Quitting the Dhamma: The Ways of Forsaking the Order According to the Early *Vinaya*

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Abstract

In this paper, I argue that in the early Vinaya, contrary to the commentarial tradition:

1. Two ways of forsaking the Order, equally valid, co-exist; and
2. Nuns may be re-ordained after leaving the Order without guilt.

Introduction

Like many organizations that consist of voluntary members, the Buddhist Order provides its members the means to leave it if they wish to do so. There have seemingly been two methods to accomplish this:

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1. One method is indicated by many variant words derived from *vi + ṽbham* (Skt. *Vi + ṽhram*), which literally means “to wander about, to go astray,” and in the Vinaya context, “to forsake the Order” (*PED “Vibbhanta,” “Vibbhamati”*). We can find such words as verbal forms *vibbhmati, vibbhami, vibbhamissati*, etc., or as primary derivatives *vibhamitvā, vibbhanta*, etc.

2. The other is called “the formal disavowal of training” (*sikkhāpacc-akkhāna*), and its details are given by canonical commentary (*Vin III 24–28; Horner vol. 1, 43–47*).

Regarding these methods, Rhys Davids and Oldenberg note: “The difference between *vibbhamati* (he returns to the world) and *sikkhaṃ pac-cakkhāti* (he abandons the precepts) seems to be that the former is an informal, and the latter a formal, renunciation of the Order” (275). But it has been unclear hitherto whether these two methods can co-exist or whether one has been superseded by the other, and, if they can co-exist, how they work together.

I am revisiting this issue in this paper. For reasons explained below, I call the first method “the physio-social way,” and the second, “the legal way.”

**The Physio-Social Way**

We can understand how this method works from clues available in the extant Pāli Vinaya:

*tena kho pana samayena aññataro Bhārakacchako bhikkhu supinante purāṇadutiyaṃya methunaṃ dhammaṃ paṭisevitvā as-samano ahaṃ vibbhamissāmīti Bhārakacchaṃ gacchanto antarā magge āyasmantam Upālinī passitvā etam atthaṃ āro-
Now at that time a certain monk of Bharukaccha, having dreamed that he committed sexual intercourse with his former wife, said: “I am not a (true) recluse, I will leave the Order [vibbhamissāmi],” and going to Bharukaccha, and seeing the venerable Upāli on the road, he told him this matter. The venerable Upāli said: “There is no offence, your reverence, since it was in a dream.” (Horner vol. 1, 60–61)

It is clear that the story happened at a time when the rule of First Defeat prohibiting sex for monks had already been prescribed but the spirit of the rule—in this context, that real sex and wet dream sex are legally different—had not yet become clear to everyone. This is why this monk thought he had committed the First Defeat, and lost his monkhood, after dreaming that he had had sex with his former wife.

Moreover, matters did not end when he decided he was no longer a monk; he must still leave the Order (vibbhamissāmi). But what does the phrase “leaving the Order” mean? Given that he thought he was no longer a true monk, leaving the Order in this context could not involve any legal procedure binding on only true monks; rather, it seemingly means what the public expects a monk to do when the latter leaves the Order: to leave the monastic environment physically and socially.²

² He would usually also change his appearance properly so as to prevent public misunderstanding (i.e., to give up his robes and put on appropriate clothes of a layman if he is returning to lay-life, or different robes if he is moving to another ascetic school); this can be viewed as part of his “social” change.
The monk in our story did attempt to leave the monastic environment by starting a journey to Bhārukaṭhaka, his home town, before meeting Venerable Upāli, who corrected his mistake.

