MEDICAID SAFETY-NET FUNDING ISSUES:

IMPLICATIONS FOR MIAMI-DADE COUNTY AND LOW-INCOME UNINSURED COUNTY RESIDENTS

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**EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**

Governor Scott and House leadership have indicated that they will not consider accepting federal funding under the Affordable Care Act for coverage of approximately one million low-income adults (“expansion funding”). This refusal shifts the issue of paying for the care of uninsured Floridians from Tallahassee to counties. Because low-income, uninsured Floridians depend on local safety-net providers for needed medical care, county leaders need to understand how and why safety-net funding is changing. This brief explains the background, status, and changes to the safety net’s funding streams: the Low-Income Pool, Rate Enhancements, and the Disproportionate Share Hospital Program; as well as the role of Inter-Governmental Transfers.

The brief also analyzes both the negative economic impact from scheduled funding reductions and the positive financial impact if federal dollars are accepted to purchase coverage for uninsured adults. Finally, the brief highlights key issues county leaders should consider in light of imminent funding changes.

**Why The Low Income Pool (LIP) is being significantly reduced and restructured?**

The LIP, which began in 2006 as part of a “waiver” agreement between Florida and the federal agency administering Medicaid (CMS), has been the major source of safety-net funding in Florida. The overarching purpose of Florida’s “waiver” was to shift beneficiaries into managed care organizations, and the LIP’s purpose was to provide support for local safety-nets through “supplemental payments” during the transition.

It was logical and expected that LIP would end. After the move to managed care was completed in 2014, Florida and CMS agreed that the 9 year old LIP program would end on June 30, 2015. Moreover, given that states can now use federal funds to cover low-income adults under the ACA, CMS established uniform principles for reviewing any state waiver requests. Those principles include the fact that coverage is a much better use of public funds than uncompensated care pools such as the LIP.

**How is the New LIP Program Different?**

Although “waivers” are negotiated between a state and CMS, all of the discretion rests with CMS. Nonetheless, Florida sought to maintain its $2.167 billion LIP program, and in April 2015, Florida officials sued CMS for alleged “coercion” during negotiations over the LIP. After the lawsuit was dismissed, the parties agreed to reduce LIP by over half for FY 2015-16 and by 75% for 2016-17.

In October 2015, CMS announced new waiver terms establishing a complex structure for dispersing future LIP funds based on the hospitals’ ratio of uncompensated care to compensated care. While it is not yet clear how the dispersement will operate in terms of the amount of LIP dollars individual hospitals will receive, two major changes are clear: 1) the size of the LIP program can only include the cost of reimbursing providers for treating patients who are currently uninsured and would not be covered even if the state accepted expansion coverage, e.g. state residents ineligible for Medicaid due to immigration status; and 2) LIP funds can only be used for verifiable charity care, meaning LIP funds can no longer be used to make up alleged or actual shortfall in the
Medicaid reimbursement rate. Additionally, LIP recipients must have a charity program that conforms to federal standards.

**Economic Impact of the LIP reduction “will be felt.”** In April 2015, Florida’s state economist described the LIP program as federal dollars that are “helicopter dropped” into the state. The 75% reduction of LIP funds in 2016-17 represents a $4.85 billion loss over 5 years. This loss of federal dollars translates into an $8 billion reduction in state GDP, 15,000 lost jobs, and an $8.25 billion loss in personal income.

**Disproportionate Share Program:** The Medicaid Disproportionate Share Hospital Program (DSH) provides additional financial support to hospitals that serve a “disproportionate share” of the poor. Florida’s current annual DSH funding is almost $240 million. Under the ACA, DSH was significantly reduced because Congress intended that the ACA’s provisions for Medicaid expansion would considerably reduce the number of uninsured individuals. Florida’s safety-net providers face the potential loss of DSH revenue, commencing in 2017.

**Rate enhancements (RE) are not guaranteed payments like LIP and DSH**
Under a managed care system, the RE are a projection—not an appropriation or supplemental payment like LIP or DSH. The RE depend on 2 major variables: 1) the extent to which managed care company contracts with that individual hospital mirror the hospital’s “enhanced rate,” agreed to by the State; *plus, 2)* the extent to which a given number of the Managed Care Organization’s enrollees actually receive “enhanced rate” services at that hospital. Thus, individual hospital rate enhancements’ should not be reported in the “net payment” column in the *hospital funding tables*. This is significant if a county is counting on RE “dollars” as part of the budget for indigent care at the county’s safety-net.

**Funding for safety-net programs and the role of Intergovernmental Transfers (IGTs) has fundamentally changed.** Funding for safety-nets through LIP, DSH, and RE is, like all Medicaid services in Florida, based on a federal/state match, with the federal government providing roughly 60% of the cost and the state the other 40%. (Notably, funding for the expansion population has a much higher federal match rate, starting at 100% and gradually reducing to no less than 90% over 10 years). However, unlike other Medicaid services and programs, the state match portion of safety-net funding comes from local communities—rather than general revenue. These local funds, which are generated in various ways, must be submitted to Tallahassee from a governmental agency in the name of a specific hospital. In FY 2014-15 counties contributed over $1 billion in IGTs.

Prior to the 2015 session and the new federal agreement governing LIP, there was tremendous local incentive to contribute to the IGT program. Counties and local taxing sources were not only assured that their local safety-net providers would receive the amount submitted on the provider’s behalf, but a significant dollar increase, ranging between 8.5% and 147%, as well.
However, as of FY 20216-17, there is no longer a guaranteed rate of return in the LIP program—much less such a lucrative rate. Further, during the 2015 session it became clear that IGT funded rate enhancements were not a sound investment for counties in the new managed care environment. Thus, the amount that counties will submit to Tallahassee, and which the state had been using to draw down the 60% federal match, has been tremendously reduced. In sum, the ability of IGTs to leverage substantial amounts of enhanced funding for the state and counties is over.

**Gain to county health care providers with ME:**
The 5 year economic gain just to local Florida health care providers—not counting multiplier effects in the economy or other savings to budget, e.g. reduction in medically needy program or revenue from newly created jobs—is approximately over $22 billion. Those dollars, which would be paid to local health care providers for services to the newly insured, would be virtually all federal dollars.

**Impact on county low income county residents without insurance:**
Even if RE numbers could be counted on as actual income (which they cannot), and even if DSH is not cut, the cuts to LIP are so deep that it will be impossible for even well funded local safety-nets such as Jackson to maintain even limited charity care programs without significant additional funds.

