Zoomers and Boomers: Asset Prices and Intergenerational Inequality

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We construct a perpetual youth DSGE model with aggregate uncertainty in which there are dynamically complete markets and agents have Epstein-Zin preferences. We prove that, when endowments have a realistic hump-shaped age-profile, our model has three steady-state equilibria. One of these equilibria is dynamically inefficient and displays real price indeterminacy. We estimate the parameters of our model and we find that a fourth-order approximation around the indeterminate steady-state provides the best fit to U.S. data. Our work interprets the large and persistent generational inequality that has been observed in western economies over the past century as the result of uninsurable income shocks to birth cohorts.

I. Introduction

We construct a Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) model in which people have finite lives and a constant probability of death. Models with this property are referred to as perpetual youth models. Agents trade with each other in dynamically complete asset markets but are unable to buy or sell securities contingent on the state of the world they are born into.

We model preferences with an Epstein-Zin (1989) recursive utility function and we compute the decision rules in discrete time for an Epstein-Zin consumer as a function of the moments of prices, wealth, and future income. We construct the pricing kernel in general equilibrium and we derive a set of equations in aggregate variables that characterize dynamic equilibria.

We introduce a government that funds its expenditures with taxes and by issuing dollar-denominated debt. We show that, for balanced-budget policies in which expenditures equal taxes, our model has one steady-state equilibrium in which the gross real interest rate equals the growth rate and at least one other equilibrium in which the real value of government debt is equal to zero. We refer to the former equilibrium as the golden rule and the latter equilibria as generationally autarkic or more compactly as autarkic.

We allow the income process of an individual to be a hump-shaped function of age and we prove that there exists a critical value of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, ies_c, such that for all values of ies < ies_c there exist two non-trivial....
autarkic equilibria. One of these equilibria is dynamically efficient. The other is dynamically inefficient.

We compute the determinacy properties of equilibrium at each of the steady states and we show that when monetary and fiscal policy are both active, in the sense of Leeper (1991), the efficient autarkic steady state is explosive, the golden-rule steady-state is determinate and the inefficient steady-state is indeterminate of degree 1. By simulating a fourth-order approximation to our model evaluated around the indeterminate steady-state we are able to capture the fact that, in U.S. data, the safe interest rate has been one to two percentage points lower than the growth rate of GDP but the return on a risky claim has been several percentage points higher.

We calibrate a subset of the parameters of our model and we estimate the remaining parameters by simulated method of moments using a fourth-order approximation around both the determinate and indeterminate steady states. By expanding the state space to include a non-fundamental shock we are able to compare a version of our model driven by purely fundamental shocks with a version in which asset prices display excess volatility caused by sunspot shocks. In each of these versions of the model, we allow the data to determine if monetary and/or fiscal policy were active and/or passive.

In our preferred specification of the model there is an important role for the non-fundamental representation of the state, even though monetary and fiscal policy are both active. This result occurs because of an interaction between the hump-shaped income profile and a low intertemporal elasticity of substitution which allows for the existence of a dynamically inefficient steady-state equilibrium that displays real as opposed to nominal indeterminacy.

We explore two additional implications of our model that we did not build into the specification. First, we show that our model displays return predictability at one-year, three-year, five-year and seven-year horizons of a magnitude that is consistent with observed return predictability in the data. Second, we show that non-fundamental shocks cause large and persistent variations in cohort lifetime wealth even though our model has dynamically complete markets. These variations are caused by the inability of birth cohorts to write insurance contracts over the state of the world they are born into. Our work interprets the large and persistent generational inequality that has been observed in western economies over the past century as the result of uninsurable income shocks to birth cohorts.

II. Literature Review

An emerging literature extends Representative Agent New-Keynesian (RANK) models to allow for uninsurable income risk by adding multiple agents and incomplete markets. These models come in two-agent varieties – TANK models – of the kind studied by Bilbiie (2008, 2020), and – HANK models – as in the
work of Auclert et al. (2020) and Kaplan et al. (2018). HANK models are more general than TANK models but they must carry around the wealth distribution as a state variable. Since the wealth distribution is an infinite dimensional object, solving and estimating HANK models is a challenging, but not insurmountable, problem. Techniques to solve and estimate HANK models, building on insights from Krusell and Smith (1998), have been developed by Reiter (2009); Winberry (2018); Auclert et al. (2021) and Bilal (2021).

Our work is complementary to the HANK literature, but we approach the issue of heterogeneity in a different way. In contrast to the literature reviewed in Kaplan and Violante (2018), where wealth inequality arises from uninsurable idiosyncratic income risk, we follow Campbell and Nosbusch (2007) by assuming that wealth inequality is caused by uninsurable aggregate risks to newborn generations who cannot insure across the state of the world they are born into. Unlike Campbell and Nosbusch (2007) who calibrate a perpetual youth model with logarithmic preferences, our agents have Epstein-Zin preferences and we estimate the parameters of our model on U.S. data. The extension to a more general preference specification is key to our results which exploit the existence of multiple steady-state equilibria when agents have a hump-shaped income profile and a low intertemporal elasticity of substitution.

The literature surveyed by Kaplan and Violante (2018) is concerned with the relative size of fiscal and monetary multipliers across wealth groups that arise as a consequence of sticky prices in a production economy. In contrast, we study an endowment economy and we are concerned with the interaction of policy with asset pricing and with the impact of large non-fundamental shocks to asset prices as a cause of inequality in the intergenerational distribution of wealth.

The first DSGE perpetual youth model in discrete time, of which we are aware, is the paper by Farmer (1990a) who builds a DSGE perpetual youth model using RINCE (Farmer, 1990b) preferences – a special case of Epstein and Zin (1989). RINCE preferences allow for a general intertemporal elasticity of substitution but they impose the restriction that agents are risk neutral. We generalize Farmer (1990a) to the case of general Epstein-Zin (1989) preferences and we allow for a hump-shaped endowment process.

In subsequent developments in the DSGE perpetual youth literature, Farmer et al. (2011) show how to construct the pricing kernel in a discrete time DSGE perpetual youth model with complete markets and Farmer (2018) uses their result to construct a model with two types of agents who have Von-Neumann Morgen-
stern preferences. Gărleanu and Panageas (2015; 2021; Forthcoming) present a series of results for the Epstein and Duffie (1992) continuous time case. We extend the Farmer et al. (2011) result to construct the pricing kernel for the case of a perpetual youth model with aggregate shocks where agents have Epstein-Zin preferences and where the endowment pattern is hump-shaped. Both of these features are key to the ability of our model to fit asset pricing facts in U.S. data.

Our solution to the individual’s problem is related to the results in Toda (2014) and Flynn et al. (Forthcoming) who study the solution to a related problem in which agents have access to a limited set of assets. In contrast, our assumption that markets are dynamically complete allows us to aggregate individual decision rules and to generate a set of low dimensional aggregate equations that characterize equilibrium and facilitates our empirical application. Our ability to accommodate heterogeneous agents in a tractable way distinguishes our empirical work from DSGE models that solve and estimate Epstein-Zin models with a representative consumer (Epstein and Zin, 1991; van Binsbergen et al., 2008).

Much of the asset pricing literature addresses the determinants of asset pricing in a continuous time model with endowment shocks that follow a diffusion process. There is no government sector in these models and inflation is assumed to be exogenous. In contrast, we build a model in which government intervenes in the goods and asset markets through fiscal and monetary policy and we assume that time is discrete. This places our work at the intersection of the representative agent macro models surveyed in Leeper and Leith (2016) and the continuous time asset pricing papers of Gărleanu and Panageas (2015, 2021, Forthcoming), Schmidt (2022), and Gomez (2022).

An important contribution of our paper is our proof that a hump-shaped endowment pattern interacts with a low intertemporal elasticity of substitution to generate multiple autarkic steady-state equilibria in a perpetual youth model. Drawing on insights from Kehoe and Levine (1983, 1985), Farmer and Zabczyk (2022) demonstrate that relative price indeterminacy emerges in three-period overlapping generations models when the endowment pattern is hump-shaped and the intertemporal elasticity of substitution is less than some critical number \( i_{es_c} \). They extend the three period model and show, by means of a calibrated example, that the same phenomenon occurs in a perfect-foresight 62-period model. Our current paper extends this result to the perpetual youth model with aggregate shocks and estimates the parameters of the model using real-world U.S. data.

Much of the empirical literature that studies asset pricing has focused on dynamically efficient steady-states. In part, this is due to the work of Abel et al. (1989) who argue that dynamically inefficient equilibria are empirically implausible. Blanchard (2019), in contrast, argues that a low safe interest rate has been the norm in post-WWII U.S. data and he asks the question: what is the appro-

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5 An important exception to this is Swanson (2021), who shows that a discrete-time representative agent New-Keynesian model with Epstein-Zin preferences is consistent with a number of asset pricing facts.
appropriate interest rate to assess the welfare effects of fiscal policy? Our empirical results, under the maintained assumption of an endowment economy, answer this question. We find that the data are best explained by a dynamically inefficient steady state in which asset prices are driven by a highly volatile sunspot shock. In our model, as in the data, the safe interest rate is below the GDP growth rate but the risky rate is above it. The ability of our model to exploit non-fundamental shocks to drive up the risky rate follows from the fact that the model contains a locally indeterminate steady-state equilibrium. Previous work that exploits this idea is surveyed in Farmer (2020).

We are not the only authors to point to dynamic indeterminacy as a potential explanation for features of the asset markets. Brunnermeier et al. (2022b,a) study the existence of bubbles in infinite horizon models in both continuous and discrete time and Aguiar et al. (2021) study Pareto improving policies in a model with idiosyncratic income risk. Reis (2021) explicitly studies the role of liquidity effects in a model with aggregate shocks in which the interest rate is less than the growth rate and Miao and Su (2021) study the emergence of debt as a bubble in a Keynesian model with production. Unlike the papers cited here, our model has no frictions and dynamically complete markets and we estimate the parameters of our model on U.S. data.

In our empirical work we estimate both determinate and indeterminate versions of our model as in the work of Lubik and Schorfheide (2004); Aruoba et al. (2018) and Farmer and Nicolò (2018). Lubik and Schorfheide (2003) were the first to develop a method to estimate indeterminate models. Their approach was refined by Farmer et al. (2015) and Bianchi and Nicolò (2021). In this paper we first choose the dimension of the state and, for each choice of the state, we approximate the solution to the model by a fourth order approximation. Our approximation uses uses Matlab code from Levintal (2017) who builds on results from Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2004) to construct an efficient algorithm using local perturbation methods.

III. The Agents’ Problem

We construct a perpetual youth model in which agents die with probability $1 - \pi$ and in which a member of the cohort born at date $j$ is endowed with a before-tax fraction $y_j^t$ of aggregate real GDP which we refer to with the symbol $Y_t$. Define $y_j^t$ as

$$y_j^t = \frac{1}{1 - \pi} \left( \kappa_1 \lambda_1^{t-j} + \kappa_2 \lambda_2^{t-j} \right),$$

for $(\kappa_1, \kappa_2) \in \mathbb{R}^2$ and $(\lambda_1, \lambda_2) \in [0, 1]^2$. We choose the parameters $\kappa_1, \kappa_2, \lambda_1$ and $\lambda_2$ to match the U.S. income profile as in Gärleanu and Panageas (2015). Figure 1 shows the age-profile of individual before-tax income shares for our choice of parameters. GDP is generated by the process
Figure 1: Individual Before-Tax Income Share

Note: This figure plots the individual before-tax income share of an agent conditional on surviving. The x-axis is the age of the agent in years, assuming the agent “begins life” at age 20.

\[
\frac{Y_t}{Y_{t-1}} = \gamma_t,
\]

where \(\gamma_t\) is a non-negative random variable whose dynamics follow an autoregressive process in logs. Define \(\tilde{\gamma}_t \equiv \log(\gamma_t)\). Let \(0 < \rho_\gamma < 1\) be the persistence of \(\tilde{\gamma}_t\), let \(\bar{\gamma}\) be the steady-state growth rate of GDP, and let \(\varepsilon_\gamma\) be an i.i.d. random variable with mean 0 and variance \(\sigma_\gamma^2\). The dynamics of \(\tilde{\gamma}_t\) are given by

\[
\tilde{\gamma}_{t+1} = (1 - \rho_\gamma) \log(\bar{\gamma}) + \rho_\gamma \tilde{\gamma}_t + \varepsilon_{\gamma,t+1}.
\]  (2)

The variables of our model are elements of a vector of random variables \(X_t \in \mathcal{X} \subset \mathbb{R}^n_+\) which we partition into two subsets

\[
X = \{S, T\}, \quad S \in \mathcal{X}_S \subset \mathbb{R}^{n_1}_+, \quad T \in \mathcal{X}_T \subset \mathbb{R}^{n_2}_+, \quad n = n_1 + n_2.
\]

We refer to \(S\) as states and \(T\) as co-states. To keep the notation concise, in the remainder of the paper we refer to variables \(x_t \in X_t\) and \(x_{t+1} \in X_{t+1}\) with the notation \(x\) and \(x'\) where \(x\) here refers to a generic element of \(X\).

