Analytical Corrections, Additions and Enhancements For Alekhine's The Book of the New York International Chess Tournament 1924

by Taylor Kingston

The games and note variations in this book were analyzed by the engine Rybka 3 UCI running in "infinite analysis" mode. During this process, differences between Alekhine's conclusions and recommendations, and those of Rybka, were found. We present here the corrections, additions and enhancements thus revealed that we consider significant: not minor half-pawn differences, but cases where an important tactical shot was missed, where a resource that could have changed a loss to a draw or win was overlooked, where a good move was called bad (or vice versa), or where a position was misevaluated. Also some cases where there was no real mistake, but an especially interesting variation, or a much stronger one, was not pointed out. We did not concern ourselves with changes in opening theory since 1924. If a game is not mentioned, it means no significant error in or improvement to its notes was found.

Numbers given with some variations represent Rybka's evaluation of the position to the nearest hundredth of a pawn, e.g. a difference of exactly one pawn, with no other relevant non-material differences, has the value +1.00 when in White's favor, or -1.00 when in Black's. A position where Rybka considers White better by 3½ pawns (or the equivalent, such as a minor piece) would get the value +3.50, the advantage of a rook +5.00, etc. These numbers may vary some from one machine to another, or with the length of time allowed for analysis, but are generally valid and reliable, and serve as a useful shorthand for comparisons that would otherwise require detailed explanation. A position rated 0.00 is usually not only theoretically even, but dead drawn, i.e. Rybka detects a forced repetition, perpetual check, stalemate or some such.

The one area where analysis engines are sometimes suspect is the endgame, for example positions where one side has a material advantage but the game is a theoretical draw. In such cases we consulted Dr. Stephen B. Dowd, a published study composer and endgame expert, for whose help we are most grateful. Where feasible, in positions with six men or less, we also consulted the Nalimov tablebase at www.k4it.de/index.php?topic=egtb&lang=en.

Computer-assisted analysis of this sort is something like instant replay reviews in a sporting event. Just as even the best referees may have their calls overruled after electronic examination, so even a chess world champion can be proven wrong – sometimes dramatically so – by the relentlessly objective scrutiny of an unblinking silicon eye that in its brute-force approach considers all possible moves, not just those suggested by general principles.

On the whole, Alekhine's judgment was upheld much more often than not. Some games are annotated excellently, examples being games 28 (Alekhine-Janowski), 41 (Marshall-Em. Lasker), 53 (Ed. Lasker-Marshall), 56 (Em. Lasker-Janowski), 66 (Capablanca-Em. Lasker), and 75 (Bogoljubow-Tartakower). And it should be borne in mind that his notes were devoted in large part to instructive positional and strategic considerations, which are largely outside the competence of tactically-oriented digital analysis. Still, about two-thirds of the tournament's 110 games required comment.

In some cases these were just minor corrections or improvements, but others were more serious. For example, wins were missed in games 43 (Tartakower-Alekhine), 48 (Ed. Lasker-Alekhine, 82 (Bogoljubow-Alekhine), and 97 (Yates-Capablanca). And contrary to what GM Andy Soltis wrote in his foreword, Alekhine was not always "ruthlessly objective" with his own mistakes, for example missing (or suppressing?) potential wins against him by Tartakower and Edward Lasker. In the aforementioned game 82, Bogoljubow-Alekhine, he is at first far too pessimistic about what he might have done, then later too optimistic. The unjustified pessimism is also strong in game 78, Alekhine-Ed. Lasker. This stands in contrast to Alekhine's *My Best Games of Chess* collection, where he would often annotate with rose-colored glasses.


In some cases Rybka found errors so egregious that we must (with some regret, because Alekhine is one of our all-time favorite players) call them howlers. Some examples:

In game 2, Yates-Alekhine, the note variation leading to this position was called "an immediate drawing line."




Yet of course Black is not obliged to repeat moves with 11... 2e6 12. 2c6+ 2d7 etc.; instead 11...c4 wins a piece.

In game 9, Ed. Lasker-Bogoljubow, the note at move 40 reached this position,



where Alekhine recommended 41...c×b5??, which allows a quick mate with 42.f6+ and 43. ₩b8+.

In a note variation at move 40 of game 26, Ed. Lasker-Em. Lasker,



Alekhine recommended 40... \(\mathbb{Z}\)e8?? which would lose to 41.\(\Delta\)f5!.

Others with comparable errors are games 5, 8, 10, 24, 26, 31, 33, 39, 69, 72, 73, 74, 96 and 97.

One wonders, then, how a grandmaster who was probably the greatest tactician of his time, and who would soon become world champion, could commit such mistakes? First, in fairness it should be noted that many errors and improvements are revealed only after extensive digging, something that can be done relatively easily and quickly by computer today but in those days required hours or even days of hard work. Alekhine obviously took his analytical duties seriously, but there is a limit to human endurance and attention. This may explain why a lot of his errors are found toward the end of a variation.

And if we "grade on a curve," Alekhine is actually on a par with other all-time greats whose works we have analyzed in similar fashion, about the same as Lasker, Euwe, Najdorf, Bronstein and Timman, and definitely better than Tartakower and Fine. Only Botvinnik and Fischer show markedly greater accuracy.

Still, there are mistakes Alekhine would surely never commit in actual play. How could this happen? Unlike, say, Tartakower and Euwe, it's unlikely he lacked time. After the tournament ended in mid-April 1924, he was not exceptionally busy. After simultaneous exhibitions in New York on April 27 and 29, and a 21-round quick-play tournament in Paris on July 21, his career record shows nothing until February 1925: no matches, tournaments or simuls. And Alekhine had not yet succumbed to the alcoholism that would start to affect his play in the mid-1930s. All we can say is *errare human est*, and hope that the "ruthlessly objective" part of Alekhine would appreciate our striving for analytical truth.


None of this should this be construed as any flaunting of our own chess prowess; we give all credit there to Rybka, Dowd and Nalimov. And we do not claim the analysis below is inerrant; though today's engines are very strong, they can miss things beyond their analytical horizon. The interested reader is encouraged to examine further on his own.

Game 2, Yates-Alekhine: In the note to White's 4th move, an elementary trap, the Noah's Ark Trap, seems to have been overlooked. After 5.d4 b5 6.Ձb3 ②×d4 7.②×d4 e×d4 8.씧×d4?? (correct is 8.Ձd5 ളb8 and only then 9.ఆ×d4) 8...c5 9.ఆd5 Ձe6 10.ఆc6+ Ձd7 11.ఆd5,

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Black is not obliged to repeat moves with 11... 2e6; instead 11...c4 wins a piece.

The note to White's 15th implies that 15. 2c5 is as bad as the text move 15. 2b3+, giving 15. 2c5 f×e4 16. 2×e4 2f4 17. 2c2 e4 without further comment. But this stops too soon.



18.Ձe3! then is very strong, viz. 18...e×f3 (18...≌f8 19.≝×e4 is worse) 19.Ձ×f4 f×g2 20.뿔×g2 and Black does not have enough for the exchange.

The note to Black's 15th is rightly critical of 15... \$\disphi^7\$, but does not give the best refutation.



Rather than 16.e×f5 g×f5 17.\(\Delta g5+ \Delta g6 18.g4\), which Rybka rates at only +0.89, stronger is 16.g4! f×g4 17.h×g4 \(\Delta ×g4 18.\Delta g5+ h×g5 19.\Delta ×g4 (threatening 20.\Delta h3+),



and Black is lost, e.g. 19... 2g8 20. 2g2 etc. (+2.79), or 19... 2f6 20. 2ad1 2e8 21. 2f3 (+3.45).

At Black's 24th,



Alekhine is critical of his own move 24... \$\mathref{g}\$5, but it is actually best. The analysis of his suggested alternative 24... \$\mathref{g}\$f6 considers only 25. \$\mathref{g}\$f3 in reply, overlooking 25. \$\mathref{g}\$f3!.



White threatens 26.句f3 營e3 27.트ae1 營f4 28.트g4+-, forcing Black into one of two drawing variations: (1) 25...負g7 26.句f3 營f4 27.트af1 (not 27.트g4?? 營xf3+) 27...營e4 28.營g2 負f6 29.營h3 etc., or (2) 25...負e7 26.句d3 負g5 27.負d5 트ad8 28.트g2 營e3 29.트g3 營d2 30.트g2 etc. 25...負g5 does not work due to 26.句f3 forcing 26...三xf3 27.營xf3.

The note to White's 28th is definitely correct to say that 28.2d3 was best,




but then goes astray at several points. After 28... $\Xi ad8$ White should not play $29.\Xi ad1$, but $29.\Xi g4!$,



and after 29... \(\mathbb{I}\)f7 30. \(\mathbb{Z}\)ag1 c6 the position is virtually even (+0.19).

If 29. \ ad1 as in the note,



Rybka does not care for 29...b6?!, preferring 29...�d6!? 30.௲g6 ₺×e4 31.௲×f6 ௲×f6,



when Black has rook, bishop and two pawns for the queen, and decent chances in a complex position. More importantly, 29...b6?! fails,




not to 30.b4 as in the note, but to 30. Ξ gf1! when to avoid losing the pinned knight Black must give up the exchange: $30...\Xi \times d3$ $31.\Delta \times d3 \cong c6+$ $32.\cong h2 \otimes d6$ $33.\Xi \times f8+$ $\Delta \times f8+$ (+0.98).

Toward the end of the same note, after (from previous diagram) 30.b4 \(\mathbb{Z}\)d6 31.\(\mathbb{Z}\)g4,



best probably for Black is 31... \(\tilde{\pi} f7 \) 32. \(\tilde{\pi} dg1 \) \(\tilde{\pi} e7 = \). The note's 31... \(h5 \) is a serious mistake,



which should be met by 32. \mathbb{Z} dg1! \mathbb{Z} f7 33. \mathbb{Z} g5! forcing 33... \mathbb{Z} ×d3 34. \mathbb{Z} ×d3 \mathbb{Q} h6 35. \mathbb{Z} ×h5+-



when Black gets far more than just the extra pawn Alekhine envisioned.

Finally, at Black's 29th, the text move 29...c6?! might well have let the win slip.



Better was 29... ₩f5. Instead of the desperate 30. ℤ×g7??, White had 30. ②h4! c×d5 31. ℤaf1 ₩×f1 (relatively best; if 31... ₩d8?? 32. ②g6+) 32. ℤ×f1 ℤ×f1+33. ₩×f1,



with a problematic position and no clear win for Black (+0.57).


Game 3, Marshall-Réti: The note at move 9 misses the best continuation in the sub-variation 9... ②c6 10. ②e2:



10.♠e2?? is actually a serious blunder, and is best refuted not by the note's 10...e5 11.d5 ♠d4,


but by 10... ②e5! (either knight will do) 11.d×e5 ⑤×e5 12. ∰g3 ⑥×d3+ 13. ∰f1 ⑤×b2, and White is down two pawns with a ruined position.

The endgame reached in the note to move 23 is erroneously said to be favorable for Black. After 23.a×b5 E×a1 24.E×a1 包×b2 25.Eb1 營×c3 26.營×b2 營×b2 27.E×b2 Eb8 28.營f2 營f8 29.營e3 營e8 30.營d3 營d7 31.營c4 營c7 32.Ea2 營b7 33.Ea6 Ea8 34.E×a8 營×a8 35.b6 ⑤b8 36.⑤b5 ⑤b7.




White is not obliged to move any pawns, nor to abandon his b-pawn, his king being able to shuffle between b5 and a5 ad infinitum. Nor does ...c5-c4 avail Black anything; after \$\times\$\times c4\$ \$\times b6\$ the black king cannot penetrate. Barring a blunder, the game is a draw.

An interesting possibility goes unmentioned at move 27.




Instead of 27... 營×e2, Black had better chances with 27... 營a4!? 28. 營f2 莒b4 29. 營f3 f5 30.e×f5 莒×f4+ 31. 營g3 莒×f5 32. 莒c4 (not 32. 營×e7+?? 莒f7 33. 營e2 營f4#) 32... 營b3+ 33. 莒c3 營b7,




and Black is up a pawn.

Game 5, Tartakower-Bogoljubow: The note at move 33 is correct that 33.a4 should not win, but the supporting analysis is flawed at several points.





Alekhine gives 33...b×a4 34.c4 a3 35.d5 \(\mathbb{Z}\)a6 36.\(\mathbb{Z}\)a2 f5?! (better 36...\(\mathbb{Z}\)e7= or \(\mathbb{Z}\)e8=) 37.c5,



and now his 37... \(\begin{aligned} \begin{aligned} \alpha 4?? \\ \text{would lose to 38.c6!} \(\begin{aligned} \begin{align

Further on in that note, after 37... \(\begin{aligned} 34 & 38. \\ \begin{aligned} 35 & 4 & 39. \\ \begin{aligned} 39 & 4 & 39. \\ \begin{aligned} 36 & 4 & 3





White could again win by playing not 40. \$\delta\$b4 as in the note, but 40.d6! \$\delta\$e6 41. \$\delta\$b4 h3 42.g×h3 \$\delta\$d7 43. \$\delta\$b5 \(\exists 644. \exists × a3, \)



with a winning position (+4.45).


And finally, continuing in the note line, after 40. \$\dispha b4 h3 41.gxh3 f3?? (necessary is 41...\$\mathbb{Z}f6=),






White should not play 42. \$\&b5?? or 42.c6?? as in the note, but again 42.d6! \$\&color e6 43. \$\&b5\$, winning Black's rook.

In the note to Black's 41st move, the sub-variation 42.\@\xh4\@\c8+ 43.\\beta\b4\@\c4+ 44.\@\xc4\b\xc4,




White need not play the losing 45. ७×c4??, but can still draw with 45.h4! f4 46.h5 f3 47.h6 f×g2 48.h7 g1 49.h8 g2 50. g7+ and the checks will never stop.

In the note to move 45, its variation #1, after 46... \(\mathbb{Z}\)d1+ 47. \(\mathbb{Z}\)c4 \(\mathbb{Z}\)d2 48. \(\mathbb{Z}\)c5 \(\mathbb{Z}\)×g2 49. \(\mathbb{Z}\)a7+ \(\mathbb{Z}\)e8 50. \(\mathbb{Z}\)d6?? (necessary is 50.d6),




Alekhine was sure that 46... \(\mathbb{Z}\)g1 was Black's fatal error, but this may not be correct. Rybka sees it coming later,



when Black played 51... \(\begin{align*} \begin{align*} \lambda & \text{1...} \(\begin{align*} \begin{align*} \lambda & \text{2...} \\ \begin{align*} \begin{align*} \begin{align*} \lambda & \text{2...} \\ \begin{align*} \begin{al

Game 7, Maróczy-Alekhine: In the note variation at move 18, after 18.c3 ♠xf3 19.gxf3,



Alekhine is correct that 19... $\mathbb{Z} \times e5$ should win (-1.87), but it is much stronger for Black to interpolate first 19... $\mathbb{Z} \times e5$ and then 20... $\mathbb{Z} \times e5$ 21. $\mathbb{Z} \times e4$ $\mathbb{Z} \times e5$ first, winning the knight and more (-6.02), since if it moves to d2 or g3, mate follows shortly beginning with 23... $\mathbb{Z} \times e5$ first, White can avoid immediate disaster with 20. $\mathbb{Z} \times e5$ or 20. $\mathbb{Z} \times e5$ first, White can avoid immediate disaster with 20. $\mathbb{Z} \times e5$ first, White can avoid immediate disaster with 20. $\mathbb{Z} \times e5$ first, White can avoid immediate disaster with 20. $\mathbb{Z} \times e5$ first, White can avoid immediate disaster with 20. $\mathbb{Z} \times e5$ first, White can avoid immediate disaster with 20. $\mathbb{Z} \times e5$ first, White can avoid immediate disaster with 20. $\mathbb{Z} \times e5$ first, White can avoid immediate disaster with 20. $\mathbb{Z} \times e5$ first, White can avoid immediate disaster with 20. $\mathbb{Z} \times e5$ first, White can avoid immediate disaster with 20. $\mathbb{Z} \times e5$ first, White can avoid immediate disaster with 20. $\mathbb{Z} \times e5$ first, White can avoid immediate disaster with 20. $\mathbb{Z} \times e5$ first, White can avoid immediate disaster with 20. $\mathbb{Z} \times e5$ first, White can avoid immediate disaster with 20. $\mathbb{Z} \times e5$ first, White can avoid immediate disaster with 20. $\mathbb{Z} \times e5$ first, White can avoid immediate disaster with 20. $\mathbb{Z} \times e5$ first, White can avoid immediate disaster with 20. $\mathbb{Z} \times e5$ first, White can avoid immediate disaster with 20. $\mathbb{Z} \times e5$ first, White can avoid immediate disaster with 20. $\mathbb{Z} \times e5$ first, White can avoid immediate disaster with 20. $\mathbb{Z} \times e5$ first, White can avoid immediate disaster with 20. $\mathbb{Z} \times e5$ first, White can avoid immediate disaster with 20. $\mathbb{Z} \times e5$ first, White can avoid immediate disaster with 20. $\mathbb{Z} \times e5$ first, White can avoid immediate disaster with 20. $\mathbb{Z} \times e5$ first, White can avoid immediate disaster with 20. $\mathbb{Z} \times e5$ first, White can avoid immediate disaster with 20. $\mathbb{Z} \times e5$ first, White can avoid immediate disaster with 20. $\mathbb{Z} \times e5$ first, White can avoid immediate disast

Game 8, Marshall-Tartakower: The note at move 9 says that after 9... ②×c3 10. ②×d8 ②×d1 11. ②×c7 ②×b2 12. ②e2 "the black knight would be in trouble,"




but Rybka shows that Black can avoid loss by pressuring the c-pawn: 12...\(\mathbb{Z}\)c8 13.\(\mathbb{Z}\)xb8 \(\mathbb{Z}\)axb8 \(\mathbb{Z}\)ax

One suspects a typo in the sub-variation of the note at move 18 giving 18. ②c3 g5 19.f×g5 ≝×g5 20. ②f3? as advantageous for White,



as this would allow the obvious 20... *\vert \text{\text{e}} \text{\text{e}} 3+, winning back the lost pawn. Better, say, 20. \vert f1.

Game 9, Ed. Lasker-Bogoljubow: Alekhine seems to have had an off day when he annotated this game, making some major tactical errors. First, the note to move 10 says the line 10...e×d4 11. ♠×d4 ♠c5 12. ♠c4 would give White "quite a good game,"




but it simply drops a pawn to 12...\$\(\prec\$c\timese4.

The note to move 35 considers the variation 35...c×b5 36.\(\delta\)×c7 b4 37.a×b4 a3 38.\(\delta\)a5 a2 39.b5 "not very convincing."




Yet it does seem to be best, and probably winning for Black, viz. 39... \(\beta\)d7 40.\(\beta\)e1 (if 40.b6? \(\beta\)b7 41.\(\beta\)d1 \(\beta\)×b6) 40...\(\beta\)c4 41.\(\beta\)a1 \(\beta\)×d3 42.c×d3 \(\beta\)×d3 43.\(\beta\)h2 \(\beta\)c2 (-3.33), or 39...\(\beta\)b8 40.\(\beta\)c1 \(\beta\)b7 41.\(\beta\)e1 \(\beta\)c4 42.\(\beta\)×c4 \(\beta\)×c4 43.\(\beta\)a1 \(\beta\)×c2 (-3.48), both evaluations about -2.00 better than the text continuation even if Black had not missed 40...\(\beta\)d5.




Black must not play $41...c\times b5$??, which allows a quick mate with 42.f6+ and 43.2b8+. Instead the best he can do is $41...2\times b5$ $42.2\times b5$ (if $42.2\times c7$? $2\times f5$ 43.2d1 2d4+ 44.2b2 2e3 $45.2\times b5$ $2\times d1$ 46.2d3 2d4+ 47.2g1 2d4+ 48.2f1 2d3 and the bishop is lost) 42...2d4+ 43.2d4+ 43





reaching an endgame favorable to Black but by no means an easy win.

At White's 41st move, in the note variation 41. \(\mathbb{\pi}\) b4 e4,



42. ♣×e4?? does not lead to a draw; rather it allows mate by 42... ♣h1+ 43. ♣f2 ☐d2+ etc. The note's second alternative 42.f×e4 does draw.

At move 46, the pedant in us prompts us to observe that the note variation 46... \$\mathbb{I}\$ f8 47. \$\mathbb{L}\$c4+ \$\mathbb{L}\$g7 can be improved slightly.



While 48.f6+ is quite sufficient to win, mate can be forced by 48.26+166 49.26+27+26 49.26+16 50.26+26+26 49.26+1

Game 10, Yates-Janowski: The note at move 16 goes wrong near the end. After 16... ♣×e1 17. ♣c5 ∜×e6 18. ♣d×e6 ♣b4 19. ♣×d8 ♣×c5,




20.₺×b7 is the only playable move. The note's 20.₺e6?? would lose the knight to 20.₺e8, since

if 21.₺×c5?? \ =e1 \ . Oddly, Alekhine seemed to see the back-rank mate possibility at an earlier point in the note,




when he rejected 19.√2×b7 "on account of 19... \(\mathbb{Z}\)de8."




In that case, however, White gets out of trouble with 20.\Dbd8!, more or less forcing 20...\Xi \times d8 21.\D\times d8 \Xi \times d8 22.\Xi \times a6, when he may actually have some advantage.


Game 14, Réti-Maróczy: At White's 22nd move,



in the note line 22.4×d6 4f8 23.4f4 4vd2 24.4xd2 4xd2 25.4xd2 Ee2,




Alekhine says "White cannot save the a-pawn, on account of the threat of 26...2c5." Yet 26.\(\mathbb{Z}\)d1! \(\text{2c5}\) 27.\(\text{2e3}\)! thwarts this threat: 27...\(\text{2}\)×e3 28.f×e3 \(\mathbb{Z}\)g7 (obviously not 28...\(\mathbb{Z}\)×a2?? 29.\(\mathbb{Z}\)d8+) 29.e4,



and now Black's bishop will be trapped no matter what he tries: (a) 29... $\mathbb{Z} \times 230.\mathbb{Z} \times 230.\mathbb{Z$


Going back to the first diagram, Rybka indicates that after 22.4×d6 4f8 23.4f4,



rather than exchange queens, Black should seek dynamic compensation, e.g. 23... \$\forall f5!? 24. \$\forall c3\$ h4 intending h4-h3 and g6-g5 with attack.


