THAT THING PRODUCED

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Abstract

Practice-as-research continues to struggle with its epistemic value. For the most part we seem to have stopped grappling with the complexity of what it is that we might know or understand as a consequence of artistic research. Instead, it is now assumed that artists producing art in the context of the academy are, by default, producing knowledge. In this writing I explore the epistemic conditions of producing artistic research, and imagine PaR’s vital and disruptive role in the so-called knowledge economy.
Introduction: Curious times

We live and work in curious times. These are times in which human beings are thought of as "profit-and-loss calculators;" in which “the attitude of the salesman has become enmeshed in all modes of self-expression.” In higher education scholarship, it is the time of “research capitalism,” when we – academics that is – are expected “to produce knowledge that is directly applicable to the needs and priorities of the community at large as identified … by the private and government sectors.” This is the time of the corporate university; founded on language that Stefan Collini – a professor of Intellectual History and English Literature – calls Prodspeak: “technology transfer, knowledge economy, grant generation, frontier research, efficiency, and accountability.” We are (re)producers of the knowledge economy. Curious times indeed.

But I am wasting time. It is the curse of the idealist. I am an academic idealist; and I’m an artist. More specifically I am a dance-artist, and in the UK, Australia and New Zealand, being an artist-in-the-academy in these curious times means making artistic work to be part of the same economy of knowledge production as scholarship in science or the arts and humanities. This activity is called various things, mostly practice-as-research in the UK, but I quite like the term artistic research that tends to be used in continental Europe; and I agree with Henk Borgdorff, Professor of Theory of Research in the Arts at Leiden University in The Hague, when he writes that in artistic research “art practice is paramount as the subject matter, the method, the context, and the outcome.”

I am writing about practice-as-research, knowledge and production because I suspect that artistic research has a vital role to play in corrupting and contaminating these curious times in higher education. I also suspect that this role is part epistemic and part ethical; it is ethical in the sense of what might be good for our society. Indeed, in many respects this writing is an attempt to conjure up an ethics of epistemology in practice-as-research.

This chapter has three sections. In The knowledge economy, I outline the relationship between dance research and knowledge production. Next, in Epistemology of practice-as-research, I look to clarify the epistemic limitations of practice-as-research, and make a case for an epistemology
that expands into a crowd of understandings. Finally, in *Contempt and the thing-produced*, I discuss the materials produced in practice-as-research, and the role they might have in reconfiguring or challenging research in higher education.

**The knowledge economy**

The term knowledge economy was introduced by the American management consultant Peter Drucker in 1969. He wrote that “what matters in the ‘knowledge economy’ is whether knowledge, old or new, is applicable.” Drucker was not seduced by the age of knowledge, but rather the “imagination and skill of whoever applies” it. At the heart of the knowledge economy is the knowledge worker: “the man or woman who applies to productive work ideas, concepts, and information rather than manual skill or brawn.” Drucker distinguishes intellectual knowledge from knowledge work. Intellectual knowledge is “what is in a book;” it is only information or data, and usually thought of as something new. He suggests that knowledge is a form of energy that exists in the work of applying something to that information.

Contemporary scholarship is caught somewhere between pursuing intellectual endeavour and generating useful research for the knowledge economy. When academics read, hear or say ‘knowledge-production,’ it is difficult to pry apart the various histories, goals, systems and ideologies at play when we do our research. I can imagine the feeling when we come to understand that what we think we are doing (scholarly and intellectual endeavour) is utterly different from what we are actually doing (producing useful knowledge for the knowledge economy). This is the scholarly equivalent of believing you are in Radiohead when in reality you play bass for Coldplay.

Perhaps such delusion is a mechanism to cope with varying degrees of uncertainty about how our work is culturally valued or understood. Perhaps we want to have our cake and eat it by producing intellectual knowledge while serving the knowledge economy (and keeping our jobs). It is certain, and certainly less palatable, that we now chronically conflate the production of intellectual knowledge with contributing to the knowledge economy. It is even more unfortunate that academics are being cajoled and
conditioned by the corporate university to understand our scholarly worth as being about the extent to which we can apply our scholarship; that is to produce useful knowledge for the knowledge economy.

