BETWEEN PAST AND FUTURE

Six Exercises in Political Thought

by HANNAH ARENDT

Author of "The Human Condition"
Between Past and Future

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For those seeking to understand our times Hannah Arendt has become a guide and an inspiration. Her penetrating observations of the modern world, based on a profound knowledge of the past, constitute a major contribution to political philosophy.

In this volume she describes the crisis, or rather series of crises, that we face as a result of the breakdown of tradition. That tradition, our heritage from Rome, no longer relieves us of the necessity of thought by supplying usable, ready-made answers. It has ceased to bridge the gap between past and future. And so this gap, once visible only to those few who made thinking their business, has become a tangible reality and perplexity to us all. It has indeed become a pressing and inescapable fact of politics.

The modern world has not been trained for the task of re-examining its basic words and concepts. Funda-

(Continued on the back flap)
Arendt
Between past and future
Also by Hannah Arendt

THE HUMAN CONDITION

ORIGINS OF TOTALITARIANISM
BETWEEN PAST AND FUTURE

Six Exercises in Political Thought

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BETWEEN PAST AND FUTURE
WHAT IS AUTHORITY?

I

In order to avoid misunderstanding, it might have been wiser to ask in the title: What was—and not what is—authority? For it is my contention that we are tempted and entitled to raise this question because authority has vanished from the modern world. Since we can no longer fall back upon authentic and undisputable experiences common to all, the very term has become clouded by controversy and confusion. Little about its nature appears self-evident or even comprehensible to everybody, except that the political scientist may still remember that this concept was once fundamental to political theory, or that most will agree that a constant, ever-widening and deepening crisis of authority has accompanied the development of the modern world in our century.

This crisis, apparent since the inception of the century, is political in origin and nature. The rise of political movements intent upon replacing the party system, and the development of a new totalitarian form of government, took place against a background of a more or less general, more or less dramatic breakdown of all traditional authorities. Nowhere was this breakdown the direct result
of the regimes or movements themselves; it rather seemed as though totalitarianism, in the form of movements as well as of regimes, was best fitted to take advantage of a general political and social atmosphere in which the party system had lost its prestige and the government's authority was no longer recognized.

The most significant symptom of the crisis, indicating its depth and seriousness, is that it has spread to such prepolitical areas as child-rearing and education, where authority in the widest sense has always been accepted as a natural necessity, obviously required as much by natural needs, the helplessness of the child, as by political necessity, the continuity of an established civilization which can be assured only if those who are newcomers by birth are guided through a pre-established world into which they are born as strangers. Because of its simple and elementary character, this form of authority has, throughout the history of political thought, served as a model for a great variety of authoritarian forms of government, so that the fact that even this prepolitical authority which ruled the relations between adults and children, teachers and pupils, is no longer secure signifies that all the old time-honored metaphors and models for authoritarian relations have lost their plausibility. Practically as well as theoretically, we are no longer in a position to know what authority really is.

In the following reflections I assume that the answer to this question cannot possibly lie in a definition of the nature or essence of "authority in general." The authority we have lost in the modern world is no such "authority in general," but rather a very specific form which had been valid throughout the Western World over a long period of time. I therefore propose to reconsider what authority was historically and the sources of its strength and meaning. Yet, in view of the present confusion, it seems that even this limited and tentative approach must be preceded by a few remarks on what authority never was, in order to avoid the more common misunderstandings and make sure that we visualize and consider the same phenomenon and not any number of connected or unconnected issues.

Since authority always demands obedience, it is commonly mis-
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taken for some form of power or violence. Yet authority precludes
the use of external means of coercion; where force is used, authority
itself has failed. Authority, on the other hand, is incompatible with
persuasion, which presupposes equality and works through a process
of argumentation. Where arguments are used, authority is left
in abeyance. Against the egalitarian order of persuasion stands the
authoritarian order, which is always hierarchical. If authority is to
be defined at all, then, it must be in contradistinction to both co-
ercion by force and persuasion through arguments. (The authoritar-
ian relation between the one who commands and the one who obeys
rests neither on common reason nor on the power of the one who
commands; what they have in common is the hierarchy itself, whose
rightness and legitimacy both recognize and where both have their
predetermined stable place.) This point is of historical importance;
one aspect of our concept of authority is Platonic in origin, and
when Plato began to consider the introduction of authority into the
handling of public affairs in the polis, he knew he was seeking an
alternative to the common Greek way of handling domestic affairs,
which was persuasion (πείθεν) as well as to the common way of
handling foreign affairs, which was force and violence (βία).

Historically, we may say that the loss of authority is merely the
final, though decisive, phase of a development which for centuries
undermined primarily religion and tradition. Of tradition, religion,
and authority—whose interconnectedness we shall discuss later—
authority has proved to be the most stable element. With the loss of
authority, however, the general doubt of the modern age also in-
vaded the political realm, where things not only assume a more
radical expression but become endowed with a reality peculiar to
the political realm alone. What perhaps hitherto had been of spirit-
ual significance only for the few now has become a concern of one
and all. Only now, as it were after the fact, the loss of tradition and
of religion have become political events of the first order.

When I said that I did not wish to discuss “authority in general,”
but only the very specific concept of authority which has been domi-
nant in our history, I wished to hint at some distinctions which we
are liable to neglect when we speak too sweepingly of the crisis of
our time, and which I may perhaps more easily explain in terms of the related concepts of tradition and religion. Thus the undeniable loss of tradition in the modern world does not at all entail a loss of the past, for tradition and past are not the same, as the believers in tradition on one side and the believers in progress on the other would have us believe—whereby it makes little difference that the former deplore this state of affairs while the latter extend their congratulations. With the loss of tradition we have lost the thread which safely guided us through the vast realms of the past, but this thread was also the chain fettering each successive generation to a predetermined aspect of the past. It could be that only now will the past open up to us with unexpected freshness and tell us things no one has yet had ears to hear. But it cannot be denied that without a securely anchored tradition—and the loss of this security occurred several hundred years ago—the whole dimension of the past has also been endangered. We are in danger of forgetting, and such an oblivion—quite apart from the contents themselves that could be lost—would mean that, humanly speaking, we would deprive ourselves of one dimension, the dimension of depth in human existence. For memory and depth are the same, or rather, depth cannot be reached by man except through remembrance.

