We refine and test theoretical mechanisms linking mass mobilization to democratization by focusing on variation in the organizations that participate in collective dissent. Specifically, we investigate the effects of organizational diversity and durability on the likelihood of democratization. Using new data on maximalist claims-making organizations that engaged in resistance events in Africa from 1990-2015, we find little evidence that organizational diversity on its own improves democratization, which we link to what we call the “diversity dilemma.” While greater movement diversity may increase democratic preferences, it undermines movement capacity to realize these preferences by increasing collective action problems and reducing a movement’s ability to make credible commitments. In contrast, the participation of durable organizations such as trade unions and religious organizations significantly increases longer-term democratization prospects, which we argue reflects their enduring pro-democratic preferences and ability to credibly threaten re-mobilization during a transition. Our findings have important implications for our understanding of democratization and mass mobilization.

Word Count: 9841

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This is a working paper
INTRODUCTION

Recent studies have found that popular mobilization in autocracies, particularly nonviolent mobilization, correlates with democratic transitions. In contrast to an earlier literature, which focused on the elite origins of democracy (O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986; Higley and Burton 1989), this research indicates a path to democracy through mass mobilization, carried forward by resistance movements. Yet many of the problematic transitions of the last several decades show that this path is indirect and rocky. For one thing, a resistance movement’s opposition to autocracy is no guarantee of its democratic preferences. In the post-World War II era, almost every major political transformation has been undertaken in the name of democracy. Yet this claim frequently falls by the wayside once the claimants are in power. Even if a resistance movement is led by genuine democrats, these leaders may lack the capacity to carry the democratizing impulse through a political transition, or the political strength to resist attempts at re-autocratization by anti-democratic forces.

To know when mass mobilization is likely to lead to democracy, we must therefore have insight into two questions: when will ostensibly-democratic resistance movements be characterized by genuine democratic preferences? And when will those with genuine democratic preferences have the capacity to see those preferences realized?

Our novel theoretical entry point to answer these questions is to derive democratic preferences and capacity from the organizations that comprise resistance movements. While many resistance movements claim to represent an underlying popular will, this will is rarely manifested without organizational mediation. Parsing resistance movements into their participating organizations and comparing their patterns of participation provides crucial new insight into their behaviors and consequences. The particular constellation of participating organizations in mobilization significantly shapes the incentive structure that shifts mass mobilization towards or away from democratic preferences and offers the capacity to carry out those preferences.

Our first argument deals with the organizational character of resistance movements as a whole.

1There is an expansive and growing literature that examines this subject. See, for example Bayer et al. (2016); Bethke and Pinckney (2016); Brancati (2016); Chenoweth and Stephan (2011); Haggard and Kaufman (2016); Teorell (2010)
Existing literature on mass mobilization has emphasized movement diversity as a key factor in encouraging democratic preferences. We find these arguments plausible but incomplete, since diverse movements (those with many different organizations) also likely face difficulty in making credible commitments and may fragment after an initial breakthrough, leading to an increased risk of democratic backsliding. We thus identify a “diversity dilemma.” Mass mobilization campaigns with many participating organizations may have more democratic preferences on average, but will have less capacity to ensure that those preferences are actualized.

Our second argument focuses on the type of participating organizations in resistance movements. We find strong theoretical rationales that the participation of organizations rooted in quotidian relationships to a mass constituency and not designed themselves to compete for political power, such as labor unions or religious organizations, will lead to greater democracy (what we call the “durability advantage”). These organizations should prefer democracy on average because it typically provides greater autonomy for their actions and a relatively low-cost mechanism of holding decision-makers accountable through the ballot box. Their strong links to identifiable constituencies should also give them greater capacity to maintain mobilization and resist attempts at re-autocratization through political transitions, giving them greater capacity to ensure that democratization takes place.

We test these arguments using a novel dataset of organizations participating in violent and nonviolent resistance movements in Africa from 1990-2015. Our data is one of the first sources to perform this disaggregation and comparison on a broad temporal and geographic scale. We find support for both the ambiguous impact of diversity and the strong positive influence of durability. The overall structure of movements, as measured by their number of organizational participants, has little impact of future levels of democracy. The participation of durable organizations in resistance, however, has strong and consistently positive impacts on democratization in both the short and medium term.

The paper proceeds as follows. First, we outline the theoretical underpinnings of our focus on organizational participation in resistance movements. Second, we present the arguments for our two central hypotheses: the diversity dilemma and the durability advantage. Third, we introduce our research design, particularly focusing on our novel data on organizations in resistance movements. Fourth, we present findings showing that the participation of durable organizations in resistance
movements correlates positively with democracy up to 5 years into the future, while there is little
evidence that organizational diversity improves democracy. The final section concludes.

**THEORY**

**Organizations in Resistance - Our Theoretical Priors**

There is growing consensus that resistance “from below” plays a key role in democratization (Haggard and Kaufman 2016; Teorell 2010). Protests that are large, enduring (Teorell 2010; Brancati 2016; Kadivar 2018), and nonviolent (Bayer et al. 2016; Celestino and Gleditsch 2013; Chenoweth and Stephan 2011; Karatnycky and Ackerman 2005; Schock 2005) appear to enhance the prospects of democratization compared to armed conflict or no mobilization. Other studies emphasize that the mobilization of specific social organizations or groups are critical to democratization. Collier (1999) identified the importance of labor unions or labor-connected parties in driving democratization in South America, Europe and Southeast Asia. Labor organizations also play a foundational role in Rueschemeyer et al. (1992), Bermeo (2003) and Bratton and van de Walle (1997) and working-class insurgency is central to the account of democratization in Wood (2000). Recently, Dahlum et al. (2017) have identified a correlation between the mobilization of industrial workers and democracy, and Butcher et al. (2018) show that the participation of organized labor improved the prospects for democratization, on average, across 123 nonviolent campaigns. Peasant-middle class alliances also feature prominently as explanations in Moore (1993) and more recently, Haggard and Kaufman (2016) argued that labor unions have been a key player in so-called “distributive” democratic transitions. Many structural accounts of democratization also include causal mechanisms that hinge on the threat or manifestation on mass mobilization (Acemoglu and Robinson 2005; Boix 2003; Lipset 1959; Przeworski 1991).

Yet resistance movements making demands for regime change in autocracies also do not inherently have enduring democratic preferences. Individuals, organizations, and communities seek regime change in autocracies for diverse and contingent reasons which may be only tangentially related to an affinity for democracy (Brancati and Snyder 2013). In many cases, ostensibly democratic transitions simply involve elite circulation, with only the “semblance” of democratic transformation (Beissinger
While opposition figures may articulate democratic preferences when out of power, flawed transitions of the last several decades feature many of these figures engaging in the same or even worse anti-democratic behavior once in power. For example, while in opposition, Zambian trade union leader Frederick Chiluba articulated a strong belief in the value of democracy and was imprisoned for his work fighting against Zambia’s single party authoritarian regime (Larmer 2016). However, after his leadership of a nonviolent resistance movement led to his election as president of Zambia, Chiluba orchestrated a significant closing of civic space and sought to indefinitely extend his tenure through changing the Zambian constitution (Van Donge 2002). Thus, we cannot assume the democratic preferences of ostensibly pro-democratic movements. Instead, it is necessary to theoretically motivate when these preferences are more likely to emerge and when movements are likely to have the capacity to compel a regime to respond to them (Dahlum et al. 2017).

