Electoral Integrity Project

Electoral Integrity Worldwide

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I: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Elections should provide opportunities for citizens to participate in politics and hold leaders to account. When they work well, elections can deepen civic engagement, inform public debate, stimulate party competition, strengthen government responsiveness, and allow the peaceful resolution of political conflict.

The problem is that too often contests fail to achieve these objectives. There is widespread concern in many countries about low or falling turnout, public disaffection, party polarization, and the failure of elections to ensure legitimate outcomes. Electoral malpractices continue to undermine contests around the world, from overt cases of violence and intimidation to disinformation campaigns, cybersecurity threats, barriers to voting, and the under-representation of women and minority candidates. To assess global trends, the Perceptions of Electoral Integrity expert survey monitors elections worldwide and regionally, across all stages of the electoral cycle.

This report describes the Perceptions of Electoral Integrity dataset (PEI-7.0). The dataset is drawn from a rolling survey of 3,861 expert assessments of electoral integrity across 337 elections in 166 countries around the world. The cumulative study covers all national presidential and parliamentary elections from July 1, 2012 to December 31, 2018.[i] This annual release adds 53 presidential or parliamentary contests held during 2018. Perceptions of electoral integrity are measured by experts in each country one month after polls close. Experts are asked to assess the quality of national elections on eleven sub-dimensions: electoral laws; electoral procedures; district boundaries; voter registration; party registration; media coverage; campaign finance; voting process; vote count; results; and electoral authorities. These items sum to an overall Electoral Integrity Index scored from 0 to 100. Additional batteries of items are used to monitor specific problems each year. Given widespread concerns about the issue of fake news, online disinformation, and foreign meddling, the 2018 survey focused on issues of campaign media.

Plan of the report

Part I provides a snapshot of the results. Figure 1 presents the updated global map of electoral integrity, using the PEI Index. The report also lists updated country election scores by global region, as well as across the electoral cycle. Part II examines the quality of campaign media. Part III focuses on three cases in more detail – Italy, Russia and Venezuela. Part IV describes EIP's methods, country coverage, and research design. The final sections list selected publications from the Electoral Integrity Project and further readings.

All electronic data can be downloaded, at the levels of experts, elections, and countries, from http://thedata.harvard.edu/dvn/dv/PEI.

FIGURE 1: ELECTORAL INTEGRITY WORLDWIDE, 2012 TO 2018

Source: *The Perceptions of Electoral Integrity expert survey, country-level www.electoralintegrityproject.com*

REGIONAL COMPARISONS

Figure 2 provides an overview of the state of electoral integrity around the world by region, presenting an average of the PEI Index for all the national elections held in each country from 2012-2018.

FIGURE 2: THE PERCEPTIONS OF ELECTORAL INTEGRITY INDEX BY COUNTRY AND REGION

N&W Europe		Americas		C&E Europe		Asia-Pacific		MENA		Africa	
Denmark	86	Costa Rica	79	Estonia	79	New Zealand	75	Israel	74	Cape Verde	71
Finland	85	Uruguay	75	Lithuania	78	Korea, Rep.	73	Tunisia	68	Benin	70
Norway	83	Canada	75	Slovenia	77	Taiwan	73	Oman	61	Ghana	65
Sweden	83	Chile	71	Czech Rep	76	Australia	70	Morocco	57	Mauritius	64
Iceland	82	Jamaica	67	Slovak Rep	74	Japan	68	Kuwait	54	South Africa	63
Germany	81	Barbados	65	Poland	74	Bhutan	66	Jordan	49	Lesotho	62
Netherlands	80	Argentina	65	Latvia	73	Tonga	64	Iran	49	Namibia	60
Switzerland	79	Brazil	64	Croatia	65	Timor-Leste	64	Total	48	Botswana	58
Austria	77	Peru	62	Georgia	58	Mongolia	64	Algeria	43	Rwanda	58
Luxembourg	76	Grenada	61	Bulgaria	58	Vanuatu	62	Lebanon	42	Ivory Coast	56
France	75	US	61	Moldova	56	Micronesia	59	Bahrain	40	Liberia	54
Portugal	75	Panama	61	Romania	55	India	59	Egypt	40	Guinea-Biss.	54
Ireland	73	Mexico	61	Armenia	55	Solomon Isl.	57	Iraq	38	Nigeria	53
Belgium	71	Colombia	60	Hungary	54	Indonesia	57	Syria	24	Burkina Faso	53
Cyprus	69	Bolivia	56	Albania	54	Nepal	56			Sierra Leone	53
Spain	69	Bahamas	54	Kyrgyzstan	53	Fiji	55			CAR	53
Italy	68	El Salvador	54	Montenegro	52	Myanmar	54			Sao Tome Pr.	52
Greece	66	Belize	53	Ukraine	51	Samoa	53			Niger	52
UK	66	Guyana	53	Serbia	49	Singapore	53			Gambia	50
Malta	65	Suriname	51	Macedonia	48	Maldives	52			Malawi	48
Turkey	45	Ecuador	50	Russia	47	Sri Lanka	52			Comoros	45
		Paraguay	50	Bosnia-Herz.	46	Philippines	51			Zambia	45
		Guatemala	48	Kazakhstan	45	Thailand	51			Tanzania	44
		Antigua Bar	48	Belarus	40	Laos	48			Sudan	43
		Dom. Rep	44	Uzbekistan	38	Pakistan	47			Senegal	43
		Venezuela	41	Azerbaijan	36	Bangladesh	38			Kenya	43
		Honduras	37	Turkmenistan	36	Malaysia	35			Mali	43
		Nicaragua	36	Tajikistan	35	Papua NG	34			Guinea	42
		Haiti	32			Afghanistan	34			Madagascar	42
						Vietnam	34			Swaziland	42
						Cambodia	30			Cameroon	40
										Angola	39
										Mauritania	38
										Zimbabwe	38
										Togo	38
										Uganda	37
										Mozambique	35
										Djibouti	31
										Chad	31
										Gabon	30
										Congo, Rep.	29
										Burundi	24
										Eq. Guinea	24
										Ethiopia	24
Total	74	Total	56	Total	56	Total	54	Total	49	Total	46

Note: The Perceptions of Electoral Integrity index summary scale ranges from 0-100. The PEI country-level mean scores cover national elections held 2012-2018.
Source: The Perceptions of Electoral Integrity expert survey, country-level (PEI 7.0)

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The comparison within each of the regions demonstrates that the **Nordic region** had elections with the highest levels of integrity (over 80), with very positive evaluations of Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden and Iceland. This is not surprising; these are all affluent post-industrial societies, consensus democracies, and egalitarian welfare states, which commonly rank highly in many other measures of democratic governance, integrity, and human rights.

They are closely followed in **Western Europe** by Germany and the Netherlands. Many other states in this region also have very high levels of electoral integrity, according to experts, such as France and Ireland. At the same time, it is noteworthy that Greece, the UK, and Malta were evaluated less positively, with PEI scores of 65-66, a full twenty-points less than the world-leader of Denmark. Following a series of problematic contests under President Erdogan, Turkey is ranked as low in integrity.

In the **Americas,** it may be no surprise that Canadian elections are well-rated by experts, but so are contests in middle-income Costa Rica and Uruguay. Latin America shows varied scores, moreover, with the US given an overall rating of 61, lower than any other long-established democracies and affluent societies. Further analysis reveals that the average expert ratings of American elections are significantly pull down by electoral laws, voter registration, and district boundaries issues.[2] The region also contains the highly problematic cases of Venezuela (discussed in detail later in the report), as well as Honduras, Nicaragua, and Haiti.

Other world regions display a similar varied patter of electoral integrity; thus, in **Central and Eastern Europe**, countries such as Estonia, Lithuania and Slovenia have held a series of free and fair contests since emerging from Communist rule, rated as positively as many equivalent contests in Western Europe. At the same time, several Eurasian autocracies hold elections with numerous serious flaws, exemplified by Tajikistan and Turkmenistan.

Asia-Pacific is equally varied in the quality of its elections, ranging from high integrity in New Zealand, South Korea, Taiwan and Australia in contrast to fundamental weaknesses in elections in Afghanistan, Vietnam and Cambodia.

The **Middle East and North Africa** display elections which show marked contrasts, with Israel and Tunisia rated most highly compared with façade elections held by the Syrian regime. **Sub-Saharan Africa** is also varied, from positive ratings in Cape Verde and Benin (at least before the presidential contest in May 2019) compared with the lowest rating of any elections around the world in Burundi, Equatorial Guinea, and Ethiopia.

The exact reasons why contests are flawed or fail differs from one state to another, but it commonly involves processes of corruption in kleptocratic states ruled by clientelism, contests disrupted by outbreaks of violence and civil conflict, and state repression of opposition forces and fundamental human rights, as well as lack of state capacity in poorer developing societies.[3] Understanding the reasons requires breaking down the summary PEI Index scores in far more detail, including by problems occurring at different stages of the election, and also by comparing changes in successive elections in each country.

SCORES ACROSS THE ELECTORAL CYCLE

Figure 3 describes expert scores across the eleven dimensions of the electoral cycle from the legal framework to the role of the electoral authorities.

FIGURE 3: PERFORMANCE OF ELECTIONS ACROSS STAGES IN THE ELECTORAL CYCLE

Note: The Perceptions of Electoral Integrity index summary scale and the subcomponent scales range from 0-100. The countries cover national elections held from 2012-2018.

Source: The Perceptions of Electoral Integrity expert survey, election-level

Overall, the weakest stage of the electoral cycle in many countries are media coverage and campaign finance. But diverse problems are evident in each contest, such as the introduction of more majoritarian electoral laws favoring the government in Hungary, problems of campaign finance in Antigua and Barbuda, and electoral boundaries in Lebanon. The cases of Russia, Italy and Venezuela illustrate the varied problems which can arise, as discussed in more detail in Part III.

Moreover, the quality of free and fair contests is closely related to the type of regime in power. This is only to be expected; electoral integrity is the core defining feature of liberal democracy. Figure 4 illustrates the general patterns. Elections are necessary for liberal democracies -- but they are far from sufficient. Today contests are held in most of the world's electoral autocracies and closed autocracies but with so many flaws that these serve to reinforce control by ruling parties and leaders, rather than facilitating genuine accountability and public choice.