It is similar with the loss of religion. Ever since the radical criticism of religious beliefs in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, it has remained characteristic of the modern age to doubt religious truth, and this is true for believers and nonbelievers alike. Since Pascal and, even more pointedly, since Kierkegaard, doubt has been carried into belief, and the modern believer must constantly guard his beliefs against doubts; not the Christian faith as such, but Christianity (and Judaism, of course) in the modern age is ridden by paradoxes and absurdity. And whatever else may be able to survive absurdity—philosophy perhaps can—religion certainly cannot. Yet this loss of belief in the dogmas of institutional religion need not necessarily imply a loss or even a crisis of faith, for religion and faith, or belief and faith, are by no means the same. Only belief, but not faith, has an inherent affinity with and is constantly exposed to doubt. But who can deny that faith too, for so many centuries se-
curely protected by religion, its beliefs and its dogmas, has been gravely endangered through what is actually only a crisis of institutional religion?

Some similar qualifications seem to me to be necessary regarding the modern loss of authority. Authority, resting on a foundation in the past as its unshaken cornerstone, gave the world the permanence and durability which human beings need precisely because they are mortals—the most unstable and futile beings we know of. Its loss is tantamount to the loss of the groundwork of the world, which indeed since then has begun to shift, to change and transform itself with ever-increasing rapidity from one shape into another, as though we were living and struggling with a Protean universe where everything at any moment can become almost anything else. But the loss of worldly permanence and reliability—which politically is identical with the loss of authority—does not entail, at least not necessarily, the loss of the human capacity for building, preserving, and caring for a world that can survive us and remain a place fit to live in for those who come after us.

It is obvious that these reflections and descriptions are based on the conviction of the importance of making distinctions. To stress such a conviction seems to be a gratuitous truism in view of the fact that, at least as far as I know, nobody has yet openly stated that distinctions are nonsense. There exists, however, a silent agreement in most discussions among political and social scientists that we can ignore distinctions and proceed on the assumption that everything can eventually be called anything else, and that distinctions are meaningful only to the extent that each of us has the right "to define his terms." Yet does not this curious right, which we have come to grant as soon as we deal with matters of importance—as though it were actually the same as the right to one's own opinion—already indicate that such terms as "tyranny," "authority," "totalitarianism" have simply lost their common meaning, or that we have ceased to live in a common world where the words we have in common possess an unquestionable meaningfulness, so that, short of being condemned to live verbally in an altogether meaningless world, we grant
each other the right to retreat into our own worlds of meaning, and demand only that each of us remain consistent within his own private terminology? If, in these circumstances, we assure ourselves that we still understand each other, we do not mean that together we understand a world common to us all, but that we understand the consistency of arguing and reasoning, of the process of argumentation in its sheer formality.

However that may be, to proceed under the implicit assumption that distinctions are not important or, better, that in the social-political-historical realm, that is, in the sphere of human affairs, things do not possess that distinctness which traditional metaphysics used to call their “otherness” (their alteritas), has become the hallmark of a great many theories in the social, political, and historical sciences. Among these, two seem to me to deserve special mention because they touch the subject under discussion in an especially significant manner.

The first concerns the ways in which, since the nineteenth century, liberal and conservative writers have dealt with the problem of authority and, by implication, with the related problem of freedom in the realm of politics. Generally speaking, it has been quite typical of liberal theories to start from the assumption that “the constancy of progress . . . in the direction of organized and assured freedom is the characteristic fact of modern history”¹ and to look upon each deviation from this course as a reactionary process leading in the opposite direction. This makes them overlook the differences in principle between the restriction of freedom in authoritarian regimes, the abolition of political freedom in tyrannies and dictatorships, and the total elimination of spontaneity itself, that is, of the most general and most elementary manifestation of human freedom, at which only totalitarian regimes aim by means of their various methods of conditioning. The liberal writer, concerned with history and the progress of freedom rather than with forms of government, sees only differences in degree here, and ignores that authoritarian government committed to the restriction of liberty remains tied to the freedom it limits to the extent that it would lose its very substance if it abolished it altogether, that is, would change into tyranny. The same is
true for the distinction between legitimate and illegitimate power on which all authoritarian government hinges. The liberal writer is apt to pay little attention to it because of his conviction that all power corrupts and that the constancy of progress requires constant loss of power, no matter what its origin may be.

Behind the liberal identification of totalitarianism with authoritarianism, and the concomitant inclination to see "totalitarian" trends in every authoritarian limitation of freedom, lies an older confusion of authority with tyranny, and of legitimate power with violence. The difference between tyranny and authoritarian government has always been that the tyrant rules in accordance with his own will and interest, whereas even the most draconic authoritarian government is bound by laws. Its acts are tested by a code which was made either not by man at all, as in the case of the law of nature or God's Commandments or the Platonic ideas, or at least not by those actually in power. The source of authority in authoritarian government is always a force external and superior to its own power; it is always this source, this external force which transcends the political realm, from which the authorities derive their "authority," that is, their legitimacy, and against which their power can be checked.

Modern spokesmen of authority, who, even in the short intervals when public opinion provides a favorable climate for neo-conservatism, remain well aware that theirs is an almost lost cause, are of course eager to point to this distinction between tyranny and authority. Where the liberal writer sees an essentially assured progress in the direction of freedom, which is only temporarily interrupted by some dark forces of the past, the conservative sees a process of doom which started with the dwindling of authority, so that freedom, after it lost the restricting limitations which protected its boundaries, became helpless, defenseless, and bound to be destroyed. (It is hardly fair to say that only liberal political thought is primarily interested in freedom; there is hardly a school of political thought in our history which is not centered around the idea of freedom, much as the concept of liberty may vary with different writers and in different political circumstances. The only exception of any consequence to
this statement seems to me to be the political philosophy of Thomas Hobbes, who, of course, was anything but a conservative.) Tyranny and totalitarianism are again identified, except that now totalitarian government, if it is not directly identified with democracy, is seen as its almost inevitable result, that is, the result of the disappearance of all traditionally recognized authorities. Yet the differences between tyranny and dictatorship on one side, and totalitarian domination on the other, are no less distinct than those between authoritarianism and totalitarianism.