Theoretically motivating democratic preferences in resistance movements raises the more basic question of clearly defining democracy, since we must have a clear sense of what movements may or may not prefer. This is difficult, as democracy is multidimensional, with some dimensions orthogonal to or even in conflict with one another (Coppedge et al. 2018). A “thick” conception of democracy can include institutions as diverse as free and fair elections, protections for minority groups and human rights generally, proportional representation, an independent judiciary, and many more. To theorize about democratic preferences and capacity in resistance movements, we simplify the definition of democracy to the commonly-used threshold for a democratic system: one in which leaders achieve power through free and fair elections (Schumpeter 2010), and in which there is relative certainty in the institutions for alternation in power but uncertainty as to the outcome of those alternation procedures (Przeworski 1991). This is the standard threshold definition of democracy in the democratization literature, and informs much of the quantitative work on democratization.2

Based on this definition, we expect mass mobilization to lead to democracy in circumstances where major political actors disagree over specific policy agendas but have relative consensus around establishing a set of institutional rules to regulate their competition, specifically through free and

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2For example, with slight variations, this is the standard underlying the major cross-national datasets that define democracy as a binary variable. See Boix et al. (2013); Cheibub et al. (2010); Geddes et al. (2014); Przeworski et al. (2000)
fair elections. In addition, resistance movements should have the capabilities to impose sufficient political pressure to bring about this arrangement. How might we disaggregate “bottom up” resistance movements to gain insight into when these preferences and capabilities are likely to emerge? Previous studies have focused on the distinction between violent movements and nonviolent movements (Bayer et al. 2016; Chenoweth and Stephan 2011; Pinckney 2018). Yet these two categories have indistinct boundaries, and contain significant variation.

We thus seek to deduce democratic preferences and capabilities from a different characteristic of resistance movements: their organizational makeup. Our theoretical starting point is that violent and nonviolent resistance movements consist of a network of organizations and social groups (Diani 2003; Dahlum et al. 2017; Staniland 2014; Weinstein 2006; Metternich et al. 2013; Leventoğlu and Metternich 2018). No resistance movement against autocracy is monolithic. Neither are resistance movements typically spontaneous, leaderless uprisings. While some uprisings appear spontaneous they are usually mobilized through pre-existing organizations or quickly develop an organizational infrastructure (Haggard and Kaufman 2016; McAdam 2010; Butcher et al. 2018). Organizations formulate and coordinate resistance strategies, bargain with authoritarian regimes, assume power in transitional periods and re-mobilize in the face of threats of re-autocratization. For example, the Tunisian General Labor Union (UGTT) and the Tunisian Bar Association won a Nobel prize for their role in the 2011 revolution and democratization process in Tunisia. Organizations are also the primary way in which individuals with shared preferences pool resources - a powerful reason why public preferences are often expressed through these formalized groups.

Conceptualizing resistance movements as interacting sets of organizations suggests two avenues through which to examine democratic preferences and capacity: a movement’s overall organizational structure and the characteristics of its individual constituent organizations. The overall organizational structure of a movement considers the number of organizations and their relative positions to one another. Examining individual organizations means looking at characteristics of individual organizations that should shape the movement as a whole when these organizations participate and to a greater degree when they become a larger proportion of the movement. We first look at movement structure, and then turn to individual group characteristics.
The Diversity Dilemma

The number of organizations that make up a resistance movement is the most basic characteristic of its organizational structure. Movements can range from being comprised of very few organizations (though rarely if ever a single organization) to a large number of organizations. We describe this characteristic of a movement as the movement’s “diversity.”

Higher diversity may be one mechanism linking mass mobilization to democratization, particularly by encouraging democratic preferences. First, diverse movements often develop consensus-based forms of decision-making that develop into enduring democratic norms. In resistance movements composed of many organizations, coordinating and accommodating various interests becomes common and familiar practice. For example, during the Velvet Revolution in Czechoslovakia - in which a wide variety of groups participated - dissidents held daily “plenums” where tactical decisions were made only after receiving buy-in by students, workers, intellectuals, and representatives of both the Czech and Slovak components of the movement (Ash 2014). These types of power-sharing arrangements prefigure the cooperative arrangements necessary for successful democratic politics and governance.

Diverse movements should also have aggregate preferences for democracy because any single constituent organization has a small chance of capturing state power, yet is vulnerable to state repression. This increases the attractiveness of institutions with checks on executive power and the ability to regularly revise who has access to such power (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2005; Acemoglu and Robinson 2005; Gleditsch and Ward 2006; Celestino and Gleditsch 2013; Przeworski 1991). Important tenets of democracy such as rule of law, separation of powers, and regular elections limit the short-term advantages of capturing the state. They thus can help prevent the emergence of a new concentration of power around a single actor and make it more likely that those temporarily out of power will be able to achieve it at some point in the future.

In contrast, when campaigns consist of only one type of organization, or feature a single dominant organization, their preferences are likely to be dominated by the ideological position of that organization type. Dedication to this vision may trump any particular commitment to the norms and institutions of democracy, which require compromise. For example, in some civil wars rebel groups will have both practical and ideological incentives to close off competition to other opponents if they ever capture
state power. Paul Kagame of Rwanda provides a prime example of this dynamic, consolidating power around himself in an authoritarian manner following a victorious campaign spearheaded solely by his Rwandan Patriotic Front.

Organizational diversity can therefore create latent preferences for democracy. Furthermore, if diverse movements are also big and have greater opportunities for tactical innovation and adaptation (Schock 2005; Chenoweth and Stephan 2011), then this may translate into greater levels of future democracy. However, other mechanisms in the literature on civil war suggest reasons to be skeptical of a general diversity-democracy link. We think of diversity as a “dilemma” that confronts resistance movements. On one hand there are strong incentives to build big, diverse coalitions capable of generating mass participation, imposing significant costs on the regime and inducing elite defections (Schock 2005; Leventoğlu and Metternich 2018; DeNardo 2014; Chenoweth and Stephan 2011). On the other hand, diversity usually creates bargaining problems. As more groups with heterogeneous interests become involved in resistance movements, it becomes difficult for the regime and opposition to locate satisfactory bargains for all constituencies. Bargaining breaks down more often in these circumstances making it more likely that repression becomes an attractive strategy for the regime. Studies of civil war have shown that rebel group fragmentation lengthens wars and reduces the likelihood of negotiated settlements (Cunningham 2006, 2013b). Diversity also makes it more difficult for the opposition to credibly commit to upholding agreements that might be made with the regime as internal factional splintering may lead to continued resistance (Cunningham 2013a).

