Political violence and counterterrorism: Disputed boundaries of a postcolonial state

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This chapter seeks to describe how Indonesia has dealt with the threat of terrorism in the post-9/11 era. However, beyond merely identifying the country’s counterterrorism policies, the analysis is placed within the broader context of how the state has historically dealt with internal security threats. This chapter argues that, contrary to the rhetoric of the ‘war on terror’, Indonesia’s counterterrorism policies are neither a specific response to transnational terror networks, nor simply a by-product of the post-9/11 era. Instead, Indonesia’s counterterrorism policies are entangled with historical state reactions to internal security challenges – ranging from social violence to terrorism and secessionism – since the country’s independence in 1945. While these different conflicts had diverse political, ideological, religious and territorial characteristics, disputes over the basic institutions and boundaries of the state run as a common thread.

As such, the Indonesian state’s response to contemporary political violence – including the separatist movement in Aceh and the threat of transnational terrorism, allegedly centred on the Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) group – should be re-examined as part of these broader historical trends in state responses to internal political violence.1 The chapter further argues that while the state, in seeking to maintain its territorial integrity and defend its institutions, has responded in a variety of ways to these conflicts, the particular tools of coercion and repression used in President Suharto’s New Order have contributed to the rise of JI and its splinter groups and left a legacy of mixed responses to terror. The New Order (1966–98) was a military-backed authoritarian regime that emerged through opposition to President Sukarno and the Communist Party (Partai Komunis Indonesia, or PKI). The examination of the evolution of internal political violence and state responses demonstrates that terrorism and counterterrorism in Indonesia are rooted within this context of the disputed postcolonial state. The New Order’s repression of domestic challengers and initial covert encouragement of Islamic extremism and the military’s historically dominant role within the state have conditioned both contemporary political violence and the state’s response to it. While regime change, security-sector reform, and the terrorist attacks of September 11th 2001 (9/11) and the 2002 Bali bombings have substantially altered the political and security landscape for Indonesia, the legacy of the New Order nonetheless exerts significant influence today.

These arguments are substantiated in the four parts of this chapter. The first part describes the evolution of and connection between organized political violence and the state in Indonesia. This overview of the threat environment allows us to place our discussion of post-9/11 terrorism within a broader historical context. The second part examines Indonesia’s post-authoritarian environment, where the evolution of JI and the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) are juxtaposed as the state’s most significant internal threats. This allows a description of how the evolution of these groups and the threat they posed is tied to how the state has managed past instances of political violence. The third part discusses recent developments in Indonesia’s counterterrorism policies. Here, the analysis finds that the historical context of internal political violence competes with the contemporary concerns of the democratic regime to lead to a delicate balance between a repressive (hard) and population-focused (soft) approach in state counterterrorism. Finally, the chapter concludes with a broader take on Indonesia’s responses to terror by placing it within the context of the global war on terror.

Violence and the state in Indonesia

Indonesia’s internal threat environment has historically been multifaceted and ever-evolving. On the one hand, the diversity of violence in a country of over 17,000 islands inhabited by over 240 million people from hundreds of ethnic groups makes it difficult to identify a single pattern. One scholar has argued, for instance, that there are at least five different types of organized violence in Indonesia: secessionist conflicts, urban riots, ethnic purges, religious wars and terrorist bombings.2 But, despite this diversity, the state has tended to adopt a coercive strategy to address each form of violence. This is partly

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because the majority of these threats have been directed against or provoked by discriminatory or repressive actions of the state, but also partly because of the historically prominent role of the military in tackling domestic political violence. One study shows that 67 per cent of 249 military operations between 1945 and 2004 were meant to tackle internal security threats. While the New Order generally managed to keep a lid on major internal challenges, threats of separatism, low-level terrorism, and sporadic violence persisted. Furthermore, the regime’s abrupt end sparked these latent tensions and opened the floodgates to a whole host of organized violence.

Taken as a whole, there were at least 215 acts of political violence aimed against the state between 1945 and 2009 (more than half involving acts of terror such as bombings). Approximately half of these acts of political violence involved disputes and contestations over the state’s authority, legitimacy or use of repressive measures – which partially explains why around 40 per cent of those attacks occurred in Java (often considered the ‘centre’ of the state, and thus a legitimate target for grievances against the government). These figures illustrate how violent contestation over the institutions and boundaries of the state has historically dominated the country’s threat environment. Notably, violent internal conflicts in Indonesia have often reflected hostilities between the central and local governments and between the state and (political) Islam.

We argue that, given the historical prominence of the Indonesian military (Tentara Nasional Indonesia, TNI), the way the Indonesian state has responded to internal threats has been significantly shaped by how that organization assesses and addresses threats. We further argue that this dynamic often prolonged internal security threats, as we elaborate in the next section. Furthermore, we suggest that the TNI’s perspective on threats to and within Indonesian society has been shaped by its colonial legacy. In particular, while Dutch colonialism united the disparate islands that now form its territory, Indonesia’s postcolonial history has been fraught with violent conflicts over the character and geography of the state. Therefore, as a postcolonial state, Indonesia inherited from its predecessors an intense distrust towards its own subjects, as well as a strong concentration of power in the centre because of the fear that the delegation of power could lead to disloyalty and separatism.

