skeptical about our ability to achieve epistemic justice by voluntarily correcting our prejudicial attitudes. Neuroscientific research on bias seems to suggest that a better path to Fricker’s epistemic justice is to foster top-down behavioral control. But if voluntaristic epistemic justice currently is not a viable, or at least a rationally viable option, what sort of town-down behavioral control will help us prevent reinforcement and achieve testimonial justice? At least one practical stance of this sort, I will argue, is instrumental trust.

3.1.1 What is instrumental trust?

In order to understand how instrumental trust can prevent reinforcement (and, hopefully, ultimately correct testimonial injustice), we must first understand what it is. As I will use the term, instrumental trust refers to having trust in someone’s testimony. And ‘having trust’, as I will use the term, picks out a particular practical attitude concerning one’s behavioral response to someone’s testimony.

On an initial gloss of this attitude, we might think of ‘having trust’ that a proposition p is true as a resolution to act as if p is true. But such a gloss clearly needs precisification. And there are a few candidate precisifications of ‘trust’ that can help us narrow in on the attitude: On Frost-Arnold’s (2014) view of trust, I trust in a proposition p (in condition C) if and only if I make p part of my “adjusted cognitive background,” where this means I take p for granted during practical reasoning in C because I either believe or accept that p is true. And acceptance, on Frost-Arnold’s picture, is importantly different than belief. Acceptance, unlike belief is “context-dependent, shared by factors other than evidence, voluntary, and exempt from demands for overall consistency across contexts.” To accept that p is true (in C) requires only that p is, in a sense, stipulated as true for the purposes of decision making.
in C. It does not require epistemic support for \( p \).

Frost-Arnold’s picture of trust seems, at first glance, very similar to the attitude I’m trying to pinpoint in talking about instrumental trust. Unlike accounts on which ‘trust in \( p \)’ is used to pick out an attitude entailing belief that \( p \), or ones on which it is used to pick out an attitude entailing pro-attitudes such as confidence or hope in \( p \)'s truth, Frost-Arnold highlights an attitude that simply requires using \( p \) as a premise in one’s practical reasoning, regardless of one’s credence in \( p \) or what other attitudes one might have toward \( p \). And this is because this attitude concerns top-down behavioral control, rather than one’s first-order attitudes toward a proposition’s truth. As a result, one could have trust (in this sense) in a speaker’s testimony while simultaneously, as a result of prejudice, having low confidence in the speaker (and their testimony).

This division between one’s attitudes toward \( p \)'s and one’s attitudes concerning how one will act with respect to \( p \) is part of what is I need for an account of instrumental trust—that is, of an attitude that could combat reinforcement without requiring prior revision of prejudicial attitudes (or at least the elimination of their effects). But the attitude described by Frost-Arnold, while no doubt a real phenomenon and one that may well often be the intended use of ‘trust’, is not quite the attitude I mean to target.

In particular, the attitude Frost-Arnold describes is too weak to do the task I’ve set out for instrumental trust. If I take \( p \) for granted during practical reasoning, I might still continue to subject \( p \) to intense scrutiny, constantly on the look-out for any reason to disavow \( p \). I might be disposed to give up acceptance of \( p \) at the slightest counter-evidence or disagreement. As a result, this attitude, even if it is our default stance toward the testimony of persons we are prejudiced against, seems insufficient to prevent reinforcement. Consider, for example, the story of Marie, an 18-year-old woman who reported being raped to her foster parents. At first, her foster parents believed her, or at the very least, they took her testimony as true for the purposes of practical reasoning. (E.g., They reported the incident to the police and moved Marie into a new apartment.) But when Marie’s behavior did not align with how her foster parents expected someone to behave after experiencing trauma, they not only stopped believing her testimony, but also stopped taking her testimony as true in practical reasoning. In fact, they went so far as to tell the police that they suspected Marie was lying. (Before finally being vindicated by the physical evidence, Marie was charged with and pressured to confess to false reporting.)

\footnote{http://www.thisamericanlife.org/radio-archives/episode/581/transcript Thanks to Michael Pace for bringing this story to my attention.}
The attitude initially taken by Marie’s foster parents meets the description of Frost-Arnold’s trust. And yet this attitude does not serve the purpose of combatting reinforcement. If persons with social privilege and power are willing to act on the testimony of black, female, queer, disabled, immigrant, impoverished, or otherwise disadvantaged persons, but only so tentatively as to be seeking (or at least highly sensitive to) counter-evidence, this willingness would not be very effective in altering behavioral response to epistemically unjust attitudes. This is exacerbated by the fact that what we perceive to be evidence against disadvantaged person’s testimony is itself affected by our prejudices. For example, a teenager’s behavior in a store that would go unnoticed if the teenager were white may well be taken as evidence of a black teenager’s guilt. Similarly, ‘provocative clothing’ may be taken as evidence that an impoverished woman is at ‘fault’ if she is raped, but not that wealthy woman is at ‘fault’. And on and on. For this reason, whatever attitude we determine is needed to combat reinforcement, it will need to be more resilient than Frost-Arnold’s trust. Or, at least, it will need to be more resilient to (possibly apparent) counter-evidence to the testimony in question.