Private agents maximize the discounted expected value of an Epstein-Zin recursive utility function. The problem of a member of cohort \(j\) is defined by the value function, \(v^j\), that solves Problem 1.
PROBLEM 1:

\[ v^j (A^j) = \max_{A^j'} \left[ (C^j)^\rho + \beta \pi \rho (m^j)^\rho \right]^{\frac{1}{\rho}}, \quad (3) \]

\[ m^j = \left\{ E \left[ v^{j'} (A^{j'})^\rho \theta \right] \right\}^{\frac{1}{\rho \theta}}, \]

\[ C^j + \pi E \left[ Q' A^j \right] = A^j + y^j (1 - \tau) Y, \quad (4) \]

with initial condition

\[ A^j (S_j) = 0 \]

and where \( \tau \) is the tax rate.

PROPOSITION 1 (Solution to the Consumers’ Problem): The value function and the policy function that solve Problem 1 are given by

\[ C^j = \psi^{-1} W^j \] and \[ v^j = \psi \frac{1 - \rho}{\rho} W^j. \]

The variable \( \psi \) is defined recursively as,

\[ \psi = 1 + \pi \beta \frac{1}{1 - \rho} \left( E \left[ v^{j'} \frac{(1 - \rho) \theta (1 - \rho \theta)}{\rho \theta - 1} Q' \frac{\rho \theta}{\rho \theta - 1} \right] \right)^{\frac{1 - \rho \theta}{(1 - \rho) \theta}}, \]

where \( W^j \) is the sum of three components.

\[ W^j = H_1^j + H_2^j + A^j, \]

and \( H_1 \) and \( H_2 \) represent the discounted present values of the two components of the after-tax income shares from the right-hand-side of Eq. (1). \( A^j \) is the value of financial assets owned by a member of generation \( j \) in state \( S_t \).

PROOF:

For a proof of Proposition 1, see Appendix A.

The parameters \( \rho \) and \( \theta \) are related to the intertemporal elasticity of substitu-
tion, ies, and the coefficient of relative risk aversion, rra, by the identities\footnote{It is more usual to parameterize Epstein-Zin preference by a parameter \( \rho \) and a parameter \( \alpha \), where in our notation, \( \alpha = \rho \theta \). Our alternative parameterization permits us to study the special case of \( ies = 1 \) by taking the limit as \( \rho \to 0 \). The more familiar parameterization using \( \rho \) and \( \alpha \) leads to numerical instability in our empirical estimates for values of \( \rho \) close to 0. For the special case when \( \theta = 1 \), agents have Von-Neumann-Morgenstern preferences on the space of lotteries over intertemporal consumption sequences.}

\[
ieq \equiv \frac{1}{1 - \rho}, \quad rra \equiv 1 - \rho \theta.
\]

\( Q' \equiv \tilde{Q}'/\chi(S') \) is the pricing kernel, \( \tilde{Q}' \) is the price at date \( t \) of a claim to one unit of the commodity in state \( S' \) and \( \chi(S') \) is the date \( t \) conditional probability that state \( S' \) occurs. \( A_j \) is the value of state \( S \) dependent Arrow securities that were accumulated at date \( t - 1 \) by generation \( j \).

The term \( \pi \) that appears in equations (3) and (4) serves two roles. In Eq. (3) it is the probability that a person survives into period \( t + 1 \). In Eq. (4) it is the price of a security that insures the life of the agent. This security sells for price \( \pi \) when there is free entry to the financial services industry.\footnote{If the agent is a debtor, the contract pays her debts in the event that she dies. If she is a creditor, the security represents an annuity that gives the agent an additional stream of payments while she is alive and that returns her assets to the financial institution that issued the security in the event of her death. Because there is a continuum of agents in each generation, there is no aggregate risk to issuing these securities.}

**IV. Government Policy**

In this section we discuss fiscal and monetary policy.

**A. Fiscal Policy**

The government purchases \( g \) goods as a fraction of nominal GDP which it pays for by raising a proportional income tax at rate \( \tau \) and by issuing nominal debt with a maturity structure parameterized by \( \delta \). The government budget equation is given by the expression,

\[
B^\delta p^\delta = \left(1 + \delta p^\delta\right) B^\delta + PY (g - \tau).
\]

Here, \( P \) is the dollar price of commodities and the nominal bond \( B^\delta \) is a promise to repay $1 plus \( \delta B^\delta \) nominal bonds in period \( t + 1 \). By choosing \( \delta \in [0, 1] \) we can mimic the maturity structure of public debt in U.S. data.

\( B^\delta \) sells for price \( p^\delta \) in period \( t \) and it follows from the assumption of no riskless arbitrage that \( p^\delta \) is given by the expression

\[
p^\delta = E\left[\frac{Q'}{P'} \left(1 + \delta p^{\delta'}\right)\right].
\]
Using the definition

\[ b^\delta = \frac{B^\delta}{P_L Y_L}, \]

where \( P_L \) and \( Y_L \) are the lagged dollar price of commodities and lagged GDP respectively, we can rewrite Eq. (6) in terms of ratios to nominal GDP,

\[ p^\delta b^\delta = \frac{b^\delta (1 + \delta P^\delta)}{\Pi \gamma} + g - \tau, \quad (8) \]

where \( \Pi \) is the gross inflation rate between periods \( t-1 \) and \( t \).

We model government purchases with the assumption that a transformation of government purchases is determined by an autoregressive process. Define \( \tilde{g} \equiv \log \left( \frac{1}{1-g} \right) \), let \( \bar{g} \) denote the steady-state government spending-GDP ratio, and define the persistence of \( \tilde{g} \) by the parameter \( 0 < \rho_g < 1 \). We assume that

\[ \tilde{g}' = (1 - \rho_g) \log \left( \frac{1}{1-g} \right) + \rho_g \bar{g} + \epsilon_g', \quad (9) \]

where \( \epsilon_g' \) is a zero mean random variable with standard deviation \( \sigma_g \).

We assume further that the government follows a fiscal rule of the form

\[ \tau = \bar{\tau} + \phi \tau \left[ \frac{b^\delta (1 + \delta P^\delta)}{\Pi \gamma} - \Phi \right], \]

where \( \phi \tau \) is a fiscal response coefficient. By setting a positive response coefficient, \( \phi \tau \), our model can capture a passive fiscal policy in which the government actively stabilizes the economy at a given debt-GDP ratio, represented here by the symbol \( \Phi \).\(^8\)

The target value of the debt-GDP ratio must be consistent with its steady-state value,

\[ \Phi = \frac{\tilde{b}^\delta (1 + \tilde{\rho}^\delta)}{\Pi \gamma}. \]

Because there may be multiple steady-states and the steady-state value of the debt-GDP ratio \( \frac{\tilde{b}^\delta (1 + \tilde{\rho}^\delta)}{\Pi \gamma} \) is different in each of them, \( \Phi \) cannot be chosen independently; it is a function of \( \bar{\tau} \) and \( \phi \tau \), as well of all of the other parameters of the model which contribute to the determination of the steady state values of \( b^\delta \),

\(^8\)A fiscal policy in which the government adjusts taxes and spending to maintain budget balance is referred to as a passive. A fiscal policy in which the government sets a deficit rule that is independent of the debt-GDP ratio is said to be active. This definition originates in an attempt to provide a unified theory of fiscal and monetary interactions (Leeper, 1991). A government that actively adjusts its fiscal rule is said to follow a passive fiscal policy. We retain the definition here for consistency with previous literature.
B. Monetary Policy

The central bank sets the gross nominal interest rate $R$ as a function of the date $t − 1$ interest rate $R_L$, the gross inflation rate $\Pi$, and the gross real GDP growth rate $\gamma$, according to the Taylor Rule (Taylor, 1999),

$$R = R_L^{\phi_R} \left[ \left( \frac{\Pi}{\Pi^*} \right)^{\phi_\pi} \left( \frac{\gamma}{\gamma^*} \right)^{\phi_\gamma} \left( \frac{\Pi^*}{Q^*} \right)^{\phi_{\Pi^*}} \right]^{1-\phi_R} \exp(\varepsilon_R),$$

where $\varepsilon_R$ is a policy shock, generated by an i.i.d. stochastic process with mean 0 and variance given by $\sigma_R^2$.

$\Pi^*$ is the gross inflation target, $\gamma^*$ is the target GDP growth rate, and $Q^*$ is the target steady-state value of the pricing kernel. The parameters $\phi_R$, $\phi_\pi$, and $\phi_\gamma$ capture the interest rate smoothing motive, the inflation response, and the output growth response of the Taylor Rule. The central bank is free to choose any value for $\Pi^*$, $\gamma^*$ and $Q^*$; but in order to hit the growth and inflation targets they must choose values that are consistent with equilibrium. In our estimation we approximate a solution to the model around a steady-state. We choose $\gamma^* = \bar{\gamma}$ and we pick values of $\Pi^* = \bar{\Pi}$ and $Q^* = \bar{Q}$ that are consistent with their target non-stochastic steady-state.

V. Definitions of the Variables

In this section we construct a set of aggregate variables and a set of equations that connect these variables at consecutive dates and in consecutive states. We divide the variables that are growing through time by GDP to create a set of stationary variables and we assemble the equations of the model into a function that defines equilibrium.

A. The State Variables of the Model

We discuss two representations of the model, one in which all of the state variables are fundamental, and one in which the state includes a non-fundamental variable driven by sunspot shocks. We refer to the fundamental representation of the state as $S$ and to the non-fundamental representation of the state as $\tilde{S}$.

$S$ includes the variables $\gamma$ and $g$ which we model as first order auto-correlated processes in the transformed variables $\log(\gamma)$ and $\log \left( \frac{1}{1-g} \right)$, $b^\delta$ which is related to the real value of the debt-GDP ratio, and $\varepsilon_R$, the monetary policy shock. $S$ also includes $R_L$ and $c_L$ from the date $t − 1$ information set and $z_L$, where $z$ is the following function of the moments of $\psi'$ and $Q'$,

$$z = \mathbb{E} \left[ \psi' \left( \frac{1-\rho}{\rho} \right)^{\theta} Q' \left( \frac{1-\rho}{\rho} \right)^{\phi} \right].$$
We include $z_L$ and $c_L$ in the state because the pricing kernel at date $t$ holds in all pairs of consecutive states $\{S_{t-1}, S_t\}$ and, as we show in Proposition 2, $Q$ is a function of $c_L$ and $z_L$.

This discussion leads to the following vector of fundamental state variables, $S$

$$S \equiv \{c_L, z_L, R_L, b^\delta, \gamma, g, \varepsilon_R\}.$$  

Most existing DSGE models are estimated under the assumption that all of the states are fundamental. However, the perpetual youth model is not restricted to purely fundamental equilibria and for some parameterizations of the model we find that there exists an indeterminate steady-state. For these parameterizations we define an asset that we refer to as equity. Equity issued at date $j$ is a claim to the income stream $\lambda^{t-j}Y_t$ for all $t \geq j$ and its price, $P^E$ is determined by the recursion\(^9\)

$$P^E = \mathbb{E}\left[Q' \left(\lambda P^E' + Y'\right)\right].$$

The price-dividend ratio is determined by the expression

$$p^E = \mathbb{E}\left[\gamma'Q' \left(\lambda p^E' + 1\right)\right].$$

Equity is a redundant asset and in a model with a unique determinate steady-state it would appear as a co-state variable. In contrast, in a model with an indeterminate steady-state, there are stationary equilibria driven purely by sunspots. In these equilibria, there are insufficient initial conditions to uniquely determine all of the variables and there may exist sunspot equilibria in which non-fundamental shocks influence prices and allocations (Azariadis, 1981; Cass and Shell, 1983).