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FIGURE 4: ELECTORAL INTEGRITY RANK AND TYPES OF REGIMES

Liberal democracies		Electoral democracies		Electoral autocracies		Closed autocracies	
Denmark	1	Lithuania	11	Rwanda	68	Oman	58
Finland	2	Slovak Republic	21	Armenia	77	Morocco	71
Norway	3	Poland	22	Guinea-Bissau	81	Kuwait	87
Sweden	4	Korea, Rep.	24	Myanmar (Burma)	82	Thailand	103
Iceland	5	Cape Verde	29	Central African Rep	94	Jordan	109
Germany	6	Chile	30	Singapore	96	Laos	114
Netherlands	7	Tunisia	35	Maldives	97	Swaziland	134
Estonia	8	Jamaica	38	Montenegro	101	Bahrain	136
Costa Rica	9	Greece	39	Ukraine	104	Uzbekistan	142
Switzerland	10	Croatia	43	Iran	110	Vietnam	157
Slovenia	12	Malta	44	Serbia	111	Syria	165
Austria	13	Argentina	46	Russia	117		
Luxembourg	14	Brazil	49	Pakistan	118		
Czech Republic	15	Timor-Leste	50	Comoros	120		
Uruguay	16	Mongolia	51	Kazakhstan	121		
New Zealand	17	South Africa	52	Zambia	122		
Canada	18	Peru	53	Turkey	123		
France	19	Lesotho	55	Sudan	126		
Portugal	20	Panama	59	Algeria	127		
Israel	23	Mexico	60	Kenya	129		
Taiwan	25	Namibia	61	Guinea	131		
Latvia	26	Colombia	62	Madagascar	132		
Ireland	27	India	64	Lebanon	133		
Belgium	28	Georgia	65	Venezuela	135		
Australia	31	Botswana	66	Egypt	137		
Benin	32	Bulgaria	67	Cameroon	138		
Cyprus	33	Solomon Islands	69	Belarus	139		
Spain	34	Indonesia	70	Angola	140		
Japan	36	Ivory Coast	72	Mauritania	141		
Italy	37	Nepal	73	Bangladesh	143		
United Kingdom	40	Bolivia	74	Zimbabwe	144		
Bhutan	41	Moldova	75	Iraq	145		
Ghana	42	Romania	76	Togo	146		
Barbados	45	Fiji	78	Uganda	147		
Mauritius	48	Liberia	80	Honduras	148		
Vanuatu	54	Hungary	83	Nicaragua	149		
United States	57	El Salvador	86	Azerbaijan	150		
Albania	84	Nigeria	88	Turkmenistan	151		
		Burkina Faso	89	Tajikistan	152		
		Sierra Leone	92	Mozambique	153		
		Guyana	93	Malaysia	154		
		Kyrgyzstan	95	Papua New Guinea	155		
		Sao Tome & Principe	98	Afghanistan	156		
		Niger	99	Haiti	158		
		Sri Lanka	100	Djibouti	159		
		Philippines	102	Chad	160		
		Suriname	105	Cambodia	161		
		Ecuador	106	Gabon	162		
		Gambia	107	Congo, Rep.	163		
		Paraguay	108	Burundi	164		
		Guatemala	112	Equatorial Guinea	166		
		Malawi	115	Ethiopia	167		
		Macedonia	116				
		Bosnia & Herzegovina	119				
		Dominican Republic	124				
		Tanzania	125				
		Senegal	128				
		Mali	130				
Total	25	Total	74	Total	133	Total	116

Note: Rank out of 167 countries (1st=highest). **Source:** The classification draws on Regimes in the World from Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) V9 (www.VDem.net).

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II: CAMPAIGN MEDIA

There are many reasons for growing concern about the quality of the campaign media, including ways in which the integrity of elections has been challenged by both misinformation and disinformation campaigns[4] and by cybersecurity attacks on official electoral records and party email servers.[5] Recent attention has been catalyzed by intelligence reports of Russian meddling in the 2016 US election.[6] But the problem is not confined to America, as foreign interference has been reported in the Brexit referenda campaign and in Europe.[7]

Given these concerns, the European Commission published a high-level expert study looking into 'disinformation', defined to include all forms of false, inaccurate, or misleading information designed, presented and promoted to intentionally cause public harm or for profit.[8] Other issues of long-standing concern for the quality of campaign communications includes the desirability of balance and pluralistic diversity in media election reporting, avoiding highly polarized partisanship.[9] Additional problems arise from the creation and dissemination online of illegal content, notably defamation, hate speech, and incitement to violence, as well as the spread of conspiracy theories online. The erosion of public confidence in the news media, fueled by populist claims of 'fake news', pose further challenges.

The fake news mantra fuels a 'post-truth' world, with populists denying the enlightenment idea that there can be such a thing as objective knowledge, scientific evidence, or impartial journalism.[10] Declining use of legacy news media, and the rise of social bubbles and echo chambers in online media, reinforce dogmatism fueled by ideology not fact.[11] Where news or social media provide repeated distortions impacting citizens' perceptions of events, these can give rise to deep-seated misinformed beliefs and cause significant harm. Attacks on journalistic elites as 'enemies of the people' are part and parcel of authoritarian populist rhetoric, with a crackdown on mainstream media by leaders such as the Philippines' Rodrigo Duterte, Hungary's Viktor Mihály Orbán and Turkey's Recep Erdoğan. At a joint press conference in Manila, when Duterte called the media 'spies', Trump laughed.[12]

How extensive are each of these problems? Are some problems confined to a few well-known cases, including the US, or are they found around the world? Despite widespread concern, and regular annual indices concerning freedom of the press and the internet around the world, little systematic evidence has been gathered to monitor the integrity of campaign media in elections across countries and varied types of regimes. To monitor the extent of the risks, the PEI expert survey added several items from a new rotating annual battery designed to capture several of these issues, including "fake news", partisan media, foreign meddling, and media monitoring. The results in Figure 5 illustrate some of the patterns showing that countries which generally perform poorly in elections overall, such as Egypt, Djibouti, and Venezuela, commonly have the most problems in media campaigns as well. But it is worth highlighting that some other specific weaknesses also emerge, such as partisan reporting in Montenegro, poor journalistic standards following government repression of the press in Hungary, and fake news on social media in Costa Rica and the Czech Republic. The silver lining, however, is that few elections were reported to experience successful cyberattacks on official voting records.

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FIGURE 5: ELECTION CAMPAIGN MEDIA

Category of electoral integrity	Country	Campaign media did not spread hate speech	Campaign media allowed informed voting choices	Foreign interests did not interfere in the campaign	Media watch groups monitored campaign news	Cyberattacks on official voting records did not occur during the election	Campaign news generally reflected a diversity of views and interests	Campaign news generally maintained high journalistic standards	Journalists were often not highly partisan in their campaign reporting	Social media often did not contain fake news	PEI index of electoral integrity, (0-100)
Very High	Finland	3.8	4.0	4.2	3.7	4.8	4.0	4.0	3.7	3.1	84
	Costa Rica	2.7	4.4	2.3	3.5	3.3	3.8	3.1	3.4	1.9	77
	Czech Republic	2.3	3.5	2.4	4.1	4.4	3.7	2.8	2.4	1.9	74
	Slovenia	2.8	3.4	3.2	3.4	4.6	3.2	2.8	2.5	2.6	73
High	Italy	2.4	3.2	3.4	3.5	4.1	3.3	2.6	2.3	2.1	69
	Cyprus	3.2	3.5	3.7	3.1	4.7	3.3	2.9	2.1	3.1	68
	Timor-Leste	2.4	4.0	4.4	3.2	4.8	4.1	3.3	3.7	2.3	67
	Barbados	2.1	3.5	3.5	2.7	4.8	3.4	2.9	3.6	2.3	66
Moderate	Colombia	2.4	3.8	2.3	3.1	3.4	3.7	3.1	3.3	1.9	59
	Grenada	3.6	3.5	2.8	3.0	4.0	3.0	2.8	2.3	3.0	56
	Montenegro	3.2	2.8	2.8	3.6	4.6	3.0	2.4	1.3	3.0	54
	El Salvador	3.8	3.0	2.6	3.3	4.0	3.1	2.3	2.3	2.2	54
	Hungary	1.8	2.3	3.2	3.1	4.2	2.2	1.6	1.6	2.6	52
	Sierra Leone	4.0	2.5	3.5	3.5	4.5	2.5	2.5	2.0	2.5	50
	Russia	3.0	2.8	4.0	3.4	3.9	2.6	2.2	2.8	3.0	50
Low	Antigua & Barbuda	4.0	1.0	2.0	2.5	4.0	2.0	2.5	2.0	3.5	48
	Paraguay	3.8	2.5	2.4	2.7	3.6	3.6	2.4	2.4	2.5	44
	Lebanon	2.7	3.2	1.9	3.8	4.0	3.1	2.9	1.9	3.6	42
	Turkmenistan	3.7	2.3	4.0	1.5	4.0	2.0	1.7	2.0	3.0	41
Very low	Azerbaijan	3.2	1.8	4.4	3.4	4.7	1.6	1.8	2.5	2.5	38
	Egypt	2.5	1.3	3.6	3.0	4.3	1.2	1.2	2.2	1.5	36
	Djibouti	4.0	2.0	1.5	2.5	2.5	2.0	2.0	1.5	3.0	34
	Malaysia	2.4	3.0	3.3	3.8	3.3	2.5	1.8	2.5	2.6	33
	Iraq	2.4	2.3	1.1	3.7	2.7	2.9	1.6	2.3	1.9	32
	Venezuela	3.4	2.3	2.9	2.8	3.6	3.0	1.9	2.2	1.7	27
	Total	3.0	2.9	3.0	3.2	4.0	2.9	2.5	2.5	2.5	53

Note: For the questions, see Table 1. Mean scores per election. All items were recoded in a positive direction to facilitate consistent comparisons across questions and the scores for each item ranged from low (1) to high (5). Countries were ranked by the overall PEI Index, ranging from 0-100.
Source: Perceptions of Electoral Integrity expert survey (PEI-6.5)

III: CASE-STUDIES OF 2018 ELECTIONS: ITALY, RUSSIA AND VENEZUELA

The comparison of a range of important elections in all regions of the world demonstrates that the quality varies substantially, due to structural, institutional and political factors.[13]

At the top end of the electoral integrity scale were Presidential elections last year in Finland (PEI Index=84) and Costa Rica (PEI Index=77), showcasing best practices with few flaws. At the other end of the scale, however, in Iraq (PEI Index=32), a turbulent contest saw ballots subject to a recount set ablaze, exacerbating tensions amid widespread electoral malpractices.[14] In Lebanon (PEI Index=42), the first national elections held since 2009 marked a vital step forward, but the contest was marred by endemic corruption, clientelism, and interference from outside forces.[15] A shock victory for the opposition in Malaysia (PEI Index=33) was remarkable in light of the odds stacked against them by systemic gerrymandering and malpractices favoring the incumbent. Some selected cases illustrate practices in more detail.