Setting aside Frost-Arnold’s account of trust for the moment, we might instead think that Buchak’s (2012) notion of ‘faith’ could play the role of instrumental trust. On Buchak’s picture, to have faith in a speaker’s testimony that \( p \) means that one is willing to take risks on \( p \) while lacking evidence that guarantees the truth of \( p \). Moreover, on Buchak’s view, one cannot have faith (in the relevant sense) if they are constantly seeking additional evidence that bears on the proposition at issue. Rather, she argues, having faith that \( p \) requires that “one is willing to take risks on \( p \) – that one is willing to choose acts that do best if \( p \) is true over acts that do best if \( p \) is false,” and “one commit to these acts without looking for further evidence in the matter of \( p \)”[15]. Faith, then, on Buchak’s view, requires both that one act and that one stop looking for evidence regarding how one should act.

Buchak’s notion of faith also comes close to capturing an attitude capable of playing the role of instrumental trust. But it is overly demanding given the purposes at hand. On her view, faith that \( p \) requires not seeking further evidence about whether \( p \) is true. But, even setting aside worries about the potential for self-deception in such cases, there are reasons for seeking evidence about \( p \) other than delaying acting on \( p \), (which, I take it, is Buchak’s primary concern). For example, one action you might be disposed to risk on \( p \) is trying to persuade others to have faith that \( p \), or even to believe that \( p \). In this case, you might

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seek further evidence in order to more effective persuade others to change their stance with respect to \( p \).\(^{16}\) Another reason you might look for further evidence is because you are obligated to do so: for example, even if a police officer is willing to act on the testimony of a rape victim, they still are obligated to seek further evidence concerning the alleged incident. But this does not seem to rule out that the officer can have instrumental trust that would do the work that I am interested in. And even if seeking the restriction on seeking evidence is narrowed to ‘seeking evidence for the purpose of determining how to act’, I am still concerned that it would be too strong: I want to leave open that instrumental faith – and the resolution to act as if \( p \) – is compatible with continuing to seek evidence that \( p \) is false (or true!), if only for the intended goal of deepening one’s resolution.

Adjusting for this issue, I propose that what is needed for instrumental trust that \( p \) is the following: First, an explanatory connection between the hearer’s actions and the speaker’s testimony – namely, that the hearer prefers to \( A \) because of, or on the basis of the speaker’s testimony, regardless of whether the hearer also would \( A \) on alternative grounds. And second, a resilience to counter evidence against \( p \) – namely, that the hearer is resolved to take \( p \) as a premise in practical reasoning even in the face of (non-conclusive) counter-evidence.\(^{17}\)

Putting these pieces together, we arrive at the following account of instrumental trust:

**Instrumental Trust**: Someone \( S \) has instrumental trust in testimony that \( p \) in context \( C \) if and only if (1) on the basis of testimony that \( p \), \( S \) resolves to use \( p \) as a premise in their practical reasoning in \( C \), and (2) \( S \)’s resolution is resilient against (non-conclusive) evidence against the truth of \( p \).

In other words, instrumental trust is, in this sense, to take testimony as true for the purpose of action in a given context, and resist evidence against the truth of that testimony. Instrumental trust, then, *may* be adopted as the result (at least in part) of higher-order awareness of one’s prejudice against a speaker’s testimony, but it need not be.

Importantly, instrumental trust does not amount to acting without considering the scope of available evidence, and does not require that one has instrumental trust in every context. The decision to adopt instrumental trust can and often should be preceded by a process of rational reflection—but reflection on the question of whether it would maximize

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\(^{16}\)Thanks to Shieva Kleinschmidt for raising this point.  
\(^{17}\)I am intentionally leaving ‘non-conclusive’ vague, as trying to make this precise would require writing another paper. It should be noted, though, that we ought to be aware of how our prejudicial attitude influence our assessment of evidence.
expected utility to adopt instrumental trust, and not on the question of whether the testimony is true. (More on this in §3.1.2) After all, reflection on the latter question would just reassert one’s epistemic biases. Moreover, as in the case of the police officer, it might be proper to adopt instrumental trust in some contexts but not others. So too, while seeking further evidence with respect to p, it wouldn’t make sense for a hearer to take p as a premise in practical reasoning, even if it would be beneficial for them to have instrumental trust in p in all other contexts.

