SAYING “ENOUGH”: AUTHORITARIANISM AND EGYPT’S KEFAYA MOVEMENT

Killian Clarke†

How do reform-oriented social movements in authoritarian states get off the ground? I argue that authoritarian regimes can actually facilitate social movement mobilization by making it easier for movement leaders to form opposition coalitions. When authoritarian states experience a political opening, certain structural aspects of these regimes will ease the process of coalition formation. I describe three ways in which these states facilitate mobilization: (1) they offer a straightforward set of least-common-denominator goals; (2) they establish incentives for existing organizations to get involved; and (3) they enhance the role of protest events in building cohesion. To make my case, I analyze the Egyptian Kefaya movement, a social movement whose diverse members had never meaningfully worked together before and whose nine months of sustained street protests defied expectations that it would collapse under regime repression.

On December 12, 2004, Mustafa Adeeb, a young Egyptian student at the American University in Cairo, was walking on his usual route home from school. As he entered the square in front of the Egyptian Supreme Court, he was struck by an unusual spectacle: beyond a black wall of state security forces, he saw several hundred men and women standing in silence on the steps of the Court. They had yellow stickers on their mouths and chests, emblazoned with the slogan “Kefaya” (the Arabic word for “enough”). Although they did not chant or shout, the messages on their posters were causing a stir among onlookers: “Yasqut, Yasqut, Hosni Mubarak,” “Down, Down, with Hosni Mubarak.” The demonstration was calling for an end to then-President Hosni Mubarak’s twenty-three-year reign as Egypt’s head of state. As Adeeb looked closer he noticed something even more perplexing: some of the protesters were carrying green banners, the color of Egypt’s Islamist opposition groups. Alongside these banners were signs bearing the distinctive slogans of certain Marxist revolutionary groups, Nasserist1 organizations, and liberal2 political parties. Adeeb could hardly believe it. “First of all, no one criticizes the President. No one! You criticize the government, or corruption, or the prime minister—but you don’t touch the president. And then on top of that, these people are supposed to be enemies. I mean they really hate each other! What were they doing standing up in the street together?” (Interview with Mustafa Adeeb, Kefaya activist, 8 August 2008).

The protest that Adeeb had stumbled upon was the Kefaya movement’s first public demonstration and marked the beginning of its ten-month-long battle against the regime of Hosni Mubarak. The movement came together in late 2004 to oppose the continued reign of the aging dictator. It united the ideologically disparate actors of Egypt’s major opposition groups into a political coalition that executed ten months of sustained protest activity, focusing on three events during 2005: a constitutional referendum in May, a presidential election in September, and parliamentary elections in November. As the movement gained momentum through 2005,

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† Killian Clarke is a Master’s candidate in the Hagop Kevorkian Center for Near Eastern Studies at New York University. Please direct all correspondence to the author at kbc248@nyu.edu.
onlookers scratched their heads in wonderment at the upstart activists who were defying precedent by taking on the Mubarak regime. Indeed, by many accounts Kefaya was a movement that should never have existed: not only did it bring together a group of political rivals who had never meaningfully collaborated before, but it persisted in taking on a far more powerful authoritarian regime for the better part of a year. How was this movement able to mobilize and sustain such confrontational activity in the repressive environment of Mubarak’s Egypt? And how was it able to draw in such a diverse range of groups whose ideological positions were both disparate and polarized?

These are the questions I answer in this study. I use the unprecedented and unlikely successes of the Kefaya movement to demonstrate how certain mechanisms that precipitate movement formation operate differently in authoritarian settings. It turns out that the two questions above are actually linked—the diverse Kefaya coalition’s unlikely success was actually facilitated by the authoritarian context in which it operated. This conclusion points to a paradox that is largely overlooked in the literature on social movements in nondemocracies: that authoritarian regimes can actually facilitate the formation of social movements. I argue that in situations of political opening, when authoritarian regimes are less able or willing to control and coerce opposition groups, mechanisms that generate social movement mobilization can actually operate more effectively than they do in democratic settings. I dis-cuss three specific mechanisms: (1) the ability to generate least-common-denominator goals; (2) the presence of incentives for existing organizations to mobilize; and (3) the elevation of protest events as catalysts for movement cohesion. Though all three of these mechanisms facilitate movement mobilization in both democratic and nondemocratic settings, the manner and ease with which they operate differs across these contexts. In particular, structural aspects of authoritarian regimes experiencing a political opening actually allow them to function more effectively than in democracies. In this sense I propose a new way of thinking about collective action in authoritarian regimes: rather than conceive of these states as unequivocally resistant to mobilization, I suggest three ways in which they make it easier for social movements to form.

The study contributes to a body of scholarship that has been relatively blind to the many questions that arise from cases of mobilization under authoritarian regimes. Research on collective action has mostly focused on movements in democratic states, and many of the theories defined in the literature are built on studies of mobilization in such settings. This orientation around mobilization in liberal contexts has generated increasing criticism from social movement scholars, a number of whom have called for a broadening of the literature to include more cases of mobilization in nondemocracies (Loveman 1998; McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001; Einwohner 2003; Osa and Corduneanu-Huci 2005; Osa and Schock 2007). Moreover, those studies that do consider social movements under authoritarian regimes tend to focus only on extreme examples of mobilization, such as nationwide revolutions that lead to state collapse (Skocpol 1979, 1982; Goldstone, Gurr, and Moshiri 1991; DeFronzo 1991; Katz 1997; Goodwin 2001; Osa 2003; Boudreau 2004; Kurzman 1996, 2004).

This essay examines a social movement that sought to effect more limited political reform. Such movements are arguably more common than full-scale revolutions, as most contemporary social movements in nondemocracies do not aim to gain control of the state, but rather strive to reform its institutions. Certainly, reform-oriented collective action happens less frequently in authoritarian than in liberal states because of political, institutional, and psychological barriers to mobilization. Yet reform-oriented social movements do emerge under dictatorships, despite the odds they face, and it is important for scholars to generate arguments that explain these unlikely instances of political action. Although their frequency may be less and their chances of success lower, they can and do play critical roles in stimulating reform in states that are seen as resistant to change-from-below. And perhaps most critically, these reform-oriented movements can sometimes sow the seeds for later waves of discontent, politicizing and bringing together activists who may eventually come to lead broader movements or even revolutions—much like the one that toppled Hosni Mubarak in February of 2011.
“ENOUGH” WITH MUBARAK: KEFAYA’S ACHIEVEMENT

In this section I identify why Kefaya was different from previous incidences of mobilization and cross-ideological cooperation in Egypt and also provide a brief overview of the events that preceded its rise and that marked its campaign. Within recent history, Egypt’s political opposition had never formed a sustained and diverse social movement that confronted the regime directly in advocating for reform.\(^4\) When mobilization in Egypt had occurred, it took the form of either grassroots organizing that targeted gradual, bottom-up reform or intense, but brief, protesting and rioting. The first form of mobilization has been championed by the Muslim Brotherhood, which was originally formed in 1928 to Islamize Egyptian society through social outreach campaigns and educational programs. Since then the Brotherhood has more or less remained true to this vision, and over the past three decades it built up a vast network of social welfare programs that reach out to Egypt’s poor and provide an alternative model of society and governance from that of the former regime (Wickham 2002). However, this strategy differs in obvious ways from those employed by Kefaya. It is explicitly non-confrontational, as the Brotherhood traditionally took great precautions not to incite the ire of the regime. Indeed, as I will explain later, the Brotherhood refused to participate in most Kefaya activities in part because of its reluctance to adopt any kind of confrontational politics. Moreover, the Brotherhood is a tightly controlled and close-knit religious movement with none of the organizational diversity that Kefaya exhibited.