While it may be that Drucker initially separated the knowledge economy from intellectual knowledge, for academics in contemporary higher education doing scholarly work is synonymous with the production of knowledge for the knowledge economy; they are seamlessly integrated. Such integration exists in our rhetoric, in the language we use as writers, and in the public assessment of research (through processes like the Research Excellence Framework in the UK). How we understand or come to know things, experiences and sensations is shaped by ideological systems of production. And what is forgotten or passed over, unknown, misunderstood or mysterious is similarly shaped – or deformed – by those same systems. We have absorbed the ideology of the knowledge producer who serves the knowledge economy, and when we use the term knowledge, we leave the ambiguity hanging.

In this chapter, I use the term knowledge in the conflated and ambiguous way – both intellectual endeavour and a tool for the knowledge economy. I do so to recognise its common usage in contemporary higher education, and to acknowledge that the absence of nuance enables academics rather fortuitously to speak with different audiences in the academy (with different goals, desires, histories and understandings) as if we are talking about the same thing. For example, even the statement “I am doing research” comes loaded with ambiguity because of how different people might understand differently the epistemic value and purpose of doing research.

In dance research, we have busily created our own lexicon of words to do with thinking, intelligence and knowledge: embodied knowledge, choreographic thinking, physical intelligence, somatic knowing, bodily knowledge, choreographic knowledge, knowledge practices, choreographic intelligence, bodily lived (experiential) knowledge, kinetic intelligence.

Our willingness and ease to attach these knowledge-knowing-intelligence-thinking suffixes to dance and choreographic ideas is telling. Perhaps it is about a relatively new academic discipline grappling with how to discuss and describe phenomena. Or perhaps we in dance are simply following higher education or cultural trends to knowledge-ify our language.
Nevertheless, together the terms imply that we have welcomed the demands of the knowledge economy – to apply our imaginations and skills as means of production – to the practices of choreography and dance. I wonder though if the easy addition of suffixes also reveals a certain insecurity: that we in dance research are a little too desperate to sit at the big table with the knowledge-producing grown-ups regardless of what we might be giving up or denaturing, or who we might be alienating, or indeed what it is that choreographers and dancers actually do.

The culture of reifying knowledge and knowledge production (and all their ambiguities) has also infiltrated the artistic world of dance. The dance critic and artist Jamie Conde-Salazar has suggested that “the dance of the future produces knowledge.”13 Similarly, the anthropologist James Leach wrote that “there is a conscious attempt on the part of contemporary dance to elevate itself in public perception through transforming its processes into ‘knowledge production’, to make it a practice commensurate with other valued spheres of action in the ‘knowledge economy’.”14 Yet just because a field – for example dance research, professional artistic dance, or even practice-as-research – says it produces knowledge does not make it so.

Perhaps the apotheosis of the knowledge production push in dance studies – and as Leach states, in the professional community too – has been the funding, research and development of dance archives.15 The big expensive ones have names like Motion Bank,16 Synchronous Objects,17 and Siobhan Davies RePlay.18 These archives – each with different emphases – are important assets to our community. They make it possible for people to access aspects of the inaccessible. It is also their usefulness that helps dance to nestle neatly into the knowledge economy. Their utility and value to the knowledge economy is strengthened because the archives are (by and large) tech-driven, they are tangible and reasonably permanent enough, and their outcomes are relatively easy to measure through online user analysis. Speaking and writing as a choreographer, I would suggest that these kinds of archives tend to attenuate the epistemological value and tangled messiness of choreographic practice.