**Question for County Leaders and Stakeholders:**

- Whether services for uninsured county residents under local charity care program(s) remain the same or be reduced; and if the decision is made to maintain the at least at its current level, what will be the necessary increased local revenue source?
- What should be done with local funds previously submitted to Tallahassee on behalf of specific local providers as IGTs?
- Given that future LIP dollars can only be used for verifiable “charity care,” what consumer protections should be provided to uninsured county residents who are eligible for charity care programs at local LIP recipient hospitals?
- Can local dollars be used to leverage additional funds for delivery system reforms related to improving outcomes and lowering costs?

**Conclusion:** Changes to the amount and the structure of Medicaid safety-net funding in FY 2016-17 will have a significant adverse impact local economies and providers serving low income insured and uninsured county residents. This brief will assist county leaders and local stakeholders in addressing how to fund and deliver health care for uninsured county residents.
I. Introduction

Low-income, uninsured Floridians depend on safety-net providers for needed medical care. The Low-income Pool (LIP), which has provided the major Medicaid funding stream for this care in Florida since 2006, was scheduled to end June 30, 2015. The anticipated end of the LIP, along with the opportunity to cover almost 1 million low-income uninsured Floridians with mostly federal dollars, prompted the 2015 Florida Legislature to consider a coverage plan developed by the state Senate. In an unprecedented special session, the Legislature ultimately rejected the Senate’s plan (the Sen. voted 33 to 3 in favor; the House voted 72 to 41 against).

While LIP was not eliminated entirely, the program’s structure was changed, the amount greatly reduced, and coverage of the uninsured was left unresolved. Unless the Governor and House leadership reconsider their position and accept federal funding under the Affordable Care Act (ACA) for coverage of low-income adults (also referred
to as “expansion funding”), the issue of paying for the care of low-income uninsured Floridians will shift from Tallahassee to counties—at least in the short term.

This issue is particularly critical in Miami-Dade County, which has the largest number of low-income uninsured in the state, the largest number of individuals eligible for expansion funding (167,521), and the largest number of people who fall into the coverage gap (89,778). Additionally, Jackson Memorial Hospital (“Jackson”) receives the largest amount of LIP and other safety-net funding in the state, and over 40% of the inter-governmental transfers came from Miami-Dade County.

Funding for safety-net providers is critical—both in terms of ensuring some level of health care access for uninsured county residents, as well as the impact of that funding on the local economy. This brief explains the background, current status, and future changes to the safety-net’s funding streams: the Low-Income Pool; Rate Enhancements or Rate Add-ons; and the Disproportionate Share Hospital Program; as well as the role of Inter-Governmental Transfers. The brief will also discuss the negative impact on the local economy as a result of scheduled LIP reductions over the next 5 years and the positive financial impact on local health care providers if federal expansion dollars are accepted to purchase coverage for uninsured adults. Finally, the brief highlights key issues county leaders should consider in light of imminent changes to safety-net funding.

II. Safety-Net Funding

A. The Low-Income Pool (LIP)

1. Background prior to 2015

In 2006, the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) granted Florida permission to establish the Low-income Pool as part of Florida’s
Medicaid Section 1115 Demonstration Waiver (initially referred to during the multi-year pilot as “Medicaid Reform” and now called the “Managed Medical Assistance Program”) (hereafter referred to as “the Waiver”). Section 1115 waivers allow states to ignore certain otherwise mandatory provisions of the Medicaid Act for time limited “experiments” that the Secretary determines will further the purpose of the Medicaid Act. The overarching purpose of Florida’s 1115 Waiver was to allow the state to shift Medicaid enrollees from fee-for-service into a managed care delivery system. While the mandatory enrollment in managed care was initially limited to a five-county pilot, the LIP program applied statewide to ease the transition to managed care.

The Secretary’s approval of the LIP allowed Florida to establish a pool of federal and local funds to finance supplemental payments—lump sum payments that were disconnected from any individual patient—to certain types of Florida health care providers. The LIP, which was approved in 2006 for a five-year period, distributed approximately $1 billion annually in both federal and state funds to support safety-net providers throughout Florida.

Years of negotiations ensued over the State’s request to make the pilot a statewide managed care program, including a request to extend and expand LIP. In July 2014, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) announced it would grant a three-year extension of the Florida Waiver, except that the LIP would only be extended for one year. “This extension is approved for three years . . . except for the Low-income Pool (LIP) supplemental payment authority which will be extended through June 20, 2015.”

It was not unexpected that the LIP program was scheduled to end. First, the program is entirely discretionary, and all of the discretion rests with the Secretary of
The Secretary had granted Florida permission to establish the LIP program in order to support safety-net funding during the transition into managed care that began with the 2006 Medicaid reform pilot waiver – a transition that was completed in 2014. As noted in the CMS July 2014 letter referenced above, Florida was given an explicit and agreed upon one-year extension of LIP. “CMS and Florida agree that this one-year extension of the LIP will provide stability for providers as Florida transitions to statewide Medicaid managed care, while allowing the state to move toward a significantly reformed Medicaid payment system.”

Also, as early as 2008, the Secretary of HHS was informed that the LIP program was “problematic” and lacked “fiscal integrity.” Those concerns were reiterated in a 2015 independent report. Moreover, the LIP began before the Affordable Care Act (ACA) established an opportunity for states to expand coverage to nearly all low-income adults. While there would still be some individuals who would remain uninsured even with an expanded Medicaid program, e.g. undocumented immigrants, the need to continue federal funding of large uncompensated care pools (such as the LIP) in order to reimburse hospitals for the cost of treating uninsured patients was largely eliminated by the ACA.

Finally, it is worth noting that there were never sufficient LIP dollars—even at the 2014 height of the program—to reimburse safety-net providers for the cost of treating the uninsured. For example, in response to a 2014 complaint from low-income Miami-Dade residents who were eligible for Jackson’s charity care program, hospital officials explained that funding for covering the cost of uncompensated care is inadequate. Jackson officials reported that 29,176 county residents were served under the hospital’s
charity care program at a cost of $365 million. That number included 6,000 who would be ineligible for federal expansion funding due to immigration status. The remaining 23,000 county residents enrolled in the hospital’s charity care program represent only approximately 25% of the county’s residents in the “coverage gap” and less than 15% of those who would be eligible for coverage if the state accepted federal expansion funding.