Moreover, all else being equal, diversity and its attendant democratic preferences do not necessarily provide a movement with the ability to force autocratic leaders to democratize, and may actually have the opposite effect. Although Acemoglu and Robinson (2005) see democracy as a solution to the commitment problem implied by economic redistribution, promises of democratic reform entail their own commitment problems because they are implemented over a period of time. New constitutions can take years to be written and elections are not typically held until one or two years after initial democratic breakthroughs. A promise to liberalize today, when the opposition is strong, may not be credible in two years time if the opposition weakens. Contemporary examples of attempted re-autocratization include Egypt (a successful coup in 2013) and Burkina Faso (a failed coup in 2015). Diverse coalitions may
have special problems navigating this transitional period and maintaining the ability to force and sustain democratic reforms. While diverse coalitions may be able to maintain unity over a shared short-term goal such as regime change, bargaining over the procedural issues that must be negotiated during any transitional period can cause splits (Beissinger 2013). Numerous revolutionary youth groups, leftist political parties and Islamist political parties were able to unite over the ousting of Hosni Mubarak in 2011, but in 2012 they divided over whether legislative elections should be held before the constituent assembly would sit in order to write a new constitution. This division opened the door for the military to re-intervene in 2013. Such tendencies to fragment over issues that arise during transitions in diverse coalitions means their power may, on average, decline faster after a transition, making opportunistic re-autocratization more likely.

We (and existing studies) are agnostic *ex ante* on the relative strength of these effects. It may be the case that the pro-democratic preference effect of greater diversity is so high that the negative impact of diversity on bargaining is not sufficient to counteract it. However, it is also possible that the negative effects of diversity on bargaining are so strong that the ultimate impact of diversity on future democracy through changed preferences is completely eliminated. This is the “diversity dilemma.” Thus, although we expect that organizational diversity creates latent preferences within a movement for democracy, we do not necessarily expect diversity to independently impact the likelihood of subsequent democratization due to the countervailing bargaining problems it entails. Thus our first hypothesis is:

\[ H_1: \text{Increasing organizational diversity in resistance campaigns has no significant effect on future levels of democracy.} \]

**The Durability Advantage**

The second characteristic of resistance movements’ organizational makeup that likely impacts democratic preferences and capabilities concerns the *types* of organizations that participate in these movements. Our theory draws upon existing scholarship that offers insights about which organizations in societies are particularly predisposed to promoting democratization. Case-based studies by Collier (1999), Rueschemeyer et al. (1992), and Bratton and van de Walle (1997) have argued and shown that democratization processes have often been forced by trade unions or labor based parties. Recently,
Dahlum et al. (2017), Haggard and Kaufman (2016), and Butcher et al. (2018) have presented quantitative evidence showing that mobilized industrial workers and national trade unions are strongly correlated with democratization after resistance campaigns. Huang (2016) and Kadivar (2018) also argue that insurgent groups can create durable mobilization infrastructures over years of struggle or through creating institutions to tax civilians. What unites these approaches is the insight that particular types of organizations, when mobilized against the regime, have features that make dissident mobilization especially likely to result in democratization.

What makes organizations like labor unions so closely associate with improved prospects for democratization when mobilized against autocratic regimes? We argue that labor unions are part of a larger class of the “durable” organizations that comprise civil society. Durable organizations are embedded in social networks and practices that are stable over time and they are not formally designed to compete for or capture state power. Rather, they exist to advocate for the interests of a clearly-identifiable constituency. In addition to labor unions, religious organizations and cultural advocacy groups are also durable organizations performing similar functions. We believe these durable organizations are particularly inclined to create pro-democratic preferences and enable resistance movements to sustain mobilization and credibly threaten punishment for attempts at re-autocratization during democratic transitions.

First, we argue that durable organizations have good reasons to prefer democracy over autocracy, all else being equal. Durable organizations are not designed to compete for and hold formal political offices. Yet, they rely on toleration by the state and often seek some degree of state preference. Autocracies typically attempt to repress durable organizations or to co-opt them by offering some degree of preferential treatment, for instance through state sponsorship of religious groups or corporatist arrangements with labor unions. Yet in an autocracy, where political violence is often the ultimate deciding factor and there are fewer limitations on the exercising of state power (Svolik 2012), durable organizations have reasons to mistrust the long-term capacity of cooperative arrangements with the state as a way to ensure their specific preferences.

In contrast, in a democracy, greater limitations on state power provide durable organizations with greater flexibility to pursue their goals. They have less reason to fear that, if preferential arrangements
with the state break down, their activities will be met with state repression. Furthermore, if they face potential conflict with the state then they have a less costly means of advocating for their constituency through the ballot box.

Durable organizations will not all have uniformly democratic preferences. Structural factors such as the degree of economic inequality, the social fractionalization across religious or ethnic lines, or the particular dynamics of autocratic regime co-optation, will doubtless affect their preferences. Yet, because of their core goals (group advocacy rather than holding political office) and the preference for some limitations on state power to ensure their operation without state repression, we expect that on average when durable organizations participate in resistance movements they should be more likely to promote democratization following the campaign. In particular, they should be more likely to hold genuinely democratic preferences than other groups that participate in resistance movements that are explicitly designed to seek partial or complete state power, such as political parties or rebel groups.

Second, durable organizations should have greater capacity to ensure that these democratic preferences are realized; this is what we call the “durability advantage.” As we highlighted in the previous section, there is an important temporal dimension to democratization (Linz and Stepan 1996; O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986; Przeworski 1991) that can create commitment problems and open the door to re-autocratization attempts. A regime may promise democratization today, but that promise is only credible when the opposition believes it can punish attempts at defection by the regime in the future. Resistance movements may not accept offers of democratization if they do not believe they will have the capability to compel post-conflict regimes to follow through on such promises. Similarly, resistance movements that do not have the capacity to punish attempts at defection may miscalculate and take the bait of short-term assurances of democratization only to discover that the regime is able to renege on these promises (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2005; Haggard and Kaufman 2016; Butcher et al. 2018; Huang 2016).

Durable organizations help resistance movements overcome these problems. First, embeddedness in quotidian practices such as work or worship mean these organizations maintain their mobilization infrastructures over time (Parkinson 2013). These concerns motivate them to build more enduring

3Kadivar (2018) and Huang (2016) argue that insurgent groups can create durable mobilization infrastructures over years of struggle or through creating institutions to tax civilians. Here we emphasise the literature that
mobilization infrastructures that can be called upon to continue to advocate for their constituencies. These durable infrastructures in turn enable movements to retain their capabilities over time and re-mobilize, or threaten to re-mobilize, if democratic backsliding occurs. The Tunisian General Labor Union (UGTT), for example, organized general strikes after left-wing politicians were assassinated in 2013. Trade unions were also central to overturning the coup by the Presidential Guard in Burkina Faso in 2015, now one of only a handful of countries in Africa to score over 0.7 on the Polyarchy index (discussed in more detail below).

Other types of organizations have difficulty sustaining their mobilization infrastructures through post-campaign transition periods. Rebel groups, for example, face high transaction costs for converting their wartime mobilization apparatus to electoral context and have generally done poorly in post-conflict elections (Dunning 2011). Spontaneous protest movements such as the so called “Twitter” revolutions may be effective at generating turnout in the short term but the proliferation of weak ties makes these movements vulnerable to repression and prone to fragmentation in a transition (McAdam et al. 2001; McAdam 1986; Tufekci 2017).