To ‘hold the centre’, so the argument goes, Indonesia needed a source of authority or legitimacy to unite its disparate territorial and ideological elements. The military has, more often than not, filled that role through its dispersed command structure designed to exploit the territory and control the people. This mindset of course exacerbates the assumption that the biggest threats to the state, and thus the military, would come from its own people – as its history seems to suggest. The Indonesian military’s experience in this regard is in some ways similar to the experience of many third-world states undergoing decolonization in the 1950s and 1960s. The need to manage internal security threats with underdeveloped state capacity and political institutions is similar, but the manner and rationale in which the Indonesian military did so – through its ‘dual function’ doctrine – came from its unique guerrilla warfare experience during the revolutionary war (1945–49).

Upon declaring independence in 1945, Indonesia’s ability to withstand military assaults by colonial powers seeking to re-occupy Indonesia after World War Two depended on the close relationship between the political and military leaders as much as the economic, political and moral support given by the local population for the guerrilla war. As such, the military’s doctrine of ‘Total People’s Warfare’ (Perang Semesta) was initially designed in the 1940s to align the people with the military in the face of common threats (i.e., foreign forces). This revolutionary experience has since been seared into the military’s education and training system and constitutionally codified as the country’s national defence doctrine.

Over time this worldview, ironically, has been used to justify a pervasive intervention by the military in all aspects of political life. Under the New Order in particular, military ideology has celebrated the pursuit of economic development as a means to save the nation from the catastrophe of Sukarno’s Old Order (1945–67), even portraying and rationalizing political stability as a precondition for development. In somewhat circular fashion, such developmentalist logic was then frequently reasserted and revised to ensure that the military’s political intervention was perpetually required by any new evidence of national instability. This evidence often included challenges posed by Islamist and secessionist groups, which jointly served to bolster the perceived necessity of military intervention and the centralization of state power. In turn, the repression of these groups then fuelled the context of political violence that gave rise to JI and GAM.

‘These imperatives are further guided, and were officially proclaimed in 1973, by the idea of ‘national resilience’. The notion of national resilience continued the inward-looking direction of the Indonesian state and its security apparatus which was first present in General Abdul Nasution’s ‘Middle Way’ doctrine. In his initial conception, the military had to stand in the middle of two political polarizing ends – the left (communism) and the right (religious extremism). But as the idea developed, it became increasingly codified as a middle or dual role that combined the military’s influence in security and defence with socio-economic and political influence. This logic underpinned the military’s doctrine of dwifungsi, or ‘dual function’, and its vision of itself as a ‘total social institution’. The doctrine then justified the military’s pervasive
influence, which further served three functions under the New Order: (1) to monitor the population, including through domestic intelligence gathering; (2) to provide a deterrent to rebellions; and (3) to respond to potential outbreaks of communal political violence.

The domestic influence of the military and the ideology of the New Order regime, by justifying violent and repressive responses to internal threats, perpetuated a cycle of violence. This is particularly the case as Suharto justified state-sponsored violence as a reflection of his intense fear of the wayward proclivities of the Indonesian people and of their consequent social and political eccentricities. As a consequence, one of the many ironies of the New Order was that the security of its citizenry was thought to require ‘appropriate, and appropriately timed and calibrated, doses of violence against certain sections of that citizenry.’ One scholar argued that the regime’s reliance on the military to handle internal security problems reinforced the view that it was the only actor that could secure a unified Indonesia, a view that continues to impact Indonesian security policy today.

Taken as a whole, the evolution of organized domestic political violence and the state’s response to it suggests that internal security threats, whether they were armed rebellions or acts of terrorism, have often been viewed by the state as one and the same – as threats to itself. As such, repressive actions, particularly under Suharto’s tenure, were perceived to be an ‘acceptable’ and ‘normal’ response. The advent of democratization in 1998, however, was supposed to change this basic calculus. But as we hope to show in the next section, the legacy of the Indonesian insecurity state continues to linger.

**Threats to the state? Juxtaposing Jemaah Islamiyah and the Free Aceh Movement**

The abrupt manner in which Suharto’s authoritarian rule ended unleashed a host of centrifugal forces threatening the violent breakup of Indonesia. Once debates over the dissolution of the central state died down, the threat of transnational terrorism and secessionist conflict loomed large among the myriad remaining internal security challenges in the 2000s, particularly JI’s terrorist attacks and the independence movement in Aceh as embodied by the Free Aceh Movement (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka, or GAM). Indonesia launched the largest military operation in its history when it went on a full-scale war against GAM in 2003. The conflict ended after the 2004 tsunami led to the signing of the Helsinki peace agreement in 2005, followed by local elections. Meanwhile, since the 2002 Bali bombings, JI – both as a group and as a ‘role model’ for splinter cells – has topped the country’s terror threat list; even more so as nearly all major bombings up to 2009 have been associated with the group’s active or former members.

The evolution of these two groups and the threats they posed to Indonesian society can be understood within the broader context of how the state has responded to internal security threats. Both JI and GAM shared a common history as ideological descendants of the Darul Islam movement, which sought to establish an Islamic state in Indonesia during the struggle for independence. Originally loyal to the Republic, S.M. Kartosowirjono proclaimed an Islamic state – Darul Islam – in 1947 following the Republic’s concession of West Java to the Dutch in the Renville Treaty. Thereafter, Kartosowirjono’s forces fought against both the Dutch and the army of the Republic. Parallel movements developed in South Sulawesi and Aceh, and formally joined the Darul Islam revolt against Jakarta in 1953. However, in 1962, Kartosowirjono was captured and executed by the army, leaving Darul Islam leaderless. Throughout the Old and New Orders, separatists desiring Islamic rule in Aceh and other Islamic groups continued to draw on the ideas of the Darul Islam movement and to clash with the secular and centralized Indonesian state. This included JI, which sought to fulfill the promise of Darul Islam by establishing a region-wide Islamic state in Southeast Asia while also developing solidarity with other Islamist groups, including al Qaeda and GAM.