In our empirical work, we explore the properties of sunspot equilibria close to an indeterminate steady-state by choosing $p^E$ to be an additional state variable. In the non-fundamental version of the model we define the augmented state vector $\tilde{S}$,

$$\tilde{S} \equiv \{S, p^E\}.$$  

There is no unique way to choose an additional state variable although Farmer et al. (2015) show, in the context of a linear model, that if one allows for an arbitrary variance-covariance between the sunspot shock and the fundamental shocks, all choices of the additional state are observationally equivalent. The sunspot moves the economy to a point on the stable manifold of a locally indeterminate steady state. By specifying a variance-covariance structure for all the

\(^9\lambda\) represents the decay rate of the claim and it is not identified independently of the volatility of the innovation to the sunspot shock. For existence of equilibrium, it must satisfy the inequality $\lambda \gamma Q < 1$ in a steady state parameterized by $Q$. In our estimation we set $\lambda = \pi \lambda_1$ which guarantees that this inequality is satisfied in any equilibrium in which human wealth is well defined.
shocks one arrives at an empirically testable model that can be compared with non sunspot theories. In this paper we show that a sunspot-driven equilibrium provides a much better fit to U.S. data than fundamental equilibria of the same model.

B. The Co-state Variables of the Model

The co-state vector $T$ includes $z, \psi, Q$ and $c$. It also includes the variables $R, \tau, \Pi, p^\delta$ and two stationary variables, $h_1$ and $h_2$ which represent the net present values of the two components of the income streams in Eq. (1) added up over all living agents and expressed as ratios to GDP. These variables are defined recursively,$^{10}$

$$h_1 = \alpha(1 - \tau) + \pi \lambda_1 E \left[ \gamma' Q' h_1' \right], \quad \text{and} \quad h_2 = (1 - \alpha)(1 - \tau) + \pi \lambda_2 E \left[ \gamma' Q' h_2' \right].$$

For the specification of the state in which all states are fundamental, $T$ also includes the price-dividend ratio $p^E$.

This discussion leads to the following vectors of co-state variables for the fundamental and non-fundamental versions of the model,

$$\tilde{T} = \{z, \psi, h_1, h_2, Q, c, R, \tau, \Pi, p^\delta\}, \quad \text{and} \quad T = \{p^E, \tilde{T}\}.$$

VI. Competitive Equilibrium

In this section we introduce the dynamic equations that link the variables through time and we define the concepts of a competitive equilibrium, a steady-state equilibrium, and a balanced-budget steady-state.

**DEFINITION 1 (Competitive Equilibrium):** A ‘competitive equilibrium’ is a stochastic sequence of prices and allocations such that markets clear at every period and allocations solve the households’ utility maximization problems at every date and in every state.

In Appendix D we establish the following proposition.

**PROPOSITION 2 (Characterization of Equilibrium):** Define a vector $X \in X \subset \mathbb{R}_+^n$

$$X \equiv \{c_L, z_L, R_L, b^\delta, \gamma, g, \varepsilon_R, p^E, z, \psi, h_1, h_2, Q, c, R, \tau, \Pi, p^\delta\}$$

$^{10}$See Appendix D.
and functions $\phi : \mathcal{X}^2 \to \mathbb{R}_+$ and $F : \mathcal{X}^2 \to \mathbb{R}_+^n$ where

$$
\phi(X, X') \equiv \left( \frac{\pi \beta^{1-\theta} c_L}{\gamma \left( c - \psi^{-1} \left[ (1 - \lambda_1 \pi) h_1 + (1 - \lambda_2 \pi) h_2 \right] \right)} \right)^{1-\rho_\theta},
$$

and

$$
F = \begin{bmatrix}
c - c_L' \\
z - z_L' \\
R - R_L' \\
\psi c - h_1 - h_2 - \frac{b^1 (1 + \delta \rho^\delta)}{\Pi L} \\
\gamma' (1 - \rho_\gamma) \log(\gamma) - \rho_\gamma \tilde{\gamma} - \varepsilon_\gamma \\
\tilde{\gamma}' (1 - \rho_\gamma) \log \left( \frac{1}{1 - \rho_\gamma} \right) - \rho_\gamma \tilde{\gamma} - \varepsilon_\gamma \\
\varepsilon_{R'}^R - \gamma' Q' (\lambda \rho E' + 1) \\
\psi - 1 - \pi \beta^{1-\rho} z \frac{1 - \rho_\gamma}{\Pi L} \\
h_1 - \alpha (1 - \tau) - \pi \lambda_1 \gamma' h_1' \\
h_2 - (1 - \alpha) (1 - \tau) - \pi \lambda_2 \gamma' h_2' \\
Q - \phi(X, X') \\
c + g - 1 \\
R - Q' \\
\tau - \tau - \phi_R \left[ \frac{\psi^1 (1 + \delta \rho^\delta)}{\Pi_1} \right] - \Phi \\
R - \left[ R_L \right]^{\phi_R} \left[ \left( \frac{\Pi}{\Pi_1} \right)^{\phi_R} \left( \frac{\gamma}{\Pi_1} \right)^{\phi_R} \left( \frac{\Pi}{\Pi^*} \right)^{\phi_R} \right]^{1-\phi_R} \\
p^\delta - Q' \left( 1 + \delta \rho^\delta \right)
\end{bmatrix}.
$$

A competitive equilibrium is characterized by a bounded stationary stochastic process $\{X_t\}_{t=1}^\infty$ that satisfies the functional equation

$$
E \left[ F(X, X') \right] = 0,
$$

with boundary conditions

$$
\psi_1^{-1} \left( h_{1,1} + h_{2,1} + \frac{b^1 (1 + \delta \rho^\delta)}{\Pi_1 \gamma_1} \right) = 1 - g_1,
$$

$$
R_L = R_{L,1}, \quad c_L = c_{L,1}, \quad \text{and} \quad z_L = z_{L,1},
$$

where $\frac{b^1 (1 + \delta \rho^\delta)}{\Pi_1 \gamma_1}$, $h_{1,1}$, and $h_{2,1}$ are the debt-GDP ratio and the two components of
the human wealth-GDP ratio in period 1, $g_1$ is the period 1 government spending-GDP ratio, and $\psi_1$ is the initial inverse savings propensity.

A steady-state is a vector $\bar{X} \in X$ that satisfies the equation

$$F(\bar{X}, \bar{X}) = 0. \quad (12)$$

**DEFINITION 2 (Steady-State Equilibrium):** A ‘steady-state equilibrium’, or more compactly a ‘steady-state’, is a competitive equilibrium in which the variables of the model are non-stochastic and time invariant. A steady-state equilibrium is ‘non-trivial’ if the steady-state pricing kernel, $\bar{Q}$, is strictly positive. A ‘balanced budget steady-state’ is a steady-state equilibrium of the model in which the government follows the balanced budget policy $\bar{g} = \tau$.

Proposition 3 characterizes the properties of balanced-budget steady-states.

**PROPOSITION 3 (Multiplicity of Balanced-Budget Steady-States):** The model has at least two balanced-budget steady-states. In one of these steady-states $\bar{Q}_{gr} = \frac{1}{\gamma}$.

We refer to this as the golden rule and we index the elements of $\bar{X}$ in the golden-rule steady state with the subscript $gr$. In the one-commodity model, the golden-rule is unique. In addition to the golden rule, there is at least one other steady-state in which $\bar{b}_{au} = 0$.

We refer to these steady states as a ‘generationally autarkic’ or more compactly as ‘autarkic’ and we index the elements of $\bar{X}$ in the $i$-th autarkic steady state with the subscript $au_i$.

**PROOF:** Using equations (7) and (8) and exploiting the balanced budget assumption leads to the steady-state expression,

$$\bar{b}^\delta(\bar{Q}) \left(1 - \frac{1}{Q\gamma}\right) = 0,$$

from which it follows that either

$$\bar{b}^\delta(\bar{Q}) = 0, \quad \text{or} \quad Q = \frac{1}{\gamma}.$$

This established Proposition 3.

**PROPOSITION 4 (Multiplicity of Autarkic Steady-States):** Define the following
compound parameters,
\[
\begin{align*}
\delta_1 &\equiv \frac{1}{1 - \pi \lambda_1 \bar{\gamma}}, \\
\delta_2 &\equiv \frac{1}{1 - \pi \lambda_2 \bar{\gamma}}, \\
\delta_b &\equiv \frac{1}{1 - \pi \beta \frac{1}{\bar{\gamma}}} \\
\Delta &\equiv \delta_1 - \delta_2, \\
\rho_c &\equiv \frac{\log(\pi \beta)}{\log(\lambda \bar{\gamma})},
\end{align*}
\]

and the following inequalities
\[
\alpha > 1, \quad \delta_b > \delta_1 > \delta_2, \quad \delta_1 - \Delta(1 - \alpha) > \delta_b, \quad \rho < \rho_c < 0. \quad (13)
\]

When the parameters satisfy the inequalities in (13), there is a trivial autarkic steady-state and two non-trivial autarkic steady-states. The steady-state pricing kernel in these steady-states are solutions to the equation,
\[
\frac{h(Q)}{1 - g} \equiv \left[ \frac{\alpha}{1 - \pi \lambda_1 \gamma Q} + \frac{(1 - \alpha)}{1 - \pi \lambda_2 \gamma Q} \right] = \left[ \frac{1}{1 - \pi \beta \frac{1}{\bar{\gamma}} \frac{1}{Q} \frac{1}{\bar{\gamma}}} \right] = \psi(Q) \frac{1}{1 - \tau}, \quad (14)
\]

where \( h(Q) \equiv h_1(Q) + h_2(Q) \) is aggregate human wealth-GDP. We refer to the values of the non-trivial steady-state pricing kernel in these two steady-states as \( \bar{Q}_{au1} \) and \( \bar{Q}_{au2} \).

The steady state indexed by \( au_1 \) is dynamically efficient and the steady state pricing kernel \( \bar{Q}_{au1} \) satisfies the inequality \( \bar{Q}_{au1} < \bar{Q}_{gr} = \frac{1}{\gamma} \). The steady state indexed by \( au_2 \) is dynamically inefficient and the steady state pricing kernel \( \bar{Q}_{au2} \) satisfies the inequality \( \bar{Q}_{au2} > \bar{Q}_{gr} = \frac{1}{\gamma} \).

The parameter \( \rho \) is related to the intertemporal elasticity of substitution by the identity
\[
\text{ies} \equiv \frac{1}{1 - \rho},
\]

and Proposition 4 implies that, when the parameters of the model satisfy inequalities (13), there exists a critical value,
\[
\text{ies}_c = \frac{1}{1 - \rho_c},
\]

such that for all values of \( \text{ies} < \text{ies}_c \) there exist multiple autarkic steady-states. In our empirical work we calibrate the parameters \( \pi, \lambda_1, \) and \( \bar{\gamma} \) and estimate the parameter \( \beta \). For our parameterization, this critical value is \( \text{ies} = 0.453 \). For an explanation and a proof of Proposition 4 see Appendix E.
VII. The Determinacy Properties of the Steady-States

In this section we discuss the concept of local determinacy of equilibrium and we explain the solution and estimation strategy that we use to compare the model with data.

A. The Definition of Local Determinacy

A steady-state, $\bar{X}$, is said to be locally determinate if, in the absence of shocks, and for initial values of the state variables in the neighborhood of $\bar{X}$, there is a unique value for the co-state variables such that equilibrium sequences $\{X_t\}_{t \geq 0}$ converge to $\bar{X}$. We elaborate on this definition below.

Define the matrices

$$A_{eq} \equiv F_X|_{eq} \quad \text{and} \quad B_{eq} \equiv F_{X'}|_{eq},$$

where $A_{eq}$ and $B_{eq}$ represents the Jacobians of the function $F(X, X')$ with respect to the vectors $X$ and $X'$ evaluated at a steady state $eq \in \{gr, au_1, au_2\}$. Consider the following linear approximation of Eq. (12)

$$A_{eq}\tilde{X} + B_{eq}\tilde{X}' = 0,$$

where the tilde signifies deviations from the steady state.