The second form of mobilization witnessed in Egypt—street protesting and rioting—occurred in two major instances after 1970: first, with the outbreak of student riots in January 1972, and then with the January 1977 bread riots. The bread riots erupted following the government’s decision to lower subsidies on bread and other basic goods. Although they lasted several weeks and resulted in massive arrests and 79 deaths, they were primarily outcries over economic policies; unlike Kefaya, they were not sustained over time or directed toward political reform (Beattie 2000; Brownlee 2007). The other example of street activism occurred in 1972, when students responded to the failures of then-President Anwar Sadat by marching out of the gates of Cairo University to stage a massive citywide rally. After five days of rioting, facilitated by lax state policing, Sadat finally cracked down, ordering army units to invade university campuses and arrest student leaders (Abdallah 1985; Erlich 1989). Though these riots, particularly the student protests, bear some resemblance to Kefaya, it would be a stretch to call them part of any sustained social movement. In the case of the student demonstrations, the protests lasted only a week and participation was limited primarily to university students.

Kefaya was also unique for its composition. For the first time in recent Egyptian history, the diverse members of Egypt’s fragmented opposition factions came together in a unified social movement. The closest the opposition had ever come to genuine cross-ideological cooperation was in 1984, when a coalition between the Muslim Brotherhood and the liberal New Wafd party was formed for the purpose of contesting parliamentary elections. A marriage of political expediency, the coalition held together just long enough for the two parties to win a quarter of the Parliament’s seats. But the alliance fragmented when parliamentary sessions began, as ideological differences prevented the two parties from collaborating on legislative initiatives. For every election after that, opposition parties have guarded their small political territories and competed against each other almost as vehemently as against the regime (Springborg 1989; Kepel 1993; Baker 2003; El-Ghobashy 2005; Bradley 2008). Collaboration among these groups has been infrequent and unsustainable. Thus, within the context of recent Egyptian history, Kefaya was unique on two fronts: it was a sustained, confrontational, reform-oriented social movement, and it brought together disparate factions within Egypt’s opposition.

That being said, Kefaya did not emerge from a political vacuum. Between 2000 and 2004, Egypt witnessed a wave of political activism that helped provide the opposition with the momentum to ultimately form a social movement. This activity focused on two regional developments: the start of the second Palestinian Intifada in 2000, and the run-up to the US-led
invasion of Iraq in 2003. The widespread feelings of outrage and anger triggered by these events sparked a flurry of political activism, as various factions within the Egyptian opposition joined forces to form committees of solidarity, action campaigns, and opposition conferences. Among the most important events during this period was a massive demonstration on March 20, 2003, in which 20,000 protestors gathered in Cairo’s Tahrir Square to denounce the United States’ invasion of Iraq. Many Kefaya activists, particularly in the younger generation, cited this protest as their first involvement in political activism and explained that it was a critical moment of convergence for the members of Egypt’s opposition. The demonstration was supposed to be an anti-US and anti-war rally. But given Mubarak’s close alliance with the United States, the crowds began to air some tentative criticisms about the regime as well (Shadid 2007).

After the protests, activists continued to meet in secret, weighing their options for further expressions of opposition and protest. The administration of US President George W. Bush was putting great pressure on Mubarak to politically liberalize Egypt and the opposition began to recognize that this pressure might yield a rare opportunity to act. At a gathering in November 2003, twenty-two elites from a number of parties and political groups gathered over a Ramadan iftar at the house of Abu Elela Mady, a moderate Islamist. They discussed their options for effecting political reform and pressuring President Mubarak to release his grip on the state. By the end of the evening they had selected six individuals with allegiances to various leftist, Islamist, Nasserist, and liberal groups to draft a document stating the aims of their new initiative. In August 2004 they released their manifesto and received supporting signatures from 300 prominent intellectuals and professionals. Then, on September 21, 2004, they invited these 300 individuals to a conference at a Christian NGO where they announced the formation of a movement for political reform. They adopted the name “The Egyptian Movement for Change” and declared George Ishak, a Coptic Christian on good terms with many Islamists, as their coordinator.

Kefaya staged its first public protest the following December (the one that Mustafa Adeeb stumbled upon). Emboldened by the relatively benign security response, the Kefaya leaders began to set up a permanent body to organize further protests. They established a Coordinators’ Committee of thirty-six leaders and a Daily Works Committee to run day-to-day operations. Then on February 4, 2005, they gathered at the annual Cairo Book Fair to raise their anti-Mubarak chants again. These demonstrations and those that took place in the coming weeks and months were responses to two political events scheduled for 2005: a parliamentary election and a presidential referendum.\(^5\) Kefaya and many other Egyptian elites were outraged when they heard that Mubarak was planning to return for a fifth six-year term. In February, the president responded to these and other criticisms (some of which came from abroad) with an amendment to Article 76 of the Constitution, subject to approval in a popular referendum, that would allow for (sham) multi-candidate presidential elections.\(^6\)

With the referendum for this amendment set for May and the presidential election for September, Kefaya redoubled its protest efforts, sustaining a period of heightened street activity from February to September. This momentum was fueled by support from many members of Cairo’s student population and certain pockets of the urban professional classes. Initially drawn into the movement through the protests, these subgroups created their own affiliated satellite movements—Youth for Change, Journalists for Change, Workers for Change, Artists for Change, and Lawyers for Change. Although these submovements participated in the Kefaya protests and chanted the same slogans as Kefaya, some of them also held their own meetings, recruited their own members, and organized their own demonstrations.

It is difficult to estimate how big Kefaya’s ranks were at any given time, especially with so many spin-off movements and individuals whose participation was partial or intermittent. People would drift in and out of involvement and membership was a nebulous category.\(^7\) However, based on reports by the movement’s leaders, turnout at major protests, and registration on the Kefaya website, a plausible estimate is that Kefaya’s membership was between 10,000 and 20,000 individuals. These members primarily came from Cairo, although as
the movement gained momentum it began to set up chapters in all of the twenty-nine Egyptian governorates, and significant protests were orchestrated in Alexandria, Suez, Mansoura, and Port Said.