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Italy

Italy held general elections on the 4th of March 2018, after a period of political turbulence following the resignation of Prime Minister Matteo Renzi, leader of the center-left Party Democratic (PD). Members of Italy's bicameral Parliament serve 5-year terms, with the president of the parliamentary republic serving as head of state in a seven year term.[16] The passage of the "Rosatellum" electoral law of 2017 saw the adoption of a 'parallel' voting system.[17] The lower house has 630 members, with first-past-the-post used for 232 seats and the remainder determined by closed-list proportional representation with regional quotas.[18] The election was held against the backdrop of the country's declining economic conditions, which exacerbated tensions associated with the migrant crisis, driving dissatisfaction with the establishment and the European Union.[19]

FIGURE 6. ITALY'S PERFORMANCE ON THE PEI SUBDIMENSIONS

Source: *The Perceptions of Electoral Integrity expert survey, election-level*

The campaign saw sporadic outbreaks of xenophobia and violence, including a far right activist shooting at and injuring African migrants.[20] OSCE observers lamented the hollowing out of moderate discourse amid a rhetorical arms race centered on concerns about immigration and integration. In particular, the OSCE raised concerns about "discriminatory stereotyping and intolerant rhetoric targeting immigrants, including on social media."[21] Voter turnout, down to

69% in the lower house (-14%), suggests that these conditions may have taken a toll on citizen engagement.[22]

Renzi's centre-left coalition led by PD saw a dramatic decline in its seat share, maintaining only 122 seats in the Chamber of Deputies and losing 227. The primary beneficiaries were Matteo Salvini's centre-right coalition, which added 138 members, for a total of 265. The populist Five Star Movement gained 114 seats, for a total of 227.[23] After extensive negotiations, the Five Star Movement and the League formed a governing coalition headed by Prime Minister Giuseppe Conte. The coalition government represents a populist victory for anti-establishment, anti-immigration, and Eurosceptic forces.

Italy's 2018 elections performed relatively poorly on the PEI Index compared with other states in Northern and Western Europe, with an overall score of 69, similar to an index of 67 in the 2013 elections. Despite this, the country has seen strong gains on the reformed electoral laws (+21) and campaign finance (+9) dimensions from the 2013 legislative elections.

As with most countries, Italy continues to have moderate scores on campaign media, rating at 52/100. This is consistent with the country's relatively high levels of fake news (Figure 5). Mistrust of the news media followed years of delegitimization by political elites, including former Prime Minister and media mogul Silvio Berlusconi. The digital turn in Italian politics, central to the success of the Five Star Movement, created fertile conditions for misinformation to thrive, exacerbated by the weakness of the independence of the media oversight body.[24] Despite high quality elections overall, politicization of media regulation, lack of media diversity, and harsh libel laws may undermine the ability of Italian citizens' to make informed political choices, particularly as the problems associated with fake news and misinformation grow more severe.

Russia

The reelection of President Putin in the Russian election on the 18th of March 2018 was in no doubt flawed, the vote was seen by some analysts as "a sort of celebration of the post-Crimea majority's identity".[25]

The Kremlin's proactive measures to prevent the existence of any genuine consolidated opposition, the absence of a free press, and loyalist security forces, serve to preserve the status quo.[26] Russian elections are characterized by widespread voter intimidation and the jailing of political opponents, and independent journalists have become common targets of state repression, with state media ensuring the delivery of propaganda.

OSCE observers characterized the election as having been conducted in "an overly controlled legal and political environment", in which restrictions on fundamental freedoms of expression and candidate registration and "extensive and uncritical coverage of the incumbent" skewed the playing field.[27]

OSCE observations are confirmed by the relatively poor performance of Russia's 2018 election on the PEI Index, with particularly severe issues identified on the electoral laws and campaign media (Figure 7). Yet, improvements on the formal aspects of the presidential election, the electoral procedures, and the vote count saw a slightly stronger performance than we reported in the 2016 Duma elections.

FIGURE 7. RUSSIA'S PERFORMANCE ON THE PEI SUBDIMENSIONS

Source: The Perceptions of Electoral Integrity expert survey, election-level

Venezuela

The Venezuelan Presidential election held on the 20th May 2018 was widely denounced as a "farce" and a "show election", with the Organization of American States stating that in the electoral process "the dictator Maduro tried – without success – to give a democratic veneer to his totalitarian regime".[28] The legitimacy of the contest, which Maduro won easily with more than two-thirds of the valid vote total, was further undermined by an opposition boycott and record low turnout.[29] Incumbent President Maduro inherited and expanded upon Chavez's mechanisms of political control, which empowered him to suppress political opposition and critical press.[30] In 2017, Maduro dissolved the National Assembly, after a coalition of opposing parties formed a majority after the 2015 parliamentary election for the first time in nearly two decades.[31] Despite a formal ban on public protests, runaway inflation and shortages of basic goods brought protestors into the streets again during the 2018 elections.[32]

The elections were widely condemned, with G7 leaders making a joint statement, "united in rejecting the electoral process leading to the May 20, 2018, Presidential election in Venezuela"

for "failing to meet accepted international standards".[33] The High Representative of the EU similarly released a statement condemning the elections for failing to comply with minimum international standards of political pluralism, transparency, and the upholding of the rule of law,[34] while Members of the European Parliament called for "fresh presidential elections in accordance with internationally recognised democratic standards".[35]

As Figure 8 shows, Venezuela performs extremely poorly on electoral integrity throughout the various stages of the electoral cycle, well below the global average on all dimensions. Venezuela's PEI Index score has halved across its past three Presidential elections, from 54 in 2012 to 39 in 2013 to 27 in the most recent contest in 2018. This decline has been driven in large part due to major declines on the electoral laws (-35), electoral procedures (-45), party registration (38), and electoral authorities (-30) subdimensions. These results correspond with downgrades from other ratings agencies, including Freedom House, which now scores Venezuela as "Not Free", substantially on the basis of the deterioration of its democratic institutions.[36]

FIGURE 8. VENEZUELA'S PERFORMANCE ON THE PEI SUBDIMENSIONS

*Source:* *The Perceptions of Electoral Integrity expert survey, election-level*

PERFORMANCE SCORES WORLDWIDE

Therefore, overall, elections are now held in almost all countries around the world but how far they meet international standards of electoral integrity varies substantially and elections, and, by themselves, are clearly insufficient for liberal democracy unless many other checks and balances prove effective in providing opportunities for government accountability, inclusive participation, and the protection of human rights in each state.

For the broadest comparison, Figure 8 lists the summary scores for PEI across the 11 dimensions for all elections covered from 2012-2018.

FIGURE 9: SUMMARY SCORES FOR ALL ELECTIONS, 2012-2018

Election code	Type	Year	PEI index	Electoral laws	Electoral procedures	District boundaries	Voter registration	Party and candidate	Media coverage	Campaign finance	Voting process	Vote count	Results	Electoral authorities	Rank
AFG_14062014_P2	Pres	2014	32	47	24	48	19	32	61	22	28	23	26	26	315
AFG_20102018_L1	Leg	2018	36	38	28	43	20	55	70	30	24	27	38	22	296
AGO_23082017_L1	Leg	2017	42	45	39	51	30	50	30	33	47	41	49	40	267
AGO_31082012_L1	Leg	2012	36	28	38	51	23	47	31	22	38	37	44	35	297
ALB_23062013_L1	Leg	2013	54	52	65	59	60	49	47	27	46	76	78	56	171
ALB_25062017_L1	Leg	2017	53	38	64	49	67	51	48	39	45	67	71	57	184
ARG_22102017_L1	Leg	2017	65	71	78	64	67	64	45	41	63	79	84	72	99
ARG_22112015_L1	Leg	2015	63	68	74	63	65	71	55	35	61	70	76	66	112
ARG_27102013_L1	Leg	2013	66	70	83	66	65	70	55	42	61	78	77	70	94
ARM_02042017_L1	Leg	2017	51	51	44	63	52	58	57	29	43	59	64	51	208
ARM_02122018_L1	Leg	2018	70	61	82	60	66	74	70	61	57	84	78	79	71
ARM_18022013_P1	Pres	2013	44	54	49	50	27	50	50	31	38	60	30	41	254
ATG_21032018_L1	Leg	2018	48	50	72	38	53	43	44	4	39	79	79	41	225
AUS_02072016_L1	Leg	2016	70	66	88	74	60	78	45	50	72	82	74	87	68
AUS_07092013_L1	Leg	2013	70	65	89	68	58	69	47	57	72	82	75	88	70
AUT_04122016_P2	Pres	2016	80	80	87	75	79	77	69	73	80	92	81	85	16
AUT_15102017_L1	Leg	2017	77	80	88	72	86	74	54	59	82	90	78	88	27
AUT_22052016_P2	Pres	2016	76	91	67	71	77	79	63	76	81	86	66	73	32
AUT_29092013_L1	Leg	2013	77	78	90	77	84	70	59	55	80	91	84	88	26
AZE_01112015_L1	Leg	2015	29	26	24	32	39	34	16	10	38	36	57	12	322
AZE_09102013_P1	Pres	2013	41	44	37	58	45	42	32	31	43	45	45	40	269
AZE_11042018_P1	Pres	2018	38	31	37	53	39	36	33	32	43	42	51	21	288
BDI_21072015_P1	Pres	2015	22	25	13	36	21	20	26	7	23	42	15	17	337
BDI_29062015_L1	Leg	2015	27	30	19	33	15	38	25	15	28	34	33	25	328
BEL_25052014_L1	Leg	2014	71	66	81	60	75	73	64	64	67	79	79	77	62
BEN_20032016_P2	Pres	2016	71	86	88	80	54	74	62	37	58	96	75	87	66
BEN_26042015_L1	Leg	2015	69	83	77	73	50	65	70	40	58	85	80	88	76
BFA_02122012_L1	Leg	2012	41	53	56	19	44	52	55	8	32	55	40	48	270
BFA_29112015_P2	Pres	2015	65	73	85	67	50	54	67	45	47	85	82	82	97
BGD_05012014_L1	Leg	2014	38	42	46	42	46	38	49	23	26	49	40	36	285
BGR_05102014_L1	Leg	2014	63	76	65	67	50	66	50	40	60	81	72	71	114
BGR_12052013_L1	Leg	2013	50	51	52	50	31	62	45	33	51	67	40	54	219
BGR_13112016_P2	Pres	2016	60	63	71	63	43	69	46	42	51	74	79	66	135
BGR_26032017_L1	Leg	2017	58	53	70	63	43	61	41	44	48	81	79	65	147
BHR_01122018_L2	Leg	2018	42	31	55	25	37	34	41	33	49	51	54	43	265
BHR_29112014_L2	Leg	2014	38	18	44	21	36	39	35	27	46	53	55	31	287
BHS_10052017_L1	Leg	2017	54	43	60	43	39	46	59	47	50	69	71	61	178
BIH_07102018_P1	Pres	2018	40	31	41	47	26	47	41	25	48	41	52	33	279