Next, let us look at another piece of evidence:

\[
\text{tena kho pana samayena Sundarīnandā bhikkhunī Sālhena Migāranattunā gabbhīni hoti. yāva gabbho tāruṇo ahosi tāva cchādesi, paripakke gabbhe vibbhamitvā vijāyi . . . (Vin IV 216)}
\]

Now at that time the nun Sundarīnandā became pregnant by Sālha, Migāra’s grandson. Until the embryo quickened she concealed it; when the embryo was matured, having left the Order \([\text{vibbhamitvā}]\), she gave birth . . . (Horner vol. 3, 165)

By having sex (and consequently getting pregnant) as a nun, the nun Sundarīnandā transgressed the rule of First Defeat (\(\text{Pāt 116–117}\)), a rule inherited from its counterpart rule for monks (\(\text{Pāt 8–9; Vin III 23; Horner vol. 1, 41–42}\)). This transgression as a fact can be inferred from the narrative itself, which said that the Buddha blamed another nun named Thullanandā for having kept the guilty nun’s secret until the latter left the Order, and prescribed the rule of the Sixth Defeat, which states that any nun who fails to confront or report another nun for the latter’s Defeat is also defeated (\(\text{Vin IV 216; Horner vol. 3, 165–166}\)).

Here again, we can find the guilty nun passing through two stages: (1) a transgression that ended the validity of her nunhood; and (2) actually leaving the Order \([\text{vibbhamitvā}]\). Because her nunhood was no longer valid, (2) can only mean leaving the Order physically and socially, but not legally, just as in the case of the monk discussed above.

From such pieces of evidence, I tentatively define this method as “to quit the Order physically and socially,” and accordingly call it “the
physio-social way.” And not withstanding the term, such a monk should have a serious intention to quit the Order, given that “It is intention that I call karma . . . ” (AN III 415; Gombrich 7); without such an intention, merely changing clothes and/or moving to another place will not do. This is why the Buddha judged as Defeated the monks who, without any clear prior intention to leave the Order, had sex wearing lay clothes, other kinds of non-monastic clothes, or no clothes at all (Vin III 34; Horner vol. 1, 52–53);\(^3\)\(^4\) and also why he never prescribed any place or destination by going to which monks and nuns would irrevocably lose their ordained status, even if they have no intention to leave the Order.

**The Legal Way**

Unlike various admission procedures (i.e., ordination, novitiation), the Buddha prescribed when someone was to be admitted into the Order, he prescribed the legal way to leave the Order not when a particular monk was leaving the Order, but only as an emendation to the rule of First Defeat (Vin III 23; Horner 40–42). Because it is implausible that no monk left the Order before this emendation, I can only conclude that the physio-social way was already in practice when this legal way was prescribed.

Also, there seems to be a big gap between the times when the old and new methods appeared. According to Pāli records, the serious rules,

\[^3\] I express my sincere thanks to Dr. Kieffer-Pülz for pointing this out.

\[^4\] This story seemingly indicates that monastic robes were, at least during the Buddha's times, the uniforms supposed to be worn round-the-clock. This is probably why those monks were tempted to think that wearing other types of clothes would somehow relax the *Vinaya* rules, just like different codes of etiquette are required for a soldier in uniform and another in civilian clothes.
i.e., those of Defeat and *Saṅghādisesa*, were prescribed only after the twentieth year of the Buddha’s enlightenment:

*bhagavato kira paṭhamabodhiyaṃ viṣati vassāni bhikkhū cittaṁ ārādhayimsu, na evarūpaṃ aṭṭācāram aksaṃsu. tamī sandhāy’ eva idaṃ suttam āha: ārādhayimsu vata me bhikkhave bhikkhū ekaṃ samayaṃ cittaṃ ti (MN I 124). atha bhagavā ajjhācāram apassanto pārājikā vā saṅghādisesaṃ vā na paññāpesi. tasmiṃ tasmiṃ pana vatthusmiṃ avasese pañca khuddakāpattikkhandhe eva paññāpesi. (Sp I 213)*

It is said that during the Buddha’s First Bodhi, (i.e.) for (the first) twenty years, monks satisfied (his) mind, and did not commit such a transgression. Referring to this, the Buddha uttered this *sutta*: “There was an occasion when the bhikkhus satisfied my mind” (*Nāṇamoḷi and Bodhi 218*). Then, not seeing (such a) transgression, he did not prescribe the rules of Defeat nor of *Saṅghādisesa*. However, he prescribed only the remaining five groups of offenses based on this or that reason.