2. 2015 Negotiations and Litigation

On April 14, 2015, CMS sent a letter to Florida’s Deputy Secretary for Medicaid, reiterating that LIP was a “time-limited demonstration,” and reminding the state that “last year CMS made clear that LIP would not continue in its current form.” The letter also stated CMS’ longstanding concerns regarding the program’s “lack [of] transparency” and “the distribution of funds based on providers’ access to local revenue instead of service to Medicaid patients.” The letter also articulated principles CMS would apply in reviewing Florida’s LIP proposal:

1. *Coverage rather than uncompensated care pools is the best way to secure access to health care for low-income individuals* and uncompensated care pool funding should not pay for costs that would be covered in a Medicaid expansion;

2. Provider payment rates must be sufficient to promote provider participation and access; and

3. Medicaid payments should support services provided to Medicaid beneficiaries and low-income uninsured individuals.
On April 15, 2015, the state Medicaid Director sent a response letter to CMS expressing concern that the federal government was “coercing” the state into expanding Medicaid, in violation of the Supreme Court’s decision in \textit{NFIB v. Sebelius}.\textsuperscript{25} Shortly thereafter, Governor Scott filed a lawsuit against the federal government for alleged coercion.\textsuperscript{26} The lawsuit asked the federal court to order CMS to continue funding Florida’s LIP program. The editorial boards of the state’s major newspapers, including the Miami Herald, criticized the lawsuit, reiterating their opinion that the state should accept federal expansion funding.\textsuperscript{27} On April 20, 2015, the state filed a formal amendment to the Section 1115 waiver seeking to renew LIP for two years at the current funding level.\textsuperscript{28}

On May 21, 2015, the day before the Department of Justice brief defending the federal government was due, CMS sent a letter reiterating the new CMS principles in response to the state’s April 20\textsuperscript{th} LIP extension request.\textsuperscript{29} The letter proposed a one-year reduction of LIP by approximately $1 billion (a 55\% reduction), with a further reduction to $608 million the following year (a 75\% reduction from FY 2014-15). The letter also reiterated the concern that Florida’s Medicaid rates are too low.\textsuperscript{30} While underscoring the new principles that provider rates must be sufficient and noting that LIP dollars could no longer be shifted to rates,\textsuperscript{31} CMS also reminded the state that it could obtain additional federal revenue through increasing payment rates. The rate increases would allow the state to draw down additional federal matching dollars—separate and apart from LIP—which would generate additional funds for providers serving Medicaid beneficiaries. The letter stated that rate increases, which would affect both fee-for-service and managed care
payments to hospitals, “would better support providers in delivering care to Medicaid beneficiaries by addressing any shortfall in payment rates.”

On June 23, 2015, CMS sent a final letter memorializing discussions on the amount of the LIP and the methodology for distribution during the next two fiscal years. The lawsuit was dismissed, and the 2015 Legislature concluded the special session with a reconfigured allocation of funding related to each of the state’s hospitals.

3. Current and Future Status

Overall, state LIP program funding in FY 2015-16 was reduced by over half, and Miami-Dade County LIP was correspondingly reduced by approximately 50%. LIP funding for local providers changed as follows:

TABLE 1: LIP Funding for Miami-Dade County Hospitals in FY 2014-15, 2015-16, and 2016-17

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Provider Name</th>
<th>LIP FY 2014-15</th>
<th>LIP FY 2015-16</th>
<th>LIP FY 2016-17</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ann Bates Leach Eye Hospital</td>
<td>$3,753,034</td>
<td>$370,966</td>
<td>$136,653</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baptist Hospital of Miami</td>
<td>$1,220,091</td>
<td>$1,220,091</td>
<td>$1,026,702</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University of Miami Hospital</td>
<td>$17,353,202</td>
<td>$4,147,962</td>
<td>$116,412</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coral Gables Hospital</td>
<td>$41,320</td>
<td>$41,320</td>
<td>$12,764</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Larkin Community Hospital</td>
<td>$3,672</td>
<td>$538,742</td>
<td>$33,364</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hialeah Hospital</td>
<td>$251,529</td>
<td>$251,529</td>
<td>$5,718,725</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Homestead Hospital</td>
<td>$417,436</td>
<td>$417,436</td>
<td>$25,579,051</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jackson Memorial Hospital</td>
<td>$505,260,965</td>
<td>$250,052,007</td>
<td>$103,799,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kendall Regional Medical Center</td>
<td>$438,884</td>
<td>$3,146,469</td>
<td>$3,480,521</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miami Children’s Hospital</td>
<td>$4,575,997</td>
<td>$4,588,130</td>
<td>$10,970</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mt. Sinai Medical Center</td>
<td>$14,168,992</td>
<td>$8,754,250</td>
<td>$334,967</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Shore Medical Center</td>
<td>$89,269</td>
<td>$89,269</td>
<td>$191,078</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palmetto General Hospital</td>
<td>$296,451</td>
<td>$296,451</td>
<td>$142,431</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University of Miami Hospital and Clinics</td>
<td>$11,374,261</td>
<td>$11,154,856</td>
<td>$17,580</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>$559,245,103</td>
<td>$285,069,478</td>
<td>$140,600,718</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Moving forward, and consistent with CMS’ principles, the LIP will be sized to reimburse safety-net providers for the cost of treating those who are not eligible for other forms of coverage, including those Floridians who would have been eligible for coverage under Medicaid expansion.\textsuperscript{38} In FY 2016 LIP is scheduled to be further reduced to $608 million, approximately a 75% decrease from its peak of over $2.167 billion FY 2014-15. Put another way: local tax payers and providers will be absorbing the cost of treating (most likely through hospital emergency rooms) uninsured Miami-Dade residents whose coverage could have been purchased almost entirely with federal funds, \textit{and} they will be doing so with far less funding than has been available since LIP began in 2006.

On October 5, 2015, CMS announced new Special Terms and Conditions (STC), which include a complex structure and procedure for dispersing the reduced FY 2016-17 LIP funds. The STC allows the state flexibility to establish a “tiering” system whereby the state could divide hospitals into up to 4 tiers and allocate LIP funds based on the hospital’s ratio of charity care to compensated care.\textsuperscript{39} It is not yet clear how the new LIP disbursement structure will be established and function.