I propose that instrumental trust, deployed under the right circumstances toward the right ends, is an effective way to prevent reinforcement and combat testimonial injustice for the following reasons:

• Instrumental trust, adopted under conditions of testimonial injustice, can prevent (or at least decrease the amount to which) prejudicial attitudes result in prejudicial behavior. Since it is the prejudiced behaviors resulting from testimonial injustice, and not unjust credibility assignments per se, that work to create and perpetuate larger unjust social structures, instrumental trust directly targets reinforcement.

• Scientific evidence suggests that instrumental trust is cognitively achievable, because it is a form of top-down behavioral control, (rather than, says, voluntaristic attitude change). This evidence also suggests that top-down behavioral control used to combat one’s biases is, over time, effective in altering one’s biased attitudes.\(^\text{18}\)

• Instrumental trust is compatible with a variety of first- and higher-order epistemic attitudes, including doubting (or not doubting) the reliability of one’s credibility assignment to a speaker, reserving judgment as to the speaker’s true credibility, believing p to be false (or true), doubting the rationality of one’s trust, etc. It also does not require that one care for, have goodwill toward, or be confident in a speaker.\(^\text{19}\) As such, it is not overly cognitively demanding, and can be achieved even by those who adopt this attitude simply due to social pressure.\(^\text{20}\) Instrumental trust resulting from coercion is still instrumental trust. It is not mean to be a virtue, but a tool.\(^\text{21}\)

Instrumental trust avoids placing oppressed groups into a position where they must,

\(^{18}\)See Arnodio.

\(^{19}\)These attitudes are commonly built into accounts of trust or faith. See Jones (1999), 69-70.

\(^{20}\)For example, I think it is quite likely that many people act with instrumental trust because they are afraid being seen as bigoted.

\(^{21}\)Of course, this does not rule out the possibility that, under certain conditions and with certain motivations, having instrumental trust is a virtue.
in effect, enter a game of epistemic bargaining where they are disadvantaged (and other groups are advantaged) from the start. It is intended to equalize the epistemic power of social groups, not disproportionately advantage oppressed groups.

Moreover, and as Jones (1999) point out, trust is a tool we have relied on since we were children in order to acquire descriptive and moral knowledge, as well as practical knowledge. Acting on testimony given by persons we have reason to believe are experts in the subject matter, or are likely to guide us to action with beneficial outcomes, is a tool that we employ all the time. Instrumental trust in the context of epistemic injustice simply emphasizes the point that perceived expertise of the speaker and consequences of trusting are not the only relevant factor when deciding whether we should instrumentally trust certain testimony – it is also relevant whether we have reason to believe our prejudices cause us to downgrade the speaker’s credibility. That is, just as we are willing to act on the testimony of persons we have reason to believe have more evidence than we do, are better at assessing evidence than we are, and so on, we also ought to be willing to act (at least in some circumstances and with respect to certain topics) on the testimony of persons we know we are prejudiced against.

That said, so far instrumental trust qua a tool furthering social justice is still under-described. For example, it is implausible that awareness of one’s bias against women means that one should adopt instrumental trust toward any woman’s testimony on any issue. (In fact, this would be impossible, given women’s conflicting testimony on many issues.) But how do we properly constrain the scope of instrumental trust? Whose testimony should we respond to with instrumental trust, and with respect to what subject matter? Though I cannot hope to fully answer these questions here, I will raise a few considerations.

3.1.2 The scope of instrumental trust

There are many legitimate questions about the scope of instrumental trust. Together, these specific questions lead to much larger questions such as, ‘Under what conditions is instrumental trust socially beneficial?’ and ‘Under what conditions is it rational to have instrumental trust?’

In this section, I will focus on two questions. Given the constraints of this paper, I also

\[^{22}\text{A similar point is made in Jones (1999), 72: “While climate, domain, and consequences are variables determining which default stance is justified that extend across agents, the fourth variable determining the appropriate default stance is agent specific. Some agents have reason to be distrustful of their tendencies toward trust in certain domains.”}\]
will not pretend to give complete answers these questions – I actually agree with Jones in thinking that "there can be no answer as to the appropriate stance to take toward testimony in general."\(^{23}\) There simply are too many variables that go into answering the question of whether, for any particular piece of testimony, one has sufficient evidence for adopting a stance of instrumental trust. Instead, I hope to make useful distinctions, and briefly highlight some of the considerations surrounding well-placed instrumental trust:

1. What types of testimony are apt for instrumental trust, (given an aim to foster social justice)?
2. Whose testimony is apt for instrumental trust, (given an aim to foster social justice)?
   (I.e., If prejudice affects our credibility assessments of persons in Group X, should we adopt instrumental trust toward the testimony of individual group members? the group majority?)