Game 15, Tartakower-Yates: A bewildering game. If, as the old saying goes, "chess is a sea where a gnat may drink and an elephant may bathe," an elephant could drown in this one.

The note at move 40 can be considerably improved. After 40... 2a4,




the note line 41.4d3 $\Xi \times f4 + 42.2e3$ does not yield much after $42...\Xi f7$ $43.\Xi b4$ $\Xi a7$, defending the knight. Much better is 41.2e4!, so that the capture on f4 is not check. If then $41...\Xi \times f4$ $42.\Xi b4$ b5 $43.\Xi \times b5 +- (+5.27)$. Or $41...\Xi b7$ 42.f5 $g\times f5$ $43.2\times f5$ $\Xi g7$ $44.\Xi b4$ $\Xi \times g5$ 45.2e4 b5 $46.\Xi \times b5$ $\Xi g4$ $47.\Xi a5$ 2c3 48.c5+2e7 49.2ex 2e4 49.2ex 49.2ex

One line stemming from 41.d6+ deserves much deeper scrutiny than Alekhine chose to give. His very brief note makes it seem obvious that it wins by force quickly, but further analysis reveals a much more complex situation.




The text reply 41...當d8 definitely loses (+5.12), as do 41...當xd6 (+4.77) and 41...當b7 (+2.52). However, 41...當c6 resists much more sternly. Alekhine's 42.总e4+ is clearly the only good try, but he analyzed no further than that. After the obligatory 42... ②xe4 43.當xe4 當xd6 44.萬xb6+ 當c5 45.爲f6,




a clear win is far from obvious. Black has two main defensive plans: (A) invade White's back rank with the rook in hopes of picking off pawns and harassing the king, or (B) keep the rook on the seventh rank to defend the h-pawn, and hope that White will be unable to advance his c-pawn successfully.

With either plan very careful play is required by both sides; one slip by White and it's a draw, one slip by Black and he loses. We give some plausible sample lines, stemming from the above diagram.


Plan A first. The main line starts 45... 필e7+ 46. 월d3 필d7+ (46... 필e1 has little if any independent significance) 47. 월c3 필d1:






which, despite White's nominal two-pawn advantage, is a theoretical draw according to the Nalimov tablebase. (This was true of every variation we tried that resulted in Black having no pawns and White just the doubled c-pawn.)

A2) However, White may be able to eke out a win by avoiding complete kingside liquidation, varying from the above line with 48. □ f7 (instead of 48.f5):




Rybka then sees one plausible line as 48. 当f7 当h1 49. 当c7+ 當d6 50. 当c8 当f1 51.c5+ 當d5 52.c6 (52. 當b4? 当b1+) 52... 当xf4 53.c7 當d6 54. 当h8 當xc7 55. 当xh7+ 當d8 56. 当h6 当f5 57. 当xg6,




reaching a position Nalimov says is won for White, though 34 more arduous moves are required to reach mate.


For **Plan B** we start from the stem position after 45. \(\begin{aligned} \Beta & \text{f6} \end{aligned} \)




B1) If 45... 三d7, keeping the white king from defending the c4-pawn, then 46. 三f8 當×c4 (46... 三c7 47. 當d3 transposes to B2 or a similar line) 47. 三c8+ 當b5 48.c4+



48...當b4 (if 48...當b6 49.當e5 當b7 50.買f8 當c6 51.當f6 買d1 (51...當c5? 52.買f7 +-) 52.當g7 買h1 53.買h8 買f1 54.買×h7 買×f4 55.當×g6+-) 49.當e5 買f7 50.c5




50...當c4 (or 50...當b5 51.當d6 萬×f4 52.萬b8+ 當c4 53.c6 etc.) 51.當d6 萬×f4 52.c6 萬f5 53.萬h8 萬d5+ 54.當e6 萬c5 55.當d7 萬d5+ 56.當c8 萬c5 57.c7 萬×g5 58.當d8 萬d5+ 59.當e7




and again White wins.

B2) After 45... 且e7+ 46. 當d3 囯d7+ 47. 當c3, rather than 47... 囯d1 as in Plan A, the best practical chance for Black seems to be 47... 囯e7:



White need not repeat moves with 48. \$\displant^2 d3\$. The best attempt to make progress is 48.f5 gxf5 (if


48... 三g7 49.f×g6 h×g6 50.三e6 三g8 51.三e5+ 當c6 52.c5 三g7 53.當c4 etc. wins for White) 49.三×f5+ 當c6




B2a) Rybka at first here recommended 50. \$\disphi\$b4 as White's best chance, but after 50... \$\disphi\$b7+ 51. \$\disphi\$b5 \$\disphi\$g7 52. \$\disphi\$c5+ (if 52. \$\disphi\$f5 simply 52... \$\disphi\$b7+ again) 52... \$\disphi\$d6 53. \$\disphi\$f5 \$\disphi\$e6 54. \$\disphi\$f6+ \$\disphi\$e7,



White must be careful to avoid 55.\\(\mathbb{\Z}\)h6 \(\mathbb{\Z}\)×g5 56.\(\mathbb{\Z}\)×h7+,






reaching a position where it appears White is thwarted no matter what he tries. If 57. 基 xh7+ 當c6 we have another Nalimov draw, if 57. 當b5 當c8 58. 當b6 萬g6+! 59. 萬 xg6 h xg6 is a draw, and Rybka sees no win in lines stemming from 57.c6 當d8 58. 當b5.


B3b) White can also try 50. \$\dd{\cap-d4}.

B3b1) After 50... Ξ e7+ 51. Ξ e5, Black should avoid 51... Ξ g7, which Rybka analyzed to a white win. Better 51... Ξ f7:




If now 52.c5 互f4+ 53. 它 互g4 54. 它 h6!! 55.g×h6 互e4+ 56. 互e5 互h4 57. 它f5 互xh6, and again we have a Nalimov draw, while if 52. 互c5+ 它d6 53. 互e5 互f4+ 54. 互e4 互f5 and White is getting nowhere. There are other plausible 50th moves for White, but as far as Rybka and we could tell, none led to anything better than what we've already considered in variation A3.

B3b2) However, after 50... ℤe7+ White can also try 51. ℤe5!?:



Black then cannot afford to keep his rook on the seventh, viz. 51... 這c7 52. 當f6 當b6 53.c5+ 當c6 54. 這e5 followed by 55. 這e7, or 51... 這a7 52. 當e6 這g7 53. 當f6+- (or 52... 這b7 53. 這f7+-), so something like 51... 這d2 is called for. A plausible continuation then is 51... 這d2 52. 當f6 這h2 (52... 這×c2? 53. 當g7 這h2 54. 這f6+ 當c5 55. 這h6 wins) 53. 當g7 這h5,



when Black is practically in *Zugzwang*, and Rybka rates the position at about +5.00.


So, it does appear that White can win after 41...\$\\$c6. However, the above may be a case of "long analysis, wrong analysis," so we are not going to pronounce an absolute judgment, and the interested reader is encouraged to analyze further. In any event, the position after 41...\$\\$c6

42. 2e4+ is far more complex than Alekhine's terse note indicates, and White's practical difficulties would have been far greater than in the actual game.

Game 16, Janowski-Em. Lasker: After 30.\(\mathbb{I}\)d2,




Alekhine says that White is threatening 31.e5 \(\text{2}e7 \) 32.\(\text{2}e4. \) However, 31.e5 is not to be feared, as Black can reply 31...\(\text{2} \times 6! \) 32.\(f \times 6! \) \(\text{2} \times 6! \) 32.\(f \times 6! \) \(\text{2} \times 6! \)



when the threat of 33... ②f3+ forces either 33. ℤe3 ②g4 or 33. ℤ×e5 ৺xe5, Black ending up with attacking chances, and a rook and two pawns for two knights either way.

In the note at move 32, in the line 32.e5 2h4 33.g×h4 2×h4 34. 2e3 2g4+ 35. 2f1,



35... \$\textit{2}f3\$ does not win as claimed. White replies \$36.\textsup e2\$, and while Black has compensation for the sacrificed piece, there is no clear win any time soon (-0.14). Black wins instead by \$35...d×e5 \$36.f×e5 (36.\textsup ×d7?? \$\textsup g2\$ #) \$36... \$\textsup g2\$ # \$37.\textsup g1\$ (if \$37.\textsup ×g2 \$\textsup x\d1\$ + \$38.\textsup x\d1\$ \$\textsup x\d1\$ + \$39.\textsup e1\$ \$\textsup x\d2\$ \$\tex





with an overwhelming advantage (-6.51).

From move 35 on, several possible significant improvements go unmentioned. At White's 35th move, a better alternative to the text move 35. \(\mathbb{E} f1 \) was 35. \(\mathbb{E} e3-e2! :




This forces an exchange of queens, since if 35... 營h6? 36. 營×c4+ 營h8 37. 三×d6 魚×d6 38. 三×d6 e×f4 39. 三×c6 三f8 40.e×f5 f×g3 41.h×g3 三bf7 42. 三c5+- (+1.88). After 35... 營×e2 36. 三×e2, Rybka then gives optimal play as 36... f×e4 37.f×e5 氫×e5 38. 氫d5 三f8 39. ⑤bc3,




with a very even position.

At move 41,



nothing is said about the fact that 41. \triangle e3? was a serious mistake. Much better was the straightforward pawn capture 41. \triangle ×e4, play likely continuing 41... \triangle e6 42. \triangle g3 g4 43.e2 (if 43.xe4) 44.xe5 44.xe5 44.xe5 44.xe7 43...Ec8 44.xe7 xe7 xe8,






and White is up a pawn with decent chances (+0.74). It's unclear why Lasker allowed this, Janowski chose not to play it, and Alekhine did not comment on it.

At Black's 43rd move,




while the text 43...曾g4+ was good enough, eventually winning the exchange, Black instead could have won a bishop with 43...這xe4! 44.曾xe4 总f5 45.曾h1 (45.曾d4?? 曾g6+ 46.曾h1 总d4+ etc.) 45...曾g6+ 46.臣g2 曾e6 47.总d2 ②xg2 48.曾xg2 总e4 49.邑e1 ②xg2 50.邑xe6 ②xd5.

At move 45,




Lasker's 45... $\$ was relatively weak (-1.26), only about the fifth-best move. Strongest was 45...h5!, when the pinned knight is doomed, since if 46. $\$ h1 h4 47. $\$ e4 $\$ g2 *. After the virtually inevitable 46...h4 Black will be up about a rook, e.g. 46. $\$ va6 h4 47. $\$ f2 h×g3 + 48.h×g3 $\$ g2! 49. $\$ va6 ×g2 $\$ h4+ 50. $\$ h2 $\$ va6 ×f3+ (-5.88), or 46. $\$ d3 h4 47. $\$ f2 h×g3 48. $\$ xa7 $\$ e4. $\$ sa8 + 47. $\$ sa9 $\$ f1 (-3.98).

Game 18, Bogoljubow-Réti: The note at move 12 is incorrect to say that after 12... a2 13. a2 13. a2 a1+14. a2 a2 a×b2 15. ab5+,





Black must lose his queen. One saving line is 15... 2d7 16. 2a1 2c1, and if 17. 2b1 2c2 2c3 2c4 2c3 2c4 2c



and though Black has lost his queen, so has White. Black is down an exchange, but has two pawns in compensation.

Game 19, Tartakower-Maróczy: The note variation at move 47 does appear eventually to win, but the process can be shortened and simplified considerably. After 47. ≜e1 f3 48.d5 e×d5+49.c×d5 €e7 50.e6 €f6,






and after 55. 2g7 or 55. 2c7 (not to mention several other moves) Black can obviously resign. The variations stemming from 51. 2h4+ present much more technical difficulty.

Game 20, Yates-Ed. Lasker: The note at White's 22nd move correctly disparages 22.g4, but gives an incorrect refutation, wrong at several points.






After 22... 2g6 23. 2×g6 f×g6, 24. 2f1 is relatively best (-0.82), not 24. 2c1. But after 24. 2c1,



the note's 24...②c3 leads to only a small advantage for Black after 25..②e4! and either 25...②×d4 26. □×c8 □×c8 27. □×d4 (-0.61), or 25...□×f3 26. □ ec2 □×h3 27. □×c3 □×c3 28. □×c3 □h×c3 29. □×c3 (-0.53). Strongest instead is 24...○f4!,




best play then continuing 25.\(\mathbb{Z}\)e3 \(\Delta\xi\)h3+ 26.\(\mathbb{Z}\)f1 \(\Delta\c5\)! 27.\(\Delta\)e4 \(\Delta\xi\)e4 \(\Delta\xi\)e4 \(\Delta\xi\)e4 \(\Delta\xi\)e4 \(\Delta\xi\)e4 \(\Delta\xi\)e4 \(\Delta\xi\)e4 \(\Delta\xi\)e4 \(\Delta\xi\)e4 \(\Delta\xi\)e5 \(\Delta\xi\



31.g×h5 (not 31.g5?? △×g5 32.△×g5 營h1+ 33.營e2 莒×f2+ 34.營×f2 營×d1 -4.83) 31...g×h5, and Black has an outside passed pawn and the better position (-2.28).

All this is moot, however, because at the start of the line, the best move for Black is not 22... 2g6 but 22... 2f4!:






If now 23.g×h5? ⑤×e2+ 24.營×e2 莒×c2-+, or 23.莒e4? ⑤×h3+ 24.營h2 f5 25.g×f5 ⑤g5-+. Therefore forced is 23.Д×h7+ ⑤×h7 24.g×h5 ⑤×e2+ 25.營×e2 莒e8, and Black is winning (about -1.70).

At Black's 22nd move, Alekhine calls 22... 2c3 "very misleading,"




giving as the refutation 22...②c3 23.②e4 ②xf3 24.gxf3 ②xa1 25.②xa1 ②f4 26.③d2 ②b6 27.③xg7 27...③xg7 28.③xd8 ③cxd8 ②9.③a1+ f6 30.⑥h2. But Black is by no means compelled to follow this line. In fact 22...②c3 is best, because three moves later, instead of 25...②f4?, Black has the far better 25...②c5!:




If now $26.2 \times c5$?? 2c3!-+, or if 26.2e1 Black, having won the exchange, simply consolidates with 26...2e6. Therefore $26.2 \times c8 2f4 27.2d2 \times c8 28.2e5$ (28.h4, trying to save the pawn, is disastrous: $28...2h3 29.2f1 2 \times c4 30.6 \times c4 264 + etc.$) $28...2 \times h3 + 29.2f2 2 \times c4 30.6 \times c4 265$, and with his extra pawn Black has every prospect of winning the endgame (-1.07).

Rybka disagrees with Alekhine's recommendation of 31...b4:




Best here is a move Alekhine does not consider, 32.a4!, and either Black's a- or b-pawn eventually falls. In the note line, after 32.\(\text{\section}\)e2,




Rybka sees no need to give up the a-pawn with 32...\(\mathbb{Z}\)d8? 33.\(\mathbb{Z}\)×a6; instead Black has 32...\(\mathbb{Z}\)d5!, when if 33.\(\mathbb{Z}\)×a6??\(\mathbb{Z}\)=+, or 33.\(\mathbb{Z}\)×a6??\(\mathbb{Z}\)e8-+; therefore 33.\(\mathbb{Z}\)c7\(\mathbb{Z}\)a8 with equality.

After move 44,




Alekhine says "Still another trap: 45.\(\mathbb{\math}



with mate very shortly.

Game 24, Maróczy-Bogoljubow: The note at move 14, after 14. △×g6 h×g6 15. △f3 c×d4 16. △g5 △e7 17. △×d4,









winning the knight safely, viz. 19.f5 fxe6 20. \$\div xg6 e5 21. \$\times xe5 \$\times f6-+ \cdot\$.

Game25, Ed. Lasker-Janowski: The note variation at move 16 can be improved considerably. After 16...c6 17. a4 \$c7 18. af5,



Black is by no means obliged to play the egregious 18...\$\(\textit{48}\)? 19.\$\(\textit{\pi} \times 7 \)\$\(\textit{\pi} \textit{a8}\)? 20.\$\(\textit{\pi} \textit{5} + \$\textit{\pi} \textit{d8}\) etc. Much better is 18...\$\(\textit{0}f6!\), and White has much less of an advantage after 19.\$\(\textit{\pi} \textit{d3}\) or 19.\$\(\textit{\pi} \textit{c2}\) (about +1.10), and still less after 19.\$\(\textit{2} \times 97 \)\$\(\textit{\pi} \times 4 \) 20.\$\(\textit{2} \times 26 \)\$\(\textit{2} \times 27 \)\$\(\textit{2} \times 420.\$\(\textit{2} \times 26 \)\$\(\textit{2} \times 27 \times 27 \times 27 \times 27 \)\$\(\textit{2} \times 27 \ti

After 27. 罩f5,




White is said to be threatening to win a pawn by 28.②d5 罩d7 29.罩×f7. However, 28...罩d7?? would lose much more than that: 29.罩×e6 f×e6 30.營b3+ (much stronger than 30.罩×f8, though that also wins),




and either 30...\$\text{\$\text{\mathcal{2}}}c8 31.\$\text{\$\text{\mathcal{2}}}\text{\$\text{\mathcal{2}}}e7+\$, or 30...\$\text{\$\text{\mathcal{2}}}a6 31.\$\text{\$\text{\mathcal{2}}}\text{\$\text{\mathcal{2}}}c8! \$\text{\$\text{\mathcal{2}}}b6 33.\$\text{\$\text{\mathcal{2}}}a4+\$ etc. Rather than 28...\$\text{\$\text{\mathcal{2}}}d7???, relatively best is 28...\$\text{\$\text{\mathcal{2}}}e8\$, though Black is still losing then (+2.06).

Game 26, Em. Lasker-Ed. Lasker: The two variations given in the note at White's 40th move can be improved, one slightly, the other immensely. After 40. △g5 ≒×d1 41. ఆf7+ ఆh8 42. ఆh5 h6,




rather than the immediate 43.\daggeratheta d1, White can try 43.\daggeratheta f7+\daggeratheta g8 44.\daggeratheta \daggeratheta h6+ g×h6 45.\daggeratheta \daggeratheta d1,



the difference being that Black has an h-pawn instead of a g-pawn, and thus White's f-pawn is passed. Whether this would make the queen ending winnable, we cannot say.

In the other note variation, 40.2e3,




Alekhine's recommendation 40... \(\begin{align*} \begin{align*} 40... \(\begin{align*} \begin{align*} 40... \(\begin{align*} \begin{align*} 42. \(\begin{align*} \begin{align*} \begin{align*} 42. \(\begin{align*} \begin{align*} \begin{align*} \begin{align*} 42. \(\begin{align*} \begin{

Game 27, Capablanca-Tartakower: Rybka has a much higher opinion than does Alekhine of the note variation at move 33, as long as after 33...公d1 34. 当h6, Black plays not 34...當f8-f7, but 34...當g7:



The key difference is that the black king touches the white rook, which is relevant in the line 35.f5 △b2 36.f6+ ≝×f6+! 37.g×f6+ ⇔×h6 38. △c2 △c4=. In other lines after 35.f5 △b2,



Rybka sees White coming out no better, e.g. 36.\$\text{\mathrea}e2 \text{\mathrea}\times a4=, or 36.\$\text{\mathrea}b5 36...\$\text{\mathrea}\times c3+ 37.\$\text{\mathrea}f4 gxf5 38.\$\text{\mathrea}\times f5=. Nor does Rybka think avoiding 35.f5 does much either, e.g. 35.\$\text{\mathrea}b5 \text{\mathrea}e6 (35...\$\text{\mathrea}\times c3+ is OK too.) 36.f5 \$\text{\mathrea}e3+ 37.\$\text{\mathrea}f4 \text{\mathrea}e4+ 38.\$\text{\mathrea}f3 gxf5 39.\$\text{\mathrea}d7 \text{\mathrea}g4=. Perhaps a white victory lies somewhere beyond the computer's analytical horizon, but the lines stemming from 34...\$\text{\mathrea}g7 definitely have significance apart from 34...\$\text{\mathrea}f7 and were worth mentioning.}

Game 28, Alekhine-Janowski: Alekhine's play is overwhelming in this game, and we can only note a few points at which it might have been even more so. First, he is perhaps too harsh in faulting his move 15.a4 for "lack of precision." Rybka sees his play over moves 15-21 as optimal, faulting him only at move 22. There, instead of 22.2e2-c1, which it considers playable but only 7th- or 8th-best, it recommends 22.a6:



Illustrative variations then are:

(A) 22... ②×a6 23. ♥a2 ②dc5 24. 互a5




with a decisive attack (about +4.70), viz.

- (**A1**) 24... ₩b6 25. ℤb1 ₩a7 26. ②b5 ₩b6 27. ②xc5 ₩xc5+ 28. ②h1 ⑤b8 29. ℤxa6 bxa6 30. ₩xa6 and mate shortly, or
- (A2) 24...\$b8 25.\$\textit{\textit{x}}c5 dxc5 26.\$\textit{\textit{Z}}xa6 bxa6 27.\$\textit{\textit{w}}xa6 \$\textit{\textit{b}}b7 28.\$\textit{\textit{Z}}b1 +−, or
- (A3) 24...♥c8 25.♥b2 \(\mathbb{\text{\mathbb{G}}}\) d7 26.\(\mathbb{\text{\mathbb{G}}}\) a4 \(\mathbb{\text{\mathbb{G}}}\) d8 [if 26...\(\mathbb{\mathbb{A}}\)×a4 27.\(\mathbb{\mathbb{G}}\) 5×a4 \(\mathbb{\mathbb{G}}\) c7 (or 27...\(\mathbb{\mathbb{C}}\) c7 28.\(\mathbb{\mathbb{G}}\) b5 and mate in six) 28.\(\mathbb{\mathbb{G}}\) b6 etc.] 27.\(\mathbb{\mathbb{G}}\) b5 forcing 27...\(\mathbb{\mathbb{A}}\)×a5 28.\(\mathbb{\mathbb{M}}\)×a5+-;
- (B) 22...b×a6 23.營a2 營a7 24.到a4 罩b8 25.罩a5



(C) Relatively best is 22...b6, similar to the actual game, but after, say, 23. ac 24. a2 he8 25. b4,



while there is no immediate win, it's obvious White will triumph eventually (+1.91 at 12 ply).