However, it is clear that there will be major changes in the 2016-17 LIP program. First, LIP funds can now only be distributed for verifiable costs of care provided to uninsured individuals with incomes up to 200% of the federal poverty level. The care must be provided through a charity care program administered by the hospital in compliance with specific federal principles.\textsuperscript{40} Providers that receive LIP funds can no longer use those funds to cover Medicaid “shortfall”\textsuperscript{41} or insufficient rates, as in the past.\textsuperscript{42} This is a logical and expected change—especially in light of Florida’s move to managed care. For at least two years, CMS has made clear that the state was expected to
reform its Medicaid payment and funding systems by moving away from LIP and supplemental payments and toward a system that would ensure beneficiaries’ access to providers statewide. Florida’s Medicaid payments are now almost exclusively in the form of per member per month payments to managed care plans—rather than payments to hospitals or other providers based upon individual reimbursements (or fee-for-service). Thus, the rates paid by the state to plans must be sufficient such that the plans can ensure “provider participation and [consumer] access and hospitals can no longer use LIP funds to make up for any alleged or actual “shortfall” in their rates.

Second, the size of the LIP program cannot be expanded to include the cost of treating uninsured county residents who would have been eligible for coverage if the state accepted Medicaid expansion funding. And finally, the state can only make LIP distributions based on the ratio of charity care to commercial pay; LIP distributions are no longer be based on a guaranteed return.

Again, it is not yet known what the individual hospital distributions will be for 2016-17 based on the scheduled LIP reduction to $608,000,000. If Miami-Dade and Jackson were to receive approximately the same percent of the total LIP distribution as in 2014-15 and 2015-16, an estimated LIP allotment for Miami-Dade in 2016-17 would be $158 million with $140 million of that going to Jackson. However, the Governor’s proposed budget only provides for a total LIP distribution to the county of approximately $140 million, with approximately $104 million to Jackson. The only other Miami-Dade hospital allocated significant funds under the proposed model is Homestead Hospital, with a $25 million LIP payment.
B. Disproportionate Share Hospital (DSH) Program

Congress established the Medicaid Disproportionate Share Hospital Program (DSH) in the early 1980s to provide additional financial support to hospitals that serve a “disproportionate share” of the poor. Florida’s current annual DSH funding is almost $240 million; with approximately $66.5 million going to Jackson. Under the ACA, DSH was significantly reduced because Congress intended that the ACA’s provisions for Medicaid expansion would considerably reduce the number of uninsured individuals. The Supreme Court’s decision that states were not required to expand Medicaid effectively undermined this quid pro quo in states that have not expanded their Medicaid program. Because the scheduled DSH reduction is not being offset with expansion
funding as contemplated by the ACA, Florida’s safety-net providers like Jackson face the additional loss of DSH revenue, commencing in 2017 with the loss increasing over the next 7 years. Further underscoring the risk to uninsured residents who rely on the safety net is that the Governor’s budget proposes a new DSH distribution which would adversely impact DSH funding for statutory teaching hospitals such as Jackson and Mount Sinai.

C. Rate Enhancements

In addition to LIP and DSH, the “Hospital Funding Tables” also lists specific dollar amounts as “Distributions” to individual hospitals for what are referred to as “Rate Enhancements.” (See excerpts from Table 5 below; reconfigured to include only Miami-Dade hospitals).
### TABLE 2: Net Payments for LIP, DSH, and Rate Enhancements for Miami-Dade County Hospitals in FY 2015-16

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Provider Name</th>
<th>IGTSs</th>
<th>Total LIP, SWL, Rate Enhancements</th>
<th>Total All IGTSs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ann Bates Leech Eye Hospital</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baptist Hospital of Miami</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University of Miami Hospital</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coral Gables Hospital</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Larkin Community Hospital</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hialeah Hospital</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Homestead Hospital</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jackson Memorial Hospital</td>
<td>32,804,082</td>
<td>184,586,579</td>
<td>217,390,661</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kendall Regional Medical Center</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miami Children's Hospital</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mt. Sinai Medical Center</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Shore Medical Center</td>
<td>89,169</td>
<td>11,175</td>
<td>6,401,808</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palmetto General Hospital</td>
<td>296,451</td>
<td>1,088,481</td>
<td>6,758,342</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University of Miami Hospital and Clinics</td>
<td>11,154,896</td>
<td>3,505,040</td>
<td>74,984</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>32,804,082</td>
<td>184,586,579</td>
<td>217,390,661</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For example, in FY 2016, Jackson will receive $250,052,007 in LIP and $66,367,766 in DSH. However, while listed alongside LIP and DSH, the hospital’s specified “rate enhancement” amounts of $84,249,293 (inpatient), $21,006,892 (outpatient), and $24,388,668 (DRG rates) are fundamentally different. Unlike LIP and DSH, the rate enhancement dollar amounts are embedded in individual fee-for-service and MCO rates, and do not represent guaranteed payments to the hospital.  

Rather, a hospital’s rate enhancements represent a projection, or “simulation.”

This projection is based on the individualized rates for various services that the State has agreed to pay to each hospital as reimbursement for patients in the fee-for-service system. Under a managed care system, a hospital’s projected rate enhancement...
distribution is contingent upon two major variables: 1) the extent to which managed care company contracts with that individual hospital mirror the hospital’s “enhanced rate” agreed to by the State; plus, 2) the extent to which a given number of the Managed Care Organization’s (MCO) enrollees actually receive “enhanced rate” services at that hospital. As the Secretary for the Agency for Health Care Administration explained, “the inpatient payments shown in these materials are merely simulations based on historical Medicaid utilization, not proposed appropriations. *Actual hospital results will vary based on their contracts with Medicaid managed care plans and the services they provide...*”  

Thus, it is somewhat misleading for Table 5’s column labeled “Net Payments” to include rate enhancements as a “payment” to the hospital, along with LIP and DSH.  

Again, the only way to guarantee supplemental payments to specified hospitals in a managed care system is either through a waiver, e.g. LIP, or through the DSH program.  

**D. Role of Intergovernmental Transfers “IGTs”: Past, Present, and Future**  

**1. LIP**  

As noted above, the state match portion of the LIP program has largely been funded through local funds sent to Tallahassee as Intergovernmental Transfers (IGT). These local funds, which are generated in various ways, including local taxing districts and local indigent care surtaxes, must be submitted to Tallahassee from a governmental agency in the name of a specific hospital.  