Not only do these groups share these common ideological origins, both also represent the cyclical pattern of domestic political violence in Indonesia, with the control over the boundaries and institutions of the state at their centre. While religious ideas motivated their fight against the state, they were also fuelled by the repressive, heavy-handed tactics of the state. Indeed, while Darul Islam and its ‘satellite rebellions’ in Aceh and Sulawesi were effectively defeated by the late 1960s, the Indonesian state under Suharto’s authoritarian New Order had a hand in ‘reviving’ these groups.  

When it comes to JI, it was under Suharto that two key factors came together in a way that ultimately produced the Bali bombers. First, the Indonesian intelligence apparatus, particularly Suharto’s Special Operations (Opsus), helped resuscitate Darul Islam in the 1970s in the hope that it would become an asset to Golkar, Suharto’s political party. General Ali Moertopo, the head of Opsus, believed he could fund and co-opt Darul Islam to promote the New Order’s anti-communist stance and to help ensure the electoral dominance of Golkar by uniting with Muslims against leftist groups. While the new representatives of Darul Islam were seen as political assets, the group’s splinters – including Komando Jihad – usefully served as an internal threat to justify military excursions and weaken Islamic political parties when they resorted to violence. However, unforeseen by Suharto and Moertopo, a revived Darul Islam also became the precursor of JI inside Indonesia.
The second factor that contributed to the establishment of JI in Indonesia was the suppression of Islamic political parties in a way that not only denied Indonesian Islamists any role in the government but made them the target of active repression. All political parties were forced to amalgamate into a small number of closely supervised organizations in 1973, leading the Muslim parties to fuse into the United Development Party (PPP). Further into the 1970s and 1980s, Suharto sought to neutralize any potential Islamic opposition by developing a range of corporatist initiatives for the capture of target segments of the Muslim constituency, such as mosques, preachers, intellectuals, religious scholars and women’s organizations, into non-party organizations.\(^{29}\) This was coupled with other forms of political repression, including restrictions on political expression and Islamic gatherings.\(^ {30}\)

This repression was exacerbated by the fact that internal security agencies, primarily under the Operational Command to Restore Order and Security (Kopkamtib), were given extrajudicial authority to root out communist sympathizers while muffling any dissenting voices against the regime.\(^ {31}\) For more than twenty years, the army-dominated Kopkamtib arrested those it considered ‘subversive elements’, including student activists, journalists, Muslim leaders and even dissenting politicians. Among those who fell victim to this strategy were the founders of JI, Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Ba’asyir.

Sungkar and Ba’asyir were targets of Suharto’s crackdown following the bombings of the 1970s, and were jailed from 1978 to 1982 after they began their rise within the radical Islamic community in Central Java.\(^ {32}\) They left Indonesia after their release. While the details of their travels and activities abroad are not well established, including how and to what extent they were connected to al Qaeda,\(^ {33}\) they appeared to have set up a base in Southeast Asia in the early 1990s and eventually returned to Indonesia after Suharto’s downfall in 1998. While there have been disagreements over who in the JI organization orchestrated the Bali bombings,\(^ {34}\) Suharto’s repression gave the group’s leaders their formative ideological experience of fighting the state. The banning of independent Islamic parties also meant the removal of any meaningful political role for youth organizations that shared their goals, opening the door for young disenfranchised youths to a militant, clandestine movement such as JI.\(^ {35}\)

In short, Suharto’s policies towards Islamic political parties and non-state groups set the stage for tensions between the state and the Muslim community and for JI’s rise. Further, tied to the narrative of national resilience and the role of the security apparatus in maintaining the New Order, state agents set their perceived enemies against each other. The co-option of Darul Islam to counter domestic communists, followed by the restrictions on Muslim political parties and Islamic practices, were illustrative of the Suharto regime’s confrontational stance towards its domestic competitors. This consequently intensified the opposition to the state by extreme supporters of Darul Islam. Arguably, however, while the vast majority of Muslims in Indonesia have pursued their political objectives through peaceful means, the extremists among them would go on to commit the largest acts of terrorism in Indonesia’s history.

Similar to JI’s origins, Aceh’s secessionist movement was a direct response to the way in which Suharto attempted to realize the nation-building goals of Indonesian nationalism.\(^ {36}\) After more than a decade following the defeat of Darul Islam in the 1960s, the nucleus of what we now call GAM emerged in 1976 and demanded the creation of an independent state of ‘Acheh-Sumatera’. GAM’s political agenda differed from the 1960s revolt in three fundamental ways: (1) it was not led by religious figures, (2) it substantially sidelined the Islamic state issue, and (3) it sought independence from Indonesia rather than to take over the central government.\(^ {37}\) The newly found gas and oil fields in Aceh in the 1970s, and the related strong response by the security apparatus to ensure Jakarta’s continued access and exploitation, provided the initial rationale and basis for the movement.