Let's begin with (1). At first blush, one might think that instrumental trust aimed at social change should be directed toward testimony that directly calls for action—for example, the testimony of African-American communities surrounding the 1994 Crime Act, or a Marie's testimony that she had been raped. But this, I think, wrongly overlooks the importance of also having trust in testimony that educates and/or indirectly calls for action.\(^{24}\) Let's distinguish between four types of testimony that seem, under many conditions, apt for instrumental trust:

A. Moral testimony. This can be divided in testimony regarding general principles (e.g., ‘Discrimination against (Group X) in (Context C) is bad/wrong.’), as well as testimony regarding the application of these principle (e.g., ‘(Action A) was/is an instance of discrimination against (Group X) in (Context C).’

   Examples: “The Religious Freedom Restoration Act is [wrongfully] discriminatory.”\(^{25}\)
   ‘LGBT organizations...are denouncing a law passed in North Carolina Wednesday

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\(^{23}\)Jones (1999), 72
\(^{24}\)For more on this point, see Karen Jones’s wonderful (1999) article “Secondhand Moral Knowledge”.
\(^{25}\)http://religionnews.com/2016/05/18/the-religious-freedom-restoration-act-is-discriminatory-lets-fix-it/
that struck down all LGBT-inclusive nondiscrimination ordinances across the state, calling it ‘devastating’, ‘appalling’, and ‘cruel and insulting’.”

B. Target experiential testimony. Persons belonging to particular groups are at higher risk for experiencing certain, often harmful experiences. Target experiential testimony reports having undergone such an experience due to one’s group membership.

*Examples:* “I...had problems with [a] male grad student who as a self proclaimed feminist would sarcastically interrupt me and show physical signs of annoyance whenever I had anything to say which was counter to any of his claims.”

“I had the misfortune of jogging early in the morning through my almost all-white neighborhood in small city near Boston. There was no crime in progress; a cop just thought I looked suspicious, pointed a gun at me and forced me to the ground while peppering his orders with lots of curse words.”

C. ‘What-it’s-like’ testimony. Rather than focus on particular instances of discrimination, this type of testimony communicates common, general experiences of belonging to a particular oppressed group (or intersection of groups).

*Examples:*

D. Target prescriptive testimony. Belonging to a group with a unique social experience makes that groups’ members particular well placed to comment on what actions or behaviors would best prevent discrimination against that group (or other harms). This type of testimony prescribes ameliorative steps to social equality with respect to a particular group.

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27Of course, belonging to particular groups also makes persons more likely to experience particular privileges; however, I assume that we tend to trust people’s testimony about their privilege much more than we trust people’s about negative group-based experiences.

28https://beingawomaninphilosophy.wordpress.com/page/2/

Example: “We [Princeton students of color] demand the university administration publicly acknowledge the racist legacy of Woodrow Wilson and how he impacted campus policy and culture.”

I do not expect or intend that this list is exhaustive, or that testimony can in fact be so neatly divided into separate categories. No doubt, there are other types of testimony that are apt for instrumental trust, and many instances of testimony fall within blurred lines. Instead, I intend for the list to clarify what considerations and distinctions might go into answering question (1). It is easy to say ‘men should believe women’s testimony’ or ‘non-disabled persons should not question the experiences of disabled persons’, but knowing what this means in practice is much more difficult. I know, in part from taking implicit bias tests, that I have racial biases. But if a person of color disagrees with me about whether Michael Phelps will win gold in the 2016 Olympics, this situation does not call for instrumental trust. Knowing that I carry this prejudice, then, leaves me with the vitally important question of where to direct my instrumental trust.

Testimony within types (A)-(D) is a prima facie candidate for testimony that is apt for instrumental trust because (a) oppressed speakers are likely to have more evidence on these matters than privileged speakers, and (b) privileged speakers are likely to downgrade oppressed speakers with respect to subject matter that challenges their privilege. Moreover, to adopt instrumental trust in testimony within one (or more) of these types means that one will resolve to act in ways that could challenge our current unjust social structures. These dispositions vary from dispositions to identify particular behaviors as wrongfully discriminatory, identify and work against stereotypes and institutionally-based inequalities, address and (if possible) correct harms committed, or prevent harms in the future.

Turning to question (2), we might also wonder about a further consideration: even if testimony falls into one of these types, surely there must be constraints on trust-aptness given the source of the testimony. Whose testimony is trust-apt? Individuals? Groups? What if group members disagree?

As with (1), I doubt there is a single answer to this question. The source of trust-apt testimony seems sensitive to many other factors, such as the type of testimony, the stakes of having instrumental trust, the subject matter, one’s biases, whether peers disagree and so

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30 I am using an extreme example for clarity’s sake, and not the diminish the importance of instrumental trust.

31https://www.change.org/p/princeton-university-administration-occupynassau-meet-black-student-s-demands
on. That said, wielding a broad brush, three general guidelines might be considered. The first, fairly obvious point to make is that testimony from within the group at issue is most likely to be trust-apt. Suppose I carry epistemic biases against both disabled and female persons. This does not mean that, if a female non-disabled person asserts something about what it is like to be disabled, this testimony is trust-apt in the same way that it would be if a disabled person asserted the same information. (That said, I think we should keep in mind that we can be biased against content associated with oppressed groups, even if asserted by a privileged speaker – see Dembroff & Whitecomb (manuscript) for more on content-based epistemic injustice.)