But the tradition does not say that no monk left the Order within that long period. If there were monks leaving the Order during that time, how did they do so? They probably just left the Order physically and socially, i.e., using the physio-social way described above.

Now let us look at the legal way, the latecomer. According to the background narrative, many monks hailing from Vesāli lived indulging themselves without any serious attempt to restrain their behaviors until they had engaged in sex. After leaving the Order and suffering in lay life, they approached Venerable Ānanda, declared that they were responsible for their own mistakes, and requested re-ordination with the promise that they would behave properly if they were given a second chance.
When Venerable Ānanda conveyed their message to the Buddha, the latter said:

\[
\text{atthānam etam Ānanda anavakāso yaṃ tathāgato Vajjīnaṃ vā Vajjiputtakānaṃ vā kāraṇā sāvakānaṃ pārājikaṃ sikkhāpadaṃ paññattaṃ samūhaneyyā \text{‘ti. (Vin III 23)}
\]

There is no reason, Ānanda, no occasion for the Buddha to revoke, on account of Vajjins or sons of Vajjins, a precept of Defeat prescribed for disciples.

This statement shows clearly that the Buddha completely rejected the request of the former Vajjin monks for re-ordination.

However, the Buddha did not stop here but added the condition “without disavowing the training, without manifesting the weakness” (sikkhaṃ appaccakkhāya dubbalyaṃ anāvikatvā) to the rule of First Defeat. This means: a monk would face Defeat only if before engaging in sexual intercourse he fails to disavow his training. Given that the new condition certainly could not help the former Vajjin monks, who had already faced Defeat, why did he do that?

I answer thus. Even though the concept of the formal disavowal of the training has appeared only as an emendation to the rule of First Defeat, it can be understood with all other rules in the Vinaya. Why? A monk who has disavowed the training is legally no longer a monk, and accordingly cannot be judged by any Vinaya rule. In other words, any moral transgression can be a Vinaya offense only when committed by someone whose monkhood is still valid. Therefore, I argue that the purpose of this formal disavowal is to permit those future monks who could not

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5 Cf: “It is impossible, Ānanda, it cannot come to pass, that the tathāgata should abolish the teaching on defeat which has been made known for the disciples, because of the deeds of the Vajjins or the sons of the Vajjins” (Horner 1: 41).
refrain from committing serious misdeeds prohibited by the rules of Defeat to bypass those rules and thereby retain the right to get re-ordained. It means that, even though the former Vajjin monks failed to win a second chance from the Buddha, their effort was not entirely fruitless; they have at least succeeded in getting a legal means established for the posterity to bypass the rules of Defeat.

One might object: given that monks can give up their monkhood also through the physio-social method described above, and thereby gain the immunity to Vinaya offenses, why should the Buddha define another procedure? I answer: because the new version is much more convenient for monks. To elaborate, let us first look at how the new procedure, i.e., the disavowal of training, works. It is detailed in the canonical commentary (Vin III 24–28; Horner vol. 1, 43–47), and can be seen in an easily understandable format at Ṭhānissaro (Code 55–57). There are four factors required for a valid disavowal of training:

1. **State of mind:** The monk wishing to disavow his training should be “in his right mind. Any statement he makes while insane, delirious with pain, or possessed by spirits does not count” (55).

2. **Intention:** “He must seriously desire to leave the Community” (55).

3. **Statement:** He must utter correctly one of the stock phrases listed in the canonical commentary, e.g., “I renounce the Buddha,” or “The Buddha is no use to me,” or “Consider me to be a householder,” etc. (See the available variants at 56.)

4. **Witness:** “The witness must be a human being in his or her right mind, and must understand what the bhikkhu says” (56). Contrary to the popular understanding, the witness need not be a third
party; the Pāli tradition, at least, does not insist on this. For instance, suppose a monk is going to have sex, an act prohibited by the rule of First Defeat. He can bypass the rule by declaring his disavowal of training to the very woman with whom he is going to have sex, if not to anyone else. However, this woman must be human to qualify as a witness; therefore, a female spirit or animal cannot be a witness even though she can be a sexual object.