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Election code	Type	Year	PEI index	Electoral laws	Electoral procedures	District boundaries	Voter registration	Party and candidate	Media coverage	Campaign finance	Voting process	Vote count	Results	Electoral authorities	Rank
BIH_12102014_P1	Pres	2014	52	39	68	41	51	41	45	35	50	66	73	66	200
BLR_11092016_L1	Leg	2016	47	39	54	72	43	48	36	36	51	44	52	44	235
BLR_11102015_P1	Pres	2015	40	29	41	57	44	43	27	27	48	34	62	32	277
BLR_23092012_L1	Leg	2012	32	14	37	45	46	32	24	22	41	22	52	16	318
BLZ_04112015_L1	Leg	2015	53	42	62	42	42	58	54	30	50	67	64	70	187
BOL_12102014_P1	Pres	2014	56	55	63	57	46	61	54	34	58	62	70	52	164
BRA_26102014_P2	Pres	2014	68	74	87	73	75	63	48	38	65	92	64	82	79
BRA_28102018_P2	Pres	2018	60	66	69	67	72	47	44	36	59	85	68	57	136
BRB_21022013_L1	Leg	2013	63	67	69	65	58	58	64	31	57	84	79	73	111
BRB_24052018_L1	Leg	2018	66	74	73	77	45	83	49	35	64	75	92	72	91
BTN_13072013_L2	Leg	2013	61	53	75	62	45	45	66	56	57	65	69	74	132
BTN_18102018_L2	Leg	2018	71	70	81	61	71	62	65	61	68	83	86	72	67
BWA_24102014_L1	Leg	2014	58	38	83	48	58	67	36	17	62	75	77	75	148
CAF_14022016_P2	Pres	2016	53	64	52	41	34	43	57	50	47	69	69	55	194
CAN_19102015_L1	Leg	2015	75	51	90	78	58	74	63	68	73	89	87	89	40
CHE_18102015_L1	Leg	2015	79	77	89	72	88	81	63	40	82	93	92	91	19
CHL_15122013_P2	Pres	2013	67	54	89	58	55	65	53	48	53	89	90	88	87
CHL_17122017_P2	Pres	2017	75	82	89	61	69	71	53	66	69	93	93	87	39
CIV_18122016_L1	Leg	2016	54	65	72	38	43	58	42	34	49	72	61	63	177
CIV_25102015_P1	Pres	2015	59	68	73	44	57	67	46	33	54	76	71	64	143
CMR_07102018_P1	Pres	2018	34	22	33	40	25	31	30	11	36	39	30	38	308
CMR_30092013_L1	Leg	2013	46	47	59	37	43	49	39	22	37	67	52	63	236
COG_05082012_L2	Leg	2012	31	28	38	42	17	33	27	8	44	27	50	23	320
COG_20032016_P1	Pres	2016	25	17	14	33	19	44	23	13	31	37	17	15	333
COG_30072017_L2	Leg	2017	32	7	19	24	9	29	28	27	43	51	46	40	317
COL_09032014_L1	Leg	2014	61	68	71	67	47	72	57	42	42	79	72	77	123
COL_11032018_L1	Leg	2018	61	72	67	70	58	58	56	44	44	81	75	68	128
COL_15062014_P2	Pres	2014	59	61	79	54	36	57	44	34	54	79	74	77	144
COL_17062018_P2	Pres	2018	57	52	74	58	61	53	47	36	50	68	79	64	154
COM_10042016_P2	Pres	2016	40	67	34	53	25	52	52	23	25	65	31	31	276
COM_22022015_L2	Leg	2015	50	65	59	50	31	56	52	27	38	67	59	61	214
CPV_02102016_P1	Pres	2016	70	81	85	65	57	73	66	56	59	82	84	77	69
CPV_20032016_L1	Leg	2016	72	79	88	53	63	73	71	57	69	78	77	79	59
CRI_01042018_P2	Pres	2018	76	85	93	78	83	72	59	61	61	92	89	92	30
CRI_06042014_P2	Pres	2014	81	80	97	67	76	79	57	65	82	99	94	97	12
CYP_04022018_P2	Pres	2018	68	70	85	68	70	66	50	48	62	88	87	69	77
CYP_22052016_L1	Leg	2016	67	58	84	66	66	61	48	48	63	86	85	77	86
CYP_24022013_P2	Pres	2013	73	83	87	67	76	71	58	51	71	87	88	80	52
CZE_13102012_S1	Leg	2012	76	77	90	67	84	74	59	66	68	93	86	84	31
CZE_21102017_L1	Leg	2017	75	79	82	73	91	80	55	63	70	86	80	83	36
CZE_25012013_P2	Pres	2013	74	80	75	76	92	82	53	57	68	93	79	77	49
CZE_25102013_L1	Leg	2013	77	85	90	75	87	77	58	55	72	94	89	87	23
CZE_27012018_P2	Pres	2018	74	84	82	74	83	81	54	54	71	88	78	84	47
DEU_22092013_L1	Leg	2013	80	77	89	74	82	83	67	70	78	94	88	84	15
DEU_24092017_L1	Leg	2017	81	81	97	72	81	76	68	71	80	96	83	91	13
DJI_08042016_P1	Pres	2016	35	26	47	42	26	29	33	17	37	45	46	36	303
DJI_22022013_L1	Leg	2013	25	18	24	44	24	20	26	16	31	23	33	20	332
DJI_23022018_L1	Leg	2018	34	17	41	35	33	33	30	20	36	46	44	34	310
DNK_18062015_L1	Leg	2015	86	91	98	83	93	90	72	72	79	98	93	93	1
DOM_15052016_P1	Pres	2016	44	44	51	60	55	50	39	18	45	54	39	45	249
DZA_04052017_L1	Leg	2017	43	36	49	51	41	44	46	26	48	46	49	37	257