Second, periods of democratic transition are often turbulent because a member of the resistance movement assumes state power if the campaign is successful. This transforms one organization’s preferences from anti-regime to pro-regime. This organization is often the largest and best able to mobilize, leaving the residual opposition groups weaker and potentially unable to deter the return to anti-democratic practices. Political parties, for example, will seek to capture state power in a transitional period, activating this dilemma. Rebel groups that achieve military victories or concessions in power-sharing arrangements also exit the opposition coalition and become (part of) the government. However, civil society organizations are not directly designed to hold positions in government and therefore often remain a potential part of the opposition during a transition. This slows the decay rate of the opposition’s mobilization capacity and means these organizations retain strong incentives to compel transitional regimes to build checks and balances into the new constitution (such as freedom of speech and assembly and term limits) as they do not expect to take state power but are vulnerable to

argues movements commonly draw upon pre-existing organizations rather than creating them ex-nihilo (Staniland 2014). However, the logic of these arguments is similar to that which we highlight here.
repression by the regime.

If resistance movements consist entirely of groups with weak ties to inconsistent social bases and no natural reason for continuing activities once the initial concessions of regime change have occurred, they will have little capacity to re-initiate resistance during the transition. Movements that feature strong and durable organizational roots will, therefore, be better able to overcome commitment problems in the short term and accept regime concessions, initiating the democratization process. They should also be more likely to successfully deter attempts at democratic backsliding by a transitional regime or to fight back against this backsliding should it happen. This leads to our second hypothesis:

\[ H_2: \text{Episodes of collective dissent with the participation of a greater proportion of durable organizations will lead to higher levels of democracy in the future.} \]

In the preceding theoretical discussion we identified and refined two mechanisms that are thought to link mass mobilization to democratization. One emphasizes organizational diversity within resistance campaigns while the other emphasizes organization type. The next section describe this study’s research design, including how we operationalize diversity and durability using new data on the organizational composition of resistance movements in Africa from 1990-2015.

**RESEARCH DESIGN**

We test our theoretical expectations quantitatively, using original data on the organizational composition of violent and nonviolent resistance campaigns in post-Cold War African states. All country-years in North and Sub-Saharan Africa from 1990-2015 are included.\(^4\) The data come from two primary sources. This means that our sample contains cases with widely heterogeneous regional contexts and socio-cultural backgrounds. We consider this a strength of the data. The temporal and geographic range is based on limitations in available data, rather than scope conditions of the theory; however, we are cognizant of the challenges of extrapolating general trends from regionally limited data. The resistance movements we capture in our data diverge significantly in terms of major contextual and internal characteristics, which gives us some degree of confidence in our findings’ external validity. However, we can, of course, only say with complete confidence that our findings apply to cases within Africa.
sources, the Varieties of Democracy dataset (V-Dem) (Coppedge et al. 2018a) from the V-Dem Project at the University of Gothenberg, and original data collection on organizational participation in resistance movements. We discuss the data collection process for the relevant variables in detail below.

**Dependent variable**

Our dependent variable is the future level of democracy in a given country. We measure this with a series of leads on the “Polyarchy” score from the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) project (Coppedge et al. 2018a), measured from time $t+1$ to $t+5$. The Polyarchy score is an index of various measures of democratic institutions intended to capture the extent to which a country approximates an ideal electoral democracy in terms of the ability of a widely enfranchised proportion of the country’s population to participate in free elections that determine the composition of executive power. Included in the Polyarchy score’s index are components that capture freedom of expression and association as these affect the population’s ability to make informed choices between candidates. We also ran tests on two additional indices from V-Dem that capture different dimensions of democracy: Liberal Democracy and Participatory Democracy (Coppedge et al. 2018a). The Liberal Democracy measure captures the degree to which government is limited and the rights of individuals and minority groups are protected against both the state and the majority. The Participatory Democracy measure captures the degree to which citizens are actively engaged in all aspects of the political process, both electoral and non-electoral (Coppedge et al. 2018b, 40-41).

**Independent Variables: Organizational Participation in Resistance**

The main independent variables are measures of the organizational diversity of nonviolent and violent resistance movements and the extent of participation by durable organizations. These measures come from an original data collection effort, described in detail here. The data record organizational participation in events of collective dissent in North and Sub-Saharan Africa from 1990 to 2015. The events we examine are violent and nonviolent events of contentious politics such as protests, strikes, terrorist attacks, and conventional as well as irregular civil conflict.
To focus our attention on incidents of dissent most likely to lead to major political changes, we limit our data collection to dissent with “maximalist” claims. Maximalist claims are demands for changes in the political structure which, if implemented, would significantly alter the executive branch’s immediate access to state power, the rules through which executives are selected, or the policy or geographic areas over which the executive has the right to exercise authority. This builds on and refines the definition of maximalism in (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011). Maximalist demands are not the same as grievances. A protest against corruption, for example, may generate calls for an independent watchdog group (not maximalist) or for the head of state to step down (maximalist). Pro-democracy demands in autocratic settings are a subset of all maximalist demands, but our broader definition also allows us to also examine episodes of contention that are aimed at the preservation of democracy rather than the creation of democracy (for example, against changes to term limits) or establishing new states which may or may not be democratic. By implication this also includes other claims for enfranchisement on the basis of gender or collective identity such as during the civil rights movement in the United States, the anti-apartheid movement in South Africa, or the female suffrage movement in the United Kingdom. Our definition would not include human rights movements such as an LGBTQ movement since it does not alter the political rules around who gets to choose the executive or those areas over which the executive can exercise control (unless LGBTQ people were also disenfranchised).

We identified events of maximalist dissent and organizational participation by drawing on four well-known events datasets for instances of maximalist claims-making and organizational participation. These datasets are the Uppsala Conflict Data Program Geo-referenced Event Dataset (UCDP-GED: Sundberg and Melander (2013)), the Armed Conflict Location and Event Dataset (ACLED: Raleigh et al. (2010)), The Mass Mobilization Data (MM: Clark and Linzer (2015)) and the Social Conflict Analysis Data (SCAD: Salehyan et al. (2012)). The first step was creating a set of candidate events of maximalist dissent with a combination of subsetting on existing variables in these datasets and text-matching.\(^5\)

\(^5\)All SCAD events with goals of elections, democracy and ethnic/religious issues or events where the event notes matched a customized series of text strings were included in the candidate list, specifically any events that included any of the following strings: resign, election, autonomy, independen, step down, democra, stand down, coup, dissolve, constitution, pluralism, president, multiparty, elector, transitional, bring, down, junta, military
We investigated each candidate event to determine whether participants in the event made maximalist demands and whether any named organizations participated in or organized the event. We consulted both secondary sources and newswires in the FACTIVA and LexisNexis databases for this process.\(^6\) For every maximalist event, we recorded the organization(s) that participated in executing the event, if there were any that were formally identifiable, typically with an official name. Multiple organizations can be associated with events of maximalist dissent, but only organizations that directly mobilized and participated were included in our dataset. For instance, in a protest planned by a labor union and a student group calling for the overthrow of a non-democratic regime we would include both the labor union and the student group but not, say, a political party that only issued a statement praising the protest. We coded organizational participation when sources stated that a specific group organized the event, members of the leadership were at the event, supporters of an organization were associated with the event, or organizations called for the event (often in the case of protests/strikes) before they occurred. We included all rebel groups included in the UCDP as their demands are by definition maximalist. We also included all organizations associated with interaction “12” events in ACLED as by definition they make maximalist claims in the ACLED codebook (Raleigh et al. 2010). We examined 10,437 events for maximalist claims and organizational participation across the SCAD, MM and ACLED datasets. Of

\(^6\)Specifically the Associated Press, Agence France Presse, BBC World News Monitoring, Reuters Newswires, and Africa News. Our major secondary sources were the Historical Dictionary Series, Political Handbook of the World, Political Parties of the World and Trade Unions of the World, occasionally supplemented by additional scholarly sources specific to the country or resistance movement.
these events, we coded maximalist claims and participation by at least one organization in 6,722 events.

