

# Corruption and Coercion: The Year in Elections 2017

Pippa Norris, Thomas Wynter and Sarah Cameron



The Electoral Integrity Project

PEI 6.0

[www.ElectoralIntegrityProject.com](http://www.ElectoralIntegrityProject.com)

March 2018



Electoral Integrity Project

The Electoral Integrity Project  
Department of Government and International Relations  
Merewether Building (H04)  
University of Sydney, Sydney NSW, 2006, Australia

Phone: +61(2) 9351 2147  
Email: [electoralintegrity@gmail.com](mailto:electoralintegrity@gmail.com)  
Web: <http://www.electoralintegrityproject.com>  
Dataverse: <http://thedata.harvard.edu/dvn/dv/PEI>  
Twitter: <https://twitter.com/ElectIntegrity>  
Facebook: <https://www.facebook.com/electoralintegrity>

Copyright © Pippa Norris, Thomas Wynter, and Sarah Cameron 2018. All rights reserved.

ISBN: 978-0-6482858-0-9

Cover photo: "[RPF Presidential Campaign 2017 15Th Jul](#)" (CC BY 2.0) by [#Rwandaphotos](#)

Printed and bound in Sydney, Australia.



## Contents

<b>I: Executive summary</b> .....	<b>4</b>
Figure 1: Electoral Integrity worldwide, 2012-2017 .....	6
Figure 2: Electoral Integrity by region, 2012-2017 .....	7
<b>II: The year in elections: 2017</b> .....	<b>8</b>
Figure 3: Democracy and Electoral Integrity in 2017.....	12
Table 1: PEI index for elections in 2017 by country and stage of the cycle.....	12
<b>III: Challenges of corruption and coercion</b> .....	<b>13</b>
Figure 4. Global Average Performance on Each Stage of the Electoral Cycle.....	14
Figure 5. Types of distributive Politics .....	15
Table 2: PEI items monitoring electoral corruption and coercion.....	18
Figure 6: Corruption, Coercion and Liberal Democracy.....	18
Table 3: Corruption and Coercion by Country. ....	18
Table 4: Predicting Corruption and Coercion. ....	18
<b>IV: Selected Case Studies</b> .....	<b>23</b>
Honduras 26 November 2017 .....	23
Kenyan presidential elections: 8 August 2017 and 26 October 2017.....	24
The United Kingdom general election on 8 June 2017.....	27
German Bundestag elections in September 2017 .....	28
<b>V: Elections to Watch in 2018</b> .....	<b>30</b>
The Russia presidential elections 8 March 2018 .....	30
The United States mid-term elections November 2018.....	31
Table 5: Forthcoming presidential and parliamentary elections in 2018.....	33
Table 6: All elections in PEI 2012-17.....	35
<b>VI: Technical Appendix: Performance Indicators, Methods and Data</b> .....	<b>40</b>
Table A1: Country coverage.....	40
Table A2: Factors predicting expert perceptions of electoral integrity scores.....	42
Table A3: Scales of electoral corruption and coercion .....	43
Table A4: PEI Survey Questions .....	45
<b>VIII: Bibliography of EIP publications, alphabetical order by author</b> .....	<b>46</b>



## Electoral Integrity Around the World

### I: Executive summary

Elections provide the main opportunities for citizens to participate in politics and hold leaders to account. When they work well, elections can deepen civic engagement, inform public debate, stimulate party competition, facilitate peaceful leadership transitions, hold governments to account, and allow the non-violent resolution of political conflict.<sup>1</sup>

The problem is that too often contests fail to achieve these objectives. There is widespread concern about falling turnout, public disaffection, party polarization, and the failure of elections to ensure legitimate outcomes. Electoral malpractices continue to undermine contests around the world, from overt cases of violence and intimidation to more subtle disinformation campaigns, barriers to fair party competition, and the under-representation of women and minority candidates. Most election results are not rejected outright or overturned but they are commonly flawed.

#### *Highlights of the results*

The key findings are:

- The persistence of major electoral malpractices, particularly problems of money and media evident as the weakest stages of the electoral cycle across many countries.
- The challenges of coercion and corruption, causing bloodshed, weakening legitimacy, and undermining democracy.
- The rise of new problems, including from authoritarian-populist parties, cybersecurity risks of foreign hacking, and social media misinformation campaigns.

#### *The Perceptions of Electoral Integrity Expert Survey*

To assess global trends, the Perceptions of Electoral Integrity expert survey monitors elections worldwide and regionally, across all stages of the electoral cycle.



This 2018 report describes the latest update of the Perceptions of Electoral Integrity dataset (PEI Release 6.0). The cumulative dataset is drawn from a survey of 3,253 expert assessment of electoral integrity across 285 elections in 164 countries around the world. The cumulative dataset covers national presidential and parliamentary elections from July 1, 2012 to December 31, 2017.

This release adds 16 presidential and 28 parliamentary elections held in 41 countries from 1 January to 31 December 2017. All electronic data can be downloaded, at the levels of experts, elections, and countries, from <http://thedata.harvard.edu/dvn/dv/PEI>.

Perceptions of Electoral Integrity are measured using a rolling survey completed by experts in each country one month after polls close. Experts are asked to assess the quality of national elections on eleven sub-dimensions: electoral laws; electoral procedures; district boundaries; voter registration; party registration; media coverage; campaign finance; voting process; vote count; results; and electoral authorities. These sum to an overall Electoral Integrity Index scored from 0 to 100. A special rotating battery is also added each year to focus on emerging challenges, including a recent battery on electoral corruption and coercion. The Technical Appendix gives full details about our research design and methods.

### *Plan of the report*

Part II focuses on what's new, including the integrity of 44 national presidential and parliamentary elections held during 2017.

Part III highlights new evidence about corruption and coercion, some of the major challenges facing electoral integrity worldwide.


Part IV describes brief selected case studies on several elections conducted in 2017, including in severely problematic cases (Kenya and Honduras), as well as challenges facing long-established democracies (the UK and Germany).

Part V looks at forthcoming contests due to be held during 2018, including the presidential contest in Russia and the U.S mid-term elections.

Parts VI and VII provide further technical information and the bibliography.



Figure 1: Electoral Integrity worldwide, 2012-2017



**Notes:** The categories are constructed from the average score for each country in national presidential and parliamentary elections from 2012-2017 in the 100-point Perceptions of Electoral Integrity Index.

**Source:** *The Perceptions of Electoral Integrity expert survey (PEI 6.0)*, country-level [www.electoralintegrityproject.com](http://www.electoralintegrityproject.com).

Figure 2: Electoral Integrity by region, 2012-2017

N&W Europe		Americas		C&E Europe		Asia-Pacific		MENA		Africa	
Country	PEI Index	Country	PEI Index	Country	PEI Index	Country	PEI Index	Country	PEI Index	Country	PEI Index
Denmark	87	Costa Rica	81	Estonia	79	New Zealand*	76	Israel	74	Cape Verde	71
Finland	86	Uruguay	75	Lithuania	78	Taiwan	73	Tunisia	68	Benin	70
Norway*	83	Canada	75	Slovenia*	78	South Korea*	73	Oman	61	Ghana	65
Iceland*	82	Chile*	71	Czech Rep.*	76	Australia	70	Morocco	57	Mauritius	64
Germany*	81	Brazil	68	Slovak Rep.	75	Japan*	68	Kuwait	54	South Africa	63
Sweden	80	Jamaica	67	Poland	74	Tonga*	65	Jordan	49	Lesotho*	62
Netherlands*	80	Grenada	66	Latvia	72	Mongolia*	64	Iran*	49	Namibia	60
Switzerland	79	Argentina*	65	Croatia	65	Vanuatu	62	Turkey	47	Liberia*	59
Austria*	77	Barbados	63	Georgia	60	Timor-Leste*	62	Iraq	44	Botswana	58
France*	75	Peru	62	Bulgaria*	58	Bhutan	60	Algeria*	43	Rwanda*	57
Portugal	74	United States	61	Hungary	56	Micronesia*	59	Egypt	43	Ivory Coast	57
Belgium	71	Panama	61	Moldova	55	India	59	Bahrain	38	Sierra Leone	56
Ireland	71	Colombia	60	Romania	55	Maldives	57	Syria	25	Guinea-Bissau	55
Cyprus	70	Mexico	57	Albania*	54	Indonesia	57			Burkina Faso	53
Spain	69	Cuba	57	Kyrgyzstan*	53	Solomon Is.	57			Nigeria	53
Italy	67	Bolivia	56	Bosnia	52	Nepal*	56			Sao Tome & Prin.	53
Greece	66	Paraguay	55	Montenegro	51	Myanmar	54			Central Afr. Rep.	53
UK*	66	El Salvador	54	Ukraine	51	Samoa	54			Mali	52
Malta*	65	Belize	54	Serbia*	49	Fiji	53			Niger	52
		Bahamas*	54	Macedonia	48	Singapore	53			Gambia*	50
		Guyana	53	Armenia*	47	Sri Lanka	52			Malawi	48
		Suriname	50	Kazakhstan	45	Philippines	51			Cameroon	46
		Ecuador*	50	Russia	44	Thailand	51			Comoros	46
		Guatemala	48	Belarus	40	Pakistan	50			Swaziland	45
		Venezuela	45	Uzbekistan	38	Laos	47			Zambia	45
		Dom. Rep.	44	Tajikistan	36	Bangladesh	38			Mauritania	44
		Honduras*	37	Azerbaijan	35	Malaysia	35			Tanzania	44
		Nicaragua	36	Turkmenistan*	34	Papua NG*	35			Sudan	43
		Haiti	31			Vietnam	34			Kenya*	43
						Afghanistan	32			Senegal*	43
						Cambodia	32			Guinea	42
										Madagascar	40
										Angola*	39
										Togo	38
										Uganda	38
										Zimbabwe	35
										Mozambique	35
										Gabon	34
										Chad	31
										Djibouti	30
										Congo, Rep.*	29
										Burundi	25
										Eq. Guinea*	24
										Ethiopia	24
<b>Regional mean</b>	<b>75</b>		<b>57</b>		<b>56</b>		<b>54</b>		<b>50</b>		<b>47</b>

\* = election in 2017

Key:



= Very High / High (60+)



= Moderate (50-59) = Low / Very Low (Less than 50)



**Notes:** The categories are constructed from the average score for each country in national presidential and parliamentary elections held from 2012-2017 in the 100-point Perceptions of Electoral Integrity Index.

**Source:** The Perceptions of Electoral Integrity expert survey (PEI 6.0), country-level.



## II: The year in elections: 2017

Around the world, elections have become almost universal for legislative and executive office but their quality varies substantially.

Figure 1 presents the updated global map of electoral integrity. Countries are classified into categories ranging from very low to very high levels of electoral integrity, as measured through the overall 100-point Perceptions of Electoral Integrity (PEI) index. The country scores are averaged for elections from 2012-2017. In total, last year 41 countries held national parliamentary or presidential contests. This includes five states with presidential elections, 16 with parliamentary elections, and 20 with both. The updated rank of countries in the PEI Index by each global region is illustrated in Figure 2.

### *High integrity elections*

Several Northern European countries continue to rank at the top of the PEI scale worldwide, scoring over 80%. 2017 saw elections conducted in a number of established democracies, including **Norway, Germany, the Netherlands, New Zealand** and **Austria**, all scoring highly in the quality of their elections. These contests saw consistently high scores across nearly all stages of the election, with their lowest scores in media and money. The positive ratings generally reflect the positive assessments of the overall state of liberal democracy and human rights in these countries, as estimated by international monitoring agencies, such as the Varieties of Democracy project, Freedom House, and Reporters without Borders.<sup>2</sup>

At the same time, many of these contests saw growing strength for authoritarian-populist parties, which may have broader consequences for liberal democratic norms.<sup>3</sup> In the **Netherlands**, Geert Wilders Party for Freedom (PVV) advanced to second place. In **Norway**, the Progress Party joined the Conservative-led coalition government. In **Germany**, the Alternative for Germany party entered the Bundestag with 94 seats, becoming the largest opposition party to the Merkel-led grand coalition. In **Austria**, the Freedom Party gained more than a quarter of the vote and formed a coalition government with the centre-right People's Party.

Populism is a style of discourse reflecting first order principles about *who* should rule, claiming that legitimate power rests with 'the people' not the elites.





Authoritarianism is a cluster of values prioritizing collective defence of the tribe at the expense of individual autonomy, emphasizing the values of loyalty, conformity, and security.<sup>4</sup> The advance of authoritarian-populism was not uniform. But across Europe, the average share of the vote won by these parties for the lower house in national parliamentary elections in Europe has more than doubled since the 1960s, from around 5.4% to 12.4% today.<sup>5</sup> During the same era, their share of seats has tripled, from 4.0% to 12.2%. Analysts have expressed concern about these developments for social tolerance, party polarization, and liberal democracy, drawing parallels to the early days of fascism and xenophobia of the 1930s.<sup>6</sup>

At the same time, contests last year in several middle-income countries also scored well in electoral integrity, according to experts, including the **Czech Republic** and **Slovenia** in Central and Eastern Europe, as well as **Chile** and **Argentina** in Latin America.

#### *Contests with moderate integrity*

Several developing countries have also now achieved moderate levels of electoral integrity, with a series of regular elections yet with several persistent issues, including contests held last year in **Nepal** and **Bulgaria**, as well as **Albania**, the **Bahamas**, and **Liberia**.

In **Nepal**, for example, official procedures generally dealt fairly with candidates, and freedoms of association, assembly and expression were largely respected. These were threatened, however, by violent attacks perpetrated by political opponents.<sup>7</sup> And in **Albania**, vote-buying and politicization of election management bodies remain persistent problems, undermining better developed aspects of the electoral process, such as its voting procedures.<sup>8</sup>

#### *Flawed and failed elections with low integrity*

At the lower end of the spectrum, deeply flawed and even failed contests were also held last year in many parts of the globe, including in **Honduras**, **Turkmenistan**, **Papua New Guinea**, **Equatorial Guinea**, and the **Republic of Congo**.

This includes the **Honduras** general election on 26 November 2017, described later in more detail, with major irregularities at the vote count leading to cries



of electoral fraud and violent protests. The process and outcome proved so contentious that the Organization of American States (OAS) recommended that the presidential election should be rerun.<sup>9</sup>

Meanwhile in the Pacific, in **Papua New Guinea**, deadly violence undermined the electoral process and thousands of voters were excluded from the electoral roll. Opposition representatives alleged that the PNG Electoral Commission under-registered eligible citizens in areas opposed to the government.<sup>10</sup> Preferential voting was thought to mitigate inter-ethnic conflict but it clearly proved insufficient to prevent violence in this case.<sup>11</sup>

In oil-rich **Equatorial Guinea**, the detention of political opponents, and a death in police custody, sowed public distrust and exacerbated wide-ranging electoral malpractices.<sup>12</sup> The one-party government has failed to improve upon its extremely poor PEI rating in 2013 and 2016 contests.

In the Central Asian Republic of **Turkmenistan**, President Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedow was declared to have won 98% of the vote following a contest where all opposition candidates were appointed by his government. This followed his 97% share of vote in the 2012 presidential election. After removing a series of legal impediments to executive power, President Berdimuhamedow continues to rule unchallenged.<sup>13</sup> In Turkmenistan, opposition parties are a sham, elections serve to legitimate and perpetuate an authoritarian regime, and central power remains with the executive.<sup>14</sup>

While many countries see stable PEI ratings from election to election, others have seen sharper declines and greater variations across successive contests. In **Rwanda**, for example, following a successful legislative election in 2013, the 2017 presidential election was considerably more problematic, particularly on electoral laws. This followed the controversial move to amend the Constitution to allow President Paul Kagame to run again, removing term limits. The EU criticized this move as undermining the principle of democratic change of government.<sup>15</sup> The ethnic violence of Rwanda's past underscores the need for close scrutiny of further developments.




*Elections, Development and Democracy*

How does the quality of elections compare with the levels of democracy and development? Figure 3 illustrates the average PEI Index on the horizontal axis compared against the level of liberal democracy, as estimated by the Varieties of Democracy project, on the vertical axis.<sup>16</sup>

A strong correlation links the two measures ( $R=0.78^{***}$ ), not surprisingly given the centrality of elections to the workings of liberal democracy. Democracy requires many institutions to work effectively – competitive political parties, an independent judiciary, a vigilant free press, oversight by parliamentary bodies, and constitutional checks and balances preventing the abuse of power by the executive. But elections with integrity are the core foundation linking citizens with the state, underpinning the accountability of office-holders to voters. The quality of elections is also systematically related to levels of economic development, with resources providing the infrastructure and investment in professional electoral management bodies which facilitate efficient contests.

**Figure 3: Democracy and electoral integrity in 2017**



**Source:** Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem 7.1) index of liberal democracy. PEI 6.0 Index of Electoral Integrity.

To examine the problems in further detail, Table 1 shows a breakdown for the eleven stages of the electoral cycle for all 41 countries holding elections in 2017. Money and media were once again the weakest stages in most elections, a familiar pattern observed over successive reports.<sup>17</sup> But problems were observed across multiple dimensions in the countries ranked most poorly.