If we consider those factors, we can see that this procedure is very easy. A monk wishing to renounce his monkhood only needs to utter a single stock phrase to any fellow human being; if the latter makes sense of the utterance, the former instantly loses his monkhood and becomes immune to any Vinaya offense resulting from any misdeed that would be committed.

In contrast, the older method, i.e., the physio-social way, is obviously not as convenient. This is probably why the new procedure was devised by the Buddha, who was obviously willing to give a second chance to monks who, in their moments of foolishness, could not refrain from committing misdeeds prohibited by the rules of Defeat.

However, such a monk pays a price. A monk who gives up his monkhood but who is later re-ordained loses his seniority, a fact Clarke has also noted (“When and Where” 122). By losing seniority, the re-ordained monk falls to the bottom of the social hierarchy of the Order. Why? The Buddha has decreed that: “I allow, in accordance with seniority, bowing down, rising up to greet, greeting with hands raised palm-to-palm over the heart, performing forms of respect due to superiors, the

*Other traditions may be different: “The list of inappropriate witnesses [in Mūlasarvastivādin Vinaya] for one’s disavowal is long, but the point is straightforward: in order to be valid, the proclamation of one’s disavowment of the teachings of the Buddha, of the path of a celibate renunciant, must be understood by a responsible third party” (Clarke, “Sex” 16; emphasis added).
best seat, the best water, the best food” (Vin II 162; Thānissaro, Code 878); it means the re-ordained monk is obliged to show respect to all those who formerly had to show respect to him. If one is willing to pay such a price, one can bypass the rules of Defeat by disavowing the training and later getting re-ordained, again and again if one wishes to do so!

**A different interpretation**

Aggacitta Bhikkhu has found that the phrase *sikkhaṃ paccakkhāya* is much more common than various forms of *vibbham* in suttas, whereas the opposite is true in the Vinaya (5–6). Accordingly, he notes:

The overwhelming preponderance of the usage of *sikkhāpaccakkhāna* over that of *vibbhamaṇa* (sic.) in the suttas can be the basis for a diametrically opposite theory on the status and validity of these two modes of quitting the saṅgha. Thus, Samuccayakkhandhaka of Vin Cv [i.e., where many instances of *vibbhamaṇa* can be found] could belong to an early stratum of the Vinaya Piṭaka when *vibbhaṇa* (sic.) was still the norm; but by the time the bhāṇakas compiled and collated the suttas, *sikkhāpaccakkhāna* had superseded the old mode . . . If such is the case, then the commentarial and current understanding and practice of using *sikkhāpaccakkhāna* as the preferred mode of quitting the saṅgha may not be groundless after all. (6)

I do not agree with him. Given that the phrase *sikkhaṃ paccakkhāya* can be found in all the major nikāyas (i.e., the Dīgha-, Majjhima-, Samyutta-, Aṅguttara nikāyas), his theory inevitably implies that the nikāyas were written later than the Vinaya. This contradicts the well-known fact that
the Dhamma and Vinaya were recited together at First Buddhist Council (Witanachchi 720).

However, we can home in on a simpler solution, if we remember that although both modes of quitting the Order have the same result, i.e., giving up the training and status of ordained monks/nuns, the words referring to those modes carry different “tones.” How? The phrase sik-khaṃ paccakkhāya is usually followed by the various forms of hīnāya āvattati (Aggacitta 4). Together, those mean “give up the training and turn to a lowly state”—obviously judgmental in tone. On the other hand, vibbhamati (“leaves the Order”) is an expression carrying a comparatively neutral tone.