These structural differences become apparent the moment we leave the over-all theories behind and concentrate our attention on the apparatus of rule, the technical forms of administration, and the organization of the body politic. For brevity's sake, it may be permitted to sum up the technical-structural differences between authoritarian, tyrannical, and totalitarian government in the image of three different representative models. As an image for authoritarian government, I propose the shape of the pyramid, which is well known in traditional political thought. The pyramid is indeed a particularly fitting image for a governmental structure whose source of authority lies outside itself, but whose seat of power is located at the top, from which authority and power is filtered down to the base in such a way that each successive layer possesses some authority, but less than the one above it, and where, precisely because of this careful filtering process, all layers from top to bottom are not only firmly integrated into the whole but are interrelated like converging rays whose common focal point is the top of the pyramid as well as the transcending source of authority above it. This image, it is true, can be used only for the Christian type of authoritarian rule as it developed through and under the constant influence of the Church during the Middle Ages, when the focal point above and beyond the earthly pyramid provided the necessary point of reference for the Christian type of equality, the strictly hierarchical structure of life on earth notwithstanding. The Roman understanding of political authority, where the source of authority lay exclusively in the past, in the foundation of Rome and the greatness of ancestors, leads into institutional structures whose shape requires a different
kind of image—about which more later (p. 124). In any event, an authoritarian form of government with its hierarchical structure is the least egalitarian of all forms; it incorporates inequality and distinction as its all-permeating principles.

All political theories concerning tyranny agree that it belongs strictly among the egalitarian forms of government; the tyrant is the ruler who rules as one against all, and the “all” he oppresses are all equal, namely equally powerless. If we stick to the image of the pyramid, it is as though all intervening layers between top and bottom were destroyed, so that the top remains suspended, supported only by the proverbial bayonets, over a mass of carefully isolated, disintegrated, and completely equal individuals. Classical political theory used to rule the tyrant out of mankind altogether, to call him a “wolf in human shape” (Plato), because of this position of one against all, in which he had put himself and which sharply distinguished his rule, the rule of one, which Plato still calls indiscriminately μον-αρχία or tyranny, from various forms of kingship or βασιλεία.

In contradistinction to both tyrannical and authoritarian regimes, the proper image of totalitarian rule and organization seems to me to be the structure of the onion, in whose center, in a kind of empty space, the leader is located; whatever he does—whether he integrates the body politic as in an authoritarian hierarchy, or oppresses his subjects like a tyrant—he does it from within, and not from without or above. All the extraordinarily manifold parts of the movement: the front organizations, the various professional societies, the party membership, the party bureaucracy, the elite formations and police groups, are related in such a way that each forms the façade in one direction and the center in the other, that is, plays the role of normal outside world for one layer and the role of radical extremism for another. The great advantage of this system is that the movement provides for each of its layers, even under conditions of totalitarian rule, the fiction of a normal world along with a consciousness of being different from and more radical than it. Thus, the sympathizers in the front organizations, whose convictions differ only in intensity from those of the party membership, sur-
round the whole movement and provide a deceptive façade of normality to the outside world because of their lack of fanaticism and extremism, while, at the same time, they represent the normal world to the totalitarian movement, whose members come to believe that their convictions differ only in degree from those of other people, so that they need never be aware of the abyss which separates their own world from that which actually surrounds it. The onion structure makes the system organizationally shock-proof against the factuality of the real world.²

However, while both liberalism and conservatism fail us the moment we try to apply their theories to factually existing political forms and institutions, it can hardly be doubted that their over-all assertions carry a high amount of plausibility. Liberalism, we saw, measures a process of receding freedom, and conservatism measures a process of receding authority; both call the expected end-result totalitarianism and see totalitarian trends wherever either one or the other is present. No doubt, both can produce excellent documentation for their findings. Who would deny the serious threats to freedom from all sides since the beginning of the century, and the rise of all kinds of tyranny, at least since the end of the First World War? Who can deny, on the other hand, that disappearance of practically all traditionally established authorities has been one of the most spectacular characteristics of the modern world? It seems as though one has only to fix his glance on either of these two phenomena to justify a theory of progress or a theory of doom according to his own taste or, as the phrase goes, according to his own “scale of values.” If we look upon the conflicting statements of conservatives and liberals with impartial eyes, we can easily see that the truth is equally distributed between them and that we are in fact confronted with a simultaneous recession of both freedom and authority in the modern world. As far as these processes are concerned, one can even say that the numerous oscillations in public opinion, which for more than a hundred and fifty years has swung at regular intervals from one extreme to the other, from a liberal mood to a conservative one and back to a more liberal again, at times attempting to reassert authority and at others to reassert freedom, have resulted only in
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further undermining both, confusing the issues, blurring the distinctive lines between authority and freedom, and eventually destroying the political meaning of both.

Both liberalism and conservatism were born in this climate of violently oscillating public opinion, and they are tied together, not only because each would lose its very substance without the presence of its opponent in the field of theory and ideology, but because both are primarily concerned with restoration, with restoring either freedom or authority, or the relationship between both, to its traditional position. It is in this sense that they form the two sides of the same coin, just as their progress-or-doom ideologies correspond to the two possible directions of the historical process as such; if one assumes, as both do, that there is such a thing as a historical process with a definable direction and a predictable end, it obviously can land us only in paradise or in hell.

It is, moreover, in the nature of the very image in which history is usually conceived, as process or stream or development, that everything comprehended by it can change into anything else, that distinctions become meaningless because they become obsolete, submerged, as it were, by the historical stream, the moment they have appeared. From this viewpoint, liberalism and conservatism present themselves as the political philosophies which correspond to the much more general and comprehensive philosophy of history of the nineteenth century. In form and content, they are the political expression of the history-consciousness of the last stage of the modern age. Their inability to distinguish, theoretically justified by the concepts of history and process, progress or doom, testifies to an age in which certain notions, clear in their distinctness to all previous centuries, have begun to lose their clarity and plausibility because they have lost their meaning in the public-political reality—without altogether losing their significance.