The political environment in Egypt became feverish through the summer as two other candidates entered the presidential race and campaigned against Mubarak. One of them, Ayman Nour from the Ghad Party, seemed to present a real challenge, and he was unofficially supported by Kefaya. But on the day of the election, September 7, 2005, ballot rigging and voting fraud resulted in Mubarak’s winning by a landslide margin of 88.6 percent. Nour came in a distant second with 7.8 percent and the third candidate from the Wafd Party, Noaman Goma’a, took 2.8 percent. Although turnout was low (officially 22.9 percent, though some independent agencies claim it was much lower), Mubarak declared that the people had spoken and accepted the seat of the presidency for the fifth time. After the results were released, many of Kefaya’s members turned away from public protesting and increased their involvement with specific political parties, campaigning in advance of the upcoming parliamentary elections. Diversity, in this case, turned out to be a liability, as each of the organizations in the coalition found it in their interests to go it alone in a quest for greater parliamentary representation rather than maintain the coalition and present a united front (a tactic that some attempted but that ultimately failed). Although Kefaya would continue to exist in name and form, Mubarak’s presidential victory marked the effective end of its activity in the streets.

THEORIES OF MOVEMENTS, COALITIONS, AND DICTATORSHIP

Kefaya’s uniqueness in recent Egyptian history corroborates the overwhelming consensus among social movement scholars that mobilization is difficult in states where institutions, information flows, and resources are controlled by a regime, and whose citizens live in fear of repression (Goodwin 2001; Wickham 2002; Schock 2005; Tilly 2006; Osa and Schock 2007; Almeida 2008). Only revolutions are expected to generate the necessary momentum to overcome the profound structural barriers to mobilization under these conditions. Scholars rarely consider how and why reform-oriented social movements might manage to mobilize under conditions that would seem to preclude their emergence.

There are some exceptions to this tendency. For example, some scholars have explored how direct repression can catalyze mobilization (Della Porta 1995; Loveman 1998; Goodwin 2001; Davenport, Johnston, and Mueller 2005; Francisco 1996, 2005). Though repression often breeds broader, revolutionary movements, there are also examples of reform-oriented collective action emerging from acts of repression (Loveman 1998). Yet Kefaya suffered little violence (at least in its early stages), and so these arguments do little to help us understand how this reform-oriented movement was able to get off the ground in the first place.

Other scholars have pointed out that authoritarian states can unintentionally shift the locus of political activity to grassroots arenas, stimulating civil society and generating new participatory organizational structures. Oxhorn (1995) has shown how the military regime in Chile generated an array of democratic and participatory structures among the rural poor. Similarly, a group of Middle East scholars have drawn on the tools of social movement theory to study how authoritarian regimes encourage the mobilization of Islamist organizations and movements (Wiktowicz 2001, 2004; Wickham 2002; Bayat 2007). Wickham (2002), in her study of the Muslim Brotherhood, shows that Mubarak’s regime actually encouraged the Brotherhood’s grassroots activity by providing it with an opportunity to offer social services to Egypt’s poor. Yet these arguments are better for explaining broad, grassroots organization and activism rather than the confrontational politics of the Kefaya movement.

These studies aside, scholars of mobilization have mostly concluded that it is overwhelmingly difficult for activists to form a social movement under an authoritarian regime. Scholars tend to agree that for collective action to occur in nondemocracies there must be some
Mobilization

degree of political opening—created, perhaps, by diplomatic or economic pressure from an outside actor, internal regime fragmentation that hamstring the repressive apparatus, or recent defeat in an external war—which provides the space in which mobilization can occur. Theda Skocpol (1979) became an early champion of this model in her explanation of three major social revolutions. She claimed that revolutions are not “made,” but “come”—they emerge to fill the vacuum created when a weak regime begins to collapse. Later reformulations of this theory argue that structural openings are critical to mobilization in authoritarian contexts because the barriers to collective action are normally so high (Goldstone 1998; Almeida 2003, 2008; Hafez 2003; Boudreau 2004; Osa and Corduneanu-Huci 2005; Schock 2005; Osa and Schock 2007). Goldstone (1998) claims that opportunities have different causal implications in nondemocracies than they do in democracies. In liberal contexts a political opening defines the nature of collective action, but in authoritarian regimes a political opportunity determines whether a movement can mobilize at all.

I do not disagree with these conclusions—the Kefaya movement likewise confirms that a political opening is often an important precursor to mobilization in an authoritarian regime. However, the argument that when a regime opens up a movement or revolution will simply “come” is insufficient. Even in democratic settings, forming a social movement is no easy feat, and scholars have devoted much time and effort to debating how this happens. It is therefore worth taking the question of social movements in nondemocracies one step further: when a political opening does create a mobilization opportunity, what factors in the political environment make it likely that a movement will emerge? In essence, why is it that in cases of political opening social movements tend, simply, to “come?”

To answer these questions I turn to a literature on social movement coalitions, which is helpful for illuminating how the mechanisms that facilitate movement formation function differently in authoritarian versus democratic regimes. As noted above, Kefaya was noteworthy not only for its audacity in taking on the Mubarak regime but also because it brought together a multitude of diverse actors. Mobilization scholars often point out that social movements are inherently coalitional affairs. For example, David Meyer says that “although it is a grammatical convenience to speak of ‘the’ movement or ‘a’ movement, social movements are comprised of coalitions of actors” (2001: 11-12). Recognizing this fact, a number of scholars have recently taken to studying social movements less as unitary phenomena and more as constructed coalitions of preexisting civil society groups, or SMOs (Van Dyke and McCammon 2010). Given the deeply coalitional nature of Kefaya, I suggest that if we focus on social movements as coalitions, and take seriously the ways in which coalitions tend to form, then we may be able to better understand how social movements in nondemocracies come together.

In fact, this is a question of altering the lens, rather than the subject matter, for there is little difference between a “social movement” and a “social movement coalition.” It is therefore no surprise to find that many theories of coalition formation echo ideas from social movement theory. However, one key difference between the literature on social movements and coalitions is that coalition scholars tend to focus more on the obstacles that keep SMOs apart, rather than mechanisms that facilitate collective action. This presents a useful framework for thinking about movements in nondemocracies. Indeed, because coalition scholars tend to study instances of mobilization in the democratic West, their research yields valuable insights about the obstacles that prevent coalitions from forming in liberal democracies. Examining how significant these obstacles were to the formation of the Kefaya coalition allows us to discern how such a movement ever got off the ground and how mechanisms that facilitate collective action might function differently in an authoritarian state.