This process produced a list of organizations linked to events in the GED, SCAD, MM and ACLED datasets. We then aggregated this list up to the organization-country-year to produce a list of organizations involved in events of maximalist dissent, both violent and nonviolent, in Africa from 1990-2015. The data includes information on 1,199 distinct organizations active across 2,980 country-organization-years. Just 141 (11.8%) of these organizations are associated with events in the GED. Thus, the vast majority of organizations that engaged in maximalist dissent in Africa from 1990-2015 were not rebel groups involved in civil wars, but organizations involved in nonviolent resistance or low-level violence that did not produce 25 or more battle deaths in a year. These data are possibly biased toward larger, more prominent organizations and those with experience or incentives to interact with the news media, especially political parties but probably also trade unions and insurgent groups. In particular, we suspect that the number of civil society organizations (CSOs) that participate in maximalist dissent are underestimated, especially in non-democracies. We may record a greater number of CSOs in more democratic states where press freedom entails better reporting or where civil society is allowed more leeway to organize and act. This raises the possibility that any correlation between the percentage of CSOs, which we use as one independent variable below, and levels of future democracy may be spuriously correlated with levels of democracy at time $t$. A lagged dependent variable to address this problem below along with a measure of how open civil society is and country fixed effects that should capture the likelihood of organizations or certain types of organizations making into the data. In addition, for our main analyses, only organizations that were associated with events that had more than 1,000 participants (as recorded by either the SCAD or MM dataset), were in the GED, or associated with ACLED events where more than 25 people were killed were included. These more “severe” events should receive better media coverage and limit the extent to which media biases affect the results (Weidmann 2016).

**Diversity** We used two measures to capture the organizational diversity of a movement: (1) a count of the number of active organizations engaged in maximalist dissent, and (2) a measure of the fractionalization of participation across different types of organizations.

Our first measure is a raw count of the number of organizations engaged in maximalist dissent in
the country-year. If organizations form at least in part around shared individual preferences, then the number of organizations is a plausible proxy for the diversity of these preferences across the movement. A movement with five political parties, for example, likely has more diverse political preferences than a movement with just one party. We normalized this measure by transforming it with the natural logarithm. Our data collection procedure should be effective at capturing the “main” organizations in a movement, but the ability to capture smaller organizations (and therefore a greater number of organizations) might vary from country to country. The log transformation should reduce the impact of this potential measurement error.

Our second measure of movement diversity is a fractionalization index of the organization types active in a country-year. All organizations were classified into one of nine categories based on their primary goals. These categories are shown in Table 1. The first category, “revolutionary organizations,” captures organizations that form with the primary goal of prosecuting maximalist claims such as regime change through non-institutional means. This category includes nearly all armed rebel organizations along with some protest groups with explicitly maximalist goals such as Tamarod in Egypt. All organizations in the data make maximalist demands during periods of dissent but not all have maximalist goals as their primary objective. For instance, trade unions participate in maximalist movements but their primary goal is to further the interests of their workers. The second category is political parties, that is to say organizations designed to contest and win elections. Our subsequent categories are groups with the primary goal of representing the interests of specific social groups starting with workers (trade unions) professional groups, women, ethnic groups, religious groups and youth/student groups. Importantly, organizations that are categorized as religious or ethnic are not primarily religious political parties (such as the Muslim Brotherhood) or ethnically based insurgent groups. These groups would be coded as political parties or revolutionary organizations, respectively. Our categories of religious and ethnic organizations are civil society based religious or ethnic organizations without a primary aim of contesting elections or pursuing maximalist goals through contentious dissent. The final category, “other CSOS,” captures organizations such as human rights advocacy groups with non-maximalist goals but no clearly identifiable social group that they claim to represent. Table 1 illustrates the categorization of organization types with examples from several of the countries included in our data.
We argue that these different social groups are likely to have different policy preferences and must answer to different constituencies (labor unions will push for labor rights while religious groups typically advocate for greater religious freedoms, for example). As such, the degree to which a movement is spread across these different social groups is an indicator of the movement’s diversity. To measure this we created a variable (Measure 2) to capture the extent of movement fractionalization by type, that is to say the degree to which the organizations active in a given country year were either dominated by one organization type or dispersed across a number of types. Fractionalization was measured using the inverse Herfindahl index, commonly used to measure domination of a market by a firm, and given in equation 1:

\[
\text{Fractionalization} = 1 - \sum_{i=1}^{n} s_i^2
\]

In this equation \(s_i\) is the proportion of all organizations engaged in maximalist resistance accounted for by organization type \(i\), and \(n\) is the total number of organization types engaged in maximalist resistance. As above, if different types of organizations form around different social groups and develop

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Org. Goals</th>
<th>Example</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Revolutionary</td>
<td>Maximalist goals</td>
<td>AFDL: Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of the Congo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Party</td>
<td>Win elections</td>
<td>UFDG: Union of Democratic Forces of Guinea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade Union</td>
<td>Worker’s rights/interests in a trade or industry</td>
<td>CTNG: The National Confederation of Guinean Workers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional</td>
<td>Professionals’s rights/interests</td>
<td>ONAT: Tunisian Bar Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women’s</td>
<td>Women’s rights/interests</td>
<td>AFTD: Tunisian Association of Democratic Women</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic</td>
<td>Ethnic rights/interests</td>
<td>MAK: Movement for the Autonomy of Kabylie (Algeria)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious</td>
<td>Coordinate religious activities</td>
<td>FNAI: Tunisian Front of Islamic Associations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Student or Youth</td>
<td>Youth/student interests</td>
<td>GUTS: General Union of Tunisian Students</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other CSOs</td>
<td>Broad, universal non-maximalist goals (i.e human rights)</td>
<td>CNOSCG: National Council of Civil Society Organizations</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
distinct political preferences then movements that are more evenly dispersed across organization types should have more diverse preferences.

**Durability** We measured the presence of durable organizations (H$_2$) with the percentage of organizations in a resistance movement-year that were trade unions, religious organizations, professional organizations, women’s organizations or ethnic organizations.$^7$ These organizations are characterized by enduring social relations centred on everyday interactions such as work, worship or collective identity and do not have the primary aim of competing for state power. They are thus more likely to endure after short term changes in the regime and will by and large retain their mobilization infrastructures. Some of these groups may even grow in transitional periods. This is in contrast to political parties which may exit anti-government resistance networks if they are able to capture state power, or rebel groups that must weather high costs transitioning from structures designed for the pursuit of political goals with violent means to nonviolent and institutional settings.