The second and more recent theory implicitly challenging the importance of making distinctions is, especially in the social sciences, the almost universal functionalization of all concepts and ideas. Here, as in the example previously quoted, liberalism and conservatism differ not in method, viewpoint, and approach, but only in emphasis
and evaluation. A convenient instance may be provided by the widespread conviction in the free world today that communism is a new "religion," notwithstanding its avowed atheism, because it fulfills socially, psychologically, and "emotionally" the same function traditional religion fulfilled and still fulfills in the free world. The concern of the social sciences does not lie in what bolshevism as ideology or as form of government is, nor in what its spokesmen have to say for themselves; that is not the interest of the social sciences, and many social scientists believe they can do without the study of what the historical sciences call the sources themselves. Their concern is only with functions, and whatever fulfills the same function can, according to this view, be called the same. It is as though I had the right to call the heel of my shoe a hammer because I, like most women, use it to drive nails into the wall.

Obviously one can draw quite different conclusions from such equations. Thus it would be characteristic of conservatism to insist that after all a heel is not a hammer, but that the use of the heel as a substitute for the hammer proves that hammers are indispensable. In other words, it will find in the fact that atheism can fulfill the same function as religion the best proof that religion is necessary, and recommend the return to true religion as the only way to counter a "heresy." The argument is weak, of course; if it is only a question of function and how a thing works, the adherents of "false religion" can make as good a case for using theirs as I can for using my heel, which does not work so badly either. The liberals, on the contrary, view the same phenomena as a bad case of treason to the cause of secularism and believe that only "true secularism" can cure us of the pernicious influence of both false and true religion on politics. But these conflicting recommendations at the address of free society to return to true religion and become more religious, or to rid ourselves of institutional religion (especially of Roman Catholicism with its constant challenge to secularism) hardly conceal the opponents' agreement on one point: that whatever fulfills the function of a religion is a religion.

The same argument is frequently used with respect to authority: if violence fulfills the same function as authority—namely, makes
people obey—then violence is authority. Here again we find those
who counsel a return to authority because they think only a reintro-
duction of the order-obedience relationship can master the problems
of a mass society, and those who believe that a mass society can
rule itself, like any other social body. Again both parties agree on
the one essential point: authority is whatever makes people obey.
All those who call modern dictatorships "authoritarian," or mistake
totalitarianism for an authoritarian structure, have implicitly equated
violence with authority, and this includes those conservatives who
explain the rise of dictatorships in our century by the need to find a
surrogate for authority. The crux of the argument is always the
same: everything is related to a functional context, and the use of
violence is taken to demonstrate that no society can exist except in
an authoritarian framework.

The dangers of these equations, as I see them, lie not only in the
confusion of political issues and in the blurring of the distinctive
lines which separate totalitarianism from all other forms of govern-
ment. I do not believe that atheism is a substitute for or can fulfill
the same function as a religion any more than I believe that violence
can become a substitute for authority. But if we follow the recom-
mandations of the conservatives, who at this particular moment
have a rather good chance of being heard, I am quite convinced that
we shall not find it hard to produce such substitutes, that we shall
use violence and pretend to have restored authority or that our re-
discovery of the functional usefulness of religion will produce a sub-
stitute-religion—as though our civilization were not already suffi-
ciently cluttered up with all sorts of pseudo-things and nonsense.

Compared with these theories, the distinctions between tyrannical,
authoritarian, and totalitarian systems which I have proposed are
unhistorical, if one understands by history not the historical space
in which certain forms of government appeared as recognizable
entities, but the historical process in which everything can always
change into something else; and they are anti-functional insofar as
the content of the phenomenon is taken to determine both the nature
of the political body and its function in society, and not vice-versa.
Politically speaking, they have a tendency to assume that in the
modern world authority has disappeared almost to the vanishing point, and this in the so-called authoritarian systems no less than in the free world, and that freedom—that is, the freedom of movement of human beings—is threatened everywhere, even in free societies, but abolished radically only in totalitarian systems, and not in tyrannies and dictatorships.

It is in the light of this present situation that I propose to raise the following questions: What were the political experiences that corresponded to the concept of authority and from which it sprang? What is the nature of a public-political world constituted by authority? Is it true that the Platonic-Aristotelian statement that every well-ordered community is constituted of those who rule and those who are ruled was always valid prior to the modern age? Or, to put it differently, what kind of world came to an end after the modern age not only challenged one or another form of authority in different spheres of life but caused the whole concept of authority to lose its validity altogether?

II

Authority as the one, if not the decisive, factor in human communities did not always exist, though it can look back on a long history, and the experiences on which this concept is based are not necessarily present in all bodies politic. The word and the concept are Roman in origin. Neither the Greek language nor the varied political experiences of Greek history shows any knowledge of authority and the kind of rule it implies. This is expressed most clearly in the philosophy of Plato and Aristotle, who, in quite different ways but from the same political experiences, tried to introduce something akin to authority into the public life of the Greek polis.

There existed two kinds of rule on which they could fall back and from which they derived their political philosophy, one known to them from the public-political realm, and the other from the private sphere of Greek household and family life. To the polis, absolute rule was known as tyranny, and the chief characteristics of
NOTES

Preface

1. For this quotation and the following, see René Char, Feuillets d’Hypnos, Paris, 1946. Written during the last year of the Resistance, 1943 to 1944, and published in the Collection Espoir, edited by Albert Camus, these aphorisms, together with later pieces, appeared in English under the title Hypnos Waking: Poems and Prose, New York, 1956.

2. The quotation is from the last chapter of Democracy in America, New York, 1945, vol. II, p. 331. It reads in full: “Although the revolution that is taking place in the social condition, the laws, the opinions, and the feelings of men is still very far from being terminated, yet its results already admit of no comparison with anything that the world has ever before witnessed. I go back from age to age up to the remotest antiquity, but I find no parallel to what is occurring before my eyes; as the past has ceased to throw its light upon the future, the mind of man wanders in obscurity.” These lines of Tocqueville anticipate not only the aphorisms of René Char; curiously enough, if one reads them textually, they also anticipate Kafka’s insight (see the following) that it is the future that sends man’s mind back into the past “up to the remotest antiquity.”

