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CAMBI-KOLLAS: BRIDGING THE DIVIDE?
HIGHLAND MIGRANTS IN SANTA CRUZ, BOLIVIA

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On August 10, 2008 Bolivians went to the polls in a recall referendum on President Evo Morales and eight of nine Departmental Prefects. Morales, who won the 2005 election with an impressive 54% of the vote, saw his support increase to over 67% in the recall election while opposition prefects in two crucial departments—La Paz and Cochabamba—were ousted. The results showed broad support for the bold reforms he favors: 1) beating back the forces of neo-liberalism and globalization, 2) moving instead—as his party’s name (Movimiento al Socialismo) unflinchingly proclaims—toward socialism; 3) ending forced eradication of peasant-grown coca while exploring new markets for the leaf; 4) redistributing the nation’s lands more equitably; and 5) reversing 500 years of oppression by restoring power to Bolivia’s indigenous majority through constitutional reforms.

Despite his radical agenda and methods that are more often confrontational than diplomatic, Morales has achieved remarkable success during his two and one-half years in office. His decree of May 1, 2006 restored state ownership of natural gas reserves (though private foreign partners can still play a role in the production and marketing of gas) and increased Bolivia’s share of the profits from 18% to 82%. Revenues to the state from gas exports have increased by $1.5 billion since 2002 (a ten-fold increase) and this inflow of revenue has restimulated economic growth after five years of stagnation. Increased revenues have also allowed Evo’s government to pay down the national debt from 71% of GDP in 2004 to 45% in 2007 and to break Bolivia’s dependent relationship with the International Monetary Fund. He has redirected new revenues into a program modeled on Brazil’s Bolsa Familia to provide 1.3 million Bolivian children with financial incentives to remain in school, has reorganized the pension plan for Bolivians over age 65 on a more sound economic footing, and has nearly doubled investments in roads and infrastructure. Peasant producers no longer fear armed raids on their coca fields and Morales has distributed 3 million hectares of government land to 60 indigenous groups while promising much more to come. All this occurred against the backdrop of a Constitutional Assembly that seeks to “refound Bolivia as a socialist state” and to guarantee the rights of Bolivia’s long-neglected indigenous majority.

But while Morales’ two-thirds approval rating in the recall referendum appears a mandate, it also reveals Bolivia’s growing polarization. Support for Evo reached nearly 84% in Potosí, La Paz and Oruro but fell to only 38% in the
important eastern department of Santa Cruz. In the crescent of four eastern provinces known as the *media luna* where opposition to Morales’ policies is strongest, opposition prefects were reconfirmed by margins ranging from 67% for Santa Cruz’s confrontational Ruben Costas to 58% for the prefect of Pando.\(^{vii}\) Costas immediately demanded that Morales respect the autonomy referendum in Santa Cruz three months earlier when 85% of *cruceños* voted “sí.” The battle for autonomy and increased departmental control of gas revenues is far from over, he warned. Since then beef producers in the *media luna* have launched a boycott on the highlands west while demonstrators have blocked roads and clashed with military forces sent to protect gas installations. In April 2009, Bolivian authorities killed a Bolivian-born Hungarian, an Irishman and a Romanian and arrested men with ties to Croatia and Hungary in an alleged plot backed by the *cruceño* opposition to assassinate Morales. “There are two Bolivias now,” said one Morales supporter.\(^{viii}\)

Nearly every aspect of Evo’s agenda threatens governing elites in Santa Cruz. That department produces nearly all of Bolivia’s sugar and soya, most of its other key agricultural and forest products, and is second only to Tarija in the production of gas and petroleum. Santa Cruz provides nearly 30% of GDP and a disproportionate share of tax revenues.\(^{ix}\) Its capital city, Santa Cruz de la Sierra, is now Bolivia’s largest city with over 1.3 million inhabitants. Leaders of the city and the department resist policies originating in La Paz, particularly when those policies reflect Evo’s indigenist, socialist, and anti-market views. An anti-Morales politician from Santa Cruz recently charged that “the west (the highlands) wants to take us back a thousand years to savage primitivism, while the east wants to move toward the future through a culture of free enterprise.” That stark contrast underscores the issues at stake to *cruceños*.\(^{x}\)

Evo’s land reform policies particularly threaten the eastern establishment: “We’re turning into another Zimbabwe, in which economic chaos will become the norm,” said Branko Marinkovic, who is currently president of the powerful *Comite Pro-Santa Cruz*. Marinkovic is the son of Croatian immigrants to Santa Cruz and claims legal title to 14,000 hectares of land that are also claimed by an eastern indigenous group. “Evo,” he charges, “wants to create a situation where we are driven to civil war.”\(^{xi}\) Daniel Castro, another spokesman for the *Comite Pro-Santa Cruz* adds: “This is a very dangerous strategy, and it has a racist component. [The Morales government’s] official policy is to place one race over another, and it’s very worrying [sic].”\(^{xii}\) Equally worrisome is the talk of secession and civil war and the increased incidence of beatings and other acts of intimidation against Morales supporters in Santa Cruz. Recently the mayor of Santa Cruz de la Sierra called for a coup against Morales and the most extreme *cruceño* partisans favor policies that verge dangerously close to “ethnic cleansing.” On the day before the autonomy referendum, leaflets circulated in the market district of the city, giving *kollas* (highland immigrants) “three days to leave Santa Cruz.”\(^{xiii}\)
Morales responds to such provocations with his own, such as taxing the departments’ shares of the gas windfall to help fund his social programs. There is a sense that all sides are accelerating toward a crisis that the recall referendum did little to avert. The International Crisis Group called a recent report, “Bolivia’s Divisions: Too Deep to Heal?” and the Council on Foreign Relations, titled its study “Bolivia on the Brink.” The divisions are obvious to any close observer, but are they too deep to heal and on what brink does Bolivia find itself? Political and social tensions align with deep historical, racial, and regional cleavages to produce a potential “perfect storm” of disorder, civil war, or even the dissolution of the country itself. Yet the country is also potentially on the brink of something far more positive and constructive. This short paper will focus on the presence of a large body of migrants from western Bolivia in the threateningly secessionist eastern department of Santa Cruz. They are both a cause of the current conflict and a possible indicator of how it might be resolved.

Lost in much of the rhetoric surrounding the regional crisis is a thorough grounding in history; not history as ideological and partisan morality play (both sides indulge that kind of history to a fault) but real history which is the convoluted dialectical interaction of precedent and challenge, continuity and change, polarities and synthesis. The roots of the current confrontation go back long before Morales. Though Bolivia is two-thirds lowland, the country is generally considered Andean and the indigenous highland narrative is better known than is the eastern lowland narrative. Historically, the east has been politically dominated by, and geographically isolated from, the highlands west. Thus cruceños have always defined themselves against western highlanders. They call themselves cambas, (from a lowland indigenous word meaning “friend”) while highlanders are kollas—(from the Quechua word “Kollasuyo” the region south of Lake Titicaca in the old Inca Empire.) The terms themselves are neutral, but in the east kolla (there it is usually spelled “colla,” though I will use the Quechua-based spelling) is a pejorative term that connotes indigenous blood and culture and a set of, mostly negative, ascribed traits.

The name cambi-kolla is my own, meant to suggest the inevitable hypenation that occurs when two cultures collide, but also the deeper levels of mutual and interactive change (cambio) that occurs. The cambi-kolla is not only a kolla who changes as he/she moves to the lowlands but also the camba whose way of life is altered by the immigration of highlanders to his home region. Collision, blending, and change inevitably produce tension and conflict, as the current situation in Bolivia makes only too obvious. But this particular clash of ethnicities and values contains within it the seeds of a reconstituted Bolivia. In an abstract sense, the cambi-kolla subsumes and synthesizes most of the oppositions—highland-lowland, communitarian-individualist, indigenous-western, conquered-conqueror, capitalist-socialist—that now threaten Bolivia’s unity and even its existence. Only time will tell whether this potential synthesis becomes reality.
The paper will begin with a brief overview of highland-lowland relations in order to better situate the current clash in history as well as to provide evidence of earlier accommodations that may serve as a precedent for today. It then turns to evidence, gleaned from sources available here in the US, to evaluate the role of the cambi-kolla in the current crisis. This is not a scholarly work based on extensive primary research, but an attempt by an interested scholar to understand what is happening in Bolivia. My interest grows out of two years living and teaching in a small camba village east of Santa Cruz de la Sierra where I learned to deeply appreciate the friendly generosity and deep cultural authenticity of the native lowlander and another three years working primarily with highland colonist communities north of Santa Cruz de la Sierra where I came to understand and admire the aspirations, work ethic, and strong communitarian spirit of kolla immigrants to the east. Finally, this study is rooted in over four decades of studying Bolivia’s history and closely following its current events.

Bolivia remains an incompletely imagined community. The conquest created a vast and lingering divide between conquered and conqueror; a divide further widened by the country's rugged terrain and the geographical and cultural distance between the historically underpopulated east and the heavily indigenous highland west. That Bolivia exists at all is the result of manipulations by a tiny creole elite in the highland colonial centers of Chuquisaca (now Sucre), Potosí, and La Paz who did not wish to see Alto Peru become an appendage of either Peru or Argentina. They appealed to the vanity of the Liberator by taking his name, asking him to help draft their first constitution, and allowing him to select their first president. Bolivia’s continuing existence in the 19th century owed more to the mutual suspicions of its neighbors than to any compelling sense of unity. By the principle of uti possidetis (literally, “as you now possess”) Bolivia’s borders loosely coincided with those of the colonial Audiencia of Charcas, but when neighbors wanted a chunk of its territory, they took it, and Bolivia’s political integration remained tentative at best.

European colonization of Santa Cruz is a parable of highland-lowland conflict. But it also reveals the bargains and understandings that allow Bolivia to exist. The first Spanish explorers came up the Paraguay River from Asunción in 1549, then traveled west in search of the mythical Gran Paititi. They found that the territory was already claimed by Peru and officials in Lima ordered them out. Defying these orders, the Paraguayanists established a colony in 1561 in the chiquitanía, 100 kilometers east of the current site, that they named Santa Cruz de la Sierra. There the camba was formed: a mestizaje of European, Chiquitano, Chiriguano, and Guaraní cultures and genes. When Francisco de Toledo became Viceroy of Peru he sent a military detachment to force the Paraguayans to relocate to a new Peruvian settlement closer to the mountain and easier to monitor from Lima and Chuquisaca. They named their new city San Lorenzo del Real but when—after 17 years of resistance—the cambas finally
were forced to relocate from the chiquitania they brought their original name with them—Santa Cruz de la Sierra—and eventually it stuck.\textsuperscript{xviii} The basic themes of the history of Bolivia’s oriente are established in that story: isolation and autonomy but beneath the formal—if often resented—political hegemony of the highlands.

In the early 1920s a visiting paceño observed: “There is not greater aspiration in that town than to be linked by railway to anywhere at all.”\textsuperscript{xxix} Out of this isolation cruceños developed their own unique culture, rooted in geography, race, and economic stagnation. In the stereotyped analyses of some of Bolivia’s greatest writers (Alcides Arguedas, Franz Tamayo, Gabriel René Moreno and others) the camba was “open,” “impulsive,” “expansive,” “generous,” “individualistic,” “voluble” and “lazy” with an excessive predilection for women, alcohol, and carousing.\textsuperscript{xx} In all these ways the camba supposedly contrasted starkly with the “taciturn,” “obstinate,” “miserly,” and “communal” indigenous kolla or with the “scheming,” “self-interested,” “politically astute,” “manipulating,” and “grasping” highland cholo mestizo.\textsuperscript{xxi} But despite these differences, at independence cruceños resisted reattaching to Brazil or Argentina. In the late 19th century they fought with highlanders against Brazil in the Acre and in the 1930s against Paraguay in the Chaco. “Santa Cruz aspires to be the head of Bolivia, not the tail of a neighboring country,” commented one cruceño leader after an aborted rebellion in the 1920s.\textsuperscript{xxii}

Regional stereotypes and the isolation that fostered them began to break down with Bolivia’s National Revolution in 1952. In 1956 an all-weather highway finally connected Santa Cruz to Cochabamba. Railroad connections to Argentina and Brazil soon followed, as did the first oil strikes near the city of Santa Cruz. Santa Cruz was now linked to the rest of the nation and the world and the impact was immediate and dramatic. The Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario (MNR) modeled its reforms on Mexico’s and rooted its revolution in the ideology of nationalism. As in Mexico, the goal of the regime was to destroy the vestiges of colonialism and neocolonialism through land redistribution and nationalization of key assets. It also tried to subsume Bolivia’s racial, ethnic, and regional divisions in a grand nationalist mestizo synthesis—la raza cósmica—and the word “indio” disappeared from the Bolivian lexicon except as an epithet. After the revolution Santa Cruz not only became the economic engine of the “new Bolivia,” but its Spanish-speaking, mestizo people were the symbolic new Bolivians.\textsuperscript{xxiii}

But at a more practical level, the end of isolation also heightened camba regionalism by opening Santa Cruz to new stresses. The MNR’s agrarian reform policies impacted Santa Cruz differently than the highlands. Because the department of Santa Cruz was land-rich and labor-poor, agrarian reform and the threat of expropriation led landlords to formalize land tenure. Previously, they had not bothered to obtain legal title, but now they withdrew squatter rights in order to reduce the chance that laborers and share-croppers might make claims
Meanwhile, with the support of US advisors, the revolutionary regime supported this consolidation process, even if it technically violated the spirit of agrarian reform. USAID and other international lenders funded roads and provided credit for land clearing, mechanization, livestock improvement, irrigation and the construction of sugar refineries and rice processing plants that fostered the consolidation and development of agribusinesses in Santa Cruz. The new incentives, roads, and refineries pushed sugar production in Santa Cruz from 160 tons in 1946 to 93,600 tons in 1964. Meanwhile rice production increased more than twelve-fold between 1950 and 1964 and oil production began to satisfy national demand. By the early 1970s Bolivia was self-sufficient in petroleum, sugar, rice, cotton, beef, lumber, and corn—all products of Santa Cruz.xxv

Agribusiness demanded labor, and the cheapest source was the highlands. Seasonal migrant laborers from the highlands flowed eastward on the new highway as agricultural goods from Santa Cruz flowed west. Sugar required zafreros (cutters) and by the mid-1960s, the sugar harvest was drawing 60,000 workers to Santa Cruz each year.xxvi But land was another attraction. One of the six stated objectives of agrarian reform was to encourage highland peasants to relocate to the under-populated lowlands, and the MNR government began a series of planned colonization projects. The first generation of projects had limited success due to inexperience and poor planning, but with strong international support from the Alliance for Progress, Bolivia began a second phase of colonization projects in the early 1960s.xxvii

Meanwhile, the population of Santa Cruz de la Sierra swelled from 40,000 in 1952 to more than 250,000 by 1972. The first phase of urban growth came primarily from rural cambas, forced off their land by expanding agribusiness and/or looking for new opportunities in the city. But the highway and the flow of seasonal labor and colonists encouraged a parallel flow of mostly urban highlanders to the city of Santa Cruz. The sleepy camba town of Montero, situated where the new highway north from the city of Santa Cruz, (also funded by the Alliance for Progress) forked east and west into newly opened agribusiness and colonization zones, became an immigrant hub. Its thriving market of highland products and its profusion of chicherías catered to a kolla clientele—seasonal workers and colonists—who came to town each weekend.xxviii

Even while Santa Cruz was thriving as never before, the introduction of kollas, chicherías and competition stirred camba resentment. Thus, while the revolution of 1952 began to integrate Santa Cruz more fully into the nation, it—paradoxically—also reignited old demands for autonomy. Regionalism had thrived in the climate of national neglect that existed prior to 1952, but now was further fed by new racial and ethnic distinctions which local elites exploited to their advantage. After the 1952 revolution, the MNR drew its greatest support from camba migrants to the city who supported urban land reform. Threatened by this potential threat to their property and seeking to reconsolidate their political
position, local elites formed the Comité Cívica Pro-Santa Cruz. The Comité channeled camba resentment of kollas into a multi-class coalition that demanded autonomy and a greater share of the oil wealth the department now generated. The Comité called cabildos abiertos (mass public meetings) and regional work stoppages to force concessions from the MNR government in La Paz and were able to seize effective control of the department. After a failed insurrection in early 1958, the MNR government sent a highland peasant and miner militia to Santa Cruz that clashed with cruceño rebels on May 19 at a little ranch near Terebinto north of Santa Cruz de la Sierra. Four rebels died and, though the central government and the MNR eventually regained control of the department, Terebinto remains a symbol of the hatred camba militants feel toward highland centralism and their fear of “Indian hordes” descending on the east.

Such resentments remained muted through the 1960s, mitigated by the region’s accelerating economic growth. Then in 1971 a faction of the military seized power with the backing of the Comité and Colonel Hugo Banzer Suarez, a cruceño, became president. Under Banzer eastern agribusiness received important subsidies as many big farmers in Santa Cruz shifted from sugar (hampered by a stagnated market and rising insect and disease control problems) to cotton. Production of the fiber in Santa Cruz expanded from 6,000 hectares in 1968 to 60,333 hectares in 1974. The Banzer government supported the boom with easy credits, state-supported services, and generous write-offs for speculative loans that went bad. Banzer and subsequent military governments also passed out huge tracts of eastern land to the politically connected, including parcels in protected areas, national parks and Indian reserves.

Whatever the camba resentment of kollas flooding eastward, labor shortages led cotton farmers to send contratistas to the highlands to find workers, but unlike the sugar zafra (men’s work) cotton picking drew whole families. Once in the lowlands and united by common work, many highlands families decided to stay and look for land on the fringes of established agricultural zones. They were encouraged by the relatively high and stable price for rice prevailing at the time. Cotton requires immense capital expenditures and sugar demands political connections to gain a cupo (allocation) at one of the refineries. Rice, on the other hand, has a short growing season, relatively easy storage, high value per weight, and low input costs outside of labor which allowed small farmers to compete with agribusiness. By 1975 an estimated 14,000 to 20,000 rural highland immigrants came to Santa Cruz each year. Santa Cruz de la Sierra doubled again in size during the decade and highlanders infiltrated, then quickly took over the major Santa Cruz markets by the late 1970s.