In some contexts student/youth organizations and other CSOs may be built on quotidian ties (although we think it is more likely that trade unions, religious organizations, professional organizations and ethnic organizations are rooted in everyday practices). As an alternate test of the percentage of durable organizations we also created a variable measuring the percentage of organizations in a resistance campaign-year that were not political parties or rebel groups (% CSOs). This percentage includes our primary measure of durable organizations as well as other kinds of civil society groups such as student groups and human rights advocacy organizations.

**Control variables**

The diversity of resistance movements and the presence of durable organizations are not randomly distributed. The types of organizations that could join resistance movements, as well as the presence and strength of social groups that could spawn organizations and their abilities to coordinate, are likely affected by past levels of civil society openness and regime type, past levels of contention, structural economic factors and economic growth. These factors also very likely impact democratization, our

$^7$Other potential measures of durability would be organizational age or size, but these data do not currently exist.
outcome of interest. Our modelling strategy is designed to minimize the effects of omitted variable bias to the greatest extent possible.

In particular, we seek to include all relevant control variables that may affect our independent and dependent variables. We include GDP growth because economic crises may make regimes more vulnerable to defections and democratic transitions (Brancati 2016). Declining economic conditions may also lower the opportunity costs for organizations to engage in resistance against the regime (Haggard and Kaufman 2016). We also control for economic development using GDP per capita, as development is associated with increasing organizational density in civil society and may independently cause regimes to liberalize (Boix 2003; Lipset 1959; Haggard and Kaufman 2016; Diamond 2008). These two variables come from the World Bank (2018). The participation of CSOs in resistance campaigns is probably more likely in countries where civil society is denser or less repressed. Thus we control for underlying civil society potential with the Core Civil Society Index from V-Dem (Coppedge et al. 2018). The widespread use of violence may deter dense or diverse organizational participation and, again, make democratization less likely by increasing elite cohesion (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011). We thus include a control for the percentage of organizations associated with violent events. We also include a linear year trend to capture continent-wide factors that may have encouraged democratization and the strong likelihood that more organizations are captured with better newswire coverage over the 25 years of our study. Finally, we include the lagged dependent variable (measured at t - 1) because the level of democracy at time t + n is related to past levels of democracy and is also related to freedom of the press and our ability to identify organizational participation. We measured all controls at t - 1 to avoid contaminating the control variables with the effects of organizational participation at time t and introducing post-treatment bias.

All models include either mixed effects with random country intercepts or country fixed effects unless specified otherwise. The country fixed effects models capture country-specific features (such as GDP events, ACLED interaction 12 events and “violent riots” or “anti-government violence” in SCAD. Although more recent events likely have poorer coverage in secondary/historical sources. In robustness tests we also use year fixed effects to control for continent-wide shocks that may be driving the results with very similar results to those reported below.

We ran robustness checks with several additional control variables (detailed in the appendix).
the nature of authoritarianism prior to 1990 and colonial heritage) that affect the number and types of organizations that participate in resistance campaigns and country-specific factors that may have deterred or encouraged democratization. OLS regression models were employed because the dependent variable is continuous. We performed all the analysis in the R statistical computing platform.

Table 3.3 reports summary statistics on the main variables used in our analysis. There is wide variation in the number of organizations participating in resistance movements. Out of a total of 1,253 country-years in the data there was maximalist resistance with at least one organization participating in 481 years, or roughly 38% of all country-years in Africa between 1990 and 2015. Of these 481 observations, 68 country-years have between 5 and 10 organizations participating in maximalist resistance, and 24 country-years have more than 10 organizations participating.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statistic</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>St. Dev.</th>
<th>Min</th>
<th>Max</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No. of Orgs</td>
<td>1,253</td>
<td>1.314</td>
<td>3.324</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fractionalization</td>
<td>1,253</td>
<td>0.048</td>
<td>0.160</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.960</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Durable</td>
<td>1,253</td>
<td>0.018</td>
<td>0.102</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>1.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% CSOs</td>
<td>1,253</td>
<td>0.033</td>
<td>0.145</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>1.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Violent Orgs.</td>
<td>1,253</td>
<td>0.317</td>
<td>0.457</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>1.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polyarchy (t-1)</td>
<td>1,252</td>
<td>0.353</td>
<td>0.185</td>
<td>0.074</td>
<td>0.803</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per cap (log)</td>
<td>1,148</td>
<td>7.722</td>
<td>0.976</td>
<td>4.898</td>
<td>10.750</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP Growth</td>
<td>1,148</td>
<td>0.020</td>
<td>0.113</td>
<td>−0.590</td>
<td>1.309</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robust CS Index</td>
<td>1,252</td>
<td>0.590</td>
<td>0.250</td>
<td>0.021</td>
<td>0.976</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
RESULTS

Descriptive statistics

Figure 1 shows the distribution of organizations we record in active maximalist dissent over the 1990-2015 period by country. Grey crosses are the better-studied violent rebel groups (those associated with GED events), while open circles are political parties, triangles are trade unions and other CSOs, and other revolutionary organizations are squares.11 Organizational participation in dissent has grown over the period of observation with peaks in the early 1990s, mid 2000s and the largest peak during the Arab Spring from 2011 onward. The types of organizations that have participated in dissent have remained fairly stable over time with political parties making up 49% of active organizations in 1991 and 38% in 2015. Rebel groups constituted 35% of active organizations in 1991 and 44% in 2015. Other civil society organizations made up 15% in 1991 and roughly 21% in 2015.

Figure 2 shows how democratization rates vary across three categories of observations in our data as an initial test of H1 and H2. The observations labelled “diverse” (triangles) consist of country-years with 10 or more organizations but where less than 25% of those organizations were classified as “durable.” The observations labelled “durable” (squares) are country-years where 25% or more of the active organizations were “durable” organizations in our schema. The “control” group includes observations without 10 or more participating organizations or 25% durable organizations and that were not exposed to either of these treatments 1-5 years after the observation year (grey dots). Along the x-axis is length of the lead from 1-5 years and the y-axis measures the change in the Polyarchy score from t - 1 to t + n as indicated on the x-axis.

Figure 2 offers some initial support for our hypotheses. Years with the participation of 25% or more “durable” organizations show positive changes in their Polyarchy scores. By t + 2 this is roughly 0.1 points higher than the Polyarchy score at t - 1. Up until t + 4 the mean Polyarchy score for country years with diverse (but not durable) opposition coalitions is very close to the control mean, but rises slightly at t + 5. While this offers initial support for H1 and H2, the percentage of durable organizations and the

11These are both rebel groups with fewer than 25 casualties in any year, such as the Niger Delta Freedom Fighters (NDFF) in Nigeria, and nonviolent groups formed with an explicitly maximalist goal, such as Tamarod in Egypt.