Table 1: PEI index for elections held in 2017 by country and stage of the cycle

Country	Office	PEI Election Rank	PEI Index	Electoral laws	Procedures	Boundaries	Voter registration	Party registration	Media coverage	Campaign finance	Voting process	Vote count	Results	Electoral authorities
Norway	Leg.	5	83	79	90	73	90	82	66	77	83	93	93	93
Netherlands	Leg.	7	82	94	91	76	86	81	75	70	72	92	93	90
Slovenia	Pres.	9	82	86	94	75	85	87	60	69	81	93	88	87
Germany	Leg.	11	81	81	97	73	81	76	67	71	80	96	83	91
Austria	Leg.	25	77	80	88	71	86	74	54	59	82	90	79	87
Iceland	Leg.	23	77	64	91	58	93	82	58	61	79	91	86	82
France	Pres.	30	76	70	92	66	63	79	63	68	72	93	74	87
New Zealand	Leg.	29	76	70	93	77	63	85	48	61	77	88	81	88
Chile	Pres.	34	75	82	89	61	69	71	54	67	69	93	93	87
Czech Republic	Leg.	33	75	79	82	73	91	80	55	63	70	86	81	83
France	Leg.	42	74	68	94	71	65	72	63	66	70	89	70	83
Korea, Rep.	Pres.	50	72	54	87	62	76	68	56	66	72	85	76	83
United Kingdom	Leg.	68	68	43	87	51	40	74	48	51	74	91	79	82
Japan	Leg.	77	66	46	82	44	68	61	52	59	66	83	78	81
Argentina	Leg.	84	65	71	78	62	66	64	46	41	63	79	84	72
Malta	Leg.	90	64	47	84	52	70	65	40	37	63	87	83	79
Mongolia	Pres.	99	63	40	80	44	69	50	61	43	64	87	72	73
Timor-Leste	Leg.	100	63	55	80	60	47	59	53	41	61	81	76	76
Tonga	Leg.	105	62	65	81	56	53	62	50	41	58	74	69	79
Lesotho	Leg.	114	61	76	74	68	44	63	53	34	50	79	69	75
Timor-Leste	Pres.	112	61	66	75	53	55	63	50	35	58	76	77	69
Liberia	Pres.	124	59	81	63	66	34	65	50	33	52	67	57	67
Nepal	Leg.	127	59	75	73	59	58	64	58	24	45	79	73	68
Bulgaria	Leg.	133	58	53	70	63	43	61	41	43	48	81	79	65
Micronesia	Leg.	140	56	72	56	70	35	67	41	40	56	66	60	63
Albania	Leg.	160	54	38	64	51	68	52	47	39	45	67	71	57
Bahamas	Leg.	159	54	43	60	42	38	45	58	47	50	69	72	61
Gambia	Leg.	177	52	46	68	41	37	52	47	25	45	77	68	69
Kyrgyzstan	Pres.	178	52	57	56	59	45	51	48	31	50	67	60	52
Armenia	Leg.	180	51	51	44	65	53	57	57	29	43	59	63	51
Rwanda	Pres.	183	51	28	58	52	74	48	31	34	46	61	83	56
Iran	Pres.	203	47	25	66	34	49	31	48	37	50	59	62	52
Kenya	Pres. (1)	201	47	64	41	60	35	64	52	23	48	57	38	40
Ecuador	Pres.	215	45	33	51	42	37	51	41	34	59	50	34	41
Algeria	Leg.	223	43	36	49	51	42	45	46	26	49	46	49	37
Senegal	Leg.	229	43	32	48	57	11	49	41	19	37	70	53	50
Serbia	Pres.	227	43	47	52	61	30	49	17	30	53	53	40	40
Angola	Leg.	232	41	43	38	53	32	49	30	33	47	41	49	40
Kenya	Pres. (2)	237	41	59	38	55	40	58	55	17	26	58	26	36
Papua New Gn.	Leg.	261	35	41	23	49	11	56	49	16	25	35	37	43
Congo, Republic	Leg.	266	32	7	18	30	6	29	30	28	43	48	49	40
Turkmenistan	Pres.	272	31	25	36	45	35	21	9	18	35	30	75	21
Honduras	Pres.	274	29	20	24	45	24	50	32	18	37	17	28	15
Equatorial Gn.	Leg.	285	22	16	19	36	24	13	14	11	25	26	46	15

**Note:** Each stage of the electoral cycle is measured by standardized 100-point scores. Elections are ranked by the PEI Index out of the 285 elections in the survey since 2012.

**Source:** The Perceptions of Electoral Integrity expert survey (PEI 6.0), election-level.



### III: Challenges of corruption and coercion

During recent decades, problems of money in politics are in the headlines every day somewhere around the world.<sup>18</sup> Classic cases – the “Recruit” scandal in Japan, the misuse of “Westminster expenses” in Britain, and “Watergate” in the United States – exemplify long-established democracies rocked by major problems involving financial malfeasance. These well-known examples are far from isolated however, as political corruption has damaged democratic governance in many Southern European countries, notably in Greece, Italy, France, Spain, and Bulgaria.<sup>19</sup> Moreover graft, kickbacks, and cronyism commonly plague public affairs in emerging economies such as India, Indonesia, Mexico, the Philippines, and Russia, all states rated poorly by Transparency International’s 2017 Corruption Perception Index.<sup>20</sup> TI’s latest report highlights that the majority of countries are making little or no progress in preventing corruption.


Problems of political finance are widely believed to have serious consequences for democracy, with proponents commonly claiming that reforms can strengthen equitable party competition, principles of transparency and accountability, opportunities for inclusive participation, and the integrity of the political process. By contrast, flaws in political financing are believed to facilitate corruption as well as having broader ramifications undermining citizen’s feelings of legitimacy, destabilizing regimes, damaging the delivery of public services, and hurting prospects for economic growth.

Not all of these problems are related to elections – but many are. There are numerous examples of the ways that corruption has affected electoral politics in recent contests; for example, in Brazil, the former President (Lula) Luiz Inacio da Silva was charged with receiving kickbacks from the state oil company Petrobras. The charges were upheld by a panel of judges in January 2018 thereby barring the leading candidate in the polls from running for the presidency.<sup>21</sup> Allegations of corruption have also recently been levelled against presidents in Argentina and Panama. In Costa Rica, a related scandal (Cementazo) damaged a number of prominent figures.<sup>22</sup> Pledges to fight this problem featured heavily in recent contests from Mexico and Italy to Austria.<sup>23</sup> By weakening the legitimacy of elected officials, populism also thrives in this sort of environment.



Given these sorts of news headlines, when asked to identify the most corrupt institution in their country, it is not surprising that elected representatives are seen by the public as one of the most problematic agencies, according to the most recent TI Global Corruption Barometer.<sup>24</sup> Of course, not all financial problems relate directly to elections through malpractices such as kick-back schemes for supporters, vote-buying, or the bribery of electoral officials, by any means. But still public concern over the abuse of money in politics has grown in prominence in recent years. During the last two decades, the issue of the most effective regulation of political finance and the prevention of corrupt practices in electoral campaigns has risen to the top of the governance agenda for the international community and for domestic reformers.

**Figure 4: Global average performance on each stage of the electoral cycle**



**Note:** Each stage of the electoral cycle is standardized to a 100-point score.

**Source:** PEI 6.0, country-level.

### *Coercion and contentious elections*

The other major challenge facing many flawed and failed contests concerns contentious elections, whether through peaceful protests or else election-related violence, coercion, and deadly conflict. During the post-Cold War era, concern has risen about the proliferation of contentious elections and the number of polls held in a pervasive climate of fraud, mistrust, and intolerance that have ignited massive protests and violence.<sup>25</sup> Contentious elections are contests involving major challenges, with different degrees of severity, to the legitimacy of electoral actors, procedures, or outcomes.<sup>26</sup>




These types of contest can undermine democratic transitions in countries emerging from dictatorship, cause further instability and social tensions in fragile states, discourage international investment, and thereby jeopardize stability, growth and development in low-income economies.<sup>27</sup>

For all these reasons, the PEI expert survey deployed a thematic battery designed to gather new cross-national evidence about the extent of election-related corruption (especially clientelism) and contentious elections (especially coercion). We gathered data useful to address several issues. Which types of countries and regimes are most vulnerable to these problems around the world? Are there trade-offs between the use of electoral coercion and corruption, or are these related? What are their consequences for the overall quality of electoral integrity? And what could be done to mitigate these problems?

*What are election-related corruption and coercion?*

Before explaining our measures, we first need to define our concepts. The abuse of political finance and corruption concerns multiple malpractices. One is clientelism – defined as *the practice of citizens exchanging ballots for particularistic material benefits, such as money, gifts, jobs, land, or favors*. Most simply, this is known as payment-for-votes. It involves politicians, citizens, and intermediary brokers.<sup>28</sup> Figure 5 illustrates the concept.<sup>29</sup>

**Figure 5. Types of distributive politics**



Distributional policies like tax cuts or school spending can be designed to deliver benefits which are universally applicable for all qualified citizens, like those reaching the minimum age for social security benefits or families falling below the poverty threshold.

Or the allocation can be targeted more narrowly towards particular localities, groups, or sectors. In this case, the provision of goods and services can involve pork-barrel politics, where public goods are allocated by elected representatives to certain local districts in the hope of attracting future popular support. Public goods may also be withheld from districts regarded as not supporting parties or leaders. Pork-barrel politics is thought to be widespread in many countries, particularly those with single member plurality electoral systems and closely contested elections. This is often regarded as problematic for democracy, by leading to the inefficient or unequal resource distribution based on partisan considerations rather than social needs. But such acts are not normally illegal, they can also be regarded as an effective form of representative politics, and elected officials remain accountable to voters.

Alternatively, however, the allocation of material goods to individual citizens can be contingent upon reciprocal acts by citizens – typically their turnout, abstention, or voting for a particular party or candidate. Clientelist exchanges are therefore targeted towards groups or individuals and contingent upon reciprocal acts by citizens receiving material benefits. There is nothing new about such practices, which date back to ‘treating’ and vote-buying in 18<sup>th</sup> Century ‘Rotten Boroughs’ in the British parliament, until they were stamped out in the UK by the introduction of the Australian Secret Ballot, the 1888 Corrupt Practices Act, and the expansion of the franchise.<sup>30</sup> Similarly, in America machine party politics, allocating local jobs for party loyalists, persisted at least until the 1950s.<sup>31</sup>

Such acts are universally regarded today by international standards as corrupt practices which abuse the conduct of elections and distort the function of democratic elections. The most common solution has been measures to safeguard the confidentiality of the ballot. For example, the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights specified in Article 21 that *“The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government, this will shall be expressed in periodic and genuine elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret vote or the equivalent free voting procedure.”*<sup>32</sup> This requirement continues to be upheld today, exemplified by the Venice





Commission's 2002 Code of Conduct, where sanctions are recommended for violations of secret suffrage and several procedures are recommended to prevent such practices, including the observation of elections by domestic and international monitors to detect any abuses.<sup>33</sup>

Clientelism employs diverse incentives or positive 'carrots' and negative 'sticks'. In sub-Saharan Africa, for example, land rights are important.<sup>34</sup> In Kenya, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ivory Coast, and Zimbabwe, the promise of giving supporters land rights has long served as an electoral tool used to reward supporters and punish opponents. In Zimbabwe, local voting results have been scrutinized and the results used to punish villages which didn't support ZANU-PF.<sup>35</sup> In Latin America, such as in Argentina, Mexico, and Brazil, it is common for parties to reward loyalists with public sector jobs.<sup>36</sup> In Asia, the Middle East, and Central Europe, small bribes and gifts of food or clothing are often offered to get voters to the polls.<sup>37</sup> In the 2009 parliamentary elections in Lebanon, for example, the majority of voters (55%) were offered material inducements.<sup>38</sup>

Goods and services ranging from gifts of cash, food, access to health clinics or schools, or the award of government jobs and contracts are dispersed by party machines and brokers.

The secrecy of the ballot is seen as one of the main safeguard deterring these practices but confidentiality can be violated in many ways. In Lebanon, for example, parties ensure the quid pro quo is fulfilled by supporters through the party distribution of ballots, and the assignment of families to ballot boxes. Other mechanisms include carbon paper used for ballot-copying in the Philippines, and requiring snaps of the ballot from phone cameras in Italy.<sup>39</sup>

### *Monitoring the severity of these problem*

While widely acknowledged, evidence establishing the extent and severity of these types of electoral malpractices is not easy to estimate.<sup>40</sup> Reports in particular cases can be drawn from **international observer missions**, such as the OAS and OSCE, which draw attention to observed problems and legal complaints about the abuse of money and coercion in electoral politics, condemning cases of vote-buying and violence.

**Representative surveys of the publics** have also documented the prevalence of these malpractices, including the Afro-Barometer and LAPOP in Latin America.<sup>41</sup>



These ask whether people have been offered a bribe in return for their vote or whether they have experienced threats or coercion. It remains unclear, however, whether these surveys can provide reliable estimates, in part due to the illegal nature of these acts. In the most repressive states, ordinary people may be fearful about reporting threats. In corrupt cultures, citizens, rather than machines or brokers, may instigate these interactions.<sup>42</sup> In Lebanon, for example, “MPs grumble about the constant inflow of constituent requests for jobs, hospital beds, school supplies, intercessions with the police, and so on”.<sup>43</sup> In social surveys, the propensity for ordinary citizens to engage in vote-buying or experience severe coercion is likely to be under-estimated.

An alternative approach to monitoring comes from **expert surveys**, including PEI, as well as V-Dem. Since 2012, PEI has contained a series of standard questions on these issues, with additional items added in the 2016-2017 round of the PEI survey rotating battery. Respondents rated the extent to which they agreed or disagreed with the questions listed in Table 2. Factor analysis (with details in the Appendix) demonstrated that these items fell into the two dimensions of electoral corruption and coercion, as expected. These items were therefore coded consistently by direction, summed into scales, and each was standardized to 100-points, for ease of comparison.

**Table 2: PEI items monitoring electoral corruption and coercion**

Corruption	Some people received cash, gifts or personal favors in exchange for their vote *
	Politicians offered patronage to their supporters *
	Some state resources were improperly used for campaigning
	Parties/candidates (did not) publish transparent financial accounts
	Voters were bribed *
	Rich people buy elections
	Parties/candidates (did not have) equitable access to political donations
Coercion	People were free to vote without feeling pressured *
	The election triggered violent protests
	Some voters feared becoming victims of political violence *


**Note:** New items contained in the 2016-2017 rotating PEI battery \*

**Source:** The Perceptions of Electoral Integrity expert survey (PEI 6.0).



Figure 6 and Table 3 show which countries and types of regimes are most vulnerable to these types of problems. Rather than trade-offs, the use of electoral coercion and corruption are often correlated.

**Figure 6: Corruption, Coercion, and Liberal Democracy**



**Note:** Size and colours reflect V-Dem's measure of Liberal Democracy. The PEI Corruption and Coercion Indices are coded from 0 to 100, whereby lower scores indicate greater levels of corruption / coercion.

**Sources:** PEI 6.0 and the Quality of Government Data.

Not surprisingly, established democracies such as Iceland, Portugal and Australia are generally free of these problems, although the United States has worse levels of corruption than average. By contrast, states such as Chad, Djibouti, Syria and Equatorial Guinea (poorly rated by V-Dem's measure of liberal democracy) are commonly afflicted by both malpractices. Further up each scale, there is a greater scatter across the line, with autocratic states, such as Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and CAR, appearing predominantly below the line – indicating relatively more issues with election-related threats and intimidation – and hybrid regimes, which are neither clearly autocracies or democracies, above, indicating greater issues with electoral clientelism and corruption.



Table 3: Corruption and Coercion by Country

Country	Office	PEI Index	Voters Bribed	Clientelist Exchange	Patronage Offered	Free to Vote	Feared Violence	Coercion Index	Corruption Index
Iceland	Both	82	95	98	80	94	100	97	79
Lithuania	Both	78	75	59	63	77	100	91	65
Austria	Both	77	91	90	79	85	83	88	74
Slovak Republic	Both	75	83	75	60	87	92	90	62
Portugal	Both	74	97	94	80	96	89	95	75
Korea, Rep.	Both	73	78	69	58	90	92	91	65
Taiwan	Presidential	73	64	41	38	84	80	87	48
Ireland	Legislative	71	95	91	56	94	98	96	67
Cape Verde	Both	71	65	48	43	77	80	83	54
Australia	Legislative	70	85	94	67	82	90	89	64
Cyprus	Both	70	69	52	31	69	75	80	49
Benin	Both	70	29	17	17	82	64	79	28
Spain	Legislative	69	91	79	65	84	84	89	63
Japan	Legislative	68	75	58	35	73	85	83	58
Jamaica	Legislative	67	47	33	33	75	48	73	42
Ghana	Presidential	65	65	31	25	78	58	72	39
Croatia	Both	65	68	50	38	85	78	86	53
Mongolia	Both	64	45	31	35	65	50	68	40
Peru	Both	62	73	35	28	78	82	82	44
Vanuatu	Legislative	62	56	32	34	69	75	79	39
United States	Both	61	97	89	56	88	53	74	62
Georgia	Both	60	57	50	46	64	68	75	43
Bulgaria	Both	58	36	29	22	63	72	74	33
Morocco	Legislative	57	33	50	50	56	83	74	39
Ivory Coast	Both	57	44	31	19	61	50	64	31
Romania	Both	55	56	40	30	74	79	79	42
Moldova	Both	55	56	31	38	65	75	74	35
Samoa	Legislative	54	20	15	10	45	45	57	23
Kuwait	Legislative	54	28	19	22	59	72	68	23
Sao Tome & Principe	Both	53	39	29	25	50	46	58	29
Central African Republic	Presidential	53	58	38	25	69	31	60	44
Niger	Presidential	52	42	42	42	69	56	63	29
Philippines	Both	51	38	19	15	58	32	56	23
Montenegro	Both	51	39	27	23	32	48	55	25
Gambia	Both	50	50	22	17	64	28	54	30
Jordan	Legislative	49	38	25	13	69	69	64	28
Iran	Both	49	53	46	40	64	68	73	39
Serbia	Both	49	52	30	19	44	67	66	32
Macedonia	Both	48	32	19	13	39	28	49	26
Laos	Legislative	47	81	75	63	38	69	69	54
Comoros	Both	46	13	63	63	13	25	35	33
Kazakhstan	Both	45	57	36	32	39	54	57	37
Zambia	Presidential	45	40	35	25	52	33	46	29
Russia	Legislative	44	52	45	40	46	60	64	37
Dominican Republic	Presidential	44	28	15	13	60	61	54	19
Belarus	Both	40	80	54	46	56	59	67	43
Uzbekistan	Both	38	69	42	44	21	50	54	33
Uganda	Presidential	38	27	13	10	33	21	38	14
Nicaragua	Presidential	36	40	45	11	29	36	42	29
Vietnam	Legislative	34	64	45	38	38	41	53	38
Gabon	Presidential	34	25	11	11	66	25	31	18
Haiti	Both	31	25	21	25	46	29	34	19
Chad	Presidential	31	25	25	17	50	25	47	15
Djibouti	Both	30	25	25	30	42	50	49	21
Congo, Republic	Both	29	21	25	33	50	19	37	18
Syria	Both	25	25	29	11	19	6	33	15
Equatorial Guinea	Both	24	26	14	18	21	8	37	15

Source: The Perceptions of Electoral Integrity expert survey (PEI 6.0), country-level



What political, structural and institutional conditions underlie these problems?