After almost two decades of continuous military rule, democracy finally returned to Bolivia in 1983 and was accompanied in 1985 by economic reforms that ended a stupefying hyperinflation and opened Bolivia to outside market forces. Santa Cruz was the region of Bolivia best situated to take advantage of
market reforms and the city’s open entrepreneurial atmosphere—fortified by an energetic, hard-working highland migrant population—allowed it to further develop as Bolivia’s most prosperous region. By the early 21st century, Santa Cruz de la Sierra was the country’s largest city and the road network out of Santa Cruz expanded in all directions, making it an ever-more-important marketing hub. After the mid-1970s, agribusiness shifted from cotton back to sugar (after a brief side track into coca and cocaine paste production in the late 1970s and early 1980s) and then to soya and ranching. Soya and cattle-raising did not require the seasonal labor that sugar or cotton demanded, but the flow of immigrants from the west continued. Now most highlanders go straight to the city and, since the rise of Morales, include middle and upper-class immigrants who seek to escape the indigenista, socialist orientation of the highlands.

The autonomy movement remained latent but relatively silent from the 1960s through the 1980s. But in the early 1990s, impetus for decentralization of Bolivia’s government came from several sources. A new multi-ethnic awareness—some of it fostered by the 500th anniversary of Columbus—brought calls for increased recognition and autonomy from indigenous groups. The World Bank pushed its own brand of decentralization to improve administrative efficiency and increase grass-roots participation in government. Threatened by both these trends, cruceño elites again began demanding greater departmental autonomy as a way to retain their power and increase departmental revenues.

During the first administration of Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada (1993-1998) a small team of experts and World Bank advisors developed a Law of Popular Participation (LPP) that increased municipal autonomy and allocated revenues and greater power at the local level. It was a plan that satisfied neither the indigenous activists nor the Santa Cruz elite. Kathleen O’Neill argues that the government chose the municipal decentralization model because it believed that Sánchez de Lozada’s MNR was the best organized of all the existing parties at the local level, which would allow it to end-run departmental elites. If so, it was a miscalculation at several levels. While the MNR did well in initial municipal elections, the reform opened the door to new local challengers—the most successful being Evo Morales and the MAS, with their base in the coca growing regions and a populist, anti-imperial, and anti-neoliberal message that drew grass-roots support from across Bolivia. The challenge from below and the revenue sharing that skipped past departmental elites and went straight to municipalities also galvanized regional leaders into greater demands for departmental autonomy.

The LPP left a mixed legacy as did all of the political and economic reforms of the democratic period. By the turn of the millennium, Bolivia was more modern and open and its people were increasingly empowered. But a stubborn economic downturn that began in 1998 and lingered through the early years of the new millennium exposed deeply rooted inequalities and injustices
that were brought into focus—and exacerbated—by neoliberal policies. Eduardo Gamarra, who closely follows events in Bolivia, notes in his report to the Council on Foreign Relations:

The great tragedy of Bolivian democracy is that, despite some sincere efforts to incorporate the indigenous majority into mainstream politics, these measures failed to foster equitable development. Poverty, unemployment, and institutionalized exclusion have resulted in two separate Bolivias: one urban, mestizo, and the beneficiary of the process of democratization and economic reform; and the other indigenous and mestizo: poor, urban and rural, and the bearer of the costs of economic development. A majority of Bolivians believe that poverty has grown and that inequalities have deepened since 1982. That belief is now the dominant accusation used by the MAS against the traditional parties of the pacted democracy and the economic strategy they imposed.xxxix

The economic downturn also brought regional differences back into focus. In the west, social organizations and new political leaders like Morales blamed the neo-liberal economic model for increasing outside exploitation and failing to improve conditions for most Bolivians. But in the east, where economic power had grown and standards of living generally improved through the 1990s, elites galvanized public opinion around their contention that La Paz-based centralism, not the neo-liberal model, was to blame for the downturn.xl

The 2003 gas war illustrates the divide. When Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada—now in his second term—backed plans by the privatized gas companies to build a pipeline through Chile to the Pacific to export gas, there was an immediate upheaval in the highlands that eventually led to his resignation. But in Santa Cruz, where Sánchez de Lozada fled, and where, with the backing of the Comité Pro-Santa Cruz, he briefly considered setting up a parallel government, the gas war spawned a new cruceño identity. Santa Cruz was the modern, progressive Bolivia; the Bolivia that looked to the future and not the past; the Bolivia that was open to the world and did not fear globalization; the Bolivia that was only deterred by the lingering parasitical centralism of the West and its resurgent indigenous socialism. At that moment “autonomy,” again became the mantra and objective of Santa Cruz elites.xli

Politics since the gas war are made in the streets. Between 2003 and 2005 Morales and the MAS—along with other popular organizations in the highlands—employed popular mobilization and strikes to weaken and ultimately oust two presidents. Since Morales came to power, opposition prefects and the powerful civic committees of the media luna have taken a page from Evo’s playbook, (as well as from their own strategies in the 1950s) using cabildos abiertos, departmental boycotts, and work stoppages to weaken Morales and
thwart his plans. Morales’ nationalization policies increased revenues from gas, but—in the process—only raised the stakes in a political struggle over control and redistribution of large amounts of new income. To foil this opposition, Morales has followed a governing strategy that Bolivian political scientist Carlos Toranzo calls “gobierno por plebiscito” (government by plebiscite) that is designed to demonstrate his popular support. But when divisions are regional, no plebiscite can ultimately resolve the conflicts, as the debate over the meaning of the recent recall referendum clearly reveals.

What the plebiscites do reveal, however, is that Santa Cruz is not of one mind and that the image of two neatly divided regions is not entirely accurate. In the 2005 election Morales was supported by a third of crupeños and his approval rose to 38% in the recent referendum. In 2005, an opposition party named Comité Pro-Santa Cruz spokesman Carlos Dabdoub as its vice-presidential candidate in order to appeal to crupeños, but that party received only 12.5% of the Santa Cruz vote. In the May 2008 autonomy referendum, 85.6% voted “sí” for autonomy, but 14.4% voted “no” or left their ballots blank and 40% of crupeños did not vote at all—most of them supporting Morales claims—backed by the National Electoral Court—that the referendum was illegal. Santa Cruz is not politically of one mind and the rest of the media luna even less so.

Pure demographics further complicate the image of a monolithic east. Santa Cruz continues to draw almost 16,000 immigrants every year. According to the 2001 Bolivian census, one quarter of all crupeños were born elsewhere in the country with that figure rising to 28% in the city of Santa Cruz and to nearly 30% in key northern colonization zones. Twenty-two percent of crupeños self-report that they are indigenous and nearly one in ten says they speak Quechua or Aymara at home. How many “kollas” lurk outside the reach of the census is difficult to discern. Raul Bustamante maintains that the pressure on immigrants to “pass” is intense. Because they fear rejection, Bustamante says that kolla’s are quick to answer the question “where are you from?” with: “I am from Santa Cruz—100% camba, more crupeño than yucca and without even a drop of kolla blood.” Be that as it may, the census reveals there are enough highlanders now living in Santa Cruz (and enough MAS supporters) to make the image of a pristine nación camba increasingly irrelevant and the demands by camba radicals that immigrants return to their point of origin both economically unwise and logistically impossible.

Alfonzo Román Hurtado agrees that many kollas who come east become more camba than the cambas; but not because they are intimidated. Rather it is because they become more modern, market-oriented, entrepreneurial and globalized. According to Román Hurtado, they have chosen change, and thus are open to it. They know that their success is in some ways dependent upon integration into the new society and rejection of the old. From this process emerges, not a self-hating kolla, but a new Bolivian, product of the fusion of ethnicities and cultures.” The cambi-kolla is thus at the cutting edge of the
modernization process, according to Román Hurtado; a participant in change as well as recipient of change, who brings capital, energy, new ideas, and receptivity and receives in return an individualistic sense of freedom and possibility that does not exist in the highlands. Román Hurtado rejects the ethnic purists in both the east and west and argues that Santa Cruz is “the geographic space where a new cultural symbiosis is occurring—where a synthesis of the distinct cultural identities of Bolivia is forming, product of the immigration to Santa Cruz from other parts of the country.”

To test this thesis, Román Hurtado carried out a survey of three distinct groups—immigrants, highlanders born in Santa Cruz, and native cambas. He found that 94% of the first generation immigrants he surveyed say that their lives improved in Santa Cruz and few had any desire to return to the highlands. Sixty-eight percent came for economic reasons, with another 18% drawn by family connections. Only 10% of the immigrants continued to wear the highland pollera. 66% identified themselves as mestizos, 26% as indigenous, and 8% as white. All spoke Spanish, though 72% also spoke either Aymara or Quechua at home. Fifty-two percent now had a camba relative.

Changes among kollas born in Santa Cruz were dramatic. Only 14% now spoke Quechua or Aymara while 32% spoke some English. Ninety-six percent defined themselves as mestizos with only 2% calling themselves indigenous and 2% white. Ninety-six percent now considered themselves cambas and only 4% still referred to themselves as kollas. Nonetheless, twenty-eight percent admitted to experiencing some discrimination against them as kollas (as compared with 60% of the immigrants). Forty-eight percent of the native cambas Roman Hurtado interviewed said they saw kollas in mostly positive terms, stressing their energy, their importance to the economy, their hard work, and their role in moving Santa Cruz forward. Sixty-eight percent said they did not mind living close to kollas and 56% said they had kolla relatives.

Román Hurtado suggests that the new Bolivian is being formed in Santa Cruz and from the kolla he/she draws fortitude, focus, hard work, willingness to sacrifice, and an ethic of investment, savings and commerce. From the camba comes self-confidence, individualism, hospitality, generosity, and a strong libertarian streak. But his sample is small and not necessarily representative; (100% of his respondents in all categories owned television and most were well educated and clearly urban.) The full political and regionalist implications of Román Hurtado’s thesis are further developed by Carlos Dabdoub, of the Comité Pro-Santa Cruz, in his review of Román Hurtado’s book: “The nación camba,” says Dabdoub, “is perhaps the only society in Bolivia that has the ‘universality’ necessary to allow this new identity to emerge—one that is ours, but at the same time deeply Latin American and free.” For Dabdoub, as for Bolivian elites in the past, the Indian needs to be brought into the modern world, and since Santa Cruz is where this is best happening, Santa Cruz itself must be liberated from the lingering, backward-looking centralism of the indigenous highlands.
The arguments of both Dabdoub and Román Hurtado reveal, as commentator Pablo Stefanoni observes, that the exact nature of cultural synthesis has profound political and ideological elements. Positivists of the late 19th and early 20th centuries depicted cultural mestizos as "a kind of curse over Bolivian society," and only modernization and Europeanization would save Bolivia from its pathological mestizaje (Alcides Arguedas: Pueblo Enfermo). Then, after the Chaco War, nationalists made cultural mestizos the basis of a new, truly Bolivian nation. But they never really incorporated the Indian into this vision, and by the 1990s, a building grass-roots reaction was underway against a process of cultural homogenization that ignored the realities of Bolivia’s indigenous majority. Stefanoni claims that Bolivian political and economic elites tried to appropriate the multiculturalist discourse, linking it to decentralization and market reforms, but in the gas war indigenous Bolivians fully reclaimed the discourse as their own. He adds: "Today we are witnessing a novel recuperation of the term "Indian" as a cohesive element for a broad popular and national identity that articulates various memories: a long memory (anti-colonial), an intermediate memory (revolutionary nationalist) and a short memory (anti-neoliberal)." Thus, Stefanoni believes that the mestizaje championed by people like Román Hurtado and Dabdoub is a "white construction of mestizaje," with a clearly defensive and conservative class bias.

On the other hand, Evo Morales—who is not the indigenist racist that his critics on the right claim—champions an "Indian mestizaje" that is also modern and that is just as empirically observable and well-established as the process described by Román Hurtado. Evo’s model is the “cholo/cholita,” variously defined as a cultural mestizo, a marginalized urban Indian, or an Indian petite bourgeoisie, with indigenous cultural content key to all three definitions. The Bolivian cholo, says Stefanoni, is “inserted into the processes of modernization, urbanization, social differentiation, capital accumulation . . . and cultural hybridization” but as an Indian. Therefore the new Bolivian is not only being created in the upwardly mobile neighborhoods of the emerging cruceño middle class polled by Román Hurtado, but also in new urban spaces like El Alto on the outskirts of La Paz or Plan 3000, a kolla barrio in Santa Cruz de la Sierra.

Allyn MacLean Stearman looks deeper into the complex interaction of kollas and cambas and, though her evidence is now dated (1985), it adds attention to rural areas, villages and towns as well as provides a less polemicized description of the process of acculturation at work. Stearman, like Román Hurtado, sees a process of cultural symbiosis in Santa Cruz, but like Stefanoni, she recognizes the indigenous, highland elements in the mix. Virtually all of Stearman’s informants—whether urban or rural—came to Santa Cruz for the most modern of reasons: para ganar dinero, pues (to earn money of course), a woman informant told her with a bemused expression, as if wondering “why do you need to ask?” And as is usually the case, the migrants she interviewed were younger, healthier, more innovative, ambitious, and adaptable than those
they left behind in the highlands. Like Román Hurtado, Stearman found that most immigrants were happy with their move, but because of constant discrimination, they also resisted acculturation.  

Cambada dominance continues, Stearman notes, "but at the same time there is an absence of the expected self-perception of inferiority by kolla migrants." In many ways the immigrant brings modernity, rather than merely receiving it as a gift when he/she comes to Santa Cruz. Stearman’s best example is the attitude of highlanders—even the most impoverished rural kolla migrants—toward markets. The camba may be more individualistic and libertarian, but it is the kolla who brings the logic and entrepreneurial flexibility of the free market to Santa Cruz. The traditional camba pulpería was rooted in webs of compadrazgo and patron-client relations of credit and debt. The kolla markets that spring up wherever highlanders have settled in the lowlands introduce bargaining, competitive prices, and an increased selection of goods. Now even the most traditional camba village has a kolla market.  

"Consequently," Stearman asserts, "mountain traditions persist [in Santa Cruz] not only because they are symbols of ethnic pride or because they have become a means to maintain migrant solidarity, but because highlanders wholeheartedly believe that their way of live is superior to that of the Cambas. They have certainly been changed, but they have also forced changes on cambas—most significantly they have brought industrious new economic attitudes and a more assertive and active political outlook.

And though the economic activities of immigrants in the lowlands are individualistic, profit-oriented, market-driven and modern, Stearman argues that the underlying strategy often fits a traditional and very old Andean logic that she calls “multiple-resource migration.” Referring to the research of anthropologist John Murra, Stearman observes that indigenous highlanders have employed vertical exploitation of numerous ecological zones since pre-Inca times. This, she claims, has been transferred to the lowlands where it has become more individualistic and horizontal rather than vertical. Many colonists maintain ties to their places of origin in the highlands and carry out direct exchange of goods between vastly different ecological zones. Colonists farm their original parcel of land in a colonization zone, maintain contacts with their old base in the highlands, and build a small house in a lowland town where children can attend school and the wife can sell items in the local market. Family members move back and forth among these zones as useful to the overall family strategy. Urban immigrants open their homes to renters—often others from their point of origin in the highlands—and open supply channels from the highlands to stock their market stalls. These strategies are modern and ancient, individualistic and communitarian, globalized and culturally situated in ways that are distinctly Bolivian and that tie the nation together.
But what does indigenous mean in Bolivia, under the changing conditions described by all three writers. Alma Guillermoprieto, in an article titled "A New Bolivia?" for the New York Review of Books, observes:

What the terms indígena, or originario, or Quechua, Guaraní, or Aymara might mean in this fluid postmodern world is open to question. An estimated two thirds of those who identify themselves as Quechua or Aymara speak Spanish. During his presidential campaign, and particularly since taking office, Evo Morales has stressed the Indianness of his government, despite his skill in soccer, his Marxist political background, and the fact that, unlike his parents, he is hardly fluent in Aymara.

Mitchell Seligson and a team of researchers sponsored by USAID provide some fascinating, if tentative answers to Guillermoprieto’s questions. Ethnic labels, even when self-ascribed, are fluid, the report notes, thus "the most interesting questions are not those related to who is [an Indian, mestizo, white etc.] but rather the conditions that allow certain identities to gain importance. Their research suggests two possible explanations for why more Bolivians identified themselves as "indigenous" in the 2001 census than in any recent national survey—both explanations interesting and significant in their own way.

First, is a methodological issue. The 2001 census posed the following question: "Do you consider yourself to be part of any of the following indigenous groups (please read all options)? Quechua, Aymara, Guaraní, Chiquitano, Mojeño, Otro nativo, ninguno, otro (please specify)." The result was that 62% of respondents identified themselves with one of the indigenous groups and only 38% chose "none of the above" or "other." Seligson’s team phrased a similar question as follows: "Do you consider yourself: "blanca/o," "chola/o," "mestiza/o," "indígena" or negra/o?" In this case the response was nearly 65% chola or mestizo; less than 20% indígena; 11% white; and 4% other. These clashing results present two possibilities, both of which are likely true: 1) Bolivians are more likely to identify with a specific indigenous group than with the category "indigenous," and 2) when given the option, most Bolivians consider themselves mestizos or cholos.

But the Seligson survey confirms that the number of Bolivians who define themselves as mestizos remains steady while, the number of self-reported "whites" is steadily decreasing (from 25% in 2000 to only 11% in 2006) and those calling themselves "indigenous" is rising at an equivalent rate. This is a reversal of centuries of subtle ethnic and racial whitening as people who had called themselves "white" now see themselves as mestizo, while a certain number of those who considered themselves mestizos now call themselves indigenous. The researchers believe that the fact that this shift is more dramatic
for men than for women is further indication of its underlying political and ideological motivation.\textsuperscript{lxvii}

But is this a sign that Bolivians are balkanizing or rather that they are becoming more comfortably proud of who they are? One interesting finding of the survey is that while Bolivians are increasingly identifying with a particular culture (Quechua, Camba or Aymara were the cultures isolated by the survey) they are also identifying more strongly as Bolivians. The researchers suggest that “Morales has managed to strengthen the tie of many citizens to the nation, especially those who identify themselves as indigenous.\textsuperscript{lxviii} Support for the political system rose sharply from 2004—a crisis year—to 2006 among both indigenous and non-indigenous Bolivians, as did a sense of national pride and of shared national values,\textsuperscript{lxix} Meanwhile, those who felt that divisions in Bolivia had reached a point that the country should divide declined from 6% in 2004 to 4.6% in 2006.