Jakarta quelled the movement with military operations, and by 1979 its leader, Hasan di Tiro, and several others were forced into exile in Sweden and Malaysia. However, popular support in Aceh for GAM did not dissipate as the province continued to face socio-economic problems. Although Aceh supplied close to 30 per cent of Indonesia’s total oil and gas exports, the region remained impoverished as it received only a fraction of the natural resources’ financial benefits.\(^ {38}\) Huge inequalities also existed between mostly Javanese migrants, who benefited from the development of gas exports, and the Acehnese.\(^ {39}\) GAM then resurfaced in the mid-1990s with more support from a fairly wide cross-section of the population. The Indonesian state’s continued economic exploitation further drove many within the population to join or be a part of GAM’s network and operations.\(^ {40}\)

Jakarta’s favoured military approach to handle any unrest in the area did not improve conditions. Total estimates of the casualties of the Aceh conflict vary, but most accounts put the figures for 1976–2005 between 12,000 and 50,000 people.\(^ {41}\) During the particularly dire Military Operations Zone (DOM) period, it was reported that there were 3,000 widows or widowers and 20,000 orphans (1989–98).\(^ {42}\) Even after the DOM status was lifted in 1998, violence between GAM and Indonesian security forces returned in 2000. As the security forces resumed their operations and as human rights abuses mounted, support for GAM increased. Estimates vary, but GAM nearly tripled its fighting force between mid-1999 and mid-2001, and its supporters controlled roughly 70 to 80 per cent of all the villages in Aceh.\(^ {43}\) In short, it was both the exploitation
of Aceh's natural resources by the state and the conduct of its armed forces that allowed the conflict to carry over into the post-Suharto period.

Taken as a whole, focusing on Aceh and JI provides a useful point of contrast. While both groups were initially descendants of Darul Islam, and while both arose partially as a consequence of the state's handling of internal threats, they have elicited different responses from the Indonesian state over time. JI, and the radical Islamic groups that preceded it, have at times been tolerated by the state, and at other times were resisted through law enforcement and other measures. GAM, on the other hand, has been met with staunch military resistance almost from the beginning. This was true during the New Order and after, as we shall see in the next section. Exploring how the state has responded to these two groups allows us to place the development of Indonesian counterterrorism policies in their historical context.

Understanding contemporary Indonesian state responses to terror

We begin by fast-forwarding our discussion to today's terrorism threat. As of 2018, Indonesia has no major rebellion, no immediate border conflict, and no nationwide domestic repression. Indeed, its communal conflicts are largely resolved, even if grievances remain, and there is no public support for violence. When it comes to terrorism, according to credible analysts, 'since a shootout with the police in Poso in 2007, JI had decided to end jihad operations in Indonesia. Several of its top leaders were in prison; those who were not were focused on religious outreach (dakwah) and education. ... All were counselling members against violence, not because jihad in Indonesia was illegitimate but because given the constellation of forces at the moment, it was too costly and did not help to further the goals of an Islamic state.' Indeed, while JI may have been re-burnishing its reputation as a jihadi organization through its channels to Syrian Islamist rebels, violent extremism in Indonesia has continued to be low-tech and low-casualty.

Meanwhile, the Aceh conflict ended with the 2005 Helsinki peace agreement, and the ensuing special governance laws and elections seem to have effectively contained any return to full-scale rebellion, particularly with GAM disbanded. Some violent splinter groups have, however, set up jihadi training camps in parts of the province (allegedly funded by Jemaah Anshorut Tauhid, or JAT, a new group that JI's Ba'asyir founded), though much of it was dismantled by the state in 2010. While the threat of open rebellion has diminished, new patterns of local conflict have emerged recently, including: (1) conflicts among former GAM elites, (2) conflicts between former GAM elites and former GAM rank-and-file combatants, and (3) conflicts between the ethnic Acehnese majority and the diverse ethnic minority groups. However, these conflicts are largely contained at the local level.

Overall, while one could argue that the post-Suharto state has largely been successful in responding to JI and GAM, we suggest that not only are the threats these groups initially posed intimately tied to the state itself (as previously shown), but the complex, incoherent and occasionally paradoxical manner in which the state managed to achieve the above conditions has ultimately left lingering concerns. In the following sections we will demonstrate that a more militaristic approach helped to perpetuate these conflicts, while a more constrained approach based in law enforcement has tended to reduce the antagonistic relationship between the state and those who support the objectives of JI or GAM.

Handling JI: From enemy-centric to population-centric?

Indonesian counterterrorism has undergone three periods of significant change: the 1998 democratic transition; the September 11, 2001, attacks and the 2002 Bali bombings. Suharto's removal in 1998 was accompanied by the separation of the national police from the military and the opening of the political party system, which effectively gave Islamic political parties access to the government. The separation of the police not only granted them autonomy, it also tasked the institution with internal security and law-enforcement duties, including counterterrorism. And, while Islamic groups had previously been the frequent targets of Suharto's repression, the post-Suharto revival of Islamic political parties meant that political elites would now find it difficult to establish any harsh policies against radical Islamic militants. Together, the post-Suharto reforms sought a break from the military's dominant role and from repressive policies against specific elements of society; they also set the stage for a restrained response to Islamic extremism.

The second transformative moment was the 9/11 attacks. Whereas before 9/11 Indonesia's counterterrorism was mostly a domestic affair, the attacks introduced a transnational dimension in the form of foreign security aid, regional counterterrorist efforts, and pressure from the US, Australia and others to crack down on Islamic militants. While the Indonesian public's response to 9/11 was a mixture of disapproval and scepticism, the US invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq were viewed negatively across the board. This scepticism was reflected in Jakarta's tendency to overlook Islamic extremism prior to the Bali bombings. Even immediately after 9/11, against pressure from the
US, Indonesia chose a more reserved strategy. The influence of Islamic political parties, the fact that the moniker ‘Jemaah Islamiyah’ can be translated as ‘Islamic community’ and a sceptical stance towards powerful governments all contributed to this reluctance. Indonesia’s initial hesitancy to take a firm stance against terrorism can be seen in the initial failure of anti-terrorist legislation before the Bali bombings.\(^5\) Overall, while 9/11 led to increased external attention to and aid for Indonesian counterterrorism, both official policy and political rhetoric were carefully designed to distance the state’s fight against terrorism from the US ‘global war on terror’.\(^5\)