The contemporary type of regime and path-dependent historical legacies are likely to prove important – but how? Experience of a succession of competitive elections and processes of democratic consolidation are likely to lessen problems of coercion *and* vote-buying in long-established democracies.<sup>44</sup> Hybrid states – which have transitioned from democracy and which hold competitive multiparty election but which have not yet developed robust institutions like stable systems of party competition – are likely to be vulnerable to contentious elections and the use of electoral corruption. By contrast, a history of autocratic regimes which fail to respect human rights in general are more likely to engage in coercive practices and outright repression to maintain electoral support for ruling parties.<sup>45</sup>

Among structural conditions, the well-known ‘oil curse’ is also expected to count as an intervening condition.<sup>46</sup> Several relatively wealthy economies dependent upon natural resources, such as Kuwait and Equatorial Guinea, are characterized by endemic corruption. Vote-buying practices are also likely to be above average when elections are held in oil-rich states and natural-resource-based economies.

In general, democracies also usually flourish in affluent societies while they remain more vulnerable and unstable in poorer states.<sup>47</sup> Poorer voters are the primary targets of vote-buying initiatives, where modest material inducements like small gifts of food or clothing may make a difference to voting behaviour. Vote-buying and coercion are therefore expected to be more widespread in low-income developing societies.<sup>48</sup>

At the level of institutions, the role of electoral system may also be important. In general, elections with single member plurality rules heighten the incentives for malpractices such as vote-buying and coercion, since even the shift of even a few votes may make all the difference for candidate victory.

To test evidence for these claims, Table 4 looks at national-level correlations between social and political indicators and the PEI estimates of the prevalence of coercion and corruption, without controls.



The results confirm that both the corruption and the coercion indices are significantly related to all these measures, as expected. The strongest links are with the Liberal Democracy index, but all the other relationships are moderately strong.

**Table 4: Predicting corruption and coercion**

	Corruption Index (PEI)	Coercion Index (PEI)
GDP per capita, PPP (const. 2011 int. \$) (WDI)	0.58	0.54
Liberal democracy index (V-Dem)	0.73	0.76
Regime longevity (Pol)	0.49	0.38
Proportional Representation (IADB)	0.34	0.48
Oil Rents (WDI)	-0.47	-0.43

**Note:** Table shows Pearson’s correlation coefficient, all significant at  $p < 0.05$ .

*The corruption Index is formed from: (1) “Some people received cash, gifts or personal favors in exchange for their vote; (2) “Politicians offered patronage to their supporters”; (3) “Some state resources were improperly used for campaigning”; (4) “Parties/candidates (did not) publish transparent financial accounts; (5) “Voters were bribed”; (6) “Rich people buy elections”; and (7) “Parties/ candidates (did not have) equitable access to political donations”.*

*The coercion Index is formed from: (1) “People were free to vote without feeling pressured”; (2) “The election triggered violent protests”; and (3) “Some voters feared becoming victims of political violence”.*

Regime longevity is measured by the number of years since the last regime transition (3 pt or greater shift in Polity score, Polity IV).

Proportional Representation is a binary coding provided by the Database of Political Institutions.

Oil Rents are reported as a proportion of GDP by the World Bank’s World Development Indicators.

**Sources:** PEI 6.0, Country-level and Quality of Government 2018 cross-sectional dataset.



## IV: Selected Case Studies

### Honduran general election on 26 November 2017

The Honduras general election on 26 November 2017 saw the incumbent President Juan Orlando Hernández re-elected following a controversial contest.

The 128 members of the unicameral National Congress in Honduras are elected via open list proportional representation vote in 18 multi-seat constituencies with seats allocated using the Hare quota.<sup>49</sup> The president is elected through simple plurality vote.

President Hernández was the first incumbent to stand again following a constitutional amendment, promoted by his National Party that abolished single term limits. He stood against nine opponents, including Salvador Nasralla for Libre-PINU-SD.

Concerns about the close ties between the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (TSE) and Hernández's National Party were exacerbated by irregularities in the vote count. In the preliminary announcement, with 57% of the vote counted, Salvador Nasralla was on track to win the election, with a 5% lead. But the tribunal halted the count for 36 hours, and in the final count Hernández was declared victor with 42.95% of the vote against Nasralla's 41.42%, a difference of just 50,446 ballots.<sup>50</sup> The National Party was also declared the clear winner in the Congressional elections, with twice as many seats as the Liberty and Refoundation party.

Subsequent analysis by the OAS described the differences between early and later counting of the presidential count as too large to be generated by chance, raising doubts about the veracity of the results.<sup>51</sup>

The experts consulted for the PEI expert survey concur with the OAS assessment. Between the presidential elections in 2013 and 2017, Honduras deteriorated sharply in electoral integrity. This fall was clearest in the vote count stage, where the 100-point score plummeted from 70 to 13, the worst score in this stage out of all countries in the survey. The aftermath of the election proved deeply destabilizing with dozens killed and thousands arrested.



In addition, clientelism, coercion, and corruption have long been rife in Honduran politics, which has never fully recovered from the constitutional crisis, coup d'état, and ousting of former President Manuel Zelaya in 2009. Honduran parties have been heavily engaged in offering store discounts for proof-of-vote, as well as using coercive practices.<sup>52</sup>

The 2017 election prompted the OAS to characterize the contest as lacking integrity, calling for fresh elections.<sup>53</sup> This advice was ignored and subsequent anti-corruption efforts have stalled.<sup>54</sup> With trust in elections already very low, the continued erosion of electoral norms in Honduras marks an extremely serious threat to its stability.<sup>55</sup>

Country	Office	PEI Index	Electoral laws	Procedures	Boundaries	Voter registration	Party registration	Media coverage	Campaign finance	Voting process	Vote count	Results	Electoral authorities
Honduras	2013 Presidential Election	45	38	51	45	40	59	36	30	47	70	30	45
Honduras	2017 Presidential Election	29	20	24	45	24	50	32	18	37	17	28	15
Score Change		-16	-18	-27	0	-16	-9	-4	-12	-10	-53	-2	-30

### Kenyan presidential elections on 8 August and 26 October 2017

Annulment of elections are rare events invoked in response to catastrophic failures of electoral governance. Rulings against victorious incumbents are even rarer. For these reasons and more, the Kenyan Supreme Court's annulment of the presidential component of Kenya's August 8, 2017, general election has been described by election observers as historic and unprecedented in Africa.<sup>56</sup>

Kenya is a presidential republic, with the president serving as both its head of state and government. Concurrent general elections are held for the presidency and the bicameral Parliament. The constitution dictates that the winning presidential candidate must garner a simple majority of votes and win at least 25% of the vote in a majority of Kenya's 47 counties. If no candidate meets these requirements, a run-off between the top two candidates is to be held within 30 days.<sup>57</sup>

The period before the August 2017 Kenyan election was marred by violence. This included a machete attack against the home of Deputy President William Ruto<sup>58</sup> and the torture and murder of Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission representative, Christopher Msando.<sup>59</sup> The campaign atmosphere





was tense, with accusations and counter-accusations between candidates, including opposition allegations of collusion between the ruling Jubilee party, and the electoral authorities, police, and armed forces.<sup>60</sup>

Incumbent President Uhuru Kenyatta, first elected in the 2013 general elections, ultimately prevailed, winning 54.17% of the vote, with a turnout of 79.5%.<sup>61</sup> The opposition alleged a wide range of issues with the conduct of the election, however, including claims of hacking and fraud, and they demanded fresh elections. Sporadic post-election violence, including the burning of a petrol station and a maternal health clinic, recalled the aftermath of the 2007 election, in which more than 1,400 people were killed, but this outbreak remained relatively well-contained.<sup>62</sup>

On 1 September, the Supreme Court declared the results invalid and called for a fresh presidential election, citing irregularities.<sup>63</sup> They stated that the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission had failed, neglected or refused to conduct the presidential election in a manner consistent with the dictates of the constitution. Problems arose from the failure to follow electoral procedures, insufficient transparency, the early announcement of Kenyatta's victory before a full accounting of results, and the refusal to comply with court orders.<sup>64</sup>

The re-run of the Kenyan presidential contest on the 26<sup>th</sup> of October 2017 proved highly contentious. The runner-up in the annulled August presidential contest, Raila Odinga, who had secured 44.9% of the vote, declared that there was no prospect of a credible election and he withdrew.<sup>65</sup> Opposition calls for nationwide public protests and an effective boycott of the election escalated tensions. A number of deaths were reported, as well as allegations of police use of live ammunition on protestors, which the police denied.<sup>66</sup>

The Kenyan Parliament subsequently passed a series of partisan amendments to electoral laws, including one barring the Supreme Court from nullifying future presidential election results unless violations had significantly altered electoral outcomes.<sup>67</sup>

Facing little opposition, Kenyatta won the October election with 98.3% of the vote. This was both a dramatic increase in his overall vote share and a marked decline in the number of votes, at 7,483,895 from 8,223,369 in the annulled general election. This discrepancy is explained by the dramatic difference in



voter turnout between the two. In the August election, turnout was 79.5%.<sup>68</sup> In the October 2017 re-run, turnout dropped by around half to 38.8%.<sup>69</sup> Further violence followed the second election.

The Elections Observation Group, a Kenyan domestic election observer that covered both elections, reported several concerns about the re-run election, ultimately concluding that the environment of “insecurity, violence, intimidation, fear, tensions, coercion, [and] undue influence... was not conducive for conducting a credible election.”<sup>70</sup> The EU mission similarly lamented the loss of life, intimidation of the judiciary and voters, deterioration of democratic norms and institutional trust, and increase in political polarisation.<sup>71</sup>

The PEI expert survey was fielded for both elections. In both instances, Kenya performed very poorly, with a PEI Index score of 47 for the August election and 41 for the October election, the latter being in the bottom fifth of elections worldwide. As expected, the largest drop between the two 2017 elections was on the Voting Process stage (down 22 points), driven by large movements on the questions “Some voters were threatened with violence at the polls” and “Voters were offered a genuine choice at the ballot box”.

The further deterioration of the performance of the electoral authorities, from already low levels, is particularly concerning. The impartiality of the institutions that perform the central functions of managing elections is critical. Abuses of power and loss of public confidence in these agencies has wide-ranging effects on electoral integrity. International election observers recommend a clear path to getting Kenya’s contests back on a more positive trajectory.

Country	Office	PEI Index	Electoral laws	Procedures	Boundaries	Voter registration	Party registration	Media coverage	Campaign finance	Voting process	Vote count	Results	Electoral authorities
Kenya	Annulled August Presidential election	47	64	41	60	35	64	52	23	48	57	38	40
Kenya	Re-run October Presidential election	41	59	38	55	40	58	55	17	26	58	26	36
Score Change		-6	-5	-3	-5	5	-6	3	-6	-22	1	-12	-4

## The United Kingdom general election on 8 June 2017

The UK general election is held under 650 single member districts by simple plurality vote (First-Past-the-Post). With polling showing the Conservative party with a 21-point lead, in spring 2017 Prime Minister Theresa May called a snap election for the 8<sup>th</sup> of June, 2017. In the announcement, May stressed the need for a general election to guarantee certainty and stability, as well as to facilitate the successful execution of Brexit negotiations.<sup>72</sup>

The performance of the UK Independence Party was closely watched given its role in the Brexit campaign, and the rise of anti-immigration, populist-authoritarian political parties throughout Europe. When the campaign started, UKIP was polling around 10%, while the Labour Party was around 25%. Labour's leader, Jeremy Corbyn, was widely thought to be too radical to perform well at the general election.

Yet, throughout the campaign, Labour's fortunes rose and rose, while the Conservatives fell and UKIP fell apart. On election day, the Conservative party lost 13 seats, for a total of 317, winning the election to form government but losing its parliamentary majority.<sup>73</sup> In late-June 2017, a deal was struck with the hard-line Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), who promised their support for key parliamentary votes, allowing May to form a minority Conservative government, which started negotiations for a messy divorce from the EU.

Labour gained 30 seats, with a swing of almost 10%, for a total of 262 MPs. The vote share for UKIP plummeted from 12.6% in the 2015 elections to 1.8%, losing their only seat. By losing their signature issue, their supporters switched. The Conservative gained votes in 'Leave' constituencies, where the UKIP vote plummeted most sharply.<sup>74</sup> Election day polls suggest that only around one fifth of UKIP 2015 voters remained faithful, while the majority (57%) switched to the Conservatives, with around one fifth returning to Labour.<sup>75</sup>

The contest of the general election was generally evaluated relatively poorly in comparison with equivalent West European democracies, with persistently lower than average PEI Index ratings and poor ratings on electoral laws, as well as a substantial drop in ratings of the voter registration process from 2015-17. In 2009 the Conservative government passed a new law revising this process, moving in 2014 from household registration (where one person in each household completed the registration form for every resident eligible to vote)



to individual-level registration. The law required everyone on the register to be identified automatically by a National Insurance number or else additional forms of identification were required. This made the task more complex than before, especially for registering the mobile, the young, and those in rented accommodation. The procedural change meant that many eligible electors dropped off the register.<sup>76</sup>

Country	Office	PEI Index	Electoral laws	Procedures	Boundaries	Voter registration	Party registration	Media coverage	Campaign finance	Voting process	Vote count	Results	Electoral authorities
United Kingdom	2015 Legislative election	65	37	85	42	62	65	39	58	72	86	73	79
United Kingdom	2017 Legislative election	68	43	87	51	40	74	48	51	74	91	79	82
Score Change		3	6	2	9	-23	9	10	-7	3	5	6	3

### German Bundestag elections on 24 September 2017

In Germany, a highly professionalised electoral process and a robust legal framework provides firm foundations for the integrity of the conduct of elections. German elections are administered by the state (Lander).

The Mixed Member Proportional Electoral system allows citizens to cast two votes; one cast for the Proportional Representation party list in each region and one for the single member plurality seats. In total 598 members are returned to the Bundestag, with half (299) elected through regional party list proportional representation elections in each state and half elected in a second vote on the ballot through single member plurality districts. The system is highly proportional for parties that meet the 5% minimum vote threshold according to the share of ballots cast in the in the *second* party list votes. Compensatory allocations are used to achieve proportional results.

The outcome of the September 2017 Bundestag elections sent a shockwave through Germany. For the first time since the Nazi era, an authoritarian populist party – the Alternative for Germany (AfD) – won enough votes to enter the German federal parliament. In the 2017 elections, the AfD not only surpassed the 5 percent minimum needed to gain seats in the Bundestag, but won almost 13 percent of the vote, obtaining 94 of the 709 seats in the lower house of parliament. Three of the AfD seats were won by coming in first in a given district,



however; 91 seats were allocated through party list Proportional Representation.

Germany had been governed since 2013 by a coalition of the two largest parties, the Christian Democrats and Social Democrats, with Angela Merkel as Chancellor. Both major parties suffered significant losses in the 2017 elections, with the Christian Democrats winning 34.7 percent of the seats in the Bundestag and the Social Democrats winning 21.6 percent, their worst result since 1949.

Merkel managed to form a grand coalition government in combination with the SPD, with the deal needing ratification by SPD members. Negotiations over forming the governing coalition took four months, partly because none of the other parties were willing to enter a coalition that included the Alternative for Germany. The entry of AfD parliament greatly complicated attempts to form a stable coalition under Angela Merkel's leadership. The grand coalition leaves the AfD as the largest opposition party in parliament and they rival, or even slightly lead, the SPD in the post-election opinion polls.

Nevertheless, Germany's electoral system continued to hold up well under the weight of a rapidly evolving political and social context despite perennial concerns about campaign finance and media reporting that affect many countries. These elections also saw concern about racist and anti-immigrant statements made by some AfD candidates.<sup>77</sup> Overall the integrity of the elections to the Bundestag were well rated by experts. (81/100)

Country	Office	PEI Index	Electoral laws	Procedures	Boundaries	Voter registration	Party registration	Media coverage	Campaign finance	Voting process	Vote count	Results	Electoral authorities
Germany	2013 Legislative election	80	77	89	73	81	83	67	70	78	94	87	84
Germany	2017 Legislative election	81	81	97	73	81	76	67	71	80	96	83	91
Score Change		1	4	9	0	0	-7	0	1	2	2	-4	7



## V: Elections to Watch in 2018

Many elections are scheduled for 2018 and several will be closely watched, including those in Russia in March, Egypt in March and April, Malaysia in May, Zimbabwe in July, Brazil in September, and the U.S in November.


### The Russian presidential election 18 March 2018

The president is elected by absolute majority vote (50%+) through a two-round system. If no candidate wins a majority in the first round, there is a run off amongst the top two candidates three weeks later.