But the department of Santa Cruz counters these trends. There the percentage who felt that the country should divide rose from 8.9% to 10.1% after the election of Morales and in the city of Santa Cruz de la Sierra, the figure more than doubled from 6.2% in 2004 to 14.1% in 2006.\textsuperscript{lxx} The Seligson survey was taken before recent clashes over the Constituent Assembly and the Autonomy Referendum further deepened regional and ethnic resentments. The percentage of cruceños, who might now favor separation, and whether views in other departments are now also trending that direction, can only be guessed. There is little doubt, however, that the country is polarizing politically, ethnically, and regionally as the recent recall referendum reveals. Trends are not reassuring.

On August 6, 2005—the 180\textsuperscript{th} anniversary of Bolivia’s independence—El Deber (the flagship newspaper of Santa Cruz) drew together a panel of five experts to discuss Bolivia’s national identity and its current crisis. Mauricio Bacardat, a priest and head of an organization working with eastern indigenous peoples, wondered whether Bolivia was really one nation; “or are there at least two distinct concepts of what it means to be Bolivian—one occidental and the other indigenous?” Historian Ana María Lema said she thought that Bolivia was finally in the midst of creating a real nation from the two. “Bolivia is no longer rural and urban life aids cultural mesticization,” she observed. This led artist Roberto Valcárcel to add that while ideologues and politicians push dogmatic positions, “the people themselves are blending.” Psychologist, Esther Balboa, observed that Bolivians are organized—some of that organization indigenous and some of it product of the 1952 revolution. These organizations take Bolivians to the streets, but also give them discipline, an outlet, and a political channel to keep the country from breakdown or from falling into the violence and long-lasting schisms that have afflicted so many of its neighbors. Quoting René Zabaleta Mercado—one of Bolivia’s greatest twentieth century writers—sociologist Cecilia Moreno added that “Bolivia is a nation of cousins.” Bolivians
fight hard and make up, like any strong family does and “I think that this familial sense—and all the structure that goes with it—serves as a cushion against the diversity and distinct visions we have as Bolivians.” Lema added that usually it is an impending crisis that brings Bolivians together. “We can throw ourselves into a fray because we know that sooner or later we will sit down over a beer or a bucket of chicha—tangible crisis brings us together. Until then, Bolivian interest groups maneuver—the differences appearing larger than they often are. But Lema admitted that, “Bolivia now traverses the edge of an abyss, and if we stray even a millimeter toward one extreme or the other, we could fall.” The cause, she said, is that “the long silence of those out of power has finally ended and this deeply disconcerts those who have always held it.”

The current brinksmanship employed on both sides invites others besides Lema to employ the abyss metaphor. In a recent interview on the Recall Referendum, Bolivia expert Eduardo Gamarra comments that this all could “end up in a very Bolivian way, in which we will go to the brink and come back with an agreement that will be nation-saving and where everybody will somehow work out a deal.” Another close observer of Bolivia, Jim Schultz of the Democracy Center adds, “Never underestimate the ability of Bolivia to look like it is about to go over the cliff and not go over the cliff.”

But echoing Lema’s concern is camba activist and television commentator, Carlos Valverde Barberí. “We’ve arrived at a moment that we don’t know exactly how to face,” he told an Associated Press reporter. “The fear I have is that one day we’ll arrive at the cliff, and we’ll arrive with such force that some will fall over the edge. And then it’ll all go to hell.” Valverde, fought for Santa Cruz as a Falangista activist in the 1950s, and has picked up arms to fight the central government more than once since. Thus he may understand the current danger better than most. But the cambi-kolla, born in the heart of Valverde’s Santa Cruz offers a synthesis and a buffer against this fate. With ties to both east and west, they may be the Bolivians who best realize that this is one nation.

And they are not alone. In the midst of the current crisis a business woman in Cochabamba said: “I would like [activists and politicians on both sides] to put aside their self-absorbed, stingy attitudes so they can open their hearts and see just one Bolivia. This is a unique country where we have all the diversity to build a new nation.” As Roberto Valcárcel observed, while the politicians polarize, “the people themselves are blending.” If true, cambi-kollas—who are both westernized and indigenous, creatures of the market and of traditional communitarian values, both highlanders and lowlanders—are an essential knitting element, illustrating to all Bolivians how diversity enriches through synthesis. Meanwhile the politicians on both sides must stop shouting and listen.
Notes

i “El referéndum fortalece al Presidente y a la media luna,” La Razón (La Paz), August 11, 2008.


vi The most detailed accounts of the Constitutional Assembly in English are provided by the Andean Information Network (homepage at http://www.ain-bolivia.org/) and three extensive reports by the International Crisis Group (the reports can be found on its Bolivia page at: http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=4663&l=1. Their perspectives are not completely the same.

vii “Seis de diez bolivianos aprueban gestión de Morales,” El Razón, August 15, 2008. Chuquisaca, where opposition politicians have astutely fanned regional demands to return the nation’s capital to Sucre (the capital of Chuquisaca) is the only department where support for Morales fell since 2005.


Allyn MacLean Stearman, Camba and Kolla, (University of Florida Press, 1985), 20 and Alfonzo Román Hurtado, Cambas y Collas: Los Paradigmas de una nueva
Cambas tend to see kollas as dirty, overly ambitious, untrustworthy, grasping, pushy, and unfriendly—common stereotypes of highlanders I heard expressed when I lived for two years in a small camba village east of Santa Cruz de la Sierra.

Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism, New Edition*, (Verso, 2006). Anderson argues that particularly in multi-cultural Latin America, nations had to first be imagined before they could cohere in any meaningful way. The process of imagining requires the creation of a common history and culture.


Summarized in Román Hurtado, *Cambas y Collas*, 125-30.

Román Hurtado, chapter 4.


Román Hurtado, *Cambas y Colla*, chapter 7.


Javier Albo, *Bodas de plata or requiem por una reforma agrarian*, (La Paz, 1979), 23.


Stearman *Camba y Kolla*, chapters 4 and 5.


xxxiii Laura Raymond's Santa Cruz, Bolivia Home Page for World Urbanization @ Macalester College Geography Department


This is a paraphrase of a point made by current Bolivian Vice-President Alvaro García Linera quoted in Federico Fuentes, "Bolivia: The Clash of Autonomies," Green Left Weekly, issue #715, June 27, 2007.


Román Hurtado, Camba y colla, 150-51.

Ibid, 135 and 139.

Ibid., 318-19.

Ibid., 323-25.

Ibid., 320-22.


vi Ignacio Mendoza P., “Hipótesis sobre descamesinización y cholificación,” *Cambios en el agro y el campesinado boliviano*, (La Paz, 1982), 150 and 152.


viii Stearman, *Camba and Kolla*, 70.


xi *Ibid.*, 66 and 137-40. I observed this first hand when I returned for the first time in 20 years to Cotoca, home of the Virgin of Cotoca, patroness of Santa Cruz. Now, across from her shrine, is a thriving *kolla* market.


xviii *Ibid.*, 24-29. National pride continues to lag behind other surveyed Latin American nations and a sense of shared values is lower than for any country in the region except Guatemala. (p.29).

Two articles covered the forum: Pablo Ortiz, “Bolivianos: disciplinados, pero con baja autoestima,” and “En Bolivia hay nación, lo que falta es igualdad,” both found in El Deber, August 6, 2005.


In 1986, as the final game of the World Cup of soccer wound down, as Argentina emerged victorious for the second time in eight years, the economist and future Argentine foreign Minister Guido di Tella jumped to his feet. To a small group assembled in front of a television set he shouted, “you see! We are a great nation!” Di Tella’s euphoria was widespread in Argentina that day, but scarcely the first link of sport to ideals of nation. For decades, Argentines had tied soccer players, boxers, and other athletes to notions of modernity, tradition, and Argentine identities. Since the 1920s, for example, the archetypal Argentine soccer hero, represented in different players over time, had demonstrated the quintessential “Argentine” traits of high skill, grit, individualism, and a drive to win.

During the proceso – the period of the last military dictatorship (1976-1982) – many Argentines found solace, escape, and inspiration in sports at a time of unprecedented political and military violence. At the same time, the military regime invested dramatic importance in the 1978 World Cup of soccer, staged in Argentina, as a marker for Argentine progress and as an event Argentine leaders hoped (in vain) would counter a mounting international chorus against human rights abuses in Argentina.

While neither apologists for nor supporters of the dictatorship, this article argues that in their public personas and in how a complicit media promoted them, tennis star Guillermo Vilas and Formula One champion Carlos Reutemann represented and came to define in the popular, middle class imagination military ideals of a modern and prosperous Argentina. The success of both athletes on the international stage promoted fanciful notions advanced by the dictatorship that Argentina was not the underdeveloped, economically troubled nation of the past. It was a country participating fully in an international system that advanced material consumption and capitalist economies, while honoring celebrity and personal wealth. In their ascent, in their fame, and in their sports skills, Reutemann and Vilas came to represent ephemerally the dictatorship’s “new” Argentina, and the military’s own purported victories over poverty, political instability, and economic uncertainty.

The article makes the case for Vilas and Reutemann as representing military culture and ideologies in three stages. First, it reasons that print and other media from the proceso can be read for middle class, urban sensibilities, prejudices, and ideals, as well as for direct and indirect representations of military government social, political, and cultural objectives. Print media,
television, and film helped set standards for cultural ideals, beauty, sport celebrity, and humor under military rule. Second, the article suggests that both Vilas and Reutemann rose to new heights in their respective sport at the time of the March 1976 coup d'état that brought the military to power. But the manner in which the public came to view their victories was conditioned by media complicity in advancing the new government's vision for a "modern" Argentina, and their casting of Vilas and Reutemann as examples of a brilliantly successful new Argentina. Third, the article reasons that after 1980, as growing numbers of middle class Argentines began to doubt the efficacy of military rule, and as they became increasingly critical of military violence, those shifts were reflected in both the characterization and the perception of Vilas and Reutemann. As the media became more questioning of military incompetence in government and of the economic and social consequences of years of authoritarian rule, their presentation of Vilas and Reutemann to Argentines changed as well. Like magazine and newspaper articles more generally, pieces on the two athletes became more reflective, more in-depth, more willing to present their subjects in both positive and negative terms. In the imagination of middle class Argentines, Reutemann and Vilas not only became flawed champions, but like the military regime whose values they had come to represent, they became more ambiguous in what they reflected of Argentine identities and values.

What can a sport figure say about society? While both Reutemann and Vilas were transcendent world champions in whom Argentines invested fantasies of greatness and ideals of national identity, neither was an iconic figure on par with the soccer star Diego Maradona, who also emerged as a national figure in the late 1970s. This explains in part why Argentines invested Vilas and Reutemann with their national ideals; each man exhibited excellence, but was flawed and as such, recognizable and accessible to Argentine fans. Neither achieved mythical status or exuded what seemed to fans the almost superhuman physical presence of some athletes; neither was ever venerated as tenaciously, for example, as was hockey star Maurice "the Rocket" Richard in Canada. During the 1950s, Richard's "fiery gaze" had suggested a maniacal brilliance to fans and foes alike. In 1979, at the height of Reutemann's popularity, racing legend Jackie Stewart told the Argentine media that there was little point in comparing Juan Manuel Fangio, the greatest Argentine race driver in history, to Reutemann: "It doesn't take deep analysis to see that Fangio, in his time, was dominant, the driver who owned the Grand Prix circuit. You can't say the same of Carlos [Reutemann]. In truth, he's among five or six possible winners whenever a Grand Prix event is staged." Neither man was above media reproach for a weak performance. Sometimes the media speculated, as did many Argentines, on why Vilas and Reutemann were not, in fact, more perfect stars. In 1979, the popular sports magazine El Gáfico asked rhetorically why, if Maradona and Bjorn Borg were recognized as the best in their respective sports, Reutemann was not lionized in
In part, the sports in question hold a key. In Argentina and elsewhere -- and unlike boxing, wrestling, soccer, and some other sports -- neither Formula One racing nor tennis produced many dramatically inspiring figures whose sporting feats tended to be intermeshed in the popular imagination with a voyeuristic relish for details of what seemed the champions’ often superhuman social and romantic exploits.

In spite of the limitations to the star power of Reutemann and Vilas, during the proceso, and at other times in Argentine history, tennis, Formula One racing, and other sports can be considered a reliable measure of ideals, ideologies, political cultures, and social values. In May 1981, for example, the Argentine Ricardo Julio Villa led Tottenham Hotspur to the English Premier League championship by scoring two goals in a 3-2 victory over Manchester City. El Gráfico editor Ernesto Chérquis Bialo characterized Villa’s role in terms dramatically more substantial than what the goals themselves marked in the victory. Since a questionable referee’s call in the 1966 World Cup of soccer meeting between Argentina and Great Britain, English fans had consistently referred to Argentines as “animals”; “they don’t call us ‘animals’ anymore,” Chérquis Bialo wrote. “They no longer hate us. They don’t mock us.” Villa and other Argentines playing in the United Kingdom had redefined and invigorated Argentina’s international, and as a consequence, its national identity.

Can Villa’s triumph and can sport more generally help explain middle class urban assessments of and attachments to military rule and military ideologies, beyond the historicist revisionism of post-Nunca Más Argentina? Reconstructed after 1983 and the return to democracy, dominant historical memories in Argentina highlight a near universal resistance to all that the military dictatorship represented, from human rights violations to conservative Catholicism to a dominant ideology of rigid moralities. In the middle class imagination and memory of the 1980s and 1990s, the history of the dictatorship has come to break free of the “chronological boundaries of 1976-1983 in the construction of a history of the Argentines replete with their unfinished projects and their permanent resistance [to oppression].” To be sure, many middle class Argentines opposed the dictatorship and resisted oppression. Many more lamented the accompanying rightward shift politically and socially, the assault on peronista societal norms, and the grotesque state terror. At the same time, during the almost eight years of military rule, many middle class Argentines subscribed in different ways to the politics and culture of the military’s “new” Argentina.

Some were collaborators. Many of those who cooperated with the regime have been exposed as professionals who participated fully in the terror apparatus including physicians, priests, military officers, parents who welcomed stolen children into their homes as “adopted,” and a host of others. Many more had qualms about the military’s policies and actions, but for reasons that included fear and exhaustion over the political and economic turmoil that had
come before, said nothing and even participated at one level or another in the dictatorship project for reform, stability, modernization, and a return to order. On two unusual occasions in particular, tacit urban middle class support for the military’s goals of stability and progress exploded into vehement public backing. The first was the Argentine victory at the final of the 1978 World Cup of soccer, where thousands of Argentines poured into the streets of their cities to celebrate the triumph of their nation at an athletic event the military had organized to showcase a “modern” Argentina. The second was the 1982 Malvinas War when, once again, middle class Argentines – many of whom deeply regretted their euphoric support for military rule in retrospect – forcefully backed their government’s attack on the British-held islands.

Middle class complacency or support for the dictatorship was conditioned in part by the media and by military propaganda. The author Diana Taylor has argued that the military regime used images, performance, the manipulation of information, and high communication skills to entrench, to normalize, and to conceal their rule of terror. At times, the military government and its allies in the media cast Argentine identity as intertwined with a national project dedicated to countering “foreign propaganda” and to Argentines standing together in opposition to criticism from overseas. This combative assertion of national identity was most famously expressed in the military’s “Somos Derechos y Humanos” campaign that urged Argentines to be proud of their national morality and that challenged Amnesty International and other foreign assertions that “Argentina” was a human rights violator.

There were dozens of related media messages meant by the government and its allies to project military rule as normal and progressive, and to tie dictatorship objectives to “Argentine” identities, moralities, and dreams. In 1977, for example, the Argentine Advertising Council (Consejo Publicitario Argentino) launched a series of advertisements asking and answering “Me? I’m Argentine.” One advertisement told Argentines not to sit on the sidelines politically and to support their government; “a negative attitude affects us all negatively.” As Argentine military leaders had in the past, through censorship, directives, and outright seizures, the military won control of some print and other media. The state-owned Channel 13 television station was seized by the Navy after the coup d’état. News broadcasts on this and other government stations became vehicles for dictatorship propaganda, relentlessly bombarding the nation with official positions that bore no reference to the rampant state sponsored terror. Through late 1976, there was extensive coverage in the press of the military’s “good news” story of a supposed restoration of order and a purported end to political violence in the aftermath of the March coup d’état. In December, for example, the popular social magazine Siete Dias published a typical puff piece on Tucumán, the focus of the military’s war on a very modest, and highly exaggerated guerrilla presence through late 1976. Now, in part as a challenge to some leftist media that through the mid-
1970s had celebrated violent revolution in Argentina, the magazine could cheerily report that the province had finally been able to "recover its rhythm" thanks to the two year-old military operation against the subversives.

Moreover, in a profound trivialization and erasure of the Argentine military's gruesome internal war, according to the journalist Pablo Sirvén, while military units unleashed the greatest massacre in contemporary Argentina, "TV was filled with models wanting to be journalists; soccer became the number one news item; reports on travel and other frivolities effectively numbed the sensibilities of TV viewers; and a proliferation of light situation comedies ended any possibility of thoughtful programming that might otherwise have reflected even minimally on what was really happening.

At the same time, there was strong opposition to military rule, as there had been in the past. Ten years earlier, at the time of the coup led by Juan Carlos Onganía in March 1966, the satirical magazine Tía Vicenta had had a circulation of 500,000. Onganía closed the magazine down quickly, concerned over its stinging indictment of leading political figures. Founded in 1978, the magazine Humor was less biting in its satirical barbs at leading military and political figures. As such it was able to survive the proceso, taking modest jabs at the generals. But the magazine's role was complex. Just as one might argue that Humor represented a publication critical of the generals, one might also reason that the modest condemnations of the magazine helped lend legitimacy to the regime by suggesting a certain freedom of the media and that the generals themselves were not beyond rebuke.