In the note to Black's 24th move, after 24... \$\displays b8,






it is definitely true that the recommended 25. Ξ c1 Gd8 26. Ξ c6 is a decisive attack (+4.38). Even stronger, though, is 25.Gb2 with the overwhelming threat of 26. Ξ c1 Gd8 27. Ξ ×b7+! Gxb7 28.Gbc5+ etc. If then, say 25...Ge8 26.Gb1 Ga8 27.Gf1 and nothing can be done against the threatened 28.Gb6+ Gxb6 29.Gxb6+- (+9.53).

The note at move 30 is correct that after 30...\(\textit{d}\)d8,



Black would be unable to defend his c-pawn after 31. 量b2. But why worry about a trivial pawn when White has 31. 量×a6!! b×a6 32. 鱼×a6 量c7 33. 量b1+ 當a7 34. 營b4 and mate in about a dozen moves at most.

Game 31, Maróczy-Em. Lasker: In the note at White's 22nd move, Alekhine seems to have gotten the evaluations of his two variations reversed. He says that after 22. △ f4,




Black should play 22... 4b4 23.4×b4 4×b4



"with a winning position." It is indeed a winning position, but for White: 24.Ձ×f5 e×f5 25.⊎b3+ Ձe6 26.⊎×b4, winning the bishop. Instead, Black must do what he advises against, and what

seems obvious, taking the knight *en prise* on d5 (from previous diagram): 22... e×d5 23. 4×f5 4×f4 24. 4×h7+ 4×h8 25. 4h4,



and now, after either 25...包b4 or 25...邑e3, Black will simply remain up a piece for a pawn, e.g. 26.營b1 邑c1 27.邑×c1 鱼×c1 28.營×c1 (nothing comes of 28.包g6+ ⑤×h7 29.包e5+ ⑤g8) 28...⑤×h7, or 25...邑e3 26.營b1 營×g5 27.邑×f4 邑h3. One can only think that Alekhine meant to advise against 22...包b4 and in favor of 22...e×d5.

Game 33, Alekhine-Marshall: This game, like many with the King's Indian Four Pawns Attack, presented major complications. So it was not surprising that even so capable a tactician as Alekhine went astray at several points.

First, the note to White's 18th move, after 18... adf6 19. a×d5 a×d5 20.c×d5 a×d5,



recommends 21.\(\mathbb{Z}\) ad1, but after 21...\(\mathbb{C}\) c6 this leads to little or no advantage (+0.34). Instead, White has the decisive 21.\(\mathbb{Z}\)×h6!:



If then $21...2 \times h6$ $22.2g5+ 23.2 \times c7+$ and mate shortly; if $21...2 \times h6$ 22.2g5+ 2g8 $23.2 \times g6$ and Black must give up his queen to stop mate; or if $21...2 \times g6$ $22.2 \times g6$ $22.2 \times g6$ $22.2 \times g6$ etc. Relatively best is $21...2 \times g6$ $22.2 \times g6$ $23.2 \times g6$ but that leaves White up the exchange and a pawn (+3.67).

At move 19, Rybka does not agree that the line 19.h3 d4 20.\(\Delta\)×d4 \(\Delta\)e5 is "without any danger for Black."



White can, to use one of Alekhine's favorite phrases, go fishing in troubled waters with 21.\(\mathbb{Z}\) ad1!? \(\Delta\) \(\cdot c4\) — Other moves are worse: if 21...\(\Delta\) g8 22.\(\Delta\) \(\Lambda\) h6, or 21...\(\Delta\) c6 22.\(\Delta\) db5 \(\Delta\) \(\delta\) d2 23.\(\Delta\) \(\delta\) d2 \(\Delta\) ad5 and the c-pawn goes, or 21...\(\cdot c6\) 22.\(\Delta\) \(\Delta\) 6 \(\Delta\) \(\delta\) c4 23.\(\Delta\) g5 \(\Delta\) h8 24.\(\Delta\) d2 25.\(\Delta\) \(\delta\) c6 +- \(-22\).\(\Delta\) c2,




with multiple threats along the d- and f-files and the a2-g8 diagonal. The knight on c4 must not move, viz. 23...\(\delta\)b6 24.\(\delta\)b3+\(\delta\)f8 25.\(\delta\)e6+, or 23...\(\delta\)a5 24.\(\delta\)f5. Thus 22...c6 is forced, starting a long, bewildering forced continuation: 22...c6 23.\(\delta\)b5 b5 24.\(\delta\)×c6 \(\delta\)b6+ 25.\(\delta\)d4



25... \$\delta_8 (if 25...a6 26.\dd5 \delta_c5 27.\delta_c7, or 25... \delta_ac8 26.\dd5 \delta_c5 27.\delta_xf6 \delta_xf6 28.\delta_xh6) 26.\delta_cxb5 \delta_ac8 27.\delta_c7 \delta_c5 28.\delta_d6




And now Black must steer clear of 28...\$b6 29.\$\mathbb{Z}\$c1 a6 30.\$\mathbb{Z}\$\times c4 \mathbb{Z}\$\times c4 + \mathbb{Z}\$h7 32.\$\mathbb{Z}\$\times c7 \mathbb{Z}\$\times 6 34.b3 a×b5 35.\$\mathbb{Z}\$\times b5 when the smoke has cleared with a won ending for White. Best instead is 28...\$\mathbb{Z}\$d5 29.\$\mathbb{Z}\$c7 \$\mathbb{Z}\$\times c7 (29...\$\mathbb{Z}\$\times c4 + \mathbb{Z}\$h7 31.\$\mathbb{Z}\$\times e8 is worse) 30.\$\mathbb{Z}\$b5 \$\mathbb{Z}\$c6 31.\$\mathbb{Z}\$\times c7 \$\mathbb{Z}\$e2 32.\$\mathbb{Z}\$f3 \$\mathbb{Z}\$\times f3 33.\$\mathbb{Z}\$\times f3 \mathbb{Z}\$\times b2 34.\$\mathbb{Z}\$e6 \$\mathbb{Z}\$e4,




when though Rybka rates the position at +2.86, there are so few pawns and the position is so open that Black may yet draw. We will hardly claim that the above analysis is exhaustive and conclusive, but it does show, contrary to Alekhine's opinion, that a lot of danger was lying in wait for Black.


In the note after move 20, Rybka does not agree that 21. ☐ ae1 營c5+ 22. ⑤h1 ②e3 leads to any advantage for Black.



Apparently Alekhine did not consider 23.\div f2!\div g8 (forced, else 24.\div e5+\div g8 25.\div xe3 after most other moves) 24.\div e5 \div f8 25.\div g1




25...②f×d5 (or 25...②h5 26.罝×f8+ 罝×f8 27.②d7 ②×g3+ 28.h×g3 營d6 29.⑤×f8 ②g4 30.②e4 營×f8 31.營×a7 營b4 32.營g1 ②kb2 33.營f1 +1.57) 26.⑤×d5 罝×f1 27.罝×f1 營×d5 28.營×e3,






and while it's not clear that White can win, the position is certainly not advantageous for Black.

The note to White's 22nd move claims that 22. 2d4 2e3 "would have led only to a draw,"



considering only one line stemming from 23. \triangle f5. Instead, White can try 23. Ξ fe1!, when a likely continuation is 23... Ξ ad8 24. \triangle c2 \triangle fg4 25.h3 \triangle xc3 26. \triangle xc3 \triangle g7 27. \triangle xg7 \triangle xg7 28. Ξ ac1 (not 28.h×g4? \triangle xc2) 28... \triangle xc2 29. Ξ xe8 Ξ xe8 \triangle xe8 30. Ξ xc2 Ξ e3 31. Ξ xc7+ \triangle f6 32. Ξ xb7 Ξ xg3 33.h×g4 Ξ xg4 34. Ξ xa7,




and this looks winnable for White.

In the note at move 52, Alekhine seems to have gotten his evaluations reversed as he did in Game 31. After 52... ₩e5+ 53.g3 ♠h4,




White simply must play 54.₺×g7 ∜×g7 55.∜e4+ ₺g6, which though rated -2.33 by Rybka may still be tenable for White (the unmentioned 54.∜×b2 may also work). If instead White plays the recommended 54.∜h3??,







Black wins with 54...②×f5 55.②×f5 h5!! 56.②×g7 h×g4+ 57.⑤×g4 🕆d4+ 58.⑤h5 🖧d1+ 59.⑤×g5 🖧c1+ 60.⑤g4 b1ڭ -+:



Game 34, Réti-Ed. Lasker: Only a minor quibble here. The note to Black's 27th claims that after 27... ∜xf4 28. ∜g2+ White is winning,






His continuation 31... \$\ddots\$ would allow White some initiative with 32.e4! and, say, 32... \$\ddots\$ a8 33. \$\ddots\$ \$\delta\$ ×e4 34. \$\delta\$ ×e5 (+0.90), or 32... \$\ddots\$ d6 33. \$\ddots\$ \$\ddots\$ e6 34. \$\ddots\$ h6+ \$\ddots\$ 835. \$\ddots\$ g4 \$\ddots\$ e8 (+1.04). In


either case White has freed up his position and my eventually be able to make his extra pawn tell. Rather than 31... \$\delta d5?!, Black would have to content himself with further maneuvering, e.g. 31... \$\delta c7 32. \$\delta f3 \overline{\pma} e8 (+0.40).

The note at move 35 is puzzling. It is correct that 35. \digg3 would lose,



but the note continuation 35... \mathbb{Z} c2?! 36. \mathbb{Z} f1 \mathbb{Z} e4?!, far from winning as claimed, leads to nothing after 36.f4 (-0.19). Furthermore, 36. \mathbb{Z} f1 is not required; a much better defense is made by 36. \mathbb{Z} d4! when if, say 36... \mathbb{Z} c7 37.e4 (+0.54), or 36... \mathbb{Z} a2 37. \mathbb{Z} f5 \mathbb{Z} e6 38. \mathbb{Z} h6+ \mathbb{Z} h7 39. \mathbb{Z} g4 \mathbb{Z} ×a3 40. \mathbb{Z} ×e5 (+0.34).

The correct refutation of 35. \dig g3 is 35...\dig d2!:




If now 36. 264 37. 424 38. 264 38. 264 38. 264 38. 264 37. 264 38. 264 37. 264 38. 264 39. 264

In the note at White's 36th move, after 36. \$\displant{2}\$f2,




by far the strongest move is not $36...e\times f4$ (only -0.66), but $36... \exists e4!$, when if $37. \oplus f3?? \exists \times f4! -+$. Therefore the e-pawn cannot be defended and White's position collapses, e.g. $37. \triangle c3 \oplus \times e3+$ $38. \oplus f1 \exists c4$ (-2.20).

The text move 36... \(\tilde{\pi} \) e4 is called "a convincing continuation,"




but it is actually much inferior to the recommended (and clearly winning) alternative 36...e×f4. After 36... \exists e4 37. \exists c3 Black had to play 37... \exists d3 to retain any advantage. The text move 37... \exists d5?! allowed White a defense that went completely overlooked:





Instead of 38.4×e5??, the losing move, White could have held with 38.4f3!, likely continuations being 38...4h4 39.g3 (-0.40), or 38...4d3 39.f×e5 40.4f2 (-0.39), or 38...4xe3 39.4fxe5 40.4f4 (-0.39).

Game 36, Bogoljubow-Em. Lasker: One minor comment here. In the note to White's 35th move, in variation II, after 35. e1 ≡×g2 36. ≡c8+ eh7 37.c5 f5 38.c6 ≡c2 39.c7,



the next move reads "39...f4 (or 39...這c4)" as if the two were interchangeable and equally good. In fact 39...這c4?? would lose to 40.鱼a5! protecting the c-pawn and allowing the white rook to move off the queening square, e.g. 40...包d6 41.邑d8 ⑤b7 42.c8營 邑×c8 43.邑×c8 ⑤×a5 44.邑a8+-, or 40...⑤g5 41.邑a8 ⑤×h3 42.c8營 邑×c8 43.邑×c8+-. After 39...f4 40.鱼a5 does not win,





because the advance of Black's f-pawn counters the threat of White's c-pawn, viz. 40.2a5 f3 41.2d1 (forced by the threat of 41...2c1 *) 41...2c6 42.2f8 f2=,



with the chess equivalent of a Mexican standoff.

Game 38, Alekhine-Réti: Only one minor improvement here. In the note for Black's 36th move, after 36...f5,



while the recommended 37.\(\mathbb{\pi}\)d7 is good enough to win, best and simplest is 37.\(\mathbb{\pi}\)a8 \(\mathbb{\pi}\)×a8 (or 37...\(\mathbb{\pi}\)a6 38.\(\mathbb{\pi}\)×a6 \(\mathbb{\pi}\)×a6 39.\(\mathbb{\pi}\)b7), when the passed pawn, supported by the two bishops, cannot be stopped without giving up a piece.

Game 39, Janowski-Marshall: "A game rich in vicissitudes," says Alekhine. Indeed it was, so rich in fact that quite a few resources, on both attack and defense, were missed by the players and the annotator.

In the note at move 15, the refutation offered for the sacrifice 15. \(\Delta\times f7\) is not convincing. After 15. \(\Delta\times f7\) \(\Delta\times f7\) 16. \(\Delta f3\) \(\Delta e6\) 17. \(\Delta f1\) \(\Delta c7\) 18. \(\Delta \times e6\) \(\Delta \times e6\) \(\Delta \times e6\)



the note's 19.4d5? is a mistake. Much better is 19.4e1!, when 20.4d5 becomes a real threat. Forced then is 19...d5 20.4xd5 \&xd5 21.4e5+ \&xe5 22.dxe5,



when, with the unusual material imbalance of two knights and a rook for the queen and two pawns, Rybka rates the position as virtually even. Black has to be rather careful, e.g. 22...②×e5? 23.④×h6!, or 22...邑ed8 23.④e3 ②×e5? 24.Дd4+-, or 23...④×e5? 24.f4 ②a5 25.營b5 ④c7 26.f5 ⑤g7 27.f×g6+ ⑤×g6 28.營a4 ⑤f7 29.營e4 ☐d6 30.Дd4+-(+1.88). This is not to say that 15.⑤×f7 was best, but it was not as bad as it was made out to be.

In a sub-variation of that same note, in the line 19.4d5 \$\displantum d7 20.4\text{\$\displantum e6} + \displantum \text{\$\displantum e6} 21.\text{\$\text{\$\displantum e1}},




the note continuation 21...②a5 22.②×a5 🗳×b3 23.a×b3 is relatively weak (-0.59). Instead 21. Ξe1?? is refuted by 21...②×d4! 22.c×d4 🗳×c4, when the dust has settled with Black up a rook (-4.64).

In the note to move 24, after 24. ♠h5 g×h5 25. ∰×h5,




the moves 25...\$\(\textit{\pi}\)c6 and 25...\$\(\textit{\pi}\)e7 seem to be regarded as equivalent. The former move is probably Black's best, but the latter fails spectacularly:






26. 曾g6+! 』g7 27. ②xf5 莒ce8 (if 27...exf5?? 28. 莒xe7) 28. ②xg5 exf5 29. 莒xe7 莒xe7 30. ②xe7+- (+2.23). This idea does not work against 25... ②c6 because if 26. 曾g6+ 曾g7-+.


At White's 42nd move, the best move goes unmentioned.



As Alekhine points out, the text move 42.\(\mathbb{Z}\)e3? allowed a winning combination that Marshall missed. With either 42.\(\mathbb{Z}\)e3, 42.\(\mathbb{Z}\)e2 or 42.\(\mathbb{Z}\)h1 White would have avoided danger, e.g. 42.\(\mathbb{Z}\)e3 \(\alpha\)g4 43.\(\mathbb{Z}\)e7+\(\mathbb{Z}\)h6 44.\(\mathbb{Z}\)×g5+\(\mathbb{Z}\)×g5 45.\(\mathbb{Z}\)e7 \(\alpha\)f6= (-0.20).

Alekhine goes astray in giving the line Marshall should have played at move 42. After 42. \(\mathbb{Z}\)e3? h2+ 43. \(\mathbb{Z}\)h1,






when after, say, 44...②×f2+ 45.\\displaxf2 \displayf2 \dinfty \displayf2 \displayf2 \displayf2 \displayf2 \displayf2 \di

At White's 44th move,



it goes unmentioned that 44.\$\mathrm{\text{gh1}}\$ was a serious mistake. Instead 44.\$\mathrm{\text{g2}}\$!, which makes ...\$\mathrm{\text{s}}\$/f2 not a check, holds, viz. 44...\$\mathrm{\text{g4}}\$ 45.\$\mathrm{\text{g}}\$e7+ \$\mathrm{\text{gf8}}\$ 46.\$\mathrm{\text{z}}\$\text{xf2}+ (not 46...\$\mathrm{\text{s}}\$\text{xf2}?? 47.\$\mathrm{\text{g}}\$e3+- or 47.\$\mathrm{\text{gf7}}\$++-) 47.\$\mathrm{\text{gh3}}\$= (0.00), or 44...\$\mathrm{\text{z}}\$\text{xf2} + 45.\$\mathrm{\text{s}}\$\text{xf2} \$\mathrm{\text{gh3}}\$+ 46.\$\mathrm{\text{s}}\$\text{xh3} \$\mathrm{\text{w}}\$\text{xf2}\$ 47.\$\mathrm{\text{z}}\$\text{xe5}= (-0.20).

One move later, Marshall again missed the best line, playing 46...\$\\$h6 which could have allowed Janowski to draw, as will be shown below. Correct instead was 46...\$\\$f8!,




when White's doom is sealed: 46.\(\mathbb{Z}\)×d7 \(\mathbb{Q}\)×f2+ 47.\(\mathbb{Z}\)g2 \(\mathbb{Z}\)g5-+,



the difference being that, unlike when the king is on h6, 48. 2g8 does not threaten mate.

At move 48, contrary to Alekhine's opinion, White's queen sac 48.\(\delta\times \text{f2}\) was not forced. The alternative he dismissed, 48.\(\text{\text{ge}}\)e6, was best, because after 48...\(\text{\text{de}}\)e4 49.\(\text{\text{gg}}\)8 \(\delta\)f6,




where Alekhine left off concluding Black had an advantage, White in fact has at least eight moves that retain equality, the best being probably 50.\(\mathbb{\pi}\)d6 or 50.\(\mathbb{\pi}\)f7, when if 50...\(\mathbb{\pi}\)×g8?? 51.\(\mathbb{\pi}\)f5+!+-.

No comment is made on 56. \$\displaystyle{1}{3}\$, a decidedly inferior move (-2.04). Better resistance was afforded by 56. \$\displaystyle{2}{9}\$,




when after, say, 56... ७×b2 57. □f3 ७×a2 58. □h3+ ७g7 59. □×h2 White can fight on (-0.95).

The laconic note at Black's 61st move says merely "Or 61...\dd 262.\dd g8, etc." indicating this was not as good for Black as the text move 61...\dd d1+. We're not sure what sort of an "etc." Alekhine had in mind, but 61...\dd d2 wins in all variations, *especially* against 62.\dd g8:





62...h1\\disp+63.\disp\xh1\\dispf4+64.\dispg2\disp\xe4+65.\disph2\dispfe5+,



and Black eventually nabs the stray rook: 66.\$\disp2 \dispd=d5+, or 66.\$\dispd=h3 \dispd=e6+, or 66.\$\dispd=g1 \dispd=a1+ 67.\$\dispd=g2 \dispd=xa2+, or 66.\$\dispd=g3 \dispd=h4 67.\$\dispd=xg6 \dispd=b2+ 68.\$\dispd=g1 \dispd=b1+.

Lastly for this vicissitudinous game, an improvement to the note at move 65. After 65. \(\begin{aligned} \Bd d8, \end{aligned} \)






while 65... ₩h4+ would indeed have been unpleasant (-1.90), much more so was 65...h1 ₩+66. ♠×h1 ₩f6 67. ☐e8 ₩f5+68. №h2 ₩×d5-+ (-5.02).

Game 41, Marshall-Em. Lasker: A very engrossing game with some uncharacteristic lapses by Lasker, and on the whole very perceptive analysis by Alekhine. Still, some surprising and interesting improvements were found.


In the note variation at move 20, after 20.₺×e6 \subseteq ×e6 21.\subseteq ×d5,






and after either 23. 2c4 \(\) be8 24. \(\) f3 or 23. \(\) \(\) ×e6 \(\) \(\) ×e6 \(\) (4 \(\) f7, White will have one less pawn than in the note line, a considerable improvement (about +0.40).


The possibilities at White's 43rd yield some surprises. Alekhine is absolutely correct that the text move $43.\text{@}\times\text{g4}$ was best, but his analysis of the alternative $43.\text{@}\times\text{g4}$ can be improved.





rather than the note's $45.\Xi g7$, Rybka prefers the trappy 45.b4, when if $45...\Delta \times b4$? $46.\Xi g7$ $\Xi f6$ $47.\Delta \times f7 + \Xi \times f7$ $48.\Xi g8 + <math>Bh7$ 49.Bg6 = Black would have to play, say, 45...Ba7, when White could either go for slow progress on the queenside with 46.Ba7, or fish in troubled kingside waters with 46.Ba7.

Returning to the note line, after 45...2×e5 46.f×e5 \equiv e7,





Alekhine considered that Black may have a defensible position, but Rybka questions this, going further with $47.\Xi g4$ $\Xi h5$ (else $48.\Xi f4$ $\Xi g6$ $49.\Xi \times g6$ $\Xi \times g6$ $50.\Xi h6+$ $\Xi h7$ $51.\Xi f6+$ $\Xi g8$ $52.\Xi \times e6+$ etc.) $48.\Xi e2$ $\Xi f8$ $49.\Xi f4$ (threatening mate starting with $50.\Xi f6+$) $49.\Xi h6+$ $\Xi h6+$ Ξ




and Black has no way to avoid exchanging rooks, leading to what should be an elementary ending winning for White, e.g. 51... 2e8 52. 2h2 2xh2 53. 2xh2. Or if 51... 2g6 52. b4 etc.

