

---

# Will Foreign Policy Matter in the 2024 U.S. Elections?

DANIEL W. DREZNER

---

## ABSTRACT

*In recent decades, foreign policy has played a minor role in U.S. presidential elections, especially compared to more trenchant issues like the economy. Will 2024 be any different? The closeness of the race means any little factor could play a role—but it remains highly unlikely. Polling continues to show that the public does not place a high priority on foreign policy. Even high salience issues, like the war in Gaza, motivate fewer voters than is commonly believed. The most likely effect is a modest hit to Kamala Harris' support, as the incumbent party will shoulder the blame for perceptions that the world is falling apart. The scale of these effects will nevertheless be minor.*

---

## INTRODUCTION

Post-Cold War conventional wisdom has been that foreign policy plays a minor role at best in U.S. presidential elections. This consensus coalesced during the 1992 election. By all accounts, incumbent George H.W. Bush had navigated a series of foreign policy challenges with aplomb. He helped midwife the end of the Cold War and the breakup of the Soviet Union with far less violence than contemporaneous observers expected. Responding to Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait, Bush marshaled an impressive multilateral coalition to eject Iraqi forces after less than 100 hours of ground operations. Bush's foreign policy team cajoled and coerced key players in the Middle East to attend the Madrid Peace Conference, a key step that paved the way for the Oslo Peace Accords and the Abraham Accords. The Bush administration orchestrated the negotiations that led

---

**Daniel W. Drezner** is Distinguished Professor of International Politics at The Fletcher School at Tufts University.

---

to the creation of the World Trade Organization and the North American Free Trade Agreement. Part of this was due to good fortune, but much of it was due to Bush's skill and will. As a former vice president, CIA director, and ambassador to China, Bush's foreign policy experience was considerable. Indeed, his experience brought out the best in a foreign policy team that, eight years later, would produce more dubious results under his son George W. Bush.<sup>1</sup>

Bush went into the 1992 election as an incumbent with an impressive foreign policy track record. Given the importance that national security issues had played during Cold War-era elections,<sup>2</sup> it was easy to view Bush's foreign policy gravitas as a major political asset during the campaign. During the 1992 campaign, however, Bill Clinton ran on the mantra of "it's the economy, stupid" and won. While Bush's foreign policy resume may have been impressive, he only won 37 percent of the popular vote and 168 Electoral College votes. The logical inference for politicians to draw was that in a post-Cold War environment, foreign policy no longer mattered in presidential elections.

A similar dynamic played out in subsequent general elections.<sup>3</sup> During recent presidential election cycles, public polling has shown that foreign policy or national security questions rank very low in significance compared to the state of the U.S. economy. During the 2012 campaign, for example, Mitt Romney complained to his supporters that when he held

*During recent presidential election cycles, public polling has shown that foreign policy or national security questions rank very low in significance compared to the state of the U.S. economy.*

..... fundraisers, "the number of foreign policy questions that I get are between zero and one. And the American people are not concentrated at all on China, on Russia, Iran, Iraq."<sup>4</sup>

..... There are excellent reasons to believe that that maxim will also hold for the 2024 election. Even as the liberal international order has eroded over the past decade, American voters have evinced less interest in foreign affairs. The aftereffects of the pandemic continue to linger, leading most Americans to turn inward rather than devote much attention to international politics. The Pew Research Center concluded in April 2024 that, "Americans are even less likely to prioritize international affairs than they were in 2019."<sup>5</sup> Public opinion polling shows that Americans are pessimistic about the current and future state of the country, perceptions that are far more likely to affect voting decisions than international relations

disputes. Such sentiments reinforce the pre-existing “rational ignorance” that American voters display towards foreign affairs—thereby minimizing the influence of foreign policy on voting decisions.<sup>6</sup>

Are there any reasons to doubt the continued irrelevance of foreign policy in the 2024 election as well? Joe Biden believed so. When he was a candidate, in both high-profile interviews and private consultations with members of Congress, Biden stressed his foreign policy record as an important reason for re-election—saying things like, “I’m the guy that put NATO together, the future. No one thought I could expand it. I’m the guy that shut Putin down. No one thought could happen. I’m the guy that put together a South Pacific initiative with AUKUS. I’m the guy that got fifty nations out—not only in Europe, outside of Europe as well to help Ukraine.”<sup>7</sup>

There are some reasons to believe that foreign policy might matter in the 2024 election—though not for the reasons that Biden has articulated. First, the extremely competitive nature of the 2024 election cycle magnifies the importance of even smaller issues. Second, the ongoing, devastating conflict in Gaza maps onto domestic political cleavages that could affect a crucial bloc of voters. Third, the general trend in international affairs towards greater instability could weigh on voters’ minds as they go to the ballot box—in a way that hurts Harris’ chances. Let’s consider each of these possibilities in turn.