Pursuant to the state statute allowing counties to implement a local indigent care surtax, Miami-Dade County voters elected to do so, and the language of the ordinance specifies that Jackson is the sole beneficiary of the local half-cent sales tax revenue.
Significant local funds, including this half-cent sales tax along with additional county funds allocated for indigent care, have been sent to Tallahassee through IGTs. 70

Prior to the 2015 session and the new agreement governing LIP, there was tremendous local incentive to contribute to the IGT program. Counties and local taxing sources were not only assured that their local safety-net providers would receive the amount submitted on the provider’s behalf, but a significant dollar increase, ranging between 8.5% and 147%, as well. 71 Not surprisingly, counties with greater resources and access to local indigent care funding, contributed most of the IGTs and received most of the LIP dollars. 72 Thus, in 2014-15, Miami-Dade and Broward Counties contributed over 75% of the total amount of IGTs and received over 50% of the total amount of LIP payments.

In fiscal year 2014-15, of the approximate $1 billion in total IGTs over $424 million (or approximately 42%) came from this county on behalf of specified local providers. 73 Following the over 50% reduction in LIP in FY 2015-16, Miami-Dade County’s IGTs were correspondingly reduced to approximately $217 million. 74 However, it is also worth noting that the County’s submission of $217 amounted to over 47% of the total IGTs submitted for FY 2015-16.
In 2016-17, the LIP is scheduled to decline to approximately $600 million. Accordingly, the state match for the LIP will be reduced to no more than $240 million, which represents the state’s 40% share of the total LIP funds.

The Governor’s model in the proposed budget reflects approximately $61 million in IGTs from Miami-Dade County (sent exclusively on behalf of Jackson). As noted earlier, Homestead Hospital also treats a large number of uninsured county residents and is also potentially eligible for a significant LIP payment under the proposed 2016-17 model. However, in order to draw down that payment, an IGT of approximately $10 million would need to be submitted on behalf of the hospital.

2. DSH

IGTs are also used to fund the state match for the DSH program. In FY 2014-15, more than $97 million in IGTs, including $34 million from Miami-Dade were submitted to Tallahassee to fund the DSH program. The state-wide total contribution was reduced to approximately $90 million in 2015-16 (with Miami-Dade contributing approximately
$33 million). This will decrease further if the DSH reductions commence as scheduled in 2017.

3. Rate Enhancements

Prior to 2015, IGTs were also used to support “rate enhancements.”77 Also, as with LIP, there were tremendous local incentives to maximize IGTs in order to increase payment rates to local hospitals.78 However, as discussed, the dollar amounts for rate enhancements listed in the Hospital Funding Tables are merely projections. In a managed care environment, counties cannot be assured that their IGTs submitted for rate enhancements will be returned to the designated provider. As noted during the the April 2015 Senate workshop on Medicaid sustainability, “self-funded (i.e. IGT) rate enhancements are not compatible with managed care because the donor cannot be certain of earning back the donation and the price differential discourages use of hospitals with higher rates.”79 Counties responded to this lack of guarantee by not submitting IGTs for 2015-16 rate enhancements.80 Instead, in 2015-16, the state legislature (for the first time) provided significant general revenue ($400 million) for rate enhancements.81 It is also unclear if this amount of general revenue will be allocated by the 2016 Legislature.

III. Economic Impact of LIP Reduction

On April 21, 2015, the Legislature’s Office of Economic and Demographic Research (EDR) released an Impact Analysis regarding LIP, IGTs, and the state Senate’s plan to draw down federal funds available under the ACA to provide health care coverage to low-income uninsured Floridians.82 Dr. Amy Baker, Chief Economist for EDR, explained how the federal funds for Florida’s LIP program function like a “helicopter
"drop" of federal dollars into the state and detailed how the loss of LIP funds would impact jobs, revenue, and program closures.

Over the course of 5 years, approximately $6.5 billion in federal dollars will be lost if the LIP were eliminated.\textsuperscript{83} In adjusting this data to reflect a 75\% reduction, the cumulative loss of LIP funding over 5 years is approximately $4.85 billion. Dr. Baker’s testimony concluded that the LIP loss “is a big enough change to the economy that we can see it. We will feel it. We will know it.”\textsuperscript{84} Her slides included a chart illustrating losses based on the then scheduled elimination of LIP, and the chart below is adjusted to reflect a 75\% reduction in LIP dollars.

\begin{center}
\begin{tikzpicture}
\node {Cumulative Impact of the Loss of LIP Funding over 5 years:}
  child {node {State Revenues are Lost} edge from parent node[draw=white,fill=white] {\$458.97 Million Lost}}
  child {node {State GDP is Reduced} edge from parent node[draw=white,fill=white] {\$8 Billion Lost}}
  child {node {Employees Leave the State} edge from parent node[draw=white,fill=white] {15,000 Jobs Lost}}
  child {node {Disposable Personal Income is Lost} edge from parent node[draw=white,fill=white] {\$8.25 Billion Lost}};
\end{tikzpicture}
\end{center}

In sum, this reduction in the amount of federal dollars being “helicopter dropped” into the state translates into the following losses for Florida’s economy:
- $459 million in state revenue;
- $8 billion in GDP;
- $8.25 billion in personal income,
- 15,000 jobs.

Given that Miami-Dade County has annually received over 25% of the total LIP dollars, the county could expect to lose approximately $1.2 billion over five years. Assuming that local losses in terms of jobs and personal income are also approximately 25% of the state’s totals, Miami-Dade is looking at losses of over $2 billion in personal income and 3,700 jobs.

**IV. Federal Funding for Coverage of the Uninsured Will Offset Losses**

The scheduled reduction of LIP and DSH funding would be more than offset if the Florida Legislature accepts federal funding to expand coverage for uninsured low-income adults. According to the EDR’s April 2015 data, nearly 1 million (951,826) people would be eligible for expansion, and nearly 850,000 (834,674) would enroll under expanded coverage. This number includes almost 570,000 low-income Floridians who have no opportunity to obtain affordable health insurance because they are in the coverage gap.