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Election code	Type	Year	PEI index	Electoral laws	Electoral procedures	District boundaries	Voter registration	Party and candidate	Media coverage	Campaign finance	Voting process	Vote count	Results	Electoral authorities	Rank
DZA_17042014_P1	Pres	2014	43	25	48	46	43	35	44	26	52	60	49	35	261
ECU_02042017_P2	Pres	2017	45	33	51	45	39	51	41	34	59	50	34	41	245
ECU_17022013_P1	Pres	2013	55	42	65	39	57	57	43	37	62	68	67	52	169
EGY_02122015_L1	Leg	2015	45	27	59	37	53	56	32	25	48	56	57	46	243
EGY_26052014_P1	Pres	2014	40	29	50	48	29	21	30	23	50	54	56	41	281
EGY_28032018_P1	Pres	2018	35	33	41	48	42	22	25	17	42	37	59	33	299
ESP_20122015_L1	Leg	2015	69	37	83	56	76	73	47	52	65	91	93	82	74
ESP_26062016_L1	Leg	2016	69	42	84	61	74	75	52	54	61	91	90	81	72
EST_01032015_L1	Leg	2015	79	75	84	70	88	76	68	59	89	87	85	83	17
ETH_24052015_L1	Leg	2015	24	14	21	38	31	28	22	19	23	18	41	13	334
FIN_19042015_L1	Leg	2015	86	80	98	72	95	93	70	70	83	99	96	96	3
FIN_28012018_P1	Pres	2018	84	86	96	73	96	86	66	70	79	97	95	94	6
FJI_14112018_L1	Leg	2018	56	30	75	72	56	54	42	39	65	64	57	61	160
FJI_17092014_L1	Leg	2014	53	30	73	49	58	48	37	32	62	64	59	63	193
FRA_07052017_P2	Pres	2017	76	70	92	68	62	79	63	69	72	93	74	87	33
FRA_18062017_L2	Leg	2017	74	68	94	69	65	72	63	66	70	89	71	83	51
FSM_03032015_L1	Leg	2015	58	61	67	59	39	63	55	26	60	68	69	68	150
FSM_05032013_L1	Leg	2013	63	62	70	73	51	77	61	37	60	68	68	67	116
FSM_07032017_L1	Leg	2017	57	72	56	68	37	67	42	43	56	68	61	64	155
GAB_27102018_L2	Leg	2018	26	29	21	35	26	39	30	4	30	25	33	17	331
GBN_27082016_P2	Pres	2016	34	33	34	38	49	62	26	18	38	34	21	19	311
GBR_07052015_L1	Leg	2015	65	37	85	43	61	65	39	58	71	86	73	80	100
GBR_08062017_L1	Leg	2017	68	43	87	51	40	74	49	51	75	91	79	82	80
GEO_01102012_L1	Leg	2012	53	56	62	52	45	54	42	27	53	75	69	57	180
GEO_08102016_L1	Leg	2016	61	53	77	52	62	57	58	46	59	71	72	70	126
GEO_27102013_P1	Pres	2013	64	76	72	57	60	56	57	51	59	82	78	71	103
GEO_28112018_P2	Leg	2018	53	58	51	61	52	64	48	33	56	67	41	54	188
GHA_07122012_P1	Pres	2012	57	77	63	59	47	74	55	32	48	80	46	61	152
GHA_07122016_P1	Pres	2016	73	83	79	73	57	88	70	45	61	89	84	85	54
GIN_11102015_P1	Pres	2015	41	40	46	42	26	47	40	25	39	60	41	45	268
GIN_28092013_L1	Leg	2013	43	50	28	39	21	64	55	19	44	56	55	34	259
GMB_01122016_P1	Pres	2016	48	25	76	54	39	53	30	28	45	66	42	69	224
GMB_06042017_L1	Leg	2017	52	46	68	39	35	52	47	23	45	77	68	69	204
GNB_18052014_P2	Pres	2014	54	63	65	53	50	55	54	30	52	66	57	60	172
GNQ_12112017_L1	Leg	2017	22	16	19	36	22	13	13	11	26	26	46	15	338
GNQ_24042016_P1	Pres	2016	27	19	21	38	31	27	14	13	29	33	57	25	327
GNQ_26052013_L1	Leg	2013	24	13	23	36	23	29	12	15	24	27	49	13	335
GRC_20092015_L1	Leg	2015	62	44	88	49	57	59	47	39	56	84	85	75	120
GRC_25012015_L1	Leg	2015	71	50	93	60	76	71	54	50	65	91	89	86	63
GRD_13032018_L1	Leg	2018	57	48	68	55	46	69	43	25	57	76	77	56	157
GRD_19022013_L1	Leg	2013	66	62	93	58	55	80	41	21	57	92	91	88	92
GTM_25102015_P2	Pres	2015	48	46	62	61	32	38	42	20	36	76	63	67	222
GUY_11052015_L1	Leg	2015	53	43	77	50	60	63	36	30	47	66	44	74	191
HND_24112013_P1	Pres	2013	45	38	51	46	41	58	36	30	46	68	30	45	244
HND_26112017_P1	Pres	2017	29	20	24	49	24	51	32	18	37	17	28	15	323
HRV_08112015_L1	Leg	2015	68	60	80	55	57	68	53	59	64	88	87	77	78
HRV_11012015_P2	Pres	2015	65	63	77	53	54	64	48	60	63	80	78	72	102
HRV_11092016_L1	Leg	2016	61	63	67	46	50	57	48	50	59	82	86	66	124
HTI_20112016_P1	Pres	2016	35	42	38	42	27	33	49	26	29	39	27	39	304
HTI_25102015_L2	Leg	2015	28	41	14	51	19	43	55	7	14	37	21	22	326
HUN_06042014_L1	Leg	2014	56	30	69	30	67	58	33	38	65	81	73	58	162

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Election code	Type	Year	PEI index	Electoral laws	Electoral procedures	District boundaries	Voter registration	Party and candidate	Media coverage	Campaign finance	Voting process	Vote count	Results	Electoral authorities	Rank
HUN_08042018_L1	Leg	2018	52	36	61	34	64	67	29	35	63	64	51	49	203
IDN_09042014_L1	Leg	2014	53	58	57	65	38	62	53	23	52	63	57	63	186
IDN_09072014_P1	Pres	2014	60	64	68	62	42	67	54	44	61	74	51	72	134
IND_12052014_L1	Leg	2014	59	72	72	58	40	57	55	33	53	72	67	76	142
IRL_26022016_L1	Leg	2016	71	77	90	70	31	82	60	57	60	89	86	77	65
IRL_26102018_P1	Pres	2018	75	78	93	66	36	79	66	71	63	89	92	85	45
IRN_14062013_P1	Pres	2013	55	36	73	52	63	20	56	47	57	62	81	59	167
IRN_19052017_P1	Pres	2017	47	25	66	34	48	31	48	37	50	59	62	52	233
IRN_26022016_L1	Leg	2016	46	28	63	50	65	30	37	22	47	53	71	46	240
IRQ_12052018_L1	Leg	2018	32	34	22	32	24	52	35	17	35	26	39	27	316
IRQ_30042014_L1	Leg	2014	44	44	53	41	38	45	46	18	48	50	53	46	252
ISL_25062016_P1	Pres	2016	86	89	96	72	96	84	67	76	85	100	94	96	2
ISL_27042013_L1	Leg	2013	78	69	94	57	87	82	64	60	81	91	88	82	22
ISL_28102017_L1	Leg	2017	77	64	91	60	94	82	58	61	79	91	86	82	25
ISL_29102016_L1	Leg	2016	85	79	73	80	95	90	70	79	85	99	92	91	5
ISR_17032015_L1	Leg	2015	73	74	89	65	78	77	50	61	59	92	89	84	55
ISR_22012013_L1	Leg	2013	75	79	94	65	79	75	66	62	56	89	86	89	43
ITA_04032018_L1	Leg	2018	69	65	79	72	81	59	52	58	63	80	84	78	75
ITA_24022013_L1	Leg	2013	66	44	86	65	73	66	53	49	63	80	76	79	90
JAM_25022016_L1	Leg	2016	67	72	87	68	59	73	61	45	46	85	76	82	89
JOR_20092016_L1	Leg	2016	53	46	78	50	48	60	54	36	46	56	48	64	192
JOR_23012013_L1	Leg	2013	46	30	57	21	45	55	45	28	47	57	46	63	237
JPN_10072016_L1	Leg	2016	67	48	79	63	79	69	50	59	59	86	74	75	85
JPN_14122014_L1	Leg	2014	71	67	86	54	77	75	57	64	64	77	86	78	64
JPN_16122012_L1	Leg	2012	67	53	83	52	74	63	59	59	66	81	77	72	81
JPN_21072013_L1	Leg	2013	67	51	89	46	72	66	49	55	66	86	75	74	88
JPN_22102017_L1	Leg	2017	66	46	82	43	68	61	52	58	66	82	78	81	93
KAZ_20032016_L1	Leg	2016	48	35	58	56	50	39	38	36	53	52	65	43	227
KAZ_26042015_P1	Pres	2015	43	29	48	46	49	35	27	32	48	56	62	40	262
KEN_04032013_P1	Pres	2013	41	70	31	51	18	57	63	20	34	37	55	27	271
KEN_08082017_P1	Pres	2017	47	64	41	60	34	63	53	23	49	56	38	41	232
KEN_26102017_P1	Pres	2017	41	59	38	49	40	58	54	16	28	57	26	36	275
KGZ_04102015_L1	Leg	2015	54	54	64	55	44	43	52	38	52	72	65	59	175
KGZ_15102017_P1	Pres	2017	52	57	57	55	45	51	48	30	50	67	60	52	205
KHM_28072013_L1	Leg	2013	32	29	38	32	13	38	28	18	34	57	25	28	314
KHM_29072018_L1	Leg	2018	29	21	42	39	27	23	21	13	29	32	58	23	324
KOR_09052017_P1	Pres	2017	72	54	87	60	76	68	56	66	72	85	76	83	58
KOR_13042016_L1	Leg	2016	71	46	85	55	80	66	54	62	75	90	81	83	61
KOR_19122012_P1	Pres	2012	77	59	88	69	86	77	57	65	78	96	85	83	28
KWT_01122012_L1	Leg	2012	50	37	63	38	67	52	52	21	60	73	29	51	215
KWT_26112016_L1	Leg	2016	52	30	64	56	59	46	48	24	55	67	67	57	199
KWT_27072013_L1	Leg	2013	58	47	80	51	54	70	53	33	51	73	63	69	146
LAO_20032016_L1	Leg	2016	48	17	67	62	55	42	26	40	44	57	86	38	226
LBN_06052018_L1	Leg	2018	42	33	44	23	52	52	39	17	46	56	50	43	266
LBR_26122017_P2	Pres	2017	54	81	63	55	33	64	49	29	47	67	56	67	170
LKA_08012015_P1	Pres	2015	51	57	69	50	49	45	34	28	46	65	61	68	211
LKA_17082015_L1	Leg	2015	53	59	73	46	46	52	41	22	50	74	54	69	196
LSO_03062017_L1	Leg	2017	61	76	74	66	45	62	53	35	50	79	70	75	131
LSO_28022015_L1	Leg	2015	64	80	82	71	48	59	49	40	56	77	77	78	109
LTU_09102016_L1	Leg	2016	78	83	85	80	81	86	70	63	72	83	88	79	21
LTU_25052014_P2	Pres	2014	82	92	91	73	75	84	67	75	79	94	90	86	9