The 2012 presidential elections provided a comfortable lead for President Putin, who won two-thirds of the vote (64%) compared with his main competitor, Gennady Zyuganov (17.4%), with a 65% voter turnout rate. The contests were widely criticized, with the OSCE observer mission which concluded: "There was no real competition and abuse of government resources ensured that the ultimate winner of the election was never in doubt."<sup>78</sup>

In the run up to the 18 March 2018 contests President Putin is widely expected to win but he is likely to face seven candidates, including Pavel Grudinin (Communist Party), Vladimir Zhirinovskiy (Liberal Democratic party), and TV presenter Kseniya Sobchak. The strongest potential challenger, however, the anti-corruption campaigner Alexei Navalny, was barred from running.

EIP monitored the integrity of Russian elections in the 13 September 2015 regional elections where there were considerable variations across Russia.<sup>79</sup>



EIP also monitored the 2016 State Duma elections, estimating weaknesses across the board.

Country	Office	PEI Index	Electoral laws	Procedures	Boundaries	Voter registration	Party registration	Media coverage	Campaign finance	Voting process	Vote count	Results	Electoral authorities
Russia	2016 Legislative election	44	35	43	48	48	43	33	34	55	40	64	40

### The United States mid-term elections 6 November 2018

Ever since Florida in 2000, America has seen growing partisan polarization over basic electoral procedures and rights. A long series of vulnerabilities in the conduct of U.S. elections has been widely documented, for example in the 2014 report of the bipartisan [Presidential Commission on Election Administration](#). The [Pew Center's Election Performance Index](#) has repeatedly and carefully highlighted uneven standards across U.S. states.

The 2016 U.S. presidential campaign deepened concern about a series of issues in American elections.

The first centres on Republican concern about vulnerabilities to electoral 'fraud', meaning risks of double voting, impersonation, and non-qualified voting. This concern was amplified by President Trump's claims that he won the popular vote "if you deduct the millions of people who voted illegally".<sup>80</sup> Even after inauguration, President Trump continued to allege that more than three million fraudulent votes were cast in the 2016 elections. This could be dismissed as partisan hot-air, however, many Americans say they believe that Trump's claims are credible. In January 2017, for example, a poll found that 25 percent of registered voters said that they believed that millions of people improperly cast ballots in the November general election.<sup>81</sup>

In counter-reaction, the second widespread concern focuses on Democratic claims that stricter requirements for voter registration and balloting are designed to suppress voters' rights and thereby depress turnout among several sectors of the electorate like the poor, people with disabilities, or minority populations. The ACLU, for example, argues that voting rights are under attack from laws making it harder for Americans to cast a ballot, include measures cutting early voting, implementing voter ID laws, and purging electoral rolls.<sup>82</sup> Meanwhile news has been dominated by U.S. intelligence agency reports of



Russian meddling, and headlines about cyber-security threats to official voting records.<sup>83</sup> Foreign hackers wishing to sow doubts about the outcome of American elections through twitter-bot stories took advantage of ripe opportunities.<sup>84</sup> Nor surprisingly, public trust in American elections fell sharply; for example, the Gallup World Poll reports that in 2016 a third of Americans (30%) expressed confidence in the honesty of their elections, down from a majority (52%) a decade earlier.<sup>85</sup>

The contests also revived concern about several long-standing issues associated with gerrymandering, with several high-profile court cases revising districts in several states, as well as disparities between the popular vote and the Electoral College vote.

In the 2016 PEI-US survey experts evaluated the 2016 election across all 50 US states and the District of Columbia. The states which experts rated most highly in electoral integrity were Vermont, Idaho, New Hampshire, and Iowa. By contrast, states scoring worst in the perceptions of electoral integrity index in the 2016 election were Arizona (ranked last), followed by Wisconsin, Tennessee, Oklahoma, and Mississippi. Since then many states have sought to change electoral laws and there have been major changes in gerrymandering enforced by court order in several states, notably Pennsylvania.<sup>86</sup>

The 2018 US mid-term elections will be closely monitored to see whether there is further evidence of Russian interference through fake news seeking to sow discord, circulated on social media, or even more serious attempts at violating cybersecurity in official state registration and election records.

Country	Office	PEI Index	Electoral laws	Procedures	Boundaries	Voter registration	Party registration	Media coverage	Campaign finance	Voting process	Vote count	Results	Electoral authorities
United States	2014 Legislative election	62	31	75	11	35	80	69	46	67	76	77	72
United States	2012 Presidential Election	63	38	70	16	40	74	63	44	68	85	84	75
United States	2016 Presidential Election	59	38	72	16	43	80	46	54	69	76	46	71
Score Change		-4	0	1	0	3	6	-17	10	1	-9	-38	-4





**Table 5: Forthcoming presidential and parliamentary elections in 2018**

Country	Previous PEI Score	Election for	Date
Czech Republic	74	President (round 1)	1/12/18
Czech Republic	74	President (round 2)	1/26/18
Finland		President	1/28/18
Cyprus	73	President (round 1)	1/28/18
Cyprus	73	President (round 2)	2/4/18
Costa Rica		Legislative Assembly	2/4/18
Costa Rica		President (round 2)	2/4/18
Monaco		Parliament	2/11/18
Djibouti	25	National Assembly	2/23/18
El Salvador	49	Parliament	3/4/18
Italy	67	Chamber of Deputies	3/4/18
Sierra Leone	56	President & parliament	3/7/18
Colombia	61	Parliament	3/11/18
Cuba	57	Cuban National Assembly	3/11/18
Nepal		President	3/13/18
Grenada	66	Parliament	3/13/18
Russia		President	3/18/18
Turkmenistan	38	Parliament	3/25/18
Egypt	40	President (round 1)	3/26/18
Costa Rica	81	President (round 2)	4/1/18
Hungary	56	Parliament	4/8/18
Azerbaijan	41	President	4/11/18
Montenegro	41	President (round 1)	4/15/18
Venezuela	40	President	4/22/18
Paraguay	55	President & Parliament	4/22/18
Egypt	40	President (round 2)	4/24/18
Gabon		Parliament	4/28/18
Montenegro	41	President (round 2)	4/29/18
Lebanon		Parliament	5/6/18
Timor-Leste	63	Parliament	5/12/18
Iraq	44	Parliament	5/15/18
Colombia	59	President (round 1)	5/27/18
Barbados	63	Parliament	May
Malaysia	35	Parliament	May
Bhutan	60	Parliament	May
Colombia	59	President (round 2)	6/17/18
Mexico	62	President & parliament	7/1/18
Afghanistan		Parliament	7/7/18
Pakistan	50	Parliament	7/15/18
Mali	52	President (round 1)	7/29/18
Cambodia	32	Parliament	7/29/18
Zimbabwe	35	President & parliament	7/31/18



Country	Previous PEI Score	Election for	Date
Slovenia	79	Parliament	July
Iraq		President	July
Sao Tome & Principe	58	Parliament	August
Sweden	80	Parliament	9/9/18
Rwanda	64	Parliament	September
Swaziland	45	Parliament	September
Maldives	54	President	September
Guinea	43	Parliament	September
Cameroon	46	Parliament	September
Latvia	72	Parliament	10/7/18
Brazil	68	President & parliament	10/7/18
Luxembourg		Parliament	10/14/18
Brazil	68	President (round 2)	10/28/18
Georgia	64	President	October
Cameroon		President	October
Ireland		President	October
USA	62	Parliament	6/11/18
Mauritania	42	Parliament	November
Mali		Parliament	November
Bangladesh	38	Parliament	November
Madagascar	40	President & Parliament	November
Demo. Rep of Congo		President & parliament	12/23/18
Togo	38	Parliament	December

**Note:** The PEI index is the score in the previous equivalent election  $f$ , where available. The dates for elections are provisional and may change. The PEI expert survey is fielded for only the final round of multi-round electoral contests.

**Source:** IFES. <http://www.electionguide.org/>; Electoral Calendar: <http://www.mherrera.org/elections.html>; Perceptions of Electoral Integrity 6.0, Election-level.



"Kyrgyzstan Elections" (CC BY 2.0) by Ronan Shenhav



Table 6: All elections in PEI 2012-17

Country	Election	Office	Election Rank	PEI Index	Electoral laws	Procedures	Boundaries	Voter registration	Party registration	Media coverage	Campaign finance	Voting process	Vote count	Results	Electoral authorities
Afghanistan	AFG_14062014_P2	Pres.	267	32	47	24	48	20	33	60	23	28	24	26	26
Albania	ALB_25062017_L1	Leg.	160	54	38	64	51	68	52	47	39	45	67	71	57
Albania	ALB_23062013_L1	Leg.	151	54	52	65	59	59	49	47	27	46	76	79	55
Algeria	DZA_04052017_L1	Leg.	223	43	36	49	51	42	45	46	26	49	46	49	37
Algeria	DZA_17042014_P1	Pres.	226	43	25	48	44	45	36	44	26	53	60	48	35
Angola	AGO_23082017_L1	Leg.	232	41	43	38	53	32	49	30	33	47	41	49	40
Angola	AGO_31082012_L1	Leg.	255	36	28	37	51	23	47	31	22	39	36	44	35
Argentina	ARG_22102017_L1	Leg.	84	65	71	78	62	66	64	46	41	63	79	84	72
Argentina	ARG_22112015_L1	Leg.	96	63	68	74	64	66	70	55	35	61	71	76	66
Argentina	ARG_27102013_L1	Leg.	78	66	70	83	66	66	70	54	42	62	78	77	70
Armenia	ARM_02042017_L1	Leg.	180	51	51	44	65	53	57	57	29	43	59	63	51
Armenia	ARM_18022013_P1	Pres.	222	44	54	49	50	26	50	50	31	38	60	30	41
Australia	AUS_02072016_L1	Leg.	59	70	66	88	74	60	78	45	50	72	82	74	87
Australia	AUS_07092013_L1	Leg.	61	70	65	89	67	56	69	47	57	72	82	75	88
Austria	AUT_15102017_L1	Leg.	25	77	80	88	71	86	74	54	59	82	90	79	87
Austria	AUT_04122016_P2	Pres.	14	80	78	87	77	79	77	69	72	80	92	81	85
Austria	AUT_22052016_P2	Pres.	28	76	91	67	72	77	78	63	76	81	86	66	73
Austria	AUT_29092013_L1	Leg.	24	77	78	90	74	85	70	59	55	79	91	84	89
Azerbaijan	AZE_01112015_L1	Leg.	273	29	26	24	32	36	34	16	10	38	36	56	12
Azerbaijan	AZE_09102013_P1	Pres.	235	41	44	37	59	45	42	31	31	42	44	46	40
Bahamas	BHS_10052017_L1	Leg.	159	54	43	60	42	38	45	58	47	50	69	72	61
Bahrain	BHR_29112014_L2	Leg.	246	38	18	44	21	36	39	35	26	46	50	56	31
Bangladesh	BGD_05012014_L1	Leg.	247	38	42	46	41	45	38	49	23	26	49	40	36
Barbados	BRB_21022013_L1	Leg.	97	63	67	68	62	55	56	63	34	58	83	79	73
Belarus	BLR_11092016_L1	Leg.	204	47	39	54	69	47	48	36	36	52	43	52	44
Belarus	BLR_11102015_P1	Pres.	240	40	28	41	58	45	44	28	27	48	34	61	32
Belarus	BLR_23092012_L1	Leg.	269	32	13	36	48	45	31	24	22	41	23	52	16
Belgium	BEL_25052014_L1	Leg.	52	71	66	81	61	76	73	64	64	67	79	79	77
Belize	BLZ_04112015_L1	Leg.	153	54	43	64	43	42	60	54	30	52	70	64	69
Benin	BEN_20032016_P2	Pres.	56	71	86	88	80	54	74	62	37	58	96	75	87
Benin	BEN_26042015_L1	Leg.	65	69	83	77	72	51	65	70	41	57	85	80	88
Bhutan	BTN_13072013_L2	Leg.	116	60	52	75	58	46	45	66	56	56	66	68	74
Bolivia	BOL_12102014_P1	Pres.	144	56	55	63	55	45	61	54	33	57	62	70	54
Bosnia	BIH_12102014_P1	Pres.	175	52	39	68	41	50	41	45	35	51	67	74	66
Botswana	BWA_24102014_L1	Leg.	134	58	38	83	48	59	67	36	17	62	75	77	75
Brazil	BRA_26102014_P2	Pres.	67	68	74	87	71	76	63	47	38	66	92	64	83
Bulgaria	BGR_26032017_L1	Leg.	133	58	53	70	63	43	61	41	43	48	81	79	65
Bulgaria	BGR_13112016_P2	Pres.	119	60	64	70	62	43	69	46	42	50	74	80	66
Bulgaria	BGR_05102014_L1	Leg.	101	63	76	65	66	48	66	50	40	60	81	73	71
Bulgaria	BGR_12052013_L1	Leg.	190	50	51	52	52	31	63	45	33	52	67	40	54
Burkina Faso	BFA_29112015_P2	Pres.	83	65	73	85	66	50	53	67	45	47	85	81	82
Burkina Faso	BFA_02122012_L1	Leg.	239	41	53	56	19	44	52	54	8	31	50	40	48
Burundi	BDI_21072015_P1	Pres.	284	22	25	13	37	18	20	26	7	23	42	15	17
Burundi	BDI_29062015_L1	Leg.	277	27	33	20	36	15	38	25	15	29	34	32	25
Cambodia	KHM_28072013_L1	Leg.	268	32	29	37	32	13	38	28	19	34	57	25	28
Cameroon	CMR_30092013_L1	Leg.	206	46	47	59	36	44	49	39	23	38	67	52	63
Canada	CAN_19102015_L1	Leg.	36	75	51	90	78	58	74	63	68	73	89	86	89
Cape Verde	CPV_02102016_P1	Pres.	60	70	81	85	66	56	73	66	55	59	82	84	77
Cape Verde	CPV_20032016_L1	Leg.	54	71	79	88	51	62	73	71	57	69	78	77	79
Central Afr. Rep.	CAF_14022016_P2	Pres.	169	53	64	52	47	33	44	57	49	46	66	69	55
Chad	TCD_10042016_P1	Pres.	271	31	42	19	40	33	34	27	10	38	35	35	31
Chile	CHL_17122017_P2	Pres.	34	75	82	89	61	69	71	54	67	69	93	93	87
Chile	CHL_15122013_P2	Pres.	76	67	53	89	56	54	65	53	48	53	89	90	88