The Social Services Estimating Conference (SSEC) previously predicted that coverage of the expansion population over ten years would result in a net influx of approximately $50 billion in federal funding, over ten years to cover the cost of health care for the newly enrolled. This data was derived by estimating the per member per month (PMPM) cost of health care coverage for a childless adult times the number of newly eligible adults in the Medicaid expansion population expected to enroll.
The same methodology can be applied to estimate the potential annual net gain in revenue to health care providers if the Legislature accepts funding to expand coverage to uninsured low-income adults in the gap. Specifically, multiplying the estimated number of county residents eligible for expansion coverage (167,521)\(^89\) times the annual cost of paying for their coverage ($543\(^90\) x 12) equals $1,091,566,836. An estimate of the revenue that would be generated for their care (taking into account the Medical Loss Ratio (MLR), which requires that 85% of the payment to the managed care company must be spent on health care services and treatments for enrollees)\(^91\) is approximately $4.6 billion over 5 years. This new revenue, which is almost entirely comprised of federal tax dollars,\(^92\) far exceeds the County’s 5 year cumulative loss of LIP dollars.\(^93\)

Again, this data only represents new dollars that the county’s health care providers will receive if federal funding for expansion coverage is accepted. It does not include economic data related to the improved health and productivity of county residents by virtue of having insurance—as opposed to relying on hospital emergency rooms and Jackson’s underfunded charity care program.\(^94\) Nor does it include the positive multiplier effects to the local economy from the new revenue local health care providers can expect. Recent studies demonstrating the substantial gains throughout state and local economies as a result of expansion funding have been published and are cited in the endnotes, along with studies documenting savings to the state budget if federal expansion dollars are drawn down.\(^95\)

**V. Conclusion: Issues for Miami-Dade County to Consider**

Paying for the care of low-income uninsured Floridians will shift from Tallahassee to local counties—at least in the short term if Florida continues to refuse to
accept federal Medicaid dollars. Given the currently scheduled reduction of LIP, $1.2 billion of federal Medicaid dollars will no longer be “helicopter dropped” into Miami-Dade County over the next five years.96

Stakeholders should understand that the ability to use local IGT dollars to leverage federally matched and enhanced funding for Jackson and other county providers has been fundamentally altered, and that IGTs are no longer used to fund hospital rate enhancements. They should also understand the budget implications to the county given that the $105,256,185 of rate enhancement dollars for Jackson listed as “distributions” and “net payments” by the Legislature represent simulations that are subject to major variables rather than “net payments” to the County’s publicly funded safety-net.

County leaders should consider that because approximately 150,000 uninsured residents are eligible for coverage, local health care providers would gain approximately $4 billion in new revenue over five years if those individuals received coverage. Finally, local leaders and stakeholders should understand how that increased revenue would impact the local economy.

Important questions for local leaders and stakeholders include:

- Whether services for local indigent health care under Jackson’s charity care program (pursuant to which all country residents can apply for free or reduced cost care) will remain the same or be reduced; and if the decision is made to maintain the Jackson charity care program at least at its current level, what will be the necessary increased local revenue source?

- Apart from the sales surtax funds (which are the property of Jackson pursuant to the language of the implementing ordinance), what should be done with other local funds previously submitted to Tallahassee on behalf of providers; should an IGT be made on behalf of Homestead Hospital of $10 million dollars in order to draw down potential matching federal funds of $15 million dollars (for a total LIP payment of $25 million); should IGTs be submitted on behalf of the other 6 local providers eligible for a LIP payment?
• Given that future LIP dollars can only be used for verifiable “charity care,” what consumer protections should be provided to uninsured county residents who are eligible for charity care programs at local LIP recipient hospitals in order to ensure that the consumer is not subject to any collection action, including balance billing, related to the event reported as “charity care”?

• Can local dollars be used to leverage additional funds for delivery system reform, including programs related to addressing the social determinants of health, and/or aimed at improving outcomes and lowering costs?

In sum, it is clear that future Medicaid safety-net funding is extremely uncertain. Both the amount and the structure of this funding will change in FY 2016-17, and this change will have a significant adverse impact on Miami-Dade County’s economy and providers serving low income insured and uninsured county residents. Thus, it is critical that stakeholders both individually understand, and publicly discuss, how to fund and deliver health care for uninsured local residents.

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Under Medicaid, costs are shared between the federal and state governments. The federal government covers approximately 58% of all Medicaid costs in Florida. This percentage is referred to as the federal matching rate or “FMAP.” In contrast to 58% FMAP for the current Medicaid population (including a 58/42 federal/state match for LIP), the ACA requires the federal government to cover 100% of costs associated with the newly eligible population until 2016. The FMAP for the newly eligible population gradually tapers down to no less than 90% in 2020 and thereafter.


See infra note 89.

According to the Florida Agency for Health Care Administration (AHCA), Medicaid recipients between 18 and 64 years old in Miami-Dade account for 15.84% of Medicaid recipients in the state of Florida. Florida Agency for Health Care Administration, Medicaid Eligibles Report: October 2015, at table “Age by County,” available at https://ahca.myflorida.com/medicaid/Finance/data_analytics/eligibles_report/docs/age_cntv_2015-10-31.pdf. Assuming that the percent of people in the coverage gap, per county, is roughly equivalent to the percent currently on Medicaid, per county, the number of people in the coverage gap in Miami-Dade County is derived by multiplying the number in the gap statewide, 567,000, by 15.84%, totaling approximately 90,000.


3 Under Medicaid, costs are shared between the federal and state governments. The federal government covers approximately 58% of all Medicaid costs in Florida. This percentage is referred to as the federal matching rate or “FMAP.” In contrast to 58% FMAP for the current Medicaid population (including a 58/42 federal/state match for LIP), the ACA requires the federal government to cover 100% of costs associated with the newly eligible population until 2016. The FMAP for the newly eligible population gradually tapers down to no less than 90% in 2020 and thereafter. Florida Legal Services, Medicaid Funding Losses to County Safety-Net Providers: Federal Funding Extending Coverage Would Offset (Apr. 27, 2015) [hereinafter the 2015 South Florida Report], available at https://flshealthblog.files.wordpress.com/2015/03/miami-dade-lip-report-april-27-2015_update_final1.pdf.


5 See infra note 89.

6 According to the Florida Agency for Health Care Administration (AHCA), Medicaid recipients between 18 and 64 years old in Miami-Dade account for 15.84% of Medicaid recipients in the state of Florida. Florida Agency for Health Care Administration, Medicaid Eligibles Report: October 2015, at table “Age by County,” available at https://ahca.myflorida.com/medicaid/Finance/data_analytics/eligibles_report/docs/age_cntv_2015-10-31.pdf. Assuming that the percent of people in the coverage gap, per county, is roughly equivalent to the percent currently on Medicaid, per county, the number of people in the coverage gap in Miami-Dade County is derived by multiplying the number in the gap statewide, 567,000, by 15.84%, totaling approximately 90,000.