It is worth pointing out that many scholars of revolutions also take on the question of coalition formation (Goodwin and Skocpol 1989; Parsa 2000; Goodwin 2001; Kurzman 2004; Foran 2005; Almeida 2005; Schock 2005). Successful revolutions are almost always precipitated by coalitions that draw together diverse sectors of a society, particularly the kinds of nationwide or social revolutions that have received so much attention in the literature. Goodwin
and Skocpol (1989) introduce the argument that successful revolutions are generally precipitated by a combination of urban “professional revolutionaries” and broad collections of rural peasants, laborers, and artisans, often brought together by particularly exclusionary authoritarian regimes. Tilly (2006) develops a typology of revolutionary coalitions, emphasizing two key axes that determine their nature: the basis of participating groups (either territorial or interest-based) and the directness of relations between the groups. However, if anything, these studies only emphasize the differences between Kefaya and such revolutionary coalitions. Kefaya never gained the scope, scale, or national ambitions of most revolutionary coalitions, and its members were largely drawn from a single social sector—what Goodwin and Skocpol (1989) would term “professional revolutionaries.” In fact, Kefaya more closely resembles those Western, reform-oriented social movements that coalition scholars have examined. Moreover, the revolution literature tends to draw on broad structural factors—like regime type, nature of repression, and degrees of social isolation—in explaining how these coalitions come about, rather than on the meso- and micro-level organizational aspects of coalition formation. I therefore intend to discuss primarily the coalition literature that deals with more limited reform-oriented movements, so as to highlight the organizational dynamics that influenced Kefaya, though when appropriate I also draw on the revolution literature to reinforce certain arguments.

The coalition literature discusses three obstacles relevant to Kefaya’s mobilization: the struggle to define widely appealing goals, the challenge of providing incentives for different SMOs to join a coalition, and the difficulty of building cohesion among diverse participants. Within any multiorganizational field there are always groups that maintain some common and some conflicting goals (Zald and McCarthy 1980, 1987; Klandermans 1990, 1992; Gerhards and Rucht 1992). As a result, activists seeking to build coalitions are challenged to select specific goals and frame them so that a wide array of SMOs find them appealing (Ferree and Roth 1998; Rose 2000; Armstrong 2002; Croteau and Hicks 2003; Levi and Murphy 2006). Some scholars argue that coalition formation is contingent on leaders being able to define a set of simple, least-common-denominator goals (Kleidman and Rochon 1997; Meyer and Corrigall-Brown 2005). Kleidman and Rochon (1997) contrast the effectiveness of this technique to that of the “laundry list” approach, in which coalition leaders adopt all the principal issues around which participating SMOs are oriented. While some have argued that such diversity in goals is effective (Olzak and Ryo 2007), Kleidman and Rochon (1997) contend that the “least-common-denominator” approach is more likely to generate the support of a broad range of actors.

A second key obstacle that coalition leaders face is convincing and inducing individual SMOs to join their movements. Scholars agree that SMOs tend to view coalition involvement through a utilitarian lens and undertake a cost-benefit analysis before deciding to join (Zald and McCarthy 1987; McCammon and Campbell 2002; Murphy 2005; Meyer and Corrigall-Brown 2005; Levi and Murphy 2006). They weigh what they can potentially gain against what they are likely to lose and ultimately make the decision that contributes most to their long-term preservation. The literature emphasizes two factors that shape these calculations: identity and resources. The desire of organizations to preserve their identity and autonomy is one of the primary reasons that they choose to refrain from coalition involvement (Staggenborg 1986; Hathaway and Meyer 1997; Dalton 1994; Hojnacki 1997; Kleidman and Rochon 1997; Obach 2004). SMOs do not want to appear to their constituencies as though they are compromising their values, straying from core goals, or giving up crucial decision-making rights. But SMO leaders balance this wariness against a desire to guarantee their SMO’s survival through access to new resources. Scholars disagree over whether an abundance or a dearth of resources is more likely to motivate SMO involvement. Some studies argue that a wealth of resources is more likely to motivate coalition formation because when resources are scant SMOs compete rather than cooperate to obtain larger shares of the pie (Zald and McCarthy 1997; Kleidman 1993). In contrast, other scholars have shown that a lack of resource availability provides a strong incentive for coalition involvement, as organizations seek access to pooled resources (Arnold 1994; Van Dyke 2003; Obach 2004; Levi and Murphy 2006). These scholars argue that if SMOs
are ultimately concerned with their own organizational maintenance, they are more likely to seek out partners when their resources are scarce and their survival is in jeopardy.

Finally, the literature on coalitions raises a third challenge to coalition formation—building cohesion. Van Dyke (2003), for example, identifies the experience of participating in a protest as important for building feelings of solidarity and collective identity. Similarly, Ansell (2001) examines the reasons why coalitions break into schisms and then reconsolidate, developing a concept of “strike waves,” which serve as “triggering events” for motivating feelings of solidarity. The social movement literature also provides some insight into how activists overcome the obstacle of movement solidarity. Like coalition scholars, some find that protest events and incidents of collective action help to build collective identity (Melucci 1989; Gamson 1992; Taylor and Whittier 1992; Gould 1995; Jasper 1997; Klandermans and de Weerd 2000; Jasper and Polletta 2001). The shared experience of participating in a protest, particularly one of heightened intensity, draws the members of a movement together and increases the resonance of an otherwise constructed collective identity. Other studies have identified a specific form of collective identity, termed “oppositional consciousness,” which arises when social movements of oppressed actors build a collective identity around their subordinated status (Mansbridge 2001; Wieloch 2002; Chowdhury 2006). Whatever the approach, coalition leaders will always struggle to construct identities that are appealing and resonant to all the diverse members of their coalitions.

SOCIAL MOVEMENT FORMATION IN AUTHORITARIAN STATES

Scholars have convincingly demonstrated that authoritarian regimes present structural obstacles to activists seeking to foment protest and organize collective action. Such activity is not only dangerous but greatly inhibited by the lack of a free press, state control of institutions, a robust internal security apparatus, and the limited availability of resources, among other factors. Yet, I argue that certain structural elements inherent to authoritarian regimes can actually facilitate coalition formation. By reducing some of the obstacles that keep potential coalition partners apart in democratic settings, these states paradoxically facilitate opposition actors’ mobilization efforts.

The argument has four components: (1) following the opening of a political opportunity, (2) a set of broad least-common-denominator goals, and (3) strong incentives for SMO involvement bring together activists who then (4) cohere into a unified social movement through intense protest events. First, scholars agree that a political opening is often a necessary precondition for mobilization in nondemocracies. A political opening creates the structural conditions that allow for the possibility of mobilization. Once that political opening has taken place, activists find themselves in an environment that is surprisingly conducive to collective action.

Second, formulating least-common-denominator goals that many different SMOs can embrace is a central problem for coalitions in democratic states. Authoritarian regimes differ in that they grant opposition leaders an obvious and widely palatable platform for rallying support. Regardless of ideological affiliation, historical background, or political beliefs, a great number of SMOs in a nondemocracy can agree over opposition to the ruling regime. Here, the revolution literature reinforces the point, as a number of scholars have pointed out that opposition to a despicable autocrat offers a particularly effective platform around which many diverse groups can mobilize (Parsa 2000; Bieber 2003; Foran 2005; Beissinger 2011).

