Staying in Place: Federalism and the Political Economy of Place Attachment

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**ABSTRACT:** A growing number of scholars have documented how social identities defined by an attachment to place influence individuals' understandings about political power and representation (Parker 2014; Cramer 2016; Jacobs and Munis 2018). Drawing on this theoretical framework, we explore how place-based identities matter for American federalism by documenting how an attachment to place alters individuals' decisions to leave their political jurisdiction and welcome newcomers into their local communities. Using a set of conjoint experiments deliberately designed to measure individual attitudes about place, politics, and America's federal polity, we find evidence that Americans hold deep and consequential attitudes about the places in which they live. Our evidence confirms that Americans are resentful towards places not like their own, and make sense of politics by drawing connections to their own unique geographies, especially states.
Americans are a mobile people. Last year, an estimated 4.8 million individuals moved to a different state; 6.5 million moved to a different county within their state (U.S. Census 2018a). And, because of the United States' federal structure, that mobility has important consequences for politics and policy. Citizens can influence subnational political processes not only through their votes, but also by the decision to leave (Hirschman 1970). The potential for exit places pressure on local jurisdictions to maintain relatively competitive tax structures (Tiebout 1956), and citizens are able to "sort" themselves into like-minded political enclaves, whose political structure reflects community-wide preferences for government services and taxing authority (Cho, Gimpel and Hui 2013; Bishop 2008; Ostrom, Tiebout, and Warren 1961). Mobility informs the American political experience; presidents enjoin citizens to take advantage of their "built-in guarantee of freedom" and "go someplace else" (Reagan 1981), and frontier mythology continues to capture the imagination of those wishing to uproot and start anew someplace else (Wrobel 2002, Slotkin 1985).

At the same time, much of U.S. politics is about the preservation of unique places in the American landscape. And federalism provides communities of disparately-minded individuals the political power to maintain the exceptional features of their place (Derthick 2001). Indeed, American migration rates have declined since the 1950s, even as public policy has made it easier for Americans to migrate and find job opportunities (Foster 2017). So, on the one hand, federalism may, in some instances, permit and encourage individuals to leave. On the other hand, federalism may nourish place-specific attachments, motivating people to stay.

In this paper, we test the stated assumptions within these two dominant conceptualizations of federal design, and measure the cognitive trade-offs individuals themselves make when thinking about exit in the American federal system - how an individual's "sense of
place” interacts with the prospect for economic advancement, given interstate differences. We present the results of two conjoint experiments and demonstrate that a variety of economic considerations pull individuals away from their communities; but, at the same time, an individual's sense of place -- the social connection they feel to a particular locale -- often outweighs the prospects for material improvement. While the connections Americans feel to specific places are often intertwined with attitudes about race, partisanship, and economic well-being, an individual's sense of place has a unique and discernable effect at the margins. We conclude that many Americans hold deep and consequential attitudes about the places in which they live, and that even in an age of national media consumption and centralized party messaging (Hopkins 2018), the local is still very much present in the minds of the American people. To the extent that these predispositions are present and active, they will necessarily inform the logics and decisions reached in the U.S. federal system because place links people with their environment, and creates psychologically meaningful categories for individuals who act within political jurisdictions of different scale (Stedman 2002). Federalism must account for identity (Feely and Rubin 2008), and we distinguish a unique set of identities that filter Americans’ impressions about where they belong and who belongs with them at the subnational level. We conclude that people care about the places in which the live, are resentful towards places not like their own, and make sense of politics by drawing connections to their own particular geographies and localized experiences.

An individual's sense of place captures a range of emotive and rational connections to their subnational political community. To distinguish and test the power of these affections, we randomly assigned respondents to one of two conjoint experiments. Conjoint designs allow us to filter out many competing considerations and simultaneously measure different indicators of
those considerations. In this design, two indicators are particularly important: the relative degrees of urbanness or ruralness respondents perceive present in a given area, and the symbolic power that each of the 50 states imposes on individuals’ senses of place. In the first experiment, we asked respondents to consider two potential job offers from around the country. We randomly altered the economic factors associated with each job offer, such as salary, but also situated that job in one of over 38,000 U.S. ZIP codes. We presented geo-specific information alongside the job offer and then asked respondents to pick the job offer they found most attractive. Even when the proposed salary is higher and tax rate is lower, individuals hold a strong preference for remaining in the type of community they currently live, within their current state. Moreover, individuals hold strong regional biases towards their status quo communities. These place-based preferences manifest again in a second experiment, where we ask respondents to consider two potential neighbors who are thinking about moving to their current place of residence. We show that individuals want neighbors from similar places. Race, partisanship, and profession all influenced neighbor preference, but individuals wanted to live next to people coming from the same state as their own.

In both sets of experiments, place-based considerations are highest among those whom we identify as having stronger place-based resentment. We test for treatment heterogeneity by rural-ness and urban-ness and extend our understanding of place-based identity beyond rural-consciousness (Cramer 2016). In modeling individual preferences for certain types of places and state characteristics, this study does not argue why some individuals migrate and not others. However, in presenting respondents with a generalizable situation that implicates state politics and interstate competition, we are better able to understand the ways in which individuals express their affinity for distinct places on the map -- particularly in federal systems where that
diversity is reinforced by separate political authorities. Places are groups and individuals
preserve, nourish, and maintain them through the preferences they have over which type of
communities they reside in, as well as what type of individuals they welcome into their own
communities as neighbors.

VALUES IN AMERICA’S FEDERATED POLITICAL LANDSCAPE

Federalism is a politically reproductive system. By constitutionally ensuring the
representation of specific geographic jurisdictions in the political process, arbitrary lines on the
map take on meaningful symbolic value.

Most commonly, state boundaries are wrapped up in partisan imagery. Scholars have
long debated the extent to which individuals identify with their states, and it is a long-held truism
that over the course of American political development, the national government has
increasingly commanded greater loyalty as distinctions between the states declined (Elazar 1972;
Feeley and Rubin 2008). Yet, parties and their partisans routinely challenge the national
government, and partisans claim greater allegiance to their state when they are the minority at the
national level (Bulman-Pozen 2014). Additionally, since most individual attitudes are dependent
on the stated positions of political party elites, different and shifting patterns of party control
between the state and national government alter individuals' prior attitudes, including beliefs
about how active one's state government should be in crafting government policy (Carsey and
Layman 2006; Cohen 2003). Given the prominence of presidential campaigns in the
contemporary United States, and the institutional design of the Electoral College, states are
further classified along party lines (Barker and Carman 2012; Hanson 1980). And the structure
of party competition within the states further gives each state a particular partisan hue,
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influencing the extent to which citizens find their government responsive and their own votes efficacious (Wolak 2018; Flavin and Shufeldt 2016).