This is why, rather than 46...\delta e7, Rybka prefers the startling 46...\delta c1!:





Frankly, when we first saw this we thought something had gone haywire in the program. It looks like Black is committing suicide leaving his bishop *en prise*, but in fact he wants to give up *all* his pieces: $47.\mathbb{Z} \times f7 \mathbb{Z} g6!! 48.\mathbb{Z} \times g6 (48.\mathbb{Z} f8 + \text{$^\circ$h}7 \text{ is no better}) 48... \text{$^\circ$e}3 + 49.\text{$^\circ$h}1 \text{$^\circ$g}1 + !! 50.\text{$^\circ$e}3 + 30.\text{$^\circ$h}1 \text{$^\circ$g}1 + !!$



Other White tries fare little or no better (from previous diagram):

- (A) Definitely not 47.當g2?? 當d2+ 48.當g1 當×d4+ 49.當g2 具g6 50.萬×g6 營e4+ 51.當f2 邑×g6-+;
- **(B)** 47.b4 \(\mathbb{B}\)h1+!! 48.\(\mathbb{B}\)×h1 \(\mathbb{B}\)×f1+ 49.\(\mathbb{B}\)h2 \(\mathbb{B}\)e2+ with perpetual check;
- (C) 47. \dig 4 \dig e3+ and Black has any number of paths to perpetual check;
- (**D**) 47.\(\mathbb{Z}\)g5 \(\mathbb{Z}\)g6 48.\(\mathbb{Z}\)h4+\(\mathbb{Z}\)g7 49.\(\mathbb{Z}\)×g6 + \(\mathbb{Z}\)×g6 50.\(\mathbb{Z}\)f6+\(\mathbb{Z}\)h7 51.\(\mathbb{Z}\)×e6 \(\mathbb{Z}\)e3+ with perpetual check again;
- **(E)** 47. ₩g5 ₩×g5+ 48. ℤ×g5 ℤh4 and 49... ℤ×d4=;
- **(F)** 47. \(\mathbb{I}\)g4 \(\mathbb{I}\)g6 48. \(\mathbb{I}\)×g6 (48.b4 \(\mathbb{I}\)×g4 \(\mathbb{I}\)g6 amounts to the same thing) 48...\(\mathbb{I}\)×g6 \(\mathbb{I}\)+3. \(\mathbb{I}\)+3. \(\mathbb{I}\)g7,



and though White still has the extra pawn it is probably not enough to win (+0.10). An amazing drawing resource in a difficult position.

At White's 44th move, Alekhine is correct that Marshall could have won with 44. 2d3!, but as at move 43 his analysis ends too soon, with 44. 2d3 2h5 45. 2h6 2f8 46. 2g5,






concluding that "Black would have no defense against 48.\geq g8+." But in fact he does: 46...\geq g6!, when if 47.\geq \sigma g6?? \geq c1+ 48.\geq f1 \geq \sigma f1 \geq ! There are only two other possibilities for White to try for the win:

(A) 47. ②×g6 ②f4!! 48. ②f7+ (or 48. ②c2 ②×g5 49. ②×c7 ②×h6=) 48... ③g7! 49. ⑤h4 ⑤c1+ 50. ⑤f2 ⑥d2+ 51. ⑥f3 ⑥e3+ 52. ⑥g4 ⑥×g6 53. ②h8+ ②×h8 ⑥f7 and though Black is down the exchange he has a fighting chance;

(B) 47.\(\mathbb{Z}\)c2 \(\mathbb{Z}\)g7 48.\(\mathbb{Z}\)\(\mathbb{Z}\)g6 \(\mathbb{Z}\)g6 \(\mathbb{Z}\)g7 50.\(\mathbb{Z}\)f7 \(\mathbb{L}\)f4 51.\(\mathbb{L}\)h5 \(\mathbb{L}\)e3+ 52.\(\mathbb{Z}\)g2,



and either 52... $\mathbb{Z} \times f7$ 53. $\mathbb{Z} \times f7$ $\mathbb{Z} \times f7$ 54. $\mathbb{Z} \times f7$ 55. $\mathbb{Z} \times f7$ 54. $\mathbb{Z} \times$

Does this mean that 44. 2d3 does not win? Not at all. Instead of 46. 2f2?, White plays 46. 2f7+!,



and Black can resign. If 46... \$\preceq\$ xf7 47. \$\preceq\$ h6+ forces mate, or if 47... \$\preceq\$ xf7 47. \$\preceq\$ h6+ \$\preceq\$ h7 48. \$\preceq\$ xh7 \$\preceq\$ g3 (if 48... \$\preceq\$ xh7 49. \$\preceq\$ f6+ etc.) 49. \$\preceq\$ g6+ and it's a massacre (+14.72).


Game 42, Bogoljubow-Capablanca: One of those limpidly clear Capablanca games where everything looks inevitable and self-explanatory. Only one minor note correction is offered. In the note to Black's 23rd move, the variation 24.b4 a5 25.b5 ♠c4 26.♠xc4 ☒xc4 27.☒a1,




much better than 27...e5 is 27... $\mathbb{Z} \times d4!$, and after either 28.c×d4 $\mathbb{Z} \times c2$ 29. $\mathbb{Z} \times c2$ $\mathbb{Z} \times c2$ followed by ... $\mathbb{Z} \times c4$ $\mathbb{Z} \times c2$ followed by ... $\mathbb{Z} \times c4$ $\mathbb{Z} \times c2$ followed by ... $\mathbb{Z} \times c4$ $\mathbb{Z} \times c2$ followed by ... $\mathbb{Z} \times c4$ $\mathbb{Z} \times c2$ followed by ... $\mathbb{Z} \times c4$ for $\mathbb{Z} \times c2$ followed by ... $\mathbb{Z} \times c4$ for $\mathbb{Z} \times c2$ followed by ... $\mathbb{Z} \times c4$ for $\mathbb{Z} \times c2$ followed by ... $\mathbb{Z} \times c4$ for $\mathbb{Z} \times c2$ for $\mathbb{Z} \times$

Game 43, Tartakower-Alekhine: A difficult game Alekhine barely managed to draw. His later analysis has puzzling lapses, some serious.

To begin with, the note at Black's 27th move is correct that 27... \(\) e8 was not an adequate defense, but then botches the proof. The final position the note reaches is said to be winning for White,




but Rybka rates it dead even, and after the likely continuation 36. \(\mathbb{Z}\)e5 \(\mathbb{B}\)b6 37. \(\mathbb{Z}\)e7 \(\mathbb{Z}\)×e7 \(\mathbb{S}\)×d6 39. \(\mathbb{S}\)×f7+ \(\mathbb{S}\)h8 40. \(\mathbb{S}\)×a7 \(\mathbb{Z}\)d7,



it's obvious there's no win for either side.


However, a win is there, if after 27... \\ 28.\\ 28.\\ 25.\\ 64 in favor of 29.\\ 25!:



Black simply cannot defend the f-pawn now:

- (**A**) 29... \(\perp\)g6 30.h5+-;
- **(B)** 29...≌e7 30.d6 c×d6 31.\delta\d5+-;







and either 34...\$\\$h8 35.\$\\$e5+\$\\$g8 36.\$h6 \$\\$\frac{1}{2}f7 d6+-\, or 34...\$\\$f7 35.\$h6 \$\\$\\$g8 36.\$\\$f5+\$\\$e7 37.\$\\$e6+\$\\$f8 38.\$d6 c×d6 39.c×d6 \$\\$\\$g6 40.\$\\$f5+\$\\$e8 41.\$d7+\$\\$e7 42.\$\\$e4+\$\\$×d7 43.\$\\$×a8+-\.

(**D**) Relatively best is to abandon the pawn with 29...\$\\$g8, but this loses too: 30.\$\\$\\$xf7 \$\\$\\$ac8 31.\$d6 c×d6 32.c×d6 \$\\$\\$ed8 33.\$\\$\\$\\$c7! etc. (if \$\\$\\$xc7 34.\$d×c7 \$\\$\\$xd4 35.\$c8\$\\$\\$+).

The note at move 28 is wrong both in asserting that after 29. \$\displayset g4\$ "Black could have saved himself more easily," and in demonstrating that claim. In its variation (I) 29. \$\displayset g4\$ \$\mathbb{Z}\$ ad8 30. \$\mathbb{Z}\$ fe1, the recommended 30... \$6\$ is a blunder that allows White to win immediately,




not with 31.c6?, but 31.\div \d7! \delta \d7 32.\delta e8+ \div f7 33.c6+- (+9.62). Instead of 30...f6??, relatively best is 30...f5,




but this loses too: $31.\mathbb{Z} \times f5 + \mathbb{E}g8$ 32.d6 c×d6 $32.\mathbb{E}c4$ $\mathbb{E}h8$ (else 33.d6+) $33.\mathbb{E}c3$ $\mathbb{E}a6$ (otherwise $34.\mathbb{E}e6$ traps the queen on most other moves, and if $33...\mathbb{E}\times d5$ $34.\mathbb{E}\times d5$ $\mathbb{E}\times d5$ $35.\mathbb{E}e8 + 34.c6$ $\mathbb{E}d6$ $35.\mathbb{E}e7$ and mate soon.

In the note's variation (II), after 29... \(\mathbb{I}\)dd8, instead of the ineffective 30. \(\mathbb{G}\)g4-e2, White has the surprising 30. \(\mathbb{G}\)e6!,






forcing 30... 營×e6 31.d×e6 莒e8 32. 莒×f7+ 當g8 33. 莒×c7:





Rybka then sees best play along the lines of 33...a5 34.\(\mathbb{I}\)g5 g6 35.h6! (35.h\(\times\)g6?! h6 36.\(\mathbb{I}\)e5 is only +0.68) 35...\(\mathbb{I}\)\(\times\)e6 36.c6 \(\mathbb{I}\)d6 37.\(\mathbb{I}\)b5 \(\mathbb{I}\)d1+ 38.\(\mathbb{I}\)h2 \(\mathbb{I}\)d4 39.\(\mathbb{I}\)g7+,



and either 39...⑤f8 40.□×h7, or 39...⑥h8 40.c7 and nothing can stop 41.□b8+. Alekhine disparages some unnamed critics who suggested 29. ⑤g4 as a winning line — but they were right.

But Tartakower's text move 29. \$\text{\text{\text{e}}} e 4\$ was also good enough to win, if he had followed through correctly. Alekhine's reply 29...f6 probably made the best of a bad situation, but still would have failed had Tartakower, instead of 30.g2-g4?!, found 30.d6!:









and though Black has four pawns for the rook, White should still win.

Finally, the note at move 33 goes wrong at the end. After the last move given, 39...h6,




Alekhine says "Black would have a perpetual check in case White should capture the rook." On further analysis, after 40. \Bb8+ \Bh7,




Rybka does not agree, giving White two ways to win:


- **(B)** 41. ₩×f7! (anyway!) 41... ₩c1+ 42. ₩e2 beginning an amazing king-walk 42... ₩c2+ 43. №e3 ₩c3+ 44. №e4,



and now the king-walk can go in two directions:

- (**B1**) 44... ₩c2+ 45. \$\delta\$d5 \\delta\$a2+ 46. \$\delta\$×d6! (giving up one queen to create another!) 46... \\delta\$×f7 47.c7 \\delta\$c4 48.c8 \\delta\$ \\delta\$f4+ 49. \$\delta\$e7 \\delta\$e5+ 50. \$\delta\$f7 \\delta\$d5+ 51. \\delta\$e6 and mate soon;






Alekhine is hardly to be faulted for not finding lines like this; the bewildering multiplicity of possible checks would baffle any human analyst. But the errors at moves 29 and 30 smack of at least a subconscious — if not deliberate — suppression of unpleasant facts, something Alekhine was prone to occasionally when annotating his own games, and seen again in his game with Edward Lasker in the next round (game 48).

Game 45, Yates-Maróczy: In the note at White's 21st move, after 21. 2e3 e5 22. 2e2,




The note at White's 22nd move is quite correct that 22. Ag6! was best, but misses the strongest continuations at two points. First, Rybka indicates that Black's best reply is not 22... 5e5 but the unmentioned 22... f7-f6,



giving 23. $\triangle \times f6$ g×f6 24. $\triangle d3$ when White's advantage is minimal (+0.45). Also reasonable is 22... $\triangle af8$ 23. $\triangle \times f7$ + $\triangle \times f7$ (+0.54).

In the note's variation (III) after 22...\(\mathbb{I}\)ff8 23.h6 g×h6,






while 24. \mathbb{Z} ×h6 is quite good, strongest by far is 24. \mathbb{Z} h4! forcing mate within a few moves, e.g. 24...h×g5 25. \mathbb{Z} ×h7#, or 24...h×g6 25. \mathbb{Z} ×h6 etc., or 24... \mathbb{Z} e5 25. \mathbb{Z} ×h6 \mathbb{Z} f7 26. \mathbb{Z} ×f7+ \mathbb{Z} ×f7 27. \mathbb{Z} df1+ etc. Mate is postponed longer only by a massive material giveaway: 24... \mathbb{Z} d4 25. \mathbb{Z} ×d4 \mathbb{Z} f1+ 26. \mathbb{Z} ×f1 \mathbb{Z} f8 27. \mathbb{Z} ×h7+ \mathbb{Z} h8 28. \mathbb{Z} ×f8+ \mathbb{Z} ×f8 29. \mathbb{Z} f4 \mathbb{Z} g7 30. \mathbb{Z} ×h6 \mathbb{Z} ×h7 31. \mathbb{Z} ×g7+ \mathbb{Z} ×g7 32. \mathbb{Z} g5+ \mathbb{Z} h7 33. \mathbb{Z} h4#.


Game 46, Em. Lasker-Réti: Only one minor correction here. At White's 19th move, Alekhine says "Not 19.₺f5 on account of 19...₺xf4+." It must be admitted that the straightforward text move 19.₺b5 is probably preferable on practical grounds because of its clarity. However, 19.₺f5, though leading to more complications, is in fact playable and about as strong. After 19...₺xf4+.



play would continue 20.g×f4 ∜yg2 21.∜h4!, preventing Black from castling.




If now 21...e×f5? 22.句d5! and there are more threats than Black can cope with, e.g. 22...邑c8 23.句f6+ 當f8 24.尚h6+ 曾g7 25.句×d7+ etc., or 22...當f8 23.邑hg1 and 23...尚×d5 is forced; most other moves allow a deadly 23.句f6+ or 23.句×c7+. Relatively best is 21...邑g8 22.句b5 邑c8 23.句×a7



23... 曾g4 (23... ②×a7?? 24. 曾e7#) 24. 萬hg1 and Black has nothing better than 24... 曾×g1 25. ⑤×c6 曾c5 26. ⑤d6+ 曾×d6 27. 萬×d6 爲×c6 28. 萬d4 (+2.51).

Game 48, Ed. Lasker-Alekhine: This game is on the whole very well annotated, but some key errors were made. The note at White's 49th move says that after 49.全c2 b3 50.全d1 單f7 White is somehow "trapped."



It's not clear what constitutes this entrapment. After the forced continuation 51. ७×c1 ☐f1+52. ☐d1 b2+53. ७c2 ☐×d1 54. ☐b8,



both 54... \(\mathbb{Z}\)c1+ 55.\(\mathbb{Z}\)d3 \(\mathbb{Z}\)a1 56.\(\mathbb{Z}\)×c3 \(\mathbb{Z}\)×a7 57.\(\mathbb{Z}\)×b2, or 54...\(\mathbb{Z}\)a1 55.a8\(\mathbb{D}\) b1\(\mathbb{D}\)+ 56.\(\mathbb{Z}\)×b1 \(\mathbb{Z}\)×a8 57.\(\mathbb{Z}\)×c3, yield positions where White has all the winning chances, or is in fact winning.



Alekhine concluded that White was winning, but he considered only 55... \$\ddotd d2+\$, which allows the king to escape by 56. \$\ddot f3 \delta e5+ 57. \$\ddot e4\$. Instead, 55... \$\ddot c2+! holds the draw, e.g.

- (a) 56.\$\displaystyle{9}f3 \displaystyle{2}e5+ 57.\$\displaystyle{9}g3 The key difference. 57.\$\displaystyle{9}e4 is impossible, and 57.\$\displaystyle{9}f4 risks losing. 57...\$\displaystyle{9}g6+ 58.\$\displaystyle{9}f4 \displaystyle{2}d3+ 59.\$\displaystyle{9}f3 \displaystyle{2}e5+ 60.\$\displaystyle{9}f2 \$\displaystyle{9}c2+ 61.\$\displaystyle{9}g6+ etc., or
- (b) 56.\$\dipsig1 \dipsig1 \dipsig2 \dipsig2 \dipsig2 \dipsig2 \dipsig2 \dipsig1 \dipsig2 \dipsig1 \dipsig2 \dipsig2 \dipsig1 \dipsig2 \dipsig2 \dipsig1 \dipsig2 \dip

Most importantly, as with Tartakower-Alekhine, a missed win for White goes unmentioned. Instead of 50.h4, Rybka indicates that Edward Lasker could have won with 50.\(\textit{\textit{L}}c2!:\)



The main variations are:

(**B**) 50... 2a2 51.e4 2g5 52. 4b3 c2 (52... 2c1?? 53. 4g8) 53. 4xc2 2c3 54. 4d3+− (+2.83).

(C) 50...b3 51.\dd1 and:




(C1) Of course not 51...b×c2+?? 52.\(\varphi\)×c1+-;

(C2) 51...b2 52. 总b1 常g5 (if 52... 岜d7+ 53. 常c2 包e2 54.g5+ etc. as in variation A) 53. 常c2 常h4 54. 常xc3 邑b7 55.g5 包e2+ (55... 常xh3 56. 邑h8 邑xa7 57. 常xb2 包e2 58.g6+-) 56. 常d3 包g3 57.g6 h5 58. 邑f8 邑xa7 59. 邑f7 邑a5 60.g7 邑g5 61. 常c3 常xh3 62. 常xb2 h4 63. 总h7 and wins; (C3) 51...包a2 52. 总xb3 邑d7+ 53. 常e1 (not 53. 常e2? 包c1+) 53...包b4 54. 常e2 c2 55. 总xc2 包xc2 56. 邑c8 邑xa7 57. 邑xc2:




This boils down to an ending where White has the e-pawn and either the g- or h-pawn, to no pawns for Black. Both are theoretically won for White, though the process is laborious, about 45 to 47 moves per Nalimov.

Game 49, Yates-Bogoljubow: Regarding the key point of the game, Black's winning a pawn at move 20, White's best line seems to have been overlooked. Instead of 20. 4e4, Rybka indicates White could have avoided losing a pawn with 20.g2-g4:



If now 20... \$\textit{lg6}\$ 21. \$\textit{l}_\$\times g6 f_\$\times g6 22. \$\textit{l}_\$\times d4 \$\textit{l}_\$\times d4 23. \$\textit{l}_\$\times d4 c_\$\times d4 24. \$\textit{l}_\$\textit{e}4=, or 20... \$\textit{l}_\$\times c2 21. \$\textit{l}_\$\times f6 22. \$\times c2 \$\textit{l}_\$\times c2 \$\textit{l}_\$\times c5=. Trickiest is 20... \$\textit{l}_\$\times f4!?,




when 21.g×h5 ②×h3+ 22.營f1 ②×f3 23.營xf3 ②×b2 24.營xh3 ②×a1 25.營d3 g6 26.☐×a1 is about even (+0.08), while 21.⑤xd4 leads to some interesting complications after 21...⊙xh3+:




- (b) 22.\$\text{g2} \(\)

Game 50, Janowski-Tartakower: The meaning of the note at move 26 is unclear. In this position,






Alekhine writes "If 26.4f2, then follows simply 26... Hd8 (27.4xc5 Hd1+ 28.4f1 4a6)." This makes it sound like White must not play 27.4xc5, but in fact he can and should, because after 27... Hd1+,




not 28. \triangle f1?? (-2.56) but 28. \triangle xd1 Ξ xd1+ 29. \triangle e1 \triangle d8 30. \triangle f2, and White is fine (+0.90). Rybka rates 26. \triangle f2 as one of White's two best moves, along with the text 26. Ξ xc5.

Game 52, Alekhine-Bogoljubow: The note to Black's 38th move says that "After 38...a3, White would not have had an adequate defense," giving two variations, one with 39. △c5, the other beginning 39. △c7+ ⑤g8:




The note continued with 40. 三a7, which Rybka does find inadequate. However, a move not considered may yet draw: 40. 鱼a5!, intending to bring the bishop to c3 where it covers the apawn's queening square. A plausible continuation then is 40...a2 41. 鱼c3 亘b4 42. 亘c8+ 零h7 43. 亘c7 (threatening 44. 鱼xf6) 43... ⑤h6 44. 亘c8 (threatening mate) 44...g5 (or 44... ⑥h7 45. 亘c7, repeating) 45. f×g5+ f×g5 46. 亘c5,



and no matter where Black moves the bishop, Rybka sees Black with some advantage but no path to a win (about -0.80).

Rybka does indicate that Alekhine may well have been right, that there was no defense to an ...a4-a3 advance, but only if Bogoljubow had played it a tempo earlier, at move 37:



For example 38.\(\mathbb{Z}\)c3 a2 39.\(\mathbb{Z}\)a3 \(\mathbb{Z}\)e7 40.\(\mathbb{Q}\)×b6 \(\mathbb{Z}\)e2+ 41.\(\mathbb{Z}\)f3 \(\mathbb{Z}\)d6 42.\(\mathbb{Q}\)a5 \(\mathbb{Z}\)×d5 43.\(\mathbb{Q}\)b4 \(\mathbb{Z}\)b2 \(\mathbb{Z}\)b1 47.\(\mathbb{Q}\)c3 \(\mathbb{Z}\)×b5 (-2.57).

Game 53, Ed. Lasker-Marshall: A game especially well analyzed by Alekhine; at several points Rybka at first indicated errors, but as the computer went deeper he was proven right. We note only some minor improvements and one important omission.

In the note after Black's 18th move, the complications possible after 19.e×f5 were bewildering, but Alekhine's conclusion that it would give Black a winning position was validated. It just should be mentioned that at the end of his note,



the move he gives (probably for illustrative purposes), 24.2e3??, is about the worst on the board, allowing mate within about a dozen moves. Better, though still without hope, are 24.2c4 or 24.2b1 (about -1.32).

At Black's 27th move, while the recommended 27... 2d5 wins in straightforward fashion, Marshall's text move 27... 2f5 is unjustly criticized. The game continuation then is forced, 28. 2f4 29. 2xf5 2xf5 30.gxf5 2c7 31. 2e3 2e5 32. 2f1, reaching this position:



It was at this point that Marshall went wrong. Instead of 32...e3?, he (and Alekhine) overlooked 32... a5!, covering e1, when White cannot prevent the advance of the e-pawn or serious collateral loss, viz. 33.c6 e3 34. af3 国b2 35. ac1 e2 36.c7 ac7 37. ac1 国xa2-+, or 33. ab1 国xb1 34. ac7 35. ac1 ac7 35. ac1 ac2 ac2 acc7 37. acc7 37.