### THE HORSE RACE

The last few elections have been decided by razor-thin margins in swing states. In 2016, Donald Trump lost the popular vote by nearly three million votes but triumphed in the Electoral College by winning Michigan, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin by a combined margin of 79,000 votes. Joe Biden defeated Trump in 2020 by close to seven million votes in the popular tally but won the pivotal Electoral College votes of Arizona, Georgia, and Wisconsin by a combined 44,000 votes. Despite a disastrous first debate performance by Biden, an assassination attempt on Trump, and Harris replacing Biden as the nominee, the current polling in the 2024 general election race continues to suggest an extremely close election in November. With majorities in the House and Senate also up for grabs, it is possible to visualize outcomes in which either Democrats or Republicans win unified control over the executive and legislative branches.<sup>8</sup> Once again, the votes of tens of thousands may determine the outcome of a race with hundreds of millions of votes. With margins that narrow, even small

factors can make a big difference.

In theory, voters who care about foreign policy could be a pivotal bloc in 2024. In practice, however, this possibility seems remote for several reasons. First, to repeat a theme, if there is a foreign policy bloc of voters, it is ridiculously small. In Gallup's March 2024 poll asking voters what they

*Once again, the votes of tens of thousands may determine the outcome of a race with hundreds of millions of votes. With margins that narrow, even small factors can make a big difference.*

think is the most important problem facing the country today, no foreign policy question garnered more than 3 percent of support from respondents. In contrast, 30 percent listed economic concerns, and 28 percent listed immigration.<sup>9</sup> The fraction of voters identifying the economy as the top issue increases when only swing states are surveyed.<sup>10</sup>

Given the small margin separating the major party candidates, even a single percentage point could decide the outcome. But this presumes that the voters who prioritize international relations as a voting issue possess homogenous foreign policy preferences that align closely with either Trump or Harris. There is no evidence to suggest that this is true. Polling of Americans on high-profile foreign policy questions, such as aid to Ukraine, is inevitably split along partisan lines. Polarization reduces any chances that one candidate would benefit from focusing on foreign policy as a campaign issue.<sup>11</sup>

## THE GAZA EFFECT

The polling evidence demonstrates that, in general, foreign policy does not motivate significant numbers of votes. Nonetheless, based on the scale of student protests and social mobilization, the war in Gaza is an issue that is important to key demographics within the Democratic Party coalition—namely, younger voters and Arab Americans.<sup>12</sup> The anger of these groups at Biden's support for Israel's actions in Gaza is easy to detect. One October 2023 poll showed that Arab-American support for Biden collapsed from 59 percent to just 17 percent after Israel launched its attack. In the Michigan Democratic primary, the number of uncommitted votes cast—widely recognized as a protest vote against Biden's handling of the war in Gaza—equaled Biden's margin of victory in the 2020 election. Similarly, polling from October 2023 onward showed that support for Biden among younger voters did not match his 2020 vote margins.<sup>13</sup>

If widespread campus protests about the conflict recur in the fall, it will bring more attention to a polarizing issue in which few approve of the president's actions.

Furthermore, Harris' ability to win back these pivotal constituencies is constrained for multiple reasons. The most obvious problem is that even if the conflict in Gaza ended tomorrow, an estimated 38,000 Palestinians will have already died from the war.<sup>14</sup> The Biden-Harris administration has offered both rhetorical and material support for Israel's actions in Gaza. Short of a permanent ceasefire and a return to more substantive peace talks—both significant policy lifts—there is little the Biden administration could do between now and November to erase its support for Israel's response. Furthermore, any conciliatory actions taken towards the Palestinians risk alienating swing voters who prioritize strong bilateral ties with Israel.