In addition to partisan, or overtly political symbols, states take on distinctive economic representations. States vary in terms of how economically prosperous their citizenry is, and in the value that they add to the country's economic vitality. Politicians are tuned into this variation, and political messages are laden with symbolic and factual distinctions that draw contrast between places and nurture state-identification: "If you look at the map of the United States," Hillary Clinton remarked following her loss in the 2016 Presidential Election, "there is all that red in the middle, places where Trump won. What that map doesn’t show you is that I won the places that own two thirds of America’s Gross Domestic product" (Hains 2018). Those economic distinctions are often the result of political choices and the policies that state officials pursue to attract citizens, businesses, and tax dollars. As such, competition between the states further solidifies the image of a distinctive political community along state lines, even in the absence of overt individual identification. Most generally, this variation in government policy is often the product of the population's aptitude to "vote with their feet" (Tiebout 1956). As described by a generation of scholars working in the public choice tradition, "the citizens' ability to vote with their feet and to take their talents and assets elsewhere [disciplines] government in the same way in which consumer choice, in nonmonopolistic markets, disciplines producers" (Greve 1999, 3; see also: Weingast 1995).

Nevertheless, in both instances, individual identification with a state is imaginable only if certain assumptions are held. In general, competitive models of federalism depend on a citizenry that is highly aware of disparate fiscal policies, or who see their state governments as special sites of resistance towards federal government policy. Moreover, both economic and partisan
connections to states are subject to short-term fluctuations and opportunistic posturing. In short, within each of these frameworks, we must expect a lot from residents, all of whom are thinking in similar, rational terms, in order to find a routine and present identification with place. However, Americans are not *Homo economicus* (Casson 1996, Zak 2010). The high standards of human rationality and economic motivation assumed in most theories that accept citizen attachment with their state neglect the broad lesson of public opinion research - that Americans are poorly informed about politics, and that their opinions on basic political questions vary significantly over time (Campbell, et al. 1960; Converse 1964; Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996; Converse 2000; Delli Carpini 2005; Lewis-Beck, et al. 2008). A variety of considerations factor into an individual's decision to move or stay, and this alters the calculus for what type of communities individuals create through formal (partisan) and informal (migration) processes in the federal system.

**IDENTITIES ROOTED IN PLACE**

Individuals are members of a variety of communities, but those that are rooted in geography have a special meaning and play a particular role in the United States given its federal structure. Missing from these dominant perspectives on federalism and American political geography is a recognition that for many Americans, *physical* space and the features of that space filter the impressions of political action that are geographically situated. Place is more than just a picture in one’s head – it is a personal and emotional attachment to the spaces where people work, play, and live, which in turn structures how we interpret political phenomenon that affect those spaces (Agnew 1987). To the extent that politically-charged and salient boundaries - most often, state borders - are used in politics, formal processes and elite messages intersect with these powerful predispositions.
Consequently, place acts as a cognitive heuristic similar to other forms of group-based identities, such as party, race, gender, and class. Place and context are prominent motivations in studies of voting behavior and candidate evaluations, given the electoral system’s reliance on borders for conducting campaigns and demarcating constituencies (Enos 2017). As Key (1949) claimed, a candidate garners support “not primarily for what he stands for or because of his capacities, but because of where he lives” (37). The theory that Americans vote for their "friends-and-neighbors" finds support in presidential elections (Lewis-Beck and Rice 1983), state-wide contests (Gimpel, et al. 2008; Bowler, Donovan, and Snipp 1993; Aspin and Hall 1987) and local elections (Brunk, Ramesh, and Adams 1988; Johnston 1974). Most recently, Panagopoulos, Leighley, and Hamel (2017) argue that place matters beyond a candidate’s ability to persuade future constituents: when candidates and citizens share a “home county,” individuals are actually more motivated to turn out and vote.

A sense of place involves, first, a psychological sense of attachment to a particular locale and the ways of life, symbolic value, and social interactions contained within that particular geography. And, a sense of place acts as an informational channel that helps connect personal circumstance to the broader, more abstract political domain (Conover 1984). Place only becomes a symbolically charged concept when individuals perceive their locale as socially meaningful (Osborne 2006). Myriad social, political, and economic interactions play out in a specific geographic area, and imbue locales with personalized meanings, producing psychological attachments (Hutchins and Stormer 2013; Williams et al., 2010). One person's "sense of place" is highly particularized, while the behaviors expected from those with a sense of place are generalizable and routine. The possibility for this group attachment is one avenue through which
American federalism could produce greater levels of citizen satisfaction with their governing system, and through which a distinctive identity with a state or locality emerges.

Scholars have dedicated most of their energies to exploring the information channeling effects of place-based identities. Most notably, in studying how voters in rural Wisconsin talk about and make sense of economic injustice in their day-to-day lives, Cramer (2016) argues that many of the people she encountered “used identities rooted in place and class… to structure the causal stories they told to each other…about the state of the economy before, during, and after the Great Recession,” possessing, as it were, a unique place-based, “rural consciousness” (6). In this way, identifying with others’ rural ways of life (intrinsically tied to a specific locale) helped individuals classify others as either being “one of us” or “one of them” (Tajfel 1981; Turner and Tajfel 1986). Drawing on a similar social-identity framework, Jacobs and Munis (2018) document how campaign advertisements that use specific place imagery, such as a city skyline or rural countryside, produce significant and substantive reactions from rural and urban residents - diminishing voters' trust and favorability towards political elites who are not from similar places. And Parker (2014) argues that these types of narratives and geographic connections are essential to the strategies members of Congress adopt in order to cultivate a "home-style" reputation with a subset of their larger constituency (see also, Fenno 1978).