There was less complexity or subtlety in more popular gossip magazines. Para Tí, Gente, Siete Dias, and Radiolandia, among others, lauded the military take over and the values the generals espoused including those of a traditional family structure, an erasure of peronista working class politics, a restoration of order, and an idealization of foreign consumer cultures. Directly, through sycophantic editorials and upbeat stories on the new regime, these and other publications affirmed military values and dismissed accusations of human rights violations. Indirectly, in the variety of the stories they included and in what those stories represented, they also affirmed military values. These magazines were targeted at and represented the values of an urban, middle class that had been made anxious over the preceding thirty years by the rise of peronismo and the associated growth of working class strength – a middle class also reeling from two decades of political violence and economic turmoil. These Argentines were not necessarily supporters of the dictatorship and were, for the most part, opposed to the gross human rights violations that the generals perpetrated. But the military's messages of hope for rapid modernization appealed to them, as did the promise of prosperity and a rapid return to democracy – all affirmed by the most widely read magazines of the day.

Popular magazines advanced military cultural, political, and social agendas including the campaign against so-called "subversion" and what the
generals argued was the moral attack on Argentina of the revolutionary left. Dictatorship era agencies set in place to control the media, including the Dirección General de Publicaciones and the Secretaría de Información Pública, maintained lists of magazines, newspapers, and publishers that it used or planned to use to advance its ideas and positions. Conspicuously absent from the military’s lists of complicit media was the powerful Editorial Atlántida. This was not because Atlántida did not tow the military line; rather, the publisher of some of the most important magazines of that and other eras – including *El Gráfico*, *Para Tí*, *Gente*, and others - was a stalwart supporter of military rule.\textsuperscript{xx}

Perhaps the closest collaboration of a publication and the dictatorship was that between Atlantida’s children’s magazine *Billiken* and the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces. In 1979, in recognition of the magazine’s representation of military ideals of family and morality, the government made the sixtieth anniversary of the publication an occasion to highlight the end of its own public campaign for “The Child, the School, and the Armed Forces” in conjunction with a celebration of the four hundredth anniversary of the City of Buenos Aires. One of many areas where *Billiken* reinforced military ideals was in regard to the generals’ obsession with political, cultural, and clinical “hygiene.” *Billiken* authors waxed endlessly on beautifully groomed adults and children; clean clothing; vaccination; and in what the journalist Paula Guitelman has called “war metaphors,” the war on tooth decay; an “attack” on the common cold; and the “struggle” against rabies. Conservative ideas on race, the promotion of whiteness, and gender ideologies that established clear divisions between male and female family and societal roles were also highlighted both subtly and overtly by *Billiken*.\textsuperscript{xxiv}

There is an irony to the dovetailing of dictatorship related imagery and values in the figures of Reutemann and Vilas in gossip magazines like *Gente* and *Siete Dias*, and in sports magazines, particularly *El Gráfico*. In their origins, the sorts of lifestyles and images they celebrated, and in their target audiences, social and sports magazines could not have been more distinct. While both appealed to middle class readers in the decades leading up to and through the 1976 coup d’état, the gossip and entertainment magazines targeted women readers in their highlighting Hollywood, beauty ideals, and images of the good life. *El Gráfico*, *Goles*, *KO Mundial*, and other sports magazines targeted the husbands, sons, brothers, and fathers of these women and featured a set of messages trumpeting masculinity and Argentine national identities. Founded in 1919, by the mid-1930s *El Gráfico* boasted a massive weekly circulation of 200,000. From the outset the magazine that was more responsible than any other for shaping the public images of Vilas and Reutemann offered messages of modernity, male virtues, and a criollo sports style that highlighted an exceptional set of Argentine athletic qualities.\textsuperscript{xxv}

Less evident in *El Gráfico* than in the social magazines, many in the media shifted right in their editorial policies after the military came to power in
March 1976. Political support for the dictatorship was explicit, even though references to military objectives were sometimes oblique and metaphoric. An article in *Siete Dias* in late 1976, for example, featured the deteriorating political situation in Rhodesia. It defended indirectly the *proceso* emphasis on order and political progress through an elimination of dangerous subversion. “Rhodesia: la inocencia condenada a muerte” featured a full page photograph of a white Rhodesian child holding an automatic rifle with the help of her father. The article explained Rhodesia’s crisis in the same dramatic Cold War context that lay at the root of the military’s explanation for its own brutal reaction to “communist” subversion, using a South Asian metaphor that appealed to Argentine military leaders who blamed weak American politicians for the “loss” of Vietnam; Rhodesia, according to the article, was on the verge of becoming a “new Vietnam.” While white leaders were working judiciously to create a multiracial government, “irresponsible” black subversives were trying to destabilize the nation and bring chaos.

More important than the blunt political support in the media were the indirect emphases on ideological priorities of the regime. The military’s radical redirection of the economy through a breaking down of economic barriers to foreign imports and investments was supported by a media emphasis on Argentina as technologically and economically modern. A December 1976 article in *Siete Dias* introduced Argentines to the new jumbo jet (Boeing 747) purchased by the national airline, Aerolineas Argentinas. Magazines and newspapers filled with advertisements for products from overseas that emphasized foreign, mostly American ideals of youth, wealth and beauty. A 1976 ad for Levi’s jeans featured the word “Wanted!” and an American western flair. Where danger or violence were presented, the media did not identify the most significant threat of the period – the military’s internal war – but the military’s version of a subversive leftist threat as well as a range of other, more oblique or foreign problems, like the presence of piranhas in Argentina’s rivers, the menace of the “Son of Sam” murders in New York City, and the racialized sexual predilections of Ugandan dictator Idi Amin.

The dramatic rise of comedians Alberto Olmedo and Jorge Porcel is perhaps the most prominent example of how popular culture reflected military ideologies. Even as the military imposed widespread censorship and took control of the bodies that regulated popular culture like the Instituto Nacional de Cinematografía, Porcel and Olmedo thrived, making fun of an easy target – politicians already marginalized by the dictatorship. The humor in the films of Porcel and Olmedo depended on a raw objectification of women. The actresses Susana Giménez and Moria Casán often played opposite these leading men in
roles that projected them in prototypically cynical associations between a highly
sexualized appearance and a lust for money. This humor, in films like Con mi
mujer no puedo (1977) and Mi mujer no es mi Señora (1978), reinforced the
economic and financial lines of the dictatorship, that exalted money as a
mediator of human relations and sanctified the family by presenting “prohibited,”
alternative sexual possibilities outside the context of marriage and family. This
genre of titillating comedy, that indirectly juxtaposed funny bad behavior with
the correct and proper conduct advanced by the dictatorship, accounted for fully
one quarter of all films made during the proceso.

The emergence of Vilas and Reutemann as dictatorship era sports heroes came in a context of a middle class celebration of leisure and celebrity in
a manner that suggested, like the films of Porcel and Olmedo, not a hint of crisis
in Argentina. In keeping with military ideology and propaganda that the coup
d’éetat had restored normalcy and had placed Argentina back on a path toward
democracy, modernization, and progress, middle class Argentines followed
keenly the activities of movie stars and other celebrities who seemed oblivious to
the crisis. A Radiolandia 2000 report on Punta del Este, Uruguay beach life in
the summer of 1978-1979 found “beautiful women, a European climate, and
sophistication.” Young people were listening to John Paul Young’s “Love is in the
Air,” the Rolling Stones’s “Miss You,” and Eric Clapton’s “Cocaine.” Susana
Gimenez was there, as was Alberto Olmedo, and the tango performer Astor
Piazzolla. Even when radio personality Magdalena Ruiz Guiñazú, a persecuted
opponent of the dictatorship was mentioned, there was no reference to politics.
She had just bought a chalet in Punta del Este. Moreover, under the
dictatorship there was an intensified and voyeuristic celebration in the media of
what the middle class viewed as the good life, the fascination for which
dovetailed with the emergence of Vilas and Reutemann as sports heroes
associated with elite living.

In deemphasizing political conflict and in the campaign to suggest
normalcy in all regards, the media joined military leaders in portraying Buenos
Aires in stark contrast to those images presented by Amnesty International and
other foreign critics of a city rife with violence, torture and disappearances.
There were remarkable and convoluted denials of torture, executions, and
kidnappings. In 1979, for example, interviewed in regard to problems facing
Argentine justice, Federal Judge Evaristo Santa Maria managed to ignore entirely
the violence facing the nation and the breakdown in justice. He spoke to the
need for more judges, a greater budget for the nation’s courts, and better
salaries for judges. At the same time the media presented an exaggerated
nostalgia for Buenos Aires traditions and institutions that suggested peaceful
continuity in everyday life. Admiral Emilio Massera, a member of the first
proceso junta, a psychopath who personally oversaw torture sessions in
clandestine detention centers, and a well-known fan of tango music, spent many
evenings listening to his favorite singer, Edmundo Rivera, at the city’s most
famous tango spot, *El Viejo Almacen*. In January 1979, *Radiolandia 2000* reinforced the military's idea of a city in peace. It featured a long article on a nostalgic tango culture that celebrated Massera’s favorites -- Rivero, and *El Viejo Almacen* -- while stressing the club's old San Telmo neighborhood and the need to preserve this important cultural institution. In solidarity with the generals, the media tended to quickly reject foreign and domestic critics of military rule, as in April 1980 when the human rights lawyer and future president Raúl Alfonsín called for a return to democracy and free elections. In response, the popular magazine *Gente* reprinted a very brief foreign report on Alfonsín’s remarks in conjunction with a much longer retort from the right wing journalist Renée Sallas who argued the military line that generals also wanted democracy, only without any sort of irresponsible rush that might return Argentina to pre-1976 political chaos.

Many among Argentina’s urban middle class ignored or were simply ignorant of the violence perpetrated by the nation's military rulers during the last dictatorship. At the same time, many Argentines filtered their concern over violence through apolitical representations of violence in popular culture. One longstanding concern of many Argentines was what the media portrayed as the violence of highway driving in Argentina. In the late 1970s, as had been the case for two decades, the Argentine media produced images and descriptions of horrific car crashes on the nation's highways. Words like “suicide” and “killing” used to describe highway accidents expressed a fear of violence. And while fast drivers were described as Juan Manuel Fangio emulators – in reference to the great 1950s Argentine Formula One driver -- the ongoing linkages of highway disaster with violence helped position Reutemann’s grace on the track as exceptional and heroic.

In one important regard, Argentina’s most accomplished race car driver, Juan Manuel Fangio, had played a role similar to Vilas and Reutemann, emerging as a world champion and sports hero during the dictatorship of the late 1950s. Like Fangio, Reutemann's period of greatest popularity came after a coup d'état, this time in March 1976. His portrayal in the media dovetailed with dictatorship discourses on modernization, the dangers of peronista working class ideals, and the equation of prosperity with bringing Argentine objectives of success and modernization into line with those of wealthy nations.

Vilas’s rise was equally striking after the March 1976 coup d’état. A function of his own ability and dedication, that rise was tied at the same time to how the media shaped his image in the context of dictatorship era ideologies and norms. Vilas had won a Masters tournament in 1974 in Melbourne, Australia. But 1977 marked his emergence as a tennis superstar. His first moment of dramatic triumph came in his April 1977 victory over the American player Dick Stockton in a Davis Cup match played in Buenos Aires. De facto president Jorge Rafael Videla, never a prominent sports fanatic, showed up at the match to introduce the players to an unprecedented crowd of 7,000. After the match he
warmly saluted Vilas on his victory. Military order was tied to Vilas’s triumph not only in Videla’s presiding over the match, but in police protection for the tennis star in the face of what *Siete Dias* called the crowd’s “delirium”; the public’s non-traditional behavior at a tennis match reinforced notions of an Argentina at peace. Fans were enjoying themselves in a relaxed manner. “We’ve never seen anything like it,” gushed the American journalists Bud Collins and Walter Bingham on the outpouring of support for Vilas. Moreover, Vilas and his David Cup teammates reflected another positive character trait for Argentines, in contrast to the Americans. While the latter were individualistic to their self-detriment, as the media described the contest, the Argentines had worked as a team; Vilas would not discuss his own triumphs until the team had defeated the Americans for the number one placing in the Americas.

In June Vilas won the French Open and subsequently reached the world number one ranking (a position he and no other Argentine man would ever again reclaim). That came in his September victory at the U.S. Open in Forest Hills, New York over the dynamic American Jimmy Connors—a victory made all the more compelling by a 6-0 win in the final set of the match. From the moment of this, his greatest triumph, the Argentine media recast him in the image of a hero. Two hours after winning Forest Hills, Vilas led a group of friends to dinner at an Argentine restaurant in Queen’s, “La Vuelta de Martín Fierro.” Shortly before the meal wrapped up hours later, Vilas took a microphone to thank his supporters, particularly those who had backed him as an also-ran. “Do you remember,” he asked those present, as though it had been more than a few days before, “when they all said that I always reached the finals but never won? Well, they gave me a hard time. They said that all I was good for was coming in second, that I was like River Plate, or [Carlos] Reutemann... or like [perennial Radical Party presidential candidate Ricardo] Balbín...” Highly skilled, gritty, individualistic, with a strong drive to win, and sentimental to boot, Vilas was being recast as the archetypical Argentine sports hero.

A year later, Reutemann experienced a similar lionization in the media when he erased his image as a perennial also ran. If Forest Hills marked Vilas’s coming out as a superstar in Argentina, Reutemann’s equivalent came in April 1978 at the West Coast Grand Prix in Long Beach, California. In beating the world’s best driver, Nikki Lauda, Reutemann showed what the media described as the heroic traits of courage, tenacity, patience, and high intelligence. For the philosopher Jorge Luis García Venturini, Reutemann’s victory marked a key triumph for the best moral values linked to sport, qualities emphasized by the military dictatorship and in contrast to world trends toward disorder, emotionalism, and sloth—enemies of Argentine progress and hallmarks of the so-called subversives defeated in 1976, according to both Venturini and the dictatorship.

As early as January 1977, the Argentine media tied Reutemann’s rising star to the dictatorship with the running of the Buenos Aires Grand Prix.
According to the rabidly pro-dictatorship *Gente*, the race could be summed up by the 42,000 people in attendance, the 58 degree Celsius temperatures on the track, Nikki Lauda’s inability to finish, Jody Scheckter’s victory... and Reutemann’s brilliance. The Argentine racer’s success on Argentine soil presaged the 1978 World Cup of soccer as a victory for how the military regime wished the nation to be seen — and how middle class Argentines saw their country through Reutemann’s heroism. The construction of normalcy through Reutemann’s skills and image won out not only in the fantastic success of the race and the associated fanfare of the parties, the beautiful women present, and the power of the cars themselves. It depended also on the creation of an image of a “democratic” Argentina, which by all appearances functioned like France, Great Britain, Italy, or any other country where a Grand Prix race might take place. The military’s lone intrusion into the action was perfectly timed. It came as the race winner reached the podium. In imagery similar to that surrounding Guillermo Vilas’s 1977 Davis Cup victory in Buenos Aires, the media showed soldiers “protecting” Jody Scheckter from the imaginary subversive enemies that the military continued to insist represented a threat to Argentine society and democracy. While military units were fully engaged in the illicit capture, torture, and execution of thousands of Argentines — men, women, and children — here and elsewhere, the media image of Argentine soldiers suggested the protection, not destruction of democratic values and society. Reutemann and Vilas became cultural vehicles through which the propaganda of social normalcy could be cast.

At times, the media represented Reutemann and Vilas in strong contrast to heroes in “baser,” more working class sports like boxing or soccer. Their dignity, exceptional intelligence, and high morality were not only traits the military claimed for itself and its model citizens; they came in contrast to the sorts of conduct that had to be defeated and might well be present in other sports. For the philosopher (and media talking head) Jorge Luis García Venturini, subversion and terrorism in Argentina and around the world came as a consequence of the vague mix of factors that the military invoked as forming the basis for its ideological opponents -- a rise in irrational thought, nihilism, spiritualism, cults of witchcraft, and the celebration of working class soccer stars. Where Reutemann’s Long Beach victory marked a genuine Argentine moral triumph, by contrast the nation’s sporting culture - focused on soccer and manifest most dangerously for some proponents of military rule in an irreligious popular fanaticism - represented a dangerous challenge to the military’s modernizing project.

Like Reutemann, Vilas lent credibility to the dictatorship by accepting and reflecting the normalcy standards imposed on a brutalized nation. Other celebrities also participated in this tragic farce. In an absurd denial by omission of the dictatorship’s violence against women, for example, esteemed authors Silvina Bullrich and Marta Lynch wrote indignant public letters to the Ayatollah Komeini decrying the treatment of women under the Iranian Revolution. They
said nothing of the incarceration and torture of pregnant women in their own country. When de facto president Jorge Rafael Videla invited Vilas to meet with him in advance of his participation in the Forest Hills tournament, the tennis star was in awe. "I had never spoken with the president," gushed Vilas to Siete Dias, "You can imagine that when I received the call I was surprised, and very pleasantly. I'm sure he's busy with many things and, while I know that tennis is now important in Argentina, I never expected that he would be able to spend a full half hour with me. It was a great honor, particularly when he told me that he would like to have attended my matches at Forest Hills, but that previous obligations had made that impossible." The imagery combined the respectful Vilas and the dutifully statesmanlike Videla.

In an atmosphere where the government regularly accused foreign enemies that included Communists, Amnesty International, the Jimmy Carter administration in Washington, and French socialists, among many others, of an assortment of international conspiracies against Argentines, when Vilas was not invited to the 1978 Masters tournament - the last in the annual Grand Prix series - many in the media saw yet another conspiracy against Argentina, this time orchestrated by ambiguously identified international tennis powers. By 1980, Vilas was a key face of Argentina abroad and an idealized figure for Argentines, highlighting the military's promise of an Argentina able to transcend the chaos of the recent past and traditional peronista politics that grated against military sensibilities for a number of reasons, including its ongoing reminder that a majority of Argentines were poor and unjustly so. Both Vilas and Reutemann were idols for middle class urban Argentines who tended to sympathize with the military's distaste for peronismo and who joined the media in imagining both men as transcendent figures who represented Argentina's potential for greatness.