That the speaker testifies from within the perspective of the group at issue is of epistemic and practical importance. As Janack (1997) points out:

Members of oppressed groups...have a perspective on the world that is not just different from the perspective available to members of the ruling class, but is also epistemically advantageous. The conclusion usually drawn from this claim is that while theories developed by members of dominant groups will reflect only the interests and values of those groups, theories developed by the oppressed will encompass a broader array of interests and experiences.32

The (practical and epistemic) rationality of instrumental trust depends on this point. If we lacked reasons for thinking that members of oppressed groups have access to a wider and richer array of evidence with respect to, e.g., (solutions to) discrimination against that group or experiences of group members, it would be hard to see how we could rationally commit to acting on the basis of that testimony, or (relatedly) why we should think that it would promote positive social ends to do so.

Second, given that moral, what-it’s-like, and prescriptive testimony consists of broad claims, considerations of disagreement between group members become particularly salient. Often, I think we have a prima facie reason to trust in a single speaker’s testimony. This reason may be decisive when it is not possible to receive input on an issue from multiple group members, or compare evidence concerning different speakers’ qualifications. But group disagreement may defeat this reason. If, for example, I (a queer person) were to make a claim about what it’s like to be queer, or about what political shifts would best benefit the lgbq community, and the vast majority of queer-identifying persons disagreed with me, my

32While Janack is speaking specifically to the inclusion of minority voices within directing scientific research, I take it that the point applies broadly.
testimony does not seem trust-apt. Consider that, while the majority of LGBQ persons in the United States support legalizing same-sex marriage and consider it a step toward social justice, a minority do not. Persons within this minority oppose marriage as an institution, and so want to limit, not expand this institution. Now, whether or not legalizing same-sex marriage will in fact promote social justice remains to be seen. But all else equal, I think a heterosexual legislator, faced with a decision to vote for or against this legislation, and without epistemic access to what it’s like to be LGBQ, ought to adopt a stance of instrumental trust toward the dominant testimony.

The same holds, I would argue, for moral testimony. While an individual’s finding an action to be (e.g.) not discriminatory might provide you with a reason to permit similar actions, this reason may be outweighed by other group members’ conflicting testimony. Internalized sexism, racism, homophobia, and ableism (among other ‘isms’) is common, as is external pressure to ‘brush off’ instances that one might otherwise find offensive or discriminatory. Assuming we are aware of the conflict between the individual’s and the group majority’s testimony, this is a defeasible reason to lean toward adopting instrumental trust in the majority’s view.

I emphasize the defeasibility of this reason, in part, because of concerns about intersectionality (among other concerns). Someone standing at the intersection of two oppressed groups (e.g., black women, queer disabled persons) may have interests that are not served by a group’s majority view. This is not to say that one subgroup or the other must have the final word: each situation is unique. It is simply to point out that a ‘majority rules’ approach is sometimes insufficient to handle the complexities of weighing conflicting interests within a single group.

Finally, in the case of target experiential testimony, which concerns specific events (or interpretations of specific events) that have occurred, testimony seems, in general, trust-apt regardless of whether it is from an individual group member or a larger body of group members, and for the same reason that you ought to trust me if I tell you that I had cereal for breakfast, or if a color you perceive as blue looks red to me. Whether or not someone was present during the event and is a member of the group at risk for these experiences is much more relevant than the number or percentage of persons providing testimony, as it means that they have access to evidence that others do not (namely, evidence regarding

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I think one example of this is found in an article written by a black woman, called ‘Things Black People Confuse as Racist’. (http://madamenoire.com/112701/things-black-people-confuse-as-racist/) The author explicitly disavows the groups consensus, describing phenomena that do not concern her, but which the vast majority of black persons perceive as racist.

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‘what it’s like’ to be a member of that group under those circumstances).

All of this is, as I said before, a broad overview of just a few of the important issues surrounding well-placed instrumental trust. My hope, however, is that these issues will start receiving greater philosophical attention, as we become increasingly aware of urgency in addressing epistemic injustice in ourselves as well as larger social systems such as law enforcement, medical institutions, and education. I now wish to turn to what I take to be the most common and troubling objections to prescribing instrumental trust: the *political correctness* and *unchecked power* worries.

