

Andrew Werner

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EMPLOYMENT

2017-Now Post-Graduate Preceptor in the Masters of Arts Program in the Humanities,
University of Chicago

EDUCATION

Ph.D. University of Chicago | Chicago, IL | Department of Philosophy, *Defended May 26, 2017*
Committee: Robert Pippin (chair); Jason Bridges; Paul Franks (Yale); Wolfram Gobsch (Leipzig)

Stanford University | Palo Alto, CA | Department of Philosophy Visiting Scholar (2015-16)

B.A. Amherst College | Amherst, MA | Department of Philosophy (Honors), 2010

DISSERTATION

“Hegel’s Speculative Method”

With what right do we believe that our thoughts can be objectively valid, can determine how things are and not merely how things seem to us? On prevailing views, Hegel answers this Kantian question by rejecting some part of Kant’s account of ordinary, truth-tracking knowledge. In contrast, I argue that Hegel defends Kant’s account of such knowledge, and that he distinguishes, within it, between analytic and synthetic judgments. He departs from Kant in offering a new account of philosophical knowledge, in which the two forms of judgment, analytic and synthetic, are united. Philosophical knowledge *analyzes* what is contained in the mere concept of the world. The result of this analysis is a *synthesis* by which we advance to another concept. The advance yields the laws that determine what we think, and it enables us to grasp those laws as constituting the nature of the world, thereby ensuring their objective validity. I thereby show how Hegel thinks philosophy can explain the possibility of ordinary knowledge.

AREAS OF SPECIALIZATION

Kant and German Idealism
20th Century French Philosophy

AREAS OF COMPETENCE

19-20th Century German Philosophy (esp. Nietzsche, Kierkegaard, Marx, Heidegger)
Early Analytic Philosophy
Ancient Philosophy
Ethics

PUBLICATIONS

2017 “Hegel on Kant’s Analytic/Synthetic Distinction,” in the *European Journal of Philosophy* (peer-reviewed); available at <http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ejop.12262/full>.

ARTICLES UNDER REVIEW

2017 “The Forms of Intuition in the Transcendental Deduction”

ARTICLES IN PREPARATION

“The Fractured Subject: Deleuze’s Response to Kant’s Paralogisms”

“Hegel, Stroud, and Transcendental Arguments”

“Objective Thought: a Reading of the Opening of Hegel’s *Encyclopedia Logic* (§§19-25)”

“Our Shared Animality: Why McDowell Needs Hegel’s Logical Progression”

RESEARCH LANGUAGES

German

French

PRESENTATIONS

Peer-Reviewed

2017 “Kant, Hegel, and the Unity of the Intellect,” SGIR-NAKS Joint Conference on Kantian Legacies in German Idealism and Romanticism, Stanford University, October 14-15

2017 “Hegel on Divine Cognition,” Models of Divine and Human Intellect in Kant and Hegel, Universität Tübingen, February 16-18

2015 “Is Logical Content *a priori* for Hegel?” Conference on Contemporary Debates in German Idealism, Xavier University, April 17-19

2010 “Different Distances: Diamond and McDowell,” Conference in Honor of Cora Diamond, University of Amiens, September 13-15

Invited

2015 “On the Very Idea of an Account of a Self-Conscious Capacity,” Conference in Honor of Stephen Engstrom, Universität Leipzig, July 15-18

2015 “The Method of Hegel’s *Logic*: Modification, Spontaneity, Unity,” Universität Leipzig, July 14

2014 “Hegel’s Idea: The Regressive and Progressive Method of the Logic,” Conference on Absolute Idealism, Universität Leipzig, July 16-18

Presentations at the University of Chicago

2016 “The Forms of Intuition in the Transcendental Deduction,” German Philosophy Workshop, September 30

2016 “Our Shared Animality: Why McDowell Needs Hegel’s Idea of a Logical Progression,” Wittgenstein Workshop, January 29

2014 “What is Philosophical Cognition? Hegel’s Answer,” German Philosophy Workshop, November 21

2013 “Immediacy in Hegel’s *Science of Logic*,” German Philosophy Workshop, January 25

2012 “Non-Normative Ethics: Some Themes from Agamben,” Contemporary European Philosophy Workshop, February 20

AWARDS AND FELLOWSHIPS

2015 Ames Departmental Dissertation Completion Fellowship, University of Chicago Philosophy Department (for 2015-2016)

2010 Sterling P. Lamprecht Prize for best BA thesis in Philosophy, Amherst College

2010 *Phi Beta Kappa* Society, Amherst College Chapter

2009 The Beinecke Scholarship for pursuing post-graduate studies in the humanities and social sciences (held from 2010-2015)

TEACHING EXPERIENCE

Collegiate

Lecturer, served as instructor of record; designed syllabus and all course assignments; held regular office hours; graded all assignments and exams

The School of the Art Institute of Chicago

Fall 2016 First Year Seminar: Introduction to Ethics

University of Chicago

Spring 2015 Deleuze’s *Difference and Repetition*

Teaching Assistant, University of Chicago: responsible for leading discussion sections (6-14 students), creating writing assignments and evaluations, providing substantive critical feedback, collaborating with faculty on the design of course materials, and grading

Autumn 2016 Marx’s *Capital*, Vol. 1 (for Anton Ford)

Winter 2014 Wittgenstein’s *Philosophical Investigations* (for Jason Bridges)

Autumn 2013 History of Philosophy 1: Ancient Philosophy (for Gabriel Lear)

Spring 2013 History of Philosophy 3: Modern Philosophy (for Anselm Mueller)