Dance research’s relationship with the knowledge economy has at least two divergent strands. The first strand relates to the politics and economics of simply making dance research happen. Like the examples of archives
above, it contains research that is highly visible and dependent on relatively large-scale funding bids that are themselves linked to research agendas staged by Government and private organisations. This kind of dance research is important not least because it helps place scholarly dance research on cultural, economic and political maps. But it is also limited because of the adaptive demands of fitting dance research into general funding calls. In other words, what needs to happen to any dance research in order for it to fall within the limitations of funding agendas? In the case of dance archives, the fit is – as I have already suggested – comfortable; the same might be said for dance research projects involving other contemporary technological preoccupations like augmented reality, virtual reality and motion capture that satisfy the technological myopia of contemporary culture (and its funding bodies).

The second strand is epistemic and involves the tangled messiness of choreographic practice that is more at odds with broad funding agendas. It is also predicated on the sense that practice-as-research is a growing subset of all dance research (and I would guess that it is, at least in the UK, Australia and NZ). This second strand of dance research’s relationship to the knowledge economy is built on two questions: What is the epistemic project of practice-as-research in general, or perhaps in other words how does practice-as-research participate in the knowledge economy? What happens to that economy when practice-as-research participates in it?

The next two sections deal with this latter strand of dance research, but the ideas are certainly not limited to dance thinking and practices. Rather, I use my biases and experience in dance practice and research as a platform to reveal the kind of epistemic messiness that underscores the contribution of practice-as-research to research in general.

**Epistemology of practice-as-research**

Erik Knudsen, the filmmaker, practice-as-research specialist, and Professor of Media Practice at University of Central Lancashire in the UK, says that “research is research, knowledge is knowledge, but there are many different ways of generating that knowledge.” Knudsen’s work here is equivalence: to compel us to believe that scholars from all disciplines are
all in the same boat trying to “generate new knowledge … in original ways.”

I appreciate Knudsen’s desire to put an end to some of the anxieties of artist-scholars grappling with epistemic questions, but I think he’s wrong saying that knowledge is knowledge regardless of how it is produced and in what contexts it is produced. I think he’s wrong because the key ideological project of practice-as-research has been to get art “on the books as research” by bending it into the dominant epistemic systems of the academy. There are good reasons for wanting to do these kinds of gymnastics: status, legitimacy, resources. Performing these back-flips – mostly injury free – has certainly kept me in a job.

Similarly, although with a focus on choreographic research, dance philosopher Anna Pakes from the University of Roehampton in London writes that:

> Unless we can identify the choreographer-researcher’s claim to knowledge, it remains difficult to maintain that choreographic research has equivalent status with other, more traditional forms of scholarly enquiry.

I suspect that the desire for equivalent status is actually a distraction from the profound epistemic possibilities of artistic research. These possibilities do not lie in concepts like *phronesis* (practical wisdom) that Pakes herself has discussed. She suggests that phronesis is “a creative sensitivity to circumstances as they present themselves.” The simple problem with *phronesis*, and its cousins *techne* and *poiesis*, is that I possess them regardless of the research project, regardless of whether or not anything happened at all. Research is, after all, fundamentally about noticing change: as a consequence of this process, this experiment, this intervention, this grappling with historical evidence (etc), what is different? What has changed? What do I, we, you understand differently, and how are these differences shared? I might be able to articulate what is different or changed, but in the case of practice-as-research how do the artistic works – those *things-produced* – do their own work?
Henk Borgdorff from Leiden University in The Hague favours “unfinished thinking” as being central to the epistemological work of practice-as-research. For Borgdorff, artistic research involves a “paradoxical invitation” in which art invites reflection but “eludes any defining thought” or “explanatory gaze.” This is the work of the artist-scholar: to leave or create room for “our implicit, tacit, non-conceptual, non-discursive relations with the world and with ourselves;” what Susan Melrose called “disciplined unknowing.” By doing so, “our thinking is set in motion” by artistic-research (or art for that matter), with no attempt to finish that thinking. This is, at least in part, a constructivist perspective, and it seals off the epistemological heavy lifting of practice-as-research from the so-called knowledge producer. Such a separation between producer and produced invites radical epistemic exchanges — or creative encounters — between research and its audiences. The distinctiveness of these exchanges rests with the ambiguity and slipperiness of the affective responses and thinking set in motion by artistic-research. That is, any performative offer through artistic-research, makes possible an unpredictable and unimaginable number of understandings and affects.