The third transformative event, the 2002 Bali bombings, in which 202 people were killed, significantly reshaped Indonesia’s counterterrorism perspective. The immediate response was the onset of a criminal investigation and the issuance of two presidential decrees on 18 October 2002: the Government Regulation in Lieu of Law (GRL) no. 1 of 2002, concerning the eradication of criminal acts of terrorism, and GRL no. 2 of 2002, making GRL no. 1 retroactively applicable to the Bali bombings.\(^5\) Notably, the new laws allowed security personnel to hold suspects for twenty days, and to possibly extend this for another six months.\(^5\) President Megawati also established the Counter-Terrorism Coordinating Desk under the Office of the Coordinating Minister for Political, Legal and Security Affairs, designed to formulate, and coordinate strategy across state agencies.\(^5\) This desk would later be transformed into the National Counter-Terrorism Agency in 2010.

Overall, while the state spent a considerable amount of resources on counterterrorism (see figure 5.1), the police were the main benefactor by virtue of their counterterrorist role. Aside from a domestic budgetary boost, the police were also flooded with foreign aid. The most notable example was the creation of Detachment 88, a special police division dedicated to counterterrorism and funded through America’s Anti-Terrorism Assistance Program.\(^5\) Another example is the creation in 2004 of the Australian-funded Jakarta Centre for Law Enforcement Cooperation (JCLEC), located at the national police academy in Central Java, designed to provide a comprehensive curriculum in investigations, information analysis and specific litigation areas. Australian funding also strengthened the police’s investigative capacity, especially pertaining to bombings.\(^5\) Finally, the police were also the leading agency and benefactor in regional and international counterterrorism cooperation.\(^5\)

This newfound funding for the police, however, heightened latent bureaucratic rivalries with the military carried over from their separation at the end of the New Order.\(^6\) Exacerbating this relationship, Law no. 34 of 2004 on the Indonesian Armed Forces suggests that the military could involve itself in military operations other than war, including against separatist movements or terrorism.\(^6\) Observers warned that involving the military in counterterrorism could open the door for possible human rights abuses and a return to Suharto-style repression, and could diminish its overall readiness.\(^6\) The debate over the role of the military has not been resolved, even as newly minted President Joko Widodo seems to have approved a larger role for the military than did the previous administrations.\(^6\)

Overshadowing these rivalries, there is a growing realization among officials that the population is the ‘centre of gravity’ and that Indonesia needs to involve all sectors of the state and society to assist the police.\(^6\) However, this is easier said than done. On the one hand, officials have held back counterterrorist efforts out of sensitivity to the Muslim community.\(^6\) After all, even as moderate Muslim groups have condemned terrorist attacks, they reject overwrought state responses that risk overstepping their boundaries.\(^6\) On the other hand, the police could not ignore the reality that the crux of the problem may lie within elements of the Muslim community. This dilemma is perhaps why the state has begun involving religious communities as part of a ‘de-radicalization’ campaign, and the police have turned to unconventional and non-coercive interrogation techniques. These include allowing detainees to meet their families, providing them with financial assistance or sending senior police commanders to have lunches with them.

Overall, domestic political changes have led to a contestation of the military’s role and the ensuing centrality of the police in various counterterrorism efforts. While these developments appeared to strengthen the anti-terrorist hand of the state, bombings persisted in Indonesia throughout the 2000s.\(^7\) Furthermore, as the police were part of the military under the New Order, the legacy of ‘national resilience’ remains central in the domestic orientation of the state’s approach to terrorism and in the tensions among the now separate security organizations. In an attempt to move beyond its authoritarian past, Indonesia’s
counterterrorist response has emphasized non-repressive measures, the centrality of the police, political sensitivity towards Islamic groups and contestation between security organizations. This has led to some successes (e.g., dismantling JI’s network), but has also left lingering security concerns (e.g., the splintering of militant groups bent on targeting the police and the state, and the reallocation of some counterterror duties to the military). A similar pattern can be discerned with the case of GAM.

Handling GAM: From counterinsurgency to peace talks

Aceh saw ebb and flow between a more repressive, militaristic approach to the ongoing insurgency and a more cooperative approach that prioritized a negotiated settlement. As we briefly mentioned above, the cycle of violence between Jakarta’s security forces and GAM continued even after the end of Suharto’s tenure; partially due to the ‘democratic opening’ and partially due to the success of the East Timor referendum. As such, the domestic political constraints facing the new government under Suharto’s protégé and vice president, B.J. Habibie, eventually forced Jakarta to end the DOM period and pass a new regional autonomy law. Initially, at least until late 1998, the military supported Habibie’s policies, withdrew thousands of troops from Aceh, and granted amnesty to GAM prisoners.

However, as the presidential elections in June 1999 drew closer, violence in Aceh returned as the military’s influence in Aceh policymaking rose under General Wiranto, which allowed key figures associated with repressive policies to dominate Jakarta’s approach. Habibie’s East Timor debacle made it additionally unlikely that the president would extend an olive branch to GAM. By the end of 1998, Opeerasi Satgas Wibawa, the military’s latest post-DOM operations, began in North and East Aceh. By the end of Habibie’s tenure, conflict with GAM had intensified, with over 70,000 Acehnese displaced.