Let $\sigma_{eq} \in \mathbb{C}^n$ denote the spectrum of the matrix pencil $(A_{eq} - \sigma_{eq}B_{eq})$ and let $m_{eq}$ denote the number of elements of $\sigma_{eq}$ inside the unit circle. Let $d_{eq}$ denote the degree of indeterminacy of the steady state. It follows from the Blanchard Kahn conditions (Blanchard and Kahn, 1980) that

$$d_{eq} = m_{eq} - n + n_1,$$

where $n_1$ is the number of fundamental state variables and $n$ is the dimension of $X$.

For a simple version of our model with a balanced budget and monetary and fiscal policies that are both active, we computed the spectra at the three steady states for values of $ies \in [0.05, ies_e]$. For all values of $ies$ in this range we found that

$$d_{au_1} = -1, \quad d_{gr} = 0 \quad \text{and} \quad d_{au_2} = 1.$$

These results imply that the efficient autarkic steady state is explosive and would never be reached if monetary and fiscal policy were both active. The golden-rule steady state is locally determinate and, in the vicinity of the golden-rule, there exists a unique equilibrium that is a function only of fundamentals. In contrast, we found that the inefficient autarkic steady-state equilibrium displays one degree of indeterminacy even when both monetary and fiscal policy are active.

11 The $\sigma_i(eq)$ are solutions to the polynomial equation: $\det (A_{eq} - \sigma_{eq}B_{eq}) = 0$. 
This is in marked contrast to results from the representative agent model in which equilibrium, under an active monetary policy and an active fiscal policy, does not exist (Leeper and Leith, 2016). The indeterminacy that occurs at the inefficient autarkic steady-state is real as opposed to nominal and it leads to the possibility of a volatile pricing kernel, driven by sunspot fluctuations in non-fundamentals.

B. Excess Volatility and the Equity Premium

The fact that the overlapping generations model has an indeterminate dynamically inefficient steady-state equilibrium was established in Samuelson’s seminal (1958) paper. In two-generation one-commodity models, the existence of an indeterminate steady-state equilibrium occurs only if debt is denominated in dollars. In models with three or more generations, that qualification is unnecessary and we have examples of multi-generation models that display indeterminacy of relative prices and real interest rates (Kehoe and Levine, 1983, 1985; Farmer and Zabczyk, 2022). Our paper provides a further example of this phenomenon. The existence of an indeterminate dynamically inefficient steady-state equilibrium is interesting because it offers the potential to understand three asset market facts that are otherwise difficult to explain. The first fact is that asset prices are far more volatile than can easily be explained by fluctuations in fundamentals (Shiller, 1981; Leroy and Porter, 1981). The second fact is that the return to government debt has been lower than the growth rate of GDP for long periods of time (Blanchard, 2019). And the third fact is that the average rate of return to the stock market has been two to three percentage points higher than the growth rate of GDP in a century of U.S. data (Mehra and Prescott, 1985).

For any risky asset with return \( R' r \), the no-arbitrage condition in the asset markets implies that

\[
E[R'_r] = \frac{1 - \text{Cov}(R'_r, Q')}E[Q'] > \frac{1}{E[Q']} = R'_s,
\]

where \( R'_s \) is the return on a risk-free bond and the inequality follows if \( \text{Cov}(R'_r, Q') < 0 \). By choosing \( p^E \) as a state variable, we ensure that fluctuations in \( \varepsilon'_s \) cause excess volatility in the pricing kernel, \( Q' \), and conditional on a realization of \( \gamma' \), they induce a negative covariance between sunspot fluctuations in the pricing kernel and the return to a risky asset.

VIII. Solution and Estimation Strategy

We parameterize the model by a finite vector of parameters \( \vartheta \in \Theta \subset \mathbb{R}^\ell \) and using the partition, \( X \equiv \{S, T\} \), we define the function \( G : X^2_S \times X^2_T \rightarrow \mathbb{R}^n \),

\[
G(S, S'; T, T'; \vartheta) \equiv F(X, X').
\]

Define a vector shocks \( \varepsilon \in \mathcal{E} \subset \mathbb{R}^k_+ \). A solution to the model is pair of functions
\( f : \mathcal{X}_S \times \mathcal{E} \rightarrow \mathcal{X}_S \) and \( g : \mathcal{X}_S \rightarrow \mathcal{X}_T \),

\[ S' = f(S, \varepsilon') \quad \text{and} \quad T = g(S), \]

where the functions \( f \) and \( g \) satisfy the functional equation,

\[ \mathbb{E} \left[ G(S, f(S, \varepsilon'), g[S, g(f(S, \varepsilon'))]; \theta) \right] = 0. \]

For the fundamental version of the model we choose

\[ S = \{ c_L, z_L, R_L, b, \bar{\gamma}, \bar{g}, \bar{\varepsilon}_R \}, \]

and we define three fundamental shocks, \( \varepsilon_\gamma, \varepsilon_g, \) and \( \varepsilon_R \). In this representation of the model, \( k = 3 \) and we specify AR(1) processes for \( \bar{\gamma} = \log(\gamma) \) and \( \bar{g} = \log \left( \frac{1}{1 - g} \right) \) and a zero mean i.i.d. process for \( \varepsilon_R \),

\[ \bar{\gamma}' = (1 - \rho_\gamma) \log(\bar{\gamma}) + \rho_\gamma \bar{\gamma} + \varepsilon_\gamma', \]
\[ \bar{g}' = (1 - \rho_g) \log \left( \frac{1}{1 - \bar{g}} \right) + \rho_g \bar{g} + \varepsilon_g', \]
\[ \varepsilon_R' \sim \text{i.i.d.}(0, \sigma^2_R). \]

In our estimation strategy we further assume that the elements of \( \varepsilon \) are uncorrelated and we parameterize their standard deviations by \( \sigma_\gamma, \sigma_g, \) and \( \sigma_R \). For the non-fundamental version of the model we choose

\[ \tilde{S} = \{ S, p^E \}, \]

and we add a non-fundamental shock \( \varepsilon_s \). In this specification, \( k = 4 \), and the states \( \gamma, g, \varepsilon_R, \) and \( p^E \) follow the processes

\[ \bar{\gamma}' = (1 - \rho_\gamma) \log(\bar{\gamma}) + \rho_\gamma \bar{\gamma} + \varepsilon_\gamma', \]
\[ \bar{g}' = (1 - \rho_g) \log \left( \frac{1}{1 - \bar{g}} \right) + \rho_g \bar{g} + \varepsilon_g', \]
\[ \varepsilon_R' \sim \text{i.i.d.}(0, \sigma^2_R), \]
\[ p^{E'} = \mathbb{E} \left[ p^{E'} \right] \exp(\varepsilon_s'). \]

In the non-fundamental model there is an additional i.i.d. shock \( \varepsilon_s' \) with mean 0 and standard deviation \( \sigma_s \).

**IX. Data Sources and Moment Matching**

This section describes data sources and partitions the parameter space into a subset of parameters that we calibrated, or estimated by OLS, and a subset that...
we estimated by simulated method-of-moments.

For the risky asset, we used data on the value-weighted market portfolio from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP). The price-dividend ratio was computed as the price of the value-weighted market portfolio divided by a 12-month moving sum of daily dividends (as in Welch and Goyal (2008)). For the risk-free 1-period asset, we used the effective federal funds rate from FRED.\textsuperscript{12}

For inflation, we used Consumer Price Index (CPI) inflation. For the government debt-to-GDP ratio we used total public debt as a percentage of GDP from FRED. All data are quarterly and the sample period is 1990Q1-2019Q4.

The model has 23 parameters which we collect into the vector $\vartheta \in \Theta$. We calibrated 11 of these parameters to match various observable features of the data and we refer to the subset of calibrated parameters as $\vartheta_C$. The remaining 12 parameters, collected into the vector $\vartheta_E$, were estimated by simulated method-of-moments,

$$\vartheta \equiv [\vartheta_C', \vartheta_E']'. $$

### A. Parameters Calibrated or Estimated by Least-Squares

Table 1 displays the values of $\vartheta_C$. We chose the survival probability $\pi$ to match an average life expectancy of 50 years. Agents are assumed to begin life as working-age adults, so if an agent enters the economy at age 20, they would live on average until they are 70.

We chose the parameters $\lambda_1, \lambda_2$, and $\alpha$ to match the U.S. income profile as shown in Figure 1. These parameters are taken from Gârleanu and Panageas (2015) who use least-squares to fit a doubly exponential process to the age profile of U.S. cohort data.

We chose AR(1) processes for output growth and government spending from univariate first-order auto-regressions of the logs of real GDP growth and a transformation of the government spending-GDP ratio in U.S. data. The estimated parameters for output growth imply an annualized real GDP growth rate of 2.43% and an annualized unconditional standard deviation of 1.14%. The estimated parameters for government spending imply a mean real government spending-GDP ratio of 20.85% and unconditional standard deviation of 1.41%.

Finally, we choose $\delta$ to match the average maturity of government debt in our data set which we estimate to be 5 years.

### B. Parameters Estimated by Method of Moments

We collect the estimated parameters into a vector $\vartheta_E = [\beta, \rho, \theta, \pi, \phi_\gamma, \rho_R; \bar{\pi}, \phi_\pi, \phi_\gamma, \kappa, \sigma_R, \sigma_s]^T$

\textsuperscript{12}Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis Economic Database.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameter</th>
<th>Calibrated Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Survival Probability</td>
<td>π</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Endowment Profile</td>
<td>λ₁</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>λ₂</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>α</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Output Growth</td>
<td>100 log(γ)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ργ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>100σγ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government Spending</td>
<td>̄g</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ρg</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>100σg</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government Debt</td>
<td>δ</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: Calibrated Parameters

Note: We chose the survival probability to match an average working-age life-span of 50 years. We chose the endowment profile parameters to match estimates in Găareanu and Panageas (2015). We estimate the output growth and government spending parameters by OLS using data from FRED. Finally, we chose the decay rate of government bonds to match an average maturity of 5 years.

The parameter β is the discount factor of the household. The parameters ρ and θ are the functions of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution and the coefficient of relative risk aversion defined in Eq. (5); these are the only three estimated private-sector parameters. τ and φₜ parameterize the fiscal rule, φₚ, φπ, and φγ parameterize the monetary rule and σₚ and σₚ are standard deviations of the monetary shock and the sunspot shock.

In order to match the equity premium and the Sharpe ratio in U.S. data we introduce the parameter κ which represents the fraction of a firm financed by debt. This parameter captures leverage and it allows us to increase our estimate of the equity premium and simultaneously increase the standard deviation of the return on the risky asset. The risk-return trade-off to a leveraged asset is a direct application of the Modigliani-Miller theorem in a model with dynamically
compete markets.

Let $R_{r,ℓ}$, $R_{r,u}$ and $R_s$ denote the gross real return on a levered risky asset, the gross real return on an unlevered risky asset and the gross real return on a riskless bond. It follows from the assumption of complete asset markets that

$$R_{r,ℓ} - R_s = \frac{1}{1 - \kappa} (R_{r,u} - R_s).$$

When we report statistics related to the risky return we use $R_{r,ℓ}$.

For some parameterizations, our model has three steady-state equilibria and for others it has only two. Our estimation strategy allows for both possibilities. First, we chose the state vector to be $S$, and we searched over the parameter space $\Theta_E$ for the minimum distance between the model and data moments. Our estimation procedure computes the steady states associated with any given vector and it rejects a steady state if it does not satisfy the Blanchard-Kahn conditions. This implies that, for a given definition of the state our equilibrium is determinate by construction.

We did not impose any assumptions, in advance, about whether fiscal and/or monetary policy are active or passive. Instead, we allowed the stance of policy to be chosen to achieve the best fit. In a model with a unique steady-state, our approach would require that either fiscal policy is active and monetary policy is passive, or monetary policy is active and fiscal policy is passive. In our model, in contrast, there are always at least two steady states and, for low values of the ies, there are three. This fact allows us to construct a determinate equilibria at any one of the three steady states by picking appropriate combinations of policy activism.

The novel aspect of our work, is that we are not restricted to the choice of $S$ as the state vector. In our empirical work we repeated the estimation exercise using $p^E$ as an additional state. We refer to the augmented state vector as $\tilde{S} = \{S, p^E\}$. The augmented model has one additional state variable and one additional non-fundamental shock that we assumed to be uncorrelated with the fundamental shocks. We parameterized the volatility of the non-fundamental shock by $\sigma_s$. This discussion implies that the standard model has 11 estimated parameters while the augmented model has 12. We refer to the standard and augmented models as models $S$ and $\tilde{S}$ respectively.