Stepping back, however, there are reasons to doubt that the war in Gaza will prove pivotal for the 2024 election. All of the available polling evidence to date suggests that the conflict is not top of mind for most voters. In Gallup's March 2024 survey, for example, just 2 percent of the respondents said that war in the Middle East was the most important problem for the United States.<sup>15</sup> Polling further shows that it is not a high priority for young voters either. In a Harvard Institute of Politics survey of voters under the age of thirty, only 2 percent said that Israel/Palestine was their biggest concern. Compared to other issues listed, the conflict in Gaza ranked 15th out of sixteen listed issues.<sup>16</sup> A Generation Lab poll of college students taken after the protests made front-page news revealed a similar finding—they ranked the Middle East conflict as the least important issue out of nine options.<sup>17</sup>

Another reason to doubt that Gaza will tip the 2024 election in either direction is that anger at Biden over Gaza will not necessarily translate into greater support for Donald Trump. As president, Trump was extremely hawkish in his support of Israel, bragging that he "fought for Israel like no president ever before."<sup>18</sup> Trump has been somewhat more critical of Israel's conduct in the Gaza conflict—but those criticisms are primarily about the public relations of the campaign looking bad for Israel. Trump's comments, such as urging Israel to "get it over with," suggest that he would prefer

*Short of a permanent ceasefire and a return to more substantive peace talks—both significant policy lifts—there is little the Biden administration could do between now and November to erase its support for Israel's response.*

Israel be more ruthless and rapid in its military operations.<sup>19</sup> In a spring 2024 interview with *Time*, Trump doubted that a two-state solution was viable.<sup>20</sup> Furthermore, Harris should be able to put some distance between herself and Biden on this issue on the campaign trail, further defusing ire at the Democratic ticket. Trump's legacy on this issue would require pro-Palestinian voters to engage in some imaginative rationalizations to prefer Trump over Harris. No doubt some will be able to do so.<sup>21</sup> Again, however, the polling numbers suggest that it is not an appreciable number of voters.

## WORLD ON FIRE

There is one more indirect way in which the conflict in Gaza could affect the 2024 election, as a data point unfavorable for Vice President Harris. It is possible that voters will reject Harris not because of specific disagreements about foreign policy, but because recent international relations trends, including the conflict in Gaza, feed into public perceptions that the world is falling apart.

*It is possible that voters will reject Harris not because of specific disagreements about foreign policy, but because recent international relations trends, including the conflict in Gaza, feed into public perceptions that the world is falling apart.*

Those perceptions have some basis in reality. The Institute for Economics and Peace's Global Peace Index assesses a variety of violence metrics, ranging from military expenditures to public perceptions of lawlessness. Their 2023 annual report concluded that "over the last fifteen years the world has become less peaceful, with the average country score deteriorating by 5 percent."<sup>22</sup> Similarly, last year the Uppsala Conflict Data Program, which has tracked conflicts since the end of World War II, recorded the greatest number of conflicts since 1945.<sup>23</sup> The ongoing wars in Ukraine and Gaza are merely the most high-profile conflicts in a world littered with them. Even beyond traditional security concerns, other global stresses, such as ransomware attacks, migration surges, and climate change point to a more uncertain, chaotic world.

Even if individual foreign policy issues do not matter to voters, an omnipresent feeling of things falling apart will have knock-on political effects. They tie into high-profile domestic policy concerns—like the surge of illegal immigration and illegal narcotics entering the United States—that the government can no longer maintain order. Incumbents inevitably

shoulder the blame for worsening trends, and in 2024 this means that the Biden-Harris administration will bear the burden of a world that seems more violent and less safe. As David Axelrod, Barack Obama’s campaign manager, explained to *The New York Times*, the images of the war in Gaza combined with the images of student protests in the United States feed into a running Republican narrative: “The whole Republican message is, ‘The world is out of control and Biden is not in command’”<sup>24</sup> This messaging is helped by recency bias—polling demonstrates that voters look back on the Trump years and think they are not as bad as they did at the time.<sup>25</sup>

The Biden-Harris administration has attempted to advance U.S. interests in these ongoing conflicts. In addition to its support of Israel, the Biden White House has offered a full-throated defense of Ukraine in the face of Russia’s invasion and bolstered its support of Taiwan to defend it from the People’s Republic of China. Such positions remain broadly popular among the American public. The electoral problem is that while Americans might support these foreign policy *outputs*, they are unimpressed with the resulting