3. The story is the last of a series of “Notes from the year 1920,” under the title “HE.” Translated from the German by Willa and Edwin Muir, they appeared in this country in The Great Wall of China, New York, 1946. I followed the English translation except in a few places where a more literal translation was needed for my purposes. The German original—in vol. 5 of the Gesammelte Schriften, New York, 1946—reads as follows:

1. Tradition and the Modern Age

1. Laws 775.
7. I refer here to Heidegger's discovery that the Greek word for truth means literally "disclosure"—ἀ-λήθεα.
10. That "the Cave is comparable with Hades" is also suggested by F. M. Cornford in his annotated translation of The Republic, New York, 1956, p. 230.
11. See Jugendschriften, p. 274.

2. The Concept of History

1. Cicero, De legibus I, 5; De oratore II, 55. Herodotus, the first historian, did not yet have at his disposal a word for history. He used the
word ἴστορεῖν, but not in the sense of “historical narrative.” Like εἶδέναι, to know, the word ἴστορία is derived from ἴδ-, to see, and ἴστορ means originally “eyewitness,” then the one who examines witnesses and obtains truth through inquiry. Hence, ἴστορεῖν has a double meaning: to testify and to inquire. (See Max Pohlenz, Herodot, der erste Geschichtsschreiber des Abendlandes, Leipzig and Berlin, 1937, p. 44.) For recent discussion of Herodotus and our concept of history, see especially C. N. Cochrane, Christianity and Classical Culture, New York, 1944, ch. 12, one of the most stimulating and interesting pieces in the literature on the subject. His chief thesis, that Herodotus must be regarded as belonging to the Ionian school of philosophy and a follower of Heraclitus, is not convincing. Contrary to ancient sources, Cochrane construes the science of history as being part of the Greek development of philosophy. See note 6, and also Karl Reinhardt, “Herodots Persegeschichten” in Von Werken und Formen, Godesberg, 1948.

2. “The Gods of most nations claim to have created the world. The Olympian gods make no such claim. The most they ever did was to conquer it” (Gilbert Murray, Five Stages of Greek Religion, Anchor edition, p. 45). Against this statement one sometimes argues that Plato in the Timaeus introduced a creator of the world. But Plato’s god is no real creator; he is a demiurge, a world-builder who does not create out of nothing. Moreover, Plato tells his story in the form of a myth invented by himself, and this, like similar myths in his work, are not proposed as truth. That no god and no man ever created the cosmos is beautifully stated in Heraclitus, fragment 30 (Diels), for this cosmical order of all things “has always been and is and will be—an ever-living fire that blazes up in proportions and dies away in proportions.”

3. On the Soul, 415b13. See also Economics, 1343b24: Nature fulfills the being-forever with respect to the species through recurrence (περινοδος) but cannot do this with respect to the individual. In our context, it is irrelevant that the treatise is not by Aristotle but by one of his pupils, for we find the same thought in the treatise On Generation and Corruption in the concept of Becoming, which moves in a cycle—γένεσις et ἀλληλων κύκλῳ, 331a8. The same thought of an “immortal human species” occurs in Plato, Laws, 721. See note 9.


5. Rilke, Aus dem Nachlass des Grafen C. W., first series, poem X. Although the poetry is untranslatable, the content of these verses might be expressed as follows: “Mountains rest beneath a splendor of stars, but even in them time flickers. Ah, unsheltered in my wild, darkling heart lies immortality.” I owe this translation to Denver Lindley.

6. Poetics, 1448b25 and 1450a16–22. For a distinction between poetry and historiography, see ibid., ch. 9.
7. For tragedy as an imitation of action, see ibid., ch. 6, 1.
9. For Plato, see Laws 721, where he makes it quite clear that he thinks the human species only in a certain way to be immortal—namely insofar as its successive generations taken as a whole are “growing together” with the entirety of time; mankind as a succession of generations and time are coeval: γένος ὁυν ἀνθρώπων ἐστὶ τι ξυμφές τοῦ παντὸς χρόνου, διὰ τέλους αὖτὸ ἐγκέπτεται καὶ συνέπτεται, τούτῳ τῷ τρόπῳ ἄθανατον ἄν. In other words, it is mere deathlessness—ἀθανασία—in which the mortals partake by virtue of belonging to an immortal species; it is not the timeless being-forever—the ἄει εἶναι—in whose neighborhood the philosopher is admitted even though he is but a mortal. For Aristotle, see Nicomachean Ethics, 1177b30–35 and further in what follows.
10. Ibid., 1143a36.
11. Seventh Letter.
14. The same point was made more than twenty years ago by Edgar Wind in his essay “Some Points of Contact between History and Natural Sciences” (in Philosophy and History, Essays Presented to Ernst Cassirer, Oxford, 1939). Wind already showed that the latest developments of science which make it so much less “exact” lead to the raising of questions by scientists “that historians like to look upon as their own.” It seems strange that so fundamental and obvious an argument should have played no role in the subsequent methodological and other discussions of historical science.
18. No one can look at the remains of ancient or medieval towns without being struck by the finality with which their walls separated them from their natural surroundings, whether these were landscapes or wilderness. Modern city-building, on the contrary, aims at the landscaping and urbanization of whole areas, where the distinction between town and country becomes more and more obliterated. This trend could possibly lead to the disappearance of cities even as we know them today.
19. In De doctrina Christiana, 2, 28, 44.
20. De Civitate Dei, XII, 13.
21. See Theodor Mommsen, "St. Augustine and the Christian Idea of Progress," in Journal of the History of Ideas, June 1951. A close reading shows a striking discrepancy between the content of this excellent article and the thesis expressed in its title. The best defense of the Christian origin of the concept of history is found in C. N. Cochrane, op. cit., p. 474. He holds that ancient historiography came to an end because it had failed to establish "a principle of historical intelligibility" and that Augustine solved this problem by substituting "the logos of Christ for that of classicism as a principle of understanding."
25. De Re Publica, 1.7.
26. The word seems to have been rarely used even in Greek. It occurs in Herodotus (book IV, 93 and 94) in the active sense and applies to the rites performed by a tribe that does not believe in death. The point is that the word does not mean "to believe in immortality," but "to act in a certain way in order to assure the escape from dying." In the passive sense (άθαναρίζεσθαι, "to be rendered immortal") the word also occurs in Polybius (book VI, 54, 2); it is used in the description of Roman funeral rites and applies to the funeral orations, which render immortal through "constantly making new the fame of good men." The Latin equivalent, aeternare, again applies to immortal fame. (Horace, Carmines, book IV, c. 14, 5.)