We searched over all determinate equilibria under both definitions of the state and we compared the best fit for the two alternative specifications, where by best fit, we mean the model that most closely matches the following fifteen macro and financial moments:

- $\mu_{r^n}$: mean of the nominal risky rate
- $\sigma_{r^n}^2$: variance of the nominal risky rate
- $\mu_{r^f}$: mean of the nominal risk-free rate
• $\sigma^2_{\text{rf}}$: variance of the nominal risk-free rate
• $\rho_{\text{rf}}$: auto-correlation of the nominal risk-free rate
• $\mu_{pd}$: mean of the log price-dividend ratio
• $\sigma^2_{pd}$: variance of the log price-dividend ratio
• $\rho_{pd}$: auto-correlation of the log price-dividend ratio
• $\mu_{\pi}$: mean of inflation
• $\sigma^2_{\pi}$: variance of inflation
• $\mu_{b}$: mean of the debt-to-GDP ratio
• $\sigma^2_{b}$: variance of the debt-to-GDP ratio
• $\sigma_{\text{rf}, \pi}$: covariance between the nominal risk-free rate and inflation
• $\sigma_{\text{rf}, \gamma}$: covariance between the nominal risk-free rate and real GDP growth
• $\sigma_{\pi, \gamma}$: covariance between inflation and real GDP growth

We estimated $\theta_E$ using two-step simulated method of moments. For a given parameter vector, we solved the model using a fourth-order perturbation approximation with code from Levintal (2017). We simulated 5,000 periods of burn-in and we kept the subsequent 100,000 draws to compute moments.

C. Model Fit

We found that the data favor model $\tilde{S}$ in which the sunspot shock plays an important role. Table 2 compares the fit of models $\tilde{S}$ and $S$ to the targeted moments. We report estimated parameter values and 95% bootstrapped confidence intervals for Model $\tilde{S}$ in Table 3. We begin by discussing the results for Model $\tilde{S}$.

With a couple of exceptions, the moments of Model $\tilde{S}$ are close to their data analogues with a typical percentage difference of less than 10%. The two exceptions to the close fit are the mean and persistence of the price-dividend ratio. The mean of the log price-dividend ratio is 3.11 compared to 3.92 and its persistence, measured by $\rho_{pd}$, is estimated to be 0.99 compared to 0.75 in data.\(^\text{13}\)

For a visual display of data generated by the model, in Figures 2 and 3 we plot simulated sample paths of length 300 quarters for a selection of macro and financial variables. All series are annualized. In Figure 2 we plot the risk-free

\(^{13}\)We suspect that this aspect of our model could be improved by exploring alternative specifications for the additional state variable that allow the price-dividend ratio to respond to lagged and contemporaneous values of shocks to other variables in the model. For example, we have not allowed for the possibility that the stock market is too volatile because it over-reacts to fundamentals. Instead, we modeled all excess volatility as exogenous.
Moments | Data | Model $\bar{S}$ | Model $S$
--- | --- | --- | ---
**Risky Rate**
$\mu_{r}^{n}$ | 9.23 | 9.34 | 9.86
$\sigma_{r}^{n}$ | 16.21 | 16.24 | 3.03

**Risk-free Rate**
$\mu_{r}^{n}$ | 2.66 | 2.82 | 2.40
$\sigma_{r}^{n}$ | 1.10 | 1.02 | 0.73
$\rho_{r}^{n}$ | 0.85 | 0.87 | 0.74

**Log Price-Dividend Ratio**
$\mu_{pd}$ | 3.92 | 3.11 | 3.03
$\sigma_{pd}$ | 0.26 | 0.29 | 0.03
$\rho_{pd}$ | 0.75 | 0.99 | 0.94

**Inflation**
$\mu_{\pi}$ | 2.38 | 2.40 | 2.37
$\sigma_{\pi}$ | 1.18 | 1.26 | 1.21

**Government Debt**
$\mu_{b}$ | 74.02 | 75.28 | 73.33
$\sigma_{b}$ | 18.90 | 18.23 | 19.47

**Correlations**
$\rho_{r,n}^{n}$ | 0.20 | 0.22 | 0.33
$\rho_{r,n}^{\pi}$ | 0.32 | 0.42 | 0.55
$\rho_{\pi,\pi}$ | 0.25 | 0.22 | 0.23

Table 2: Targeted Moments Fit

Note: We annualize all moments except correlations. Specifically, we multiply means by 4 and standard deviations are multiplied by 2, and we report both quantities in percentage points. We raise auto-correlations to the power 4. We compute moments from the model as the average of 1,205,000 simulated draws where the first 5,000 draws are discarded as burn-in.

rate, inflation, the consumption-GDP ratio, the log human-wealth-GDP ratio, the debt-GDP ratio and the deficit-GDP ratio.

The top left panel of Figure 2 shows the risk-free rate which varies between 5% and 1% and the top right panel shows the annualized quarter-on-quarter inflation rate. Both of these series closely match the data moments that we targeted. For the risk-free rate, the model mean is 2.82% compared to 2.66% in data with a persistence of 0.87 compared to 0.85 in data. We also match volatility well with
Figure 2: Simulated Macro Data

Note: This figure plots 300 quarters of data simulated from model $S$ solved using a fourth-order perturbation and evaluated at the parameters estimated using the simulated method of moments. We present results for six different variables. Going top to bottom and left to right these are the nominal risk-free rate, inflation, consumption-GDP ratio, log human wealth-GDP ratio, debt-GDP ratio, and deficit-GDP ratio.

The middle-left panel of Figure 2 reports the consumption-GDP ratio which is driven by our estimated process for government spending; the consumption and government spending ratios add up to 1 by construction. The middle-right panel displays the logarithm of the ratio of human wealth to GDP.

The human-wealth ratio series varies between 5 and 5.5 in log units and is highly persistent. This fact has important consequences for inter-generational inequality that we document below. Although our model has dynamically complete markets, new birth cohorts are unable to insure across the states of the world they are born into. The difference between the life prospects of a birth co-cohort with a log human wealth of 5.5 as opposed to 5 is substantial and a difference of this magnitude implies very large differences in life prospects across generations.

The bottom two panels of Figure 2 show that our model generates realistic paths for both the debt-GDP ratio and the deficit-GDP ratio. The mean of the model debt-GDP ratio is 75% with a standard deviation of 18% compared with 74% and 19% in data and an average deficit-to-GDP ratio of 3.3%.
Turning now to the financial data, in Figure 3 we graph annualized data for the equity premium, the volatility of excess returns, the market price of risk, and the price-dividend ratio. The top left panel of this figure shows the equity premium which has a mean mean value of 6.33%. This series is persistent and displays significant time-variation with a range between 10% and 6% over the sample. The equity premium displays a steady decline in response to the run-up in asset prices. A similar pattern is observed in the market price of risk, graphed in the lower left panel.

The top right panel of Figure 3 plots the conditional volatility of excess returns which shows that our model displays some endogenous stochastic volatility that arises from non-linearities which are captured in our fourth-order approximation. Finally, the bottom right panel plots the price-dividend ratio which is a state variable in the estimated version of our model. This series exhibits large and persistent fluctuations that are driven by the non-fundamental sunspot shock.

Figure 3: Simulated Financial Variables

Note: This figure plots 300 quarters of data simulated from model $S$ solved using a fourth-order perturbation and evaluated at the parameters estimated using the simulated method of moments. We present results for four different variables. Going top to bottom and left to right these are the conditional equity premium, conditional volatility of excess returns, market price of risk, and price-dividend ratio.

Model $S$ exhibits major shortcomings relative to Model $\tilde{S}$ when it comes to fitting the targeted moments. The main issue is that Model $S$ is incapable of producing enough volatility in interest rates and asset prices relative to the data. Model $S$ produces a high equity premium of 7.45% using financial leverage but
only produces a risky rate volatility of 3.03% compared to 16.21% in the data. This leads to an annualized Sharpe ratio 2.53 which is significantly larger than the annualized Sharpe ratio of 0.41 in the data.

Similarly, the log price-dividend ratio is too low on average with a mean of 3.03 compared to 3.92 in the data and exhibits significantly less volatility, 0.03 compared to 0.26. Model $S$ also produces a much stronger correlation between the nominal risk-free rate and inflation than in the data, 0.55 compared to 0.32.

D. Parameter Estimates

Our point estimate of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, $\iota$, is equal to 0.41. This estimate is less than $\iota_s$, implying a parameterization with three steady states. We found that the data favors an approximation around the dynamically inefficient steady-state, allowing the model to capture the fact that, in the U.S. data, the safe interest rate has been lower than the growth rate in much of the post-war period.

Our point estimate of the coefficient of relative risk aversion, $\rho$, is 17.37. In a model with constant-relative-risk-aversion (CRRA) preferences, a value for $\rho$ of 17.37 would imply a value for the $\iota$ of 0.06 which is well outside the 5% confidence bound of 0.37 for our estimate of that parameter. Similarly, the estimated value of the $\iota$ would, under CRRA preferences, imply a coefficient of relative risk-aversion of 2.48. This, once again, is below the 5% confidence bound of our estimate of this parameter which is equal to 14.87. We conclude that our estimates allow us to reject the hypothesis of Von-Neumann Morgenstern CRRA preferences in favor of Epstein-Zin.

Next, we turn to the fiscal rule parameters. We estimated a steady state tax-to-GDP ratio of 17.55% which implies a steady state deficit-to-GDP ratio of 3.33%. The debt stabilization parameter $\phi$ = $3.63 \times 10^{-6}$ implies a weak fiscal response of taxes to deviations of debt from its steady state. This response accounts implies a nearly constant tax rate as a fraction of GDP and is too small to act as an independent stabilization mechanism. We conclude that our estimates imply that fiscal policy during our sample period was active.

For the monetary policy rule, we estimated a response coefficient to inflation of $\phi_\pi$ = 2.14 and a response coefficient to real GDP growth of $\phi_\gamma$ = 0.94. These estimates imply that monetary policy was active and are within the range estimated in previous literature. The 95% confidence intervals for these parameters significantly overlap with confidence intervals reported in other estimated DSGE models. For example, Gust et al. (2017), report point estimates of $\phi_\pi = 1.67$ and $\phi_\gamma = 0.73$ and corresponding 95% percent credible sets of [1.21, 2.14] and [0.39, 1.07], albeit in a richer model which includes production and a zero lower bound on nominal interest rates.

We estimated the leverage ratio, $\kappa$, to be 0.81 which implies a debt-to-equity ratio of approximately 4. This is higher than the value of 2 used in Bansal and Yaron (2004), like the monetary policy parameters $\phi_\pi$, and $\phi_\gamma$, it is relatively
### Table 3: Estimated Parameters

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameter</th>
<th>Estimate</th>
<th>95% Bootstrap CI</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Preferences</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\beta_{\pi}$</td>
<td>0.992</td>
<td>[0.991, 0.993]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$ies$</td>
<td>0.404</td>
<td>[0.370, 0.466]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$rra$</td>
<td>17.373</td>
<td>[14.874, 21.232]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Fiscal Rule</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\tau$</td>
<td>0.176</td>
<td>[0.156, 0.189]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\phi_{\tau}$</td>
<td>$3.63 \times 10^{-6}$</td>
<td>[3.24 $\times 10^{-6}$, 3.97 $\times 10^{-6}$]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Taylor Rule</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\rho_{R}$</td>
<td>0.914</td>
<td>[0.884, 0.967]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$100 \log (\Pi^*)$</td>
<td>-0.398</td>
<td>[-0.447, -0.363]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\phi_{\pi}$</td>
<td>2.137</td>
<td>[1.765, 2.390]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\phi_{\gamma}$</td>
<td>0.939</td>
<td>[0.817, 1.143]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Leverage</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\kappa$</td>
<td>0.812</td>
<td>[0.729, 0.860]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Exogenous Shocks</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$100 \sigma_{R}$</td>
<td>$7.69 \times 10^{-4}$</td>
<td>[6.80 $\times 10^{-4}$, 8.46 $\times 10^{-4}$]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$100 \sigma_{s}$</td>
<td>1.443</td>
<td>[1.029, 1.560]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:** We estimate parameters using the simulated method of moments (SMM). For each parameter value, we solve the model using fourth-order perturbation around all steady states for which a solution exists. We use the solution associated with the lowest value of the objective function. We simulated the model using a common set of random numbers for 105,000 draws. We discard the first 5,000 draws as burn-in and use the subsequent 100,000 to compute moments. We report bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals in brackets and account for data moment variability by using a block bootstrap with optimal block length chosen according to Politis and White (2004).

imprecisely estimated with a 95% confidence interval of [2.69, 6.15].