The note before White's 46th move says 46. \g2-f3 "would have sufficed for the defense," but it does not.



It fails to 46... 這e2! 47. 這d1 (if 47. 營×e2 營×h3+, or 47. 這g2 營c1+) 47... 這h2+ 48. 愛g1 這×h3 etc. (-4.39). Rybka indicates the most if not the only viable moves are 46. 鱼d5 (correctly recommend by Alekhine), 46. 鱼d1 and 46. 鱼a4.

Game 54, Réti-Tartakower: After 20.f5,




Alekhine recommends 20...2d7, which is indeed better than the text move 20...2xf5. Rybka indicates however that Black's best line is 20...2xf5!? 21.2xf5 2xf5 22.h4 &e6, with compensation for the exchange (+0.20), and much better chances than in the actual game.

The note at move 26 is correct that 26...g×h3 would allow White to win quickly, but then goes wrong at two points. After 27.总e3-d4(?) 營g6+ 28.營h1,




not 28... ②f6?? (+6.53), but 28... ②×d4! 29. ♥×d4+ ⑤g7, when White's advantage is minimal (+0.51). Instead, the winning way is 27. ②e3-g5!:




when the best Black can do is 27... \$\mathref{g}6\$ 28. \$\mathref{\psi} \times h3+\$\mathref{\psi}h7\$ (if 28... \$\mathref{\psi}g8\$ 29. \$\mathref{\psi}e7+\$) 29. \$\mathref{\psi}f3\$ \$\mathref{\psi}e5\$ (else 30. \$\mathref{\psi}h2\$) 30. \$\mathref{\psi}e4\$ and wins.

Game 55, Maróczy-Janowski: At Black's 23rd move, Alekhine's recommended 23...c5 is among Black's best moves, but after 24. □g1,




the sample continuation 24...g5?! 25.c3?! is far from best for either side. Better for Black is 24...\forall f7, while after 24...g5?! 25.\dark g4! gives White some advantage (+0.83).

At move 25, Rybka indicates White might have initiated counterplay with 25. 294! \(\begin{aligned} \Beta \) 8,




and either 26. \$\displays h_3\$ or 26. \$\displays h_2\$!? \$\displays f_3\$ 27. \$\displays g_2\$ h_5 28. \$\displays x_95\$. Throughout the game, Maróczy repeatedly and unaccountably failed to see the potential of \$\displays h_2\$-g_4, and Alekhine does not mention the idea until the note at move 32.

In that note, Alekhine is absolutely correct that 32. \$\disphi\$h1! was best,






but he does not seem to have looked much further, or he would have noted that it wins hands down. Black can really do nothing about the coming attack on the g-pawn. As relatively best (but still useless), Rybka gives 32... \$\mathre{\text{gf}}8 33.\mathre{\mathre{\text{g}}} \mathre{\text{gf}} \mathre{\text{gf}} \mathre{\text{34.}} \mathre{\text{\$\text{g}}} \mathre{\text{5+-}}.




Game 56, Em. Lasker-Janowski: An interesting game where one cannot help but think that Janowski's habitual reluctance to part with either of his beloved bishop pair caused his downfall. It is quite well annotated on the whole, especially from a strategic standpoint; we offer just a few tactical improvements.


The note at move 39 says 39... 2e6 "would have threatened nothing," but it is one of Black's best moves at that point.



Rybka gives 40. 2a4 and then not 40... 2xc4?, but 40... 2xd3 41. 2xd3 \(\) 45+ 42. 2c2 \(\) 43. 2xd2+ 43. 2xc4, a position even David "I detest the endgame" Janowski should be able to win (-1.90).

At Black's 49th move,






the note is correct that both 49... \$\mathbb{\pi}\$h7 and 49... \$\mathbb{\pi}\$d4 were preferable to Janowski's 49... \$\mathbb{\pi}\$e3, but the analysis after 49... \$\mathbb{\pi}\$d4 can be improved.




Rybka considers both 50.2a4 and 50.2b3 superior to the note's 50.2e4. But if 50.2e4 is played, then not 50...2×b2?! but 50...2×e4!:




It is much better to retain the bishop on d4 because $\Xi d1$ -g1 is prevented and a potential queening square is covered, viz. $51.f \times e4 \ \Xi h7 \ 52.\Xi d2 \ \Xi h2 \ 53. \ \Delta d1 \ f3 \ 54.g \times f3 \ g3+- \ (-4.21)$. Or if $51.d \times e4$, only then $51... \ E \times b2 \ 52.\Xi \times d6+\Xi \times d6 \ 53. \ E \times b2 \ E d2+54. \ E \times c1 \ E \times g2 \ 55.f \times g4 \ E g3 \ 56.\Xi a4 \ E d6 \ 57.\Xi b4 \ E c7 \ and \ 38... \ E \times f4 \ winning \ (-2.55)$.

Alekhine's note at move 57 is clearly intended to illustrate the trap awaiting Black if he plays 58... \(\mathbb{Z}\times f3\), but some further comment is warranted. After 57... \(\mathbb{Z}\times d2\)?,




the note's 58.\(\mathbb{Z}\times\d2?!\) leads only to equality if Black avoids 58...\(\mathbb{Z}\times f3?'\) in favor of 58...\(\mathbb{Z}\d6\), 58...\(\mathbb{Z}\g6\), or 58...\(\mathbb{A}\d6\) fall around 0.00). Much better, in fact winning, is 58.\(\mathbb{Z}\times d2!\),







threatening 59. 2×f4+, and if 58... 2d6 (or 58... 2f7/2d7 59. 2×b7+) 59. 2b6+ 2c5,



At Black's 60th move,




Alekhine is absolutely correct that 60... $\Xi e2$ was necessary, but it bears mentioning that after $61.\Xi \times b7 + \&c6 62.\Xi \times g7 \Xi \times e3$, Black might still not have drawn.



Instead of 63. 2e4, White could still try for a win with 63. 2a7!?, e.g. 63... 2xd3 64. 2xa6+ b7 65. 2b6+ 2a7 66. d1 2a3 67. 2b5, and Black will have to work hard to draw.

Game 58, Réti-Bogoljubow: The note at move 18 says "After 18... \ e5 19. \ c4+ \ h8 20.f6, among other lines, would be very strong."





But 20.f6 seems to lead to nothing, e.g.

- (A) 20... @e6 21.f×g7+ @×g7 22. @×d4 @×c5 23. @×c5 \(\mathbb{Z}\)×c5 \(\mathbb{Z}\)×c5 \(\mathbb{Z}\)×c7+ \(\mathbb{Z}\)×g7+ \(
- **(B)** 20... **△**×c5 and:
- (**B1**) 21.營f7 g×f6 22.眞e4 (or 22.營×f6+ 營g8 23.罝ae1 罝f5 24.營h6 罝af8=) 22...f5 23.眞×f5 罝e7 24.營c4 營d6=;
- (**B2**) 21.f×g7+ ⑤×g7 22.Д×d4 (if 22.Дe4 Дe6 23. ⑤d3 and as long as Black doesn't put something en prise, almost any move suffices for near deadeye equality) 22...Д×d4+ 23. ⑥×d4 ⑤b6=.

In fact there is only one good move after 18... \(\mathbb{Z}\)e5 19.\(\mathbb{Z}\)c4+\(\mathbb{Z}\)h8, that being 20.\(\mathbb{Z}\)×d4!:



Now 20... 4×f5 21. 4×e5 營×e5 22.b4 is obviously losing for Black, and if 20... Ee7 21. 422 4e8 22.f6 (now it works!) 22... Ef7 23. Eae1 (+2.71), so 20... Exf5 21. 4e4 and:

- (A) 21... \(\beta\xeta\frac{1}{4}\) \(\delta\zeta\) 24. \(\beta\text{h}4\) \(\delta\end{a}\)e6 25. \(\beta\xeta\text{h}7+\delta\text{g}8\) 26. \(\delta\end{c}2\)e2 (+2.02);
- **(B)** 21...b5 22.\degree c3 and:




- (B1) 22... \(\begin{align} \begin{align} \text{23.} \\ \begin{align} \begin{align} \text{24.} \\ \begin{align} \b
- (**B2**) 22... 三×f1 23. 三×f1 (threatening 24. 三×f8+ 三×f8 25. 鱼×g7+, therefore the bishop must move so the queen can guard g7) 23... 鱼g4 24. 三f4 曾d7 (or 24... 鱼h5 25. 三h4 曾f7 26. 鱼×c6) 25. 鱼×c6 曾×c6 26. 三×g4 (+1.92).


There are various other tries for Black, but none are better than these, and most are worse.

Game 60, Ed. Lasker-Yates: One minor clarification. At White's 22nd move,






Alekhine writes "after 22. \$\text{\psi}g5\$, Black, by means of 22... \$\text{\psi} \times h6\$, followed by 23... \$\text{\psi}f4+\$, would force an ending similar to the one in the actual game." This is certainly true in the case of 23. \$\text{\psi} \times h6\$, but it bears mentioning that after the other recapture, 23. \$\text{\psi} \times h6\$?,



Black would have the much stronger 23... \$\frac{1}{2}f5!\$, threatening mate and forcing 24. \$\frac{1}{2}d2\$ e4 25. \$\frac{1}{2}d4\$ \$\frac{1}{2}d2\$ e4 25. \$\frac{1}{2}d4\$ e5 26. \$\frac{1}{2}e1\$ e7 26. \$\frac




Perhaps Alekhine meant strategically winning, because after 22...營c7, while White has compensation for the pawn, Rybka can find nothing even close to a tactical win. If 23.萬×e5 台e6 (-0.35), or 23.f×e5 台e6 (-0.50), or 23.Д×d4 d5 24.Д×e5 d×c4 25.Д×c7 萬×c7 26.百c1 萬b8 27.萬e2 萬cb7 28.萬cc2 (-0.40).

In the note at move 48, Alekhine recommends 48...f3 over the text move 48...\mathbb{H}h1,



because then if 49.g×f3 \$e6 "[the] pawns are separated [and] it is sometimes very difficult to achieve victory." Nalimov confirms that the position of that variation is in fact a theoretical draw. However, it bears mentioning that capture on f3 is not obligatory, and with 49.\Becauge g6+\Becauge e7 50.g4!, White would still win in a fashion similar to the note at move 47.

Game 62, Maróczy-Capablanca: A well-annotated game up to Black's 41st move. To that point, only some minor quibbles and improvements can be offered. First, in the note line at White's 24th move, after 24. ♠h4 g6 25. ☒g3 ♣h7 26. ♠×h6 ♣×h6 27. ☒c1+ ♣h7 28. ♠f5,



it can be noted that Black need not play the losing 28...g×f5?. Correct is 28...\mathbb{\math\and\max}\max\eximm\and\max\exim\and\max\dan\mathantom\and\max\da

In the note to move 26, the variation 26... \(\mathbb{Z}\)d3 27.\(\mathbb{Z}\)e3 \(\mathbb{Z}\)d6 28.\(\mathbb{Z}\)e2?! (better 28.\(\mathbb{Z}\)e2),



Rybka calculates that rather than 28... ♠e7, Black can simply play 28... ♠×e4, and after 29. ♠b6 ☐b8 30. ☐×e4 ☐×b6 Black is a clean pawn up (-1.00).

In the variation given at White's 34th move, 34.g3 \bigspace h5 35.g×f4 e×f4 36.\bigspace xf4 \bigspace xf4 \bigspace xf4,




Alekhine treated the moves 37. 2g3 and 37. 2e3 as equivalent, but they are not. 37. 2g3? loses as

claimed to 37...f4, but if 37.Ձe3 f4 38.\e2! \existse2+ 39.\existse2 f×e3 40.\eartimes2×e3 and Black's advantage is minimal (-0.57).

At Black's 36th move, the text 36... 2g2-f4 was good enough, but an interesting and stronger alternative was 36... 2h4!,



Best play then continues 37. \(\mathbb{I}\)f1 f4 38. \(\Delta\)h1 \(\mathbb{I}\)d3 39. \(\mathbb{I}\)ef2 \(\Delta\)ef2 \(\Delta\)ef6 40. \(\Delta\)ef2 \(\Delta\)h5,



and White is almost in *Zugzwang*. He can do little but mark time while Black builds up more pressure, e.g. 41. \$\mathre{g}1 \Delta f8 42. \$\mathre{g}h2 \Delta h7 43. \$\mathre{g}g1 \Delta g5, and White is crushed.

The real surprise is at Black's 41st move.




There, Capablanca's 41... ②×f3+ was good enough to win (-1.45), but it is amazing that both he and Alekhine missed the far, far stronger 41... □×d8!! 42. ♥×d8+ ♥h7:




This both deflects White's queen and removes the possibility of the defensive exchange sac $\mathbb{Z}d8 \times \mathbb{Z}d3$ as in the game. Black has a crushing attack, e.g. 43. $\mathbb{Z}d1$ $\mathbb{Z}\times f3 + 44$. $\mathbb{Z}h1$ $\mathbb{Z}\times h3$ etc. (-13.62), or 43. $\mathbb{Z}a7$ $\mathbb{Z}\times f3$ and there's no chance for a perpetual: 44. $\mathbb{Z}\times g7 + \mathbb{Z}\times g7 + \mathbb$

Similarly (though less dramatically), at Black's 49th move,




49... ☐ f7, keeping the knight on attack, was much the best move, viz. 50. ♣ g2 ♣ e2 51. ☐ a1 f3+52. ♣ g3 ♣ × e4 + 53. ♠ × e4 ← (-4.55).

Game 64, Marshall-Janowski: We note only one improvement. At White's 23rd move,




the text move 23.\(\exists \)e4 is only about fourth best. Both Marshall and Alekhine missed 23.\(\exists \)c3! \(\exists \)xa2 24.\(\exists \)xf6 \(\exists \)xf6 (worse is 24...gxf6 25.c6 \(\exists \)d6 26.\(\exists \)xe4) 25.\(\exists \)xf6 gxf6 26.\(\exists \)xe4, and White is up a piece instead of two minor pieces for a rook (+3.10 vs. +1.14).

Game 65, Ed. Lasker-Tartakower: At move 26 there are errors of both omission and commission. First, it is not pointed out that White should not have wasted his chance with 26.g4?!, but immediately played 26.≜×b5 a×b5 27.₺c6,




forcing the win of material by either 27...f6 28. avd8, or 27... avd8 28. avd8 ave5 29. avd6. By first interpolating 26.g4, White could have lost most or all of his advantage, because after 26... avd8.


27. ②×b5 White does not win as claimed. Rather than the automatic recapture, Black has an overlooked and surprising resource, 27... ②c5!:



The threat to the queen forces one of two responses. If 28.2e3 2xe3 29.8xe3 axb5=, while if 28.2d4, which seemingly keeps White a piece up, Black can force a draw by 28...2e5! 29.2e3 2xd4 30.2xd4 2xf3+ 31.8h1 2xd4 32.2xd4 2xd4 33.8xd4,



and now 33... \$\dip f3+ 34. \$\dip g1 \$\dip \times g4+\$ etc. with perpetual check, since if 35. \$\dip f1?? \$\dip f4+\$ winning the rook. Therefore, had Black played 26... \$\dip h3\$,



White, to retain any winning chances, would have to forego 27. \$\delta \text{b5}\$ for something like 27. \$\delta \text{g5}\$ \$\delta \text{f6} 28. \$\delta \text{vb5} a \times b5 29. \$\delta e2\$ (not 29. \$\delta \text{vb5}?? \$\delta \text{vg4} 30. \$\text{fxg4} \$\delta \text{vh2} + 31. \$\delta \text{vh2} \delta \text{vd1} + 32. \$\delta \text{vd1}\$ \delta \text{vd1} \delta \text{vd1} + 32. \$\delta \text{vd1}\$ with just a minimal advantage (+0.50). Unfortunately for Tartakower the point became moot when he played 26... \$\delta \text{g6}\$?.


Game 66, Capablanca-Em. Lasker: A difficult and complex game worthy of the combatants, and quite well annotated by Alekhine. We offer only one correction.

The note to Black's 10th move states that after 10...f6, the reply 11.₺g5 "would not have sufficed on account of 11...₩e8."





This overlooks the possibilities of 12.2b5!, when White has threats on both wings. If then 12...fxe5 13.2c7 \did d7 14.\dixh5 \dix xh5 \dix x65 15.\dix xh7+ \dif f7 16.\dig g6+ \dig g8 17.dxe5




17... 4h6 (not 17... 4xc7?? 18. 4h7+ 4f7 19. 4g6+ 4e7 20. 4xg7+ etc.) 18. 4xa8 4xe5 19. 4h7+ 4f7 20. 日ac1 and White is winning (+2.72).

If instead 12...f×g5,




then 13.②c7 營f7 14.⑤×a8 ₤f6 15.營c2 g6 16.Д×f6 ⑤×f6 17.f4 g4 18.☐ac1,



and try as he might, Black is unable to touch the cornered knight, e.g. 18... \$\(\textit{d}\)d7 19. \$\(\textit{c}\)c7 a6 20. \$\(\textit{c}\)5 \$\(\textit{Z}\)c8 21. \$\(\textit{d}\)b6 \$\(\textit{Z}\)b8 22.b4 etc. Meanwhile if Black leaves the knight alone, White can start to extricate it with a2-a3, b2-b4 etc. Rybka indicates the best reply to 11. \$\(\textit{Q}\)g5 is not 11... \$\(\textit{d}\)e8? but 11... \$\(\textit{g}\)6, viz. 12. \$\(\textit{d}\)×h7 f×e5 (12... \$\(\textit{d}\)×h7?? 13. \$\(\textit{d}\)×h5+) 13. \$\(\textit{d}\)×f8 \$\(\textit{d}\)×f8 14. \$\(\textit{d}\)×g6 \$\(\textit{d}\)f6 (+0.19).


Game 67, Alekhine-Maróczy: The note at White's 18th move is correct that 18. \(\mathbb{Z}\) c7 would be premature, but after 18...\(\mathbb{Z}\) d8 19.\(\mathbb{Z}\) c5,





after which Rybka gives best play as 20... 鱼e8 (threatening 21...b6) 21. 包f5 g6 (not 21...b6? 22. 曾×d5 曾×d5 23. 包e7+) 22.f3 g×f5 23.f×e4 莒c8 24. 莒c5 曾×a5 25. 莒×a5 莒c2 26. 曾f1 d×e4 and Black has a slight edge (-0.54).

Game 68, Tartakower-Marshall: The note at move 50 proposes 50... \(\mathbb{Z}\)c4 as a better drawing chance than the text 50... \(\mathbb{Z}\)e2,



giving 51.\(\mathbb{I}\)d2\(\mathbb{I}\)e4, "whereupon White would have won in the end, though not without difficulty." But White can win without difficulty by 51.\(\mathbb{I}\)c6!, when if 51...\(\mathbb{I}\)e4 52.\(\mathbb{I}\)c7\(\mathbb{I}\)e2 53.\(\mathbb{I}\)×a7 etc. (+7.43), or 51...\(\mathbb{I}\)×c6 52.b×c6 \(\mathbb{S}\)d8 53.\(\mathbb{S}\)b5 \(\mathbb{S}\)c7 54.\(\mathbb{S}\)c5 etc. (+8.04).

Game 69, Bogoljubow-Ed. Lasker: A sub-variation in the note to Black's 4th move contains an surprising blunder. After 4... △d4 5. △xd4 e×d4 6. △d5 ⊜d8 7. △f4?? (inexplicably given an exclam),





Black would simply play 7... \$\text{\psi}g5\$ forking knight and bishop (-1.59). One must wonder what Alekhine thought he saw in 7.\$\text{\psi}d5\$-f4. One might suspect a typo, but there is no knight move, nor any move to f4, that is good for White. Perhaps intervening moves such as 7.\$\text{\psi}c4\$ c6 were omitted. In any event, correct and good for White (+1.04) is 7.\$\text{\psi}h5\$! so that if 7...c6 8.\$\text{\psi}e5\$+ \$\text{\psi}e7\$+ \$\text{\psi}c7\$+.

The note at move 25 is somewhat unclear. After 25... \(\mathbb{Z}\times c5\) \(26.\) \(\mathbb{Z}\times c5\) \(\mathbb{Z}\times f4!\) \(27.\) \(\mathbb{Z}\times b7\) \(\mathbb{Q}\times 5\),




Alekhine gives two lines, and seems to be saying that both draw. That is certainly true of 28.g3, when Black has no choice but perpetual check by 28... ⊕e3+ etc. However, the other line, 28. ⊕c2, does not draw but loses: 28... ⊕xh2+ 29. ♣f1 ☐xb7! 30. ⊕c8+ ♣g7:



if now 31.\(\text{\psi}\xb7??\)\(\text{\psi}f4+ 32.\text{\psi}g1 \)\(\text{\psi}e3+ \) and Black forces mate soon, e.g. 33.\(\text{\psi}f1 \)\(\text{\psi}g3 \) etc., or 33.\(\text{\psi}h6+ 34.\text{\psi}g1 \)\(\text{\psi}h2+ 35.\text{\psi}f1 \)\(\text{\psi}f4+ \) etc. Therefore 31.\(\text{\psi}h3\) or 31.\(\text{\psi}g4\) is forced, either move leaving Black in a clearly winning position (at least -2.53).

At Black's move 26,



it goes unmentioned that 26... \subseteq xf4? was a critical mistake that as much as any other cost Black

the game. Instead, he could have held with 26... 6b6!, for example 27. 4×6 7 4×6 5 28. 4×6 7 6×6 7 (-0.15).


Game 70, Janowski-Yates: It is sad to see good attacking chances in this game wasted in dilatory play by the aging Janowski, who in his prime had been one of the most vigorously energetic of tacticians. At Black's 24th move,



it bears mentioning that Yates could have blunted the coming attack somewhat by 24...c6, preventing \$\alpha\$f3-d4 for the time being. When he failed to do this and played 24...\$\alpha\$d7, Janowski could have played 25.\$\alpha\$d4! immediately,




when Rybka indicates his attack would already be irresistible, e.g. 25... 宣c8 26. ②c6! (better than ②e6 as in the game) 26... 曾f7 27.b4 (preventing 27... ②c5) 27... a5 28.b4 b5 29.f4 曾h8 (29...e×f4?? 30. 宣e7) 30.f×e5 ②×e5 31. ②×e5 f×e5 32. 宣f1 曾e7 33. □×f8+ 曾×f8 34. ②×g6,



reaching a position Rybka rates at +1.86 (34...a×b4 35.a×b4 🗳×b4? 36.\ddot\frac{1}{2}f5+-).