FIGURE 2. Democratization by Diversity and Durability, Africa, 1990-2015
Durability not Diversity

diversity of organizational participation are not randomly assigned and are likely correlated with factors that also affect democratization. Thus, it is crucial to examine these questions through regression models that can take the systematic effects of other factors that affect organizational participation and democratization into account.

Regression Models

In this section, we present the results of our primary regression models, as well as a number of robustness checks. Figure 3 displays results from the country fixed effects models of our two measures of organizational diversity. The points are the average marginal effect in models including our full set of controls, while the vertical lines are 95% confidence intervals. As the plot shows, organizational diversity – measured either by the logged number of organizations or the fractionalization across organization types – has little impact on future levels of democracy. The expected Polyarchy scores 2-5 years into the future are not significantly different for a country that experiences dissent with high levels of organizational diversity when compared to a country-year with no dissent at all. Polyarchy scores are significantly lower at $t + 1$ for episodes of dissent involving many different organization types and with a large number of organizations overall, indicating that such movements may have particular problems negotiating transition periods or difficulty attracting short term government concessions. These results provide evidence supporting $H_1$: high organizational diversity does not, on average, lead to greater democratization, indicating that the countervailing forces of the “diversity dilemma” may be at work.

The picture is quite different when examining the influence of durable organizations, as shown in Figure 4. Our primary measure of the “durability advantage,” the percentage of participants in resistance that are durable organizations, exhibits a significant positive impact on the Polyarchy score at each point from $t + 1$ to $t + 5$. The impact is smaller for CSOs, a measure that includes human rights or other activist organizations that may have lower mobilization capacity and thus be less able to shape post-conflict institutions. For the percentage of durable organizations the size of the effect is relatively

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12 The full regression tables including results for both mixed and fixed effects models can be found in Appendix tables 2-5.
13 Results are substantively identical in the mixed-effects models with random intercepts.
large - a country that experiences an episode of dissent characterized by 100% durable organizations is expected to score more than 0.1 points higher on the Polyarchy index 2-3 years after. The models also include a significant and positively signed lagged dependent variable, meaning the substantive effects are larger because higher past democracy scores make it more likely that democracy scores in the future will be higher.

The control variables behave mostly as expected, with the Polyarchy score at $t - 1$ proving to be a consistent and significant predictor of future Polyarchy at $t + 2$ but becoming insignificant at $t + 4$. Higher scores on the core civil society index at $t - 1$ are also strongly and positively correlated with future levels of democracy up to 5 years into the future. Neither GDP per capita nor GDP growth are ever significant in the main models. The proportion of organizations associated with at least one violent event is negatively related to democratization at $t+1$ but not after. There is also a strong linear trend towards democracy, as indicated by the positive sign and high degree of significance on the year variable.

**Robustness Checks** These results provide further evidence strengthening the ambiguous impact of organizational diversity and the strong positive impact of durable organizations. Yet there are a number
of potential weaknesses of these tests that necessitate a number of robustness checks. First, we ran several tests changing the specific variables included in the model. It is plausible that our results may be attributable to some systematic omitted variable bias. Thus, we re-ran our models with several additional control variables to account for other “usual suspects” in the mobilization-democracy story.\footnote{Specifically, we include controls for oil wealth, regional democratic diffusion, government repression, and campaign size. Details on our sources and coding are in the Appendix.} Far from eliminating the correlations identified in the main models, our results become more highly significant when including these additional controls. It is also possible that institutional changes toward or away from democracy may not manifest as dissent immediately. Institutional openings in the more distant past may still provide opportunities for mobilization even if the regime becomes less democratic in the short term. To address this, we re-ran our models including longer lags of the dependent variable and the civil society index. Our measures of the participation of durable organizations remains positive and significant. Next, while the Polyarchy score – our primary dependent variable – captures a very broad conception of democracy, it leaves out important dimensions of democracy relevant for our theoretical story, such as the protection of minority rights or participatory institutions. Thus, we replicated our main models but replaced the Polyarchy score with V-Dem’s Liberal Democracy and
Participatory Democracy indexes. The results are substantively similar.

Second, our results may be driven by a systematically different subset of the diverse set of country-years on which we perform our tests. To account for this, we re-ran our main models on several subsets of the full dataset. Specifically, we split the sample based on whether the regime at \( t - 1 \) was autocratic or democratic;\(^{15}\) and into “peace years” where no organizations were associated with GED events and “war years” where there was an ongoing UCDP civil war. Our results are robust in autocratic and peace years. The percentage of durable organization is negatively and significantly correlated with Polyarchy scores at \( t + 1 \) in the sample of democracies and not significantly associated from \( t + 2 \) to \( t + 5 \). We suspect that the participation of these organizations in maximalist resistance in democracies signals a period of democratic crisis.

Third, in our main tests we follow Weidmann (2016)’s suggestion of avoiding reporting bias by including only organizations that participate in high-intensity events (those with 1,000 participants or 25 casualties). It is possible that this exclusion biases our results towards those resistance movements most likely to achieve democratic progress. We re-tested the results measuring diversity and durability indicators for all organizations regardless of the size of the events they were associated with (i.e. including organizations associated with smaller events). As Weidmann’s argument on reporting bias would lead us to expect, there is some additional noise in the data when these smaller events are included, but the size and significance of the coefficients remains substantively similar.

Finally, we conducted two tests on two small samples of country-years highly likely to be “transitional:” years where there was at least one protest of 10,000 people or more in the country-year (56 cases) and years where there was an irregular regime change (43 cases). Although the small number of cases here precluded the use of country fixed effects, the models do still involve the full range of control variables including the lagged dependent variable and lagged civil society index which should capture differences in key institutions, capacities for collective action and media-biases across countries and time. Our results retain the direction and significance of the main tests in the years of irregular regime change, but lose significance in some models limited to years of large protests.

In none of the robustness tests does the number of organizations have a significant positive effect

\(^{15}\)With the distinction between these two defined by a Polyarchy score threshold of 0.5.
on future democratization. Fractionalization continues to have a significant negative coefficient at $t + 1$ in a number of the robustness tests. Specifically, the fractionalization coefficient is negative and significant in civil war years, democracies, after large protests, with extra controls and with small protests included. It is very close to statistical significance in the remaining robustness tests with the exception of periods following irregular leadership changes. That we continue to find few significant correlations between diversity and future democracy following big protests and in peace years suggests that the diversity dilemma applies to periods of nonviolent contention and violent contention.

**Instrumental Variable Analysis**

Causal identification in any observational study is challenging. Our regression models aim to address concerns by conditioning on many of the extensive number of variables identified as important in the democratization literature, as well as by including country fixed effects and the lagged dependent variable. The conservative nature of this modeling strategy makes it unlikely that there is some systematic variable sufficiently highly correlated with our independent and dependent variables to explain the observed effects. It is possible, however, that organizations anticipate medium-term democratization and participate in dissent in response to this expectation and/or that other unobserved features cause the participation of durable organizations or diverse coalitions and also cause democratization. However, these unobserved factors must be independent of the features controlled for in the regression models.