EMPIRICAL IMPLICATIONS AND HYPOTHESES

In this study, we are particularly interested with how a connection to place intersects with economic priors -- the desire and willingness to migrate in order to take advantage of economic opportunities. We are interested in how a sense of place operates outside the voting booth, and manifests in politically significant ways, even when individuals share other social bonds, such as partisanship, race, and gender. We know that a sense of place filters political messages and helps
individuals make sense of their political world, but to what extent does individual attachment to a
place motivate other preferences and intersect with other priors, such as economic self-interest?

In a federal system, such as the United States, voting is augmented by other types of
politically consequential acts, including the decision to stay or leave a subnational, territorial
jurisdiction. We hypothesize that the decision to stay or exit a political jurisdiction is a
consequence of an individual's sense of place, and that place-based identities operate as an
additional constraint on individual action, independent of economic circumstance or partisan
preference. In this way, attachment to a particular locale and a particular way of life in that locale
matters for how Americans interact with their governments, especially at the state level, in these
three ways:

*The Reaffirmation of Place* -- Hypothesis 1A: The likelihood of a respondent choosing a
prospective new community decreases as the distance between the prospective new community
and the respondent’s own current community increases. Hypothesis 1B: The likelihood of a
respondent choosing a prospective new neighbor decreases as the distance between the
prospective new neighbors place of origin and the respondent’s own current community
increases.

*The "Pull" of Place* -- Hypothesis 2A: The likelihood of a prospective job being selected will be
lower when it is located in a community unlike the respondent’s (along the urban-rural
continuum). Hypothesis 2B: Respondents who harbor high levels of place resentment will be
especially likely to show a strong preference for jobs in communities like their own.
The "Push" of Place -- Hypothesis 3A: The likelihood of a prospective neighbor being selected will be lower when they are from communities unlike the respondent’s (along the urban-rural continuum). Hypothesis 3B: Respondents who harbor high levels of place resentment will be especially likely to show a strong preference for neighbors from their own.

First, we predict that Americans, on average, will prefer living in places like the ones they currently live, and will feel constrained to remain in or near their current place of residence. This constraint exists even when the chances for a significant economic opportunity might pull individuals away from their state or region. In this way place matters for the prospects of exit in a federal system, regardless of whether individuals have a strong sense of place, or are overtly conscious of the unique aspects of their geographic community. Place has a reaffirming quality, insofar as it keeps individuals from leaving, even when political or economic situations vary.

Place takes on greater importance among those who have a well-defined attachment to a particular locale, or who clearly recognize the distinguishing attributes of their geographic community. Given the general tendency in most public opinion scholarship to take the individual as the unit of analysis and aggregate upwards in nationally-representative samples, contextual differences are often drowned out by the vast amount of "place-lessness" that many Americans experience (Ogorzalek 2019). Measures of an individual's "sense of place" must therefore both appreciate the geo-sociological organization of individuals and the sources of their mass opinion, while retaining the methodological individualism of most behavioral research (Agnew 1996). By asking individuals about places and their inherent value, we can measure variation in individuals' senses of place (a generalizable impression) while accounting for their individualized experience in developing a unique sense of place. By a sense of place, we seek to
understand how individuals use geographic divisions to make sense of the following four considerations:

1. The distribution of political power within respondent's state;
2. The deservingness of different communities in respondent's state;
3. The appreciation for people who choose to stay in communities unlike their own;
4. The evaluation of work-habits and the economic worth of different places.

Individuals who are more attuned to the distributional, cultural, and political distinctiveness of their own communities will behave differently than those who are unattached or unaware of their community's unique features and ways of life. In this way, individuals living in the same locale, or place, can have very different senses of place. The "push" and "pull" of geography will matter more or less for those individuals as a result. Those with higher levels of place-consciousness will be less likely to leave their community bound for one of fundamentally different character, and more likely to desire neighbors from locales like the one in which they live.

Place is not mere space. Migration scholars have long noted that distance matters in individual-level calculations over where to move; arithmetic space imposes tangible burdens on would-be migrants, even within the same country (Spring, Tolnay, and Crowder 2016; Greenwood 1975). However, places farther away may feel closer to home, and in symbolizing distinct ways of living, we argue that our measures of place and place-based resentment capture more than the rational costs imposed by distance, or even the homogenization of labor markets and economic opportunities (Kaplan and Schulhofer-Wohl 2012). Place is a perception, often divorced from objective measurements used by social scientists; place names are symbolically charged, and politicians draw sharp lines between those living "here" and the other "over there."
Likewise, we know that social networks -- the presence of like-minded communities and familial connections -- drive migration patterns and create a patchwork of immigrant communities, both internationally and domestically (Haug 2008; Boyd 1989). In emphasizing place, we do not mean to discount the particularized experiences individuals enjoy from proximate relationships, or the power of familiarity and informal information channels. Rather, we emphasize the broader narratives people weave for themselves about the larger political communities in which they live, the different ways politicians treat those jurisdictions, and the distinct attributes of those places that are specific to a unique spot on the map (Cramer 2012).

EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN

In order to determine whether and to what extent place-based social identity, or a sense of place, affects an individual's propensity to exit a political jurisdiction, we must isolate the geographic nature of a "place" from other economic, social, or political attributes. Individuals, in other words, choose to join communities for many different reasons, including the political and economic decisions reached by local and state governments. To the extent that a sense of place operates independently of those decisions, and commands a loyalty irrespective of economic circumstance, it is necessary to disentangle these intersecting concepts. A conjoint experiment permits us to pinpoint preferences for various attributes tied up in individuals' senses of place. There are three chief advantages that conjoint experiments can boast relative to more conventional observational econometric techniques:

1. They task respondents with a more realistic multidimensional decision space wherein multiple different potential decision criteria are randomly varied simultaneously by the researcher;
2. Relative to other approaches, they help mitigate both social desirability bias and demand effects (Caruso, Rahnev and Banaji 2009);

3. They provide for causal inference (Hainmueller, Hopkins and Yamamoto 2014).

We ran two conjoint experiments to test the three hypotheses; screenshots of the experimental design are available in the supplemental appendix. In the first experiment, we told respondents that "it is not uncommon for people in the United States to move from one place to the next in search of a better job or lifestyle" and that "people move for a variety of reasons: personal, work, lifestyle preference." We presented them with two potential job offers that might require them to move. We then asked them to select which job offer they found more attractive.