4 The risks of instrumental trust

Instrumental trust is risky. As I see it, to deny this reality only undermines the credibility of those who would advocate for it. Sometimes, even well-placed and reasonable trust in testimony goes wrong. Consider possibilities like the following:

A. After years of marriage, James and his wife decided to file for divorce. But when James’s wife demanded full custody of their two children, and James refused, things went awry. According to James, his wife falsely accused him of rape in order to secure custody of this children:

"She told me to back off in the family courts - she was losing the case to have residency of our children. I said I wouldn’t. So she went down to the local police station and alleged that she’d been repeatedly raped by me during our marriage."

As a result of her allegations, James was arrested, and lost custody of their children, as well as his job. It took almost a year for the charges against him to be dropped.³⁴

B. University X is in an uproar after a series of swastikas have been found across campus. Dr. B, a college dean, is overheard by a student while speaking on her cellphone to a friend. Speaking about the responsible student, who claimed that punishment would violate his right to free speech, she comments in irony, ‘Well, it is a college campus, after all. Isn’t part of any well-rounded education

³⁴http://www.telegraph.co.uk/men/thinking-man/11912748/Guilty-until-proven-innocent-life-after-a-false-rape-accusation.html. This is the allegedly true story of the man who started http://accused.me.uk/, a community for persons falsely accused of sexual misconduct or assault. Even if it turned out not to be true, though, I find it absurd to deny that similar stories have in fact occurred.
listening to the perspective of white supremacists?’ The eavesdropping student, missing the irony, begins to spread word of the incident. The story spreads and distorts rapidly. Soon, students of color are flooding the quad, demanding Dr. B’s resignation. University administration, fearing bad publicity, asks Dr. B to resign, and she complies.35

C. (On a lighter note...) After a university arranged to bring a camel to campus as a form of stress-relief treatment during exams, huge protests erupted. As students explained, ‘camels are associated with stereotypes that reinforce harmful Western perceptions of Arab people.’ The camel’s appearance was cancelled.36

For those who are sympathetic with prescribing instrumental trust, even raising the possibility of scenarios like these may be seen as raising a fear-mongering lighting-rod that charges the power of racism, xenophobia, homophobia, sexism, and so on. And understandably so: a quick internet search immediately reveals stories like these being used to fuel stereotypes and myths that reinforce social inequalities, such as myths of vengeful dishonest women, reverse racism, destruction of First Amendment protections, Islamic violence, etc. Persons who would appeal to stories like these in order to resist instrumental trust (or anything like it) appear to have two main worries about adopting this attitude: the political correctness and unchecked power worries.

These worries go hand in hand, with the latter often seeming to resulting from the former. Despite this close connection, it is possible for someone to have one worry but not the other, and so we can state them separately:

**Political correctness:** Intentionally or not, prescribing instrumental trust for oppressed group members’ testimony creates stigma surrounding questioning or resisting such testimony. As a result, even reasonable, well-intentioned speakers will be disinclined to challenged any such testimony for fear of being perceived as bigoted.

**Unchecked power:** Prescribing instrumental trust for oppressed group members’ testimony amounts to prescribing giving these persons an epistemic blank check (at least within particular domains). But we have no guarantee that these

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35I’ve invented this story, but again, find it plausible that similar stories have in fact occurred.
36This one definitely is true. http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2015/08/10/the-hell-you-say
groups will not abuse this power, (e.g., by casting blame and suspicion on inno-
cent people, constructing social systems for personal gain, taking advantage of
access to economic resources, and so on).

In philosophy, it is common practice to voice worries about one’s position, and then
deftly dispose of those worries with a carefully crafted argument. I have no intention of
following this practice here, nor could I do so. What is important to discuss about the
**political correctness** and **unchecked power** worries is not why they are *false*. These risks
are, to some degree, real. What is important to discuss is, rather, why these risks do not
provide sufficient reason for resisting **instrumental trust**.

Let’s first consider the political correctness worry. This worry is raised often in politically
conservative circles, thought it is rarely (ever?) clearly articulated.\(^3\) In this context, though,
I suspect that the reasoning behind it would be something like the following:

**instrumental trust** is prescribed as a tool of social justice, and it demands that we
choose to act (at least in some contexts) as if oppressed groups’ testimony were true,
regardless of whether we take this testimony to be credible. But, in that case, someone
who questions this practice, or questions an instance of it, will be seen as opposing
the cause of social justice, and not just as opposing the practice or an instance of it. It
effectively shuts down rational discourse about these matters by placing people in a
position where they must either conform or be seen as tools of a patriarchal, racist,
hegemonic, blah blah blah society.