8 Section 1115 of the Social Security Act allows the Secretary of HHS to waive compliance with most (but not all) of the Medicaid statutory requirements “to the extent and for the period he finds necessary” to enable a State or States to carry out an “experimental, pilot, or demonstration project which, in the judgment of the Secretary, is likely to assist in promoting the objectives of” the Medicaid Act. 42 U.S.C § 1315(a); see 42 C.F.R. § 431.404.
See Fla. Stat. § 409.91211(1)(c).


Beno v. Shalala, 30 F.3d 1057, 1069 (9th Cir. 1994) (citation omitted); see also, e.g., Aquayo v. Richardson, 352 F. Supp. 462, 470 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), aff’d, 473 F.2d 1090 (2d Cir. 1973).

CMS July 2014 Letter, supra note 11, at 103.

U.S. Government Accountability Office, Medicaid Demonstration Waivers: Recent HHS Approvals Continue to Raise Cost and Oversight Concerns 28 (Jan. 2008) (GAO-08-87) (finding federal spending under the Florida LIP “problematic” and that HHS had not ensured the “fiscal integrity” of the Medicaid program); see also GAO, Medicaid Demonstration Waivers: Approval Process Raises Cost Concerns and Lacks Transparency 14-17 (June 2013) (GAO-13-384) (raising similar concerns with similar pooling arrangements in Texas).


E-mail from Ashwin Kumar, Jackson Health System (Apr. 8, 2015, 08:54 AM EST) (on file with authors).

“Nationally, more than three million poor uninsured adults fall into the “coverage gap” that results from state decisions not to expand Medicaid, meaning their income is above current Medicaid eligibility but below the lower limit for Marketplace premium tax credits. These individuals would have been newly-eligible for Medicaid had their state chosen to expand coverage.” The Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured, KFF Issue Brief (October 23, 2015), available at http://kff.org/health-reform/issue-brief/the-coverage-gap-uninsured-poor-adults-in-states-that-do-not-expand-medicaid-an-update/.

23,000 of the 89,778 county residents in the gap is approximately 25%. 23,000 of the 167,521 county residents eligible for expansion is approximately 13%.

Letter from Vikki Wachino, Acting Director, Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Servs., to Justin Senior, Deputy Sec’y for Medicaid, Florida Agency for Health Care Admin (Apr. 14,

24 Id.


30 Id at 3.

31 Id.

32 Id at 4.


34 The Legislature produced a document entitled Medicaid Hospital Funding Programs, composed of multiple spreadsheets, which “display calculations made by the Florida Legislature in making appropriations for the Medicaid hospital funding programs.“ The document’s spreadsheets include columns for the amount of each hospital’s different LIP programs, rate enhancements and DSH, as well as the amount of funding (“intergovernmental transfers” or “IGT”) contributed by local entities on behalf of each individual hospital. Hospital Funding Tables 2015-16, supra note 7.
Governor’s Model, Florida LIP Funding 2016-17 (on file with authors) [hereinafter Hospital Funding Tables 2016-17]. Notably, this is a proposed model which may be altered by the Legislature during the 2016 session.


39 2015 STC, supra note 38, at # 71(b)(i). The hospitals in each tier will then be compensated a percent of their uncompensated care. For example, hospitals in Tier 1 may be compensated for 100% of their charity care costs, hospitals in Tier 2 - 75%, Tier 3 – 50%, and Tier 4 – 25%. The state is currently developing a model, which will then need to be approved by CMS.

40 2015 STC, supra note 38, at # 68(b).

41 “Medicaid shortfall is the difference between non-DSH Medicaid payments and hospital cost to provide care to Medicaid recipients.” Navigant Report, supra note 15, at 56.

42 2015 STC, supra note 38, at # 71(a).


44 Vikki Wachino May 21, 2015, supra note 29, at 3.

45 2015 STC, supra note 38, at # 68(b).

46 2015 STC, supra note 38, at # 67.


48 Miami-Dade has received approximately 26% of total LIP and Jackson approximately 23% of the total LIP. Hospital Funding Tables 2014-15, supra note 7 & Hospital Funding Tables 2015-16, supra note 7.

49 Hospital Funding Tables 2016-17, supra note 7.

50 Hospital Funding Tables 2016-17, supra note 7. Also, Homestead Hospital serves a large number of uninsured and was not a previous recipient of significant LIP funds. Hospital Funding Tables 2014-15, supra note 37 & Hospital Funding Tables 2015-16, supra note 37.

51 Corey Davis, NATIONAL HEALTH LAW PROGRAM, Q&A DISPROPORTIONATE SHARE HOSPITAL PAYMENTS AND THE MEDICAID EXPANSION 2 (July 2012) [hereinafter NHeLP DSH], available at http://www.healthlaw.org/component/jsfsubmit/showAttachment?tmpl=raw&id=00Pd0000006EJLIEAO.


53 Hospital Funding Tables 2015-16, supra note 7, at 36.


Protecting Access to Medicare Act, H.R. 4302, 113th Cong. § 221 (2014) (extending the implementation of DSH reductions from 2014 to 2017); see also, Kaiser DSH Issue Brief, supra note 54, at 2-3. The federal government delayed implementation of the DSH reductions until 2017 and will follow the DSH Health Reform Methodology specified in the final rule. This methodology takes 5 factors into account in determining DSH cuts across states: (1) Is the state a Low-DSH or a Non-Low DSH State?; (2) How will the reductions be allocated for the Low-DSH and Non-Low DSH States?; (3) How will the pool amounts be allocated across the states?; (4) What is a state’s total reduction?; and (5) What other factors are considered?

Although the details are not yet clear, under the ACA, the Secretary of Health and Human Services is required to cut DSH funding by $14.1 billion from 2014-2019. NHeLP DSH, supra note 51, at 4. For details on Medicaid DSH reductions, see 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-4(f)(7).


Dudek Letter, supra note 59.

Id. “Raising one hospital’s price compared to another may seem like a helpful measure on its face, but it will undermine that hospital’s ability to attract patients in a managed care environment. Health plans will simply steer patients to less expensive hospitals nearby, undermining the impact of the increase…It is important to note that the inpatient payments shown in these materials are merely simulations based on historical Medicaid utilization, not proposed appropriations. Actual hospital results will vary based on their contracts with Medicaid managed care plans and the services they provide during fiscal year 2015-16.”