In presenting the two job offers, we randomly varied three economic factors that likely influence individuals' decisions to move. The prospective salary of each offer took on a random value between $30,000 and $80,000. The number of employees (firm size) took on a random value between five and 200. And the average home price in the surrounding community was set between $100,000 and $500,000. Finally, in order to test the attractiveness of small government, we suggested that the average tax rate paid by county residents (not specific to any government) was between 15 and 40 percent. Respondents evaluated those four fictionalized criteria alongside five geographic attributes from a real place in the United States. Drawing from a list of 38,211 ZIP codes (excluding government and U.S. military identifiers), we constructed an API that randomly displayed a unique, factual combination of a place's state name, county name, population, and population density for each job offer. We also included considerations of race and partisan politics. Specifically, we showed respondents the percentage of county residents who identified as white, the percentage who had a college degree, and the percentage that voted for Donald Trump in the 2016 U.S. Presidential Election. Data for county-level demographics
were taken from the U.S. Census, while the presidential vote share was collected by David Leip’s Atlas of Presidential Elections.

Counties vary in size and scale across the United States, and it is certainly the case that in some regions, the county takes on little political or cultural relevance. However, by presenting job offers in a specific county, we were able to use factual demographic, political, and economic data combined from several sources. This cuts down on the artificial nature of the experiment and presents opportunities to respondents that might actually exist outside the survey environment. It provides a more specific set of considerations than if we were to present offers at the state-level. Importantly, it also allows us to maximize variation between urban and rural areas within states, as opposed to between them. In addition, by drawing a random ZIP code, the probability of seeing a specific place is weighted by population size, although it is not perfectly proportionate. However, it was more likely to see a job offer in counties with higher populations.

The second conjoint experiment operated with a similar logic. Instead of asking respondents to consider two potential job opportunities though, we asked them to consider two potential neighbors who were thinking about moving to their community. To be sure, Americans rarely have an actual say in who their neighbors will be, and potential neighbors are largely free to move to communities regardless of underlying prejudice or resentment in the area. However, we argue that if a distinct preference for neighbors from a particular locale emerges, then we are capturing an attitude that influences individuals' decision-making process when they choose communities to move into and leave; it is a secondary measure of the same cognitive process measured in the first experiment.

As with the job offers, the two potential neighbors were from a specific location in the United States, identified by drawing a random ZIP code. Each neighbor choice displayed the
place name, population, population density, and the percentage of the county that voted for Donald Trump. In addition to these four geo-specific attributes, we randomly varied the potential neighbors' names, ages, race, sex, professions, and marital status. Believing that by explicitly pointing out the prospective neighbors’ sex and race, we might distort responses, we used the respondent name to convey this information. We identified the most commonly used surnames and given names among whites, blacks, and Latino-Americans, using the U.S. Census' name survey. We chose names that were racially unambiguous (over 90 percent of instances were confined to a single race) and common (highest number of indications), so that respondents could more easily discern the race and sex of the potential neighbor. A more detailed description of these attributes is available at the end of the manuscript in Tables A1 and A2.

For both experiments, respondents were presented with five pairs of potential job offers or five pairs of potential neighbors. This was a forced choice conjoint. Additionally, it is important to point out that at several moments during the course of the experiment, we primed respondents with place-specific information pertaining to their current county of residence. We incorporated or "micro-tailored" the prompts and instructions to the respondent's county and state of residence. We also displayed the respondent's county's population density, since this measure is not always the most intuitive to grasp; having a comparison number allows respondents to at least figure out if the potential job or neighbor was in or from an area of higher or lower population density.

Our first hypothesis models the effect of each attribute regardless of respondent characteristics. Since hypotheses two and three require us to measure an individual's sense of place, we immediately presented respondents with a four-question battery following the final hypothetical set of job offers or potential neighbors. We asked respondents to consider where
they lived, worked, and spent most of their time and had them choose whether they were “very urban,” “somewhat urban,” “more urban than rural,” “more rural than urban,” “somewhat rural,” or “very rural.” We then asked respondents whether they agreed or disagreed with a series of statements which were also micro-tailored to their state of residence and their own place perception (rural or urban). Table 1 details the measure of place-identity. By conditioning the question wording to each respondent’s particular state, we narrow respondents’ considerations to those issues most intimately related to the place-based divisions within their specific geographical context. There is a difference between Californians feeling attached to Los Angeles or San Francisco and feeling disconnected with nearby rural areas, versus Californians appreciating city life in general, and its distinction from rural ways of life. As such, we believe that by priming state of residence, we better capture place-based identities that are truly local or constrained in geographic scope.

[INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE]

We measure place resentment with a battery of four questions, which are listed in Table 1. Respondents indicated the extent to which they agreed with each item (captured by a 5 pt. Likert scale). We combined these four items additively and then normalized them on a scale of 0 to 1. Our measure is approximately normally distributed (mean = 0.53, median = 0.5, s.d. = 0.21). To facilitate subgroup analyses, we constructed a four-category variable of place resentment (rural high, rural low, urban high, urban low) using the 75th percentile (value = 0.69) to distinguish those with “high” place resentment from those others.

The survey was administered on March 3, 2019 between 9:00 a.m. and 5:00 p.m. using Lucid – a new but reputable market research firm whose panels readily facilitate collecting compositionally representative non-probability samples of the American public. In a recent
study, Coppock and McClellan (2019) find that Lucid samples benchmark well with highly regarded samples used in political science research, including the American National Election Study, Cooperative Congressional Election Study, and others. A total of 1,192 individuals were solicited across the two experiments and paid $1.00 for a completed survey, which took an average of 5.2 minutes to complete. Given the refined, subtle nature of our treatment condition, we are not concerned with the nature of our respondent pool, even though on many demographic criteria, our sample mirrors some of the better randomized samples in the discipline (see Table A3 in the Appendix). Like many convenience samples, the sample was younger, more racially diverse, and better educated. However, there was significant variation among respondents’ perceptions of place; 36.75 percent of respondents indicated that they lived in a rural area. The rural sample was whiter, more Republican, and less educated than the urban sub-group (see Table A4 in the Appendix).