Then, it is no wonder the former is much more common in suttas. Why? I think it is because the Buddha would certainly like to see his disciples treading the Path to liberation until their death. Even though he allowed them the right to leave the Order if they wished, he could not have desired to have them be happy about it. I argue that in sutta contexts he usually mentioned the act of disrobing in a derogatory tone probably in order to discourage certain disciples in the audience who might have been planning to disrobe. This is also probably why in many contexts he spoke as if returning to lay life after disavowing the training were “one-way traffic” (5) i.e., as if there were no second chance. (He was telling the truth, for, even nowadays, most disrobed monks do not choose to be re-ordained.)

On the contrary, it would be preferable to use a neutral term in a legal setting; this is probably why the latter is much more common in the Vinaya. Viewed in this way, there is nothing contradictory between suttas and the Vinaya.
The Old Way vs. the New Way

Next, we have to face an inevitable question. Given that the general principle of the Vinaya is: “when a rule has been amended, all earlier formulations of the rule are automatically rescinded” (“Unilaterally” 4), did the Buddha rescind the old physio-social way when he prescribed the new legal way of disavowing the training?

The Burmese tradition believes he did. Here is an excerpt from a standard Burmese textbook on Vinaya studies:

When a lay person observes the morality of Eight Precepts (for a certain period), those precepts go away at the end of the period, and only that of Five Precepts remains. If a novice wishes to leave the Order, he need not disavow the training; rather, he just gets disrobed, and the novice morality would leave him. On the contrary, the morality of a monk is different; one needs a formal disavowal to get rid of it. (Trans. from Janakābhivamsa 37)

The Thai tradition also seemingly maintains the same opinion, for Bhikkhu Ṭhānissaro writes:

. . . if a bhikkhu disrobes in an invalid manner, he still counts as a bhikkhu and is subject to the rules whether he realizes it or not. If he then were to break any of the pārājika rules, he would be disqualified from ever becoming a bhikkhu again in this lifetime. (Code 55)

I beg to differ, however, and my reasoning is as follows.

First, the new way cannot be a complete replacement of the old one. Why? Because a monk who has disavowed the training is still obliged to leave the Order physically and socially (unless he requests re-ordination or novitiation to justify his continued stay in the Order). And
a monk who has transgressed a rule of Defeat cannot request re-ordination (at least, in the Pāli tradition); everything else for him is the same as for the monk who has disavowed the training.

If, then, the older way cannot be entirely abandoned, is it still a valid way to lose one’s monkhood? To put it another way, is it still possible to give up one’s monkhood just by changing into lay clothes and going home, without a formal disavowal of training?

To answer this question, we should first think which of these two ways is more serious, more demanding. In the newer legal way, a monk giving up his monkhood needs only to make a personal declaration to a witness; the disavowal of training may even remain secret if the witness agrees. However, in the older physio-social way, a monk leaving the Order physically and socially manifests to the public that he is no longer able to lead a monk’s life. Therefore, the latter is clearly more serious; it means, I argue, that the latter should continue to be a valid way of losing one’s monkhood.

Otherwise, we must maintain that the only innocent way to leave the Order is through the legal method of disavowing the training. Then, suppose a monk wishing to leave the Order, but ignorant of this method or without any plan to reenter the monkhood later, just changes into lay clothes and goes home. We would have to maintain that his monkhood is still valid whether he is aware of it or not; then if he has sex in his lay life, he would transgress the rule of First Defeat and accordingly be morally tainted. I think this does not make much sense. (See another piece of evidence at p. 140.)

Therefore, I believe that the older physio-social way was not superseded by the newer legal way. If one chooses to use the legal way, the older way would be a follow-up procedure; if one uses the older way directly, the new way would not be required. Then why have two tradi-
tions deviated from this? Probably because of Buddhaghosa’s influence. (See pp. 134 ff. for details.)

On the other hand, nuns are a different case, which I am dealing with in the next section.