Dudek Letter, supra note 59. Further, underscoring the uncertain nature of rate enhancements is the fact that “self-funded [IGT] rate enhancements are not compatible with managed care because the donor cannot be certain of earning back the donation and the price differential discourages use of hospitals with higher rates.” FL. SENATE, WORKSHOP ON SENATE PLAN FOR MEDICAID SUSTAINABILITY, at 6 (Apr. 21, 2015) [hereinafter April 21, 2015 Senate Meeting Materials], available at http://www.faast.org/sites/default/files/Supporting%20042415.pdf See also where the Deputy Secretary for Medicaid explained “these types of facility specific add-ons were not expected to continue to work well in managed care.” Justin Senior, AGENCY FOR HEALTH CARE ADMINISTRATION, UPDATE ON STATEWIDE MEDICAID MANAGED CARE AND LOW
https://ahca.myflorida.com/medicaid/recent_presentations/SMC_LIP_Update_Senate_HHS_Ap
63 See Table 2, supra, page 16, last column.
64 42 CFR 438.60
65 Navigant Report, supra note 15, at 13-14. (“In Florida, IGTs are used to help fund hospital rate payments (inpatient and outpatient), the LIP program, the DSH program, and the physician supplemental payment program. In SFY 2014/15, for example, AHCA anticipates receiving a little over $1.3 billion in IGTs resulting in nearly $3.3 billion in reimbursements when combined with federal matching funds…. In previous years and in the current year (SFY 2014/15), IGTs fund nearly the entire state share of the traditional $1 billion LIP program and over 60 percent of the state share of the DSH program…. In addition, IGTs fund 100 percent of the state share of LIP-6, which was formerly known as self-funded IGTs.”)
66 See Fla. Stat. §212.055(5).
68 Fla. Stat. §212.055(5)
70 See Table 2, supra, page 16.
72 Over 80% of the State’s IGTs come from Miami-Dade and Broward counties. Hospital Funding Tables 2014-15, supra note 7.
73 Id.
74 Hospital Funding Tables 2015-16, supra note 7.
75 Hospital Funding Tables 2014-15, supra note 7.
76 Hospital Funding Tables 2015-16, supra note 7.
77 Justin Senior January 7, 2015 Presentation, supra note 62, at 20. “[S]elf-funded (IGT) hospital rate enhancements have been used by Florida for several years to allow hospitals with local funding sources to ‘buy back’ rate cuts.”
79 April 21, 2015 Senate Meeting Materials, supra note 62, at 6.
80 Counties submitted a total of $459,108,788 for IGTs in 2015-16, which was applied to the state match portion of LIP. The state match portion for rate enhancements was provided through $400 million in GR. Hospital Funding Tables 2015-16, supra note 7, at 53.
81 Hospital Funding Tables 2015-16, supra note 7, at 53. Under the column for “Total IGTs” there is a line item for GR (i.e. General Revenue) totaling $411,256,000. See also, Mary Ellen Klas, House and Senate agree to $400 million to backfill LIP, TAMPA BAY TIMES, June 6, 2015, http://www.tampabay.com/blogs/the-buzz-florida-politics/house-and-senate-agree-to-400-milion-to-backfill-lip/2232615.

83 Id at 2. The state’s April 2015 model estimated that elimination of LIP would result in the following losses: $611.96 million of state revenue, $10.69 billion in GD, and $11 billion in personal income, along with nearly 20,000 jobs.

84 Rick Stone, State Economist Warns ‘We Will Feel It’ If Medicaid-Related Hospital Funds Are Lost, WLRN, Apr. 21, 2015, http://wlrn.org/post/state-economist-warns-we-will-feel-it-if-medicaid-related-hospital-funds-are-lost.

85 EDR Presentation April 21, 2015, supra note 82, at 5.


87 The authors recognize that at this point in time, this estimate is marginally outdated, and an updated estimate, accounting for the years without expansion, is not yet available. See also, The Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation, The Florida Healthcare Landscape (Nov. 2013), available at http://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/2013/11/8511-the-florida-health-care-landscape1.pdf.

88 SOCIAL SERVICES ESTIMATING CONFERENCE, ESTIMATES RELATING TO FEDERAL AFFORDABLE CARE ACT: TITLE XIX (MEDICAID) & TITLE XXI (CHIP) PROGRAMS, at 15 (Mar. 7, 2013), available at http://edr.state.fl.us/Content/conferences/medicaid/FederalAffordableHealthCareActEstimates.pdf [hereinafter SSEC], at 14-16. Note that the PMPM of $543 was based on SFY 2013. For the purpose of this report, it has not been adjusted for inflation.

89 According to EDR data, there are 951,826 Floridians eligible for Medicaid expansion. See EDR Presentation April 21, 2015, supra note 82, at 5. According to the Florida Agency for Health Care Administration (AHCA), Medicaid recipients in Miami-Dade account for 17.6% of Medicaid recipients in the state of Florida. FLORIDA AGENCY FOR HEALTH CARE ADMINISTRATION, CURRENT COMPREHENSIVE MEDICAID MANAGED CARE ENROLLMENT REPORTS: December 2015, at table 5 [hereinafter AHCA Medicaid Enrollment by County], available at https://ahca.myflorida.com/medicaid/Finance/data_analytics/enrollment_report/docs/ENR_December_2015.xls.

Assuming that the percent of people eligible for Medicaid expansion, per county, is roughly equivalent to the percent currently on Medicaid, per county, the number of people eligible in Miami-Dade County is derived by multiplying the number eligible statewide, 951,826, by 17.6%, totaling 167,521.

90 SSEC, supra note 88, at 14 -16. Note that the PMPM of $543 was based on SFY 2013. For the purpose of this report, it has not been adjusted for inflation nor does it reflect the regional PMPM provided to Miami Dade County as compared to the state average rate.

91 2015 STC, supra note 38, at 2.
In addition, Jackson has significant encounter fees that are much larger than Medicaid’s and which are a proven barrier for people below 100% FPL. Jackson Health System Fees, available at http://www.jacksonhealth.org/library/forms/carecard-fees.pdf.


If Miami-Dade has historically received approximately 25% of the total state LIP funding, we can extrapolate that Miami-Dade will experience approximately 25% of the loss felt statewide. As explained in Section III, it is estimated that the cumulative loss of LIP funding statewide over 5 years is approximately $4.85 billion. 25% of $4.85 billion is approximately $1.2 billion.