At the other end of the world, in the University of Canberra’s Centre for Creative and Cultural Research, Paul Magee is making similar propositions to Borgdorff but in relation to writing and poetry. His suggestion — with a nod to how universities have their “artistic moments” — is that artist-scholars do no more than produce something “like a compelling, mesmerising question.” Magee also discusses a multi-voiced epistemology in practice-as-research; a type of crowd epistemology of unlike minds. He writes that “we think not in monologue but in dialogue, that is, in a medley of voices that variously propose, reply, interject and argue, all within the head we might refer to as ‘I’; that is what you do when you think … there’s actually no ‘you’ there, unless in the plural.” Although Magee is describing the plurality of a single mind, what if we take his words more literally? That we extrapolate his thinking such that it is research itself that fundamentally involves a medley of voices, and only you in the plural form? Magee also suggests that a modern poem is a “device for generating creative desire — the desire for meaning, for resolution, for further aesthetic experience, for an infinite
number of things — *in others.* These others — public audiences and critical research *friends* — extend the artist-scholars’ understanding of their own work, and make experiences of newness, surprise and difference possible for the artist. It is the audience’s relationship and exchange with the *thing-produced* that drastically set apart practice-as-research from other forms of research. The epistemic value of practice-as-research — what the arts and research community understand differently because of the research — is created through the act of the *thing-produced* being experienced. Practice-as-research is dependent on its audience to do its epistemic work.

The politics and ethics of these epistemic propositions are important. By relinquishing ownership of knowledge, by resisting the singular author (and her, his or their knowledge-producing ambitions), we tend towards a crowd of understandings that diminish my contribution, that diminish any claims I might like to make, that fold in my ignorance as a key epistemic component of practice-as-research. This is different from washing my hands or not taking responsibility for what is made: the *thing-produced.* Rather, it is recognising that, as the philosopher Stanley Cavell said, “our relation to the world as a whole … is not one of knowing.” Further, even the possibility of first-person not knowing (that is, under certain conditions, and in certain circumstances, ‘I am ignorant’) is built on collective understanding. Theologian Stephanie Berbec says of Judith Butler that she “writes from the perspective that there is no I without first a we …. [pushing] toward a politics of alliance, cohabitation, and interdependency.”

The American poet and writer Wendell Berry wrote that one of our problems as humans is we “cannot live without acting: we have to act. Moreover, we have to act on the basis of what we know, and what we know is incomplete. … And so the question of how to act in ignorance is paramount.” My proposition is an *expanded epistemology* in practice-as-research where artist-scholars push willfully into the crowd while staying mindful that how we understand our practices and actions is predicated on incompleteness. By acknowledging our ignorance, we can test and work with ideas through practice that exist at the border of our awareness, understanding and ignorance. That we expand into mystery, uncertainty and “moral complexity,” in which the academy might once again become
a place for grappling with the spirit, the divine, the unknowable, and ignorance itself. It makes perfect sense that centres of understanding – places of knowledge – should openly welcome and encounter such things. It is at such borders – between knowing and not-knowing, ignorance and understanding, vulnerability and certainty, mess and clarity, tangle and order – that the most fecund forms of friction are manifest.

It is how practice-as-research relates to epistemic vulnerability that becomes so vital and powerfully tenuous. The members of the After Performance research collective, writing in Contemporary Theatre Review, suggest that:

To profess to not know in today’s knowledge economy … seems to be an act of making oneself vulnerable. … One might claim there is indeed ‘capital’ attached to the practices of not knowing … To share that raw intellectual vulnerability incites a process of exposure and giving of oneself to others, to be held and supported, so that our own truths can be aligned, and then recalibrated, via our collectivity and adjacency.40

With such vulnerability in mind, what I am calling for here in practice-as-research is an expanded epistemology: that we understand the ontology of practice-as-research to be dependent – at least in part – on its crowd-based or communal epistemic conditions. Practice-as-research is brought into being by its artistic cells or components, and it is research predicated on we. The ways of knowing in artistic research become unspeakable dialogues between the artistic/creative works and their audiences, and unspeakability is a terrifying possibility for the academy. The various and unpredictable dialogues are unspeakable because they are built on ignorance and mystery, and because they are only ever approaching knowledges asymptotically. We – artist-scholars together with our audiences – are producing something that can never arrive as knowledge – whether its purpose is intellectual endeavour or applied knowledge for the knowledge economy.