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Election code	Type	Year	PEI index	Electoral laws	Electoral procedures	District boundaries	Voter registration	Party and candidate	Media coverage	Campaign finance	Voting process	Vote count	Results	Electoral authorities	Rank
LTU_28102012_L2	Leg	2012	73	86	69	77	75	85	65	55	69	85	70	72	56
LUX_14102018_L1	Leg	2018	76	67	90	73	85	73	59	72	72	90	77	89	29
LVA_04102014_L1	Leg	2014	72	72	83	69	66	72	60	56	69	88	77	78	60
LVA_06102018_L1	Leg	2018	75	77	85	74	75	76	66	59	75	89	79	75	44
MAR_07102016_L1	Leg	2016	57	74	69	63	42	50	60	42	41	73	72	56	158
MDA_13112016_P2	Pres	2016	55	44	64	52	46	68	36	34	58	78	58	62	165
MDA_30112014_L1	Leg	2014	56	58	64	64	57	47	48	32	57	79	59	58	163
MDG_19122018_P2	Pres	2018	44	33	59	65	15	57	57	30	32	53	38	52	248
MDG_20122013_P2	Pres	2013	40	36	41	36	18	48	44	20	37	58	45	49	280
MDV_16112013_P2	Pres	2013	54	58	64	61	45	61	47	32	53	68	65	48	173
MDV_22032014_L1	Leg	2014	59	60	75	47	51	58	58	49	59	63	76	56	140
MDV_23092018_P1	Pres	2018	44	28	55	56	44	24	44	17	50	64	50	46	256
MEX_01072012_P1	Pres	2012	62	58	75	70	76	59	56	44	57	85	48	67	119
MEX_01072018_P1	Pres	2018	67	77	82	73	71	57	61	49	56	85	76	74	82
MEX_07062015_L1	Leg	2015	52	49	66	58	62	46	44	34	43	73	53	62	201
MKD_11122016_L1	Leg	2016	48	44	56	52	32	55	37	32	49	60	55	47	229
MKD_27042014_P2	Pres	2014	47	48	56	43	23	56	28	30	51	72	50	54	230
MLI_11082013_P2	Pres	2013	52	62	62	48	25	50	54	39	45	69	67	58	198
MLI_12082018_P2	Pres	2018	33	36	40	39	2	53	38	18	30	29	42	33	313
MLT_03062017_L1	Leg	2017	64	47	84	54	70	65	40	37	63	87	83	79	106
MLT_09032013_L1	Leg	2013	65	49	86	55	64	68	45	38	65	89	79	78	96
MMR_08112015_L1	Leg	2015	54	42	72	54	30	40	49	34	55	74	69	69	176
MNE_07042013_P1	Pres	2013	41	52	48	53	31	56	33	23	43	45	35	33	272
MNE_14102012_L1	Leg	2012	61	81	71	61	47	62	60	22	55	88	79	60	125
MNE_15042018_P1	Pres	2018	54	50	55	56	44	61	49	33	48	74	72	49	179
MNE_16102016_L1	Leg	2016	51	59	52	57	40	61	39	31	54	67	50	46	213
MNG_07072017_P2	Pres	2017	63	40	80	45	69	50	61	43	63	87	71	73	117
MNG_26062013_P1	Pres	2013	64	56	78	62	60	66	48	46	64	84	70	71	105
MNG_26062016_L1	Leg	2016	64	50	69	50	68	62	61	40	64	92	76	69	108
MOZ_15102014_P1	Pres	2014	35	36	38	46	25	43	33	20	39	32	37	33	305
MRT_15092018_L2	Leg	2018	29	21	28	54	15	38	37	5	23	31	44	28	325
MRT_21062014_P1	Pres	2014	46	53	38	61	25	45	52	36	51	56	35	48	239
MRT_21122013_L2	Leg	2013	41	50	56	29	26	40	48	21	38	41	46	56	273
MUS_10122014_L1	Leg	2014	64	64	90	55	72	60	47	31	58	87	78	79	104
MWI_20052014_P1	Pres	2014	48	70	49	61	31	69	49	18	42	49	45	55	228
MYS_05052013_L1	Leg	2013	35	15	43	10	21	48	22	21	56	43	42	32	301
MYS_09052018_L1	Leg	2018	34	15	46	12	26	39	26	16	50	30	67	25	309
NAM_28112014_P1	Pres	2014	60	67	62	70	53	69	52	35	56	63	79	68	133
NER_20032016_P2	Pres	2016	52	75	56	64	35	43	44	32	50	74	43	66	202
NGA_28032015_L1	Leg	2015	53	75	66	62	42	60	49	20	31	73	67	70	182
NIC_06112016_P1	Pres	2016	36	31	41	49	42	36	47	27	32	35	43	26	295
NLD_12092012_L1	Leg	2012	78	91	91	67	84	78	61	62	75	88	88	88	20
NLD_15032017_L1	Leg	2017	82	94	91	73	86	81	75	70	72	91	93	90	10
NOR_09092013_L1	Leg	2013	83	81	92	71	87	84	67	74	81	97	93	91	8
NOR_09112017_L1	Leg	2017	83	79	90	73	90	82	66	77	84	94	92	93	7
NPL_07122017_L1	Leg	2017	59	75	73	58	58	64	58	26	44	79	73	68	138
NPL_19112013_L1	Leg	2013	53	73	63	56	44	57	53	35	42	66	46	65	185
NZL_20092014_L1	Leg	2014	75	71	95	63	54	83	56	54	78	87	89	88	38
NZL_23092017_L1	Leg	2017	75	70	93	77	63	85	47	61	77	88	81	88	35
OMN_25102015_L1	Leg	2015	61	52	79	52	58	56	54	41	62	74	78	59	129
PAK_11052013_L1	Leg	2013	50	68	57	51	53	38	59	36	37	62	45	60	217

Election code	Type	Year	PEI index	Electoral laws	Electoral procedures	District boundaries	Voter registration	Party and candidate	Media coverage	Campaign finance	Voting process	Vote count	Results	Electoral authorities	Rank
PAK_25072018_L1	Leg	2018	44	59	52	52	49	33	48	31	45	42	41	47	251
PAN_04052014_P1	Pres	2014	61	55	78	56	65	65	54	24	63	75	64	71	130
PER_05062016_P2	Pres	2016	65	71	56	57	77	55	56	49	66	88	76	71	98
PER_10042016_L1	Leg	2016	60	58	44	66	70	63	51	40	59	80	73	56	137
PHL_09052016_P1	Pres	2016	55	52	68	54	41	62	57	25	50	76	52	66	168
PHL_13052013_L1	Leg	2013	48	61	60	51	27	63	51	20	38	60	51	55	221
PNG_08072017_L1	Leg	2017	34	40	21	45	11	55	49	16	26	35	37	43	307
POL_24052015_P2	Pres	2015	74	79	82	72	75	76	55	61	74	82	80	80	50
POL_25102015_L1	Leg	2015	75	79	87	78	76	74	52	63	74	87	85	82	37
PRT_04102015_L1	Leg	2015	72	71	85	66	46	72	58	59	73	89	84	80	57
PRT_24012016_P1	Pres	2016	77	83	93	66	52	86	57	65	72	95	92	90	24
PRY_21042013_P1	Pres	2013	55	63	70	59	46	54	40	24	51	74	79	57	166
PRY_22042018_P1	Pres	2018	44	36	47	59	48	49	43	20	47	56	45	41	246
ROU_09122012_L1	Leg	2012	48	46	59	37	28	58	32	32	46	67	68	50	223
ROU_11122016_L1	Leg	2016	65	61	79	54	43	58	50	57	65	82	82	77	101
ROU_16112014_P2	Pres	2014	53	40	54	50	29	66	41	43	46	80	72	56	190
RUS_18032018_P1	Pres	2018	50	34	61	48	59	49	35	39	55	52	62	45	216
RUS_18092016_L1	Leg	2016	44	35	43	48	53	43	33	34	55	39	63	40	247
RWA_03092018_L1	Leg	2018	58	43	67	46	62	53	52	47	55	76	68	63	151
RWA_04082017_P1	Pres	2017	51	28	58	50	73	48	31	35	47	61	83	56	209
RWA_16092013_L1	Leg	2013	64	62	71	61	72	60	54	59	61	70	77	65	107
SDN_13042015_P1	Pres	2015	43	28	49	41	39	46	37	27	45	57	59	43	258
SEN_30072017_L1	Leg	2017	43	32	48	58	13	49	41	19	39	68	55	50	260
SGP_11092015_L1	Leg	2015	53	27	76	14	77	46	33	35	60	69	75	58	195
SLB_19112014_L1	Leg	2014	57	74	67	71	41	59	62	29	40	72	63	68	156
SLE_17112012_P1	Pres	2012	57	67	78	46	66	64	30	33	54	63	63	72	159
SLE_31032018_P2	Pres	2018	50	60	67	50	50	43	41	33	44	64	40	67	218
SLV_01032015_L1	Leg	2015	49	53	44	57	53	60	49	38	47	49	53	42	220
SLV_04032018_L1	Leg	2018	53	69	61	56	42	54	48	38	42	64	67	61	183
SLV_09032014_P2	Pres	2014	59	60	80	61	47	60	44	34	61	85	43	74	141
SRB_02042017_P1	Pres	2017	43	47	53	57	26	49	17	29	54	53	40	40	263
SRB_16032014_L1	Leg	2014	57	54	74	55	38	57	36	35	57	79	79	67	153
SRB_24042016_L1	Leg	2016	46	42	53	54	33	53	37	37	51	53	45	43	238
STP_07082016_P2	Pres	2016	47	55	63	49	41	48	39	24	50	55	51	51	231
STP_07102018_L1	Leg	2018	51	71	63	37	67	73	33	21	48	58	53	53	207
STP_12102014_L1	Leg	2014	58	73	80	55	51	68	43	28	45	72	71	72	149
SUR_25052015_L1	Leg	2015	51	50	65	52	46	61	37	27	48	57	64	54	212
SVK_05032016_L1	Leg	2016	74	70	85	63	83	74	67	56	77	81	84	78	46
SVK_29032014_P2	Pres	2014	74	72	83	65	75	87	63	55	65	92	86	82	48
SVN_02122012_P2	Pres	2012	75	69	88	65	88	70	50	57	79	92	80	86	42
SVN_03072018_L1	Leg	2018	75	71	88	68	90	76	47	60	78	90	84	78	41
SVN_12112017_P2	Pres	2017	81	85	94	72	85	87	59	69	81	93	88	87	11
SVN_13072014_L1	Leg	2014	79	78	78	65	93	77	69	69	80	94	76	87	18
SWE_09092018_L1	Leg	2018	85	87	93	71	90	86	75	72	83	95	92	93	4
SWE_14092014_L1	Leg	2014	80	79	90	74	88	79	60	66	79	93	88	94	14
SWZ_20092013_L1	Leg	2013	45	24	64	30	48	32	47	36	45	62	56	49	241
SWZ_21092018_L1	Leg	2018	38	15	55	47	43	36	35	24	37	51	44	38	292
SYR_03062014_P1	Pres	2014	26	9	29	36	20	18	17	12	27	37	59	27	330
SYR_13042016_L1	Leg	2016	23	10	19	31	15	25	16	7	22	24	66	16	336
TCD_10042016_P1	Pres	2016	31	42	19	41	33	34	27	10	39	35	35	33	319
TGO_25042015_P1	Pres	2015	38	43	42	26	27	51	49	28	38	39	33	32	290