*The electoral problem is that while Americans might support these foreign policy outputs, they are unimpressed with the resulting foreign policy outcomes.*

foreign policy *outcomes*. U.S. voters strongly prefer wars to end and crises to be resolved. Supporting Ukraine and Taiwan advances U.S. interests but does not resolve conflicts. Ukraine remains mired in a bloody war, as does Gaza. Taiwan continues to be a geopolitical sore spot. These conflicts seem unending, and political science research shows that American voters are unenthusiastic about unending conflicts. As Christopher Gelpi, Peter Feaver, and Jason Reifler have noted, “the U.S. public’s tolerance for the human costs of war is primarily shaped by the intersection of two crucial attitudes: beliefs about the rightness or wrongness of the war, and beliefs about a war’s likely success... [but] belief about the likelihood of success matter most.”<sup>26</sup>

Across a wide array of foreign policy issue areas, the Biden-Harris administration has demonstrated a combination of deftness and diplomacy. It has strengthened formal international institutions like NATO and other multilateral initiatives like the Quad. Under Biden, the United States adroitly intervened to preserve democratic transitions in this hemisphere, engaging in the kind of quiet but effective diplomacy that used to be a State Department hallmark.<sup>27</sup> These have been intrinsically good policies,

but they are not headline-grabbing achievements. They do not counteract the “world on fire” discourse that the GOP is pushing. Even if voters in the United States cannot put their finger on it, their sense of a fraying global order could weigh on them as they make their choice in November.

## CONCLUSION

Given the competitiveness of the 2024 election, it is worth considering one final contingency: whether other countries like Russia or China will meddle in the presidential election. Russian attempts to interfere in U.S. elections have been a hardy perennial in this century, and there is every sign that Russian disinformation efforts will continue throughout 2024.<sup>28</sup> Both outside researchers and U.S. government officials have accused Chinese operatives of “promoting conspiracy theories, stoking domestic divisions and attacking President Biden ahead of the election in November,” according to one recent account in *The New York Times*.<sup>29</sup> This matches U.S. intelligence assessments made earlier this year.<sup>30</sup>

Given Russian interference in past U.S. elections, such concerns are understandable. It would be a mistake to conclude, however, that China or Russia automatically prefers Trump to Harris. While Trump has demonstrated a greater fondness for authoritarian regimes, his erratic and imma-

*It is far more likely that Chinese and Russian interventions will be designed to further erode Americans' trust in U.S. institutions. While on occasion that might mean boosting Trump, it will more likely translate into efforts to discredit the legitimacy of any election outcome.*

ture style of governance also suggests bigger tail risks to both countries.<sup>31</sup> Unsurprisingly, one Chinese academic analogized the 2024 presidential choice as choosing between “two bowls of poison.”<sup>32</sup> It is far more likely that Chinese and Russian interventions will be designed to further erode Americans’ trust in U.S. institutions. While on occasion that might mean boosting Trump, it will more likely translate into efforts to discredit the legitimacy of any election outcome.

In conclusion, if recent history is any guide, then U.S. foreign policy will have only marginal effects in the 2024 election; the impact of accelerated economic growth or inflation in the first half of 2024 will be much greater. To the extent that there are effects, however, they work against Vice President Harris. A drop in support among

Arab-Americans could affect Harris' chances in Michigan. A sense that the world is falling apart would hurt the incumbent and favor his challenger. Even though the world seemed to be falling apart under Trump's first term as well, he will benefit from recency bias among voters.<sup>33</sup> To the extent that Russia and China choose to intervene in the election, they will likely take steps that benefit Trump more than Harris. Still, the scale of these effects will be minor.

Given the vast disagreements between Harris and Trump on areas ranging from NATO to Ukraine, from Latin America to multilateralism and democracy promotion, it is safe to say that the 2024 election will have profound effects on American foreign policy.<sup>34</sup> The reverse effect of foreign policy on the 2024 election will be far, far weaker. *f*