In our preferred specification the state is $\tilde{S}$ and there are four shocks, $\varepsilon_{\gamma}, \varepsilon_g, \varepsilon_R$ and $\varepsilon_s$. The standard deviations of $\varepsilon_{\gamma}$ and $\varepsilon_g$ were recovered from least-squares regressions of univariate AR processes and our point estimates are $\sigma_{\gamma} = 5.3 \times 10^{-3}$ and $\sigma_g = 2.3 \times 10^{-3}$. Our estimate of the standard deviation of $\varepsilon_R$ is $\sigma_R = 0.008 \times 10^{-3}$. These are all small numbers relative to the main driver of fluctuations in our model, the sunspot shock $\varepsilon_s$, which has an estimated standard deviation of $\sigma_s = 14 \times 10^{-3}$, three times larger than the growth shock. We conclude from these estimates that the hump-shaped income profile, in conjunction with sunspot...
shocks and a low ies are critical features of our explanation of the data that are inconsistent with a steady-state driven by fundamentals.

X. Some Additional Implications of Our Model

In this section we explore some additional implications of our model that we did not explicitly target in our moment matching exercise. These include the ability of our model to explain return predictability and the age-distribution of consumption inequality. The fact that our model works well at explaining these features of the data is, we argue, an additional fact that supports our explanation.

A. Return Predictability

We begin with the issue of return predictability. It is well-known that valuation ratios, such as the price-dividend ratio, predict future excess returns, especially at longer horizons. In Table 4, we examine the predictability of long-horizon excess returns in our model and we compare the ability of our model to explain future returns with predictability regressions in the data.

Let \( R_{t\rightarrow t+h}^e \) be the gross levered excess return on equity between periods \( t \) and \( t + h \) and consider regressions of the form
\[
\log R_{t\rightarrow t+h}^e = \alpha + \beta \log(p_{t+h}^E) + \varepsilon_{t+h},
\]
for values of \( h \) corresponding to 1, 3, 5, and 7 years. For our estimated model, we simulated 10,000 samples of length 120 quarters and we estimated four regressions, one for each forecast period, in each sample. This procedure gave us a distribution of coefficient estimates and \( R^2 \) values. In Table 4, we report the median values of the regression coefficient at each horizon, along with the 2.5th and 97.5th percentiles for the simulated data and the realized regression coefficients in the data.

In the data, the return predictability coefficients are negative at every horizon and they become increasingly more negative with the forecast horizon. These model coefficients range from \(-0.80\) at a one year horizon to \(-4.38\) at a seven year horizon. This compares to return predictability coefficients in the data of \(-0.25\) at a one year horizon to \(-0.97\) at a seven year horizon. Our model matches the pattern of decreasing negative coefficients and, although the magnitudes of our simulated coefficients are larger than in the data, the data coefficients fall within the 95% confidence bounds coming from the distribution across 10,000 replications. We likely overstate the magnitude of the predictability coefficients because the price-dividend ratio in our model is significantly more persistent than in the data.

The model \( R^2 \) values also display the same pattern as the data but they are lower than their empirical counterparts. The model \( R^2 \) values start at 0.09 for

---

14See e.g. Fama and French (1988).
1-year ahead excess returns and increase to 0.46 for 7-year ahead excess returns. This is compared with data $R^2$ values that range from 0.16 to 0.69. Our model-implied $R^2$ values are lower than their empirical counterparts, but they are also within the bounds of sampling uncertainty for our sample of 10,000 replications.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Horizon (Years)</th>
<th>Data</th>
<th>Model</th>
<th></th>
<th>Model</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Coefficient</td>
<td>$R^2$</td>
<td></td>
<td>Coefficient</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>-0.25</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>-0.80</td>
<td>0.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[-2.44, 0.01]</td>
<td>[0.00, 0.26]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>-0.61</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>-2.27</td>
<td>0.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[-5.37, 0.07]</td>
<td>[0.00, 0.57]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>-0.90</td>
<td>0.56</td>
<td>-3.53</td>
<td>0.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[-6.94, 0.27]</td>
<td>[0.01, 0.73]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>-0.97</td>
<td>0.69</td>
<td>-4.38</td>
<td>0.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[-8.12, 0.53]</td>
<td>[0.01, 0.82]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4: Long-Horizon Regressions of Excess Returns on the Log P/D Ratio

Note: The model coefficients are generated using 10,000 simulated samples of length 120 quarters. For each sample, we run predictive regressions of the form $\log R_{t+1:t+h}^e = \alpha + \beta \log(p^e_t) + \varepsilon_{t+h}$, where $R_{t+1:t+h}^e$ is the gross excess return on the risky asset between time $t$ and $t + h$. We report median values of the estimated coefficients $\beta$ and the $R^2$ of these regressions. The 2.5th and 97.5th percentiles across simulations are reported in brackets.

B. Intergenerational Inequality

Next we turn to the implications of our model for the temporal structure of wealth and consumption inequality across generations. Although we assume the existence of dynamically complete markets over aggregate uncertainty, the generational structure of our model does not allow agents to insure over the state of the world they are born into. When this assumption is combined with large persistent fluctuations in non-fundamental uncertainty it implies that cohorts born at different points in time have vastly different lifetime earnings prospects.

Figure 4 plots the average consumption to average income ratios of four different age groups over time to illustrate their dynamics. This figure shows that the young have the highest consumption-to-income ratios on average but there is time-variation in these ratios for different age groups. Young agents, ages 20-34, start out life by borrowing against their human wealth and thus have consumption-income ratios of approximately 1.5. For age groups, 35-49, 50-64 and 65-79, the agents in our model have consumption-income ratios close to 0.7.

While we do not include either housing or human capital in our model, this
Figure 4: Consumption-Income Ratios by Cohort Over Time

Note: This figure plots the average consumption to average income ratio for agents of four different age groups: ages 20-34, ages 35-49, ages 50-64, and ages 65-79 over 300 quarters of data simulated from model $S$ solved using fourth-order perturbation and evaluated at the parameters estimated by simulated method of moments. A value of one corresponds to an agent who consumes their entire income in a given period, values greater than one correspond to agents who are borrowing, and values less than one correspond to agents who are saving.

Pattern is suggestive of the life-cycle consumption patterns in real world data in which households in their twenties and thirties accumulate debt to finance education and house purchases that they pay off at later stages of their lives.

A second feature of our model is its ability to capture persistent temporal variation in consumption inequality of the kind documented by Attanasio and Pistaferri (2016). To illustrate this feature of our model, we computed the ergodic distribution of the consumption Gini coefficient in 25,000 years of quarterly data generated in a fourth-order simulation of our model using the estimated parameters. Figure 5 plots a kernel estimate of this distribution.

While the mode of the consumption Gini is around 0.45, there is considerable time-variation with significant probability mass at 0.38 and 0.48 implying large movements in inter-generational inequality over time. We infer that while Generation Z – the zoomers – are much worse off than the boomers, the descendants of Generation Z a hundred years or more from now may benefit from an upswing in the generational pendulum and face a similar life-cycle pattern of consumption and wealth accumulation to that of the Baby Boomer generation.
XI. Conclusion

We have constructed and estimated a perpetual youth model of an endowment economy with dynamically complete markets and aggregate shocks. Our work makes three principal contributions to the literature.

First, our theoretical work presents the first discrete-time solution of the problem of a long-lived agent with Epstein-Zin preferences as a function of the moments of the endowment profile and of current and future prices. Previous macro models that use Epstein-Zin preferences have exploited the representative agent assumption to simplify the solution. Our contribution to this literature will permit researchers to construct more general models with multiple types of agents and can potentially be generalized to allow for multiple commodities.

Second, we have proved the existence of multiple autarkic steady-state equilibria in the perpetual youth model when agents have a hump-shaped endowment profile and when the intertemporal elasticity of substitution is less than a critical value that depends on the income profile and the preference and aggregate endowment parameters. We established that one of the autarkic steady-states is dynamically inefficient and we demonstrated that this fact permits the construction of equilibria that are driven principally by non-fundamental shocks to
beliefs. By exploiting sunspots and indeterminacy, we are able to explain three asset market puzzles: the low safe rate of interest, excess volatility of asset prices and a large equity premium.

Third, we compared estimated versions of our model with and without sunspot equilibria and we showed that the indeterminate equilibrium provides a significantly better fit to U.S. data from 1990Q1-2019Q4. Although our model can explain how fiscal and monetary policy influence generational inequality, it cannot explain feedback effects from fiscal and monetary policy to real GDP since we assume that all GDP movements are generated by an exogenous stochastic process.15

Our model is consistent with two features of U.S. data that were not used to estimate the model’s parameters. The first of these features is the ability of our model to replicate real-world asset return anomalies. In the data, asset returns are predictable at medium to long horizons. Our model displays return predictability at one-year, three-year, five-year and seven-year horizons and the 95% confidence bounds from return predictability of our model bracket the predictability coefficients estimated from U.S. data. The second feature of U.S. data that our model displays is that of large persistent movements in generational inequality. Members of Generation Z are the first Americans in recent history to be worse off than their parents with little or no prospects of accumulating significant financial assets. In contrast, many Baby Boomers were already house owners in their thirties. The model we have constructed provides a plausible explanation for this phenomenon.

**Appendix A: Proof of Proposition 1**

**PROBLEM 2:**

\[ v^j = \max_{W^j} \left[ (C^j)^{\rho} + \beta \pi (m^j)^{\rho} \right]^{\frac{1}{\rho}}, \quad (A1) \]

\[ m^j = \left[ \mathbb{E}(v^{j'})^{\rho \theta} \right]^{\frac{1}{\rho \theta}}, \quad (A2) \]

\[ \pi \mathbb{E} \left[ Q' W^j \right] = W^j - C^j, \quad (A3) \]

\[ W^j = H^j, \quad (A4) \]

We seek to prove that the value function \( v^j \) and the policy function \( C^j \) that solve Problem 1 are given by the expressions

\[ C^j = \psi^{-1} W^j \quad \text{and} \quad v^j = \psi^{\frac{1-\rho}{\rho}} W^j, \quad (A5) \]

where \( \psi \) is the inverse propensity to consume out of wealth and where \( \psi \) satisfies

---

15 In ongoing research, we are generalizing these results to a production economy with the goal of comparing alternative mechanisms of policy transmission from nominal to real variables.
the recursion,
\[ \psi = 1 + \pi \beta^{1-\rho} \left( \mathbb{E} \left[ \psi' \frac{(1-\rho)\theta \rho}{(1-\rho)\theta} Q' \right] \right)^{\frac{1-\rho^\theta}{1-\rho}}. \]  \hspace{1cm} (A6)

The proof proceeds in five steps.

STEP 1 We show that the wealth of a person with the income share defined in Eq. (1) evolves according to Eq. (A3).

STEP 2 We show that our conjectured solution obeys the envelope condition.

STEP 3 We show that the Euler equation implies the following two lemmata

LEMMA 1: \textit{In the optimal program}
\[ m^j = \beta^{1-\tau} \left( \mathbb{E} \left[ \psi' \frac{(1-\rho)\theta \rho}{(1-\rho)\theta} Q' \right] \right)^{\frac{1-\rho^\theta}{1-\rho}} C^j. \]  \hspace{1cm} (A7)

Lemma 1 is proved in Appendix B.

LEMMA 2: \textit{In the optimal program}
\[ C'^j = C^j \beta^{1-\tau} \left( Q' \frac{1}{\rho+1} \psi' \frac{1}{\rho+1} \right) \left( \mathbb{E} \left[ \psi' \frac{(1-\rho)\theta \rho}{(1-\rho)\theta} Q' \right] \right)^{\frac{1-\rho^\theta}{1-\rho}}. \]  \hspace{1cm} (A8)

Lemma 2 is proved in Appendix C.

STEP 4 Using Lemma 1 we show that if the first equality from (A5) holds, and if \( \psi \) satisfies the recursion defined in Eq. (A6), that the budget constraint, Eq. (A3), holds at consecutive dates.

STEP 5 Using Lemma 2 we show that the value function has the functional form given by the second equality in equations (A5).

PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1:

STEP 1 Define, \( I^j \); the endowment at date \( t \) of a member of cohort \( j \) conditional on surviving to date \( t \), as \( I^j \),
\[ I^j = \frac{1}{1 - \pi} \left( \kappa_1 \lambda_1^{s-j} + \kappa_2 \lambda_2^{s-j} \right) (1 - \tau) Y, \]  \hspace{1cm} (A9)

and define the human wealth of cohort \( j \) by the recursion
\[ H^j = I^j + \pi \mathbb{E} \left[ Q' H^{j'} \right], \]  \hspace{1cm} (A10)
where $H^j$, $I^j$ and $Q$ are functions of the state $S$. Define

$$W^j = A^j + H^j,$$

(A11)

where $A^j$ is the value of Arrow securities owned by a member of cohort $j$ that have positive value in the state $S$. It follows from the budget constraint of a member of cohort $j$ that

$$\pi E \left[ Q' A^j \right] = A^j + I^j - C^j.$$  

(A12)

Combining equations (A10) – (A12) gives the wealth evolution equation,

$$\pi E \left[ Q' W^j \right] = W^j - C^j.$$  

(A13)

This establishes STEP 1.

STEP 2 The envelope condition is that

$$\frac{\partial v^j}{\partial W^j} = \frac{\partial v^j}{\partial C^j} \frac{\partial C^j}{\partial W^j}.$$  

(A14)

Using Equations (A1) and (A5)

$$\frac{\partial v^j}{\partial W^j} = \psi \frac{1 - \rho}{\rho} = \left( \frac{v^j}{C^j} \right) \frac{1 - \rho}{\rho} \psi^{-1} = \frac{\partial v^j}{\partial C^j} \frac{\partial C^j}{\partial W^j}.$$  

(A15)

This establishes STEP 2. Appendices B and C establish STEP 3.

STEP 4 Use Eq. (A5) to replace $W^j$ and $W^j'$ with $\psi C^j$ and $\psi' W^j'$ in Eq. (A13),

$$\pi E \left[ Q' \psi' C^j' \right] = \psi C^j - C^j.$$  

(A16)

Use Lemma 2 to replace $C^j'$ in Eq. (A16)

$$\pi E \left[ Q' \psi' \left\{ C^j \beta^{\frac{1}{1-\rho}} \left( Q' \frac{1}{1-\rho} \psi' \frac{\theta - 1}{\theta} \right) \right\} \right] = \psi C^j - C^j.$$  

(A17)

Cancel terms in $C^j$ and rearrange terms,

$$\psi = 1 + \pi \beta \frac{1}{1-\rho} \left( \pi E \left[ \psi' \left( \frac{1 - \rho}{1 - \rho} \right) Q' \frac{\theta}{\theta - 1} \right] \right) \left( \pi E \left[ \psi' \left( \frac{1 - \rho}{1 - \rho} \right) Q' \frac{\theta}{\theta - 1} \right] \right)^{\frac{1 - \theta}{1 - \rho \theta}}.$$  

(A18)
Consolidating terms,
\[
\psi = 1 + \pi \beta^{\frac{1}{1-\rho}} \left( \mathbb{E} \left[ \psi^{(1-\rho)\theta} \frac{Q^{\frac{\mu\theta}{1-\rho \theta}}}{(1-\rho \theta - 1)} \right] \right)^{\frac{1-\rho \theta}{1-\rho}}.
\] (A19)

This establishes STEP 4.

STEP 5 Define the function \( u^j \) by the recursion,
\[
u^j = \left( (C^j)^{\rho} + \beta \pi (m^j)^{\rho} \right)^{\frac{1}{\rho}},
\] (A20)
\[
m^j = \left[ \mathbb{E}(u^j)^{\rho \theta} \right]^{\frac{1}{\rho \theta}}.
\] (A21)

\( u^j \) is the utility attached to an arbitrary stochastic sequence \( \{C^j_t\}_{t \geq j} \). Use Lemma 1 to replace \( m^j \) in Eq. (A20),
\[
u^j = \left( (C^j)^{\rho} + \beta \pi \left( \left[ \mathbb{E}(u^j)^{\rho \theta} \right]^{\frac{1}{\rho \theta}} \right)^{\frac{1-\rho}{1-\rho \theta}} \right)^{\frac{1}{\rho}}.
\] (A22)

Rearranging
\[
u^j = C^j \left[ 1 + \pi \beta^{\frac{1}{1-\rho}} \left( \mathbb{E} \left[ \psi^{(1-\rho)\theta} \frac{Q^{\frac{\mu\theta}{1-\rho \theta}}}{(1-\rho \theta - 1)} \right] \right)^{\frac{1-\rho \theta}{1-\rho}} \right]^{\frac{1}{\rho}},
\] (A23)

Using Eq. (A19) and the conjecture
\[
C^j = \psi^{-1} W^j,
\] (A24)

it follows that the expression for the optimal value, \( v^j(W^j) \), is given by Eq. (A25)
\[
v^j(W^j) = C^j \psi^{\frac{1}{\rho}} = \psi^{\frac{1}{\rho}} W^j.
\] (A25)

This establishes STEP 5.

**Appendix B: Proof of Lemma 1**

Differentiating the value function, Eq. (A1) w.r.t. \( W^j \) leads to the expression
\[
\frac{\partial v^j}{\partial W^j} = \frac{\partial v^j}{\partial C^j} \frac{\partial C^j}{\partial W^j} + \frac{\partial v^j}{\partial m^j} \frac{\partial m^j}{\partial W^j} + \frac{\partial v^j}{\partial v^j} \frac{\partial v^j}{\partial W^j} = 0.
\] (B1)
where the partial derivatives of $v^j$ and $m^j$ w.r.t. $W^j$ are taken using the functions defined by equations (A2), (A3) and the conjecture, Eq. (A5). These expressions are,

\[
\frac{\partial v^j}{\partial C^j} = \left( \frac{v^j}{C^j} \right)^{1-\rho}, \quad \frac{\partial C^j}{\partial W^j} = -\pi' \chi' Q' 
\]

\[
\frac{\partial v^j}{\partial m^j} = \beta \pi' \left( \frac{v^j}{m^j} \right)^{1-\rho}, \quad \frac{\partial m^j}{\partial v^j} = \chi' \left( \frac{m^j}{v^j} \right)^{1-\rho^\theta}, \quad \frac{\partial v^j}{\partial W^j} = \psi' \frac{1-\rho}{\rho}, \quad \frac{\partial m^j}{\partial W^j} = \psi' \frac{1-\rho}{\rho}, \quad (B2) \]

where $\chi'$ is the conditional probability that state $S'$ occurs. Substituting these expressions into Eq. (B1)

\[
\left( \frac{v^j}{C^j} \right)^{1-\rho} \pi' \chi' Q' = \beta \pi' \left( \frac{v^j}{m^j} \right)^{1-\rho} \chi' \left( \frac{m^j}{v^j} \right)^{1-\rho^\theta} \psi' \frac{1-\rho}{\rho}. \quad (B4) \]

canceling terms and rearranging terms gives,

\[
Q' = \beta C^j \frac{1-\rho}{\rho} (m^j)^{\rho(1-\theta)} \left( v^j \right)^{\rho^\theta-1} \psi' \frac{1-\rho}{\rho}. \quad (B5) \]

Take the term in $\psi'$ to the left-hand-side, raise the equation to the power $\frac{\rho^\theta}{\rho^\theta-1}$ and take date $t$ conditional expectations of both sides,

\[
E \left[ \psi'^{\theta(1-\rho)} Q'^{\frac{\rho^\theta}{\rho^\theta-1}} \right] = \beta \frac{\rho^\theta}{\rho^\theta-1} C^j \frac{(1-\rho)\rho^\theta}{(\rho^\theta-1)} (m^j)^{\frac{\rho(1-\theta)\rho^\theta}{\rho^\theta-1}} E \left[ \left( v^j \right)^{\rho^\theta} \right]. \quad (B6) \]

Simplify this expression using the fact that

\[
E \left[ \left( v^j \right)^{\rho^\theta} \right] = (m^j)^{\rho^\theta}, \quad (B7) \]

to give

\[
E \left[ \psi'^{\theta(1-\rho)} Q'^{\frac{\rho^\theta}{\rho^\theta-1}} \right] = \beta \frac{\rho^\theta}{\rho^\theta-1} C^j \frac{(1-\rho)\rho^\theta}{(\rho^\theta-1)} (m^j)^{\frac{(\rho-1)\rho^\theta}{\rho^\theta-1}}. \quad (B8) \]

Rearranging and raising both sides to the power $\frac{1-\rho^\theta}{(1-\rho)\rho^\theta}$

\[
m^j = \beta \frac{1}{\rho} \left( E \left[ \psi'^{\theta(1-\rho)} Q'^{\frac{\rho^\theta}{\rho^\theta-1}} \right] \right)^{\frac{1-\rho^\theta}{(1-\rho)\rho^\theta}} C^j. \quad (B9) \]

This establishes Lemma 1.
Appendix C: Proof of Lemma 2

Using Eq. (B9) we have the following expression for \( (m^j)^{\rho(1-\theta)} \)
\[
(m^j)^{\rho(1-\theta)} = \beta \frac{\rho(1-\theta)}{1-\rho} \left( \mathbb{E} \left[ \psi^{(1-\theta)\rho} Q'} Q'' \right] \right)^{\frac{(1-\theta)(1-\rho)}{(1-\rho)^{\rho}}} (C^j)^{\rho(1-\theta)}. \tag{C1}
\]
Use this expression to replace \( m^j \) in Eq. (B5),
\[
Q' = \beta C^j (m^j)^{\rho(1-\theta)} \left( \psi^{(1-\theta)\rho-1} V^j \right)^{\rho-1} V^j. \tag{B5}
\]
to give
\[
Q' = \beta C^j (m^j)^{\rho(1-\theta)} \left( \frac{\rho(1-\theta)}{1-\rho} \left( \mathbb{E} \left[ \psi^{(1-\theta)\rho} Q'' \right] \right)^{\frac{(1-\theta)(1-\rho)}{(1-\rho)^{\rho}}} (C^j)^{\rho(1-\theta)} \right) \left( \psi^{(1-\theta)\rho-1} V^j \right)^{\rho-1} V^j. \tag{C2}
\]
Consolidate terms in \( \beta \) and \( C^j \), and use Eq. (A5) to replace \( \psi^{(1-\theta)\rho} \) by \( C^j \psi^{(1-\theta)\rho} \)
\[
Q' = \frac{\beta (1-\rho)}{1-\rho} \left[ \left( \mathbb{E} \left[ \psi^{(1-\theta)\rho} Q'' \right] \right)^{\frac{(1-\theta)(1-\rho)}{(1-\rho)^{\rho}}} (C^j)^{\rho(1-\theta)} \right] \left( \psi^{(1-\theta)\rho-1} V^j \right)^{\rho-1} V^j. \tag{C3}
\]
Simplifying further gives
\[
Q' = \beta \frac{1-\rho}{1-\rho} \left( \frac{C^j}{C^j} \right)^{\rho\theta} \left( \mathbb{E} \left[ \psi^{(1-\theta)\rho} Q'' \right] \right)^{\frac{(1-\theta)(1-\rho)}{(1-\rho)^{\rho}}} \psi^{(\theta-1)}. \tag{C3}
\]
Rearranging,
\[
C^{j'} = C^j \beta \frac{1}{1-\rho} \left( \frac{C^j}{C^j} \right)^{\rho\theta} \left( \mathbb{E} \left[ \psi^{(1-\theta)\rho} Q'' \right] \right)^{\frac{(1-\theta)(1-\rho)}{(1-\rho)^{\rho}}} \frac{1}{1-\rho}. \tag{C4}
\]
This establishes Lemma 2.