RESULTS

We estimate marginal means in order to analyze our conjoint data. Multiple scholars have argued that marginal means are the appropriate estimate for researchers interested in preferences for different attribute levels of objects being evaluated, rather than the individual causal effects of attribute levels on the likelihood that a profile is selected. This is especially the case for researchers who are interested subgroup preferences, as we are here in considering varying levels of place type and place-based consciousness (Leeper et al. 2018; Clayton et al. 2019). In the marginal means plots, the x-axis corresponds to how likely jobs featuring each specific profile attribute level were to be chosen. In other words, in the context of a forced choice conjoint design, the marginal mean of an attribute level represents the average level of favorability for profiles featuring that particular attribute level, averaged over all levels of other attributes. A
vertical line is plotted at 0.5 as a marginal mean estimate of 0.5 would indicate that profiles with that particular feature were chosen roughly half of the time. Therefore, estimates above or below 0.5 suggest that profiles featuring that attribute level were more or less likely to be chosen. If the confidence interval does not span 0.5, we can conclude that profiles featuring that particular attribute level were significantly more/less likely to be chosen.

We coded each set of decisions relative to the respondent's own geographic location, so that states where potential neighbors were from and job offers were located were identified as being the same as the respondent's state, in an adjacent state, in the same geographic region, or in a more distant geographic region; this is the geographic-attachment attribute. We also coded population density along a three-category measure so that potential jobs and neighbors from places with less than 50 persons per square mile were classified as rural, those between 50-150 suburban, and any place about 150 persons per square mile as urban.

Place Reaffirmation

First, we direct our attention to whether respondents exhibit preferences for jobs based upon location. In particular, we are interested in whether respondents demonstrate a preference for jobs based upon their geographical attachment to their current location, even when navigating a multidimensional decision space featuring a litany of competing considerations. As highlighted above, these competing considerations include material concerns such as job salary, real estate prices, and tax rates, as well as political (percentage 2016 presidential vote won by Trump in the prospective community), social (percentage of the prospective community that is white and college educated), and mundane considerations related to the work place (number of employees). The marginal means displayed in Figure 1 support our first hypothesis (Hypothesis 1A). In particular, the marginal means associated with four levels of the geographic attachment job
attribute indicate that jobs in the same state as respondents’ current places of residence were significantly more likely to be chosen than jobs in other locations. The estimated marginal mean associated with jobs in the same region as the respondent also suggest that these jobs were more preferred, though the confidence interval spans 0.5 and, thus, we are unable to confidently conclude that these jobs were preferred to jobs in more distant regions. Nevertheless, these results provide strong evidence that distance from current residence is an important criterion that individuals consider when thinking about moving for their career, even when weighed alongside other considerations such as salary.

While interesting, the finding that people prefer job offers that are geographically proximate to their current location does not rule out alternative explanations to psychological attachments to place that is the focus of our theory. Indeed, a plausible explanation for why people may prefer geographically proximate job offers is that they dread the prospect of being burdened by a costly cross country move. And a preference for remaining in a state might be tied to social and group ties that are not necessarily related to an individual’s sense of place. To address this ambiguity, we turn now to Hypothesis 1B to assess whether respondents exhibit a similar proximity bias when selecting which neighbors they would prefer to join their community. As hypothesized, the estimated marginal means for the four levels the geographic attachment attribute reveal that respondents were significantly more likely to indicate that they favored prospective neighbors who were from their same state and, to a lesser extent, the same region as themselves. Furthermore, the magnitude (i.e., how far the marginal mean deviates from 0.5) of these estimates is noteworthy, being considerably larger than those estimated for any other attribute level. Altogether, our tests of Hypotheses 1A and 1B provide evidence that strongly suggests that, in ideal scenarios where individuals have a high degree of control over
such matters, Americans seek to reaffirm their place both in terms of the communities they choose to join in search of work, as well as the people they welcome into their own communities as neighbors.

[INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE]

[INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE]

Place's Pull

Next, we assessed whether respondents reveal systematic preferences for prospective jobs in communities like their own. In particular, we are interested in whether respondents exhibit a demonstrable place-based bias along the urban-rural dimension. First, we tested Hypothesis 2A’s prediction that jobs in communities unlike the respondents’ will be less likely to be selected. To assess this hypothesis, we direct our attention to the marginal means estimates associated with the various levels of the “Job Population Density” attribute in Figure 3. We find strong evidence in support of Hypothesis 2A. Jobs in rural locations were significantly less likely to be preferred by urban respondents, whereas jobs in urban locations were significantly less likely to be preferred by rural respondents. Moreover, rural respondents exhibited a significant preference for jobs in rural locations, though the preference for urban jobs among urbanites in our sample did not achieve statistical significance. Overall, it appears that both urban and rural respondents experience the “pull” of place – gravitating toward places they likely perceive as more familiar while avoiding jobs located in communities unlike their own.

Results supporting Hypothesis 2A suggest that both urban and rural individuals, as whole, experience the pull of place. We also expect that the pull of place might be especially strong for those high in place-based consciousness. In particular, we suggest that urban and rural residents who had higher levels of resentment towards rural and urban areas, respectively, should behave similarly.
Figure 4 plots the marginal means for each attribute level disaggregated by place resentment (high and low rural resentment as well as high and low urban resentment). The estimates plotted in Figure 4 reveal mixed evidence regarding Hypothesis 2B. As predicted, rural respondents who harbor high levels of resentment toward urbanites (“Rural high” in Figure 4) are more likely than less resentful rural respondents to prefer jobs in rural areas, as well as less likely to prefer jobs in urban areas. Indeed, among those rural respondents with the highest levels of place-based resentment, the pull of rural areas was just as influential as a high salary.

We do not, however, find a similar pattern amongst urban respondents who harbor high levels of resentment toward rural people. Those with the highest levels of urban resentment were principally motivated by economic considerations (salary, home price, and a low tax rate). Interestingly, those with lower levels of urban resentment were more prone to consider geographic considerations than those who scored higher on our place-identity scale. Those with lower levels of urban resentment had a statistically strong preference for remaining in their current state of residence, and a distaste for taking jobs in rural areas.