Clearly, Aristotle was the first and perhaps the last to use this word for the specifically philosophic "activity" of contemplation. The text reads as follows: οὐ χρή δὲ κατὰ τοὺς παρανοοῦντας ἀνθρώπων φρονεῖν, ἀνθρωπον δὲντα θνητά τὸν θνητόν, ἀλλ' ἐφ' ὅσον ἐνδέχεται ἀθανατίζειν. . . . (Nichomachean Ethics, 1177b31). "One should not think as do those who recommend human things for those who are mortals, but immortalize as far as possible. . . ." The medieval Latin translation (Eth. X, Lectio XI) does not use the old Latin word aeternare but translates "immortalize" through immortalem facere—to make immortal, presumably one's self. (Oportet autem non secundum suadentes humana hominem entem, neque mortalia mortalem; sed inquantum contingit immortalem facere. . . .) Modern standard translations fall
into the same error (see for instance the translation by W. D. Ross, who translates: "we must . . . make ourselves immortal"). In the Greek text, the word ἀθανατίζω, like the word φονάζω, is an intransitive verb, it has no direct object. (I owe the Greek and Latin references to the kind help of Professors John Herman Randall, Jr., and Paul Oscar Kristeller of Columbia University. Needless to say, they are not responsible for translation and interpretation.)

27. It is rather interesting to note that Nietzsche, who once used the term "eternize"—probably because he remembered the passage in Aristotle—applied it to the spheres of art and religion. In Vom Nutzen und Nachteil der Historie für das Leben, he speaks of the "aeternisierenden Mächten der Kunst und Religion."


29. How the poet, and especially Homer, bestowed immortality upon mortal men and futile deeds, we can still read in Pindar's Odes—now rendered into English by Richmond Lattimore, Chicago, 1955. See, for instance, "Isthmia" IV: 60 ff.; "Nemea" IV: 10, and VI: 50–55.

30. De Civitate Dei, XIX, 5.


32. Leviathan, book I, ch. 3.

33. Democracy in America, 2nd part, last chapter, and 1st part, "Author's Introduction," respectively.

34. The first to see Kant as the theorist of the French Revolution was Friedrich Gentz in his "Nachtrag zu dem Räsonnement des Herrn Prof. Kant über das Verhältnis zwischen Theorie und Praxis" in Berliner Monatsschrift, December 1793.


38. Nietzsche, Wille zur Macht, no. 291.

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bisher auch nicht an einem Zipfel aufzuheben vermochte, dass dieses Verfahren in der modernen Naturwissenschaft stimmt.”

40. Werner Heisenberg in recent publications renders this same thought in a number of variations. See for example Das Naturbild der heutigen Physik, Hamburg, 1956.

3. What Is Authority?


3. This was already noticed by the Greek historian Dio Cassius, who, when writing a history of Rome, found it impossible to translate the word auctoritas: ἔλαργίσαν αὖτο καθάταξ ἀδύνατον ἐστὶ. (Quoted from Theodor Mommsen, Römisches Staatsrecht, 3rd edition, 1888, vol. III, p. 952, n. 4.) Moreover, one need only compare the Roman Senate, the republic’s specifically authoritarian institution, with Plato’s nocturnal council in the Laws, which, being composed of the ten oldest guardians for the constant supervision of the State, superficially resembles it, to become aware of the impossibility of finding a true alternative for coercion and persuasion within the framework of Greek political experience.

4. τόλει γὰρ ὅκ ἐσθ’ ἠν ἄνδρος ἐσθ’ ἐνσ. Sophocles, Antigone, 737.

5. Laws, 715.


7. H. Wallon, Histoire de l’Esclavage dans l’Antiquité, Paris, 1847, vol. III, where one still finds the best description of the gradual loss of Roman liberty under the Empire caused by the constant increase of power of the imperial household. Since it was the imperial household and not the emperor who gained in power, the “despotism” which always had been characteristic of the private household and family life began to dominate the public realm.

8. A fragment from the lost dialogue On Kingship states that “it was not only not necessary for a king to become a philosopher, but actu-
ally a hindrance to his work; that, however, it was necessary [for a good
king] to listen to the true philosopher and to be agreeable to their ad-
Texts, 1950. In Aristotelian terms, both Plato’s philosopher-king and
the Greek tyrant rule for the sake of their own interest, and this was
for Aristotle, though not for Plato, an outstanding characteristic of
tyrsans. Plato was not aware of the resemblance, because for him,
as for Greek current opinion, the principal characteristic of the tyrant
was that he deprived the citizen of access to a public realm, to a “mar-
ket place” where he could show himself, see and be seen, hear and be
heard, that he prohibited the ἄγορεύων and πολιτεύεσθαι, confined the
citizens to the privacy of their households, and demanded to be the
only one in charge of public affairs. He would not have ceased to be a
tyrant if he had used his power solely in the interests of his subjects—
as indeed some of the tyrants undoubtedly did. According to the
Greeks, to be banished to the privacy of household life was tantamount
to being deprived of the specifically human potentialities of life. In
other words, the very features which so convincingly demonstrate to
us the tyrannical character of Plato’s republic—the almost complete
elimination of privacy and the omnipresence of political organs and in-
stitutions—presumably prevented Plato from recognizing its tyrannical
character. To him, it would have been a contradiction in terms to brand
as tyranny a constitution which not only did not relegate the citizen to
his household but, on the contrary, did not leave him a shred of private
life whatsoever. Moreover, by calling the rule of law “despotic,” Plato
stresses its non-tyrannical character. For the tyrant was always sup-
posed to rule over men who had known the freedom of a polis and, be-
ing deprived of it, were likely to rebel, whereas the despot was assumed
to rule over people who had never known freedom and were by nature
incapable of it. It is as though Plato said: My laws, your new despots,
will not deprive you of anything you rightfully enjoyed before; they
are adequate to the very nature of human affairs and you have no more
right to rebel against their rule than the slave has a right to rebel
against his master.