Country	Election	Office	Election Rank	PEI Index	Electoral laws	Procedures	Boundaries	Voter registration	Party registration	Media coverage	Campaign finance	Voting process	Vote count	Results	Electoral authorities
Colombia	COL_09032014_L1	Leg.	109	61	67	71	68	49	72	57	42	41	79	72	77
Colombia	COL_15062014_P2	Pres.	129	59	62	79	52	37	56	44	35	55	79	74	76
Comoros	COM_10042016_P2	Pres.	238	41	67	34	58	25	54	51	23	25	65	31	31
Comoros	COM_22022015_L2	Leg.	187	50	64	59	50	30	56	51	27	39	67	60	61
Congo, Rep.	COG_20032016_P1	Pres.	280	25	17	14	32	19	44	23	13	31	38	17	14
Congo, Rep.	COG_05082012_L2	Leg.	270	31	28	38	42	17	33	27	8	44	27	50	23
Congo, Rep.	COG_30072017_L2	Leg.	266	32	7	18	30	6	29	30	28	43	48	49	40
Costa Rica	CRI_06042014_P2	Pres.	10	81	80	97	66	78	79	57	65	82	99	94	97
Croatia	HRV_11092016_L1	Leg.	111	61	63	67	43	50	57	48	51	59	81	85	66
Croatia	HRV_08112015_L1	Leg.	66	68	60	80	55	57	68	53	59	64	88	87	77
Croatia	HRV_11012015_P2	Pres.	87	65	64	77	51	55	64	48	59	63	80	79	72
Cuba	CUB_03022013_L1	Leg.	138	57	29	76	41	73	59	39	45	54	67	86	56
Cyprus	CYP_22052016_L1	Leg.	71	67	58	85	64	67	61	47	48	63	86	86	77
Cyprus	CYP_24022013_P2	Pres.	44	73	83	87	66	74	71	58	52	71	87	88	80
Czech Rep.	CZE_21102017_L1	Leg.	33	75	79	82	73	91	80	55	63	70	86	81	83
Czech Rep.	CZE_25012013_P2	Pres.	41	74	79	75	76	92	82	53	57	69	93	79	77
Czech Rep.	CZE_25102013_L1	Leg.	21	77	85	90	75	87	77	58	55	72	94	89	86
Czech Rep.	CZE_13102012_S1	Leg.	27	76	77	91	68	84	75	60	65	67	93	86	85
Denmark	DNK_18062015_L1	Leg.	1	87	91	98	84	94	90	72	72	79	98	94	93
Djibouti	DJI_08042016_P1	Pres.	263	34	26	47	39	26	29	33	16	35	43	46	36
Djibouti	DJI_22022013_L1	Leg.	279	25	18	24	45	25	20	26	16	30	22	33	20
Dominican Rep.	DOM_15052016_P1	Pres.	218	44	43	51	54	55	49	38	18	45	55	39	44
Ecuador	ECU_02042017_P2	Pres.	215	45	33	51	42	37	51	41	34	59	50	34	41
Ecuador	ECU_17022013_P1	Pres.	145	55	42	65	39	58	57	43	38	63	68	68	52
Egypt	EGY_02122015_L1	Leg.	208	46	27	60	37	52	56	33	28	48	57	59	46
Egypt	EGY_26052014_P1	Pres.	241	40	29	50	52	33	21	31	23	50	52	57	40
El Salvador	SLV_01032015_L1	Leg.	191	49	53	44	58	52	60	49	37	47	49	54	42
El Salvador	SLV_09032014_P2	Pres.	125	59	59	80	59	47	60	44	34	61	85	43	74
Equatorial Gn.	GNQ_12112017_L1	Leg.	285	22	16	19	36	24	13	14	11	25	26	46	15
Equatorial Gn.	GNQ_24042016_P1	Pres.	276	28	19	21	37	32	27	14	13	30	33	57	25
Equatorial Gn.	GNQ_26052013_L1	Leg.	282	24	13	23	38	23	29	12	15	23	27	50	13
Estonia	EST_01032015_L1	Leg.	15	79	75	84	70	86	75	68	59	89	87	85	83
Ethiopia	ETH_24052015_L1	Leg.	281	24	15	22	36	31	29	21	19	23	19	41	13
Fiji	FJI_17092014_L1	Leg.	171	53	30	72	49	56	48	37	32	61	63	59	63
Finland	FIN_19042015_L1	Leg.	3	86	80	98	72	95	93	70	70	83	99	96	96
France	FRA_07052017_P2	Pres.	30	76	70	92	66	63	79	63	68	72	93	74	87
France	FRA_18062017_L2	Leg.	42	74	68	94	71	65	72	63	66	70	89	70	83
Gabon	GBN_27082016_P2	Pres.	265	34	33	34	37	48	62	26	18	38	34	21	19
Gambia	GMB_06042017_L1	Leg.	177	52	46	68	41	37	52	47	25	45	77	68	69
Gambia	GMB_01122016_P1	Pres.	196	48	25	76	54	39	53	30	28	45	66	42	69
Georgia	GEO_08102016_L1	Leg.	110	61	53	77	50	62	56	58	46	59	71	72	71
Georgia	GEO_27102013_P1	Pres.	89	64	76	72	56	58	56	57	51	59	82	78	71
Georgia	GEO_01102012_L1	Leg.	161	54	55	62	54	45	53	42	27	53	75	69	57
Germany	DEU_24092017_L1	Leg.	11	81	81	97	73	81	76	67	71	80	96	83	91
Germany	DEU_22092013_L1	Leg.	13	80	77	89	73	81	83	67	70	78	94	87	84
Ghana	GHA_07122016_P1	Pres.	46	73	83	79	71	57	88	70	46	61	89	83	85
Ghana	GHA_07122012_P1	Pres.	136	57	77	62	59	48	74	55	31	47	80	45	62
Greece	GRC_20092015_L1	Leg.	106	62	44	88	51	58	59	47	39	56	83	85	75
Greece	GRC_25012015_L1	Leg.	58	71	49	93	58	76	71	55	50	64	92	90	86
Grenada	GRD_19022013_L1	Leg.	79	66	62	92	56	54	80	42	22	56	92	93	88
Guatemala	GTM_25102015_P2	Pres.	194	48	46	62	63	33	38	41	20	36	77	63	67
Guinea	GIN_11102015_P1	Pres.	236	41	40	46	42	27	47	39	25	39	58	41	45
Guinea	GIN_28092013_L1	Leg.	225	43	50	28	39	21	64	55	20	44	55	55	34
Guinea-Bissau	GNB_18052014_P2	Pres.	150	55	63	66	53	50	55	56	31	50	66	58	60
Guyana	GUY_11052015_L1	Leg.	168	53	43	77	49	62	63	36	30	47	67	44	74
Haiti	HTI_20112016_P1	Pres.	262	34	42	38	36	27	32	48	27	29	39	27	39
Haiti	HTI_25102015_L2	Leg.	275	28	41	14	51	20	44	55	8	14	37	21	22
Honduras	HND_26112017_P1	Pres.	274	29	20	24	45	24	50	32	18	37	17	28	15
Honduras	HND_24112013_P1	Pres.	214	45	38	51	45	40	59	36	30	47	70	30	45



Country	Election	Office	Election Rank	PEI Index	Electoral laws	Procedures	Boundaries	Voter registration	Party registration	Media coverage	Campaign finance	Voting process	Vote count	Results	Electoral authorities
Hungary	HUN_06042014_L1	Leg.	142	56	30	69	30	68	58	32	38	65	81	73	58
Iceland	ISL_28102017_L1	Leg.	23	77	64	91	58	93	82	58	61	79	91	86	82
Iceland	ISL_25062016_P1	Pres.	2	86	89	96	74	95	84	67	76	85	100	94	95
Iceland	ISL_29102016_L1	Leg.	4	85	79	73	78	95	90	70	79	85	99	91	91
Iceland	ISL_27042013_L1	Leg.	20	78	70	94	60	86	82	65	60	81	91	87	81
India	IND_12052014_L1	Leg.	128	59	72	72	58	40	57	55	32	53	72	67	77
Indonesia	IDN_09042014_L1	Leg.	165	53	58	57	66	38	62	53	23	52	63	57	63
Indonesia	IDN_09072014_P1	Pres.	117	60	64	68	62	43	68	54	44	61	74	51	72
Iran	IRN_19052017_P1	Pres.	203	47	25	66	34	49	31	48	37	50	59	62	52
Iran	IRN_26022016_L1	Leg.	209	46	29	62	49	65	31	36	25	47	54	71	45
Iran	IRN_14062013_P1	Pres.	149	55	34	73	50	62	20	56	47	57	62	81	59
Iraq	IRQ_30042014_L1	Leg.	220	44	45	53	38	36	46	46	19	48	49	51	46
Ireland	IRL_26022016_L1	Leg.	55	71	77	90	70	32	82	60	57	61	89	86	77
Israel	ISR_17032015_L1	Leg.	47	73	74	89	64	79	77	49	61	59	92	89	84
Israel	ISR_22012013_L1	Leg.	38	75	79	94	65	79	75	66	62	56	89	86	89
Italy	ITA_24022013_L1	Leg.	74	67	44	86	66	75	66	53	49	64	80	76	79
Ivory Coast	CIV_18122016_L1	Leg.	156	54	63	73	40	44	58	42	33	49	73	62	64
Ivory Coast	CIV_25102015_P1	Pres.	123	59	67	73	47	58	67	46	34	54	76	71	64
Jamaica	JAM_25022016_L1	Leg.	73	67	72	87	68	60	73	61	45	46	85	75	82
Japan	JPN_22102017_L1	Leg.	77	66	46	82	44	68	61	52	59	66	83	78	81
Japan	JPN_10072016_L1	Leg.	72	67	48	79	63	77	70	50	58	59	85	74	75
Japan	JPN_14122014_L1	Leg.	57	71	67	86	54	77	75	58	64	64	77	85	78
Japan	JPN_21072013_L1	Leg.	75	67	51	89	45	71	66	50	55	66	86	76	74
Japan	JPN_16122012_L1	Leg.	69	67	53	83	51	75	63	59	59	68	81	76	72
Jordan	JOR_20092016_L1	Leg.	167	53	46	78	50	48	60	55	36	46	56	48	64
Jordan	JOR_23012013_L1	Leg.	210	46	30	57	21	47	55	45	27	47	57	46	63
Kazakhstan	KAZ_20032016_L1	Leg.	195	48	35	58	56	50	38	38	37	54	54	65	43
Kazakhstan	KAZ_26042015_P1	Pres.	228	43	29	48	45	48	35	27	33	48	57	62	40
Kenya	KEN_08082017_P1	Pres.	201	47	64	41	60	35	64	52	23	48	57	38	40
Kenya	KEN_26102017_P1	Pres.	237	41	59	38	55	40	58	55	17	26	58	26	36
Kenya	KEN_04032013_P1	Pres.	233	41	70	31	52	17	58	62	20	34	36	55	26
Korea, Rep.	KOR_09052017_P1	Pres.	50	72	54	87	62	76	68	56	66	72	85	76	83
Korea, Rep.	KOR_13042016_L1	Leg.	53	71	46	85	55	79	66	54	63	75	90	81	83
Korea, Rep.	KOR_19122012_P1	Pres.	26	77	59	88	68	89	76	57	64	78	96	85	83
Kuwait	KWT_26112016_L1	Leg.	174	52	30	64	57	62	47	48	25	55	68	67	57
Kuwait	KWT_27072013_L1	Leg.	131	58	47	80	51	54	70	53	33	52	73	63	69
Kuwait	KWT_01122012_L1	Leg.	186	51	37	63	38	67	52	52	19	61	75	29	52
Kyrgyzstan	KGZ_15102017_P1	Pres.	178	52	57	56	59	45	51	48	31	50	67	60	52
Kyrgyzstan	KGZ_04102015_L1	Leg.	152	54	54	64	55	43	43	52	38	53	71	65	59
Laos	LAO_20032016_L1	Leg.	205	47	17	67	53	58	40	25	40	44	55	85	38
Latvia	LVA_04102014_L1	Leg.	51	72	72	83	70	65	72	61	56	69	88	77	78
Lesotho	LSO_03062017_L1	Leg.	114	61	76	74	68	44	63	53	34	50	79	69	75
Lesotho	LSO_28022015_L1	Leg.	93	64	80	82	70	49	61	48	39	56	78	77	78
Liberia	LBR_26122017_P2	Pres.	124	59	81	63	66	34	65	50	33	52	67	57	67
Lithuania	LTU_09102016_L1	Leg.	19	78	83	85	81	82	86	70	63	72	83	88	79
Lithuania	LTU_25052014_P2	Pres.	8	82	92	91	71	76	85	67	75	79	94	90	86
Lithuania	LTU_28102012_L2	Leg.	48	72	86	69	75	74	85	64	55	69	85	70	72
Macedonia	MKD_11122016_L1	Leg.	200	48	44	57	51	32	55	37	32	48	60	55	47
Macedonia	MKD_27042014_P2	Pres.	197	48	49	56	46	24	57	28	30	51	72	49	54
Madagascar	MDG_20122013_P2	Pres.	242	40	36	41	35	18	48	44	20	36	58	45	49
Malawi	MWI_20052014_P1	Pres.	198	48	70	49	61	30	69	49	18	42	50	45	55
Malaysia	MYS_05052013_L1	Leg.	257	35	15	43	10	21	47	22	21	56	44	42	32
Maldives	MDV_22032014_L1	Leg.	122	59	60	75	47	48	58	58	49	60	63	76	56
Maldives	MDV_16112013_P2	Pres.	155	54	59	64	58	43	62	47	31	53	67	67	48
Mali	MLI_11082013_P2	Pres.	172	52	62	62	48	25	51	53	39	45	69	67	58
Malta	MLT_03062017_L1	Leg.	90	64	47	84	52	70	65	40	37	63	87	83	79
Malta	MLT_09032013_L1	Leg.	82	65	50	86	53	62	68	46	39	65	88	80	78
Mauritania	MRT_21062014_P1	Pres.	207	46	53	38	65	25	45	52	37	51	56	35	48
Mauritania	MRT_21122013_L2	Leg.	231	42	50	56	30	23	40	47	22	40	48	46	56



Country	Election	Office	Election Rank	PEI Index	Electoral laws	Procedures	Boundaries	Voter registration	Party registration	Media coverage	Campaign finance	Voting process	Vote count	Results	Electoral authorities
Mauritius	MUS_10122014_L1	Leg.	88	64	64	90	56	72	60	47	32	59	87	77	79
Mexico	MEX_07062015_L1	Leg.	176	52	49	66	58	60	46	43	34	44	73	53	62
Mexico	MEX_01072012_P1	Pres.	102	62	58	75	71	76	59	56	44	58	85	48	67
Micronesia	FSM_07032017_L1	Leg.	140	56	72	56	70	35	67	41	40	56	66	60	63
Micronesia	FSM_03032015_L1	Leg.	126	59	60	68	60	43	63	56	27	61	71	69	68
Micronesia	FSM_05032013_L1	Leg.	104	62	63	68	72	44	76	61	37	60	69	66	67
Moldova	MDA_13112016_P2	Pres.	148	55	44	64	48	45	68	35	33	57	78	58	63
Moldova	MDA_30112014_L1	Leg.	143	56	58	64	65	57	46	48	32	56	78	60	58
Mongolia	MNG_07072017_P2	Pres.	99	63	40	80	44	69	50	61	43	64	87	72	73
Mongolia	MNG_26062016_L1	Leg.	92	64	50	69	49	68	62	61	40	63	92	75	69
Mongolia	MNG_26062013_P1	Pres.	94	64	56	78	59	61	66	47	45	64	84	69	71
Montenegro	MNE_16102016_L1	Leg.	185	51	59	52	59	40	61	39	31	54	67	50	46
Montenegro	MNE_07042013_P1	Pres.	234	41	52	50	55	31	56	33	23	43	45	35	33
Montenegro	MNE_14102012_L1	Leg.	108	62	81	71	61	48	63	60	23	55	88	79	60
Morocco	MAR_07102016_L1	Leg.	137	57	73	70	68	40	50	59	40	43	74	73	56
Mozambique	MOZ_15102014_P1	Pres.	260	35	36	38	47	26	42	33	20	40	32	37	33
Myanmar (Burma)	MMR_08112015_L1	Leg.	157	54	42	72	55	30	40	49	34	55	74	70	69
Namibia	NAM_28112014_P1	Pres.	118	60	67	63	69	53	70	51	35	56	64	79	68
Nepal	NPL_07122017_L1	Leg.	127	59	75	73	59	58	64	58	24	45	79	73	68
Nepal	NPL_19112013_L1	Leg.	163	53	73	63	57	44	57	52	35	42	66	47	65
Netherlands	NLD_15032017_L1	Leg.	7	82	94	91	76	86	81	75	70	72	92	93	90
Netherlands	NLD_12092012_L1	Leg.	18	78	91	91	65	85	78	61	63	75	87	88	88
New Zealand	NZL_23092017_L1	Leg.	29	76	70	93	77	63	85	48	61	77	88	81	88
New Zealand	NZL_20092014_L1	Leg.	31	76	71	95	65	55	83	55	55	78	87	89	88
Nicaragua	NIC_06112016_P1	Pres.	254	36	31	40	49	39	37	47	27	32	35	43	26
Niger	NER_20032016_P2	Pres.	179	52	75	56	69	33	44	44	29	48	74	42	66
Nigeria	NGA_28032015_L1	Leg.	162	53	75	66	63	42	60	49	20	31	73	67	70
Norway	NOR_09112017_L1	Leg.	5	83	79	90	73	90	82	66	77	83	93	93	93
Norway	NOR_09092013_L1	Leg.	6	83	81	92	70	87	84	67	73	81	97	92	91
Oman	OMN_25102015_L1	Leg.	113	61	51	80	51	58	58	54	41	62	74	78	59
Pakistan	PAK_11052013_L1	Leg.	189	50	68	57	51	54	38	59	36	37	62	45	60
Panama	PAN_04052014_P1	Pres.	115	61	55	77	54	65	65	54	24	63	75	64	71
Papua New Guinea	PNG_08072017_L1	Leg.	261	35	41	23	49	11	56	49	16	25	35	37	43
Paraguay	PRY_21042013_P1	Pres.	146	55	63	70	58	45	54	40	24	51	73	79	57
Peru	PER_05062016_P2	Pres.	81	65	71	56	59	76	55	56	49	66	88	76	71
Peru	PER_10042016_L1	Leg.	120	60	58	44	67	69	63	51	40	60	80	73	56
Philippines	PHL_09052016_P1	Pres.	147	55	52	68	55	40	62	57	24	50	76	52	66
Philippines	PHL_13052013_L1	Leg.	192	48	61	60	51	26	63	51	20	38	60	51	55
Poland	POL_24052015_P2	Pres.	43	73	79	82	69	74	76	55	60	74	82	80	80
Poland	POL_25102015_L1	Leg.	35	75	79	87	77	77	74	51	63	74	86	85	82
Portugal	PRT_24012016_P1	Pres.	22	77	83	93	66	52	85	57	65	72	95	92	90
Portugal	PRT_04102015_L1	Leg.	49	72	71	85	65	46	72	58	59	73	89	83	80
Romania	ROU_11122016_L1	Leg.	85	65	61	79	54	43	58	50	58	65	82	82	77
Romania	ROU_16112014_P2	Pres.	166	53	40	54	51	30	66	41	43	45	80	72	56
Romania	ROU_09122012_L1	Leg.	193	48	46	59	38	29	58	32	32	46	67	68	50
Russia	RUS_18092016_L1	Leg.	217	44	35	43	48	48	43	33	34	55	40	64	40
Rwanda	RWA_04082017_P1	Pres.	183	51	28	58	52	74	48	31	34	46	61	83	56
Rwanda	RWA_16092013_L1	Leg.	91	64	62	71	60	71	60	54	60	60	70	77	65
Samoa	WSM_04032016_L1	Leg.	158	54	33	67	59	38	54	59	33	50	69	60	66
Sao Tome & Principe	STP_07082016_P2	Pres.	199	48	55	63	52	40	48	39	25	50	55	50	51
Sao Tome & Principe	STP_12102014_L1	Leg.	132	58	73	80	60	51	68	43	27	45	72	71	72
Senegal	SEN_30072017_L1	Leg.	229	43	32	48	57	11	49	41	19	37	70	53	50
Serbia	SRB_02042017_P1	Pres.	227	43	47	52	61	30	49	17	30	53	53	40	40
Serbia	SRB_24042016_L1	Leg.	211	46	42	53	54	33	53	38	36	50	52	45	43
Serbia	SRB_16032014_L1	Leg.	135	57	54	74	57	38	57	35	34	57	79	79	67
Sierra Leone	SLE_17112012_P1	Pres.	141	56	67	78	46	65	63	29	32	54	63	63	72
Singapore	SGP_11092015_L1	Leg.	170	53	27	76	14	77	46	33	35	60	69	75	58
Slovak Republic	SVK_05032016_L1	Leg.	39	74	70	85	62	82	74	67	57	77	81	84	78
Slovak Republic	SVK_29032014_P2	Pres.	37	75	74	83	68	74	87	62	55	65	92	86	83