Alekhine is rightly critical of 30.c6, but after his suggested alternative 30.f4,






Black need not make things quite so easy with 30...\$\textstyle{\pi} \textstyle{\pi} \textstyle




viz. 34...d5 (34...d×e5? 35. 🗓 ×e5 🗒 gg8 36.c7 etc.) 35. 🗓 a6 🗒 e8 36.c7 🚨 e6 37. 🗳 c6 🗟 c8 (+1.85).

In the endgame, Alekhine considers White to be lost after 58.f4. That was certainly not the best move, yet later at move 63,



Rybka indicates that instead of the text 63.\$f2, White could still have drawn with 63.h4, giving about a dozen variations with a 0.00 evaluation as deep as 20 ply. For example 63...\$e6 64.h5 $\Xi c3+65.\$h4$ $\Xi f3 66.\$g5$ $e3 67.\Xi \times a5$ $\Xi g3+68.\$h6$ \$f6 (if 68...e2 $69.\Xi e5+$ \$f6 $70.\Xi \times e2$) $69.\Xi a6+$ \$f7 $70.\Xi a7+$ \$e6 $71.\Xi a5$, and neither side can get anywhere. Or $63...\Xi c3+64.\$g2$ $\Xi f3$ $65.\Xi \times a5+$ \$e6 66.h5 $\Xi \times f4$ 67.h6 $\Xi g4+$ 68.\$f2 $\Xi h4$ 69.\$g3 e3 70.\$f3=.

Game 72, Alekhine-Yates: The note at Black's 14th move, in the variation with 14...f5,



recommends 15. ac4 ah8 16.e×f5 g×f5 17. ag5 f4 18. ah5 af6 19.d6 with a winning attack."



But in fact this squanders White's attacking chances, and the best he can hope for is a draw, viz. 19... \$\mathre{\text{d}}' \text{20.} \mathre{\text{f}}' + (if 20. \$\mathre{\text{b}}' \text{4?} \mathre{\text{c}} \times 42 \) 20... \$\mathre{\text{Z}} \times f7 \, 21. \$\mathre{\text{c}}' \text{7} \, 21. \$\mathre{\text{c}}' \, 21. \$\mathre{\text



and Black can either continue fishing with 21... \$\text{\psi} \text{7} 22. \$\mathbb{\psi} \text{7} f \text{\psi} 3 (-0.40), or force White to take a draw with 21... \$\text{\psi} \text{\psi} \text{4} e \text{\psi} 4 23. \$\mathbb{\psi} \text{\psi} 4 \text{\psi} 4 24. \$\mathbb{\psi} \text{\psi} 6 \text{\psi} 5 25. \$\mathbb{\psi} \text{\psi} 5 26. \$\mathbb{\psi} 6 26. \$\mathbb{\psi} 7 \text{\psi} \text{\psi} 5 27. \$\mathbb{\psi} 2 28. \$\mathbb{\psi} 6 26. \$\mathbb{\psi}

The note line can be improved at several places after 14...f5,



but we'll just give the earliest deviation, which happens to be the strongest: 15.exf5 (instead of 15.\(\text{Q}\)c4) 15...gxf5 16.d6 \(\text{@}\)e8 17.\(\text{Q}\)g5 \(\text{E}\)f6 18.\(\text{A}\)h5 \(\text{@}\)f8 19.\(\text{@}\)b3+ \(\text{@}\)h8 20.\(\text{Q}\)f7+ \(\text{E}\)xf7 21.\(\text{@}\)xf7+- (+2.50).

Contrary to move 25's note, 25. 2e5×f7 is just fine.



If then 25... \(\mathbb{Z}\) ×d5, thought by Alekhine to be a refutation, White wins with 26. \(\mathbb{Z}\)g4! \(\mathbb{Z}\)g5 (or 26... \(\mathbb{Z}\)h7 27. \(\mathbb{Z}\)f6) 27. \(\mathbb{Z}\)×g5 h×g5 28. \(\mathbb{Z}\)d1+− (+3.12).

Game 73, Réti-Marshall: Some surprising errors in a game Alekhine seems to have analyzed in haste. The note at White's 18th move is correct that 18.d×c5 would have exposed White to a dangerous attack,



but Rybka does not find this borne out by the continuation given, 18... \subseteq g6 19.g3 f4 20. \subseteq d2 h5,




the resulting position being evaluated at practically even, +0.11. Instead, the truly dangerous, in fact winning continuation is (from previous diagram) 18... \$\Delta f4!\$ 19.g3 \$\Delta e2+:



If now 20. \$\text{\$\text{\$\frac{1}{2}}\$h6 (threatening 21...\$\text{\$\frac{4}{5}}\$h5 22.h4 \$\text{\$\frac{4}{5}}\$f3+ 23. \$\text{\$\frac{4}{5}}\$h2 \(\text{\$\frac{2}{3}\$}\$k4+ 24.g×h4 \$\text{\$\frac{4}{5}}\$f4 and mate very soon) 21. \$\text{\$\text{\$\frac{2}{3}\$}\$g1 (if 21. \$\text{\$\frac{4}{5}\$}\$d2 \$\text{\$\frac{4}{5}\$}\$f3+ etc.) 21...f4!



22.c6 f×g3 23.f×g3 (23.營×g5?? 莒×h2#) 23...⑤×g3+ 24.莒×g3 營×g3 25.營d2 營f3+ 26.營g2 營×g2+ 27.營×g2 莒×c6,




and Black wins easily (-3.62).

If on the other hand White plays 20. 2.2, then 20...166 21. 1.2 ×c7 (if 21.h4 164 + 22. 164 etc. as already seen), and now 21...164!,




threatening two different mates: 22...f3+23. \$\delta f3\$ \$\delta d5+24.\$\delta \times e2\$ \$\mathbb{\mathbb{E}} e5\$ \$\mathbb{\mathbb{E}} \times 65\$, and 22... \$\mathbb{E} \times h2+23.\$\delta \times h2+24.\$\delta g2\$ \$f3\$ \$\mathbb{E}\$. White can forestall these only at great material cost, e.g. 22.\$\delta d2\$ \$\frac{1}{2}\$ \$\delta g3\$ \$23.\$\delta \times 65\$ \$\delta 4\$ \$\delta \times 44+\$ etc., or 22.\$\delta d7\$ \$\mathbb{E} d8\$ forcing 23.\$\delta \times d8+ \$\delta \times 48-+.

At Black's 22nd move,




while the text 22...f4 was good enough to win (about -2.25), it went unnoticed that Marshall had a much stronger line in 22... ₩h3+! 23. ₹f3 ℤe8 24. ℤae1 f4






and either 25. 三×e2 營h5+ 26. 含g2 f3+ 27. 含f1 f×e2+ 28. 含e1 營f3-+ (-23.13), or the desperate 25. 含e5 三×e5 26. d×e5 營h5+ 27. g4 營×e5 28. 三×e2 營d5+ 29. 三e4 (or 29. 含×f4 g5+ 30. 含g3 三h3+ 31. 含×h3 營f3#) 29... 登d3+ with mate in 15 at most.



27.\(\mathbb{Z}\)c1?? is a gross blunder which is refuted not by 27...\(\omega\times b3\)?! but by 27...\(\omega\times 6+ 28.\omega\times d2 \omega e2+ 29.\omega c3 \omega b5+ winning the queen. The final error comes after 28.a\times b3,



when Alekhine's baffling 28...曾g2?! gives Black little advantage after 29.曾b6! defending the f-pawn (-0.66). Winning easily instead is 28...曾e6+! 29.曾d2 (or 29.曾f1 智h6 30.曾e1 莒e8+31.曾d1 曾e6 etc.) 29...曾e2+ 30.曾c3 曾xf2 (-3.67).


Finally, in the note at move 26, after 26.h×g3 \widetilde{g} ×g3+ 27.\widetilde{g}e2 \widetilde{g}g2+ 28.\widetilde{g}d3,




we agree that 28... \models \cdot h1 would eventually win, but why not simply 28... \models c2, mate?

Game 74, Maróczy-Ed. Lasker: It goes unremarked that 25... \(c5-b4? \) was a mistake;






(better 25... ⊈g6 or 25... ∜d7), and that instead of 26. ℤab1, White could have won a pawn with 26. ℚf5 ∜f8 27. ℚ×h6+




The note at move 34 is seriously mistaken. After 34...∑b8 35. \(\cdot\) c2,



Black is by no means obliged to play 35...\(\Delta a 3?\)?; he has at least a dozen playable moves, such as 35...\(\Delta b 6, 35...\(\Delta d 7, 35...\(\Delta b 6, \text{ or } 35...\(\Delta b 4.\) Furthermore, after 35...\(\Delta a 3?\)? 36.\(\Delta c 6, \text{ wrongly given an exclam, does nothing for White,}\)



Instead the killer is 36. \displays f5!,



with the deadly threat of 37.2d3 and 38.2h7. About the best Black has is 36...2h8, but then comes $37.2\times g5!$ f×g5 (or $37...h\times g5$ 38.2d3+-) $38.2h\times f7$ &e7 39.2 $h\times d5$ and White is up two pawns with much the better position.

At Black's 38th move,




Edward Lasker's 38... Ξ b6 is said to be the decisive blunder, but this is questionable. Rybka rates it near the top of about ten playable moves in the range +0.25 to +0.35, and indicates the crucial mistake came later on, as shown below.


Contrary to the note at move 40 for Black, 40... ©c6 is probably playable, arguably best, and is certainly not refuted by the line Alekhine gives. In reply to 41. ©fd4,




not 41... 2c5?!, but 41... 44 and either 42. 42 45 with equality, or 42. 42 43 43 45 with only a small advantage for White (about 40.46).

The note at move 69 incomprehensibly claims that "After 69.2c8+ and 70.2xb6, the pawn ending would result in a draw." This is simply wrong. After 70... xb6 (70...axb6?? is far worse),





White wins easily with either 71.f4 or 71.e4, for example 71.e4 \$c6 72.\$c4 \$d6 73.\$b5 \$c7 74.\$c5 \$d7 75.\$d5 \$e7 76.\$c6 etc., or 71.f4 \$×a6 72.e4 \$b6 73.e5 \$c6 (if 73...f×e5 74.f×g5+-) 74.e×f6 \$d6 75.f×g5,




reaching an ending even a novice could win.

Game75, Bogoljubow-Tartakower: A game well played by Bogoljubow and well annotated by Alekhine. We found only one improvement. In the note to Black's 22nd move, after 22... ♠c4,




the line given, $23.4 \times d7 = 24.4 \times d5 = 67$, wins only one pawn. White can get at least a pawn more with $23.4 \times d5 = 24.4 \times d7 = 24.4 \times$

Game 76, Réti-Em. Lasker: Another well-annotated game; Rybka found only one improvement, in the note to move 37, after 37. \(\textit{\Delta} \times 44: \)




The note variation starting with 37... \sum ×d4 may eventually win as claimed (though Rybka found

no win), but if so the process is laborious and problematic. Rybka saw no need to give up the valuable rook, preferring 37...f6!. A likely continuation then is 38.\$f3 (if 38.\$\mathbb{Q}c4 + \mathbb{Q}f7\$, the point of 37...f6) 38...b3 39.\$\mathbb{Q}c3 \mathbb{Q}\times d3 40.\$\mathbb{Q}b7 \mathbb{Q}c4 41.g4 \mathbb{Q}d5 + 42.\$\mathbb{Q}\times d5 + \mathbb{Z}\times d5 43.\$\mathbb{Z}\times 2 \mathbb{Z}a5 44.\$\mathbb{Q}\times 2 (44.\$\mathbb{Q}\times a5?? b2) 44...\$\mathbb{Z}\times a4,




with an easily won exchange-up ending.

Game 77, Capablanca-Marshall: A dull and even game throughout, to which we can add only one comment. In the note at move 37 it is said that after 38. □ c7+ ⑤ h6, Black would be winning. This is not true; in fact had Capablanca been intent on drawing, he pretty much could have forced it with 39. □ h7+!.



If now 39... 當g5? 40. 當c5+ 當d5 41. 當b4! (threatening mate), Rybka rates the position at +5.00, foreseeing a lengthy series of checks and threats that results in White winning queen for rook or some comparable gain. One illustrative line: 41...當f6 42. 當f4+ 當e6 43. 當f7+ 當e5 44. 當e7+ 當e6 45. 當c7 (threatening 46. 萬e7) 45...當d5 (or 45...當d5 46. 萬e7+ 當f6 47.e4 當d4 48.e5+) 46. 萬e7 當f6 47.e4+ 當d4 48.e5, forking queen and rook.

Therefore Black must play 39... \$\delta \text{h7} 40. \$\delta c7 + \$\delta \text{h6} 41. \$\delta \text{vd6},\$



reaching a queen ending neither side can win.

Game 78, Alekhine-Ed. Lasker: Yet another game Alekhine was lucky to draw (see Tartakower-Alekhine, game 43, and Ed. Lasker-Alekhine, game 48), and which he annotated worse than he played. To start with, in the note at move 22, he seems so intent on proving his opponent had a won game that he overlooks important resources for White. After 22.e×f5 e4,




much better than 23.\(\Delta\d4?\) is 23.\(\Delta\d5\)+!, beginning a long forced line: 23...\(\Delta\d5\) 24.\(\Delta\xd5\) e75 exf3 (or 24...\(\Beta\xf5\) 25.\(\Delta\e7+\Beta\h7\) 26.f\(\xg6+\Beta\h8\) 27.\(\Delta\xc6\) f\(\xg2+\28.\Beta\xg2\Beta\xf1\) 29.\(\Beta\xf1\) \(\Delta\xf1\) 24.1\(\Delta\xc6\) f\(\xeg2+\28.\Beta\xg2\Beta\xf1\) 29.\(\Beta\xf1\) \(\Delta\xf1\) 24.1\(\Delta\xc6\) f\(\xeg2+\28.\Beta\xg2\Beta\xf1\) 29.\(\Beta\xf1\) 29.\(\Delta\xf1\) 24.1\(\Delta\xc6\) f\(\xeg2+\28.\Beta\xg2\Beta\xf1\) 29.\(\Delta\xf1\) 24.1\(\Delta\xc6\) f\(\xeg2+\28.\Beta\xc6\) 24.1\(\Delta\xc6\) 24.1\(\Delta\




and White has whatever advantage there is (+0.62).

Further on in the note line, after 23... 2g4 24. 2xc6 2xc3 25. Zb1 Zxf5 26. Zxf5 gxf5,




27. \(\text{2} \times a5 \)? is a serious mistake; again White can hold with 27. \(\text{2} \text{b3} + \text{2} \text{g7} 28. \(\text{2} \text{c4} \text{2} \text{b8} 29. \text{2} \times a5,



because now if 29...e3 30. 2e2=.

Furthermore, the note completely overlooks another good 22nd move — yes, you guessed it — 22. \(\begin{aligned} \\ \\ \\ \\ \end{aligned} \) b3+:




and either 22...\$\frac{a}{b}7 23.\$\frac{a}{g}5+\$\frac{a}{b}8 24.exf5 gxf5 25.\$\frac{a}{e}6 f4 (25...\$\frac{a}{f}7? 26.b5) 26.b5 \$\frac{a}{x}\$\centrighter{e}6 27.\$\frac{a}{x}\$\centrighter{e}6 \$\frac{a}{c}5 28.bxc6 \$\frac{a}{x}\$\centrighter{e}6 29.\$\frac{a}{b}1\$ with advantage for White (+0.85), or 22...\$\frac{a}{b}8 23.\$\frac{a}{b}4 \$\frac{a}{b}7 24.exf5 gxf5 25.\$\frac{a}{c}xf5 =.

The note at Black's 23rd move is wrong at several points.




After 23...@xb5 24.\(\mathbb{Z}\)e1 (probably better is 24.\(\mathbb{Z}\)d1) 24...fxe4 25.\(\mathbb{Z}\)xe4 \(\mathbb{Z}\)c5,




not 26. \triangle d5+?, but 26. \triangle ×g6 Ξ e6 27. \triangle e3 Ξ ×g6 28. \triangle ×c5 and White stands worse but is not lost (-1.09).

Continuing with the note line, after 26.4d5+? &h8 27.4g5 e4 28.4b1,



White is now indeed lost, but 28...Qd3?! is hardly the way to prove it; after 29.Qf7+ \(\mathbb{Z}\)×f7 \(\mathbb{Z}\)f8 31.\(\mathbb{Z}\)×g6 \(\mathbb{Z}\)×b1 32.\(\mathbb{Z}\)e3 White can still fight (-1.29). Much stronger instead is 28...\(\mathbb{Z}\)d3!,



when the rook on e1 has nowhere to go: if 29. Ξ g1 Δ f2*, or 29. Ξ e2 Ξ f1*, or 29. Ξ d1 Δ f2+, and if 29. Δ d2 Δ ×e1 Δ d8 (-6.77). Relatively best but still losing badly is 29. Δ f7+ Ξ ×f7 30. Δ ×f7 Ξ f8 31. Ξ f1 Δ c4 32. Ξ b7 Ξ ×f7 (-2.97).

At move 27, Alekhine writes "In reply to 27...\(\text{\text{\text{2}}}\)c5, White intended 28.\(\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{2}}}}}\)d5+ \(\text{\texi}\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\texi\tex{\text{\texi{\text{\text{\texi}\text{\text{



28. \triangle d5+? is very bad; the only playable line is 28. \triangle ×g6 Ξ e6 29. \triangle ×h5 (-0.41).

Continuing with the note line, after 28...\$\disphi 7 29.\$\textit{@}e3\$, best for Black is 29...\$\disphi a4:



Had Alekhine then played 30.\(\mathbb{\pm}\) b1?? as intended, he would quickly resign as Lasker happily played 30...\(\mathbb{\pm}\)c3 (-5.27). Relatively best is 30.\(\mathbb{\pm}\)g2, but that just leaves White two pawns down with inadequate compensation (-1.44), while if 30.\(\mathbb{\pm}\)c1 e4! opens the bishop's diagonal with major effect.

The note at move 31 is correct that both 31... 宣e7 and 31... 宣g8 would risk losing for Black, but the proof is flawed in one sub-variation of the latter case. After 31... 宣g8 32. 鱼d5+ 室h8 33. 鱼f7 邑e7,



the recommended 34.\$\mathbb{Q}\$5 does nothing, viz. 34...\$\mathbb{Z}\$\times f7 + 35.\$\mathbb{Z}\$\times f7 \$\mathbb{Q}\$g8 36.\$\mathbb{Z}\$d7= (0.00). The try for a win is 34.\$\mathbb{Q}\$c4! \$\mathbb{Q}\$b8 (if 34...\$\mathbb{Q}\$g7 35.\$\mathbb{Q}\$\times a6) 35.\$\mathbb{Z}\$d8+ and 36.\$\mathbb{Z}\$\times b8 (+1.51).

The note at move 36 is correct that 36. 4h6?? "would have been decisive for Black,"



but the incomprehensible recommendation 36... ②a4 (somehow given a !) is not the way to prove it; that would just allow White to draw with 37. $\Xi h7+$ ③g8 38. $\Xi g7+$ etc. Instead the winner is 36... ②e6!, viz. 37. $\Xi \times e6$ a2 38. $\Xi \times f8$ a1 $\Xi \times g6+$ 39. $\Xi \times g6+$ 40. $\Xi \times g6+$ 39. $\Xi \times g6+$ 39

All the above are errors in note variations, not actual game moves. We come now to the most egregious of this game's errors, committed by Alekhine as both player and analyst, and by Edward Lasker. At move 38,



rather than the text 38.4c1??, White had to play 38.4e3 \(\)f6 39.4d3 when a draw was still possible (-0.88).


After the further moves 38...a2 39.\mathbb{\mathbb{Z}}a7,



Lasker missed his last chance to win, playing 39...②d4+?. Instead, the clincher was 39...②c5! 40.\(\mathbb{Z}\)a4 \(\mathbb{A}\)d4 and the pawn can't be stopped, since if 41.\(\mathbb{Z}\)×a2 \(\mathbb{Z}\)f2+. Also winning was 39...\(\mathbb{Z}\)f2+!, when if 40.\(\mathbb{Z}\)×f2 \(\mathbb{A}\)c5+, or if 40.\(\mathbb{Z}\)d3 \(\mathbb{A}\)c5 etc. as already seen. Such mistakes in what was probably major time pressure are understandable. What is harder to understand and excuse is that neither White's mistake at move 38 nor Black's at move 39 was given any comment. As with games 43 and 48, one has to wonder if Alekhine was suppressing, unconsciously or deliberately.

Game 79, Bogoljubow-Yates: Surprisingly few errors for such a long game, and Alekhine's analysis of Yates' tragic mistake at move 40 is accurate and instructive. But two omissions, one major, bear pointing out.


At White's 46th move, rather than the text 46. \$\ddots d2\$, the game might have been shortened considerably by 46. \$\ddots d1\$,




the difference being that it prevents a skewer if White plays $\Xi \times a2$, e.g. $46...\Xi a3$ 47.g4! $\Xi \times f3$ and White can safely play $48.\Xi \times a2+-$,




whereas with the king on d2 Black would win with 48... \(\mathbb{I}f2+\) and 49... \(\mathbb{Z}\) \(\alpha a2\). Relatively best after 46.\(\mathbb{Z}d1\) is 46...\(\beta 3 \) 47.\(\mathbb{Z}c1\) \(\mathbb{Z}\) \(\alpha \) \(\alpha 6 \) 48.\(\mathbb{Z}b2\) \(\mathbb{Z}\) \(\alpha \) \(\alpha 5 \) \(\mathbb{Z}f8 \) 50.f4,






and White will obviously have an easier time winning than in the actual game.

More importantly, the claim that Black was in *Zugzwang* after 55. △b5 is not true.



Yates might well have been able to hold by just shuffling his king around the squares g7, f7, e6 and e7, and he did not need to be concerned about defending his d-pawn at that moment because it was expendable. For example 55...\$\Gincer f7 56.\Exists \times d5 \Exists d5 \Exists c4,





and it is suicidal to retain the rook on the d-file in hopes of advancing the d-pawn, as either 57.\(\beta\)d3?? are answered by 57..\(\beta\)b4! and Black wins. Forced therefore is 57.\(\beta\)b5 \(\beta\)×d4 58.\(\beta\)×b3 \(\beta\)×h4 with good drawing chances.