**Why Nuns Have No Formal Disavowal of Training**

In contrast to monks, nuns have been denied the right to formally disavow the training:

\[
\text{tena kho pana samayena aññatarā bhikkhunī sikkham paccacakkhāya vibbhami, sā puna paccāgantvā bhikkhuniyo upasampadaṃ yāci. bhagavato etamatthāṃ ārocesuṃ. na bhikkhave bhikkhuniyā sikkhāpaccakkhānaṃ: yad eva sā vibbhantā tad eva sā abhikkhunīti. (Vin II 279)}
\]

Now at that time a certain nun, having disavowed the training, left the Order; having come back again she asked the nuns for ordination. They told this matter to the Lord. He said: “Monks, there is no disavowal of the training by a nun, but in so far as she is one who leaves the Order, she is in consequence not a nun.” (Horner vol. 5, 386)

If we closely look at the text cited above, we can see that:

1. This story took place only after the Buddha had already prescribed the new legal method for renouncing the Order; the nun here simply made use of it.

2. She might be the first nun attempting to use the legal method; this is why other nuns were not certain whether she
should be accepted or not when she came back, and reported to the Buddha.

3. The text does not mention whether she got re-ordained as requested, or not (See the probable reason of this silence at p. 134).

But why did the Buddha cancel the formal disavowal of the training for nuns?  

I have argued above that both the old physio-social method and the new legal method are valid ways for monks to leave the Order without guilt. If my argument is correct, it means that the Buddha in this story simply canceled the latter and retained the former for nuns (thus keeping the door open for them if they choose to come back). But why?

There is no explicit answer in the Vinaya canon itself, but my tentative answer is thus: to prevent a serious loophole arising in the rule of the Sixth Defeat for nuns (Pāt 118–119; Vin IV 216; Horner 3: 166), of which the background narrative is already given at (p. 120), and the rule text of which runs as follows:

*yā pana bhikkhunī jānaṃ pārajīkaṃ dhammaṃ aijhāpannaṃ bhikkhunīṃ n’ ev’ attanā paṭicodeyya na gaṇassa āroceyya,*

7 Having obviously failed to find the answer to this question, Juo-Itsueh Shih observes: “This passage suggests that there must have been a time when nuns were allowed to forsake the Saṅgha by formal announcement, like monks. The other possibility is that to introduce the prohibition on nuns’ renouncing the training, a prohibition which had existed from the outset, the monastic redactors carelessly composed this text, prefacing the rule with an incident which could never could have happened. However, it would make easier sense if we view this from a different angle . . . we would face no problem if we see the modification of the rule for nuns to have taken place later than the above-cited passage of the Cv.” (166). I believe her interpretation is too far-fetched, given that there seemingly exists a clear rationale behind the cancellation of the legal way for nuns, as I show in this paper.
yadā ca sā ṭhitā vā assa cutā vā nāsitā vā avassaṭā vā sā pacchā evaṁ vadeyya pubb’ evāhaṁ ayye aṅnāsiṁ etam bhikkunīṁ evarūpā ca evarūpā ca sā bhaginī ti, no ca kho attanā pāṭicodessaṁ, na gaṇassa ārocessan ti, ayampi pārājikā hoti asaṁvāsā vajjappatīcchādikā. (Pāt 118; Vin IV 216–217)

Whatever nun, knowing that a nun has committed a matter entailing Defeat, should neither herself reprove her, nor speak to a group, but when she may be remaining [as a nun] or deceased or expelled or moved (to another ascetic school), should afterwards speak thus: “Noble ladies, previously I knew this bhikkunī that she was a sister like this and that, but I did not reprove her myself, nor speak to a group,“ she too becomes defeated, not in communion, [being] one who conceals a fault.

8 I have here followed Ute Hüskens (94), who has rejected the reading pāṭicodeyyaṁ . . . āroceyyaṁ of the PTS edition, and preferred pāṭicodessaṁ . . . ārocessan of the Burmese, Sinhalese, and Thai editions. She has not provided any reasoning for her preference, but see the next note for mine.