[INSERT FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE]

[INSERT FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE]

Place’s Push

We then examined whether respondents also feel the “push of place.” In other words, we tested Hypothesis 3A to determine whether respondents reveal an aversion to people from places unlike their own. Results plotted in Figure 5 mostly support Hypothesis 3A. Rural respondents were significantly less likely to prefer prospective neighbors who came from urban areas, and urban respondents were less likely to be prefer potential neighbors that came from rural areas, though not significantly so. Nevertheless, urbanites had a strong distaste for neighbors that came
from communities where a large majority of residents voted for Donald Trump, and they had a revealing preference for neighbors that came from the same state as the one in which they lived. Prospective rural neighbor profiles were significantly more likely to be preferred by rural voters, and the data suggest that rural residents have a similar preference for individuals coming from their own state, although the relatively small number of rural respondents inflates the confidence intervals for that estimate and pushes it just beyond the 0.50 threshold.

Lastly, we tested Hypothesis 3B to determine whether those who harbor high degrees of place-based resentment were especially likely to feel the push of place. Results indicate that, contrary to expectations, those high in place resentment are not especially likely to experience the push of place (see Figure 6). Higher levels or urban and rural resentment are unassociated with most potential neighbor attributes and none of the geographic-specific qualities, such as state of residence. Those with high levels of rural resentment have a statistically significant preference for white, married individuals, and do not prefer to live next to Latinos. Where the data suggest some preference for rural residents, there is no discernable difference between those with higher and lower levels of rural resentment. Together, results presented in Figures 5 and 6 suggest that the push of place is experienced rather broadly, particularly amongst the rural subpopulation, and is not narrowly confined to those who harbor high levels of resentment towards places unlike their own.

[INSERT FIGURE 5 ABOUT HERE]

[INSERT FIGURE 6 ABOUT HERE]

CONCLUSION

We often discuss federated arrangements of power without drawing reference to the communal, or cultural, distinctions individuals impose on themselves -- emphasizing instead the
fiscal, constitutional, and administrative relations among the general government and its constituent parts. Yet, at its foundational core, those differences are reflections of citizen preference and choice. American federalism creates divisions and it also allows residents, through the ability to move and create new communities of interest to reaffirm those divisions. Martha Derthick (2001) goes so far as to argue that “the social functions of federalism may be more significant than the political and governmental ones...[and] unless federalism does sustain communities that feel themselves to be such, it is hard to justify” (84-85).

Taken together, attitudes motivating the "pull" and the "push" of America's geographic diversity showcase the importance of place as a discrete behavioral phenomenon -- one with important implications for understanding the political power individuals have in federated systems (Lee 1966). As we find, Americans have disparate preferences for the types of communities in which they want to reside, and the types of neighbors they want joining those communities. Moreover, these attitudes, while susceptible to politicization, are distinguishable from other political or economic preferences, and comprise an individual's unique sense of place.

As we document, individual bonds with a specific place are tied up with the political sub-jurisdictions that comprise American federalism -- the states. Individuals, rural and urban, prefer to stay in their state and even prefer neighbors from their own state. Within the states, clear preferences for urban and rural communities also emerge. It is remarkable, too, that such a distinct preference for "urban" or "rural" materializes alongside variables that capture a range of meaningful differences between those areas. The image or symbolic representation of a place holds a value that is distinguishable from economic self-interest, or the desire to sort oneself into a certain partisan community. In preferring communities like their own, rural residents, and those high with rural-resentment, were indeed much more likely to prefer communities that were, on
average, whiter, less-educated, and where residents overwhelming preferred the election of President Trump – findings consistent with recent work on the social sorting of American politics (Mason 2018). Yet, "ruralness" captured something distinctive about these communities that rural-residents preferred, and urban-residents disdained. Far from refuting or denying the prospects for competitive federalism, we contend that these attitudes, contingent on place-based distinctions, set a hard, cultural constraint on national action (Bednar, Eskridge, and Ferejohn 2001). More generally, the evidence confirms how readily attitudes about place intersect with other social or political identities, including partisanship. The rational and socially detached democratic individual is a misnomer (Achen and Bartels 2016). Individuals make sense of their political world by the people they connect with and the groups they form (Conover 1984). And many of those connections are still spatially defined and constitutionally protected by federal assurances.

There is the possibility that, as measured, these behavioral dynamics might also exist in unitary systems, or in regimes exhibiting higher degrees of governmental centralization than what is found in the United States. We can imagine that the Frenchman living in his small village looks upon Paris with equal disdain and has an analogous aversion to moving to the metropole. But the United States resolves those tensions with federalism; whether that is a superior institutional arrangement is an open question - one this study cannot answer. Yet, as a growing number of scholars emphasize how American political attitudes have nationalized, the implication is that the behavioral foundations for its federal system have weakened. We suggest that, in contrast, place-specific identities remain robust and meaningful. Their influence on political processes are often subtle, and below the surface of national political conversation; institutional analysis that compares the effectiveness of unitary versus federated systems, or their
contribution to polarizing attitudes should recognize the various ways in which these place-based identities manifest in a variety of political situations.

As with all survey experiments, the definitive test of our theory is realized in the actual decisions individuals reach about how to behave. Here, there is no substitute for documenting the movement of individuals from one place to another. States in the Northeast and Upper-Midwest are rapidly losing population, and those population losses are disproportionately heavy in rural communities within those states (U.S. Census 2018b). To the extent that much of this internal migration is driven by national economic restructuring and the competition between states over revenues and obligations, there is little gainsaying that an individual's attachment to a particular place can be easily subsumed by economic need. Yet, too much focus on movement neglects the importance of individuals' decisions to stay in a particular place, and the political relevance of those decisions. In choosing to remain, a sense of place becomes a powerful political instrument that is first channeled through the states.