Country	Election	Office	Election Rank	PEI Index	Electoral laws	Procedures	Boundaries	Voter registration	Party registration	Media coverage	Campaign finance	Voting process	Vote count	Results	Electoral authorities
Slovenia	SVN_12112017_P2	Pres.	9	82	86	94	75	85	87	60	69	81	93	88	87
Slovenia	SVN_13072014_L1	Leg.	16	79	78	78	66	93	77	69	69	80	94	76	87
Slovenia	SVN_02122012_P2	Pres.	40	74	69	88	59	87	70	50	57	79	92	80	86
Solomon Islands	SLB_19112014_L1	Leg.	139	57	73	67	70	41	59	61	29	40	72	63	68
South Africa	ZAF_07052014_L1	Leg.	95	63	74	78	65	52	60	57	36	63	75	73	71
Spain	ESP_26062016_L1	Leg.	63	70	42	84	62	73	75	52	55	62	91	90	81
Spain	ESP_20122015_L1	Leg.	64	69	37	83	53	75	73	47	52	65	91	93	82
Sri Lanka	LKA_08012015_P1	Pres.	182	51	57	68	51	49	46	35	28	45	63	62	69
Sri Lanka	LKA_17082015_L1	Leg.	173	52	59	73	47	47	51	41	22	50	73	54	69
Sudan	SDN_13042015_P1	Pres.	224	43	26	50	41	38	48	37	26	46	57	59	44
Suriname	SUR_25052015_L1	Leg.	188	50	50	65	48	45	60	39	27	48	58	65	54
Swaziland	SWZ_20092013_L1	Leg.	212	45	25	64	28	48	31	47	37	45	62	55	49
Sweden	SWE_14092014_L1	Leg.	12	80	79	90	75	88	80	61	66	79	93	87	94
Switzerland	CHE_18102015_L1	Leg.	17	79	77	89	72	88	82	63	41	82	93	92	91
Syria	SYR_13042016_L1	Leg.	283	23	10	19	30	14	25	15	7	22	24	67	16
Syria	SYR_03062014_P1	Pres.	278	27	9	29	33	19	18	17	13	29	37	60	27
Taiwan	TWN_16012016_P1	Pres.	45	73	65	94	64	84	83	61	51	54	94	86	88
Tajikistan	TJK_01032015_L1	Leg.	258	35	19	46	38	27	28	31	17	39	48	55	36
Tajikistan	TJK_06112013_P1	Pres.	256	36	16	39	45	20	29	32	28	36	49	59	34
Tanzania	TZA_25102015_P1	Pres.	221	44	33	60	44	32	54	43	23	43	56	39	46
Thailand	THA_02022014_L1	Leg.	181	51	76	43	70	59	53	47	49	48	59	34	34
Timor-Leste	TLS_20032017_P1	Pres.	112	61	66	75	53	55	63	50	35	58	76	77	69
Timor-Leste	TLS_22072017_L1	Leg.	100	63	55	80	60	47	59	53	41	61	81	76	76
Togo	TGO_25042015_P1	Pres.	249	38	43	43	26	27	51	49	29	38	38	33	33
Togo	TGO_25072013_L1	Leg.	248	38	25	39	29	19	42	48	25	44	41	40	48
Tonga	TON_16112017_L1	Leg.	105	62	65	81	56	53	62	50	41	58	74	69	79
Tonga	TON_27112014_L1	Leg.	70	67	73	67	71	58	74	55	47	69	86	65	77
Tunisia	TUN_21122014_P2	Pres.	62	70	78	86	78	56	73	53	47	68	87	61	86
Tunisia	TUN_26102014_L1	Leg.	80	66	74	75	69	44	72	60	47	59	79	81	71
Turkey	TUR_01112015_L1	Leg.	216	44	28	60	46	50	43	25	24	43	61	68	45
Turkey	TUR_07062015_L1	Leg.	202	47	22	68	38	49	49	28	27	46	71	69	52
Turkey	TUR_10082014_P1	Pres.	184	51	43	62	50	57	51	27	29	53	68	68	53
Turkmenistan	TKM_12022017_P1	Pres.	272	31	25	36	45	35	21	9	18	35	30	75	21
Turkmenistan	TKM_15122013_L1	Leg.	250	38	20	55	48	41	30	20	23	36	46	71	34
Uganda	UGA_18022016_P1	Pres.	253	38	33	35	31	33	52	42	14	33	56	41	41
Ukraine	UKR_25052014_P1	Pres.	121	59	70	70	53	41	63	57	39	50	70	78	71
Ukraine	UKR_26102014_L1	Leg.	164	53	59	64	53	45	53	49	34	47	65	66	58
Ukraine	UKR_28102012_L1	Leg.	244	40	37	42	44	32	41	39	23	51	39	40	39
United Kingdom	GBR_08062017_L1	Leg.	68	68	43	87	51	40	74	48	51	74	91	79	82
United Kingdom	GBR_07052015_L1	Leg.	86	65	37	85	42	62	65	39	58	72	86	73	79
United States	USA_08112016_P1	Pres.	130	59	38	72	16	43	80	46	54	69	76	46	71
United States	USA_04112014_L1	Leg.	107	62	31	75	11	35	80	69	46	67	76	77	72
United States	USA_06112012_P1	Pres.	98	63	38	70	16	40	74	63	44	68	85	84	75
Uruguay	URY_30112014_P2	Pres.	32	75	91	94	71	78	72	65	58	56	92	94	84
Uzbekistan	UZB_04122016_P1	Pres.	252	38	25	57	47	37	19	17	20	37	51	84	28
Uzbekistan	UZB_04012015_L2	Leg.	251	38	27	54	53	39	29	24	21	44	42	65	20
Uzbekistan	UZB_29032015_P1	Pres.	245	39	27	50	37	35	30	25	26	43	48	73	36
Vanuatu	VUT_22012016_L1	Leg.	103	62	75	69	56	24	72	68	38	58	73	72	79
Venezuela	VEN_06122015_L1	Leg.	230	42	33	49	36	42	51	27	22	47	50	65	40
Venezuela	VEN_14042013_P1	Pres.	243	40	33	37	42	43	58	38	25	46	39	38	31
Venezuela	VEN_07102012_P1	Pres.	154	54	48	61	51	58	67	29	22	61	69	79	49
Vietnam	VNM_22052016_L1	Leg.	264	34	14	41	36	33	27	20	25	42	39	54	35
Zambia	ZMB_11082016_P1	Pres.	213	45	60	50	58	42	55	32	28	45	48	33	57
Zambia	ZMB_20012015_P1	Pres.	219	44	53	54	61	32	50	30	27	33	58	54	50
Zimbabwe	ZWE_31072013_L1	Leg.	259	35	27	29	31	15	50	33	26	36	46	50	32



## VI: Technical Appendix: Performance Indicators, Methods and Data

**Aims:** The project launched the expert survey of Perceptions of Electoral Integrity on 1<sup>st</sup> July 2012. The method of pooling expert knowledge has been used for years for measuring complex issues, such as to assess the good governance, levels of corruption, and processes of democratization.

**Global Coverage:** The PEI survey of electoral integrity covers independent nation-states around the world which have held direct (popular) elections for the national parliament or presidential elections. The criteria for inclusion are listed below. The elections analysed in this report cover the period from 1 July 2012 to 31 December 2017. In total, PEI 6.0 covers 285 elections in 164 nations.<sup>87</sup>

**Table A1: Country coverage**

Criteria for inclusion in the survey	#	Definition and source
Total number of independent nation-states	194	Membership of the United Nations (plus Taiwan)
<b>Excluded categories</b>		
Micro-states	12	Population less than 100,000 as of 2013: Andorra, Antigua & Barbuda, Dominica, Liechtenstein, Marshall Islands, Monaco, Nauru, Palau, San Marino, Seychelles, St. Kitts and Nevis, and Tuvalu.
Without de jure direct (popular) elections for the lower house of the national legislature	5	Brunei Darussalam, China, Qatar, UAE, and Saudi Arabia
State has constitutional provisions for direct (popular) elections for the lower house of the national legislature, but none have been held since independence or within the last 30 years ( <i>de facto</i> )	3	Eritrea, Somalia, and South Sudan
Sub-total of nation-states included in the survey	174	
<b>Covered to date in the PEI 6.0 dataset (from mid-2012 to end-2017)</b>	<b>164</b>	<b>94% of all nation-states included in the survey</b>

Because of the selection rules, elections contained in each cumulative release of the PEI survey can be treated as a representative cross-section of *all* national presidential and legislative elections around the world (with the exception of the exclusion of micro-states). The countries in PEI 6.0 are broadly similar in





political and socio-economic characteristics to those not yet covered in the survey, with the exception of being slightly larger in population size.

**Respondents:** For each country, the project identified around forty election experts, defined as a political scientist (or other social scientist in a related discipline) who had demonstrated knowledge of the electoral process in a particular country (such as through publications, membership of a relevant research group or network, or university employment). The selection sought a roughly 50:50 balance between international and domestic experts, the latter defined by location or citizenship. In total, 3,253 completed responses were received in the survey, representing just under one third of the experts that the project contacted (28%).

**Concepts:** The idea of electoral integrity is defined by the project to refer to agreed international conventions and global norms, applying universally to all countries worldwide through the election cycle, including during the pre-election period, the campaign, on polling day, and its aftermath.<sup>88</sup>

**Measurement:** To measure this concept, the PEI survey questionnaire includes 49 items on electoral integrity (see Table A1) ranging over the whole electoral cycle. These items fell into eleven sequential sub-dimensions, as shown. Most attention in detecting fraud focuses upon the final stages of the voting process, such as the role of observers in preventing ballot-stuffing, vote-rigging and manipulated results. Drawing upon the notion of a ‘menu of manipulation’, however, the concept of an electoral cycle suggests that failure in even one step in the sequence, or one link in the chain, can undermine electoral integrity.<sup>89</sup> The PEI 6.0 Codebook provides detailed description of all variables and imputation procedures. A copy and all the data can be downloaded from <https://thedata.harvard.edu/dataverse/PEI>.

The electoral integrity items in the survey were recoded so that a higher score consistently represents a more positive evaluation. Missing data was estimated based on multiple imputation of chained equations in groups composing of the eleven sub-dimensions. The Perceptions of Electoral Integrity (PEI) Index is an additive function of the 49 imputed variables, standardized to 100-points. Sub-indices of the eleven sub-dimensions in the electoral cycle are summations of the imputed individual variables.<sup>90</sup>

**Validity and reliability tests:** The results of the pilot study, from the elections held in 2012, were tested for external validity (with independent sources of evidence), internal validity (consistency within the group of experts), and legitimacy (how far the results can be regarded as authoritative by stakeholders). The analysis demonstrated substantial external validity when the



PEI data is compared with many other expert datasets, as well as internal validity across the experts within the survey, and legitimacy as measured by levels of congruence between mass and expert opinions within each country.<sup>91</sup>

For *external* validity tests, the PEI-6.0 Index was significantly correlated with other standard independent indicators contained in the 2017 version of the Quality of Government cross-national dataset. This includes the combined Freedom House/imputed Polity IV measure of democratization ( $r=.75^{**}$  N. 159), the Economist Intelligent Unit's Index of Democracy ( $r=.8^{**}$ , N. 148), and the Varieties of Democracy measures of electoral democracy (polyarchy) ( $r=.82^{**}$ , N. 147) and Liberal Democracy ( $r=.87^{**}$  N. 147).<sup>92</sup>

For *internal* validity purposes, tests were run using OLS regression models to predict whether the PEI index varied significantly by several socio-demographic, political and experiential characteristics of the experts, including sex, age, education, their level of expertise, and their self-reported ideological position. The sample was broken down by type of regime in the country (using Freedom House's classification), since a higher proportion of international experts were surveyed in autocracies, where fewer political scientists study elections.

**Table A2: Factors predicting expert perceptions of electoral integrity scores**

Variable	Autocracies				Hybrid regimes				Democracies			
	B	SE	Beta	p	B	SE	Beta	p	B	SE	Beta	p
<b>Demographics</b>												
sex (1=female; 0=male)	1.75	1.7	0.05		-0.1	1.04	-0		-2.9	0.69	-0.1	***
Education Highest level of education	0.6	3.53	0.01		1.05	2.74	0.01		5.55	2.6	0.05	*
Agegroup Age groups by decade	0.27	0.58	0.02		0.4	0.39	0.04		0.07	0.26	0.01	
<b>Expertise</b>												
Familiarity How familiar are you with elections in this country?	0.62	0.43	0.07		0.53	0.35	0.05		2.05	0.28	0.2	***
expertdomestic Int'l (0) or domestic (1) expert	9.38	1.95	0.26	***	2.72	1.27	0.1	*	2.19	0.85	0.08	*
Lived # years lived in country	-0.2	0.69	-0		-1	0.51	-0.1	*	-0.1	0.4	-0	
Born Were you born in this country? 1=yes, 0=no	-3.8	2.52	-0.1		-1	1.67	-0		-1.1	1.01	-0	
<b>Political views</b>												
leftrightscale Political views on Left (1) / Right (10) scale	2.12	0.46	0.22	***	1.07	0.29	0.13	***	0.55	0.2	0.07	**
(Constant)	20	18			37.1	14.1			21.4	13		
Adjusted R2	0.1				0.02				0.06			
N.	506				1002				1745			

**Notes:** Regimes classified by Freedom House categories Autocracies (Not free) hybrid regimes (semi-free) and democracies (free); Dependent Variable: PEI Index of Electoral Integrity, (0-100), imputed. \* $p<.05$ , \*\* $p<.01$ , \*\*\* $p<.001$ . **Source:** PEI 6.0, expert-level.

The results indicate that the use of domestic or international experts proved significant across all types of regimes, suggesting the importance of relying upon both sources. Political views across the left-right ideological spectrum are significant and positive across all regimes, with experts who located themselves on the right more likely to give favourable assessments. Finally, in democratic states, sex, education, and familiarity with elections also played a role. The



relatively modest adjusted  $R^2$  suggested that the models explained a limited amount of variance in overall scores.

### *Scales of corruption and coercion*

To develop new scales of electoral corruption and coercion, including previous PEI items and new items in the rotating battery, factor analysis was used. The results in Table A3 show that two dimensions emerged, as expected. These items were then summed and the resultant scales standardized to 100 points, for ease of interpretation and comparison.

**Table A3: Scales of electoral corruption and coercion**

Item	Corruption	Coercion
Some people received cash, gifts or personal favors in exchange for their vote *	0.932	
Politicians offered patronage to their supporters *	0.891	
Some state resources were improperly used for campaigning	0.645	
Parties/candidates (did not) publish transparent financial accounts	0.646	
Voters were bribed *	0.762	
Rich people buy elections	0.699	
Parties/candidates (did not have) equitable access to political donations	0.429	
The election triggered violent protests		0.793
Some voters were threatened with violence at the polls*		0.841
Some voters feared becoming victims of political violence *		0.795
% Variance	70.9	8.4

**Note:** Principal Component Factor analysis with varimax rotation and kaiser normalization. \*=new items in the 2017 rotating thematic battery.

**Source:** PEI 6.0 election-level.



### *Acknowledgments*

*The Year in Elections Report* has been produced by the Electoral Integrity Project (EIP), based at the University of Sydney and Harvard University. We are grateful for the contributions of all the thousands of experts who spent time and effort in responding to our requests for information. This research would not have been possible without their assistance. The EIP has been generously supported by the award of the Kathleen Fitzpatrick Australian Laureate from the Australian Research Council (ARC ref: FL110100093).

The authors are most grateful for suggestions and feedback from the EIP team, including Megan Capriccio, Elias Christofi, Thomas Powell, Max Grömping, Ferran Martinez i Coma, Alessandro Nai, Miguel Lara Otaola, and Jeffrey Karp, as well as from visiting fellows and interns who provided input into the research and collection of the datasets.

The full report is available for download from [www.electoralintegrityproject.com](http://www.electoralintegrityproject.com) and the PEI 6.0 dataset and codebook can be downloaded from <http://thedata.harvard.edu/dvn/dv/PEI>.