Third, although incentives for SMOs to join coalitions are highly variable in liberal states, there are strong incentives for SMOs in authoritarian states to join a coalition. Autocratic regimes make a point of limiting access to resources. As the literature suggests, SMOs that lack access to resources may be more drawn to a coalition where they can share pooled resources and enhance their own organizational durability. They will seek to form coalitions not only out of
their joint desire to oppose the regime but also for the self-interested purposes of accessing greater financial resources, recruiting new members, and elevating their own political positions.

Once they have generated some momentum, a final aspect of authoritarian regimes helps social movements endure. Scholars have identified protest events as important forums for building cohesion and have suggested that more intense moments of collective action will yield stronger feelings of solidarity. Moreover, as is suggested by the notion of oppositional consciousness, protest events at which a threatening and palpable enemy is present are likely to promote even stronger cohesion. I therefore argue that protests in authoritarian states, where the intensity is high and large numbers of security forces are often present, promote strong feelings of solidarity among activists.

DATA COLLECTION AND METHODS

I traveled to Cairo for five weeks in August 2008 and carried out thirty-five interviews with thirty-eight leaders, members, and affiliates of Kefaya. Twenty-one of my interviews were conducted with the older members and leaders of the movement, while seventeen were with youth and student members. I interviewed members of all the major ideological factions: five independents, five Nasserists, seven Islamists, six socialists/communists, twelve liberals, and three who identified themselves as Islamists and socialists. I also interviewed members of affiliated groups who participated with Kefaya but never formally joined the movement. One area in which my pool lacked diversity was sex: of my thirty-eight respondents only four were women. However this reflected the broader demographic within Kefaya, which was a movement largely composed of men. I arrived in the field with the names of forty-five Kefaya members and affiliates taken from Arabic and English news articles, as well as several policy and academic papers. Drawing on preexisting contacts in Egypt, I arranged a set of initial interviews with individuals from this list. After every interview, I inquired as to whether the respondent knew of other individuals with whom I ought to meet. Additionally, if there was someone on my list with whom I knew the interviewee was acquainted, I asked whether he or she could provide me with contact information. In addition to the interviews I drew information from newspapers such as Al Ahram Weekly, Al Masry Al Youm, The Daily News Egypt, Al Ahram, Al Dostoor, and certain foreign publications. I also reviewed internet-based sources, including statements, manifestos, and proposals on the Kefaya website and a number of political blogs.

To analyze the data I developed twenty codes based on initial observations of patterns, my research questions, my hypotheses, and the literature on social movements. I then grouped the data into these categories and re-read and re-coded to identify more specific patterns. Finally, I looked for ways in which these patterns could help explain how the Kefaya movement had come about.

A POLITICAL OPENING

In 2003 the administration of George W. Bush began pressuring Mubarak to take positive steps towards democracy. Given Egypt’s dependence on US foreign aid, Mubarak had no choice but to shelve the harsh tactics of repression that had become a mainstay of his policies and allow for a more open political climate. This political opening created an opportunity for activism that Kefaya was able to exploit. Indeed, one activist said that the political environment in 2005 was “like a ripe piece of fruit that was waiting for whomever might come along and pick it” (Interview with Amin Iskander, Kefaya founder and leader in the Karama Party, 12 August 2008).
Still, in the early days of Kefaya’s formation its leaders were unclear how much the environment had really changed. Many of them had been at the anti-war protests in 2003 where the security forces had stood by and warily allowed the demonstrations to occur. But they had also experienced or witnessed incidents of brutal attacks against some of these protests. There was strong disagreement among the founding members as to whether the movement ought to adopt protest tactics at all, with some contending that it would be more prudent to organize conferences and release opposition statements. Magdi Oror, the Assistant General Secretary of the Labor Party and a member of the Kefaya Coordinators’ Committee, described the debate that occurred in these early stages:

The Labor Party members were saying “No to Mubarak.” And the Revolutionary Socialists started saying “Yasqut Mubarak.” And some of the members of the Daily Committee of Kefaya feared this at the beginning, because they thought the police would crack down. They wanted silent protests. Or they wanted to criticize corruption, or the government, or Gamal Mubarak—but not the President. (Interview with Magdi Oror, Assistant General Secretary of the Labor Party, 25 August 2008)

In the end the moderates capitulated to the movement’s more radical wing, which insisted that another indoor committee would simply wither away. Nevertheless, no one knew if the regime would respond to Kefaya’s first protest with brutal repression or reluctant toleration. The nature of this protest reflected the activists’ nervous attitudes. The moderates in the movement had insisted that it be a silent protest, with no chanting or shouting of slogans. But towards the end of the event, the leaders of two of the more radical member organizations—the Revolutionary Socialists and the Labor Party—began belting out chants against Mubarak. Although this infuriated the coalition’s moderates, who were terrified that if the movement was too confrontational it would be crushed, the security forces remained impassive. Indeed, had it not been for the nerve of these hard-liners, Kefaya might never have realized the true extent of the political opening that had emerged in 2004 and 2005. Many of Kefaya’s members explained that had it not been for that first protest, which proved that the attitude of the regime toward protest had indeed changed, the Kefaya movement might never have taken off. Through the remainder of 2005, the Mubarak regime continued to tolerate an unprecedented level of political activism and protest activity, though on several occasions it did crack down on Kefaya with police violence and attacks against protesters. Still, by normal Egyptian standards it was a period of remarkable openness, and Kefaya capitalized on the opportunity, defying the regime in a way that had never been allowed before.

**DEFINING A LEAST-COMMON-DENOMINATOR GOAL**

As 2005 progressed, Kefaya came to be defined by its slogans. One of the reasons these chants had such resonance was that they referred to a very simple set of goals: remove the president, reform the state. The movement espoused a clear, basic, and widely palatable program, which was able to draw in large swaths of Egypt’s opposition and unite them towards a common end.

A least-common-denominator goal provides a useful theoretical concept for thinking about Kefaya’s goal definition and framing challenges. Although the groups that joined its coalition had ideological backgrounds ranging from socialist to liberal to Islamist, all could agree that they hated the regime. Defining its goals along this axis is one of the principal reasons Kefaya was able to appeal to so many parties and groups. As George Ishak, the founder and leader of the movement, put it, they were the “minimum acceptable issues, and we never went beyond them” (Interview with George Ishak, General Coordinator of Kefaya, 11 August 2008).