To address this potential concern, we ran two instrumental variable analyses (shown in the Appendix). The starting point comes from Smith (2014) who claims that food price shocks, instrumented with trade-adjusted changes in international grain prices, are causally related to mobilization, along with 6 and 9 month deviations in rainfall. Food price shocks predict diverse organizational participation well, and we argue in the Appendix that there are good arguments that this instrument satisfies the exogeneity and exclusivity assumptions in relation to democratization.

Food price shocks and rainfall deviations do not predict the percentage of durable organizations or CSOs that participate in resistance movements. Youth bulges do, however, and there is a significant literature arguing that this is a plausible instrument for mass mobilization, specifically in relation to democratization (Fuller and Pitts 1990; Urdal 2006). Youth bulges measured as the proportion of the
population between 0 and 14 do (negatively) predict CSO and durable organizational participation and we argue in the appendix that this variable likely satisfies the exogeneity assumption. However, there is more uncertainty over the exclusivity assumption in our case. The instrumental variable models reported in the appendix have additional controls from the V-DEM data to capture the link between youth bulges and preemptive repression\textsuperscript{16} that may create institutional “lock ins” that make democratization difficult or empower the military (Nordås and Davenport 2013; Urdal 2006). Nonetheless these results should be treated with caution, although we emphasize that variation in organizational participation predicted by youth bulges is unlikely to be driven by anticipated democratization and goes some way to easing concerns that the findings are driven by reverse causality. Omitted variable bias remains a potential problem.

The results of two-stage least squares regression models using food price shocks as an instrument for diverse participation and youth bulges as an instrument for the % of durable organizations and CSOs can be found in the Appendix. The models retain country fixed effects and the main control variables. The results are consistent with the fixed effects models in the main text.

In summary, we find consistent evidence in support of both $H_1$ and $H_2$. There is little evidence for a direct effect of organizational diversity on future democracy, measured either as the number of organizations or dispersion across organization types, indicating the existence of a diversity dilemma. In contrast, there is strong and consistent evidence of a durability advantage. Durable organizations’ participation in resistance is positively associated with levels of democracy 2-5 years into the future. This result holds with extra control variables and in autocracies, which matches the theoretical notion that durable organizations help overcome commitment problems and punish attempts at re-autocratization which are likely to be especially severe in more autocratic settings. We also note that our overall modelling strategy is very conservative. The main results are from OLS models with country fixed effects, a lagged dependent variable and a time trend. They are also robust to the inclusion of year dummies and additional control variables that capture yearly variations in media coverage within countries. Thus, it is unlikely that country- or regime-specific features are driving the results or that

\textsuperscript{16}Specifically, one and two year lags of the CSO repression variable, along with an indicator of whether the regime was a military regime on December 31 of the previous year (Hadenius and Teorell 2007; Wahman et al. 2013).
continent-wide shocks (such as the Arab Spring) account for the associations. The inclusion of an indicator of the strength of civil society in combination with country fixed effects means our results are also probably not driven by media biases particular to a particular country or within countries over time.

**CONCLUSION**

In this manuscript we have proposed and tested new mechanisms linking mass mobilization to democratization through the organizational characteristics of resistance movements. We first identified a “diversity dilemma.” Some studies argue that diverse coalitions are most likely to democratize because they mobilize large numbers of people and have aggregate preferences for democracy. On the other hand, diversity can introduce bargaining problems that may make these movements less likely to succeed in the short term and vulnerable to fragmentation and re-autocratization in the longer term. We also identified a “durability advantage,” arguing that democratization is more likely when organizations embedded in quotidian social networks with no direct designs on achieving power – durable organizations – join resistance movements.

We tested these hypotheses using a new dataset of organizational participation in maximalist dissent in Africa from 1990-2015. Adopting a conservative modelling strategy employing either random country intercepts or country fixed effects, a lagged dependent variable and time trends, we found little evidence that movement diversity is associated with future levels of democracy, measured either as the number of organizations or dispersion across organization types. Durable organizations on the other hand, were positively correlated with future levels of democracy for up to 5 years. This result was robust across a number of modelling strategies and subsamples, as well as in an instrumental variable analysis.

These results suggest that the link between mass mobilization and democracy is largely attributable to the participation of durable organizations in resistance movements. These organizations have deep roots in stable social networks that provide a consistent mobilization infrastructure. Furthermore, because they are not designed to compete for or capture state power, these organizations are also ideally placed to act as a bulwark against attempts to re-establish autocracy during a transition. Our research
also suggests that the shift towards democratic preferences typically assumed to be a part of diverse movements alone is not enough to bring about democracy. Indeed, the consistent non-effect we find between measures of movement diversity and democratization suggests that the dilemmas associated with building big-diverse movements are a significant challenge that can undermine democratization. That adherence to nonviolent tactics does not overcome this dilemma suggests that this problem is especially difficult to navigate. In addition, this research has implications for the relationship between structural factors and democratization. Numerous studies propose causal mechanisms that run through the mobilization of collective actors (Ross 2001; Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2005), or even specific collective actors such as trade unions (Butcher and Svensson 2016; Haggard and Kaufman 2016). However, these mechanisms are rarely tested. Our results suggest that a useful step forwards would be to examine the extent to which structural factors and democratization are related through the mobilization of durable organizations.

The strategy of examining variation in resistance movements through their organizational make-up is a research agenda in its early stages, with many potential expansions for future research. For instance, the effect of diversity in resistance movements is an avenue open for much more quantitative research. Our measures of diversity are proxies – we are not yet able to directly measure the diversity among stated goals or preferences of participating organizations. More direct measurements on this dimension may produce different or more nuanced results than those we have presented here. In addition, diversity is closely related to the dispersion of power among opposition actors. As such, it may not be how diverse the actors are that drives democracy but rather a relatively even balance of power between them (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2005). Our measure of fractionalization across types is closer to dispersion than the raw count of organizations, but this too could be more directly measured with the fractionalization of the movement by organization size. While our measure of the raw counts of numbers of organizations participating in resistance captures organizational diversity to some degree, we are likely conflating many resistance movements featuring many genuine centers of power and competition among themselves with campaigns that may have several organizations participating, but in which these organizations are all more or less satellites of a single central organization that overwhelms them in size.
Our analysis is also limited in time and scope. Organizational complexity has played an important role in resistance movements in Southeast Asia (Boudreau 2009), Latin America (Stepan 1989), and Eastern Europe (Bunce and Wolchik 2011). While there is significant diversity across African countries and the campaigns therein, and we have no reason to believe that the effects of organizational participation would be systematically different in other parts of the world, neither can we confidently say that these patterns will hold true for resistance campaigns in other regions. This is a crucial empirical question for future research.

These findings offer some preliminary lessons for pro-democracy activists and other practitioners. Namely, those engaged in an anti-government resistance who are committed to pursuing democratic reforms should focus on encouraging the participation of durable organizations, such as labor unions, religious groups, or other context-specific organizations. Including a wide variety of groups in a resistance campaign can also be beneficial for democratization prospects when a large proportion of these groups are more durable. Furthermore, for third parties seeking to promote democracy following anti-government movements, they should be ready to provide more assistance in situations where the participant organizations themselves may struggle to enforce such reforms, for example in places where the campaign was comprised of nascent groups or lacked engagement from civil society organizations.

REFERENCES