The **political correctness** worry likely voices what is, to some extent, an actual risk.
But by-and-large, it is a red herring. Two things should noted from the start: First, this
worry makes a significant projection on to the attitudes of those who endorse something
like **instrumental trust**. There is no reason why adopting or supporting the spread of this
attitude must be combined with the accusatory, even hostile attitude feared by someone
with the **political correctness** worry. For one, to *have instrumental trust*, one need not
even have social justice as a goal – **instrumental trust** is about what one does (or is disposed
to do); it is silent on the issue of motivation. But also, even those who are motivated by a
goal of social justice can endorse what they take to be the best method of achieving this end

\(^3\)A representative example of what I usually hear comes from Donald Trump: “I think the big problem this
country has is being politically correct. I’ve been challenged by so many people, and I don’t frankly have time
for total political correctness. And to be honest with you, this country doesn’t have time either. This country is
in big trouble. We don’t win anymore.”
without taking accusatory attitudes toward those who share this aim, but disagree about the best method of achieving it. In fact, I suspect accusatory attitudes would be ultimately counterproductive. They would effectively shut down dialogue with persons who are not yet convinced of this approach, lessening the chances that they will come to agree. And so, even if someone has wrongheaded views about how to achieve social justice (e.g., ‘Do nothing—it will sort itself out!’), lashing out is unlikely to move us any closer to this goal.\footnote{I want to be clear here that I am talking only about what is sometimes called ‘expressive speech’ — speech that expresses a point of view, but is not meant to do much more than that. While this speech can no doubt be harmful, I do not think we have the same reasons to squash it by force or coercion as we do speech with a clear purpose that harms others (e.g., threats, slurs). I am also assuming that both interlocutors value social justice, and want to do whatever will best bring about that state of affairs. It may be appropriate to coerce or put social pressure on those who deny the value of equalizing social power across self-interested groups, (e.g., racists, sexists). I will not take a stand on that question here.}

Second, this worry overlooks the fact that advocating instrumental trust is far from advocating an unthinking reaction to anything that an oppressed group (or its members) assert. In fact, it is an alternative to unthinking reactions: it provides an alternative to automatically allowing prejudices to influence how we evaluate and respond to speakers. And, as seen from §3.1.2, instrumental trust cannot be applied unthinkingly. It requires, for example, consideration about what sort of testimony is being presented, whether there is intergroup disagreement (and if so, along what, if any, identity lines), and potential harms to other oppressed groups. Far from taboo, raising questions about the considerations for and against adopting instrumental trust in a particular situation is necessary. This still shifts the question away from the credibility of the speaker(s) and the truth of their testimony, and onto questions that are easier for us to evaluate without bias. (For example: Accepting the testimony’s truth, what is the expected utility of this action? Given possible outcomes, are the costs of taking the action likely to outweigh the costs of not taking the action?) Linda Alcoff, in her discussion of ‘speaking for others’, makes a similar point about the importance of paying attention to context and the effects of speech:

One cannot simply look at the location of the speaker or her credentials to speak; nor can one look merely at the propositional content of the speech; one must also look at where the speech goes and what it does there. Looking merely at the content of a set of claims without looking at their effects cannot produce an adequate or even meaningful evaluation of it, and this is partly because the notion of a content separate from effects does not hold up. The content of the claim, or its meaning, emerges in interaction between words and hearers within
a very specific historical situation. Given this, we have to pay careful attention
to the discursive arrangement in order to understand the full meaning of any
given discursive event.\footnote{Alcoff (1991) http://www.alcoff.com/content/speaothers.html}

While I agree with Alcoff about the importance of these factors in evaluating discursive events, I think her point also applies with respect to the question of whether to adopt \textsc{instrumental trust}. Looking merely at a set of claims made by an oppressed group (or its members) not only allows someone’s epistemic biases to have a disproportionate influence over their actions, it also fails to account for all of the relevant evidence in determining whether the claims are trust-apt.

These considerations take away much of the \textbf{political correctness} worry’s bite. Someone objecting to \textsc{instrumental trust} (or one of its instances) on reasonable grounds pertaining to its capacity to increase expected utility should be heard rather than chastised. And, \textit{supposedly}, this is the sort of scenario that persons endorsing the worry are concerned with; someone objecting to \textsc{instrumental trust} from thinly or not-at-all veiled prejudice can rightly be dismissed, and perhaps chastised.\footnote{I am of the perhaps controversial opinion that social coercion can be permissible and perhaps even good in the right contexts. Unfortunately, I cannot get into that issue in this paper.} Of course, this does not guarantee that there will not be persons who try to squash debate by painting even those who reasonably disagree about the efficacy of \textsc{instrumental trust} as opponents of social justice. But this is not a problem of \textsc{instrumental trust}; it is a problem of failed tolerance and charity.

Let’s next consider the \textbf{unchecked power} worry. I think this worry is, to some degree, assuaged by my response to the \textbf{political correctness worry}—after all, I am far from proposing that we look at someone’s gender or skin color and immediately act on the truth of anything they say. (In fact, it would strike me as problematic to do this, as it reduces a speaker to their group membership.) But more can be said regarding this worry in particular.