10. Von Fritz, op. cit., p. 54, rightly insists on Plato’s aversion to
violence, “also revealed by the fact that, wherever he did make an at-
ttempt to bring about a change of political institutions in the direction
of his political ideals, he addressed himself to men already in power.”

II, p. 416n; “The idea that there is a supreme art of measurement and
that the philosopher's knowledge of values (phronesis) is the ability to measure, runs through all Plato's work right down to the end” is true only for Plato's political philosophy. The very word φρόνησις characterizes in Plato and Aristotle the insight of the statesman rather than the "wisdom" of the philosopher.

13. See especially Timaeus, 31, where the divine Demiurge makes the universe in accordance with a model, a παράδειγμα, and The Republic, 596 ff.
15. Laws, 710–711.
16. This presentation is indebted to Martin Heidegger's great interpretation of the cave parable in Platons Lehre von der Wahrheit, Bern, 1947. Heidegger demonstrates how Plato transformed the concept of truth (ἀλήθεια) until it became identical with correct statements (διόθετος). Correctness indeed, and not truth, would be required if the philosopher's knowledge is the ability to measure. Although he explicitly mentions the risks the philosopher runs when he is forced to return to the cave, Heidegger is not aware of the political context in which the parable appears. According to him, the transformation comes to pass because the subjective act of vision (the ἴδεα and the ἴδεα in the mind of the philosopher) takes precedence over objective truth (ἀλήθεια), which, according to Heidegger, signifies Unverborgenheit.
17. Symposium, 211–212.
19. In The Republic, 518, the good, too, is called φανύτατον, the most shining one. Obviously it is precisely this quality which indicates the precedence which the beautiful originally had over the good in Plato's thought.
20. The Republic, 475–476. In the tradition of philosophy, the result of this Platonic repudiation of the beautiful has been that it was omitted from the so-called transcendentals or universals, that is, those qualities possessed by everything that is, and which were enumerated in medieval philosophy as unum, alter, ens, and bonum. Jacques Maritain, in his wonderful book, Creative Intuition in Art and Poetry, Bollingen Series XXXV, I, 1953, is aware of this omission and insists that beauty be included in the realm of transcendentals, for “Beauty is the radiance of all transcendentals united” (p. 162).
21. In the dialogue Politicus: “for the most exact measure of all things is the good” (quoted from von Fritz, op. cit.). The notion must have been that only through the concept of the good do things become comparable and hence measurable.
22. Politics, 1332b12 and 1332b36. The distinction between the younger and older ones goes back to Plato; see Republic, 412, and Laws, 690 and 714. The appeal to nature is Aristotelian.

23. Politics, 1328b35.


27. The derivation of religio from religare occurs in Cicero. Since we deal here only with the political self-interpretation of the Romans, the question whether this derivation is etymologically correct is irrelevant.

28. See Cicero, De Re Publica, III, 23. For the Roman belief in the eternity of their city, see Viktor Poeschl, Römischer Staat und griechisches Staatsdenken bei Cicero, Berlin, 1936.


30. De Re Publica, 1, 7.


33. Professor Carl J. Friedrich drew my attention to the important discussion of authority in Mommsen’s Römisches Staatsrecht; see pp. 1034, 1038–1039.

34. This interpretation is further supported by the idiomatic Latin use of alicui auctorem esse for “giving advice to somebody.”

35. See Mommsen, op cit., 2nd edition, vol. I, pp. 73 ff. The Latin word numen, which is nearly untranslatable, meaning “divine command” as well as the divine modes of acting, derives from nuere, to nod in affirmation. Thus the commands of the gods and all their interference in human affairs are restricted to approval or disapproval of human actions.

36. Mommsen, ibid., p. 87.

37. See also the various Latin idioms such as auctores habere for having predecessors or examples; auctoritas maiorum, signifying the authoritative example of the ancestors; usus et auctoritas as used in Roman law for property rights which come from usage. An excellent presentation of this Roman spirit as well as a very useful collection of the more important source materials are to be found in Viktor Poeschl, op. cit., especially pp. 101 ff.


39. A similar amalgamation of Roman imperial political sentiment with Christianity is discussed by Erik Peterson, Der Monotheismus als politisches Problem, Leipzig, 1935, in connection with Orosius, who related the Roman Emperor Augustus to Christ. “Dabei ist deutlich,
dass Augustus auf diese Weisechristianisiert und Christus zum civis romanus wird, romanisiert worden ist" (p. 92).


42. See Phaedo 80 for the affinity of the invisible soul with the traditional place of invisibility, namely, Hades, which Plato construes etymologically as "the invisible."

43. Ibid., 64–66.

44. With the exception of the Laws, it is characteristic of Plato's political dialogues that a break occurs somewhere and the strictly argumentative procedure has to be abandoned. In The Republic, Socrates eludes his questioners several times; the baffling question is whether justice is still possible if a deed is hidden from men and gods. The discussion of what justice is breaks down at 372a and is taken up again in 427d, where, however, not justice but wisdom and ειβολια are defined. Socrates comes back to the main question in 403d, but discusses σωφροσύνη instead of justice. He then starts again in 433b and comes almost immediately to a discussion of the forms of government, 445d ff., until the seventh book with the cave story puts the whole argument on an entirely different, nonpolitical level. Here it becomes clear why Glaukon could not receive a satisfactory answer: justice is an idea and must be perceived; there is no other possible demonstration.

The Er-myth, on the other hand, is introduced by a reversion of the whole argument. The task had been to find justice as such, even if hidden from the eyes of gods and men. Now (612) Socrates wishes to take back his initial admission to Glaukon that, at least for the sake of the argument, one would have to assume that "the just man may appear unjust and the unjust just" so that no one, neither god nor man, could definitely know who is truly just. And in its stead, he puts the assumption that "the nature both of the just and the unjust is truly known to the gods." Again, the whole argument is put on an entirely different level—this time on the level of the multitude and outside the range of argument altogether.

The case of Gorgias is quite similar. Once more, Socrates is incapable of persuading his opponent. The discussion turns about the Socratic conviction that it is better to suffer wrong than to do wrong. When Kallikles clearly cannot be persuaded by argument, Plato proceeds to tell his myth of a hereafter as a kind of ultima ratio, and, in distinction to The Republic, he tells it with great diffidence, clearly
indicating that the teller of the story, Socrates, does not take it seriously.