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Election code	Type	Year	PEI index	Electoral laws	Electoral procedures	District boundaries	Voter registration	Party and candidate	Media coverage	Campaign finance	Voting process	Vote count	Results	Electoral authorities	Rank
TGO_25072013_L1	Leg	2013	38	25	39	29	18	43	47	25	43	42	40	48	291
THA_02022014_L1	Leg	2014	51	76	43	70	58	53	47	49	49	60	34	34	210
TJK_01032015_L1	Leg	2015	35	19	46	37	28	26	30	18	38	46	54	36	306
TJK_06112013_P1	Pres	2013	36	16	40	45	21	29	32	28	36	50	58	34	298
TKM_12022017_P1	Pres	2017	31	25	37	43	34	20	9	19	35	31	75	22	321
TKM_15122013_L1	Leg	2013	37	20	53	45	40	30	20	24	37	45	71	34	293
TKM_25032018_L1	Leg	2018	40	20	51	47	54	22	34	30	40	46	83	24	278
TLS_12052018_L1	Leg	2018	67	67	86	60	56	62	56	45	61	92	72	88	84
TLS_20032017_P1	Pres	2017	61	65	75	53	54	63	50	35	59	76	77	69	127
TLS_22072017_L1	Leg	2017	63	55	80	62	47	58	53	41	61	81	76	76	115
TON_16112017_L1	Leg	2017	62	65	77	56	51	62	49	43	58	73	70	79	122
TON_27112014_L1	Leg	2014	67	71	67	70	58	75	56	45	69	85	65	78	83
TUN_21122014_P2	Pres	2014	69	78	86	77	54	74	53	46	68	87	60	86	73
TUN_26102014_L1	Leg	2014	66	75	75	68	45	73	59	47	59	78	81	71	95
TUR_01112015_L1	Leg	2015	44	28	60	45	51	43	25	24	43	61	68	45	250
TUR_07062015_L1	Leg	2015	47	22	68	38	49	48	28	26	46	71	69	52	234
TUR_10082014_P1	Pres	2014	51	43	62	56	58	51	27	29	53	68	68	53	206
TUR_24062018_P1	Pres	2018	35	19	35	35	54	26	15	22	48	44	60	29	300
TWN_16012016_P1	Pres	2016	73	65	94	64	84	83	61	51	54	94	86	88	53
TZA_25102015_P1	Pres	2015	44	33	60	44	33	54	43	23	43	56	40	46	255
UGA_18022016_P1	Pres	2016	37	33	35	30	33	52	42	14	32	56	41	41	294
UKR_25052014_P1	Pres	2014	59	70	70	53	40	63	57	39	50	70	78	71	139
UKR_26102014_L1	Leg	2014	53	59	64	51	45	53	49	34	48	65	66	59	181
UKR_28102012_L1	Leg	2012	39	38	42	42	32	41	38	23	51	39	40	39	283
URY_30112014_P2	Pres	2014	75	91	94	72	78	72	65	58	57	92	94	84	34
USA_04112014_L1	Leg	2014	62	31	75	11	35	80	69	47	67	76	77	72	121
USA_06112012_P1	Pres	2012	63	38	70	16	41	74	64	44	68	85	84	75	113
USA_06112018_L1	Leg	2018	66	47	77	37	58	77	60	54	69	79	79	73	93
USA_08112016_P1	Pres	2016	59	39	72	16	43	80	46	54	69	76	46	70	145
UZB_04012015_L2	Leg	2015	38	28	54	57	37	30	26	22	42	42	66	24	286
UZB_04122016_P1	Pres	2016	38	24	57	44	41	20	17	22	37	51	86	28	289
UZB_29032015_P1	Pres	2015	39	27	50	40	35	30	25	26	43	48	73	36	284
VEN_06122015_L1	Leg	2015	42	33	49	36	43	51	27	22	47	50	65	40	264
VEN_07102012_P1	Pres	2012	54	48	61	51	58	67	30	22	61	69	79	49	174
VEN_14042013_P1	Pres	2013	40	33	37	41	42	58	38	25	46	39	38	31	282
VEN_20052018_P1	Pres	2018	26	12	16	34	22	29	28	17	33	28	45	19	329
VNM_22052016_L1	Leg	2016	34	14	41	34	32	27	20	25	41	41	55	35	312
VUT_22012016_L1	Leg	2016	62	75	69	56	24	72	67	38	58	73	72	78	118
WSM_04032016_L1	Leg	2016	53	33	67	60	35	54	58	30	50	68	60	66	189
ZAF_07052014_L1	Leg	2014	63	72	78	69	52	60	56	35	62	75	73	71	110
ZMB_11082016_P1	Pres	2016	45	60	50	58	42	55	32	27	45	50	33	57	242
ZMB_20012015_P1	Pres	2015	44	53	54	62	31	49	30	27	34	58	55	50	253
ZWE_30072018_P1	Pres	2018	41	33	46	47	32	56	43	16	44	51	34	43	274
ZWE_31072013_L1	Leg	2013	35	27	29	31	15	50	33	25	36	46	49	32	302
Total			55	53	65	54	51	57	47	38	54	68	65	60	169

IV: TECHNICAL APPENDIX: INDICATORS, COVERAGE AND METHODS

Global Coverage: The PEI survey of electoral integrity covers independent nation-states around the world which have held direct (popular) elections for the national parliament or presidential elections. The criteria for inclusion are listed below. The study covers 336 elections in 166 nations from 1 July 2012 to 31 Dec 2018.

TABLE A1: COUNTRY COVERAGE

	#	Definition and source
Total number of independent nation-states	194	Membership of the United Nations (plus Taiwan)
Excluded categories		
Micro-states	11	Population less than 100,000: Andorra, Dominica, Liechtenstein, Marshall Islands, Monaco, Nauru, Palau, San Marino, Seychelles, St. Kitts and Nevis, and Tuvalu.
Without de jure direct (popular) elections for the lower house of the national legislature	5	Brunei Darussalam, China, Qatar, UAE, and Saudi Arabia
State has constitutional provisions for direct (popular) elections for the lower house of the national legislature, but none have been held since independence or within the last 30 years (*de facto*).	3	Eritrea, Somalia, and South Sudan
State has direct elections for the lower house of the national legislature but only candidates for the ruling party have ballot access, excluding independents and candidates for any other party.	2	North Korea, Cuba
Not yet included in the survey	8	DRC, Kiribati, Libya, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Trinidad and Tobago, Yemen.[37]
Covered to date in the PEI 7.0 dataset	166	95% of all the subtotal of nation-states

Respondents: The project identified around forty experts per election, defined as a political scientist (or other social scientist in a related discipline) who had demonstrated knowledge of the electoral process in a particular country (such as through publications, membership of a relevant research group or network, or university employment). The survey included 43% international experts and 57% domestic experts, the latter defined by location or citizenship. In total, 3,861 completed responses were received in the survey, representing a response rate of 28%. In certain cases, listed in Table A2, highlighted with an *, the number of responses was very low, with large confidence intervals, and these results should be treated with due caution.

Concepts: The idea of electoral integrity is defined by the project to refer to agreed international conventions and global norms, applying universally to all countries worldwide through the election cycle, including during the pre-election period, the campaign, on polling day, and its aftermath. [38]

Measurement: To measure this concept, the PEI survey questionnaire includes 49 items on electoral integrity (see Table A3) ranging over the whole electoral cycle. These items fell into eleven sequential sub-dimensions, as shown. Most attention in detecting fraud focuses upon the final stages of the voting process, such as the role of observers in preventing ballot-stuffing, vote-rigging and manipulated results. Drawing upon the notion of a 'menu of manipulation', however, the concept of an electoral cycle suggests that failure in even one step in the sequence, or one link in the chain, can undermine electoral integrity. [39] The PEI Codebook provides

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detailed description of all variables and imputation procedures. A copy and all the data can down-loaded from https://thedata.harvard.edu/dataverse/PEI.

The electoral integrity items in the survey were recoded so that a higher score consistently represents a more positive evaluation. Missing data was estimated based on multiple imputation by chained equations in groups composing of the eleven sub-dimensions. The Perceptions of Electoral Integrity (PEI) Index is an additive function of the 49 imputed variables, standardized to 100-points. Sub-indices of the eleven sub-dimensions in the electoral cycle are summations of the imputed individual variables.[40]

Validity and reliability tests: The results of the pilot study, from the elections held in 2012, were tested for external validity (with independent sources of evidence), internal validity (consistency within the group of experts), and legitimacy (how far the results can be regarded as authoritative by stakeholders). The analysis demonstrated substantial external validity when the PEI data is compared with many other expert datasets, as well as internal validity across the experts within the survey, and legitimacy as measured by levels of congruence between mass and expert opinions within each country.[41]

For *external* validity tests, when matched by country and year, the PEI Index of electoral integrity in this report was significantly correlated with other standard independent indicators contained in the 2019 version of the Varieties of Democracy dataset. This includes the Varieties of Democracy Indexes of Clean Elections (.903***), Electoral Democracy (polyarchy) (r=.851***, N. 159) and Liberal Democracy (r=.893***, N. 159), as well as the Polity IV revised combined Democracy scores (.699***).[42]

Note: States are classified by Regimes of the World: Red =Closed Autocracy; Orange =Electoral Autocracy; Yellow= Electoral Democracy; Green =Liberal Democracy.

Sources: Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem-9); PEI-7.

For *internal* validity purposes, OLS regression models were run to test whether the PEI index varied significantly by several socio-demographic, political and experiential characteristics of the experts, including their sex, age, education, their level of expertise, and their self-reported ideological position. The sample was broken down by type of regime in the country (using the Regimes of the World classification), since a higher proportion of international experts were surveyed in electoral autocracies, where fewer political scientists study elections.

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The results indicate that the use of domestic or international experts proved significant across all types of regimes, suggesting the importance of drawing upon both sources. Political views across the left-right ideological spectrum are significant and positive across all regimes, with experts located on the right more likely to give favorable assessments. Finally, in democratic states, sex, education, and familiarity with elections also played a role. The relatively modest adjusted R^2 suggested that the models explained a limited amount of variance in overall scores.