This cycle of escalation and de-escalation continued under Habibie’s two successors. Despite initially pursuing a confusing approach to Aceh, Habibie’s first successor, Abdurrahman Wahid, brought in the Henry Dunant Center (HDC) as a third party mediator, which produced two peace initiatives. The first was the 2000 Humanitarian Pause, which saw initial promise by the early autumn of that year. By September, however, conflict resumed as GAM and Jakarta blamed each other for violations of the agreement. When popular support for Wahid’s presidency crumbled, the TNI consolidated its hold over Aceh policy. Repressive security actions went into full swing in February 2001, and at the time of Wahid’s impeachment in July, there were more security forces in Aceh than at any time since Suharto’s downfall.

Megawati Sukarnoputri, Wahid’s successor, initially adopted a ‘dual track’ approach in dealing with GAM – engaging in security operations while holding limited negotiations. This approach unravelled as GAM’s military strength increased amid ongoing negotiations. The military, building on its strong personal rapport with Megawati, continued to increase its dominance over Aceh policy. Nevertheless, the HDC still produced the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (COHA) in 2002. The COHA was initially promising as violence abated and negotiations continued, but tensions had resurfaced by February 2003 as the planned GAM disarmament did not materialize and Jakarta’s forces were not relocated to GAM’s satisfaction. Violence returned as security disturbances were rising and widespread.

By that time, Megawati had already approved the promotions of hardline generals such as Endriartono Sutarto and Ryamizard Ryacudu in a 2002 reshuffle. Also in 2002, the military decided that Aceh should be constituted as a separate regional military command. By the middle of that year, some 32,000 personnel were deployed to carry out security operations in Aceh, and Jakarta stepped up its security response. In mid-2003, the government declared a military emergency (martial law) in Aceh. Subsequently, the TNI began its largest military operations in history. While official figures varied, the number of security force personnel (military and police) has been claimed to be around 55,000–60,000. In total, there were 230 known security operations by the Indonesian Government during this period. It should come as no surprise that all peace efforts ceased.

Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono entered office in October 2004 and inherited the Aceh quagmire. The military continued to dominate policymaking under martial law, as several influential generals were opposed to a reconciliatory approach. But Yudhoyono, buttressed by a huge mandate as Indonesia’s first-ever directly elected president and a strong domestic support for his cabinet, soon announced his intention to bring peace to Aceh. As a first step, he removed hardline officers and filled key command positions with his close associates. But cognizant of the importance of Aceh to the officer corps’ monetary bottom line, his vice president was tasked to address the military’s ‘financial needs’ by providing a ‘withdrawal fund’ of as much as US$58.4 million. Finally, while many attribute the end of the Aceh conflict to the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, secret contacts between GAM and Jakarta had already begun before the tsunami struck. Under the auspices of the Crisis Management Initiative, a non-governmental organization led by former Finnish president Martti Ahtisaari, negotiators met in January 2005 for the first of what were eventually five rounds of negotiations over seven months. Yudhoyono’s
ability to appease or remove potential ‘spoilers’ in the military got rid of any impediments to the Helsinki Agreement, which was signed in December 2005.

Overall, Jakarta’s approach to GAM, similar to its approach to JI, did not waver from the fundamental baseline of maintaining state unity. Furthermore, the response also cycled between a militaristic approach and a cooperative one, similar to the debate over police versus military control of counterterrorism. In contrast to JI, however, GAM was seen as a direct threat to the state and therefore fell within the purview of the military, rather than the police. While the Helsinki deal seems to have muffled rebellious actions, the repressive manner in which the state responded prior to that agreement left lingering tensions and allowed local conflicts to develop. These measures, far from being an isolated response to the particular situation in Aceh, stem from historical state responses to internal threats, as regime change and security-sector reform have been unable to completely eradicate the New Order’s legacy of ‘national resilience’ in the face of postcolonial vulnerability.

Conclusions and broader implications

While transnational terrorism has impacted Indonesia in the post-9/11 era, political violence, terrorism and the state’s response have been rooted in Indonesia’s domestic politics and historical narrative. As such, Indonesian counterterrorism has been different in both form and function to the reactions of the leading Anglo-American states in the war on terror. While the latter states committed their militaries abroad in an effort to exterminate foreign militants, Indonesia has crafted security responses representative of the tension between its authoritarian past and its efforts to move beyond it. This has led the state to be critical of the US global war on terror, to respond cautiously to its own domestic constituents, and to combine conventional counterterrorism policies with non-conventional and non-coercive ones.

However, contemporary counterterrorism and security policies in Indonesia still betray the legacy of the New Order’s state-building projects and its inward-looking doctrine of ‘national resilience’. Through these Suharto policies the actions of the Indonesian state also revived the Darul Islam movement and catalysed the precursors of contemporary Islamic terrorism. And, through its initial coercive response to GAM, the state arguably perpetuated the conflict in Aceh. It is perhaps the recognition of this cycle of responses to and catalysis of domestic political violence that has led the democratic Indonesia that came after the New Order to pursue security reform and non-coercive security and counterterrorist strategies. While the diminishing status of JI and the Helsinki peace agreement signal the possible effectiveness of these efforts, the contested involvement of the military in counterterrorism and the state’s mixed response to GAM suggest that the vulnerability and legacy of the New Order may not yet be passed. With between 300 and 700 Indonesians estimated to have joined the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria by 2016, and with an unknown number of those individuals having since returned to Indonesia as the Islamic State lost territory, Indonesia may again have to grapple with its history.