The sometimes contradictory Vilas image reflected the depth and complexity of both middle class sensibilities and fantasies of how the tennis star demonstrated the best of what was Argentine. Vilas was often portrayed in the media as accessible, a typical Argentine who enjoyed a good steak and a mate while on the road. Even his losses - what set him apart, in the end, from Bjorn Borg or Jimmy Connors, the best players in the world - were cast in a positive arielista light. Unlike the unemotional Swede Borg, Vilas made clear disdainfully that he did not wish to play like a "machine," to win at all costs. His fans loved that "human" quality about their champion. At the same time, Vilas was regularly cast as one of the international smart set, one of the beautiful people. In April 1980, for example, he was photographed with Princess Grace of Monaco after having played a match at the Monte Carlo Open. Here the tennis star was no simple, mate swilling Argentine. He represented an Argentine middle class caprice, promoted by dictatorship visions of an internationalized modernity, of glamour and high living as accessible. Two years later, Vilas was linked
romantically to Princess Caroline of Monaco. This likely did even more for his popular image in Argentina than any victory on the court. 

At times, dictatorship disparagement of working class culture was expressed by sympathetic media in contrast to the lofty triumphs of Vilas and Reutemann. In 1979, in Buenos Aires, when Vilas represented his country in a Davis Cup match against Chile, crowds hollered and applauded the errors of the Chilean players. At one point, rowdy fans went much further than they had at the 1977 Davis Cup matches. Some grabbed Vilas and began to rip the clothing from him. The magazine Gente recoiled at what its editors regarded as an ugly intrusion into the game of tennis, a public far more violent than anything Argentines had seen the previous year at the World Cup of soccer. Gente explained the actions of the crowd as a pathology, tying the hooliganism not only to an assault on the dignity of an upper class pastime, but to barbaric behavior conditioned by a 48% illiteracy rate in Argentina – a factor that ran in direct conflict to an ordered modern society where the rule of law should reasonably prevail. Gente ranted that the Davis Cup incident had undone all of the hard work undertaken at the time of the World Cup to improve Argentina’s image abroad and was yet another representation of “the person who harasses a woman alone on the street, who votes irresponsibly, who has no respect for a red light... all this, we repeat, is semi-illiteracy.” 

The link between sport and public behavior expressed a range of ongoing military criticism and repression as far as conduct and morality were concerned including, for example, an ominous insistence by some military leaders that women who dressed in pants could reasonably be suspected of “subversive” activities. Media vitriol toward working Argentines and what they had represented politically before 1976 coincided with the dictatorship assault on peronismo and the ways the latter had promoted the interests of working Argentines. It also constructed Vilas as a cultural figure antithetical to Argentine working class cultures and celebratory of military ideals.

While in both cases, there was very little reliable information on how the athletes lived their lives outside of the public eye, Reutemann’s superstar image was even more morally impeccable than that of Vilas. In keeping with the military’s promotion of traditional family values and gender roles – and its denigration of women who worked outside the home - Reutemann’s public image was that of the ideal Argentine family man. Married to a beautiful blond wife, Mimicha, and with two striking young children, Mariana and Cora Inés, Reutemann was portrayed as a dedicated father, struggling to balance the pressures of being Ferrari’s top driver with the demands of fatherhood and the responsibilities of a good husband. Even when the Reutemans separated in 1979, a decision at odds with the military’s dominant ideology of family above all else, the media skirted the issue to enhance the carefully constructed image of the moral, family man. A Gente article cast Reutemann’s separation in a context of the demands of his Formula One career where the marriages of other drivers,
including James Hunt, Clay Regazzoni, and Hans Stuck had also fallen apart as a result of unusual, work related stress.\[\text{iii}\]

The media imagery of Reutemann as white and good looking reflected an idealized high life and a moral conduct that emphasized dictatorship era visions of family, the nation's European heritage over a more ambiguous criollo mix of indigenous and European ancestries, and self-discipline. Reutemann neither smoked nor drank alcohol. There were no scandals or skeletons in the closet. There was only one goal, to become a champion Formula One driver. At the same time, the media focused where it could on what seemed Reutemann's superhuman qualities. When asked in late 1977 whether he feared driving in the rain, while recognizing the dangers of driving in adverse condition, Reutemann answered in the negative. “Fear is an essential human emotion,” the journalist Martín Calvo told Reutemann. “How is it possible you don’t believe in fear, that you don’t feel it?” “For you,” Reutemann replied, “fear might well be an essential emotion. For me it would be absurd to admit to feeling fear.” In regard to an accident he suffered in a race in Sweden, Reutemann went on to say that there was no time to feel any emotion at all.\[\text{iv}\]

Unlike Reutemann, Vilas was no family man. Tongues wagged in the popular media when the tennis star vacationed with Princess Caroline of Monaco in Tahiti in 1982. But Vilas’s playboy image had been toned down sharply in the media after the coup d'état. After March 1976 the media were more inclined to cast Vilas in a manner that matched military ideals of the quiet dignity of a sports hero. While it was clear to all that Vilas was not married, was something of a sex symbol nationally and internationally, and kept the company of different women, raw details of his social life were rarely splashed across the pages of popular magazines or newspapers, as had been the case before 1976. In the sort of article it would simply not print after the coup, a month before the military take-over Gente ran a cover story on the love affair between Vilas and the model Mirta Teresa Massa. Extensive details on the comings-and-goings of the love birds were interspersed with suggestive, behind-the-bush telephoto lens shots of the couple that “could not be photographed together until now.” The coup brought a new morality to the print media, and a reinvention of the Vilas image as more staid. There would be no more paparazzi style photos.

In early 1978, the Argentine media celebrated Ferrari’s decision to make Reutemann their number one driver reinforcing in the popular middle class imagination, through Ferrari's image of luxury, the idealized links between Reutemann's looks, his success, and his class. The popular magazine Radiolandia 2000 pointed out that Reutemann was now positioned to take on his chief nemesis, the Austrian driver Niki Lauda, portrayed graphically in a photograph that – in contrast to Reutemann’s movie star appearance – showed the burns Lauda had suffered over most of his face as a result of a car accident.\[\text{v}\] Both Vilas and Reutemann socialized with the sorts of international figures that afforded them prestige and cachet, as depicted in the media. Those
connections paralleled the military government’s own aspirations to be accepted in the international community, as well as the dictatorship era middle class consumer culture that came increasingly to prize the trappings of what was perceived as an international good life. In November 1978, Gente reported on the friendship between Reutemann and the American actor Paul Newman, a race car aficionado.

Newman was scripted as something of an obverse to the squeaky clean Reutemann. The American seemed more rough around the edges. The magazine reported on Newman telling Reuteman that he admired the latter’s rigor, his professionalism, his alcohol abstinence, “that you don’t each French fries, that you do a thousand laps of the track a day, and that you come out fresh as a daisy.” Reutemann’s place as a clean living Argentine bon vivant came both in conjunction with Newman’s star status, and in contrast to his modestly bad side; “honestly,” he confided to a Reutemann, whom Argentines would never have confused with a gambler, "I'm a big poker player. One night I bet Lee Marvin that I could outplay him for the number of hours he'd like. He accepted and I ended up beating him over forty-five and a-half-hours."

If, during the late 1970s, Argentines would have understood a moral significance in the difference between how Newman and Reutemann lived their lives, by the early 1980s such lines were no longer as clearly drawn between Reutemann and others. The shine had begun to wear off the military era culture of order, consumerism, and what would have been considered traditional moralities. At the same time, the media attention to Vilas and Reutemann also began to shift. There was no precise end point to dictatorship cultures. Much of what the dictatorship created socially, institutionally, and culturally persisted long after the fall of the generals at the end of 1983. It was not until the late 1980s, for example, that the humor of Olmedo and Porcel began to wane. But as early as 1981, the media began to reflect a middle class unease with and increasing distaste for military moralities, and an open dissatisfaction with ongoing economic troubles in Argentina that the dictatorship had promised to resolve. For the first time since the coup d’etat, the media began to reflect on political themes. In February 1981, five years after the famous actress Irma Roy had lost her television job for political reasons, Radiolandia 2000 reported sympathetically on her inability to find work while a year later, the magazine Revista 10 did a very similar exposé on the actor Mario Luciani, also without work since the coup d’état. Neither magazine would have contemplated even so indirect a criticism of the military regime three years earlier.

In the aftermath of the 1982 Malvinas War the media illustrated growing middle class hostility to the regime first, by no longer presenting the government exclusively in glowing terms and second, by offering critical viewpoints of the regime. In September 1982, until not long before a ferocious apologist for military rule, the magazine Gente led with an exposé of high level and massive government corruption in conjunction with the 1978 World Cup of soccer, held in
Moreover after 1980, as Argentines in many walks of life began to challenge the authority of the generals, the luster on both Reutemann and Vilas began to fade. Argentines began to explore new interests politically and culturally, presaging the explosive incursion of foreign information, ideas, and arts after 1983. While Reutemann and Formula One remained at the top of the Argentine racing world, for example, there was a dramatic increase in media and fan attention to competing events in motor cross, Formula Two, Formula Three, and stock car racing.

A September 1981 article in Radiolandia 2000 speculated simply, and without any real evidence that Reutemann might retire. In contrast to heroic portrayals in earlier articles, Reutemann was now presented as a driver who had reached his peak. Photographs showed him stern and tired, without his trademark smile. Media transmitted images of both athletes and how the public perceived them changed in conjunction with the growing doubts that many Argentines began to have and to express for the military regime. There was no abrupt transformation in the public image of the two athletes, just as popular intolerance for military rule and what it represented politically, culturally, and socially built slowly. In 1979 and 1980, for example, Vilas’s authority as both a tennis player and an Argentine of international stature allowed him to predict a remarkable 60% possibility of success for the Argentine Davis Cup team in the upcoming international competition that year. Vilas’s reputation for ongoing success and professionalism lent credibility to his forecast for another national triumph. That authority simply no longer existed by the end of military rule four years later.

In 1980, the media still portrayed Carlos Reutemann much as it did the nation itself under dictatorship – staid, solid, successful, and progressing professionally according to plan. Like Vilas, if Reutemann had a “weakness,” a feature that kept him second place on the international circuit, it was one that made each athlete even more popular with the public; while not exactly clear what the difference meant in the mechanics of moving his vehicle around the track at high speeds, Argentine fans found endearing that Reutemann approached his sport with his “heart” rather than his head. “Every day I’m more content,” Reutemann told journalists in 1980. Like Vilas, he had matured as a champion in the public imagination and spoke with the confidence and generosity appropriate to his high status about his fellow race drivers, his busy schedule, and the technology behind the latest Ford, Renault, and BMW race cars on the circuit.

In 1981, the media began to chip away at the images of the two athletes, much as it did at that of the previously untouchable military rulers. While both men remained popular and continued to perform well on their respective international circuits, the media highlighted chinks in their armor as never before. Articles began, for example, to emphasize the eccentricities of Vilas’s coach and advisor; today a Forbes list billionaire, at the time the...
Romanian Ion Tiriac helped cultivate a press self-image of fiery unpredictability. To Argentine fans of Vilas, he seemed a "Transylvanian" wild man with a fiery temper. As many middle class Argentines became more worried about contradictions in dictatorship politics and "progress," Tiriac's "bad boy" image made Vilas a similarly contradictory figure. Tiriac seemed the mirror image of the dignity of his charge, and the genteel quality of tennis, as projected in the Argentine press.

Sometimes the transformations in the Reutemann and Vilas narratives were more striking than that marked by the appearance of a Transylvanian foreigner at courtside. More so than that of Vilas, Reutemann's success, as that of the military regime whose values he had come to represent, came to be tempered by doubt and uncertainties. In May 1981, Reutemann won the Belgian Grand Prix. But the smiling, handsome face that had graced the pages of newspapers and magazines after past victories was gone. El Gráfico ran a photograph of Reutemann seated and slumped over. His face was covered by his hands alongside the caption, "I can't feel happy." The familiar victory narrative stressing the courageous driver, racing at high speeds and out-thinking his opponents, was now tempered by a darker Reutemann, troubled by the violence of his sport—in this case the regularity of crashes on the course, but more pointedly his own responsibility for the death of a mechanic, crushed by Reutemann's car during a practice pit stop. "What will you do now?" asked Reutemann's friend Rafael Grajales after the race. "Nothing, nothing," answered a shaken Reutemann, "I'm going home; I want to relax and forget about all of this." The race car driver still represented the dictatorship in the imagination of the Argentine middle class, only now that image was confused, even dark.

The fall of the dictatorship in 1983 coincided with the end of an era in Argentine sport. The shift was not immediate, but the media and the public would no longer celebrate sporting heroes as they had in the past. In the 1980s and 1990s, sports notables did not dominate the covers of popular magazines in the manner that Vilas and Reutemann had done. In part, this change can be tied to the international and national fall-out from the globalization of sport. The 1980s, for example, marked the emergence of powerfully wealthy sport franchises, such as the Manchester United soccer team in England and fight promoter Don King's boxing superstars in the United States. Many of Argentina's best athletes went to work and live in Europe or the United States. They distanced themselves physically and culturally from Argentine fans and the sorts of popular narratives that tied them to national identity.

The last of the media sports superstars, Diego Maradona, represented this transformation tragically in a popular narrative that saw his dramatic rise and move to Europe ended by drug addiction, health problems, and disorientation. For many Argentines, these were all symptoms of the loss of an essentially Argentine identity, first, through his move away from family and community to the big city, and then, through a second move to Europe. While
the San Antonio Spurs’ Manu Ginóbili, the highest paid Argentine athlete in history, is a superstar in Argentina, his cultural importance is far less than was that of Maradona, Reutemann, or Vilas in their day. A resident of Texas, when Ginóbili visits Argentina the stays are brief, often incognito, and replete with bodyguards that keep away those countrymen who might do him harm. There are no photographs of the quiet Ginóbili celebrating a victory with friends in an Argentine restaurant in the United States or sipping on a *mate*.

The shift in the ties between sport and popular culture can also be linked to changes in Argentina after the fall of dictatorial rule. As censorship and other limitations on the movement of information, ideals, music, and art fell away – a change impelled in part by technological advances that included the arrival of cable television in 1982 – Argentines became more focused on international sport, and less interested in national sports and sports heroes. The result of each of these trends were popular sports figures less larger-than-life than Reutemann or Vilas, more glamorous for their distance from Argentina, less invested in the popular imagination with Argentine identity traits – in short, less Argentine. Once impossible to imagine, in 2006 the Nike Corporations erected giant billboards in Buenos Aires to promote their sportswear not with the image of an Argentine player, but with a massive photograph of the Brazilian (and Barcelona Football Club) star Ronaldinho.

There was no successor to Reutemann, no race car driver who ever challenged again for the top position in Formula One driving. While interest in the sport remained strong in the two decades that followed the dictatorship, its fans tended to be of the same generation of men who had followed Carlos Reutemann’s rise and watched the sport on television in neighborhood bars on Sunday mornings (where they continued to congregate). Gabriela Sabatini followed Vilas as a tennis icon in Argentina. But while she captured the attention of the media and the public for both her tennis prowess and her beauty, Sabatini was an unlikely sports hero and underlined the changes that had taken place in the intersections of Argentine sport and popular culture. She was a woman, an incongruity in a country that had never celebrated a woman’s triumphs as equal to those of a Reutemann or a Vilas, and as much an indication as anything else of the democratization of popular culture in the aftermath of the dictatorship.\footnote{\textsuperscript{103}}

In addition, if there was anything left of them by the time of her rise in the mid-1980s, the military era’s family and social values were shattered by Sabatini. A strong woman, she had a muscular physique and hit the ball with powerful base line strokes, “like those of a man.” Her image contrasted sharply with the women who had appeared in popular magazines at the height of Reutemann’s and Vilas’s popularity – the former’s wife, and the latter’s romantic partners among others. Unlike those women, Sabatini was and remained independent in all regards. The romantic and family narratives that had categorized and enhanced the reputations of Reutemann and Vilas – family man and playboy respectively – had no relevance to Sabatini. That she could never
be tied to a fiancé or husband, and that her lesbian identity eventually crept out
as an open secret - one that the media, respectfully and to their credit, would
never report in a degrading manner – to a public that did not much care,
consigned to the past the proceso era links between Reutemann, Vilas, and
imagined national values.

Notes

1 The author thanks Professor Ksenija Bilbija, the helpful comments of those who
assessed the manuscript of this article, and the Social Sciences and Humanities
Research Council of Canada.

2 Interview, Carlos Escudé, 16 July 2002.

Matthew B. Karush, “National Identity and the Sports Pages: Football and the
Mass Media in 1920s Buenos Aires,” The Americas 60 (July 2003): 11-32;
Rebecca Earle, “Creole Patriotism and the Myth of the `Loyal Indian',' Past &

4 See Rafael Cartay, Fábrica de ciudadanos: la construcción de la sensibilidad
urbana (Caracas 1870-1980) (Caracas: Fundación Bigott, 2003), 233-239; Gilles
Lipovetsky, El imperio de lo efímero: la moda y su destino en las sociedades
modernas (Barcelona: Anagrama, 1996), 84 -87.