9 In contrast, Hüskens translates: “(I thought:) I will neither myself reprove her nor speak to a group” (94); she obviously thinks that the verbs with the verbal ending -ssaṁ (i.e., pāṭicodeyyaṁ and āroceyyaṁ) are future forms. But given that the context is the description of a past event, she has been forced to add “I thought” to have the sentence make sense.

I must beg to differ here. In my opinion, those verbal forms are of kālātipatti (“conditional”) tense, for the ending -ssaṁ, shared by both those verbs, can serve as the 1st pers. singular ending in this tense (Perniola 270; Warder 331). Given that the conditional tense “expresses a condition that has not been realized or cannot be realized” (Perniola 356), it perfectly fits in the context, for, with those verbs in this tense, the sentence would refer to an unrealized condition, i.e., the fact that the nun (i.e., the speaker) did not confront nor report the other nun even though the former could have done so.

But this is not a conditional sentence per se; why should we view it as one? Yes, it is not a conditional sentence, and it does not need to be one: “The term ‘conditional’
Simply speaking, this rule means that if any nun conceals another nun’s misdeed entailing Defeat, the former also faces Defeat.

Now let us consider a scenario. A nun is having an affair with a man and plans to sleep with him. If the new legal method were valid for nuns, she could disavow her training with a witness. Having sex after is much too wide for this tense, and was adopted by philologists on the grounds of comparative morphology” (Warder 331–332).

Again, “the conditional has the augment regularly except when there is a prefix . . .” (331), and yet those verbs have neither augments (i.e., the vowel a preceding the root) nor prefixes. How can they qualify to be of the conditional tense? Even though Warder speaks as if an augment is compulsory for the verbs without prefixes in the conditional tense, classical grammars seemingly maintain that an augment for this tense is only optional:

\[ \text{kva} \text{ci dhātunamādimhi akārāgamo hoti hiyyattaniāj-jatanikālātipatti} \text{cetāsu tisu vibhattīsu. ("Kacc" 519; "Sadd-sut" 1032)} \]

At certain places, the arrival of the letter a is there when those endings—past imperfect, aorist, conditional—follow. (E.g.) agamā, agamī, agamissā. What is the point of the word kva? gamā, gamī, gamissā.

(Note: In the examples above, agamissā and gamissā are both 3rd pers. singular forms in conditional tense, meaning “would have gone”; of them, the former has an augment, whereas the latter does not.)

\[ \text{āā} \text{do āā do ss āā do ca kriyatthassa vā aña hoti. ōkāro-nubandho, agamā, gamā, agamī, gamī, agamissā, gamissā. ("Mogg" 6.15)} \]

The letter a is or (is not) at the beginning of the root (lit. “the one which has the sense of action”) when there follow the endings ā, etc. (i.e., hiyyattani, ē, etc. (i.e., ajjatan), and ssē etc. (i.e., kālātipattī). The letter ō is an indicatory letter. (E.g.) agamā, gamā, agamī, gamī, agamissā, gamissā.

(Note: here also the two last examples are of conditional tense, differing only in the presence/absence of an augment.)

Therefore, the verbal forms discussed above, I argue, can serve as instances that corroborate the classical theory.
disavowing the training, she would not face Defeat. Then, other nun(s) concealing the fact would not also face Defeat, for technically the former did not commit an offense entailing Defeat. As a result, the rule of the Sixth Defeat for nuns would be as good as annulled.

It is to close this loophole, I argue, that the Buddha canceled the legal way of formally disavowing the training for nuns. That is to say, he wanted to have a nun’s resignation from the Order publicly transparent. If my argument is correct, it means that this cancellation of the legal way for nuns was probably later than the rule of the Sixth Defeat.

Then, can a nun who has publicly disrobed be re-ordained? It depends, I argue, on whether she has been innocent of irrevocable offenses (pārājika) prior to her disrobing. If innocent, she can be re-ordained; if not, she cannot.

On the other hand, the act of disavowing the training, like what the nun discussed above has done, is not legally valid, and irrelevant in deciding whether such a nun should be re-ordained. This is probably why the compilers of Vinaya-piṭaka, with their focus on nuns’s disavowal of training as regards this text, have not felt it necessary to record whether that nun’s request was granted or not.