"Honduran activists and supporters rally" (CC BY-NC 2.0) by joegaza



Table A4: PEI Survey Questions

	Sections	Performance indicators	Direction
PRE-ELECTION	<b>1. Electoral laws</b>	1-1 Electoral laws were unfair to smaller parties	N
		1-2 Electoral laws favored the governing party or parties	N
		1-3 Election laws restricted citizens' rights	N
	<b>2. Electoral procedures</b>	2-1 Elections were well managed	P
		2-2 Information about voting procedures was widely available	P
		2-3 Election officials were fair	P
		2-4 Elections were conducted in accordance with the law	P
	<b>3. Boundaries</b>	3-1 Boundaries discriminated against some parties	N
		3-2 Boundaries favored incumbents	N
		3-3 Boundaries were impartial	P
	<b>4. Voter registration</b>	4-1 Some citizens were not listed in the register	N
		4-2 The electoral register was inaccurate	N
		4-3 Some ineligible electors were registered	N
	<b>5. Party registration</b>	5-1 Some opposition candidates were prevented from running	N
		5-2 Women had equal opportunities to run for office	P
5-3 Ethnic and national minorities had equal opportunities to run for office		P	
5-4 Only top party leaders selected candidates		N	
5-5 Some parties/candidates were restricted from holding campaign rallies		N	
CAMPAIGN	<b>6. Campaign media</b>	6-1 Newspapers provided balanced election news	P
		6-2 TV news favored the governing party	N
		6-3 Parties/candidates had fair access to political broadcasts and advertising	P
		6-4 Journalists provided fair coverage of the elections	P
		6-5 Social media were used to expose electoral fraud	P
<b>7. Campaign finance</b>	7-1 Parties/candidates had equitable access to public subsidies	P	
	7-2 Parties/candidates had equitable access to political donations	P	
	7-3 Parties/candidates publish transparent financial accounts	P	
	7-4 Rich people buy elections	N	
	7-5 Some state resources were improperly used for campaigning	N	
ELECTION DAY	<b>8. Voting process</b>	8-1 Some voters were threatened with violence at the polls	N
		8-2 Some fraudulent votes were cast	N
		8-3 The process of voting was easy	P
		8-4 Voters were offered a genuine choice at the ballot box	P
		8-5 Postal ballots were available	P
		8-6 Special voting facilities were available for the disabled	P
		8-7 National citizens living abroad could vote	P
		8-8 Some form of internet voting was available	P
POST-ELECTION	<b>9. Vote count</b>	9-1 Ballot boxes were secure	P
		9-2 The results were announced without undue delay	P
		9-3 Votes were counted fairly	P
		9-4 International election monitors were restricted	N
		9-5 Domestic election monitors were restricted	N
	<b>10. Results</b>	10-1 Parties/candidates challenged the results	N
		10-2 The election led to peaceful protests	N
		10-3 The election triggered violent protests	N
		10-4 Any disputes were resolved through legal channels	P
	<b>11. Electoral authorities</b>	11-1 The election authorities were impartial	P
11-2 The authorities distributed information to citizens		P	
11-3 The authorities allowed public scrutiny of their performance		P	
11-4 The election authorities performed well		P	
2016 ROTATING BATTERY		17-1 Voters were bribed*	N
		17-2 People were free to vote without feeling pressured	P
		17-3 Some voters feared becoming victims of political violence	N
		17-4 The process kept the ballot confidential*	P
		17-5 Elections were free and fair	P
		17-6 Some people received cash, gifts or personal favours in exchange for their vote	N
		17-7 Politicians offered patronage to their supporters	N
2017 ROTATING BATTERY		18-1 Voting results were subject to a post-election audit	P
		18-2 Official election records were safe from hacking	P
		18-3 Most news media reporting about the campaign was factually accurate	P
		18-4 Most news media reporting about the government's record was true to the facts	P
		18-5 Much news was fake	N

**Note:** Direction of the original items P=positive, N=negative. \*Rotating item form 2016 repeated in 2017 under same question ID. **Source:** PEI 6.0



**VII: Bibliography of EIP publications, alphabetical order by author**

- Bjarnegård, Elin and Pär Zetterberg. 2016. '[Political parties and gender quota implementation: The role of bureaucratized candidate selection procedures.](#)' *Comparative Politics* 48(3): 393-417.
- Bowler, Shaun, Thomas Brunell, Todd Donovan, and Paul Gronke. 2015. 'Election administration and perceptions of fair elections.' *Electoral Studies* 38: 1-9.
- Butcher, Charles and Benjamin E. Goldsmith. 2017. '[Elections, ethnicity and political instability](#)'. *Comparative Political Studies* (In press) doi:10.1177/0010414016666858
- Coffe, Hilde. 2017. '[Citizens' media use and the accuracy of their perceptions of electoral integrity.](#)' *International Political Science Review*. doi: 10.1177/0192512116640984
- Donovan, Todd, and Jeffrey Karp. 2017. '[Electoral rules, corruption, inequality and evaluations of democracy.](#)' *European Journal of Political Research*. doi:10.1111/1475-6765.12188.
- Flesken, Anaïd and Jakob Hartl. 2017. '[Party Support, Values, and Perceptions of Electoral Integrity.](#)' *Political Psychology*. doi:10.1111/pops.12431
- Frank, Richard W., and Ferran Martínez i Coma. 2017. '[How election dynamics shape perceptions of electoral integrity.](#)' *Electoral Studies*. doi:10.1016/j.electstud.2017.05.007
- Garnett, Holly Ann and Margarita Zavadskaya. Eds. [Electoral Integrity and Political Regimes](#). London: Routledge.
- Garnett, Holly Ann. 2017. 'Election management bodies'. In Pippa Norris and Alessandro Nai. Eds. 2017. [Election Watchdogs](#). New York: Oxford University Press.
- Gauja, Anika. 2016. '[The legal regulation of political parties: Is there a global normative standard?](#)' *Election Law Journal*. 15(1): 4-19. doi: 10.1089/elj.2015.0354



Gauja, Anika. Ed. 2015. Special issue of the [Election Law Journal](#) on Electoral integrity and the legal regulation of political parties. 15(1): doi: 10.1089/elj.2015.0354

Grömping, Max and Ferran Martínez i Coma. 2015. '[Electoral Integrity in Africa.](#)' Hans Seidel Foundation.

Grömping, Max. 2013. 'Cambodia's 2013 Elections: The Retreat of "Electoral Authoritarianism"?''. *SocDem Asia Quarterly*, 1(2):13-15.

Grömping, Max. 2014. '[Echo Chambers. Partisan Facebook Groups during the 2014 Thai Election](#)'. *Asia Pacific Media Educator*, 24(1):1-21. doi: 10.1177/1326365X14539185

Grömping, Max. 2017. 'Domestic monitors.' In Pippa Norris and Alessandro Nai. Eds. 2017. *Election Watchdogs*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Grömping, Max. '[Domestic Election Monitoring and Advocacy: An Emerging Research Agenda](#)'. *Nordic Journal of Human Rights* 35, no. 4 (2017): 407-423.

Inglehart, Ron and Pippa Norris. 2017. 'Trump and Populist-Authoritarian Parties: The Silent Revolution in Reverse.' *Perspectives on Politics*. 15(2): 443-454.

Karp, Jeffrey, Alessandro Nai, Miguel Angel Lara Otaola and Pippa Norris. 2016. *Building Professional Electoral Management*. Sydney: EIP.

Karp, Jeffrey A. and Caitlin Milazzo. 2015. '[Democratic scepticism and political participation in Europe.](#)' *Journal of Elections, Public Opinion & Parties*. 25(1): 97-110.

Karp, Jeffrey A. and Jack Vowles. 2017. Forthcoming. 'When Country/Elections Become Cases: From National to Cross-National Political Polls and Surveys.' In Lonna Atkeson and Michael Alvarez(eds.) *Oxford Handbook on Polling and Polling Methods*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Karp, Jeffrey A. and Maarja Luhiste. 2016. '[Explaining political engagement with online panels: Comparing the British and American election studies.](#)' *Public Opinion Quarterly*. 80(3): 666-693.



Karp, Jeffrey, Alessandro Nai, Ferran Martínez i Coma, Max Grömping and Pippa Norris January 2017. *The Australian Voter Experience. Trust and confidence in the 2016 federal election*. Sydney: University of Sydney.

Karp, Jeffrey A, Alessandro Nai, and Pippa Norris. 2018. '[Dial 'F' for fraud: Explaining citizens suspicions about elections](#)'. *Electoral Studies*, doi.org/10.1016/j.electstud.2018.01.010.

Lago, Ignacio and Ferran Martínez i Coma. 2016. '[Challenge or consent? Understanding losers' reactions in mass elections](#).' *Government and Opposition*.

LeDuc, Lawrence, Richard Niemi, and Pippa Norris. Eds. 2014. [Comparing Democracies 4: Elections and Voting in a Changing World](#). London: Sage Publications.

Martínez i Coma, Ferran, Alessandro Nai and Pippa Norris. 2016. [Democratic Diffusion: How regional organizations strengthen electoral integrity](#). Washington DC: Organization of American States.

Martínez i Coma, Ferran and Carolien Van Ham. 2015. '[Can experts judge elections? Testing the validity of expert judgments for measuring election integrity](#)'. *European Journal of Political Research* 54(2) 305-325. doi:10.1111/1475-6765.12084.

Martínez i Coma, Ferran and Ignacio Lago. 2016. '[Gerrymandering in comparative perspective](#).' *Party Politics*. Pre-publication. doi:10.1177/1354068816642806

Martínez i Coma, Ferran. 'Electoral reform.' In Pippa Norris and Alessandro Nai. Eds. 2017. [Election Watchdogs](#). New York: Oxford University Press.

Martínez i Coma, Ferran, Pippa Norris and Richard W. Frank. 2015. '[Integridad en las elecciones de America 2012-2014](#).' [[Integrity of the elections in America 2012-2014](#)], *America Latina Hoy* 70: 37-54.

Martínez i Coma, Ferran. 2017. '[Ethnic diversity decreases turnout. Comparative evidence from over 650 elections around the world](#).' *Electoral Studies* 49(1): 75-95.





Martínez i Coma, Ferran, and Minh Trinh. 2017. 'How electoral integrity affects voter turnout in democracies.' *Australian Journal of Political Science* 52.1 (2017): 53-74.

Martínez i Coma, Ferran. 'Electoral reform.' In Pippa Norris and Alessandro Nai. Eds. 2017. *Election Watchdogs*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Mazmanyan, Armen. 2017. 'Constitutional courts.' In Pippa Norris and Alessandro Nai. Eds. 2017. *Election Watchdogs*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Nai, Alessandro, and Annemarie Walter. Eds. 2015. *New Perspectives on Negative Campaigning : Why Attack Politics Matters*. Colchester: ECPR Press.

Nai, Alessandro. 'The Forth Estate.' In Pippa Norris and Alessandro Nai. Eds. 2017. *Election Watchdogs*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Norris, Pippa, Andrea Abel van Es, and Lisa Fennis. 2015. '*Checkbook Elections? Political Finance in Comparative Perspective*'. Sydney: EIP.

Norris, Pippa, Ferran Martínez i Coma, Alessandro Nai, and Max Grömping. 2015. '*The Year in Elections, 2016*'. Sydney: EIP. Pp.114.

Norris, Pippa, Ferran Martínez i Coma, Alessandro Nai, Max Grömping. 2015, *Perceptions of Electoral Integrity-UK, (PEI-UK 1.0)* doi:10.7910/DVN/U6OYK9, 6 Dec 2015

Norris, Pippa, Ferran Martínez i Coma, Max Grömping, Alessandro Nai. 2015, *Perceptions of Electoral Integrity-Mexico, (PEI-Mexico 1.0)*, doi:10.7910/DVN/O6UCIM, 13 Dec 2015

Norris, Pippa, Ferran Martínez i Coma, Max Grömping, and Alessandro Nai. 2015, *Perceptions of Electoral Integrity, (PEI-4.5)* (Bi-annual series) doi:10.7910/DVN/LYO57K, Latest: 18 Aug 2016

Norris, Pippa, Ferran Martínez i Coma, Max Grömping, and Alessandro Nai. 2015, *Perceptions of Electoral Integrity-Russia, (PEI-Russia 1.0)* doi:10.7910/DVN/LYO57K, 16 Dec 2015.



Norris, Pippa, Max Grömping and Holly Ann Garnett. 2017. 'The 2016 American Presidential Election – Perceptions of Electoral Integrity, US 2016 subnational study'. January 2017. Sydney: University of Sydney.

Norris, Pippa and Max Grömping. 2017. '*The Populist Threat to Electoral Integrity: The Year in Elections 2016-17*'. Sydney: University of Sydney.

Norris, Pippa, Alessandro Nai and Max Grömping 2016, "[Perceptions of Electoral Integrity - US 2016 \(PEI\\_US\\_1.0\)](#)", [doi:10.7910/DVN/YXUV3W](#) Latest: 16 Dec 2016

Norris, Pippa, Richard W. Frank, and Ferran Martínez i Coma. 2014. '[The Year in Elections, 2013](#)'. Sydney: EIP.

Norris, Pippa, Richard W. Frank, and Ferran Martínez i Coma. 2015. '[The Year in Elections, 2014](#)'. Sydney: EIP.

Norris, Pippa; Martínez i Coma, Ferran ; Nai, Alessandro; Grömping, Max, 2016, "[Perceptions of Electoral Integrity-Mexico, \(PEI-Mexico 2.0\)](#)", [doi:10.7910/DVN/17WUSN](#), Oct 2016

Norris, Pippa; Nai, Alessandro; Karp, Jeffrey, 2016, "[Electoral Learning and Capacity Building \(ELECT\) data](#)", [doi:10.7910/DVN/MQCI3U](#). Latest: 14 Dec 2016

Norris, Pippa; Nai, Alessandro; Karp, Jeffrey, 2016, "[The Australian Voter Experience \(AVE\) dataset](#)", [doi:10.7910/DVN/FEBKDE](#)

Norris, Pippa and Alessandro Nai. Eds. 2017. *Election Watchdogs*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Norris, Pippa and Andrea Abel van Es. Eds. 2016. *Checkbook Elections? Political Finance in Comparative Perspective*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Norris, Pippa, Ferran Martínez i Coma, and Richard W. Frank. 2013. '[Assessing the quality of elections](#).' *Journal of Democracy*. 24(4): 124-135.

Norris, Pippa, Richard W. Frank and Ferran Martínez i Coma. 2014. '[Measuring electoral integrity: A new dataset](#).' *PS: Political Science & Politics* 47(4): 789-798.



Norris, Pippa, Richard W. Frank, and Ferran Martínez i Coma. Eds. 2014. [\*Advancing Electoral Integrity\*](#). New York: Oxford University Press.

Norris, Pippa, Richard W. Frank, and Ferran Martínez i Coma. Eds. 2015. [\*Contentious Elections: From Ballots to the Barricades\*](#). New York: Routledge.

Norris, Pippa, Thomas Wynter, & Sarah Cameron. 2017. [\*The Year in Elections, Mid-2017 Update\*](#). Sydney: EIP.

Norris, Pippa. 2013. [‘Does the world agree about standards of electoral integrity? Evidence for the diffusion of global norms.’](#) Special issue of *Electoral Studies* 32(4):576-588.

Norris, Pippa. 2013. [‘The new research agenda studying electoral integrity’](#). Special issue of *Electoral Studies* 32(4): 563-575.

Norris, Pippa. Ed. 2013. [Special issue of \*Electoral Studies\* on electoral integrity](#). 32(4):576-588.

Norris, Pippa. 2014. ‘Electoral integrity and political legitimacy.’ In [\*Comparing Democracies 4: Elections and Voting in a Changing World.\*](#), eds. Lawrence LeDuc, Richard Niemi, and Pippa Norris. London: Sage.

Norris, Pippa. 2014. [\*Why Electoral Integrity Matters\*](#). New York: Cambridge University Press.

Norris, Pippa. 2015. [\*Why Elections Fail\*](#). New York: Cambridge University Press.

Norris, Pippa. 2016. [‘Electoral integrity in East Asia.’](#) In *Taiwan Journal of Democracy*. 12(1): 1-18.

Norris, Pippa. 2017. [‘Electoral integrity and electoral systems.’](#) *Oxford Handbook of Electoral Systems* eds. Erik S. Herron, Robert J. Pekkanen, and Matthew S. Shugart. New York: Oxford University Press.

Norris, Pippa. 2017. ‘Electoral integrity and political regimes’. In Holly Ann Garnett and Margarita Zavadskaya. Eds. *Electoral Integrity and Political Regimes*. London: Routledge.



Norris, Pippa. 2017. '[Electoral integrity and voting behavior](#)' *Routledge Handbook on Voting Behavior and Public Opinion*. Eds. Justin Fisher, Edward Fieldhouse, Mark N. Franklin, Rachel Gibson, Marta Cantijoch and Christopher Wlezian. NY: Routledge.

Norris, Pippa. 2017. 'Electoral integrity in East Asia.' *Routledge Handbook on Democratization in East Asia*. Co-ed Tun-jen Cheng and Yun-han Chu. Routledge: New York.

Norris, Pippa. 2017. 'A discussion of Alexander Cooley and Jack Snyder's Ranking the World,' *Perspectives on Politics*. 15(1):165.

Norris, Pippa. 2017. '[Is Western democracy backsliding? Diagnosing the risks.](#)' *Journal of Democracy*. 28(2). April.

Norris, Pippa. 2017. 'Electoral transitions: Stumbling out of the gate.' For *Rebooting Transitory — Democratization in the 21st Century* (Eds.) Mohammad-Mahmoud Ould Mohamedou and Timothy D. Sisk. NY: Routledge.

Norris, Pippa. 2017. 'Why procedural fairness matters for electoral legitimacy.' *International Political Science Review*.

Norris, Pippa. 2017. *Strengthening Electoral Integrity: The Pragmatic Case for Assistance*. New York: Cambridge University Press. (In press, forthcoming fall)

Norris, Pippa, Thomas Wynter, & Sarah Cameron. 2017. '[The Year in Elections, Mid-2017 Update](#)'. Sydney: EIP.

Otaola, Miguel Angel Lara, Ferran Martínez i Coma, and Pippa Norris. 2016. '[El maratón electoral de América.](#)' *Foreign Affairs Latin America* 16(4): 77-86.

Otaola, Miguel Angel Lara. 2017. "[To include or not to include? Party representation in electoral institutions and confidence in elections: A comparative study of Latin America.](#)" *Party Politics*.

Pietsch, Juliet, Michael Miller, and Jeffrey A. Karp (eds.). 2016. *Public Opinion and Democracy in Transitional Regimes: A Comparative Perspective*. NY: Routledge.












Pietsch, Juliet, Michael Miller, and Jeffrey A. Karp. 2015. '[Public support for democracy in transitional regimes.](#)' *Journal of Elections, Public Opinion & Parties*. 25(1): 1-9.

Simon Finley, Annette Fath-Lihic, Richard Frank, and Michael Maley. 2015. [Secure and Fair Elections Workshop Model Curriculum](#). Pp.90. Stockholm: International IDEA/UNDP. ISBN: 978-91-7671-029-6

Smith, Rodney. 2016. '[Confidence in paper-based and electronic voting channels: evidence from Australia.](#)' *Australian Journal of Political Science* 51(1): 68-85.