**Contempt and the thing-produced**

I propose that in practice-as-research we are not producing knowledge, and that our work is all the more important for doing nothing of the kind. Art
and design scholar Steven Scrivener has tried to make epistemic sense of practice-as-research by using the “standard account” which defines knowledge as justified, true, belief. That is, “where the thing that we know appears true, we believe it to be true and we can justify our belief.” He argues for an artwork to claim new knowledge it must communicate and justify that knowledge, and stridently believes that no art work can make such claims. In other words, the thing-produced is by no means producing knowledge as justified, true, belief, even if and when accompanied by some form of supporting or contextualising text in which the author makes and stakes claims for what-is-known. And if – like Pakes – we try and make epistemic sense of practice-as-research through the work of Aristotle, David Carr and Gilbert Ryle then this only accounts for the phronetic know-how that underpins all practice-as-research projects by any given group or individual. Such know-how is common to all research (not just the creative kind), and – as I have argued earlier in this chapter – does not account for the potential changes in understandings that arise from research; changes that are fundamental to understanding the epistemic value of any and all research.

For performance theorist Adrian Heathfield, one of the strengths of research through and in performance is about “staging processes of knowing that can’t easily be resolved into identifiable knowledge products that will then circulate smoothly in the ‘knowledge economy’.” Heathfield is implicitly proposing research through performance to be a thrombus or clot in the circulatory system of the knowledge economy – that how performance might do its most valuable work is when it is in relationship to ways of knowing that are not able to shape – or be shaped by – the various tools and systems of the knowledge economy. But what does he mean by a ‘process of knowing’ and how would we recognise it if we were involved in one? Heathfield prefaces his ideas by suggesting that “we could leave behind the whole framework of thinking of research as knowledge production entirely.” Of course, it is not clear if he means entirely in the context of that particular discussion in Contemporary Theatre Review or as a guiding principle to understand research generally.

We – artist-scholars that is – are certainly producing something that the academy recognises as knowledge through its research monitoring and
assessment exercises (like the Research Excellence Framework in the UK). Such recognition is the case even if the epistemic nature of those things-produced remains contested in practice-as-research scholarly literature. Given the historic and ongoing epistemic uncertainty of practice-as-research, its acceptance as a knowledge producing activity in the academy is a remarkable phenomenon. It is akin to a relatively new sport, played in only a few pockets of the world each with markedly different rules, being invited to be an official sport in the Olympic Games. Gold for practice-as-research!

But what if – as I argue – these things-produced are not knowledge? What are the conditions of production for practice-as-research and what are their epistemic implications for Universities and artist-scholars? There are two key conditions:

Condition 1: Artist-scholars are clearly producing something. I have already argued – based on the work of Magee\(^46\) and Borgdorff\(^47\) – that the epistemic nature of the things-produced is something akin to asking questions, “unfinished thinking,”\(^48\) or a crowd-oriented medley of voices.\(^49\)

Condition 2: Despite the recognition of practice-as-research in international research assessment exercises and peer-reviewed journals,\(^50\) artist-scholars do not produce any version of knowledge that is accepted and valorised within knowledge economies.

If the above two conditions are accurate or true then what follows is either: a) the things that are produced by artist-scholars should not be ‘counted’ or involved in the labour of universities; or b) in order to unconditionally accept practice-as-research then universities need to adapt or change what is considered to be knowledge producing work, and even the nature of research itself.