Alekhine made no comment on this, nor on the fact that with 55...\(\mathbb{Z}\)c2+?? was the losing move, and that with 56.\(\mathbb{Z}\)d3 \(\mathbb{Z}\)h2? Black went from bad to worse. 55...\(\mathbb{Z}\)f7 was the only chance to save the game after missing his winning opportunity at move 40.


Game 82, Bogoljubow-Alekhine: A complex game in which Alekhine's analysis, understandably biased toward Black's chances, is in the first half too pessimistic, but too optimistic in the later stages.

Alekhine is correct that "Black might have entered without disquietude upon the complications bound up with 12...\$\(\textit{2}\)f6,"





but the main line of his analysis, 13.\disph5 \disp\text{xd4} 14.\disp\text{xe6} \displase6+15.\disphd1 \disphd6+ 16.\disphd5 0-0 17.\displaxf5 \displaxd5+18.\displac1 \displad8 19.\displaxh7+ \displaf8 20.\displaf5,




If 20...\dd2+ 21.\dd2+,



the note's 21...曾g5?! leads to little advantage after 22.曾f3 且e5 (-0.65). Better 21...c5! 22.罝f1 (not 22.f3?? 曾d1+! 23.罝×d1 罝×d1+ 24.曾a2 且d5+ 25.b3 罝×a1#) 22...曾g5 23.曾×g5 且×g5 24.f3 包c6 (-2.02).

The note at move 45 can be strengthened. 45.g4 is even worse for White than supposed, because after 45...f×g4+ 46.\&×g4,



Black need not be content with merely winning the pawn with 46... ≝f8 (-1.11). Stronger is

46... ♣b8! 47. Ĕa8 (47. Ĕa6?? �b7 loses the whole rook) 47... �b7 48. Ĕ×b8+ �vb8, and Black is up a piece.


At Black's 79th move, Alekhine's assessment of 79...e6-e5 is overly optimistic, and his analysis misses both defensive and attacking resources.




In the line 80.d×e5 he goes no further than 80... \$\mathbb{L}\$b6 81. \$\mathbb{L}\$g2 \$\mathbb{L}\$c6 (intending 82...d4), concluding this is favorable to White.



In the other main line, after 80.f×e5 @d8 81. \(\mathbb{Z}\)a7+ \(\mathbb{Z}\)e6 82. \(\mathbb{Z}\)h1 \(\mathbb{Z}\)g5+ 83. \(\mathbb{Z}\)c2 f4,





rather than the chancy 84.g4, White should play 84.g×f4 Axf4 and virtually any reasonable move maintains deadeye equality. But to continue with the note line, after 84.g4 f3 85. Ahh7 f2 we reach a crucial position:






Alekhine here considers three moves, 86.\mathbb{\mathbb{Z}}\hd7, 86.\mathbb{\mathbb{Z}}\hc7, and 86.\mathbb{\mathbb{Z}}\hb7. Black can win in the first two instances, though in the first Alekhine's method is not best and in the second it does not work at all. Looking first at 86.\mathbb{Z}\hc7,







and the threat of 91. \square be7# forces 90... \square g5 91. \square ×f2 and any advantage belongs to White (+0.59). The way to win against 86. \square hc7 is 86... \square d3+!:



If now $87.\$\times d3$ f1\$+ and mate soon. Therefore the white king must run away, but he can't hide: 87.\$b2 $\Xi b8+$ 88.\$a3 &c1+ 89.\$a4 &b5+ 90.\$a5 &g5,




and Rybka indicates Black mates in at most 14 moves, e.g. 91. \$\mathbb{I}f7 \mathbb{Q}d8+ 92. \$\mathbb{Q}b4 \mathbb{Q}d7+ etc.\$




Alekhine's 86... \(\) d8 does eventually win, but much stronger is 86... \(\) d3+! etc. as shown above.

All this is moot, however, because White can hold with 86.\(\mathbb{Z}\) hb7!:




Now 86...2d3+ does not work. Alekhine gives only 86...2d8, as if Black's win were then self-evident, but it's a mirage: $87.\Xi d7! \Xi \times g4$ (not $87...f1 \cong ?? 88.\Xi d6 + \$f5 89.\Xi f7 + \$e4 90.\Xi \times f2$,



and barring a blunder, it's 0.00 all the way.

Game 83, Marshall-Ed. Lasker: A correction to the note at move 14:



Rybka considers 14. 2f3 actually best, and finds that after 14... 2×d5 15.e×d5 2c4 Black does not recover the pawn lost at move 11:



16. 월d3! ව \times b2 (not 16... এ \times b2? 17. 월 \times c4 $\mathbb{Q}\times$ a1 18. $\mathbb{Z}\times$ a1 \mathbb{Z} c8 19. \mathbb{Z} b1 b6 20. වe5 with both material advantage and an attack) 17. 월b3, when if 17...b6 or any other move defending the b-pawn, then 18. \mathbb{Q} e5 $\mathbb{Q}\times$ e5 19. $\mathbb{Q}\times$ e5 and the knight is trapped. Therefore 17... \mathbb{Q} d7 (so that if 18. \mathbb{Q} e5 \mathbb{Q} a4) 18. $\mathbb{Q}\times$ b7 and White is once again a pawn up.

Game 85, Janowski-Maróczy: The note at White's 19th move can be improved at two points. After 19.e×f7+ \subseteq ×f7,





the note's 20. \triangle f3? is a mistake. Best is 20. \triangle ×c4! when capture of the knight is to White's advantage: 20...b×c4?? 21. \triangle ×c4 etc. (+2.48), or 20... Ξ ×f1 + 21. Ξ ×f1 b×c4 22. \triangle ×c4 * Ξ h8 23. Ξ f7 Ξ d6 24. Δ d3 g6 25. Ξ ×b7 (+1.32). Therefore Black must play 20... Ξ e7 21. Δ e5 c5 22. Ξ f5 with a slight advantage to White (+0.46).


If White does play 20. 2f3?,



the note line 20...c5?! does not lead to much after 21.\@e6! \@f6 22.\@e5 \@xe5 23.dxe5 \@e7 24.\@g4 \Ee8 25.\Ead1 (only -0.42):








e.g. 21.營c2 鱼e3+ 22.營h1 c5 23.罝ad1 罝d8 24.d×c5 鱼×c5 and Black's superiority is obvious (-1.78).

At White's 25th move,




Rybka indicates Janowski could have attained equality with 25.\div \text{s}!?, giving best play then as 25...\d3 26.\dag{1}f3 a6 27.\div \text{a6} \dag{1}xf3 28.\dag{1}xf3 f4 29.\div \text{s}f8 \div \text{s}f8 30.\dag{1}b1 d2 31.\dag{1}ff1 (0.00).

In the final note, Rybka indicates that 29...\$\delta h7\$ is actually Black's best move (-0.87), but the engine could not calculate any win for Black from that point. After Maróczy's suggested 29...\$\delta c7-c6\$,



Alekhine is correct that the sub-variation 30.4h5 g6 31.4f3 4xf3 32.4xf3 4g5 leads to equality. The main analysis stemming from 30.d5 seems to have been written to illustrate

potential pitfalls for White, rather than to show best play for both sides. It can be improved at move 36,




where instead of 36. ②×b5? (which Rybka confirms does lose), White has 36. ③×f5! with a draw, viz. 36... ②e4 37. ⑤ ×b5 c3 38. ⑥ b8 ⑥ h7 39. ②a4=, or 36... c3 37. ⑥ ×d5 c2 38. ⑥ c5 c1 ⑥ + 39. ⑥ ×c1=.

Game 87, Ed. Lasker-Capablanca: A very interesting game where some important resources for both sides went unnoticed, some in note variations, but more importantly, some in the actual game.

In the note to Black's 19th move, Alekhine is correct that Capablanca was right to surrender his e-pawn, but had he tried to defend it, White's position would have been even stronger than supposed. After 19...\(\mathbb{E}\)c7 20.\(\mathbb{E}\)ec1 \(\mathbb{E}\)e8,




Alekhine's suggestion of 21.2e1 intending 2d3-c5 is thwarted by 21...2d7 22.2d3 2b5 (+0.36). Better is 21.2xc7 22.2c1 2d7 23.2b6,



when if 23... \$\mathbb{G}\$f8? 24.\$\mathbb{E}\$c7 \$\mathbb{G}\$d8 25.\$\mathbb{G}\$×b7 etc. Relatively best is 23...\$\mathbb{E}\$c8 24.\$\mathbb{E}\$×c8+\$\mathbb{C}\$×c8 25.\$\mathbb{L}\$×e7, with an extra pawn that is passed and protected, and much the better game (+1.38).


Contrary to the note at move 25, White could have proceeded immediately with 25.2c1,






because if 25...\$\(\textit{\textit{L}}\) 5 then 26.\$\(\textit{\textit{L}}\) a2! \$\textit{\textit{L}}\$f8 (otherwise 27.\$\textit{L}\) b4 wins the rook) 27.\$\textit{\textit{L}}\) ac1 and White rids himself of the "unpleasant prisoner" rook.

In the note at move 29, the suggested 29... 2e6-g5 is not as convincing as supposed.




30.**含**g2 is not compulsory in reply; better is 30.g4!?. If then 30... **当**f8 31.h4 **2**e4 32.g5 and Black's pressure is much reduced. Or if 30... **2**e4 31.g×f5 g×f5 32. **日**f8 33.e6 **日**f6 (or 33... **2**e8 34.**日**×f5) 34.e7 **2**f7 35.**2**g4!,



and Black must give up the exchange by 35...當×e7 36.氫×f6 當×f6, since if 35...f×g4?? 36.罝×e4 d×e4 37.罝×f6+ 當×e7 38.罝×h6+-.


The note after move 41 is correct that 42.f3 would be a bad move, but then misses the strongest reply.



The suggested 42... ②d2+ leads to nothing after 43. ②f2 ⑤xb3 44. □h4 a5 45. □xh5 ⑥xd4 46. f4=


As we have seen in some other endgames, no comment is made on what were the actual crucial mistakes. Alekhine is correct that 44. \$\frac{1}{2}f1-e2\$ was inferior to 44. \$\frac{1}{2}h6+\$, but not fatally so, and Edward Lasker still could have held after that. The irreversible errors were at White's 46th and 47th moves.

First, rather than 46.\(\mathbb{I}\)h5-h6+?, correct was 46.\(\mathbb{E}\)f3-f4!,




in order to keep the black king off f5. If then, for example 46...\(\mathbb{I}\)f1 47.\(\mathbb{I}\)h6+\(\mathbb{O}\)e7 48.\(\mathbb{I}\)h7+\(\mathbb{O}\)f8 49.e6\(\mathbb{I}\)×f2+50.\(\mathbb{O}\)e5=, or 46...\(\mathbb{O}\)×f2 47.\(\mathbb{I}\)h6+\(\mathbb{O}\)d7 48.\(\mathbb{I}\)×a6\(\mathbb{O}\)×h3+ 49.\(\mathbb{O}\)g4 \(\mathbb{O}\)f2+50.\(\mathbb{O}\)f5 \(\mathbb{O}\)e4 51.\(\mathbb{I}\)a7+\(\mathbb{O}\)c6 52.\(\mathbb{I}\)a6+\(\mathbb{O}\)b7 53.\(\mathbb{I}\)a5 \(\mathbb{O}\)b6 54.\(\mathbb{I}\)a8 etc. There are other possibilities, but Rybka rates none higher than about -0.11, hardly a winning advantage.

Further on in the game, even after 46.\(\mathbb{\pi}\)h6+? \(\mathbb{\pi}\)f5, Rybka indicates that Lasker still had good drawing chances if, instead of 47.\(\mathbb{\pi}\)×a6?, he had played 47.h4:




White must be very careful if he is to salvage the half-point, but the activity of his rook and passed pawns should enable it. The two main lines are (A) 47... 2d2+48. 2e449. 2e449.






and now if 50...\$\mathbb{g}7 51.\mathbb{I}d8 \mathbb{Z}\times b3+ 52.\mathbb{G}f4 \Darksign xf2 53.\mathbb{Z}\times d5 (-0.18), or 50...\$\mathbb{G}g5 51.\mathbb{G}g8+ \mathbb{G}\times h5 52.e6 \mathbb{Z}\times f2+ 53.\mathbb{G}e3 \mathbb{G}f6 54.e7 \Darksign d6 55.e8\mathbb{G}+ \Darksign \times e8 56.\mathbb{Z}\times e8 (-0.31).

Game 88, Marshall-Bogoljubow: A very well played game (by White, at least) that arguably deserved the tournament's first brilliancy prize, rather than just second. Marshall's attack from move 22 on is conducted so brilliantly that any improvements Rybka found are too trivial to mention. We offer only one minor comment from an earlier point. In his note to White's 20th move, Alekhine opined that by 20...\$\tilde{2}\eq 4\$, Black "could have defended himself by offering a pawn sacrifice not without prospects."




That is perhaps true if White plays $21.2 \times 4 \times 4 \times 22.4 \times 5 = 67 (+0.86)$, but a better way is $21.4 \times 5! = 67 (\text{not } 21... \times 5! \times 22.2 \times 4 = 23.2 \times 61 = 24.2 \times 61 = 24.2$



White will be able to pressure the backward pawn by playing \(\textit{\textit{L}}b1-a2\) and doubling or even tripling his major pieces on the d-file. The knight can also be posted on d4, if desired, by the h1-g3-e2-d4 route. Meanwhile Black's counterplay materializes too slowly.

One final aside. At move 28,



Alekhine called Marshall's 28. 🗵 × f2 "an unnecessary sacrifice which merely prolongs the game

somewhat," preferring 28. \$\frac{1}{2}\$g2. Marshall would no doubt be pleased to know that Rybka considers 28. \$\tilde{\pi}\$xf2! objectively best.

Game 89, Maróczy-Réti: A competently played game with relatively few notes, so there is little to comment on. Rybka found one error. The note after Black's 23rd move is quite wrong.




24.b3, which Alekhine said would be "of doubtful merit," is actually quite playable and is probably best. The supposed refutation, 24...d5 25.d×e5 \(\textit{\textit{a}}\)3,




is actually disastrous for Black: 26.e×d5! ≜×c1 27.\(\mathbb{Z}\)×c1 f×e5 28.\(\mathbb{L}\)×e5



Rather than 25... a3?, somewhat better is 25...d×e4, but after 26. ae1 b4 27.e×f6 a×f6 28. ad4 ae8 29. ag3 ac6 30. ae3 ≡e7 31. ac5





Black can no longer defend the e-pawn, since if 31... 且e6? 32. 基xf8 當xf8 33. 當c5+ 當g8 34. 當xa5.

Better still after 24.b3! is for Black to avoid 24...d5? altogether,




and play, say, 24...b4 or 24...\(\)c6 with only a slight disadvantage (about +0.54).

Game 92, Tartakower-Capablanca: The note variation after White's 13th move can be strengthened somewhat. After 13...≜×c3 14.b×c3 ₺e4+ 15.₺g1 ₺×c3 16.₺b3,




Alekhine's 16... ②e4 is good (-1.22), but better is 16... ②e6 17. ∜xc3 (or 17. ②xe6 ②e2+ 18. ⑤f2 ②xd4) 17... □c8 and 18... ②xc4 (-1.62).

The note variation following Black's 13th move is much weaker than Alekhine realized, and can be improved considerably. After 14. 2xb5,



he envisioned "penetrating decisively with the rook to b2" by 14...a6 15.\(\Delta\)c3 \(\Delta\)×c3 \(16.b\)×c3 \(\Delta\)e4+ 17.\(\Delta\)g1 \(\Delta\)b2:







and now Black must either submit to a draw with 19...這e2 20.鱼c4 罩b2 21.鱼b3 etc., or keep fishing around with 19...罝f2 20.曾e3 鱼b7 21.包e5 罩c8 22.罩c1 a5 23.c4 a4 24.c5 曾b5 25.鱼c2 曾b2 26.包d3 曾a3 27.鱼b1, which Rybka rates almost dead even.

However, going back to the position after 14. <a>\text{2} × b5,



the line can be greatly strengthened with a slight change of move order, 14... 2e4+ 15. \$\&\text{g1}\$ a6:



Rybka now indicates that Black wins in all variations. The main ones:

(a) Relatively best for White is the straightforward but losing 16. ②c3 ②×c3 17.b×c3 ②×c3 (-1.75);


- (b) Much worse is 16.句a3? ②×a3 17.b×a3 ③g4 18.③b3 ③×f3 19.g×f3 (if 19.營×f3 營×d4+ 20.營f1 包d2+) 19...營g5+ 20.營f1 莒b6 21.f×e4 營f4+ 22.營e1 營×e4+ 23.營d2 莒c8-+ (-13.17); (c) 16.负d3 句g5 17.句×g5 營×g5 18.句c3 ④×c3 19.b×c3 莒b2 (Here it is decisive!) 20.營f3 ④b7 21.②e4 莒×g2+! 22.營×g2 營e3+ 23.營f1 ④×e4 24.營g3 營×g3 25.h×g3 ④×h1 (-3.35); (d) 16.句a7? ⑤b7 17.份b3 句d2 18.營×b4 (if 18.句×d2 營×d4+ 19.營f1 營×d2 -10.94) 18...①×f3+ 19.g×f3 營×d4+ 20.營f1 營f4 21.營c3 ④×f3 22.莒g1 ⑥g4+ 23.營e1 莒fe8+ and mate shortly; (e) 16.a3 a×b5 17.⑥g43 句d2 18.a×b4 ⑤×f3+ 19.營×f3 營×d4+ 20.營f1 莒b6 (-2.39); (f) 16.營b3 ⑥ga5 (-2.82).
- At Black's 20th move, Alekhine considered 20... \$\dig 5+ 21. \$\dig f2\$ "inviting" but "by no means convincing,"





because if 21... \(\mathbb{I}\) fe8 22. \(\mathbb{Q}\) e4 defends adequately. A classic case of wrong rook! The line is quite convincing if instead Black plays 21... \(\mathbb{E}\) be8! 22. \(\mathbb{Q}\) e4 f5 23. \(\mathbb{E}\) ×e3 \(\mathbb{E}\) h4+ 24. \(\mathbb{E}\) g2 f×e4:



Now obviously if 25.f×e4?? Ξ ×e4, therefore forced is 25.f4 Ξ ×f4, and Black is clearly winning (-1.87). The difference between this position and the one stemming from 21... Ξ fe8 is that in the latter, after 22.f4 the f-pawn is not *en prise*, and furthermore White can also play 22. Ξ he1!,







25...e×f3+ 26.\\dispxf3 \dong xf3 \dong xf3 \dong xf3 \dong xf3 \dong h5+ and Black goes up queen for rook.

A minor comment on the position after White's 25th move.




Capablanca played 25... Ξ d8, setting up the threat of 26... Ξ ×c6. However, he could have played 25... Ξ ×c6 straight away, since if 26.d×c6 Ξ h3+ and either 27. Ξ g1 Ξ xf3 winning the queen, or 27. Ξ g2+ 28. Ξ e3 Ξ e8+ and mate shortly.

Game 93, Janowski-Alekhine: In the note at White's 24th move, after 24. 27 2xc1 25. 2xf8,




Black can retain some winning chances by avoiding 25... \$\prescript{\pi} \text{s}\$ in favor of 25... \$\prescript{\pi} f4!? 26. \$\text{\pi} b4\$ \$\prescript{\pi} \text{s}\$ 1... \$\pi \text{s}\$ 27. \$\pi h1 \$\text{\pi} b2\$, with a small advantage (-0.70).

The note at move 33 is correct that White was better off with 33.\(\mathbb{\mathba\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\m




when Janowski played 34. 2f5?, on which Alekhine makes no comment. Instead, White still

could have avoided loss with 34. Ed1!, when Black finds it too difficult to defend his a- and b-pawns, e.g. 34... 曾e8 35. Ee1 曾b8 (or 35... 曾c6 36. Ec1) 36. Ea1 曾b7 37. Le3 a6 38. 曾e6,



and something has to give (-0.09).

Game 94, Marshall-Maróczy: The note at move 9 is seriously misleading. It gives the impression that $9...c\times d4$ would be a blunder, allowing a forced mate starting with $10.4\times f7$. In fact $9...c\times d4$ is actually best, even winning, as long as after $10.4\times f7$,




Black avoids 10... 🗒 x f7? and plays 10... 🗳 c7!. A plausible continuation then is 11. 🗗 x d6+ 🕏 h8 12. 🗗 cb5 🗳 b6 13. 🖺 f7 + 🗒 x f7 14. 🖺 x f7 🗳 x b5 15. 🖺 b3 🗗 x f4 🖾 x f4 🖾 x e5,



and though the material imbalance is just bishop and knight for rook, Rybka rates the position at -2.85. In contrast, the text move 9...d×e5 scores a mere -0.29.


In the note at Black's 28th move, variation (I) can be greatly strengthened. After 28... △d5 29. № b2 b6 30. △b5,






much stronger than 30...\(\mathbb{Z}\)c8?! is 30...\(\Delta\)×c3! 31.\(\Delta\)×c3 (worse is 31.\(\Delta\)×c7? \(\Delta\)×d1+ 32.\(\Delta\)c2 \(\Delta\)×f2 33.\(\Delta\)a4 \(\Delta\)d7 34.\(\Delta\)a6 \(\Delta\c6) 31...\(\Delta\)×c5 32.\(\Delta\)b3 c4+ (-1.70).

If, however, 30...\subseteq c8 is played,




then not 31. 2a7?? as in the note (-4.16), but 31. 2a4 2×b4 32. 2a3 2d5 33. 2b3 and White still has some life (-0.90).

Game 96, Em. Lasker-Maróczy: Some major tactical errors are found here. The note after Black's 21st move goes wrong immediately. After 22. ♯e3,




the recommended 22...』×d3 only leads to a small advantage for Black (-0.68). Much better is 22...覺×c3! leading to a long forced continuation: 23.②e1 (to allow 罩e3-h3) 23...還fc8 (not 23...覺×a1?? 24.ত[h3] and mate shortly) 24.ত[h3] 覺×e5 25.覺h7+ 覺f8 26.覺h6+ (slightly better than 26.覺h8+) 26...覺g7 27.②xb5 ②f5 28.覺×g7+ 覺×g7,



and Black is a sound pawn up with the better position (-1.65).