Zavadskaya, Margarita, Grömping, Max, & Martínez i Coma, Ferran. 2017. 'Electoral sources of authoritarian resilience in Russia: Varieties of electoral malpractice, 2007-2016.' [Demokratizatsiya: The Journal of Post-Soviet Democratization](#), 25(4) : 455-480.





## References

- 
- <sup>1</sup> Pippa Norris. 2014. *Why electoral integrity matters*. Cambridge University Press.
- <sup>2</sup> See, for example, Freedom House. 2018. *Freedom Around the World, 2017*. <https://freedomhouse.org>; Varieties of Democracy project <https://www.v-dem.net>.
- <sup>3</sup> Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart. 2018. *Cultural backlash: Trump, Brexit and the rise of authoritarian populism*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- <sup>4</sup> Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart. 2018. *Cultural backlash: Trump, Brexit and the rise of authoritarian populism*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- <sup>5</sup> Calculated from Holger Döring and Philip Manow. 2016. [Parliaments and governments database \(ParlGov\)](#) 'Elections' dataset.
- <sup>6</sup> Jakub Grygiel. 2016. 'The Return of Europe's Nation-States: The Upside to the EU's Crisis.' *Foreign Affairs* 95: 94-101.
- <sup>7</sup> European Union Electoral Observation Mission to Nepal. 2017. '[House of Representatives and Provincial Assembly Elections 26 November & 7 December: Preliminary statement](#)'. Kathmandu, 9 December
- <sup>8</sup> Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, Office of Democratic Institutions and Human Rights. 2017. '[OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission, Republic of Albania parliamentary elections: Final report](#)'.
- <sup>9</sup> Gustavo Palencia. 2017. 'OAS says Honduran presidential election should be redone'. *Reuters*, December 18.
- <sup>10</sup> Commonwealth Observer Group. 2017. '[Papua New Guinea national election report](#)'.
- <sup>11</sup> John Coakley and Jon Fraenkel. 2017. '[The ethnic implications of preferential voting](#).' *Government and Opposition*, *Government and Opposition* 52(4): 671-697.
- <sup>12</sup> European Union External Action. 2018. '[Statement by the spokesperson on the human rights situation in the Republic of Equatorial Guinea](#)'.
- <sup>13</sup> Michel Casey. 2016. 'Constitutional changes pave way for Turkmen president-for-life.' *The Diplomat*.
- <sup>14</sup> Abel Polese, Donnacha O. Beachain, and Slavomir Horak. 2017. '[Strategies of legitimation in Central Asia: regime durability in Turkmenistan](#).' *Contemporary Politics* 23(4): 427-445.
- <sup>15</sup> Council of the European Union. 2015. '[Declaration by the high representative Federica Mogherini on behalf of the EU on constitutional review in Rwanda](#).'
- <sup>16</sup> Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) project [Dataset Version 7.1](#)
- <sup>17</sup> See Pippa Norris and Andrea Abel van Es. Eds. 2016. *Checkbook Elections? Political Finance in Comparative Perspective*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- <sup>18</sup> Pippa Norris and Andrea Abel van Es. Eds. 2016. *Checkbook Elections? Political Finance in Comparative Perspective*. New York: Oxford University Press.



- <sup>19</sup> Paul Heywood, Veronique Pujas and Martin Rhodes. 2002. 'Political corruption, democracy and governance in Western Europe.' In *Developments in West European Politics 2*, eds. Paul Heywood, Erik Jones and Martin Rhodes. Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave; Donatella Della Porta, and Alberto Vannucci. 1999. *Corrupt Exchanges: Actors, Resources, and Mechanisms of Political Corruption*. New York: Aldine de Gruyter.
- <sup>20</sup> Transparency International. 2017. '[Corruption Perceptions Index 2017](#)'.
- <sup>21</sup> Ernesto Londoño. '[Upending Brazil's presidential race, court upholds ex-leader's conviction.](#)' *New York Times*, January 24.
- <sup>22</sup> The Economist Intelligence Unit. 2017. '[Presidential campaigns get under way](#)'.
- <sup>23</sup> Jonathan Polk, et al. 2017. '[Explaining the salience of anti-elitism and reducing political corruption for political parties in Europe with the 2014 Chapel Hill Expert Survey data.](#)' *Research & Politics* 4(1): 1-9.
- <sup>24</sup> Transparency International. 2017. '[Global corruption barometer: Citizens' voices from around the world.](#)' November 14.
- <sup>25</sup> See, for example, the Global Commission on Elections, Democracy and Security. 2012. *Deepening Democracy: A Strategy for improving the Integrity of Elections Worldwide*. Sweden: IDEA.
- <sup>26</sup> Pippa Norris, Richard Frank and Ferran Martínez i Coma. 2012. *Contentious Elections*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- <sup>27</sup> Jack Snyder. 2000. *From Voting to Violence: Democratization and Nationalist Conflict*. New York: Norton; Roland Paris. 2004. *At War's End: Building Peace after Civil Conflict*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Paul Collier. 2009. *Wars, Guns and Votes: Democracy in Dangerous Places*. New York: HarperCollins.
- <sup>28</sup> Alisha Holland and Brian Palmer-Rubin. 2015. '[Beyond the machine: clientelist brokers and interest organizations in Latin America.](#)' *Comparative Political Studies* 48(9): 1186-1223.
- <sup>29</sup> Allen Hicken. 2011. '[Clientelism.](#)' *Annual Review of Political Science* 14: 289-310; Miriam Golden and Brian Min. 2013. '[Distributive politics around the world.](#)' *Annual Review of Political Science* 16: 73-99.
- <sup>30</sup> Cornelius O'Leary. 1962. *The Elimination of Corrupt Practices in British Elections, 1968-1911*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- <sup>31</sup> Fredric Charles Schaffer. (ed.) 2007. *Elections for Sale: The Causes and Consequences of Vote Buying*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner.
- <sup>32</sup> UN General Assembly. 1948. '[Universal Declaration of Human Rights.](#)'
- <sup>33</sup> European Commission for Democracy Through Law. 2002. *Code of Good Practice in Electoral Matters*. Venice Commission 18-19. Section 4.
- <sup>34</sup> Lahra Smith. 2009. '[Explaining violence after recent elections in Ethiopia and Kenya.](#)' *Democratization* 16(5): 867-897.





- <sup>35</sup> Scott Straus and Charles Taylor. 2012. 'Democratization and electoral violence in Sub-Saharan Africa, 1990-2008.' In *Voting in Fear: Electoral Violence in Sub-Saharan Africa*. (ed). Dorina Bekoe. United States Institute of Peace: Washington, DC.
- <sup>36</sup> Ernesto Calvo and Maria Victoria Murillo. 2013. '[When parties meet voters: Assessing political linkages through partisan networks and distributive expectations in Argentina and Chile.](#)' *Comparative Political Studies* 46(7): 851-882; Tina Hilgersa. 2008. '[Causes and consequences of political clientelism: Mexico's PRD in comparative perspective.](#)' *Latin American Politics and Society* 50(4): 123-153.
- <sup>37</sup> Fredric Charles Schaffer. (ed.) 2007. *Elections for Sale: The Causes and Consequences of Vote Buying*. Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner.
- <sup>38</sup> Daniel Corstange. 2018. '[Clientelism in Competitive and Uncompetitive Elections.](#)' *Comparative Political Studies* 51(1): 76-104.
- <sup>39</sup> Jordan Gans-Morse, Sebastian Mazzuca, and Simeon Nichter. 2014. '[Varieties of clientelism: Machine politics during elections.](#)' *American Journal of Political Science* 58(2): 415-432.
- <sup>40</sup> Jeffrey Conroy-Krutz and Carolyn Logan. 2012. '[Museveni and the 2011 Ugandan election: did the money matter?](#)' *Journal of Modern African Studies* 50(4): 625-655. p. 627.
- <sup>41</sup> Michael Bratton. 2008. '[Vote buying and violence in Nigerian election campaigns.](#)' *Electoral Studies* 27(4): 621-32; Valeria Brusco, Marcelo Nazareno and Susan Carol Stokes. 2004. '[Vote Buying in Argentina.](#)' *Latin American Research Review* 39(2): 66-88.
- <sup>42</sup> Simeon Nichter and Michael Peress. 2017. '[Request fulfilling: When citizens demand clientelist benefits.](#)' *Comparative Political Studies* 50(8): 1086-1117.
- <sup>43</sup> Daniel Corstange. 2018. '[Clientelism in Competitive and Uncompetitive Elections.](#)' *Comparative Political Studies* 51(1): 76-104.
- <sup>44</sup> Philip Keefer. 2007. '[Clientelism, credibility, and the policy choices of young democracies.](#)' *American Journal of Political Science* 51(4): 804-821; Lenka Bustikova and Cristina Corduneanu-Huci. 2017. '[Patronage, trust, and state capacity: The historical trajectories of clientelism.](#)' *World Politics* 69(2): 277-326.
- <sup>45</sup> Andreas Schedler. 2002. '[The menu of manipulation.](#)' *Journal of democracy* 13(2): 36-50.
- <sup>46</sup> Pippa Norris. 2015. *Why Elections Fail*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- <sup>47</sup> Adam Przeworski, Michael E. Alvarez, José Antonio Cheibub, and Fernando Limongi. 2000. *Democracy and development: Political institutions and well-being in the world, 1950-1990*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- <sup>48</sup> Alisha Holland and Brian Palmer-Rubin. 2015. '[Beyond the machine: clientelist brokers and interest organizations in Latin America.](#)' *Comparative Political Studies* 48(9): 1186-1223; Allen Hicken. 2011. '[Clientelism.](#)' *Annual Review of Political Science* 14: 289-310.
- <sup>49</sup> International Foundation for Electoral Systems. 2017. '[Republic of Honduras: November 26, Honduran National Congress](#)'; International Foundation for Electoral Systems. 2013. '[Republic of Honduras: November 24, Honduran National Congress](#)'.



- <sup>50</sup> The Economist. 2017. '[What the data say about the integrity of Honduras's election: our analysis of a disputed count](#)'. December 9. Available at:.
- <sup>51</sup> OAS. 2017. '[Analysis for the Organization of American States \(OAS\)](#)'.
- <sup>52</sup> Ezequiel González-Ocantos, Chad Kiewiet de Jonge, and David W. Nickerson. 2015. '[Legitimacy buying: The dynamics of clientelism in the face of legitimacy challenges](#).' *Comparative Political Studies* 48(9): 1127-1158.
- <sup>53</sup> Organization of American States, General Secretariat. 2017. '[Statement by the OAS General Secretariat on the election in Honduras](#)'. December 17.
- <sup>54</sup> Elisabeth Malkin. 2018. '[Citing hostility, leader of anti-corruption panel in Honduras resigns](#)'. *New York Times*, February 16.
- <sup>55</sup> Latin American Public Opinion Project. 2016/2017. '[The AmericasBarometer](#)'.
- <sup>56</sup> European Union Election Observation Mission. 2018. '[Final report: Republic of Kenya, general elections 2017](#)'.
- <sup>57</sup> International Foundation for Electoral Systems. 2017. '[Republic of Kenya election for President, August 8, 2017](#)'.
- <sup>58</sup> Reuters. 2017. '[Man attacks Kenyan deputy president's home with a machete ahead of vote, 1 injured](#)'. July 29.
- <sup>59</sup> Kimiko de Freytas-Tamura. 2017. '[Kenyan election official is killed on eve of vote](#)'. *New York Times*, July 31.
- <sup>60</sup> European Union Election Observation Mission. 2018. '[Final report: Republic of Kenya, general elections 2017](#)'. p. 26.
- <sup>61</sup> Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission, Kenya. 2017. '[Fresh presidential election results county summary](#)'.
- <sup>62</sup> European Union Election Observation Mission. 2018. '[Final report: Republic of Kenya, general elections 2017](#)'.
- <sup>63</sup> Maggie Fick and George Obulutsa. 2017. 'Kenyan court scraps presidential vote, Kenyatta calls for calm'. *Reuters*, September 1.
- <sup>64</sup> The Economist. 2017. '[Kenya's supreme court explains why it annulled last month's presidential poll](#)'. September 20.
- <sup>65</sup> Jason Burke. 2017. 'Kenya: Raila Odinga withdraws from election rerun'. *The Guardian*, October 11.
- <sup>66</sup> European Union Election Observation Mission. 2018. '[Final report: Republic of Kenya, general elections 2017](#)'.
- <sup>67</sup> Kimiko de Freytas-Tamura. 2017. '[Kenyan election officials open new vote to all original candidates](#)'. *New York Times*, October 11.
- <sup>68</sup> Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission, Kenya. 2017. '[Fresh presidential election results county summary](#)'; Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission, Kenya. 2017. '[Declaration of results for election of the president of the Republic of Kenya at the national tallying centre](#)'



- <sup>69</sup> Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission, Kenya. 2017. '[Fresh presidential election results county summary](#)'.
- <sup>70</sup> Elections Observer Group. 2017. '[ELOG statement on October 26 fresh presidential election](#)'. November 1.
- <sup>71</sup> European Union Election Observation Mission. 2018. '[Final report: Republic of Kenya, general elections 2017](#)'.
- <sup>72</sup> Tim Ross and Tom McTague. 2017. *Betting the House: The inside story of the 2017 election*. London: Biteback Publishers; Nicholas Allen and John Bartle (Eds). 2018. *None Past the Post: Britain at the Polls 2017*, Manchester: Manchester University Press.
- <sup>73</sup> International Foundation for Electoral Systems. 2017. '[United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, election for the house of commons](#).' June 8.
- <sup>74</sup> Pippa Norris. June 2017. *British Parliamentary Constituency Database 2010-2017*, V1.2; Einar Thorsen, Daniel Jackson, Darren Lilleker (Eds). *UK Election Analysis 2017*. Center for the Study of Journalism, Culture & Community, Bournemouth University.
- <sup>75</sup> Lord Ashcroft '[UK General Election Day poll, 6-9<sup>th</sup> June 2017](#).'
- <sup>76</sup> UK Electoral Commission. 2017. '[Analysis of the December 2016 electoral registers in the United Kingdom](#).'
- <sup>77</sup> Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, Office of Democratic Institutions and Human Rights. 2017. '[OSCE/ODIHR election expert team final report, Federal Republic of Germany, elections to the Bundestag 24 September 2017](#)'. 24 November 2017.
- <sup>78</sup> Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, Office of Democratic Institutions and Human Rights. 2017. '[OSCE/ODIHR needs assessment mission report, Russian Federation presidential election, 18 March 2018](#)'. 21 December 2017.
- <sup>79</sup> Margarita Zavadskaya, Max Grömping and Ferran Martínez i Coma. 2017. '[Electoral sources of authoritarian resilience in Russia: Varieties of electoral malpractice, 2007-2016](#).' *Demokratizatsiya: The Journal of Post-Soviet Democratization* 25(4): 455-480.
- <sup>80</sup> Donald Trump. 2017. '[In addition to winning the Electoral College in a landslide, I won the popular vote if you deduct the millions of people who voted illegally](#).' November 27.
- <sup>81</sup> The poll was conducted in January (26-28) 2017 by [Politico/Morning Consult](#).
- <sup>82</sup> American Civil Liberties Union. 2016. '[Voting rights 2016: what's at stake](#)'.
- <sup>83</sup> Office of the Director of National Intelligence. 2017. *Assessing Russian Activities and Intentions in Recent US Elections*. Unclassified version. January 6.
- <sup>84</sup> Financial Times. 2016. '[Russia's meddling in the US presidential election](#)'. September 7.
- <sup>85</sup> Gallup World Poll. 2016. Question wording: "In this country, do you have confidence in each of the following, or not? How about honesty of elections?" Response options: Yes/No/Don't know; Norris, Pippa, Holly Ann Garnett, and Max Grömping. 2016. 'Why don't more Americans vote? Maybe because they don't trust U.S. elections.' *Washington Post*, December 26.



---

<sup>86</sup> Michael Li. 2018. '[The crazy fight over Pennsylvania's congressional map: Round 2.](#)' February 22.

<sup>87</sup> In addition, in 2014 elections in Haiti, Lebanon, and Comoros were delayed or suspended. Those are thus not included in the dataset. The election in Thailand was held and later annulled. There were also elections in North Korea and Trinidad and Tobago but with too few responses these cases are excluded from the dataset.

<sup>88</sup> Pippa Norris. 2013: '[The new research agenda studying electoral integrity.](#)' *Electoral Studies* 32(4): 563-575.

<sup>89</sup> Andreas Schedler. 2002. '[The menu of manipulation.](#)' *Journal of Democracy* 13(2): 36-50.

<sup>90</sup> See the [codebook](#) for further information.

<sup>91</sup> Pippa Norris, Richard W. Frank, and Ferran Martínez i Coma. 2013. '[Assessing the quality of elections.](#)' *Journal of Democracy* 24(4): 124-135; Pippa Norris, Richard W. Frank, and Ferran Martínez i Coma. 2014. Eds. *Advancing electoral integrity*. Oxford University Press; Ferran Martínez i Coma and Carolien van Ham. 2015. '[Can experts judge elections? Testing the validity of expert judgments for measuring election integrity.](#)' *European journal of political research* 54(2): 305-325; Pippa Norris, Richard W. Frank and Ferran Martínez i Coma. 2014. '[Measuring electoral integrity around the world: a new dataset.](#)' *PS: Political Science & Politics* 47(4): 789-798.

<sup>92</sup> Jan Teorell, et al. 2017. [The Quality of Government Standard Dataset](#), version Jan17. University of Gothenburg: The Quality of Government Institute.