We are surprised that variation among those with high and low levels of resentment were often indistinguishable in the selection of job opportunities, and non-existent in preference for neighbors. The resentment battery has successfully modeled variation in vote choice (Authors, Forthcoming) among rural and urban residents. One possibility is that those high in place-based resentment are welcoming to outsiders, if they are sincere in their commitment to move to a new type of community; in effect, in the minds of those living in rural or urban areas, potential neighbors shed any pretense of urban or rural superiority, respectively, when they decide to join. We also concede that resentment is only one way to capture place-based identities. Future work, including replication studies, might consider alternatives, such as those widely used in environmental psychology (see, for example, Hernandez et al. 2007, Lalli 1992).
Nevertheless, it is often when an attachment to place bleeds into resentment and prejudice against those from people from "over there" that place-based identities translate to competing policy proposals and disparate partisan support. Rural anger -- and potentially suburban and urban anger -- is a hallmark of growing populist discontent in the American public. While certain features of American politics are clearly nationalized, those nationalizing trends exist within a governmental framework that imposes recurrent divisions on geographic communities, and which channels that anger. Therefore, among many individuals, nationalized media and nationalized partisan appeals may, in fact, reinforce place-based resentment. In short, we argue that, particularly among students of American federalism, scholars should recognize the myriad ways in which spatial identities inform the attitudes that contribute to the patchwork of local, state, and intergovernmental political processes. More work is needed, too, on the sources of these beliefs, and the ways in which they intersect with well-documented trends in economic sectionalism and geographic polarization. To the extent that political elites play upon these divisions, place-based identities are another dimension in the partisan and ideological polarization that defines the current era of American politics (Mason 2018; Conlan and Posner 2016), but it is not clear whether these behaviors are emergent, or are simply more visible in a political context viewed through a national lens.
REFERENCES


Coppock, Alexander, and Oliver A. McClellan. 2019. Validating the demographic, political, psychological, and experimental results obtained from a new source of online survey respondents. *Research & Politics*. Published online: https://doi.org/10.1177/2053168018822174


STAYING IN PLACE


Figure 1: Job Attribute Level Marginal Means -- Reaffirmation of Place
Figure 2: Neighbor Attribute Level Marginal Means -- Reaffirmation of Place
Figure 3: Job Attribute Level Marginal Means by Respondent Place Type -- Pull of Place
Figure 4: Job Attribute Level Marginal Means by Respondent Place Resentment -- Pull of Place
Figure 5: Neighbor Attribute Level Marginal Means by Respondent Place Type -- Push of Place
Figure 6: Neighbor Attribute Level Marginal Means by Respondent Place Resentment -- Push of Place
Table 1: Measuring Place-Based Identity

Do you agree or disagree with the following statements:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Urban Respondent</th>
<th>Rural Respondent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Q1: Political Equity</strong></td>
<td>Rural areas have too much say in [Respondent State] politics.</td>
<td>Big cities have too much say in [Respondent State] politics.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Q2: Deservingness</strong></td>
<td>Over the past few years cities in [Respondent State] have gotten less than what they deserve.</td>
<td>Over the past few years rural communities in [Respondent State] have gotten less than what they deserve.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Q3: Affect</strong></td>
<td>We wouldn’t have to waste tax dollars bailing out rural places if people just moved away.</td>
<td>We wouldn’t have to waste tax dollars bailing out big cities if people just moved away.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Q4: Self-Reliance</strong></td>
<td>When cities are hit by bad times, people living there solve problems on their own. The state and federal government shouldn’t give rural areas and small towns special favors.</td>
<td>When rural places are hit by bad times, people living there solve problems on their own. The state and federal government shouldn’t give big cities special favors.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Staying in Place:
Federalism and the Political Economy of Place Attachment

Supplemental Appendix

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Survey Design

We want to know why people move.

People move all the time. They move across the country. They move across town.

One of the main reasons people move is because of job opportunities. Another reason is because they want to live a different kind of life.

We want to know your thoughts on moving.

In order to better understand your thoughts, we would like to know where you currently live, so please enter your 5-digit ZIP Code.

We will not retain this information. We will only use it in this survey to ask you questions specific to where you live.

Thank you for agreeing to take this survey.

By clicking "Next" you are confirming that you currently live in Maine

Yes, I live in Maine

No, I live in another state.
It is not uncommon for people in the United States to move from one place to the next in search of a better job or lifestyle. People move for a variety of reasons: personal, work, lifestyle preference.

We would like to know what you think about moving to other places in the United States.

Imagine that you are looking for a new job. Below are two job offers. Based on all the information provided, IF you had to choose one, which would it be?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Offer A</th>
<th>Offer B</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Raleigh, West Virginia</td>
<td>Fairfax, Virginia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salary</td>
<td>$44,583</td>
<td>$49,358</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Employees</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>173</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>County Population</td>
<td>77,335 people live in Raleigh County</td>
<td>1,142,197 people live in Fairfax County</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population Per Square Mile</td>
<td>128 residents per sq. mile. This makes Raleigh a Slightly Urban Area</td>
<td>2,922 residents per sq. mile. This makes Fairfax a Very Urban Area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average Home Price</td>
<td>$145,690</td>
<td>$386,522</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of Residents with a College Degree</td>
<td>18.15 %</td>
<td>60.26 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent County White</td>
<td>88.74 %</td>
<td>66.4 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent Residents Voted for President Trump</td>
<td>73.76 %</td>
<td>28.61 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average Tax Rate for County Residents</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A. The Job in Raleigh, West Virginia

B. The Job in Fairfax, Virginia
Here are two other job offers.

Based on all the information provided, if you had to choose one, which would it be?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Offer A</th>
<th>Offer B</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Location</strong></td>
<td>White, Illinois</td>
<td>Barron, Wisconsin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Salary</strong></td>
<td>$36,145</td>
<td>$48,742</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Number of Employees</strong></td>
<td>78</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>County Population</strong></td>
<td>14,202 people live in White County</td>
<td>45,368 people live in Barron County</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Population Per Square Mile</strong></td>
<td>29 residents per sq. mile. This makes White a Slightly Suburban Area</td>
<td>53 residents per sq. mile. This makes Barron a Slightly Suburban Area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Average Home Price</strong></td>
<td>$399,149</td>
<td>$202,838</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Percent of Residents with a College Degree</strong></td>
<td>13.73 %</td>
<td>18.21 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Percent County White</strong></td>
<td>97.67 %</td>
<td>95.91 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Percent Residents Voted for President Trump</strong></td>
<td>76.89 %</td>
<td>60.05 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Average Tax Rate for County Residents</strong></td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A. The Job in White, Illinois

B. The Job in Barron, Wisconsin
Neighbors

It is not uncommon for people in the United States to move from one place to the next in search of a better job or lifestyle. But, with all of this moving going on, many people would like to have some say over who moves into their community.