First, like the ‘PC’ worry, I suspect that the \textbf{unchecked power} worry is mostly a red herring that uses low probability risks to distract away from the frequent harms caused by testimonial injustice and \textbf{reinforcement}. This is impossible to prove, since we are lightyears away from oppressed groups actually \textit{having} significant epistemic power. But one piece of evidence that \textbf{unchecked power}-type worries are usually overblown is seen in the realm of sexual assault reporting.

An opinion frequently heard in conservative circles is that men should never be thought
guilty until proven innocent, and so we should subject women’s sexual assault reports to vigorous scrutiny. After all, they say ‘accusations like that can ruin a man’s reputation’—(a point that I grant is true to some extent and in some contexts, though counterexamples abound). The fear of women falsely reporting sexual assault has motivated a media focus on false reports of sexual assault, as well as the propagation of a myth that women frequently lie about sexual assault.41

This worry is unsubstantiated by the facts. It is hard to evaluate the exact number of falsified reports, since police statistics typically combine false and unsubstantiated reports within a single category, but estimates typically range between 2% and 6%, which is, according to some sources, comparable to false reporting rates for other felonies.42 (It is mind-bogglingly difficult to find information on false allegations more generally—apparently we only care about tracking false rape allegations.) More importantly, the number of false reports is vastly outweighed by the number of actual victims who report and do not receive justice, or who do not report (no doubt in part because of the scrutiny rape victims are subject to, combined with the unlikelihood of conviction). According to the Bureau of Justice Statistics’ National Crime Victimization Survey statistics from 2013, only an estimated 35% of rapes are reported, and somewhere between 5 and 20% of sexual assaults overall.43 Of reported cases of rape, between 19.5 and 40% go to trial. Of these, between 8 and 37% are prosecuted. Even using the absolutely highest estimates, then, out of every 100 rapes that occur, 5 rapists will be prosecuted.

These numbers speak for themselves against the improbability that approaching women’s testimony about sexual assault with instrumental trust, at least at the personal if not the legal level, would result in giving them a dangerous, inordinate level of epistemic power. And I see no reason to believe that the number of false reports would increase were the number of reports that are ignored or scrutinized into oblivion to decrease. Without such an argument, the unchecked power worry—at least in this domain—appears to be baseless. I suspect that something similar holds for other domains, such as black men’s what-it’s-like testimony about interactions with police, or transgender persons’ target prescriptive testimony about relaxing requirements for revising legal gender markers (e.g., birth certificate, driver’s license).

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41 This myth is wholly embraced by MRAs (men’s right activists), who think that women use sexual assault reporting as a common form of revenge or power-grabbing. See http://www.gq.com/story/mens-rights-activism-the-red-pill
42 http://www.stanford.edu/group/maan/
43 http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cv13.pdf
Second, insofar as there is a risk of epistemic power abuse, this risk can be at least partially mitigated by wise use of instrumental trust. In addition to reflecting on the outcomes (both pro and con) of adopting instrumental trust, we should be careful to gather testimony from a wide variety of group members (when applicable and possible) or experts within that group, and ask questions in order to better understand a speaker’s reasoning and perspective. Common sense must also be used, as well as appreciation of concerns of intersectionality and preventing harm to other oppressed groups (or persons located at the intersection of oppressed groups). Moreover, instrumental trust does not prescribe that the hearers, in acting on their preferences having accepted the testimony’s truth, will always act according to what the speaker desires. A hearer with instrumental trust, under this formulation, should act in a way that maximizes expected utility on the assumption of the testimony’s truth. This is, of course, consistent with a situation in which the hearer prefers to act in a way other than the action desired by the speaker.44

Finally, it is important (and I think often overlooked) that instrumental trust is not something that would disproportionately benefit oppressed groups, because we already adopt such a stance toward in-group members or members of privileged groups. Our implicit biases don’t simply work in one direction: just as we are disposed to automatically judge as untrustworthy persons from groups we are biased against, we are disposed to automatically judge as trustworthy persons belonging to our in-groups or privileged groups.45 Instrumental trust then, seems unlikely to unduly privilege oppressed groups. Rather it seems that, at worst, we would become inordinately disposed to trust everyone. What’s more, empirical evidence concerning how biases affect predictions of trustworthiness, combined with the fact that white males dominate positions of social power—positions where trustworthiness predictions have most social impact—suggests that we should be far more concerned about the unchecked power of those within this (intersectional) social group than that of any other social group.

44Interestingly, this means that a blatant racist, who is willing to accept the truth of oppressed speaker’s testimony, but prefers to act in terrible ways given this acceptance, still has instrumental trust in that speaker. This is part of why it is important to note that instrumental trust is a tool, not a virtue, and the ends to which one puts it are incredibly important.

45See, e.g., Stanley et al. (2011). These data demonstrate that the extent to which an individual invests in and trusts others with different racial backgrounds is related to the magnitude of that individual’s implicit race bias.” http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/21518877
5 Bibliography