During early discussions, the movement’s leaders agreed on the need to draft a program that would have broad appeal. The product of this discussion was a concise, two-page manifesto that was vaguely politically liberal and democracy-oriented, but focused primarily on civil and
human rights. The founders knew that they had to decide on issues that would “be simple and at the same time have a wide and comprehensive scope” (Interview with Amin Iskander, Kefaya founder and leader in the Karama Party, 12 August 2008). Abou Elela Madi explained how the founders decided on the content for the platform:

We spoke about political issues only, because we knew that we had all the radical currents in Egypt—liberal, Islamic, leftist, Marxist, Nasserist, nationalist. So we knew we would have a lot of differences, especially on economic and social issues. So we looked only to issues of political reforms. And with this we could get much more acceptance. (Interview with Abu Elela Madi, Kefaya founder and Director of the Wasat Party, 13 August 2008)

As long as they limited the document’s contents to political reforms and ending the president’s reign, they knew that no one within the opposition would find much to contest.

Nevertheless, some disputes did occur, despite these widely palatable aims. For example, the Revolutionary Socialists and the Labor Party, both of whom took hard lines against Israel and the United States, insisted that the manifesto include a denouncement of the “odious [foreign] assault on Arab native soil.” According to Madi, most of the founders did not feel strongly about this point, but they agreed to include it because they wanted these groups’ support. Negotiating agreement around points like this prolonged the drafting of the manifesto and delayed its release to the general public. Yet even factoring in these delays, Kefaya navigated its goal development with surprising ease. Given the diversity of its members, it is remarkable that the most significant points of contention were disagreements over what language to use in condemning the United States and Israel.

In a democratic state, goal development tends to be much more difficult, even among groups sharing values and interests. In contrast, Egypt’s authoritarian system helped Kefaya’s leaders by mitigating the challenge of generating appealing least-common-denominator goals.

**SMO INCENTIVES**

Kefaya comprised a motley assortment of parties and organizations: a fledgling liberal party calling for free-market reforms, an underground group of Marxists and Trotskyites, and an Islamist party with socialist roots. What was it, besides agreement on a set of basic demands, that drew such disparate political organizations into a social movement that had little chance of achieving its goals? Though the literature on this question suggests conflicting answers—resource scarcity has been shown to help some coalitions in forming but hinder others—the case of Kefaya suggests that in an authoritarian state, where SMOs typically lack access to resources, these organizations may seek to participate in a social movement because of the possibility of gaining access to pooled resources. The parties in Kefaya chose to join the coalition, in part, to obtain two resources: new members and political legitimacy.

In normal times, the Mubarak regime would ensure that opposition players in Egypt were kept divided and weak by severely limiting the availability of resources. This tactic was manifested in numerous ways: the regime refused to grant official party licenses; obstructed parties from opening bank accounts; periodically raided party headquarters, destroying equipment and harassing members; and monopolized information channels, preventing parties from receiving key news and from disseminating their own messages. During normal times, when the climate was toxic and the regime showed no tolerance for expressions of opposition, political parties grudgingly made do with the few resources they were granted. But in a situation of limited political opportunity, when the fear of repression had been dulled, the incentive to collaborate through the pooling of resources became more potent.

Both the nature of the groups that participated in Kefaya and their behavior once they became involved indicate that joining the coalition was, in part, a self-interested move to boost their access to resources and bolster their credibility. Kefaya was composed, by and large, of the
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Weakest members of the Egyptian opposition. Although some of its members were independents, it secured the official support and participation of five political groups: the Labor Party, the Wasat Party, the Ghad Party, the Karama Party, and the Revolutionary Socialists. The Labor Party had had its party license revoked and its newspaper shut down in 2000 for touting an Islamist message. The Wasat and Karama parties were splinter factions of the Muslim Brotherhood and the Nasserists, respectively, and each had had their applications for official party status rejected on several occasions. The Ghad Party had been recognized by the government, but it was young and untested, with a small mass base and little public recognition. Finally, the Revolutionary Socialists did not claim to be a political party—they had emerged in the early 2000s from an underground communist society and had become active in organizing the street protests around the Intifada and the Iraq War. What these groups all shared was a severe lack of resources, minimal political credibility, low membership bases, and a marginal role in Egyptian politics. They had little to lose and much to gain in joining an opposition social movement.

What is also conspicuous about this list is the absence of several long-standing political groups within the Egyptian opposition, most notably the Tagammu Party, the Nasserist Party, the Wafd Party, and the Muslim Brotherhood. Kefaya’s founders sought the support of these groups but could not convince them to come on board. The Tagammu, Nasserist, and Wafd parties had a long history of working begrudgingly with the regime and had managed over the years to gain some small political concessions. They were all officially recognized, had an established membership, participated in parliamentary elections, and occasionally even won a handful of seats. Their cozy relationship with the government and the small gains that they received militated against them getting involved in the Kefaya coalition.

The Muslim Brotherhood had different reasons for not joining Kefaya, which ultimately were based on their long-term interests. Historically the Brotherhood had one of the most hostile relationships with the regime, and was the target of consistent political repression. But these painful experiences also caused the Brotherhood to prioritize survival over almost every other goal, which made them naturally reticent to directly confront the regime. Although Brotherhood members sympathized with Kefaya’s goals, they deemed Kefaya’s street tactics too risky to officially adopt or consistently support. Moreover, the Brotherhood operated from a unique position of strength in Egyptian politics, a result of its well-developed network of grassroots support (Wickham 2002; El-Ghobashy 2005). They saw none of the resource benefits that other participants did and thus, as one activist put it, they “were always on the fence with regard to Kefaya” (Interview with anonymous Kefaya activist, 5 August 2008). As the literature on coalitions would predict, the Brotherhood was too wary of losing autonomy, identity, and control over its own resources to join a coalition in which it would not be in charge.

More than just the nature of the parties that joined Kefaya, their behavior also demonstrated that they saw it as an opportunity to gain resources. The parties jockeyed for visibility, influence, and power, and tried to recruit members of the youth movement. These actions must be understood in the context of the parties’ marginal positions in Egyptian politics, where their voices were rarely heard and their influence over political debates hardly felt. For them, Kefaya represented an opportunity to demonstrate their authority and make their positions known. As they sought to increase their prominence, parties naturally competed over who would be the leader of the movement. One member of the Coordinators’ Committee decried this petty bickering and jockeying for political advantage:

The problem was not differences of opinion so much as it was the determination of certain people to dominate the movement. They would try to turn the debate in such a way as to pass a decision that corresponded to what they wanted…. The issue did not matter. Any issue could be discussed, but then the leader of a particular group would come and would change the discussion completely so as to promote the preferences of his own party. (Interview with Mustafa Kemal Sayed, Member of the Kefaya Coordinators’ Committee, 21 August 2008)
The parties were involved in the movement to promote their own interests and they debated and discussed issues, in part, to acquire influence. Some other respondents said that the fiercest debates occurred over the issue of media attention—every leader wanted to be the face of the movement because they had “a personal interest in becoming more visible through the media” (Interview with Mohamad Said Idris, Kefaya founder and member of the Coordinators’ Committee, 24 August 2008). For these parties, involvement in Kefaya was a chance to gain credibility and political influence. It is worth noting that in the end this bickering and posturing may have contributed to the fracturing of the movement as the parties failed to find enough common ground to create a front for the parliamentary elections and so left the coalition to compete in the elections alone.