The note's next move is seriously wrong as well. If Black does play 22... \(\textit{2} \times d3, \)






the correct reply is the obvious and natural 23.\(\mathbb{Z}\times d3\). The note's 23.\(\Delta d4\)? is a terrible blunder that is refuted even more convincingly than Alekhine's 23...\(\Delta f5\) by the even stronger 23...\(\Delta \times c3\) 24.\(\Delta b3\) (else 24...\(\Delta \times a1+\) 24...\(\Delta f5\) 25.\(\Delta \times d3\) \(\Delta \times a1+\) 26.\(\Delta \times a1\) \(\Delta \times b6\) 27.g\(\times h6\) (-7.13).

Alekhine is correct that Maróczy missed a golden opportunity when he failed to play 36... \(\mathbb{Z}\)c2, but another, lesser chance went unnoticed two moves later.



Here, 38...②b2! was Black's last try for a win. White's intended ②d2-f4-e5+ would now be rendered pointless by 39...②×d3. Rybka sees best play for both sides as 39. 🕆 e7 ②×d3 40. 🕆 f6+ 🖧 841. 🖺 e7 ②e5 42. 🕆 ×e5 🛧 h1 43. 🕆 ×d4 🖧 1+ 44. 🖒 h3 🖒 f1+ 45. 💪 g3 🖒 c4 46. 🚊 e3,



reaching a position evaluated at -0.85. Black is somewhat cramped and awkward, but if he can get his king's rook into the game, his material advantage could be enough to win.

The note at Black's move 41 is among the worst in the book.



The text move 41...©c3 was objectively best, and the recommended 41...f4+ would have been disastrous. Rather than having to play 42.\$h4 as Alekhine thought, White can go right ahead with 42.\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\$}}\$}\$}\$}\$}\$}.




because if 42... \(\mathbb{E}\)e1 43. \(\mathbb{E}\)b8! \(\mathbb{E}\)g1+ 44. \(\mathbb{E}\)h4 \(\mathbb{E}\)h1+ 45. \(\mathbb{L}\)h2 and to avoid mate Black must play 45... \(\mathbb{E}\) ×h2 (+4.38). Clearly, 43. \(\mathbb{E}\)b8! never occurred to Alekhine.

Game 97, Yates-Capablanca: An apocryphal story was once published in which the young Alekhine was said to be smoking a noxious Russian tobacco called mahorka. One can only wonder what he was smoking when he annotated this game, there are so many fundamental errors. Admittedly, some are not revealed without analysis in depth, but others are more obvious, and positions are completely misjudged.

To begin with, 19.e5 is claimed to "lead to an immediate loss,"




but Rybka considers it White's best move, and the only one to maintain equality. In response, Black should have played, say, 19...d5, 19...\belowb6, or 19...\belowb6, all of which are evaluated close to 0.00. Capablanca's 19...\belowbg5?, far from being "the opening maneuver of the winning line of play," should have lost (or had no better than an outside chance to draw), had Yates only played a move Alekhine and Capablanca must have considered impossible, 20.\belowsg5!:



If now 20... \$\preceq\$ x95 21.g4 \$\preceq\$ g6 22. \$\preceq\$ f3 \$\preceq\$ h6 23. \$\preceq\$ x96 hxg6 24.exd6 \$\preceq\$ xh3 25. \$\preceq\$ e5 and White is in great shape (+2.15). The crucial line is 20... \$\preceq\$ xd1 21. \$\preceq\$ xh7+ \$\preceq\$ h8:




Now White has two good continuations: the solid 22.Ձf5 ∜xg5 23.Ձxc8 ≅xc8 24.∜xd1 dxe5 25.Ձf3 ∜f6 26.Ձxe5 and White is up a pawn and in no danger of losing (+1.03); and the riskier and more complicated (but probably more rewarding) 22.f4:




Black then has only two viable moves:

(B) 22...@h5 23.@f5 \(\mathbb{E}\)c7 24.b4!,



and now, surprisingly, the attacked knight must stay put:

- **(B1)** if 24... ②e6? simply 25. ②xe6 fxe6 26. ②xe6+-;
- **(B2)** 24... ②d7?? 25. ∜h4 g6 26. ②×f7+ ∑×f7 27. ∜×d8+;
- **(B3)** 24... ②a4 25.e6 ☐e7 26.g4 and the bishop must stand and die (+2.75), since if 26... ②g6 27. ♥h4+ forces mate;






— aiming for the trapped knight — 29... $\% \times f4$ (if 29...d5 30. % e5 $\% \times e5$ 31.f×e5 and the knight is still trapped) 30. $\Xi c7$ $\% \times b4$ 31. $\Xi \times b7 +- (+3.17)$;

(**B5**) Therefore Black has nothing better than 24...dxe5,



after which comes 25.b×c5 g6 (worse is 25...e×f4? 26.營h4 g6 27.營×f4 營g7 28.公de4 +2.10) 26.邑d3 營e7 27.邑d6



27...e×f4 (if 27...g×f5 28.營h4 營g7 29.營×h5+-) 28.營a1+ f6 29.包de4 g×f5 30.氫×f6 罩×f6 31.營×f6+ 營×f6 32.罝×f6 營g8 33.罝×a6




and White, with two passed pawns, should win this ending (33... $\Xi \times c5$?? 34. $\Xi a8 + \Im g7$ 35. $\triangle e6 +$). There are of course many more variations than we have time and space to consider here, but Rybka finds them all at least quite favorable to White, if not in fact winning.

The assertion that 22... 2e7 "would have been decisive" is not supported by Rybka. After 23.g4 2e6,






instead of the note's 24.\Bb7?!, much better is 24.\Bb3! \Bxc2 25.gxh5 with a fairly even game (-0.29). Further on in that note, after 24.\Bb7 \Bxc2 25.gxh5 \Ac5,



the only two moves Alekhine considers, 26. 2e4 and 26. 2c1, are serious blunders; relatively best is (again) 26. 2b3, when White is worse (-0.95) but not clearly lost.

In the note to Black's 23rd move, in the sub-variation 23... ∜×g5 24.g4 ②e6,



much better than the suggested 25. \$\textit{\textit{L}f5}\$ is 25. \$\textit{\textit{L}f3}\$ \textit{\textit{\textit{E}}e7} 26. \$\textit{L}b3\$ as 27. \$\textit{L}b5\$ \$\textit{\textit{L}g6}\$ 28. \$\textit{\textit{L}} \textit{xa5}\$ (+1.54). It bears mentioning that Rybka does not share Alekhine's view of 23... \$\textit{\textit{L}} \textit{xg5}\$ as a winning attempt, though admittedly that may be due to the materialist bias computer programs often show.


Finally, the note to White's 25th move is rife with errors. First off, in the sub-variation 25.f4 g6 26.\\disk\d1, the suggested 26...\dic5-e6 does not win;



it only draws after 27. ②×e6 營×b4 28. ②×f8 莒×f8 29. ⑤f3 營h7 30. f5!,



What does win in that line is 26... 2d3!,




when the threat of 27... $\Xi c1$ forces $27.\Delta b3 \Delta \times b4$ (-1.81).

In the note's main line, 25.f4 g6 26. ♦ h4 ♣ h5 27.g4 € e6,




the suggested $28.g \times h5$?? is a ghastly mistake. Correct is $28.2 \times g6$! f×g6 $29.g \times h5$ $20.h \times g6$ + $20.g \times g6$ g8 $31.f \times g5$ with a difficult but approximately even game (-0.09).

If, however, White does play 28.g×h5??,




the refutation is not 28... \(28... \(28... \) \(28... \) \(28... \) \(28... \) \(28... \) \(28... \)



and either 30. \$\delta h2 \delta \times d2+ etc., or 30. \$\delta f1 \delta c1+ 31. \$\delta e2 \delta \times f4+ (-14.34), or 30. \$\delta f2 \delta c1+ 31. \$\delta g2 \delta \times f2+ 32. \$\delta \times f2+ 32. \$\delta \times f2+ 34. \$\delta e3 \delta \times h7 (-7.74).

Continuing with the note line, after 28... ②×g5?! Alekhine gives 29.f×g5 ∜×e5 30.h×g6 ∜e3+ "and wins,"




but there is no win for Black in that position, viz. 31.\displays12\displays12 \displays12 + 32.\displays2 \displays12 + 33.\displays12 \frac{1}{2} \displays12 + 33.\displays12 \displays12 + 34.\displays13 \displays12 \displays14 \displays13 \displays13 \displays13 \displays14 \displays13 \displays13 \displays14 \displays13 \displays13 \displays14 \displays14 \displays13 \displays14 \dinplays14 \displays14 \displays14 \displays14 \din



and whichever pawn Black chooses to lose, White will have two connected passed pawns on one wing or another, and little chance of losing (-0.29).


Finally, to add the caboose to this analytical train wreck, we note that all the above analysis of lines stemming from 25.f5 is moot, because in fact a win for White was missed, by both Yates in the game and Alekhine in his analysis. Instead of 25.f5, or the text 25.\(\mathbb{\mathbb{H}}64-h4\), Yates could have beaten Capablanca (something he never managed to do in eleven tries) with 25.\(\mathbb{\mathbb{H}} \times d1!\):





If now 25...g6? 26. 4×g6! 4×g5 (or 26...f×g6 27. 日h4+ 4g8 28. 4df3+-) 27. 4f3 4×g6 28. 日h4+ 4g8 29. 日g4 winning the queen (+3.03).

Somewhat better, but still inadequate, is 25... as 25... 26. 26. 26. 27. ☐ h4:



Black then has only two moves Rybka rates under +3.00:

(A) 27... 宣c6 28. 鱼c2+ 宣h6 (28... 當g8 29. 營×d5 宣h6 30. 宣×h6 g×h6 31. 營c6 is worse) 29. 宣×h6+g×h6 30. 營×d5, and with three pawns for the exchange and much the safer king, White should win (+1.88);


(B) 27... **△** e6 28. **△** b1!




Threatening 29. 单f5+ 曾g8 30. ④×e6 f×e6 31. 曾h7+ 曾f7 32. 曾h5+ 曾g8 33. ②g5+-. If 28... ②g5 29. 邑h5 ②×f3+ 30. g×f3 g6 31. ④×g6+ and wins (+3.74). Least of evils is 28... 邑c4 29. 邑h5 (threatening 30. ④g8+ and mate) 29... g6 30. ④×g6+ 曾g7 31. ④d3 邑f4 32. ④×a6 邑h8 33. 邑×h8 ③×h8, and with four pawns for the exchange, White can surely win (+2.24).


Why Alekhine showed such a pro-Capablanca bias in his analysis here is hard to understand; by the time he wrote the tournament book for New York 1927 he certainly had changed his tune. In fairness we must acknowledge that some of these variations are long and complex, but White's best choices at moves 19 and 25 went completely overlooked, leading Alekhine to misevaluate those positions badly. One wonders if he was still too much in awe of The Great Cuban to be objective.

Game 98, Ed. Lasker-Réti: The variation examined in the note to White's 15th move is made to seem more advantageous than it actually is. After 15.g4 ♣b7 16.�e4,






16... $\triangle \times d5$ is preferable to the note's 16... $\triangle \times d5$. Continuing on, after 16... $\triangle \times d5$ 17. $\triangle fg5$ $\triangle \times g5$ 18. $\triangle \times g5$,




the note's 18...②f4? is very bad. Much better is 18...②f6, when if 19.②e6 營c6! (threatening mate) 20.f3 罩fe8, avoiding loss of the exchange and leaving White only a small advantage (+0.52).

In variation (IIA) of the note to Black's 21st move, after 21... \(\mathbb{Z}\) ae8 22.f5 g×f5 23.g×f5,




rather than 23... $\forall \times d5$? (+0.99) is 23... $\langle \times d5 \rangle$! (+0.07), mainly because if 24. $\forall g4 \otimes h8$ and 25. $\langle \times h7 \rangle$ doesn't work because of 25... $\langle \times h7 \rangle$ +.

In the main line of variation (II), after 21... \(\mathbb{Z}\) ae8 22.f5 \(\mathbb{Z}\) ×d5 23.f×g6 \(\mathbb{Z}\)×e4 h×g6,



while the line given, 25.②×d6 罩d8 26.②e4, is good for White, he can do better with 25.②h6! forcing Black to give up the exchange, viz. 25...罩f7 26.②×d6, or 25...罩f3 26.蛩g2 罩d3 27.②f6+ 蛩f7 28.②×e8 蛩×e8 29.罩ad1 罩×d1 ③0.罩×d1 蛩d7,



when with Black's knights way out of play White can make hay on the kingside, viz. 31.h4 \$\display 6 32.h5 g\times h5 33.g\times h5 etc.

In the note at Black's 22nd move,



the analysis of the variation stemming from 22...d×e5 is flawed at several points, but we will skip over that because Black's best move is entirely overlooked: 22...\subseteq ×e5! 23.\subseteq ×e5 d×e5 with dynamic equality (about +0.28).

At Black's 26th move,



Alekhine's recommended 26... \$\mathbb{Z}e7\$ would have definitely been better than the text move 26... \$\mathbb{L}e7\$, but Rybka prefers 26... \$\mathbb{L}e4!?, a move that leads to interesting complications and really makes White work if he wants to win. Best play then continues 27. \$\mathbb{L}e6\$ \$\mathbb{L}e7\$ 28.a4 \$\mathbb{L}e5\$:




Now White does not seem to get much out of 29. \(\mathbb{Z} \times 5 \times 43 \) 30. \(\mathbb{Z} 6 \) h6 31. a×b5 a×b5 32. \(\times f 7 \) (32. \(\times 6 \) 4? \(\mathbb{Z} f \times 6 \) 32. \(\mathbb{Z} f \times 6 \) 34. \(\times 6 \) 34. \(\times 6 \) 35. \(\mathbb{Z} \times c 1 \) (only +0.40). Best is probably 29. \(\mathbb{Z} d 6 \) b4 30. c×b4 c×b4 31. \(\mathbb{Z} d 8 + \mathbb{Z} g 7 \) 32. \(\mathbb{Z} d 2 \) 2×e6 33. \(\mathbb{Z} \times 6 \) 34. \(\times 6 + \mathbb{Z} \times 6 \),




when White stands better but is still a long way from chalking up the point (+1.08).


Game 101, Em. Lasker-Tartakower: A brief comment on White's 23rd move. If White is intent on sacrificing the exchange,



the optimal way seems to be 23.₺f5!? h5 24.₺×g5 f×g5 25.₺f3 h4 26.₺×g5 ₺×g5 27.₺×g5 g6 28.₺×h4 ₺×f1+ 29.₺×f1 ₺f7,



Game 102, Capablanca-Réti: The note at Black's 18th move treats two moves as equivalent which are not. After 18...e×f4 19.₺×d5,





Alekhine gives 19... \$\text{\text{\text{d}}}6\$ (or 19... \$\text{\text{d}}8\$) 20. \$\text{\text{\text{\text{2}}}}\$xd3. This is OK with the queen on d8, but with her on d6,



White has 21. Ξ e3!, and to avoid losing a whole piece Black must give up the exchange, $21...\Xi \times f4$ 22. $g \times f4$ (+1.58).


One last drawing chance for Black goes unmentioned. At move 31,



instead of the natural-looking but futile 31...\$g6?, Réti could have tried the seemingly suicidal but more effective 31...\$e6!?. Rybka then sees best play proceeding 32.h×g5 h×g5 33.\$e4 (better than 33.\$\mathbb{Z}\$\times\$g5) 33...\$\mathbb{E}\$h8:



If now 34.\(\mathbb{Z}\times\)g5 \(\mathbb{Z}\)h4+ 35.\(\mathbb{Z}\)f3 \(\mathbb{Z}\)h3+ 36.\(\mathbb{Z}\)f4 \(\mathbb{Z}\times\)d3 and Black has counterplay. The other try is 34.\(\mathbb{Z}\times\)d4 \(\mathbb{Z}\)h4 35.\(\mathbb{Z}\)e4 (not 35.\(\mathbb{Z}\times\)h4?? g×h4 36.\(\mathbb{Z}\)e4 h3 37.\(\mathbb{Z}\)f3 \(\mathbb{Z}\times\)e5 -+) 35...a5 36.a4,




and after the pawn moves are exhausted, Rybka indicates that Black can merely shuffle his rook along the h-file ad infinitum, e.g. 36... ± 63 ± 64 etc, or 37. ± 63 \pm

Game 104, Bogoljubow-Maróczy: In the note at move 21, variation (II) can be improved. After 21. ₩b6 ♣d7 22. ♣xa5 Ħfb8 23. Ħxd7 Ħxb6 24. ♣xb6 ₩f3 25. Ħe1,



Game 105, Ed. Lasker-Janowski: Another won game Janowski sadly failed to win. Most of Alekhine's notes here are very accurate, with one exception. At Black's 30th move, he comments "Why not at least 30... 2xg2? In any event it could not have led to anything worse." But indeed it could.



White would then win with 1. 旦 b 8+ 當 c 6 32. 旦 c 8+ 當 d 6 (or 32... 當 d 5 33. e 4+ 鱼 x e 4 34. 旦 d 8+ 當 c 6 35. ⑤ x e 4 當 x e 6 36. d 5+) 33. e 4 皆 h 4 34. 旦 d 8+ 當 e 7 35. 旦 d 7+ 當 e 8 36. ⑤ x g 7+ etc. (+2.94).


Best at move thirty is neither that nor the text 30... \(\text{\text} d5, \text{ but probably } 30... \(\text{\text} f7, \)



with the serious threat of 31... \$\dig g6\$. It is doubtful that White can win then. He can force a draw


by 31. \(\Beta b \) \(\Beta a 5 \) 32. \(\Delta d 8 \) \(\Beta f + \) etc., or try, probably in vain, for more with 31.e4 \(\Delta \times e 4 \) 32. \(\Delta g 5 \) \(\Delta d 3 + 33. \(\Beta e 3 \) (not 33. \(\Delta \times d 3 + 34. \(\Beta \times d 3 \) \(\Beta f 4 - 1.54) 33... \(\Beta f 5 \) 34. \(\Delta b 8 + \Beta c 6 = . \)

Game 106, Em. Lasker-Marshall: The note after Black's 27th move is incorrect. In the event of 28. ♣×g4,




Black should not play 28... \(\Delta 5? \), which allows White to continue winning with, for example, 29.b4 \(\Delta 8 \) 30. \(\Delta 6 \) \(\Delta 6 \) 31. \(\Delta 1 \) \(\Delta 7 \) 32.f4 etc. Best instead is 28... \(\Delta f2+! \) (surprising that Alekhine would overlook this obvious knight fork) 29. \(\Delta f4 \Delta \times 4+ \text{ 30.f \times 4 } \Delta \times 41, \text{ when a plausible continuation is 31.b4 c6 32. \(\Delta 6 7 + \Delta d7 \) 33. \(\Delta g8 \Delta c3 \) 34.a3 (34.\(\Delta \times h6? \(\Delta \times a2) \) 34... \(\Delta 6 \) 35. \(\Delta \times h6 \Delta b5 \) with a draw almost inevitable.

Rybka indicates the best 28th move for White was 28. \mathbb{H}e1,




allowing him to nab the g-pawn with impunity (28...\25 29.\2*xg4), since if 28...gxf3? 29.\2*xh3, or 28...h5? 29.f4 etc.

Game 107, Capablanca-Bogoljubow: The variation given at Black's 12th move is not as bad as claimed. After 12... ≜xc3+ 13. ♣xc3 ♠a4+ 14. ♣b4 ♠xb2 15. ∄b1 a5+ 16. ♠xa5,




not 16...b6?, which does lose, but 16...\(\Da4\)! 17.\(\Da4\) a4! 17.\(\Da4\) \(\text{a4}\) (or 17.\(\Da4\)b5+ \(\Da4\)d7) 17...b6 18.\(\Da4\) \(\Da4\) 19.\(\Da4\)b4 \(\Da4\) \(\Da4\) 20.\(\Da4\) \(\Da4\) b×a5+ 21.\(\Da4\) \(\Da4\) a7 and any white advantage is very small (+0.18).

In the note to move 35, in the sub-variation 35... a7 36. a7 36. a5 ≡h1 37. ac4 ≡b1 38. a×e3 ≡×b2+39. and 36. acc4 ≡b1 38. acc4 ≡b1 38




since it accomplishes little after 40. 2c4 and either 40... 2b8 41. 2c2 driving off the rook, or 40... b5 41. 2d6+ 2d7 42. 2xf7 = xa3 43.g5 which favors White.

Contrary to the note at White's 37th move 37. <a>♠×f7 is perfectly playable,



Contrary to the note at White's 40th move, 40. 2g4 is fine. After 40... 2b1 41. 2d3 2d1+,



there is no need for White to play 42. \$\&eq\$4? allowing a draw. Instead two moves keep good winning chances alive:


- (B) 42.\Bd2 \Bd2 \Bd3 (not 42...\Bf1?? 43.\Be2+) 43.\Bd2 \Bd25 (if 43...\Bd1+?? 44.\Bc2 \Bf1 45.\Bh7 \Be8 46.g6 f\timesg6 47.\Bind \timesa7+-) 44.\Bh7 etc. (+1.26).

Black's 44th move and White's 45th are quite puzzling, and Alekhine makes no comment on them. Here,




Bogoljubow made no attempt to defend his f-pawn, which he could have done by 44...堂e7 or 44...邑h7. Instead, he played 44...皇c5, to which Capablanca replied with 45.②d2, instead of the seemingly obvious 45.邑×f7, which appears to allow White to win in straightforward fashion, e.g. 45...邑g1 46.②d2 邑g2+ (if 46...邑×g5?? 47.②e4+) 47.蛩d3 蛩c6 48.②e4 凰×a3 49.邑a7 etc. (+1.61).

The note at move 56 has Black making unnecessarily bad moves. After 56... \$\div e7 57.c4\$,




57... 三×a3? 58.c5 鱼d8? makes things far too easy for White (+3.70). Instead 57... 三g1! puts up a much better fight, e.g. 58. 三e8+ 當d6 59. 三g8 當c5 and Black still has drawing chances (+0.86).

Alekhine made no comment at move 57, but Rybka indicates that may well have been the real decision point.




Game 109, Réti-Janowski: At White's 26th move,





Alekhine gives the impression that $26.h \times g6$ would have been inferior to the text $26.\% \times g6+$, due to the reply $26... \triangle e7$.



In fact $26.h\times g6$ was objectively best, and $26...\triangle e7$ would have led to swift defeat after 27.f5 exf5 28.e6 2.e6 29.2b2+ 86 30.2e1 2.e6 20.2e1 20.2e1