TABLE A2: SCORES, CONFIDENCE INTERVALS AND RESPONSE RATES

Country	PEI index of electoral integrity, (0-100), imputed	PEI Index (raw individual), low ci	PEI Index (raw individual), high ci	PEI expert response rate	Number of PEI expert responses
Afghanistan	34			0.15	14
Albania	54	47	53	0.24	36
Algeria	43			0.24	20
Angola	39			0.29	23
Antigua and Barbuda*	48			0.06	2
Argentina	65	57	64	0.39	55
Armenia	55	61	68	0.31	37
Australia	70	68	75	0.40	33
Austria	77	71	77	0.45	70
Azerbaijan	36	34	42	0.21	22
Bahamas	54	32	64	0.17	6
Bahrain	40	24	31	0.14	11
Bangladesh	38	24	39	0.48	16
Barbados	65			0.15	11
Belarus	40			0.21	26
Belgium	71	55	70	0.32	12
Belize	53			0.21	8
Benin	70	66	73	0.16	11
Bhutan	66			0.26	20
Bolivia	56	45	56	0.28	11
Bosnia & Herzegovina	46	21	36	0.29	25
Botswana	58	51	67	0.39	15
Brazil	64	59	63	0.38	50
Bulgaria	58	41	51	0.38	60
Burkina Faso	53			0.15	12
Burundi	24			0.13	11
Cambodia	30	19	33	0.39	30
Cameroon	40	55	56	0.19	15
Canada	75	84	87	0.60	24
Cape Verde	71			0.19	14
Central African Republic*	53			0.15	4
Chad*	31			0.11	3
Chile	71	63	69	0.40	38
Colombia	60	61	64	0.18	28
Comoros	45			0.09	7
Congo, Rep.	29	15	42	0.15	14
Costa Rica	79	76	86	0.21	17

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Croatia	65	60	69	0.26	29
Cyprus	69	65	72	0.32	38
Czech Republic	76	76	80	0.57	125
Denmark	86	89	93	0.49	18
Djibouti	31			0.14	14
Dominican Republic	44			0.28	10
Ecuador	50	39	53	0.31	26
Egypt	40			0.14	19
El Salvador	54	59	64	0.28	32
Equatorial Guinea	24	13	28	0.27	28
Estonia	79			0.50	18
Ethiopia	24	6	17	0.40	19
Fiji	55			0.29	25
Finland	85	81	85	0.42	36
France	75	65	77	0.35	33
Gabon	30	16	35	0.17	13
Gambia	50	37	66	0.18	15
Georgia	58	52	64	0.19	35
Germany	81	79	80	0.57	48
Ghana	65	57	68	0.32	24
Greece	66	60	68	0.40	33
Grenada	61			0.16	12
Guatemala	48			0.20	9
Guinea	42			0.16	12
Guinea-Bissau	54			0.19	8
Guyana	53			0.18	7
Haiti	32	23	56	0.15	13
Honduras	37			0.16	12
Hungary	54	46	53	0.49	35
Iceland	82			0.33	47
India	59	57	60	0.30	12
Indonesia	57	48	62	0.34	26
Iran	49	39	47	0.20	23
Iraq	38	9	39	0.22	17
Ireland	73	73	79	0.42	49
Israel	74			0.32	26
Italy	68	65	70	0.51	54
Ivory Coast	56			0.27	19
Jamaica	67	63	67	0.31	11
Japan	68	64	73	0.32	72
Jordan	49			0.23	16
Kazakhstan	45			0.22	16
Kenya	43	36	48	0.22	31
Korea, Rep.	73	75	82	0.24	30
Kuwait	54			0.20	23
Kyrgyzstan	53			0.17	13
Laos*	48			0.15	4
Latvia	73			0.34	27
Lebanon	42			0.27	11
Lesotho	62	64	75	0.29	23

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Liberia*	54			0.07	3
Lithuania	78	73	79	0.28	31
Luxembourg	76			0.15	6
Macedonia	48	40	51	0.34	27
Madagascar	42	33	38	0.21	18
Malawi	48			0.38	15
Malaysia	35	29	37	0.36	30
Maldives	52	33	41	0.19	22
Mali	43	46	48	0.18	14
Malta	65	62	67	0.27	20
Mauritania	38			0.06	7
Mauritius	64			0.27	10
Mexico	61	53	64	0.34	49
Micronesia	59			0.10	11
Moldova	56			0.21	15
Mongolia	64	55	70	0.16	18
Montenegro	52	46	51	0.21	30
Morocco*	57			0.10	4
Mozambique	35			0.20	8
Myanmar (Burma)	54	53	57	0.41	16
Namibia	60			0.19	7
Nepal	56	42	54	0.40	28
Netherlands	80	64	79	0.48	41
New Zealand	75			0.29	24
Nicaragua	36			0.19	7
Niger*	52			0.10	4
Nigeria	53	48	59	0.43	18
Norway	83	84	86	0.38	29
Oman	61			0.33	12
Pakistan	47	41	49	0.28	60
Panama	61	55	70	0.20	8
Papua New Guinea	34	25	31	0.27	13
Paraguay	50	42	52	0.38	26
Peru	62	60	66	0.30	24
Philippines	51	54	66	0.40	41
Poland	74	68	69	0.42	31
Portugal	75	79	89	0.50	39
Romania	55	48	62	0.41	48
Russia	47	54	69	0.27	26
Rwanda	58			0.18	19
Samoa	53	47	61	0.15	6
Sao Tome & Principe	52			0.14	14
Senegal*	43			0.08	3
Serbia	49	44	47	0.29	31
Sierra Leone	53			0.07	5
Singapore	53	50	68	0.34	14
Slovak Republic	74	74	83	0.31	25
Slovenia	77	60	79	0.28	46
Solomon Islands	57	54	55	0.20	8
South Africa	63	65	69	0.41	16

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Spain	69	67	75	0.50	41
Sri Lanka	52	58	65	0.21	16
Sudan	43	25	45	0.26	10
Suriname	51			0.33	13
Swaziland	42	27	55	0.19	15
Sweden	83	84	87	0.53	44
Switzerland	79			0.54	20
Syria	24	5	34	0.19	16
Taiwan	73	65	70	0.36	14
Tajikistan	35			0.21	16
Tanzania	44	36	48	0.38	14
Thailand	51	49	60	0.38	15
Timor-Leste	64	59	68	0.26	32
Togo	38			0.13	10
Tonga	64			0.17	11
Tunisia	68	62	68	0.22	17
Turkey	45	40	55	0.35	59
Turkmenistan	36	20	48	0.20	22
Uganda	37	33	40	0.22	12
Ukraine	51	45	50	0.36	40
United Kingdom	66	67	71	0.30	53
United States	61	55	60	0.30	34
Uruguay	75			0.42	16
Uzbekistan	38			0.18	23
Vanuatu	62			0.19	8
Venezuela	41	23	35	0.40	64
Vietnam	34			0.21	8
Zambia	45	47	55	0.27	21
Zimbabwe	38	30	46	0.33	23
Total	55	50	61	0.28	23

Note: (*) Low number of respondents

TABLE A3: PEI CORE SURVEY QUESTIONS

	Sections	Performance indicators	Direction
PRE-ELECTION	**1. Electoral laws**	1-1 Electoral laws were unfair to smaller parties	N
		1-2 Electoral laws favored the governing party or parties	N
		1-3 Election laws restricted citizens' rights	N
	2. Electoral procedures	2-1 Elections were well managed	P
		2-2 Information about voting procedures was widely available	P
		2-3 Election officials were fair	P
		2-4 Elections were conducted in accordance with the law	P
	3. Boundaries	3-1 Boundaries discriminated against some parties	N
		3-2 Boundaries favored incumbents	N
		3-3 Boundaries were impartial	P
	4. Voter registration	4-1 Some citizens were not listed in the register	N
		4-2 The electoral register was inaccurate	N
		4-3 Some ineligible electors were registered	N
	5. Party registration	5-1 Some opposition candidates were prevented from running	N
		5-2 Women had equal opportunities to run for office	P
		5-3 Ethnic and national minorities had equal opportunities to run for office	P
		5-4 Only top party leaders selected candidates	N
		5-5 Some parties/candidates were restricted from holding campaign rallies	N
CAMPAIGN	**6. Campaign media**	6-1 Newspapers provided balanced election news	P
		6-2 TV news favored the governing party	N
		6-3 Parties/candidates had fair access to political broadcasts and advertising	P
		6-4 Journalists provided fair coverage of the elections	P
		6-5 Social media were used to expose electoral fraud	P
	7. Campaign finance	7-1 Parties/candidates had equitable access to public subsidies	P
		7-2 Parties/candidates had equitable access to political donations	P
		7-3 Parties/candidates publish transparent financial accounts	P
		7.4 Rich people buy elections	N
		7-5 Some state resources were improperly used for campaigning	N
ELECTION DAY	**8. Voting process**	8-1 Some voters were threatened with violence at the polls	N
		8-2 Some fraudulent votes were cast	N
		8-3 The process of voting was easy	P
		8-4 Voters were offered a genuine choice at the ballot box	P
		8-5 Postal ballots were available	P
		8-6 Special voting facilities were available for the disabled	P
		8-7 National citizens living abroad could vote	P
		8-8 Some form of internet voting was available	P
POST-ELECTION	**9. Vote count**	9-1 Ballot boxes were secure	P
		9-2 The results were announced without undue delay	P
		9-3 Votes were counted fairly	P
		9-4 International election monitors were restricted	N
		9-5 Domestic election monitors were restricted	N
	10. Results	10-1 Parties/candidates challenged the results	N
		10-2 The election led to peaceful protests	N
		10-3 The election triggered violent protests	N
		10-4 Any disputes were resolved through legal channels	P
	11. Electoral authorities	11-1 The election authorities were impartial	P
		11-2 The authorities distributed information to citizens	P
		11-3 The authorities allowed public scrutiny of their performance	P
		11-4 The election authorities performed well	P

Note: The direction of the original items P=positive, N=negative**.** Core items are repeated each year.

Source: www.electoralintegrityproject.com

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
Norris, Pippa, Sarah Cameron, & Thomas Wynter. Eds. 2018. *Electoral Integrity in America: Securing Democracy*. New York: Oxford University Press. (In press, forthcoming fall)

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