Another key incentive for joining Kefaya was the possibility of recruiting new members, particularly from the youth. Kefaya’s youth wing was largely comprised of independent students who were new to political activism and had no defined political identity. For the parties, these young independents were prime targets for recruitment as they sought to expand their limited memberships. One member of the Coordinators’ Committee admitted that “some leaders considered that Kefaya might be a source for membership for their parties” (Interview with Abdel Galeel Mustafa, member of the Kefaya Coordinators’ Committee, 25 August 2008). Younger members of the movement, particularly independents, referred to these activities in more hostile terms: “They were trying to recruit their elements from within the movement. They came to Kefaya to recruit people, and this really pissed me off” (Interview with Ahmed Mahgoub, Kefaya activist, 10 August 2008). The persistence and tenacity with which these parties pursued even reticent or openly resistant independent youths shows that they aimed to use Kefaya to acquire new human resources.

The social movement organizations that participated in Kefaya were drawn to the movement by the prospect of acquiring both tangible human resources and intangible resources like legitimacy and visibility. Because the regime had kept these groups weak and marginal by consistently restricting their access to organizational resources, the parties saw coalition involvement as more advantageous than they might have if they had been operating in a more liberal state where resources were more available. In this way the authoritarian regime made it easier for Kefaya to draw in participating SMOs and build a durable coalition.

**PROTEST EVENTS AND BUILDING COHESION**

Egypt’s authoritarian regime also facilitated Kefaya’s sustained mobilization by elevating the role of protest events in consolidating and uniting the coalition. The dominant opinion among Kefaya’s members was that the movement was most united during protest events. While many respondents mentioned bickering and infighting during committee meetings, they all agreed that when Kefaya took to the streets, its members were unified in their opposition to the regime. One protester explained that “the factions would mostly dissolve when we got out into the street” (Interview with Ahmed Al Droubi, Kefaya activist, 6 August 2008); another said that they would “become ‘one’ in the streets” (Interview with Ahmed Seif Al Islam, Kefaya activist and Director of the Hisham Mubarak Law Center, 24 August 2008). One youth member said that his closest bonds had been formed with the people who stood beside him in the protests—“the people I was in the street with, regardless of their political currents” (Interview with Khaled Abdel Hamid, Kefaya activists and youth leader of the Revolutionary Socialists, 7 August 2008). In these and other comments “the street” is widely referenced as the site where movement consolidation occurred and partisan differences dissolved.

Of course, as other scholars have pointed out, protest events are often intense, giving them the potential even in liberal contexts to bring a diverse coalition together. But the protests that Kefaya activists experienced were particularly effective in unifying the movement because of the overwhelming security presence. Kefaya demonstrations rarely drew more than
one or two thousand protesters, and sometimes many less. Activists would usually arrive at a protest site to find a sea of security forces waiting for them with ominous black riot gear (it was almost impossible for Kefaya to plan a protest without the time and place leaking out to the authorities). Often the protesters were outnumbered by as much as ten to one. As the activists began chanting, the police would close in and surround them in a tightly contained ring. In this way the security forces served as a constant reminder to Kefaya’s activists of their relative weakness and vulnerability.

This intense and threatening atmosphere served as a powerful catalyst for cohesion. Ahmed Al Droubi explained how his relationships to members of the parties changed during protests: “In the street we were together, because we had a common enemy. But I really hated what they [my fellow protesters] stood for” (Interview with Ahmed Al Droubi, Kefaya activist, 6 August 2008). Not only does Droubi emphasize how the “common enemy” brought him closer to his fellow protesters, but he also reveals how ideologically divided they all were. Even passers-by and onlookers were drawn into the movement through this uniformity of treatment, as indicated by one activist’s account: “They dealt with all of us in the same way. And so they made an activist out of me. Before that, I admired Kefaya. But that day [while watching the protest take place], they made me a Kefaya activist just by treating me like one” (Interview with Tariq Munir, Kefaya activist and journalist, 9 August 2008). These and other comments indicate that the Kefaya coalition was held together by more than just the self-interested concerns of diverse parties agreeing on broad goals. Because of the protest events, the coalition began to develop a momentum and unity of its own. These findings suggest that when authoritarian forces monitor protest activities, moments of collective action will take on great significance in keeping a coalitional movement bound together. Again, the implication of this is that an authoritarian regime may paradoxically aid activists in their efforts to build and sustain a social movement.

CONCLUSIONS: KEFAYA'S LEGACY

At the time, many political analysts and commentators dismissed Kefaya for its failure to bring about real reform. But social movements can affect their states in multiple and often unpredictable ways. Five and a half years after the apparent demise of the Kefaya movement, another wave of protest emerged in Egypt and quickly gained a momentum that Kefaya was never able to muster. Eighteen days after the first of these new protests, President Hosni Mubarak ceded his powers to a military council and fled to his home in Sharm al-Sheikh. It was an ending about which the leaders and members of Kefaya had likely only dared to dream.

Scholars will undoubtedly spend many years unraveling the varied and complex factors that contributed to the success of this uprising. It is not my goal here to draw conclusive connections between Kefaya and the protests that ultimately toppled Mubarak in 2011; that must be the subject of future studies. Yet I do want to raise the possibility that Kefaya’s importance to Egypt was downplayed at the time of its activities, and that this importance provides a lesson to scholars seeking to understand collective action in nondemocracies. Reform-oriented movements in authoritarian states may often fail to achieve their immediate goals, but this does not render them unimportant. Sometimes they can be critical agents of gradual democratic change, opening up new avenues of contention and participation, or pressuring a regime into making small but irreversible reforms. A number of scholars have demonstrated this potential with studies that identify a connection between social movements and democratization (Garretón, 1989; Adler and Webster 1995; Bermeo 1997; Bratton and van der Walle 1992, 1997; Collier and Mahoney 1997; Giugni, McAdam, and Tilly 1998; Markoff 1996; Wood 2000).
More significant for the case of Egypt and Kefaya is the idea that protests can occur in waves. Sometimes even a small protest movement can establish the basis for a subsequent, more powerful wave (Tarrow 1983, 1989, 1995; Tilly 1995; Bieber 2003; Almeida 2008). Activists meet each other, form bonds and groups, develop political sensibilities, hone their protest tactics, and become accustomed to taking risks and confronting uncertainty. As political situations change, movements and activists may subside, biding their time until a new political opportunity emerges. When it does, they can call upon their previous protest experiences to precipitate a new, and potentially more successful, wave of activism.