We would like you to think about people who want to move to where you live: Kennebec, Maine.

Imagine that the two people below are considering moving to your neighborhood. Based on all the information provided, if you had to choose one, who would it be?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Potential Neighbor A</th>
<th>Potential Neighbor B</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Latoya Jackson</td>
<td>Meagan Smith</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marital Status</td>
<td>Married</td>
<td>Single with children</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Profession</td>
<td>Local Government</td>
<td>Local Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Current Residence</td>
<td>Milwaukee, Wisconsin</td>
<td>Roosevelt, New Mexico</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population of Current Residence</td>
<td>958,859 people live in Milwaukee County</td>
<td>19,064 people live in Roosevelt County</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population per square mile of Current Residence</td>
<td>3,971 residents per sq. mile</td>
<td>8 residents per sq. mile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of Population at Current Residence who voted for President Trump</td>
<td>28.58 %</td>
<td>65.28 %</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A. Latoya Jackson

B. Meagan Smith
Now imagine that the two people below are considering moving to your neighborhood.

Based on all the information provided, IF you had to choose one, who would it be?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Potential Neighbor A</th>
<th>Potential Neighbor B</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Susan Davis</td>
<td>Jed Miller</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marital Status</td>
<td>Married with children</td>
<td>Single</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Profession</td>
<td>Attorney</td>
<td>Attorney</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Current Residence</td>
<td>El Paso, Colorado</td>
<td>LaSalle, Illinois</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population of Current Residence</td>
<td>672,453 people live in El Paso County</td>
<td>111,077 people live in LaSalle County</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population per square mile of Current Residence</td>
<td>316 residents per sq. mile</td>
<td>98 residents per sq. mile</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Percent of Population at Current Residence who voted for President Trump | 56.19 % | 53.65 %

A. Susan Davis

B. Jed Miller
Measuring Place-Based Resentment/Identity

Thank you for your responses.

We now have a few questions about you.

Thinking about your home, where you work, and where you spend most of your time, would you say that you live in an urban location, a rural location, or someplace in between?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Option</th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
<th>Somewhat Agree</th>
<th>Neither Agree nor Disagree</th>
<th>Somewhat Disagree</th>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>very urban</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>somewhat urban</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>more urban than rural</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>more rural than urban</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>somewhat rural</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>very rural</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Rural Respondent)

Please tell us whether you agree or disagree with the following statements:

- Over the past few years rural communities in Maine have gotten less than what they deserve.
- When rural places are hit by bad times, people living there solve problems on their own. The state and federal government shouldn't give big cities special favors.
- We wouldn't have to waste tax dollars bailing out big cities if people just moved away.
- Cities and the people who live in them make all of Maine a better place to live.
- Big cities have too much say in Maine politics.
(Urban Respondent)

Please tell us whether you agree or disagree with the following statements

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
<th>Somewhat Agree</th>
<th>Neither agree nor disagree</th>
<th>Somewhat Disagree</th>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rural areas have too much say in Virginia politics</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>We wouldn’t have to waste tax dollars bailing out rural places if people just moved away.</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small towns and the people who live in and around them make all of Virginia a better place to live.</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>When cities are hit by bad times, people living there solve problems on their own. The state and federal government shouldn’t give rural areas and small towns special favors.</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Over the past few years cities in Virginia have gotten less than what they deserve.</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attribute</td>
<td>Option 1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Random U.S. ZIP, Corresponding County and State</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salary</td>
<td>Random Integer between 30,000 and 80,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employees</td>
<td>Random Integer between 5 and 200</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>County Population</td>
<td>U.S. Census Data</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population per Square Mile</td>
<td>U.S. Census Data</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average Home Price</td>
<td>Random Integer between 100,000 and 500,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of the County White</td>
<td>U.S. Census Data</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of Residents Voted for President Trump</td>
<td>David Leip’s U.S. Atlas Data</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average Tax Rate for County Residents</td>
<td>Random Integer between 15 and 40</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attribute</td>
<td>Option 1</td>
<td>Option 2</td>
<td>Option 3</td>
<td>Option 4</td>
<td>Option 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Race/Sex</td>
<td>White/Male</td>
<td>White/Female</td>
<td>Black/Male</td>
<td>Black/Female</td>
<td>Latino/Male</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Potential Names</td>
<td>Jed Miller/Meagan Smith</td>
<td>Roosevelt Jones/Leslie</td>
<td>Tomeka Williams/Latoya</td>
<td>Santos Martinez/Rosio</td>
<td>Rosio Rodriguez/Rosaura</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>Random Integer between</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>25 and 65</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marital Status</td>
<td>Single</td>
<td>Single with children</td>
<td>Married</td>
<td>Married with children</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Profession</td>
<td>Attorney</td>
<td>School Teacher</td>
<td>Accountant</td>
<td>Local Government</td>
<td>Service Industry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population of Current Residence</td>
<td>U.S. Census Data</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population Per Square Mile</td>
<td>U.S. Census Data</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Current Residence</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of Current Residence</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population Who Voted for Trump</td>
<td></td>
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</table>
Table A3: Survey Sample Statistics

<table>
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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>&quot;Job Offer&quot; Experiment</th>
<th>&quot;Neighbors&quot; Experiment</th>
<th>ANES 2016 Pilot Study</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>45.16</td>
<td>45.99</td>
<td>48.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Male</td>
<td>56.41</td>
<td>58.11</td>
<td>47.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% White</td>
<td>74.25</td>
<td>71.08</td>
<td>72.91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% College Degree</td>
<td>44.31</td>
<td>49.83</td>
<td>35.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Republican</td>
<td>41.24</td>
<td>40.32</td>
<td>32.08</td>
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<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>608</td>
<td>585</td>
<td>1,200</td>
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</tbody>
</table>


Table A4: Sample Demographics by Respondent Place of Residence, both experiments

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<th></th>
<th>Urban</th>
<th>Rural</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>43.81</td>
<td>48.52</td>
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<tr>
<td>% Male</td>
<td>58.89</td>
<td>54.94</td>
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<tr>
<td>% White</td>
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<td>80.79</td>
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<tr>
<td>% College Degree</td>
<td>50.53</td>
<td>40.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Republican</td>
<td>36.80</td>
<td>47.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>305</td>
<td>322</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>