Argentina’s last military dictatorship has been most closely identified with two
key touchstones, its internal war on civilians and radical changes in economic
policies that helped undermine peronista social, political, and economic legacies.
Tied to rampant human rights abuses and a set of economic policies designed to
promote free international trade and investment, and to dismantle Argentina’s
union movement, was a dominant ideology developed to promote the military's
vision of the change. “La industria, el agro y el comercio enfrentan al ministro
Martínez de Hoz,” Siete Dias (Buenos Aires), 12-18 August, 1977; “Roberto
Campos habla del Plan Martínez de Hoz,” Gente (Buenos Aires), 10 May 1979; “El
balance de Martínez de Hoz,” Gente, 10 November 1977; Nazareno Bravo, “El
discuro de la dictadura militar argentina (1976-1983). Definición del opositor
político y confinamiento-“valorización” del papel de la mujer en el espacio
privado,” Utopia y Praxis Latinoamericana (Maracalbo) 8 (2003); Claudia
Laudano, Las mujeres en los discursos militares (Buenos Aires : Editorial 12,
1997); Horacio del Prado, « Gol Argentino, » Goles Match (Buenos Aires), 15
October 1980.


xi At the same time, both sports were more widely popular across class lines than they were in most countries in the Americas. The boxy Ford Falcon, for example, a quintessential 1960s middle class family sedan, manufactured for almost two decades in Argentina after having been discontinued in the United States, was valued for its staying power and reliability. Even so, and despite the Falcon’s reputation as solid and reliable, Ford drew on the popularity of auto racing in Argentina by advertising it there in 1977 as a “perennial champion” not only in “confidence and strength,” but also for five consecutive years in off track, touring. See “Campeón siempre: Ford Falcon. El valor probado,” *Siete Días*, 22-28 July 1977 and *Goles*, 12 July 1977.


\[xviii\] See Felipe Martínez, Juan S. Montes Cató, Javier M. Real, and Nicolás Wachsmann, “La Revolución Libertadora y el intento por eliminar al peronismo del imaginario de los trabajadores,” in Cine e imaginario social, eds. Fortunato Mallimacci and Irene Marrone (Buenos Aires: Oficina de Publicaciones del CBC, 1997); 269-273.


“Punta: Enero caliente caliente con ese delicado ‘touch’ de distinción,” *Radiolandia 2000*, 12 January 1979. Three years later, during the Malvinas War, the media climate had changed. Less inclined to promote the military or its ideology, magazines, newspapers, and television had begun to introduce a more doubtful approach to the dictatorship and the cultural and social premises that defined the proceso. Now, for example, an article on Ruiz Guiñazú stressed her political toughness and even her differences with the official line of the military on disappearances and other themes. “Magadalena Ruiz Guiñazú: El duro oficio de la verdad...,” *Radiolandia 2000*, 23 April 1982.


x1 Horacio Vargas, Reutemann: el conductor (Rosario: Homo Sapiens Ediciones, 1997), 38-42.


xiii Though, by this time, Vilas had already earned more money than any athlete in Argentine history with the exception of boxer Carlos Monzón.


xiv 1 “Por todo esto soy el mejor del mundo’,” Siete Días, 15-21 September 1977; “Guillermo Vilas ... y él creó el tenis,” Grandes del Deporte Argentino (El Gráfico), 1991.

xiv 2 “Por todo esto soy el mejor del mundo’,” Siete Días, 15-21 September 1977.


xix To be sure, there were irreconcilable contradictions in sport as a cultural medium through which military ideologies were transmitted by the media. On the one hand, the functionality of the Vilas/Reutemann images as men of the era depended on the distinction between the higher class sports in which they competed and the more working class pastimes of soccer or boxing. All the same, the military and its allies in the media were not above investing soccer stars or boxers with traits that marked the normalizing propaganda of the dictatorship. Not only did the military government highlight the 1978 World Cup of Soccer as a showcase for Argentina, but the generals invited world champion boxers Carlos Monzón and Sergio Víctor Palma to undertake highly publicized
trips to entertain the troops in Tucumán, while the latter were fighting "subversion" in that province.


lv “No quiero ser una máquina de jugar tenis,” Gente, 4 May 1978.


Laudano, mujeres en los discursos militares, 39-58.

viii “Cada piloto de Fórmula 1 se conoce a través de su mujer,” Gente, 10 November 1977; “Horas antes de la carrera, Reutemar habla ‘de todo’,” Gente, 10 January 1974.

ix “La Fórmula uno destruye los matrimonios?” Gente, 8 November 1979; “Se fue tras el objetivo Kyalami,” Golés, 8 February 1977.


xv “Ahora, el país quiere respuestas,” Gente, 9 September 1982; “Harguindeguy y Videla tienen que ir a la carcel’,” Siete Días, 7-13 September 1983.


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CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN BOLIVIA (2000-2006)

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In the post-dictatorship period, civil-military relations in Latin American countries have evolved. In some countries less than others. While in the Southern Cone, the armed forces diminished their presence in government bureaucracies,¹ in Bolivia the military gained political strength. Although Bolivia has transitioned from a highly politicized military to one subordinate to the civilian leadership, the country does not yet have healthy civil-military relations. The purpose of this paper is to begin inquiring about the problems civil-military relations face in Bolivia. The specific question is whether these problems are derived from the country’s political system or from the military institution, itself. This study focuses on the period of 2000 through 2006.

This paper is divided into two sections that explore both the broader and the more specific aspects of the civil-military relations in Bolivia. The first part discusses civil-military relations in Bolivia and the issues that influence it, such as its relationship with the police corps and with the indigenous. The second part analyzes civil-military relations from 2000 through 2006 based on news articles, observation and interviews. The study concludes that the military is no longer a pawn of political parties, but a conscientious political player that pursues bureaucratic interests over those of the country. It also concludes that the problems civil-military relations faces in Bolivia derive mostly from how the political system was structured in the post-dictatorship period. Weak congressional oversight and clientelist relationships between political parties and the military delayed discussion on the role of the military in the democratic period and the training and allocation of resources to prepare the military for the activities it was called on to execute.

Part I – History of Civil-Military Relations in the 20th Century

Having at one point abolished its military, Bolivian society has a particularly complex relationship with its armed forces.² For much of its history Bolivia was under military rule. Civilians took power after the War of the Pacific, but lost it during the Chaco War. They again took power in the 1952 Revolution and closed the Colegio Militar for one year intending to abolish the military, only to lose governmental control to the armed forces, once again, in 1964.³ From 1978 to 1985, internal factions of the armed forces joined with civilians to fight for a democratic transition, resulting in a period of extreme violence and in a military retreat to the barracks after the transition.⁴ Since then, former general and military dictator Hugo Banzer was elected in free and fair elections and polls consistently show high approval rates for the military.⁵ Nevertheless, since 1997, with the beginning of the War on Drugs, civilians and the armed forces have
clashed, often violently. Lastly, only recently has the civilian leadership made an attempt to limit the conduct of the military with the 2005 Bolivian Defense White Paper.

The democratic transition resulted in an *autonomía desprofesionalizada* (unprofessional autonomy) of the armed forces. This term, coined by Juan Ramón Quintana and Raúl Barrios, describes a situation in which the military is left to itself, with limited civilian oversight, and in which there is no general agreement on the responsibilities of the military. Because there is no agreement, the military cannot specialize and become more professional. This situation of *autonomía desprofesionalizada* leads an idle military back into politics when it perceives that a rebellious civil society, unsatisfied with economic inequality, might be a threat to the nation. vi

Two other problems derive from the *autonomía desprofesionalizada* of the military in society. The first is a two-aspect budgetary problem. The first aspect is the allocation of national budget to the military, which is subject to bargaining between political and military elites while tending to diminish over time. vii The second aspect is that the budget that is effectively allocated owes no *de facto* accountability to the state. There is limited congressional oversight on how it is spent. viii The second problem is a constant change in command of the armed forces leadership posts. The average commander of the forces and commander-in-chief lasts two years. This destabilizes the chain of command in the armed forces and creates an image among civil society of the bureaucracy as having erratic behavior. ix

To end this situation of *autonomía desprofesionalizada*, civil-military relations in Bolivia must be institutionalized. The institutionalization of civil-military relations is key to democratic consolidation in the post-dictatorship period. Until recently, an informal understanding characterized the civilian control of the military. The informality of the civilian control interfered with the normal work of an institutional order and delayed the consolidation of democracy. The 2005 Defense White Paper was the first step in institutionalizing civilian control. x

There are two main reasons why the institutionalization of civil-military relations was delayed: international economic crises and resistance from political parties. The international economic crises stem from both the debt crisis in Latin America that began in 1982 and the growth of drug trafficking in the 1980s and 1990s. This added burden to Bolivia’s transition to democracy delayed the reform of the armed forces. Growing international concern over coca production in the high-altitude tropical forests and the immediate need for the military to act on the eradication project financed by the United States also postponed any of the changes in military structure and civil review of its actions that reform would require. xi

In addition to the relationship of the armed forces with the civilian leadership and civil society, two other relationships shape the state of civil-military relations. These are the relationships of the armed forces with the
indigenous and with the police corps. The military is a force of socialization for the indigenous and often have competing mandates with the police.

The Bolivian military suffers from a conflict of interests between the institution and its soldiers. It is a conscript military in which the lower ranks and non-commissioned officers in Bolivia are mostly of indigenous descent from rural areas. At the same time, it is in these rural areas and against organized indigenous groups that the military is most frequently deployed to protect the state. The indigenous, thus are pitted against other indigenous. More importantly, the Bolivian military is pitted against Bolivians themselves, creating animosity against the armed forces.

Conscription in the military initially served the purpose of creating a stronger more respected military. It was meant to create a homogenized society in which indigenous and non-indigenous would live together. The armed forces were tasked with teaching the indigenous how to read and write and basic hygiene so that they could adapt to western society. Pitting the Bolivian military against the people it is sworn to protect and tasking them with welfare responsibilities politicizes the institution. It becomes involved in domestic politics by taking sides in internal conflict and is made aware of the inadequacies of the civilian institutions in providing basic services to its citizens.

Another contentious relationship of the Bolivian armed forces is with the police corps. Both forces compete for primacy in control of the use of force and frequently the military has been employed to do work that generally falls under the responsibility of the police force – such as patrolling the streets and criminal investigations. The police and the armed forces have also clashed violently. From 2000 through 2003 the police were involved in the social conflict and joined the social movements against the government that had no other choice but to employ the armed forces against them. The armed forces relationship with the indigenous and with the police corps have traditionally been contentious, but are aggravated by a lack of a defined role for the armed forces and, as we will later see, training for that role.

Part II – Civil-Military Relations from 2000 to 2006

There is still only partial democratic control of the military in Bolivia. Civil-military theorists disagree on the required level of civilian control in a liberal democracy. For that reason, this paper focuses mostly on the core areas of civilian control for which there is general consensus among theorists—congressional oversight on budget expenditures and promotions, education and training, and a clear chain of command. Even in these core areas there are many limitations to democratic control in Bolivia.

Civil-military relations are a two-fold problem. Peter Feaver argues that it is a challenge of maintaining a strong military, ready to fend off threats to national security, and a subordinate military that will not see the civilian leadership as a threat. This balancing challenge was most visible in Latin America
in the 1980s. The excessive preoccupation with guaranteeing military subordination led to policies that almost obliterated the institution, making it incapable of action in case of threat.

The Bolivian case was no different. From 2000 through 2004 the armed forces saw a budget increase of only 5 million dollars, while their responsibilities have expanded, notably the inclusion of the War on Drugs and the control of social movements. XVII Of the total budget, only one percent goes to equipment, which includes buying it and maintaining it. XVIII As a way to offset its inability to buy weapons and equipment, Bolivia receives many foreign donations of equipment. XIX

There are at least two requirements for healthy civil-military relations. As in any social-institutional relationship, healthy civil-military relations require that both sides respect certain boundaries and fulfill certain responsibilities. The military must be subordinate to the civilian leadership and the civilians must be able to lead. A look at the military institution from 2000 through 2006 finds an interesting scenario of a subordinate military, but possessing a certain disdain of its civilian leadership, perceived as ignorant of matters of defense. In 2003 and in 2005 when the presidents Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada and the Carlos Mesa were forced to resign, the media called on the armed forces to force them to step down. In response, the commander-in-chiefs, at all times, stated that they were beholden to the constitution and would not undermine the institution of the presidency. XX On the other hand, in interviews with former commanders of the forces and commanders-in-chief, when posing the question of why, in their opinion, had there been five defense ministers in Bolivia in the last democratic period, the answer was always that the military ministers knew the trade better than the civilian ministers. Additionally, the interviews and news articles from the period indicated that many military leaders held the civilian leadership responsible for the political turmoil of 2003 through 2006 in which the armed forces went into violent confrontation with civilians. XXI

The Bolivian civilian leadership lacks leadership capabilities for three reasons. First, there is little expertise on matters of defense in Congress. Congress' role in civilian leadership is that of monitoring military affairs and guaranteeing military compliance through the use of budget and career promotions as carrots and sticks. In Bolivia, however, the military section of the budget is not used as a political instrument. When changes are made, they are the result of changes in civilian policy (i.e. the existence of a military component in the drug control policy) and not for institution-building or punishment purposes. Career promotions, also, are seen as bureaucratic ordeal of approving the list sent by the president – a rubber-stamping procedure; rather than an opportunity for oversight and to guarantee military compliance through incentives. XXII Additionally, the members of congressional defense committees rotate every year and have very small staff, thus congressmen are unable to specialize and gather enough information in one subject or policy area. XXIII
The second reason why there is weak civilian leadership is the setup of the chain of command. For historical reasons, the Bolivian president is not the commander-in-chief, but rather the capitán general of the armed forces. The commander-in-chief is chosen from the military officer corps and is at the same hierarchical level as the minister of defense. The capitán general commands the army in times of peace and is advised in technical issues by the commander-in-chief and in political and administrative issues by the minister of defense. xxiv

In practical terms this creates two problems. Although the responsibilities of the commander-in-chief and the minister are different, in practice the chain of command is not clear. Often the minister of defense overshadows the commander-in-chief because he has a personal relationship with the president or is more familiar with political circles. xxv Also, the lack of Congressional oversight creates a situation in which the military is awarded extensive institutional autonomy. It decides on its size, who enters the armed forces, and what equipment it will buy. Little interest or resources on the part of the members of the congressional defense committees result in very few changes in the legislation proposed by the commander-in-chief. xxvi

The third reason why the civilian leadership is weak is a limited pool of civilian experts in defense issues. There are few experts in academia and even fewer in politics. Political parties rarely have an expert in defense issues, civilian or retired military. xxvii Thus, rarely is a policy-maker, from the executive as well as from congress, informed on any topic related to the armed forces. The minister of defense, because of that ministry’s legal authority, is usually an economist or lawyer, which supposedly is a better fit for political and administrative work. In practice, however, the ministers do influence defense policy, but because of their professional background are unprepared to do so.

While civilians are weak leaders, the armed forces are reluctant followers. Members of the armed forces understand the benefits of democracy and of not being involved in politics, but they do not understand the benefits of a civilian leadership. xxviii In interviews, military officers stated that the armed forces do not trust the civilian leadership and that the armed forces would prefer to have career officers as ministers of defense. One example of this contentious relationship between the armed forces and the civilian leadership is the Decreto Supremo N° 27977 of January 2005. After the violent clashes in 2003, the armed forces pressured president Carlos Mesa to create legislation on internal conflict that guaranteed that any future order to use violence domestically would be in writing. It is not the legislation itself that is a problem—there should always be legal guidelines for the deployment of the armed forces—but that the armed forces felt they had to pressure the civilian leadership into taking responsibility for their orders. This denotes the armed forces mistrust in their civilian leadership.

One reason for the reluctance in embracing and trusting civilian leadership is the armed forces’ isolation from civil society, partially generated by
the lack of civilian curricula in the military education system. The case of protection of human rights is an example of the problems generated by this isolation. Members of the armed forces are trained to deal with foreign enemies. When sent to domestic theaters and faced with domestic opponents they apply similar logic and end up shooting at or directing violence towards civilians. Contentious civil society manifestations quickly turn violent. When the media and public opinion turn against the armed forces, they blame their civilian leadership for having sent them in the first place.\textsuperscript{xxx} Recently as a result of civilian deaths caused by military personnel involved in militarization of the War on Drugs and the use of the military in social conflict, the institution began to incorporate human rights in all its educational levels. This is the first civilian curriculum incorporated into the military educational system and it is not yet well received.\textsuperscript{xxx}

Given the political developments from 2000 through 2006, this research also finds that the military is no longer a pawn of political parties. Raúl Barrios and Juan Quintana argue that in the early 1990s, alerted by imminent budget cuts, the military began taking sides in the struggle of political parties. The military sided with whichever party that would cut the least out of its budget and guarantee that there would be no government oversight as to how it was spent. The political parties, in turn used tacit military support to help them win negotiations for party coalitions.\textsuperscript{xxxi}

Recently, the armed forces appear to have adopted the strategy of publicly lobbying for budget increases and modernization. In 2005, when a presidential election was scheduled to occur and during the short-lived term of Carlos Mesa and even shorter one of Eduardo Rodríguez the military continuously called for equipment modernization and a percentage of their salaries linked to gas revenue.\textsuperscript{xxxii} The elected president, Evo Morales—leader of the cocalero movement, a group that, in previous administrations, clashed violently with the armed forces—granted the modernization they requested and began a discussion on the salary adjustment. Even while on the opposition, Morales always attempted to reach out to the military. Such a conciliatory tone with a repressive branch of the government is evidence of the political strength of the military. Its strength was also evident during the Sánchez de Lozada administration. The military is an essential actor in protecting the government in the face of strong opposition. At one point, however, the only group in the country that supported Sánchez de Lozada was the military. Their actions and statements illustrate how committed the armed forces are to their duty to defend democratic institutions. During the Sánchez de Lozada crisis the armed forces stated that their support was steadfast not to the person of the president, but to the office of the president and to democratic institutions.\textsuperscript{xxxiii}

Another finding of this paper corroborates Quintana’s assertion that relations between civilians and the military were improving. Despite several fatalities in confrontations between the military and social movements, Bolivian
society trusts the military. Bolivian armed forces have the smallest number of commissioned and noncommissioned officers of all militaries in Latin America. For this reason the face of the military, seen by civil-society is not of the traditionally white elite, but of the indigenous soldier. Society thus feels that their attacks on rural areas and campesino movements are just the military institution obeying the orders of the elite government and leadership. The military’s work in helping communities after natural disasters helps to improve their image.

This cognitive division is evidenced in at least two events by the fact that the lower ranks of the military have sided with civilians rather than the institution. The first event is during a state of siege following the Water War in 2000. Sergeants of the armed forces joined the police and other civil society groups in manifestations calling for better conditions for labor and increase in salaries. The second event was the manifestations leading up to president Carlos Mesa renouncing his presidency. After three weeks of manifestations a group of sergeants rebelled against the rest of the institution and publicly declared that they joined the manifestations in favor of Mesa resigning.