#### ENDNOTES

- 1 Elizabeth Saunders, "No Substitute for Experience: Presidents, Advisers, and Information in Group Decision making," *International Organization* 71 (April 2017): S219-S247.
- 2 Robert Jervis, "Introduction: Presidential Elections and Foreign Policy," *Political Science Quarterly* 131 (Summer 2016): 217-236.
- 3 One could argue that foreign policy has mattered during presidential primaries at various junctures during the post-Cold War era. One key for Barack Obama's 2008 defeat of Hillary Clinton was the latter's support for Operation Iraqi Freedom. Similarly, in 2016 Donald Trump's populist foreign policy worldview was sufficiently different from his more traditional Republican challengers to attract a significant bloc of support from base voters disenchanted with the more internationalist perspective of GOP elites.
- 4 "Full Transcript of the Mitt Romney Secret Video," *Mother Jones*, September 19, 2012, <https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2012/09/full-transcript-mitt-romney-secret-video/>.
- 5 Jacob Poushter and Laura Clancy, "What Are American's Top Foreign Policy Priorities?," Pew Research Center, April 23, 2024, <https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2024/04/23/what-are-americans-top-foreign-policy-priorities/>.
- 6 Stephen Earl Bennett, "'Know-Nothings' Revisited Again," *Political Behavior* 18 (September 1996): 219-233.
- 7 "ABC's George Stephanopoulos' exclusive interview with President Biden: Full transcript," *ABC News*, July 5, 2024, <https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/abc-news-anchor-george-stephanopoulos-exclusive-interview-biden/story?id=111695695>. See also Julia Ioffe, "Biden Group Therapy," *Puck*, July 16, 2024, <https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/abc-news-anchor-george-stephanopoulos-exclusive-interview-biden/story?id=111695695>.
- 8 Due to the Senate seats up for election in 2024, however, the odds of unified Democratic control are smaller than for Republicans. Simply put, Democrats have to defend more Senate seats in states that have consistently voted Republican in the last few election cycles and have no pick-up opportunities in Democratic-leaning states.
- 9 "Most Important Problem," Gallup, accessed on May 30, 2024, <https://news.gallup.com/poll/1675/most-important-problem.aspx>.

- 10 Megan Cerullo, "Voters in battleground states say the economy is a top issue," *CBS News*, April 29, 2024, <https://www.cbsnews.com/news/economy-top-issue-voters-presidential-election-2024/>.
- 11 The only way this would not be true would be if those interested in foreign policy held distinct preferences as compared to the mass public. And recent evidence suggests this is highly unlikely. See, on this point, Joshua Kertzer, "Re-Assessing Elite-Public Gaps in Political Behavior," *American Journal of Political Science* 66 (July 2022): 539-553.
- 12 On student protests, see Katie Glueck, Katie Benner, and Sheera Frenkel, "How the War in Gaza Mobilized the American Left," *The New York Times*, April 12, 2023, <https://www.nytimes.com/2024/04/12/us/politics/palestine-israel-democrats.html> and "Hundreds of college protestors arrested across the U.S.: What to know," *The Washington Post*, updated May 5, 2024, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/education/2024/04/25/university-protests-arrests-locations/>. On Arab Americans, see Andrea Shalal, "Arab American support for Biden, Democrats plummets over Israel, poll shows," *Reuters*, October 31, 2023, <https://www.reuters.com/world/us/arab-american-support-biden-democrats-plummets-over-israel-poll-2023-10-31/> and Aymann Ismail, "The Storm Brewing in Michigan," *Slate*, April 29, 2024, <https://slate.com/human-interest/2024/04/donald-trump-joe-biden-2024-election-michigan-muslims.html>.
- 13 Margherita Stancati and Abeer Ayyoub, "In Gaza, Authorities Lose Count of the Dead," *The Wall Street Journal*, April 28, 2024, <https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/in-gaza-authorities-lose-count-of-the-dead-779ff694><https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/in-gaza-authorities-lose-count-of-the-dead-779ff694>.
- 14 Margherita Stancati and Abeer Ayyoub, "In Gaza, Authorities Lose Count of the Dead," *The Wall Street Journal*, April 28, 2024, <https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/in-gaza-authorities-lose-count-of-the-dead-779ff694><https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/in-gaza-authorities-lose-count-of-the-dead-779ff694>.
- 15 "Most Important Problem," Gallup, accessed on May 30, 2024, <https://news.gallup.com/poll/1675/most-important-problem.aspx>.
- 16 "Harvard IOP Youth Survey – Spring 2024," Harvard Kennedy School, Institute of Politics, accessed May 30, 2024, [https://iop.harvard.edu/sites/default/files/2024-04/240415\\_Harvard\\_IOP\\_Spring\\_2024\\_Topline\\_Final.pdf](https://iop.harvard.edu/sites/default/files/2024-04/240415_Harvard_IOP_Spring_2024_Topline_Final.pdf).
- 17 Sareen Habeshian, "Exclusive Poll: Most college students shrug at nationwide protests," *Axios*, May 7, 2024, <https://www.axios.com/2024/05/07/poll-students-israel-hamas-protests>.
- 18 Kierra Frazier and Alex Isenstadt, "Trump used to brag about his support for Israel. Now his criticisms are growing sharper," *Politico*, April 4, 2024, <https://www.politico.com/news/2024/04/04/trump-israel-gaza-war-00150577>.
- 19 Adriana Gomez Licon, "Trump urges Israel to 'finish up' its Gaza offensive and warns about global support fading," *AP News*, updated March 26, 2024, <https://apnews.com/article/trump-israel-gaza-netanyahu-biden-ba17bedaf2f1b5f2ea220828d0fba73b>.
- 20 Eric Cortellessa, "How Far Trump Would Go," *Time*, April 30, 2024, <https://time.com/6972021/donald-trump-2024-election-interview/>.
- 21 Aymann Ismail, "The Storm Brewing in Michigan," *Slate*, April 29, 2024, <https://slate.com/human-interest/2024/04/donald-trump-joe-biden-2024-election-michigan-muslims.html>.
- 22 Institute for Economics & Peace, "Global Peace Index 2023," June 2023, p. 3, <https://www.visionofhumanity.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/06/GPI-2023-Web.pdf>.
- 23 Data can be accessed at "Recorded fatalities in UCDP organized violence 1989-2023," UCDP, accessed May 30, 2024, <https://ucdp.uu.se/>