High School

Teacher, Texas Debate Collective Summer Institute: responsible for designing the curriculum for the camp (80-100 students); from 2009-2013, instructing 9-14 students (100 instructional hours/year); since 2013, overseeing all instructors, giving each substantive critical feedback on their teaching

2009-present Lincoln Douglas Debate

SERVICE

2012-4 Graduate Student Representative to the Philosophy Faculty, *University of Chicago*

COURSEWORK

*’ denotes audited

Early Analytic Philosophy

- 2010 Meaning (Joseph Stern)
- 2011 Topics from Anscombe (Anselm Mueller)
- 2011 Frege (Michael Kremer)
- 2011 Wittgenstein's Later Philosophy (David Finkelstein)
- 2012 Wittgenstein's *Tractatus* (James Conant)

German Philosophy

- 2010 Kant's Ethics (Candace Vogler)
- 2012 Hegel's *Science of Logic*: Part 1 (Robert Pippin)
- 2012 Self-Consciousness and the Psychoanalytic Unconscious (Jonathan Lear; Matthew Boyle)
- *2013 Hegel's *Science of Logic*: Part 2 (Robert Pippin)
- *2014 Hegel's *Science of Logic*: Part 3 (Robert Pippin)
- *2016 Kant's Transcendental Deduction, Stanford (Michael Friedman)

Ancient Philosophy

- 2011 Aristotle's Theory of Action (Agnes Callard)
- 2011 Aristotle's *Metaphysics Gamma* (Marko Malink)
- *2012 Aristotle on Substance and Essence (Marko Malink)
- *2015 Aristotle's *Metaphysics Zeta*, Stanford (Alan Code)
- *2016 Plato's *Euthyphro*, Stanford (Willie Costello)

REFERENCES

Robert Pippin

Evelyn Stefansson Nef Distinguished Service Professor of Social Thought, Philosophy, and in the College at the University of Chicago

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Jason Bridges

Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of Chicago

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Paul Franks

Professor of Philosophy and Religious Studies and Judaic Studies at Yale University

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Wolfram Gobsch

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Michael Friedman

Suppes Professor of Philosophy of Science and Professor, by courtesy, of German Studies

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Michael Kremer (teaching reference)

Mary R. Morton Professor of Philosophy
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Dissertation: *Hegel's Speculative Method*

In my dissertation, I offer an interpretation and defense of Hegel's speculative method as an alternative to Kant's Transcendental Deduction. The speculative method, I argue, is a special kind of conceptual analysis that Hegel develops to explain the possibility of ordinary, empirical knowledge of the world, by showing that our capacity to think can reveal how the world is in itself, not merely how it seems to us to be.

I take the first step in chapters 1-2 where I describe the Kantian problem to which the speculative method is the solution. The Kantian problem: the nature of thought is merely our nature, as thinking beings. But we routinely employ thoughts to make claims about the world outside of us. With what right? Even if we grant that we are *forced* to think of objects as causally related to one another, with what right do we take that to be more than merely how things (have to) seem to us? Hegel responds to this worry by arguing that we cannot so much as think of the world without already thinking of it as knowable by us, thereby trying to dissolve the Kantian problem. To make this case, Hegel needs to show that our most fundamental thought of the world is special: it is not a thought of the world as outside of and independent of our natures, but rather one on which our nature and the world's nature are the same. Moreover, he thinks articulating this nature involves a special kind of conceptual analysis. To clarify Hegel's position, I explore the difference between this special kind of analysis and so-called "strong transcendental arguments," and I defend the former against Barry Stroud's criticism of the latter.

In chapters 3-4, I articulate further Hegel's account of this conceptual analysis. Within ordinary thought, it is perfectly intelligible that we might get the world wrong: e.g., I might be wrong that the locusts killed my crops – perhaps it was the heat. Most interpreters think Hegel's speculative method involves something analogous to this kind of error: we take ourselves to have an idea of the world, but that account proves to be contradictory, so we have to advance to a new and different account of the world. I argue that this view makes it impossible for Hegel to answer Kant's worry: for, according to this interpretation, we can always ask whether our results only get at how things seem to us, just as it merely seemed to me that the locusts killed my crops. We would never be able to dismiss this question as inappropriate, and so could never appeal to the speculative method as answering it. By providing a close reading of Hegel's own description of his method, I argue instead that it eliminates the intelligibility of this kind of error. That is, there is no room for a lack of fit between the results of the method and the world, and so no room to ask whether the account merely gets at how the world seems to us.

Finally, in chapters 5-6, I offer a novel account of Hegel's criticism of, and alternative to, Kant's Transcendental Deduction. On a common interpretation (offered, for instance, by Sally Sedgwick), Hegel criticizes Kant's concept of ordinary thought because it turns the form of our thought into an unjustified imposition on the world. Against this interpretation, I argue that Kant and Hegel have a shared conception of ordinary thought; they differ only on how to secure the validity of ordinary thought. Kant's Deduction appeals to pure *a priori* forms of intuition in relation to which the forms of our thinking are valid. Hegel, however, thinks that the appeal to *a priori* forms of intuition cannot work, because (for Kant) our forms of intuition - and not, as Sedgwick claims, our forms of thought - are merely subjective facts about us, or a mere imposition on what appears to us, and so cannot explain the validity of thought. Hegel's alternative to Kant's Deduction arises from his special conceptual analysis of the world: because the validity of the forms of ordinary thought emerge as what is required to have any grasp of the world at all, those forms are known to be valid.