Consistent with this view, many interviewees responded to questions about Kefaya’s legacy by saying that the movement had mattered most for the way it politicized a new generation of youth, introducing them to opposition politics and educating them in the art of protest. The activist Ahmed Maher is a fine case in point. He described to me how he joined Kefaya, showing up at one of its early protests after reading about it in the opposition press. After Kefaya’s protests declined in 2005, Maher remained active in politics, exploring new forums to express his opposition to the regime. In April 2008 he formed a group on the social networking site Facebook called the 6 of April Youth, which sought to organize young activists to stand in solidarity with a series of labor strikes. He explained to me how he created organizing committees modeled off the Youth for Change committees and adopted the most successful protest tactics that he had witnessed during the Kefaya days. His friend and colleague Ahmed Salah likewise pointed to the influence Kefaya had on Maher:

Ahmed Maher was in Youth for Change, though he was not that active. He was new to politics. But he saw a lot and he learned a lot and he took those lessons with him. And now he is showing great courage in being the leader of this new 6 April movement…. And they are using the Kefaya slogans. Because Kefaya is an identity, it’s an ideology that we have and that has carried through in the work Ahmed is doing with his 6 April Youth. And who knows where those ideas will take them next. (Interview with Ahmed Salah, Kefaya activist, 4 August 2008)

Two and half years later, it was Ahmed Maher and several other members of the 6 of April Youth that used Facebook to call for the first protest of the 25 January uprising.

Reform-oriented social movements in authoritarian regimes undoubtedly matter, and my aim has been to explain how they manage to emerge when strong autocratic states would seem to preclude their mobilization. Political opportunities are likely just as important for movement formation in these regimes as the literature suggests. However, the study also moves beyond the political opportunity framework, demonstrating that certain structural factors inherent to authoritarian regimes make it easier for activists to cobble together opposition coalitions. We should not be surprised to see small (even ostensibly insignificant) social movements arise in conditions of modest political liberalization. Their rise, it turns out, is facilitated by some of the very structures that normally hold them back.

NOTES

1 Nasserism is the political ideology associated with former Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser. Generally speaking, it entails identification with the project of Arab nationalism and an espousal of socialist policies and state-led economic growth.

2 In Egypt, “liberal” is generally used to describe individuals or groups who believe in free-market liberalism, secularism, and the protection of personal liberties.

3 In distinguishing between social movements and revolutions I adopt Sidney Tarrow’s definition of a social movement: “collective challenges, based on common purposes and social solidarities, in sustained interaction with elites, opponents, and authorities” (1998: 4). In contrast, revolutionary movements are considered to be a subset within this category: they advance “exclusive competing claims to control of the state, or some segment of it” (Tilly 1993: 10).

4 By Egypt’s “recent history” I mean the period beginning in 1970 when President Anwar Sadat came to power and ending with the revolution of January and February 2011 that brought to an end the regime of Hosni Mubarak. In
comparing Kefaya to past incidents of political protest in Egypt, 1970 makes the most sense as a starting point as it is also the year in which Egypt’s regime began to take the shape that it had until February 2011. In 1971 Sadat reformed Nasser’s Arab Socialist Union and began to establish the controlled party system that defined Egyptian politics until 2011 and that helped the regime stay in power.

In Egypt, the president was for many years selected in a referendum, rather than an election. In these presidential referendums there was only one candidate and the people either voted “yes” or “no.”

The amendment established unfair requirements for who could participate in the election. It required all presidential candidates to either come from government-recognized parties or to receive supporting signatures from 250 members of the Shoura Council. Most established government parties are controlled by the regime and the Shoura Council was dominated by the regime-sponsored National Democratic Party (NDP), making it unlikely for them to approve any independent candidates.

Of the individuals I interviewed, participation ranged from some who said they were going to two protests a day through the summer of 2005 to one who said he had been only to the three biggest protests.

According to Zald and McCarthy, a social movement organization (SMO) is “a complex, or formal organization that identifies its goals with the preferences of a social movement or a countermovement and attempts to implement those goals” (1987: 20).

Resources is a broadly defined term encompassing, among other things, money, equipment, expertise, information, memberships, political influence, and credibility.

In cases of major political openings it may be the case that SMOs are able to access more resources. If this occurs then coalition formation will be more difficult. However, a political opening in an authoritarian state is usually somewhat limited, entailing the reduced likelihood of repression. In these instances SMOs’ access to resources will remain low, as was the case with Kefaya.

Twenty-four interviews were conducted in English and eleven in Arabic. For five of the Arabic interviews I brought a local Egyptian translator. For the remaining six Arabic interviews the services of the translator were not needed, as I spoke the formal Arabic dialect as did the interviewee.

Gamal Mubarak is Hosni Mubarak’s son and at the time was the General Secretary of the NDP’s Policy Committee and the party’s Deputy Secretary General. It is widely believed that he was being groomed to succeed his father as President and, as a result, he too came under attack by Kefaya during 2005.

Even George Ishak, who was leading the event, described being “very frightened” because of uncertainty about how the regime would respond (Interview with George Ishak, General Coordinator of Kefaya, 11 August 2008).

Kefaya’s very name was appropriated from one of its most popular chants, in which a movement leader would call out a number of grievances (Corruption! The NDP! Hosni Mubarak!), and after each phrase the protesters would cry back: “Kefaya!” “Enough!” Other chants—“Yasqut, Yasqut, Hosni Mubarak” and “La li Tamdid! La li Tawrith!” (No to succession! No to inheritance!)—became common parlance among activist circles and the Egyptian public at large.

Of the 38 interviewees, 32 cited this factor as critical to the coalition’s cohesion. The issue was raised in 55 discrete instances.

Such “frame disputes” are common among movements in their formation stages as leaders negotiate and discuss how they plan to frame the issues around which the movement will mobilize (Snow, Rochford, Worden, and Benford 1986; Snow and Benford 1988).

Certain members of these groups did contribute to Kefaya’s activities and some even sat on the Coordinators’ Committee, but as individuals only. For example, one Muslim Brotherhood leader, Sayed Abdel Sattar, helped draft the manifesto and two others, Issam Al Ariyan and Muhammad Abdel Qudoos, participated in many Kefaya protests.

Another reason the Muslim Brotherhood remained outside of Kefaya may have stemmed from some Kefaya members’ reticence towards collaborating with them. Many members of Kefaya wanted to work with the group because they believed this was the only way to make Kefaya an effective opposition front. Among those who opposed working with the Brotherhood were a small number who had ideological or personal problems with the group and a larger faction that were wary of joining with an organization that was much more powerful than any of the groups in Kefaya and might try to control the movement. In the end, Kefaya did reach out to the Brotherhood, just as it did to the other political opposition groups. But for the reasons outlined above, no more than a handful of individual Brotherhood members became active.

This is not to say that the parties did not harbor some reservations about joining Kefaya. In fact, as the literature would predict, they worried about preserving their unique identities and organizational autonomy, and they required that their members maintain ultimate loyalty to the party, not Kefaya.

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