Conclusion
This paper was meant as an initial incursion into the theme of civil-military relations in Bolivia. Although there is still much to explore, it concludes that civil-military relations in Bolivia look good on paper, but still needs a lot of work in practice. While the military appears to be subordinate due to its calls for institutional stability and democracy, it does not respect its civilian leadership. The civilian leadership on the other hand erred by involving the military in the War on Drugs and in social conflict without giving it proper tools (police batons, rather than guns) or a legal framework under which to act. Additionally, the civilian leadership did not make the effort to understand the institution it was supposed to lead and blurred the chain of command on which the military rely for guidance. Nevertheless, the fact that the military have adopted the democratic discourse is a step in the right direction and indicates that the weaknesses in Bolivian civil-military relations are mostly due to institutional weaknesses and lack of state capacity, thus suffering from the same problems as the rest of the Bolivian state bureaucracy.

Notes


The commissioned positions were forbidden to the indigenous until 2005.


Quintana, Juan. *Soldados y Ciudadanos: Un estudio crítico sobre el servicio militar obligatorio en Bolivia*.


Idem.

1 "Argentina anunció donación de equipamiento militar a Bolivia." Agencia Bolivariana de Noticias, November 20, 2006; "Chávez ayudará con 10 módulos militares ." La Razon, October 14, 2006; Interview with Gral Alvin Anaya, former Commander-in-Chief, July 02, 2008.

xx "Crisis en Bolivia sin solucion a la vista: presidente no cede, protestas tampoco." Agence France Presse - Spanish, October 15, 2003; "Militares rechazan golpe y atenuan severa crisis en Bolivia." Agence France Presse -- Spanish 4 June 2005: 1. A review of all newspaper articles regarding the military in that period found that the language used by the military in their statements was always in favor of preserving institutions and respecting the constitution. These articles are just two examples.


xiii Interview with Rut Miranda July 04, 2008.


xv Interview with Rut Miranda July 04, 2008; Interview with Gral. Alvin Anaya; The case of Rodriguez Veltzé's minister of defense, a very good friend of Veltzé's, is an example.

xvi Interview with Rut Miranda July 04, 2008 who confirms that the Defense committee makes limited alterations to the legislation proposals. Interview with Admiral Raúl Mejía Ibañez, director of Escuela de altos Estudios Nacionales, July 11, 2008 and Loreta Telleria who state that there is very little interest on the part of the congressmen or their staff and committee staff in the courses and events that their respective institutions hold.


Interview with Hugo Jemio, Human Rights trainer for the military at Defensor del Pueblo, July 06 2008; Interview with Tcnl. Humberto Vargas, director de derechos humanos y derechos humanitarios en el Comando en Jefe de las Fuerzas Armadas Bolivianas, July 07, 2008.

Interview with Capitán de Fragata Cosme Alvarez Daza, jefe de estudios de la Escuela Naval on June 07, 2008.


Bolivia: Policía pide tres por ciento de impuestos del gas Deutsche Presse-Agentur 9 agosto 2005.

"Fuerzas Armadas descartan posibilidad de golpe de Estado militar en Bolivia." Agence France Presse -- Spanish, December 17, 2003 in which the commander-in-chief, Luis Aranda is quoted as saying, in spanish, "en ningun momento hemos apoyado a una persona, ni siquiera a un regimen, sino que hemos apoyado a un sistema y a la ley".


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LA REDEFINICIÓN DE LA PUERTORRIQUEÑIDAD A TRAVÉS DE LA FOTOGRAFÍA EN LA LLEGADA DE JOSÉ LUIS GONZÁLEZ

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Desde el momento de su aparición, en la Francia de 1839, la fotografía fue incorporada en diferentes discursos, como el científico, el militar y el educativo. Se subrayó cómo la nueva técnica fotográfica permitía obtener documentos exactos y veraces. La fotografía proporcionaba la ilusión de la exactitud y de transmitir el objeto de estudio tal cual. Por su lealtad a la verdad y su supuesta objetividad la fotografía se convirtió en el aspecto esencial de la exploración y la definición de las posesiones coloniales de grandes imperios del siglo XIX. Era una herramienta indispensable en la empresa de delimitar y domesticar los territorios coloniales con el fin de poseerlos. En *Picturing Empire* James Ryan explica que “the invention and development of photography (from 1839) concurred with the extraordinary expansion of Britain’s overseas Empire. [...] An indispensable record of the progress and achievements of Empire was provided by photography [...]” (11). Además, era una manera eficaz, explica Ryan, de tasar y catalogar las diferentes razas en las colonias nuevas. Las fotografías movilizaban, reforzaban y a veces contradecían conceptos sobre la alteridad racial y cultural mantenidos en la metrópoli.

De la misma manera, el expansionismo norteamericano dependió de la fotografía en la descripción y exploración de territorios recién adquiridos al concluir la guerra entre Estados Unidos y España. *Our Islands and their People as Seen with Camera and Pencil*, libro norteamericano de dos volúmenes publicado en 1899 es representativo de un grupo de publicaciones de su época cuyo propósito era informar al público norteamericano sobre las nuevas posesiones ultramarinas. Las fotografías que aparecen en la obra y, que se centran en la geografía, los recursos naturales y los habitantes de estos territorios, tenían la meta de familiarizar a los estadounidenses con las nuevas posesiones y definir al “otro” poseído y explotarlo. En su estudio sobre *Our Islands*, Lanny Thompson explica que

![Ilustración](https://via.placeholder.com/150)

[]a práctica de describir y descubrir al pueblo de Puerto Rico fue parte del proceso de establecer una relación cultural desigual entre la colonia y la metrópoli, es decir, de la construcción del “otro” colonizado. La fotografía, lejos de ser una técnica objetiva, formó una parte integral de este discurso colonial (Thompson 5).

Aunque los fotógrafos y autores de *Our Islands* establecen su autoridad narrativa por haber sido observadores directos, testigos oculares de lo que describen, la
objetividad que afirman se deshace al leer títulos como “Primitive Porto Rico” y “Wild Races of the Phillipine Islands”. La construcción del “otro” en esta obra denota una actitud autoritaria, positivista y racista. Thompson explica que “[i]as descripciones de la gente usualmente conllevaban evaluaciones sobre su gobernabilidad, su capacidad y hábitos de trabajo, su cultura y su posible americanización” (8). Es una actitud que forma parte de un proyecto “civilizador” de índole imperialista. Algunas de las fotografías de Our Islands reaparecen más de ochenta años después de su publicación inicial en una obra del escritor puertorriqueño, José Luis González. Esta obra de José Luis González examina el papel de la escritura histórica en el proceso de definir la identidad puertorriqueña y entabla un diálogo con diferentes textos históricos como el de Our Islands en su exploración de lo que significa ser puertorriqueño. La meta de este trabajo es estudiar tres de las fotografías que aparecen en La llegada y analizar su función como segundo plano narrativo que dialoga con lo textual. Lejos de servir una función simplemente ornamental, estas fotos y su yuxtaposición con la narrativa desestabilizan la mirada colonial tradicional que definía al ser puertorriqueño y deconstruyen el autoritarismo de este sistema.

Las fotografías que en su contexto original formaban parte de un discurso colonizador y esencialista, se incorporan en La llegada para luego ser retadas y redefinidas. Carlos Fuentes comenta la tendencia de escritores contemporáneos de yuxtaponer documentos históricos con la ficción. Explica: “En esta tendencia yo veo una afirmación del poder de la ficción para decir que el pasado tiene que ser reinventado a cada momento para que el presente no se nos escape de las manos” (Daroqui 24). La llegada vuelve al pasado a través de la ficción para reabrirlo a los interrogantes del momento sobre la identidad puertorriqueña. Incluye los discursos del pasado (el hispanófilo en particular) no sólo para desmitificarlo sino también para añadirle otras perspectivas.

Fig.1. La fotografía tal y como aparece en la portada de La llegada (1997).
La primera fotografía de interés para este estudio aparece en la portada de la novela y luego se reproduce al abrir el libro, una página antes de la dedicatoria. La original que aparece en Our Islands retrata a unos cincuenta soldados en un campamento en Cuba. Algunos están sentados, otros reposados y otros de pie, pero todos en estado de informalidad. La leyenda bajo la fotografía original explica:

Throughout the Islands, wherever our soldiers went, they were received by the native population as friends and deliverers. Many Cuban boys, who had been rendered homeless by Spanish cruelty, fraternized with our men and made themselves as much a part of the “outfit” as if they were enlisted for the war (Our Islands 4).

Este comentario reitera el discurso norteamericano oficial de la época que promueve la guerra contra España no por razones expansionistas sino humanitarias. La crueldad del imperio español había sido comentada y exagerada en los periódicos norteamericanos por meses antes de la declaración de guerra insistiendo en la necesidad de la intervención estadounidense. Este proyecto redentor se delinea en Our Islands desde sus primeras páginas en las cuales el general de división del ejército norteamericano, Joseph Wheeler, comenta:
The war of 1898 was probably more essentially a war of the people than any other conflict of arms in which this country has been engaged. The long continued series of atrocities practiced by Spanish officials in Cuba exhausted the patience and aroused the humane sentiments of American citizens to such a degree as to compel positive action upon the part of the government (Our Islands 3).

Esta misma fotografía, aparece ampliada en la novela, eliminando casi la mitad de la foto original. Excluye a la mayoría de los soldados sentados y reposados y pone en relieve a los soldados agachados y rodeados por niños nativos. La manipulación de la imagen incluida en la novela resalta dos cosas: la bandera norteamericana y la compostura oficiosa de los soldados sentados al nivel de los niños. Esta introducción visual a la novela anuncia el proyecto de la obra de revisitar el pasado (obvio por la fotografía en blanco y negro y la palabra crónica en el título en negrita encima de la foto) y dialogar con ese momento clave en la historia de Puerto Rico, es decir el momento de la retirada de las fuerzas españolas y la llegada de los norteamericanos a la Isla. También este preludio fotográfico sugiere que la novela socavará el discurso del poder, el de la historia oficial, al enfatizar la igualdad espacial entre los soldados y los niños. La fotografía no comunica la supuesta salvación o redención propuesta por los norteamericanos sino resalta la curiosidad de los jóvenes que fraternizan con los soldados llevando sus sombreros y cargando sus cantinas. Lanny Thompson señala que Our Islands a menudo subrayaba la inocencia y el primitivismo del puertorriqueño a través de las fotografías de niños locales pobres y a veces huérfanos. Sin embargo, los niños de la foto de la portada no están desnudos ni llevan harapos y no parecen estar acosando a los soldados por comida y dinero. Al contrario, tanto soldados como niños parecen disfrutar mutuamente de la compañía del otro. Entonces, la imagen del norteamericano como salvador es desmitificada y despojada de la gloria de las grandes narraciones históricas.
La próxima fotografía de interés para este estudio aparece al principio del primer capítulo y es de unos soldados españoles que están encima de sus caballos mirando la distancia. En Our Islands, la leyenda describe la actividad de este grupo militar: “SPANISH CAVALRY ON SCOUTING DUTY” (Our Islands 8). En La llegada, José Luis González manipula esta fotografía, excluyendo, por ejemplo, al primer soldado del lado derecho cuya pose parece más relajada y menos oficial. También elimina la presencia en el trasfondo de tres personas descalzas refrescándose en el agua de un riachuelo. La foto editada que se incluye en La llegada se centra exclusivamente en cuatro de los soldados cuya pose es seria y rígida. El lenguaje gestual de estos hombres de armas, representativos del imperio español, comunica orgullo y soberbia. La narración en el primer capítulo, describe su retirada ante el avance de las tropas norteamericanas y lo que se narra es su impotencia política y militar. Por ejemplo, durante su retroceso se les gritan insultos a los soldados demostrando que ya no se acepta su autoridad en la Isla: “¡Cachacos hijos de la gran puta, al fin les llegó su hora!” (La llegada 11). El único poder que les queda, lo ejercen sobre un jíbaro pobre a quien le demandan agua con actitud tosca y mandona. A pesar de las muchas deserciones de sus rangos y las pérdidas que sufren a manos de revolucionarios puertorriqueños, continúan a comportarse con superioridad y soberbia. La debilidad del ejército español y su pérdida de poder se afirman de nuevo cuando al terminar de beber, uno de los soldados grita “¡Viva España!” y nadie, ni hasta el jíbaro, lo segunda. Representativo de los rangos más bajos de la sociedad, el jíbaro desafía el poder español con su
silencio, reafirmando que hasta los subalternos ya no se unen bajo el estandarte español.

Yuxtapuesta con la narración, la fotografía entonces asume otro significado: en lugar de describir una actividad militar en la colonia, resalta la rigidez orgullosa de un ejército débil. El texto revela la verdadera impotencia y la cobardía del ejército español a pesar de su pose militar en la foto. Despojar la fotografía de toda sugerencia de movimiento y actividad, además de resaltar el trasfondo desolado y seco que los rodea, enfatiza la debilidad de los soldados y, por extensión, la decadencia del imperio español cuya autoridad ya no se acepta en Puerto Rico.

Figs. 5 y 6. La primera aparece en La llegada (1997) y la segunda en Our Islands and Their People (1899). En el caso de esta fotografía, no hay gran diferencia entre la original y la que aparece en la novela de José Luis González.

La tercera fotografía a analizar cierra el último capítulo de La llegada y es de un hombre sonriente cargando a dos niños. En Our Islands, la leyenda de esta foto aclara que el hombre es “OUR ARTIST IN PORTO RICO” (Our Islands 316). No se explica quienes son estos niños, pero en su estudio sobre Our Islands, Lanny Thompson explica que en este texto hay una conexión entre los niños fotografiados y la definición de la puertorriqueñidad:

[...] el niño, frecuentemente desnudo y negro, es una de las representaciones fundamentales del puertorriqueño en este libro [Our Islands]. Entre las connotaciones de la niñez se encuentran la inmadurez, la dependencia y la necesidad de tutoría y supervisión. Pero la niñez podría connotar también la inocencia, la lealtad y el potencial educativo (Thompson 39).
Los niños cargados como bultos o sacos de café [recordemos el énfasis en el potencial económico de Puerto Rico], definien al puertorriqueño en el imaginario norteamericano como ser infantil e incapaz de gobernarse, y justifica la intervención militar y política. Además, su desnudez denota la pobreza y el estado primitivo de los puertorriqueños y la paternidad redentora de los norteamericanos. Esta foto cierra el último capítulo de la obra de González en el cual se describe la entrega oficial de Llano Verde a las tropas norteamericanas, el descenso de la bandera española y el inmediato alzamiento de la bandera estadounidense. Esta ceremonia, que según el texto, “fue mucho menos dramática de lo que casi todos esperaban” (*La llegada* 151) logra un nivel cómico cuando el alcalde confunde la expresión adolorida del coronel, causada por su diarrea, con simpatía y respeto: “pensó que un adversario capaz de expresar así su respeto por la pena del vencido, era un adversario respetable a su vez” (*La llegada* 152). El colonizador nuevo tanto como el reemplazado, pierde su esplendor y, su conquista es eclipsada por la ironía, el malentendido y la ridiculez de la situación. La foto, que en el contexto de la obra, resalta la incomodidad de los niños cargados como sacos y la torpeza del norteamericano que los lleva al hombro, destroza la imagen grandiosa del colonizador. Esta foto, en su contexto nuevo, desestabiliza la mirada colonial del sujeto puertorriqueño y desorienta el proyecto esencialista y colonizador que presume definir al puertorriqueño en términos de su potencial económico y su adaptabilidad a las aspiraciones colonizadoras.

*La llegada* emprende un diálogo con varios textos históricos, uno de los cuales es *Our Islands*, texto representativo de la historia oficial, y que formó parte del proceso de la construcción de un nuevo Puerto Rico bajo el poderío de los Estados Unidos. Este diálogo incorpora el discurso visual del colonizador pero, sacadas de su contexto original y manipuladas por el autor, las representaciones fotográficas sirven un propósito nuevo, el de desmantelar definiciones esencialistas de la identidad puertorriqueña. La inclusión de las fotografías escogidas por el autor en la obra estudia la relación entre imagen e identidad y recuerda la importancia de todos los discursos, visuales o narrativos, en la definición de la identidad.

En su obra, José Luis González rechaza toda idealización del colonizador, sea español o norteamericano y, se detiene en impugnar su imagen desmitificándola y despojándola de toda supuesta gloria redentora. González propone una definición de la identidad puertorriqueña que no mitifica ni el pasado ni el presente colonial sino que, como explica María Julia Daroqui, “problematiza la historia desnudando los acontecimientos sociales contemporáneos como parte de una dinámica en proceso, ni circular ni terminada” (Daroqui 25). Aunque la tarea de definir lo que significa ser puertorriqueño no es nada sencilla, José Luis González forja el camino para muchos escritores en su búsqueda de una identidad nacional. Como afirma
González mismo, su obra es un intento “de aproximación a una verdad siempre relativa, discutible y revisable” (Rivera-Martínez 76).

Notas

i Otras publicaciones de la misma vertiente incluyen Our New Possessions de Trumbull White (1898); Puerto Rico and its Resources de Frederick Ober (1898); Our Island Empire de Charles Morris (1899); The New America and the Far East de George Waldo Browne (1910) y Our Atlantic Possessions de Jay Earle Thomson (1928).

ii El presente trabajo forma parte de un capítulo de mi tesis doctoral titulada “Las rupturas del contrato mimético en cinco obras caribeñas (Rutgers University). En este capítulo emprendo un análisis más completo de las once fotografías que aparecen en La llegada.

iii Este trabajo supone que José Luis González mismo escogió las once fotografías que incluye en su novela. No hay otra información que contradiga esta suposición.

iv El sitio de PBS Crucible of Empire: The Spanish American War ofrece información visual y auditiva valiosa relacionada con la guerra de 1898. Véase los enlaces siguientes de este sitio de PBS para caricaturas de la época de la guerra que refuerzan la conceptualización del español como traicionero que no supo gobernar sus territorios y, por ende, la necesidad de la intervención estadounidense: http://www.pbs.org/crucible/cartoon1.html y http://www.pbs.org/crucible/cartoon7.html.

v Insularismo, la obra canónica de Antonio S. Pedreira, caracteriza la nación puertorriqueña como niño indicando su necesidad de guía y enseñanza.