Notes

1 While we often refer to the ‘Indonesian state’, we are not claiming that the state has been a consistently unified actor throughout its history.
3 At least a dozen groups launched attacks against the state during the first three decades of Indonesia’s independence. See Dorodjatun Kuntoro-Jakti and T.B. Simatupang, ‘The Indonesian experience in facing non-armed and armed movements: Lessons from the past and glimpses of the future,’ in K. Sniwongse and S. Paribatra (eds), Durable Stability in Southeast Asia (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1987), pp. 113–16.
5 While exact figures are hard to verify, one estimate is that around 19,000 people lost their lives, with 1.3 million displaced, in civil wars, militia attacks, ethnic cleansings, terrorist bombings, political mobilizations and guerilla insurgencies, or in the security force reprisals that these actions prompted, between 1997 and 2005. See Aspinall, ‘Ethnic and religious violence in Indonesia,’ p. 569.
6 These preliminary figures are from an unpublished database, ‘The evolution of the Indonesian national security state’, which is part of an ongoing project developed by the Centre for Strategic and International Studies, Jakarta, and managed by Evan A. Laksmana. The project measures contestations over the state by coding the cause being waged by the groups perpetrating violence in categories including separatism, disapproval over state ideology, and other issues related to the regime or state practices, rather than economic or ethnic grievances.
7 Figures taken from the unpublished database ‘The evolution of the Indonesian national security state’. The data set initially stopped the coding at 2009 because that was the last year Indonesia saw a major suicide attack. Recent developments, including the early 2016 attack in Jakarta, have clearly changed the equation.
To minimize clutter in our narrative, we use "TNI" to refer to the military, while acknowledging that the name was used after the separation of the police in 1999 and that the military has used different names since 1945. On how the Indonesian military dominated the Indonesian state, see Ulf Sundhaussen, The Road to Power: Indonesian Military Politics, 1945–1997 (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1982).


Honna, ‘Military ideology.’

Officially, national resilience is ‘a dynamic condition of will power’, determination, and firmness with the ability to develop national strength to face and confront threats to the country. See Aditya Vickers, A History of Indonesia (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2013), p. 145.


In 1976, GAM was established as the Aceh-Sumatra National Liberation Front (ASNLF) by Hasan di Tiro, grandson of Teungku Cik di Tiro, a hero of the anticlonial struggle against the Dutch. For its initial history, see Kristen E. Schueller, The Free Aceh Movement (GAM): Anatomy of a Separatist Organization (Washington, DC: The East–West Center, 2004), pp. 4–5.

See the discussion of this history in Quinton Temby, ‘Imagining an Islamic state in Indonesia: From Darul Islam to Jemaah Islamiyah,’ Indonesia 89 (April 2010): 3.


These points on JI’s origins were made by Sidney Jones, ‘New Order repression and the birth of Jemaah Islamiyah,’ in Ed Aspinall and Greg Fealy (eds), Soeharto’s New Order and Its Legacy: Essays in Honour of Harold Crouch (Canberra, Australia: Australian National University Press, 2010), pp. 39–40.


Based on Presidential Decision no. 179/KOTI/1965, the agency hadextrajudicial authority to exercise both military and non-military operations to restore and uphold the government’s authority and integrity. See Pusat Sejarah dan Riset TNI (TNI centre for history and tradition), Sejarah TNI Jilid IV (1966–1983) (Jakarta: Indonesian Army Historical Research Center, n.d.), pp. 91, 97, 98.


While it is agreed that they eventually found their way to Afghanistan in the 1980s and interacted with the Mujahidin, whether or not they established connections with al Qa’ida is disputed. See Sidney Jones, ‘The changing nature of Jemaah Islamiyah,’ Australian Journal of International Affairs 59:2 (2005): 172–4.

After Suharto’s death in 1999, it is believed that Ba’asyir took over control of the organization. See Singh, ‘The challenge of militant Islam,’ p. 54. In contrast, one scholar argues that JI is better described as a ‘much hazier, messier picture of a loosely organized network of like-minded activists, acting together on an ad hoc basis’: John T. Sidell, Riots, Pogroms, Jihad: Religious Violence in Indonesia (Cornell University Press, 2006), pp. 206–7.

Jones, New Order repression, p. 40.

We can observe similar patterns in Papua and East Timor. See Aspinall and Berger, ‘The Break-up of Indonesia?’


39 Ibid., p. 172.


41 The actual figure perhaps lies somewhere around 30,000. There have also been reports of 625 cases of rape and torture, 781 extrajudicial killings and 163 forced disappearances in 1999, along with an estimated 5,000–7,000 torture cases and 3,266 extrajudicial executions between 1999 and 2002. Figures from Braithwhite et.al, *Anomie and Violence*, p. 352.


44 There were other Islamic groups in the 1970s and 1980s that the Suharto regime also repressed violently under the pretext that they were threatening the state. See the details in Pusat Sejarah dan Tradisi TNI, *Sejarah TNI Jilid IV*.


46 Ibid., 142.

47 Ibid., 139.


50 As nearly 90% of the Indonesian population is Muslim and Islamic political parties have, combined, garnered 30%–40% of the electoral vote in Indonesia's elections since 1999, there is a strong check to prevent the government from alienating Islamic interests. See Greg Fealy, 'Indonesia’s Islamic parties in decline,' *Inside Story*, 11 May 2009, available at: http://inside.org.au/indonesia%E2%80%99s-islamic-parties-in-decline (accessed 30 September 2014).