45. Imitation of Plato seems to be beyond doubt in the frequent cases where the motif of apparent death recurs, as in Cicero and Plutarch. For an excellent discussion of Cicero's *Somnium Scipionis*, the myth which concludes his *De Re Publica*, see Richard Harder, "Ueber Ciceros Somnium Scipionis" (*Kleine Schriften*, München, 1960), who also shows convincingly that neither Plato nor Cicero followed Pythagorean doctrines.

46. This is especially stressed by Marcus Dods, *Forerunners of Dante*, Edinburgh, 1903.

47. See *Gorgias*, 524.


52. See especially the *Seventh Letter* for Plato's conviction that truth is beyond speech and argument.


54. From the draft Preamble to the Constitution of Massachusetts, *Works*, vol. IV, 221.


58. See especially the *Discourses*, book III, ch. 1.

59. It is curious to see how seldom Cicero's name occurs in Machiavelli's writings and how carefully he avoided him in his interpretations of Roman history.

60. *De Re Publica*, VI, 12.


62. These assumptions, of course, could be justified only by a detailed analysis of the American Revolution.


### 4. What Is Freedom?

1. I follow Max Planck, "Causation and Free Will" (in *The New Science*, New York, 1959) because the two essays, written from the
standpoint of the scientist, possess a classic beauty in their nonsimplifying simplicity and clarity.

2. Ibid.
5. 1310a25 ff.
7. Ibid., § 118
8. §§ 81 and 83.
9. See *Esprit des Lois*, XII, 2: "La liberté philosophique consiste dans l'exercice de la volonté. . . . La liberté politique consiste dans la sûreté."
10. *Intellectus apprehendit agibile antequam voluntas illud velit; sed non apprehendit determinate hoc esse agendum quod apprehendere dicitur diciare.* Oxon. IV, d. 46, qu. 1, no. 10.
12. Leibniz only sums up and articulates the Christian tradition when he writes: "Die Frage, ob unserem Willen Freiheit zukommt, bedeutet eigentlich nichts anderes, als ob ihm Willen zukommt. Die Ausdrücke 'frei' und 'willensgemäss' besagen dasselbe." (Schriften zur Metaphysik I, "Bemerkungen zu den cartesischen Prinzipien." Zu Artikel 39.)
14. We find this conflict frequently in Euripides. Thus Medea, before murdering her children, says: "and I know which evils I am about to commit, but θυμός is stronger than my deliberations" (1078 ff.); and Phaedra (*Hippolytus*, 376 ff.) speaks in a similar vein. The point of the matter is always that reason, knowledge, insight, etc., are too weak to withstand the onslaught of desire, and it may not be accidental that the conflict breaks out in the soul of women, who are less under the influence of reasoning than men.
15. "Insofar as the mind commands, the mind wills, and insofar as the thing commanded is not done, it wills not," as Augustine put it, in the famous ch. 9 of book VIII of the *Confessions*, which deals with the will and its power. To Augustine, it was a matter of course that "to will" and "to command" are the same.
17. Pythian Ode IV, 287–289:

φαντ ἀδικεῖν
tοῦτο άναράτατον, καλὰ γνώσκοντα άνάγκα
ἐκτὸς ἔχειν πόδα.
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20. Ibid.
21. See the first four chapters of the second book of The Social Contract. Among modern political theorists, Carl Schmitt is the most able defender of the notion of sovereignty. He recognizes clearly that the root of sovereignty is the will: Sovereign is who wills and commands. See especially his Verfassungslehre, München, 1928, pp. 7 ff., 146.
22. Book XII, ch. 20.

6. The Crisis in Culture

2. See Edward Shils, “Mass Society and Its Culture” in Daedalus, Spring 1960; the whole issue is devoted to “Mass Culture and Mass Media.”
5. Cicero, in his Tusculan Disputations, I, 13, says explicitly that the mind is like a field which cannot be productive without proper cultivation—and then declares: Cultura autem animi philosophia est.
8. See the famous chorus in Antigone, 332 ff.
11. Plato, Gorgias, 482.
13. Ibid., introduction, VII.
14. Aristotle, who (Nicomachean Ethics, book 6) deliberately set the insight of the statesman against the wisdom of the philosopher,
was probably following, as he did so often in his political writings, the public opinion of the Athenian polis.


16. Ibid. § 19.

17. For the history of word and concept, see Niedermann, op. cit., Rudolf Pfeiffer, *Humanitas Erasmiana*, Studien der Bibliothek Warburg, no. 22, 1931, and "Nachträgliches zu Humanitas" in Richard Harder's *Kleine Schriften*, München, 1960. The word was used to translate the Greek φιλανθρωπία, a word originally used of gods and rulers and therefore with altogether different connotations. *Humanitas*, as Cicero understood it, was closely connected with the old Roman virtue of *clementia* and as such stood in a certain opposition to Roman *gravitas*. It certainly was the sign of the educated man but, and this is important in our context, it was the study of art and literature rather than of philosophy which was supposed to result in "humanity."


19. Cicero speaks in a similar vein in *De Legibus*, 3, 1: He praises Atticus cuius et vita et oratio consecuta mihi videtur difficillimam illam societatem gravitatis cum humanitate—"whose life and speech seem to me to have achieved this most difficult combination of gravity with humanity"—whereby, as Harder (op. cit.), points out, Atticus's gravity consists in his adhering with dignity to Epicurus's philosophy, whereas his humanity is shown by his reverence for Plato, which proves his inner freedom.
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mental thinking has never been a general requirement. Faced now with the imperative need for it, as the traditional key words of politics—justice, reason, responsibility, virtue, glory—lose their meaning, we see crises developing in every direction, and no way of meeting them. In fact, we lack the very concepts with which to envisage our problems.

It is to this task of fundamental thinking that Hannah Arendt addresses herself, showing how we can distill once more the vital essence of traditional concepts by discovering their real origins, and how, by exercise of the intelligence, we can appraise our present position and regain a frame of reference for the future.

To participate in these six exercises is to associate, in action, with one of the most original and fruitful minds of our times.

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