Appendix D: Proof of Proposition 2

We begin by establishing that aggregate human wealth obeys a simple recursive relationship. We assume that, conditional on survival, the cohort of newborns is endowed with the after-tax income streams, for \( i = \{1, 2\} \),
\[
\kappa_1 \{ \lambda_1^{s-l} \}_{s=l}^{\infty} (1-\tau)Y_s \quad \text{and} \quad \kappa_2 \{ \lambda_2^{s-l} \}_{s=l}^{\infty} (1-\tau)Y_s, \tag{D1}
\]
where
\[
\kappa_1 = \alpha_1 (1 - \lambda_1 \pi), \quad \kappa_2 = \alpha_2 (1 - \lambda_2 \pi), \quad \text{and} \quad \alpha_1 + \alpha_2 = 1. \quad (D2)
\]

Note that the $\frac{1}{1-\pi}$ from (1) drops out since we are integrating over the measure $1 - \pi$ of newborn agents. Define the type $i$ after-tax human wealth, $H^t_i$, owned by cohort $t$ at date $t$ for $i \in \{1, 2\}$,
\[
H^t_i = \alpha_i (1 - \lambda_i \pi) (1 - \tau) \mathbb{E} \left[ \sum_{k=t}^{\infty} (\lambda_i \pi)^{k-t} Q_t(S_k) Y_k \right], \quad (D3)
\]
where $Q_t(S_k)$ is the date $t$ price of a claim to one commodity in state $S_k$, for $k > t$.

At date $t$ there are $\pi^{t-j}$ surviving members of cohort $j \leq t$ each of whom owns a claim to a fraction $\lambda_i^{t-j}$ of the type $i$ income stream of a new-born. It follows that the type $i$ human wealth at date $t$ of cohort $j$ is given by the expression
\[
H^j_i = (\lambda_i \pi)^{t-j} H^t_i, \quad \text{for all} \quad j \leq t. \quad (D4)
\]

Adding up Eq. (D4) over all cohorts $j = -\infty, \ldots, t$ gives the following expressions for type $i$ aggregate human wealth
\[
H_i = \frac{1}{1 - \lambda_i \pi} H^t_i, \quad (D5)
\]
and notice that $H_i$ has a recursive representation, using prime notations, as
\[
H_i = \alpha_i (1 - \tau) Y + \lambda_i \pi \mathbb{E} \left[ Q'H^t_i \right]. \quad (D6)
\]
Define the human wealth ratio, $h_i$ for $i = 1, 2$
\[
h_i \equiv \frac{H_i}{Y}, \quad (D7)
\]
where $Y$ is aggregate GDP and the $h_i$ follow the recursion
\[
h_i = \alpha_i (1 - \tau) + \lambda_i \pi \mathbb{E} \left[ \gamma' h^t_i \right]. \quad (D8)
\]

Next, we establish that Eq. (D9),
\[
\phi(X, X') \equiv \frac{\pi \beta^{1-\rho} \rho \zeta}{\gamma \left( \rho \psi^{-1} [(1 - \lambda \pi) h_1 + (1 - \lambda \pi) h_2] \right) \left( \frac{\rho - \psi^2}{\rho - \psi \rho} \right)}^{1 - \rho \theta}, \quad (D9)
\]
is a valid representation for the pricing kernel.

We begin with Eq. (C4), which we repeat below and which holds for all individuals at alive in two consecutive date-state pairs,

\[ C'_{j} = C_{j} \beta^{1-\rho} \left( Q'_{\theta-\rho} \psi'_{\theta-1} \right) \left( E \left[ \psi'_{\theta-\rho} Q'_{\theta-1} \right] \right)^{1-\theta}. \]  

(C4)

Let \( C_{t} = \sum_{j} C_{j}^{t} \) be the aggregate consumption of all people alive at date \( t \). Let \( \mathcal{A}(t, t+1) \) denote the index set of all individuals alive at dates \( t \) and \( t+1 \) and note that

\[ \sum_{j \in \mathcal{A}(t, t+1)} C_{j}^{t} = \pi C_{t}. \]  

(D10)

Eq. (D10) recognizes that a measure \( \pi \) of people alive at date \( t \) survive into period \( t+1 \). Next, note that

\[ \sum_{j \in \mathcal{A}(t, t+1)} C_{j}^{t+1} = C_{t+1} - C_{t+1}^{t+1}, \]  

(D11)

where \( C_{t+1}^{t+1} \) denotes the consumption of generation \( t+1 \) at date \( t+1 \). These individuals own no financial assets but, from Eq. (D5) they own a fraction \( 1-\lambda_{i} \pi \) of type \( i \) human wealth. Using the expression for the policy function from Eq. (A5) it follows that

\[ C_{t+1}^{t+1} = \psi_{t+1}^{-1} \left[ (1 - \lambda_{1} \pi) H_{1,t+1} + (1 - \lambda_{2} \pi) H_{2,t+1} \right] \]  

(D12)

Summing equation (C4) over all \( j \in \mathcal{A}(t, t+1) \), using equations (D10), (D11) and (D12) gives

\[ C' - \psi^{-1} \left[ (1 - \lambda_{1} \pi) H_{1} + (1 - \lambda_{2} \pi) H_{2} \right] = C_{t+1} \beta^{1-\rho} \left( Q'_{\theta-\rho} \psi'_{\theta-1} z^{1-\theta} \right), \]  

(D13)

where

\[ z = E \left[ \psi'_{\theta-\rho} Q'_{\theta-1} \right]. \]  

(D14)

Rearranging Eq. (D14)

\[ Q'_{\theta-\rho} \psi'_{\theta-1} z^{1-\theta} = \frac{\pi \beta^{1-\rho} C}{C' - \psi^{-1} \left[ (1 - \lambda_{1} \pi) H_{1} + (1 - \lambda_{2} \pi) H_{2} \right]}. \]  

(D15)

Divide the top and bottom of the right hand side by \((\alpha_{1} + \alpha_{2})Y\), rearrange terms
and lag the equation by one period to give

\[ Q \equiv \left( \frac{\pi \beta^{1-\rho} c_L}{\gamma \left( c - \psi^{-1} \left[ (1 - \lambda_1 \pi) h_1 + (1 - \lambda_2 \pi) h_2 \right] \right) \left( \frac{\sigma - 1}{\lambda L^{(1-\rho)} \psi^{1-\rho}} \right)^{1-\rho \theta}} \right)^{1-\rho \theta}, \quad (D16) \]

where \( c_L \) and \( c \) are the ratios of consumption to GDP at dates \( t - 1 \) and \( t \). This completes the proof of the functional form of the function \( Q = \phi(X, X') \).

**Appendix E: Proof of Proposition 4**

A steady-state goods market equilibrium is characterized by the equality,

\[ \bar{\psi}^{-1} \left( \bar{h}_1 + \bar{h}_2 + \frac{\bar{b}^\theta (1 + \delta \bar{g}^\delta)}{\Pi \gamma} \right) = 1 - \bar{g}. \]  

(E1)

The left-hand-side of this expression is the demand for consumption goods and the right-hand-side is the supply of consumption goods. Both variables are written as ratios to GDP. In an autarkic steady-state, \( b^\theta(Q) = 0 \) and \( \bar{g} = \bar{\tau} \): these conditions imply that,

\[ \frac{h(Q)}{1 - \bar{g}} = \frac{\psi(Q)}{1 - \bar{\tau}}, \]  

(E2)

where the functions \( h(Q) \) and \( \psi(Q) \) are written out explicitly in Eqn. (E3).

\[ \frac{h(Q)}{1 - \bar{g}} \equiv \left[ \frac{\alpha \left( 1 - \alpha \right)}{1 - \pi \lambda_1 \bar{\gamma} Q} + \frac{1}{1 - \pi \lambda_2 \bar{\gamma} Q} \right] = \left[ \frac{1}{1 - \pi \beta^{1-\rho} Q^{\frac{1}{\rho - 1}}} \right] = \psi(Q), \]  

(E3)

where \( h(q) \equiv h_1(Q) + h_2(Q) \).

Define the compound parameters,

\[ \delta_1 \equiv \frac{1}{1 - \pi \lambda_1 \bar{\gamma}}; \quad \delta_2 \equiv \frac{1}{1 - \pi \lambda_2 \bar{\gamma}}; \quad \delta_b \equiv \frac{1}{1 - \pi \beta^{1-\rho}}; \]  

(E4)

\[ \Delta \equiv \delta_1 - \delta_2, \quad \rho_c \equiv -\frac{\log(\pi \beta)}{\log(\lambda \bar{\gamma})}, \]  

(E5)

and the following inequalities,

\[ \alpha > 1, \quad \delta_b > \delta_1 > \delta_2, \quad \delta_1 - \Delta (1 - \alpha) > \delta_b, \quad \rho < \rho_c < 0. \]  

(E6)
Figure E1 plots the logarithm of the human wealth-GDP ratio, $h$, this is the solid line, and the logarithm of the inverse savings propensity, $\psi$, this is the dashed line. Both variables are plotted as functions of $Q$. The figure shows that $h(Q)$ and $\psi(Q)$ are both increasing functions and inspection of both functions reveals that $h(0) = \psi(0) = 1$. This establishes that $Q = 0$ is a trivial autarkic equilibrium. Note further that $h(Q)$ has asymptotes at

$$Q_1 \equiv \frac{1}{\pi \lambda_1 \bar{\gamma}} \quad \text{and} \quad Q_2 \equiv \frac{1}{\pi \lambda_2 \bar{\gamma}}. \quad (E7)$$

We have plotted the function $h(Q)$ in a domain that excludes values of $Q > Q_1$ because steady-state human wealth is not defined outside of the domain $[0, Q_1]$. We have also assumed, in drawing this figure, that the parameters satisfy inequalities

![Figure E1: Steady State Autarkic Equilibria](image-url)
(E6). Note also that $\psi(Q)$ has an asymptote at

$$Q_b \equiv \left( \frac{1}{\pi \beta^{1-\rho}} \right)^{\frac{\rho-1}{\rho}}. \tag{E8}$$

The proof that there are three autarkic steady-states proceeds in steps.

1) Note that the functions $h(Q) : (0, Q_1) \rightarrow \mathbb{R}_+$ and $\psi(Q) : (0, Q_1] \rightarrow \mathbb{R}_+$ are continuous.

2) Next we establish that $h$ and $\psi$ are increasing. The derivative of $h$ is given by the expression

$$h_Q = \frac{\alpha \pi \lambda_1 \gamma}{(1 - \pi \lambda_1 \gamma Q)^2} - \frac{(1 - \alpha) \pi \lambda_2 \gamma}{(1 - \pi \lambda_2 \gamma Q)^2} > 0, \tag{E9}$$

where the inequality follows since $\alpha > 1$. The derivative of $\psi$ is given by the expression

$$\psi_Q = \frac{\rho}{\rho - 1} \frac{\pi \beta^{\frac{1}{1-\rho}} Q^{\frac{1}{1-\rho}}}{(1 - \pi \beta^{\frac{1}{1-\rho}} Q^{\rho})^2} > 0, \tag{E10}$$

where the inequality follows since $\rho < 0$. This establishes that both functions are increasing.

3) Now consider the derivatives of $h$ and $\psi$ evaluated at $Q = 0$. These are given by the expressions,

$$0 < \{h_Q\}_{Q \rightarrow 0} \rightarrow \pi \gamma (\alpha \lambda_1 + (1 - \alpha) \lambda_2) < \infty, \tag{E11}$$

$$0 < \{\psi_Q\}_{Q \rightarrow 0} \rightarrow \infty, \tag{E12}$$

which establishes that for small $\varepsilon$, $\psi(\varepsilon) > h(\varepsilon)$.

4) Now consider the inequalities (E6) which imply that $Q_b < Q_1$ where $Q_b$ is the asymptote of the function $\psi$ and $Q_1$ is the asymptote of the function $h$. Since both functions are increasing, it follows that, as $Q \rightarrow Q_b$, $\psi(Q) \rightarrow \infty > h(Q)$.

5) We have established that there is a trivial equilibrium at $Q = 0$ and that $\psi(Q) > h(Q)$ close to $Q = 0$ and close to $Q = Q_b$. Now note that

$$h(1) - \psi(1) = \delta_1 - \Delta (1 - \alpha) - \delta_6 > 0, \tag{E13}$$

where the inequality follows from assumption (E6).
We have established that $h$ and $\psi$ are continuous functions and that $h$ starts below $\psi$, is above $\psi$ for $Q = 1$ and drops below $\psi$ at $Q = Q_b$. It follows that the functions must cross at least twice and for large enough negative values of $\rho$ there are two non-trivial autarkic equilibria. When inequalities (E6) hold, $\bar{Q}_{au1} < \bar{\gamma}^{-1}$ and $\bar{Q}_{au2} > \bar{\gamma}^{-1}$. These inequalities establish that $\bar{Q}_{au1}$ is dynamically efficient and $\bar{Q}_{au2}$ is dynamically inefficient as claimed in Proposition 4. □.

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