- 24 Jeremy W. Peters, “How the Israel-Gaza Protests Could Hurt the Democratic Party,” *The New York Times*, April 21, 2024, <https://www.nytimes.com/2024/04/21/us/israel-gaza-democrats.html>.
- 25 Mike Allen and Noah Bressner, “What Americans most remember — and forget — about Trump’s presidency,” *Axios*, May 13, 2024, <https://www.axios.com/2024/05/13/trump-presidency-us-voters-remember-memories-chart>.
- 26 Christopher Gelpi, Peter D. Feaver, and Jason Reifler, “Success Matters: Casualty Sensitivity and the War in Iraq,” *International Security* 30 (Winter 2005/6), p. 8. See also Richard Eichenberg, “Victory Has Many Friends: U.S. Public Opinion and the Use of Military force, 1981–2005,” *International Security* 30 (Summer 2005): 140-177. 2005; Andrew H. Sidman and Helmut Norpoth, “Fighting to Win: Wartime Morale in the American Public,” *Electoral Studies* 31 (June 2012): 330-341.
- 27 James Goldgeier and Elizabeth N. Saunders, “Good Foreign Policy is Invisible,” *Foreign Affairs*, February 28, 2017, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2017-02-28/good-foreign-policy-invisible>.
- 28 Julian E. Barnes and David E. Sanger, “Russia Amps Up Online Campaign Against Ukraine Before U.S. Elections,” *The New York Times*, March 27, 2024, <https://www.nytimes.com/2024/03/27/us/politics/russian-ukraine-us-interference.html>.
- 29 Tiffany Hsu and Steven Lee Myers, “China’s Advancing Efforts to Influence the U.S. Election Raise Alarms,” *The New York Times*, updated April 2, 2024, <https://www.nytimes.com/2024/04/01/business/media/china-online-disinformation-us-election.html>.
- 30 Office of the Director of National Intelligence, “*Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community*,” February 5, 2024, <https://www.odni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/ATA-2024-Unclassified-Report.pdf>.
- 31 See Daniel W. Drezner, “Immature Leadership: Donald Trump and the American Presidency,” *International Affairs* 86 (March 2020): 383-400.
- 32 Didi Tang and Ken Moritsugu, “China sees two ‘bowls of poison’ in Biden and Trump and ponders who is the lesser of two evils,” *AP News*, January 30, 2024, <https://apnews.com/article/china-us-election-biden-trump-7308b0d650b8ea309f343dec00d0b827>.
- 33 Aimee Picchi, “Voters remember Trump’s economy as being better than Biden’s. Here’s what the data shows,” *CBS News*, March 6, 2024, <https://www.cbsnews.com/news/trump-biden-economy-gdp-wages-inflation/>.
- 34 See, on this point, Daniel W. Drezner, “The Strange Future After a Second Trump Term,” *Politico*, July 6, 2024, <https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2024/07/06/trump-second-term-world-order-00164045>.