What is most curious is that in UK higher education the current situation would appear to be some paradoxical combination of a) and b) in which artist-scholars do not produce knowledge and yet their work is still circulated (even if not always smoothly) in the higher education knowledge economy.

What makes such a paradox possible? Who or what is making the compromises that sustains the paradox? If I were to imagine that as a
researcher I am making few if any compromises in the development, production and presentation of the *things-produced*, but they are still participating in or contributing to the so-called knowledge economy, then the knowledge economy – and its epistemic fundamentals – has changed without even knowing or recognising it. This situation is like a glitch\(^5\) or an ‘other world’ of ignorance, imagination and messiness that the epistemic hegemony of the academy is not even aware of; or that by accepting practice-as-research the scholarly hegemony thinks it has swallowed another version or epistemic iteration of itself without needing to clear its throat. Even more curious is that under these conditions practice-as-research ought to have no fiscal value in the market-place of the knowledge economy.

The Cameroonian philosopher Achille Mbembe wrote that “As a result of the conflation of knowledge, technology and markets, contempt will be extended to anyone who has nothing to sell.”\(^5\) I can imagine that in practice-as-research, rather than producing knowledge and with nothing to sell in the economy of knowledge, we are merely producing contempt. It is by working closely with ignorance, and the subsequent production of contempt that practice-as-research work – the *thing-produced* – becomes vital in these curious times. That as people not producing knowledge while participating as a bug-like glitch in the knowledge economy we help to create the thinnest of openings for imagining how research – and its epistemic underpinnings – might change, adapt or evolve, and even what the work and function of universities might become. In such a way, those of us who are contempt-producing knowledge workers, along with our “subterranean, interpersonal, muddy, and emergent”\(^\) research, might play an un-productive and ethical role in ways of knowing and their place in our culture and society.

In 1969, Peter Drucker wrote of the knowledge economy that the “key to productivity was knowledge, not sweat.”\(^5\) If “being ethical may actually mean being inefficient at times,”\(^5\) then even in my role as a knowledge worker, producing sweat might be a way to be less productive, and more aware of my ignorance. After all, I am quite open to a bit of sweat.
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Notes

2 Ibid.
3 Coleman & Kambourel in Berg and Seeber, *The Slow Professor*, 53.
4 Ibid., 53.
5 Ibid., 63.
9 Ibid., 253.
10 Ibid., 247.
11 Ibid., 252.
12 en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Research_Excellence_Framework
13 Conde-Salazar, *La Danza Del Futuro*, 78.
14 Leach and Davis, “Recognising and Translating Knowledge,” 220.
15 Of these examples, only *Siobhan Davies RePlay* describes itself as an archive. *Synchronous Objects* and *Motion Bank* are digital responses to various works. Nevertheless, all play a role in how the works of the artists involved are remembered.
20 Ibid.
23 Ibid.
24 Ibid., 18.
26 Ibid., 145.
27 Ibid., 145.
28 Ibid., 147.
29 Ibid., 171.
33 Ibid., 5.
34 Ibid., 7-8.
35 Magee, “Is Poetry Research?” my emphasis.
38 Berry, *Life Is a Miracle*, 10-11.
39 Ibid., 8.
40 After Performance, “Vulnerability and the Lonely Scholar”. Accessed 20 May 2017. Thanks to Amaara Raheem for first alerting me to this writing.
41 after Dancy, *Introduction to Contemporary Epistemology*.
43 Pakes, “Knowing Through Dance-Making.”
44 Adrian Heathfield in Butt, Heathfield, and Keidan, “Performance Matters” 114.
45 In ibid., 114.
47 Borgdorff, *The Conflict of the Faculties*.
48 Ibid., 143.
50 e.g. the Research Excellence Framework in the UK, the Excellence for Research in Australia, and the Performance Based Research Fund in

51 This term is on my mind because of the work and thinking of artist-scholar and C-DaRE PhD student Claire Ridge who is working with the concept of the glitch through screen-based practices.


55 Berg and Seeber, *The Slow Professor*, 60.

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Biography

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