51 A series of bombings in Jakarta in 1999 are thought to have been the work of JI, but very little was done in response. Also, leaders of the FPI and Laskar Jihad – Islamic extremist groups – were arrested only after the Bali bombings. See Vickers, *History of Modern Indonesia*, p. 221.

52 Opposition to the law focused on its association with a US approach to counterterrorism and the possibility it could resurrect aspects of the authoritarian New Order state.

53 For more details see Senia Febrica. 'Securitizing terrorism in Southeast Asia: Accounting for the varying responses of Singapore and Indonesia,' *Asian Survey* 50:3 (2010): 569–90.

54 Both decrees were passed by a vote of 220 to 46, but the retroactive application of GRL no. 2 would later be struck down as unconstitutional. See Kent Roach, *The 9/11 Effect: Comparative Counter-terrorism* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011), pp. 152–3.


56 See Leonard Sebastian, 'The Indonesia dilemma: How to participate in the war on terror without becoming a national security state,' in Kumar Ramakrishna and See Seng Tan (eds), *After Bali: The Threat of Terrorism in Southeast Asia* (Singapore: Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, 2003), pp. 357–82.


59 This includes joint operations, intelligence exchanges and extradition agreements with Malaysia and Singapore; a memorandum of understanding on combating terrorism with Australia; a mutual legal assistance treaty with South Korea; an agreement on information exchange with Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand, and Cambodia; and participation in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Plan of Action to Combat Transnational Crimes.


62 Under Law No. 15 of 2003 on Countering Criminal Acts of Terrorism, Indonesia adopts a criminal justice model of counterterrorism in which the National Police (POLRI) is the lead agency and the military can be seconded to assist on an ad-hoc basis as commanded by the president. As of early 2018, efforts are underway in the national legislature (DPR) to revise this law to give a wider role for the military in counterterrorism without being seconded to the police. If passed, the revision could effectively end Indonesia's criminal-justice approach to counterterrorism and perhaps even bring us back to the New Order era where the military handles domestic security. See the debate over this revision in Julie Chernov Hwang, 'The unintended consequences...


64 Private conversation with B.G. Tito Karnavian, then head of Detachment 88, Jakarta, 9 July 2010. This population-centric approach to counterterrorism suggests the assumption that counterterrorist aims can be achieved through the methods of counterinsurgency, when in fact those two strategies may not always work in concert; see Michael Boyle, "Do counterterrorism and counterinsurgency go together?" International Affairs 86:2 (2010): 333–53. For a discussion of counterinsurgency and counterterrorism in Indonesia, see David J. Kilcullen, Counterinsurgency (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010).

65 President Megawati's absence at the Bali bombing memorial has been partially explained as distancing himself from international condemnation of Islamic extremist. See Anthony Smith, 'Terrorism and the political landscape in Indonesia: The fragile post-Bali consensus,' in Anthony Smith (ed.), Terrorism and Violence in Southeast Asia: Transnational Challenges to States and Regional Stability (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2005), p. 103.

66 This is particularly salient given that terrorism has been said to strengthen the intelligence agencies. For example, the State Intelligence Agency developed Directorate 43 to infiltrate jihadist organizations, counter militant massages, and monitor Islamist groups and their social networks. See Vickers, History of Modern Indonesia, p. 223; International Crisis Group, "De-radicalization and Indonesian prisons," Asia Report 142 (19 November 2007): 159.

67 Targets of major bombings since 2002 include the J.W. Marriott Hotel in 2003, the Australian embassy in 2004, Tentena market in 2005, simultaneous attacks in Bali and Palu in 2005, the Marriott Hotel again in 2009, and a police mosque in 2011.


69 Habibie appointed General Syarwan Hamid (who headed North Aceh military operations during DOM) as home affairs minister and Feisal Tanjung (TNI commander during DOM) as coordinating minister for political and security affairs. Several other officers who commanded or were previously stationed in Aceh were also assigned into key strategic and advisory positions. See Michelle Ann Miller, Rebellion and Reform in Indonesia: Jakarta's Security and Autonomy Policies in Aceh (London: Routledge, 2009), pp. 15–16.


71 Initially Wahid raised the possibility of a referendum in Aceh like the one in East Timor, and attempted to start dialogue, but undermined these efforts by trying to buy off GAM officers and permitting the military to step up security operations. See Tatik S. Hafidz, Fading Away: The Political Role of the Army in Indonesia's Transition to Democracy 1998–2001 (Singapore: Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, 2006), p. 160.

72 In the first three months only 69 civilians and 14 members of the security forces were killed (as opposed to the 300 dead during the previous four months). See Hashim Djajal and Dini Sari Djajal, Seeking Lasting Peace in Aceh (Jakarta: Centre for Strategic and International Studies, 2006), p. 52.


74 This rapport stemmed from her nationalist stance and her party's close relationship with the TNI, with as many as 150 retired generals as party members. See Sukardi Rinakit, The Indonesian Military after the New Order (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2005), p. 213.


77 Some put it around 58,000 just before the tsunami. See Damien Kingsbury, Peace in Aceh: A Personal Account of the Helsinki Peace Process (Jakarta: Equinox, 2006), p. xii.


80 It should be noted that, upon assuming office, Yudhoyono did not immediately change the repressive Aceh approach that had been in place since May 2003. See Miller, Rebellion and Reform, p. 151.


83 The most detailed accounts of the Helsinki rounds can be found in Kingsbury, Peace in Aceh, and Hamid Awaludin, Peace in Aceh: Notes on the Peace Process between the Republic of Indonesia and the Aceh Freedom Movement in Helsinki (Jakarta: Centre for Strategic and International Studies, 2009).