Obras citadas


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EL PUEBLO AFROECUATORIANO: SU SITUACIÓN ACTUAL Y LAS MEDIDAS NACIONALES E INTERNACIONALES PARA REFORMARLA

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En 1553, un barco parte de Panamá camino al Perú y queda encallado en el litoral ecuatoriano. El grupo de esclavos a bordo logra escapar y fundar bajo el liderazgo de Alonso de Illescas la ciudad-santuario que hoy es la capital de la provincia de Esmeraldas. Éste es un solo grupo de los muchos afroecuatorianos arribados al Ecuador como esclavos desde el África occidental en el siglo XVI para trabajar en las zonas costeñas y las plantaciones. Otros grupos llegaron desde Colombia o vinieron luego con los Jesuitas para trabajar en los cañaverales, mientras al final del siglo XVIII llegaron muchos esclavos para trabajar como lavadores del oro que se descubrió en el Río Santiago, provincia de Esmeraldas.

No obstante el relato inspirador de Alonso de Illescas, hasta hoy los afroecuatorianos son el grupo étnico más marginado y menos representado en el ámbito político y económico. En este ensayo se examinarán las muchas y complejas razones que contribuyen a la realidad actual de los afroecuatorianos, algunos proyectos de grupos externos e internos que les brindan apoyo y ejemplos de los afroecuatorianos que han logrado salir de una situación desesperada e inspirar o apoyar a su comunidad.

Se podría observar que el mayor problema de los afroecuatorianos es la falta de oportunidades, desde la educación hasta el empleo. Sin embargo, como la telaraña que parece ser de un solo diseño, son muchos y variados los hilos que constituyen su situación. Entre los factores contribuyentes están el abandono por parte del gobierno a cada nivel, la discriminación racial y social, la falta de desarrollo económico, la corrupción y la falta de una fuerte presencia organizada a nivel nacional.

Entre 1820 y 2007, alrededor de 140 regímenes diferentes gobernaron en el país. Este promedio de 1,3 años por gobierno hace difícil la aplicación de leyes y decretos y disminuye la capacidad de continuar programas y proyectos, dada la falta de un buen seguimiento. Sin embargo, con la creación de la Confederación de Nacionalidades Indígenas Ecuatorianas (CONAIE) en 1986, existió por primera vez una organización a nivel nacional con la habilidad de actuar como agente social y movilizar a distintos grupos étnicos. En 1996, se creó el partido político Pachacútki con el propósito de ayudar a los indígenas políticamente. Aunque muchos afroecuatorianos dirían que grupos como CONAIE no les representan tanto como a los grupos indígenas, entre sus logros más importantes para las comunidades indígenas y afroecuatorianas habría que
subrayar los cambios en la constitución de 1998 que oficialmente crearon programas e instituciones como el Proyecto de Desarrollo de los Pueblos Indígenas y Negros (PRODEPINE), reconociendo de esta manera por primera vez los distintos grupos étnicos del país. Los Artículos 56 y 57 de la nueva constitución que se ratificó en septiembre de 2008 han mantenido ese mismo reconocimiento.

Aunque sigue creciendo la presencia política de los indígenas a nivel nacional, con el nombramiento de ministros como Nina Pacari (Ministra de Relaciones Exteriores en 2002) y otros representantes al congreso y a los niveles menores, todavía falta la presencia continua de actores nacionales afroecuatorianos, y por ende, los recursos para mejorar las condiciones en sus comunidades. En la mayoría de los casos, los políticos son el instrumento principal para la asignación y distribución de los fondos gubernamentales ecuatorianos para las provincias, los cantones y las parroquias. “El marco entero para el reparto de fondos es malo, tanto para los grupos étnicos como para las poblaciones rurales” (Shackell, Robin entrevista). Además de la falta de representación nacional y local, habría que añadir la corrupción presente a cada nivel del gobierno, la razón principal por la que los fondos no llegan al pueblo.

Según la Organización Transparencia Internacional, que utiliza empresarios y analistas, tanto residentes como no residentes, e incluye 16 estudios y encuestas de diez instituciones independientes para publicar su informe anual de la corrupción, “en 2007 Ecuador se encuentra entre los peores países en cuanto a la corrupción, siendo el número 30 de los 32 países incluidos en el estudio regional de las Américas, y el número 150 entre los 179 países estudiados al nivel global” (“2007 Corruptions Perceptions Index”). Este resultado no es sorprendente, ya que Ecuador ha salido en prácticamente el mismo lugar en cada estudio hecho por esta organización en los últimos cinco años.

De los países andinos, Ecuador es el más pequeño e incluye cuatro regiones geográficas distintas: la sierra, la costa, la Amazonía y la región insular (las Islas Galápagos). En cierta forma la geografía del país ha contribuido a la segregación étnica que todavía existe hoy día. La gran mayoría de los afroecuatorianos vive en la provincia costera de Esmeraldas, y los grupos de indígenas mayormente se han quedado en su lugar de origen: “Eight out of ten Ecuadorians stays in their regions” (Sánchez 14). En cuanto a la educación, existe una disparidad regional: “In Ecuador, the levels of education are lowest for regions with relatively higher proportions of indigenous and afro-descendant populations” (Sánchez 9). Esta diferencia significa un menor acceso a los trabajos modernos y profesionales. “It is clear that indigenous workers exclusion at labor markets operates due to lack of endowment of human capital, considering education. In addition, there is empirical evidence that racial discrimination is also another factor in Ecuador that punishes wages” (Sánchez 10).
En Ecuador, sobre todo en la capital, no se ven afroecuatorianos en la televisión a menos que sea en anuncios sobre la cultura o los deportes. Según el sitio de web de la organización Afroamérica XXI (la primera coalición afrolatina que comenzó en el 1995 y tiene capítulos en 13 países):

Ecuador is thought to be one of the most racist nation in Latin America given to the fact that although many are ready to mention the presence of blacks and Amerindians in the country, they are only referred to when it comes to boost national pride and tourist attractions. . . .Furthermore, the stereotypical notion that blacks are useless needs to be shattered and the exploitive use of the indigenous population’s exoticism and the black populace’s athleticism to bolster national pride only when the country deems it necessary has to be crushed. ("Afro-Ecuadorian")

Rubiahna Leye Vaughn fue la única voluntaria afroamericana de un grupo de estudiantes universitarios de Stanford University en un viaje a Ecuador en el 2003 para trabajar con los niños callejeros en Quito. Ella describe de forma chocante sus experiencias y observaciones con el racismo:

The children at the shelter where I worked and the people on the street couldn’t tell from my clothes and mannerisms that I was not Ecuadorian, because they couldn’t get that far; all they saw was my skin color. To them I was just a black girl, that’s all. Amidst the vendors and shoppers I passed on my way to work each day, the only other black women I saw were prostitutes. They were tall, powerful women, stuffed into miniskirts and tiny tank tops, who shared the same crowded sidewalks with men and women who looked down upon them because of their color more so than their profession, or so it seemed. They were the only black women I saw my entire time in Quito. Consequently, the men I encountered in that neighborhood assumed that I too was a prostitute and treated me as such. I was catcalled, spat at, chased, pinned against walls and yelled at . . . . (Vaughn 5)

En Ecuador es común escuchar a la misma persona decir que el racismo prácticamente no existe y después contar un chiste racista. En A New Day for Blacks in Ecuador, Lori Robinson asegura que "stories, incidents and language that demean Black and indigenous people are an open part of Ecuadorian popular culture" (3).
A pesar del racismo que sigue vivo en Ecuador, se ha ratificado una serie de leyes y actas dirigidas a corregir el problema, como la ordenanza metropolitana 0216 (2007) que creó el Consejo Metropolitano para la Eliminación de la Discriminación Racial en Quito, la creación del Día Nacional del Negro, y eventos como "el Foro de Periodistas 2007: Comunicación Ética y Racismo," con el propósito de combatir los estereotipos sobre las mujeres negras, entre otros. Aunque todavía no se ven los resultados de estas acciones gubernamentales, son pasos necesarios en el proceso de mejorar la vida de los afroecuatorianos. De los gobiernos internacionales, organizaciones como la agencia estadounidense para el desarrollo internacional, USAID por sus siglas en inglés, y las organizaciones no gubernamentales (las ONG) podrán ser también parte integral de cualquier solución.

Actualmente USAID cuenta con aproximadamente 22 millones de dólares para el país, y las ONG también tienen sus presupuestos. Con tantos fondos uno se preguntará sobre la razón por la continuación de los problemas y carencias. Como aclara el diplomático británico Robin Shackell, que desempeñó funciones como agregado político y coordinador de proyectos del medio ambiente del gobierno británico en Quito entre 1999 y 2003:

> Si bien es cierto que los fondos de desarrollo de la comunidad internacional y de las ONG ayudan al pueblo, los afroecuatorianos no han sido los grandes beneficiarios de éstos. Los fondos han ido disminuyendo en los últimos años debido a otras prioridades como, por ejemplo, la guerra en Irak, y en algunos casos por un desempeño malo por parte de algunos de los grupos ecuatorianos. Los fondos de los grupos internacionales tienden a ser destinados a ciertos programas como las actividades antinarcóticos, del medioambiente y de derechos humanos. Ni las comunidades afroecuatorianas, ni las indígenas, con algunas excepciones notables, han sido prominentes en la lista de prioridades. Los grupos que residen cerca de la frontera con Colombia, son un ejemplo de los que atraen más fondos. (Shackell, Robin entrevista)

En cuanto a las mujeres negras del sector popular: "[P]opular sector Black women had minimal to no contact with NGOs through their organizations . . . university-educated Black leaders and Combonian missionaries became the primary developers of popular education for and supporters of popular sector Black organizations" (Stifter 136). Sin embargo, cuando las ONG han patrocinado cursos para las organizaciones, algunas de éstas les han afectado de forma muy positiva a las mujeres. "The majority of women . . . believed participation had significant impact on their lives. . . . What women learned through participation . . . helped them go from feeling like household creatures
to being people with a voice and vote in society” (Stifter 124). Un reto que ha enfrentado la comunidad afroecuatoriana al intentar aumentar los fondos que provienen de las ONG es cumplir con los numerosos requerimientos. Según algunos de los líderes de la comunidad, “NGOs only work with organizations that are sufficiently ‘virtuous,’ and . . . the Black Movement and its organizations were very far from that ideal. Their comments showed that they, apparently, had assumed an ideal notion of NGO ‘client’” (Stifter 199). Entre las ONG que han brindado apoyo, algunas no lo han hecho de la mejor forma, según ciertos miembros de la comunidad. “NGOs try to change things too quickly . . . the few programs offered to popular sector mestiza and Black women did not consider their needs and limitations” (Stifter 202. 224).

En los últimos cinco años se han fortalecido algunos de los grupos existentes que apoyan a los afroecuatorianos como La Coordinadora Nacional de Mujeres Negras (COMUNE), La Federación de Organizaciones y Grupos Negros de Pichincha (FOGNEP) y la Federación de las Comunidades Negras de Imbabura y Carchi (FECONIC). Debido a la creación del Proyecto de Desarrollo de los Pueblos Indígenas y Negros PRODEPINE y otras iniciativas, los grupos nacionales se han unido a grupos internacionales como Afroamérica XXI y la Fundación Internacional para los Sistemas Electivos (IFES por sus siglas en inglés) una organización internacional sin fines de lucro, que apoya el desarrollo de sociedades democráticas.

Los frutos de estas uniones han sido algunos esfuerzos continuos y varios proyectos. El sitio web de Afroamérica XXI fomenta el apoyo a las comunidades afrólatinas por parte de las ONG y otras organizaciones y pide voluntarios y el apoyo de los individuos a través del programa de ayuda educativa a los niños, las giras o “tours” a las áreas afrólatinas y las compras de los productos fabricados por las comunidades afrólatinas. Entre los proyectos recientes se encuentra uno de la IFES para combatir la discriminación y pobreza de la comunidad afroecuatoriana a través del entrenamiento de un liderazgo político, el registro de ciudadanos para aumentar el número de votantes, foros con los partidos políticos y ayuda económica a las ONG afroecuatorianas para que sigan fortaleciendo a sus comunidades. Según Eric Lynn, quien maneja el programa de IFES en varios países latinoamericanos inclusive el Ecuador, su organización ha implementado varios proyectos nuevos en los últimos tres años a través de Afroamérica XXI, CONAMUNECE y FECONIC. “El objetivo principal es aumentar la visibilidad de la comunidad afroecuatoriana en todo el país, creando así la imagen de un grupo importante en el sentido no sólo cultural, sino también político. Por ejemplo, antes de las elecciones de 2007, IFES les ofreció a todos los partidos políticos un curso de liderazgo gratis para cualquier candidato afroecuatoriano (Lynn, entrevista).

En algunos casos, como el de las revistas Cimarrón y el Palenquero Mayor, IFES ayudó con computadoras, “software” y capacitación. Estos esfuerzos pudieron aprovechar las buenas iniciativas de la comunidad y facilitar
mejoras en la calidad de las revistas que ahora llaman más la atención del pueblo y de otros actores nacionales e internacionales. Ha respaldado también un programa radial de música, cultura y discusiones políticas que comenzó a nivel local, pero que ya se escucha semanalmente en todo el país.

Según Lynn, los programas han tenido un efecto positivo en la comunidad afroecuatoriana, al aumentar la confianza de otras organizaciones que consideraban proporcionar fondos para proyectos benéficos, como el esfuerzo educativo sobre el SIDA/VIH, que ha sido posible por un donativo del Banco Internacional del Desarrollo (BID). “Durante la campaña electoral de 2007, casi todos los partidos políticos acudieron al Afroamérica XXI para pedir su respaldo oficial, un fenómeno político jamás visto” (Lynn, entrevista).

Hay también varios proyectos más modestos que se llevan a cabo dentro de las comunidades. Estos proyectos a corto plazo tienen su lado bueno y malo. Algunos de los participantes han expresado sus deseos de conseguir más ayuda económica indicando que “self-esteem had been the focal point of far too many seminars when they desperately wanted to learn how to improve their economic situations” (Stifter 137). Desde una perspectiva más general, el movimiento necesitaba organizarse y ganar más experiencia. “[T]heir organizations were part of a Black Movement that was too new and in the process of consolidation and, therefore, did not have clear ideas or objectives nor the recognition brought by a history of successful projects” (Stifter 232).

Los retos cotidianos de los afroecuatorianos hacen aún más impresionantes las historias de los que han triunfado, como el distinguido escritor Nelson Estupiñán Bass, la respetada ex gerente del Puerto de Esmeraldas y candidata a vicepresidente, Mae Montaño y un sin número de futbolistas y deportistas olímpicos que son el orgullo de sus comunidades y, paradójicamente, del país.

El reconocimiento oficial de algunos héroes históricos como Alonso de Illescas mediante resoluciones legislativas, los Artículos de Actualidad1 que publica el Centro Cultural Afroecuatoriano sobre escritores, personajes religiosos, músicos y figuras históricas y una presencia cada vez más fuerte de deportistas afroecuatorianos, han creado modelos a seguir para la juventud afroecuatoriana. Entre ellos se encuentra la presencia inesperada de una mujer que nació en Esmeraldas y fue criada por su madre soltera y su tía, quienes lavaban ajeno para criar a cinco niños. Según esta mujer, la misma Mae Montaño, la aspiración más grande de su mamá fue que se educaran. “From my childhood, I worked hard to study more and more because my only desire was to work to make the money necessary for my mother and aunt to not to have to work so hard” (qtd. in Ingalls 2). Montaño dice que como estudiante tuvo la oportunidad de involucrarse en distintas causas políticas pero que nunca quiso, opinión que cambió después al darse cuenta de que “without getting involved in politics, I

1 Website: http://www.centroafroecuatoriano.com/
could never bring about real change” (qtd. in Ingalls 2). Hoy en día Montaño opina que “Political campaigns are like electoral businesses, and we need to learn how to raise funds to participate in a political campaign” (qtd. in Ingalls 2). Actualmente Montaño encabeza un nuevo movimiento político (Visión Ciudadana) que lanzó en agosto de 2008.

Como se ha indicado en este ensayo, a pesar de algunos cambios constitucionales, el fortalecimiento de las organizaciones afroecuatorianas y los proyectos y modelos a seguir de la comunidad, hasta hoy los afroecuatorianos son el grupo étnico más marginado y menos representado en el ámbito político y económico en Ecuador con un promedio de 20% menos de ingresos y un nivel casi doble de la pobreza. Son muchas y complejas las razones que contribuyen a la realidad actual de los afroecuatorianos, como la geografía del país, la corrupción, la discriminación y la falta de recursos económicos, educación y representantes gubernamentales a cada nivel. También se han analizado algunos de los proyectos y grupos externos e internos, y presentado a distinguidos afroecuatorianos tanto históricos como actuales cuyo progreso en los últimos años es un símbolo de la esperanza para los afroecuatorianos que han luchado durante años. Sin embargo, en una frase que resalta que son muchas las tareas restantes, la misma Mae Montaño quizás mejor lo ha dicho, “Hay tanto que hacer”.  

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2 Mi traducción, cita original en inglés: “There is so much to do” (qtd. in Ingalls 3).
Obras citadas


Lynn, Eric Program Associate, Americas (elyynn@ifes.org). Entrevista personal. 29 de enero de 2008.


MACLAS PRIZE WINNERS - 2008


John D. Martz III Prize for best graduate paper presented at the 2008 MACLAS XXVIII Conference: Lezlie Shackell (Howard University) for “El pueblo afroecuatoriano: Su situación actual y las medidas nacionales e internacionales para reformarla”.

Juan Espadas Prize for best undergraduate paper presented at 2007 MACLAS XXVII Conference: Kristin Corcoran (The College of William and Mary) for “Un desafío para la memoria: la víctima y la nación argentina en la película, Crónica de una fuga.”
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