Buddhaghosa\textsuperscript{10} interprets this case differently, which we will see in the next section.

\textit{Buddhaghosa’s view}

Buddhaghosa explained the canonical text on nuns’s disavowal of the training as follows:

\textsuperscript{10} Some scholars have claimed that the Vinaya commentary is not Buddhaghosa’s work (Hinüber, “Early”). I hope to present my view in another paper.
yad eva sā vibbhanta 'ti yasmā sā (1) vibbhanta (2) attano ruciyā khantiyā odātāni vatthāni nivāseti, tasmā eva sā a-bhikkhuni, na sikkhāpaccakkhānenā 'ti dassetī. sā puna upasampadaṃ na labhati. (Sp VI 1295 enumeration added)

(The sentence) yadeva sā vibbhanta, etc., shows that she becomes a non-bhikkhuni because: (1) she leaves the Order; i.e., (2) she wears white clothes on her own choice, on her own will, not because of formally disavowing the training. She does not get ordination again.\(^{11}\)

At first sight, Buddhaghosa seemingly has not explained why the Buddha canceled the formal disavowal of the training for nuns. But I think actually he has. How?

In that sentence, “becoming a non-bhikkhuni” could be interpreted in two alternative ways:

1. Such a nun loses her nunhood (but she can regain it later if she wishes).

\(^{11}\) I believe that (1) is elaborated by (2), i.e., that Buddhaghosa explains the word vibbhanta (“the one who leaves the Order”) by “the one who wears white clothes on her own choice, on her own will,” hence the translation above.

In contrast, Kieffer-Püllz has viewed (1) and (2) as two consecutive events in a two-step procedure—firstly, leaving the Order, and secondly, wearing white clothes (12–13). If she were right, the commentator would not have repeated the canonical word vibbhanta verbatim in his explanation, but would have used another word like vibbhamitvā (“having left the Order”) to show the process; in other words, he would have said, e.g., vibbhamitvā attano ruciyā khantiyā odātāni vatthāni nivāseti (“Having left the Order, she wears white clothes on her own choice, on her own will.”). But this is not the case. Moreover, as will be seen at footnote 13, Buddhaghosa himself has said that just changing into lay clothes with attachment to them is equivalent to leaving the Order (vibbhamatī) for nuns. Therefore, I am not convinced by her interpretation, and subsequently by its implication that we will see at footnote 15.
2. Such a nun is not “nun material,” i.e., is not worthy of nunhood (and therefore she should not be given re-ordination).

Buddhaghosa has obviously chosen the latter interpretation, concluding that such nuns cannot be re-ordained. If so, it makes sense to deny them the right to formally disavow the training, the purpose itself of which is to pave the way for the return of disrobed members of the Order.

But why has he not chosen the former interpretation, as I have done?

My tentative answer is: by Buddhaghosa’s time, Buddhist monasticism had seemingly forgotten the spirit of the formal disavowal of the training, i.e., to bypass the rules of Defeat. Given that (1) disavowing the training is not a big deal to perform before actually getting disrobed, and (2) it also helps to define the exact time of ending one’s monkhood, the newer legal way has seemingly been promoted to become a compulsory step to leave the Order without guilt, whereas the older physical-social way has lost its independence and has been demoted in practice to become only a procedure naturally following the formal disavowal of the training.\(^{12}\) If this was the case, Buddhaghosa would see only two ways of leaving the Order:

1. *The innocent way*: to leave the Order through the formal disavowal of the training. A person leaving in this way can be re-accepted for ordination.

2. *The guilty way*: through transgressing one of the Defeat rules. Such a person cannot get re-ordained.

When the Buddha canceled the formal disavowal of the training for nuns, he practically canceled the first way. Therefore, the only way

\(^{12}\) This has been the case with, at least, Burmese and Thai traditions, as mentioned before.
available for ordained nuns to leave the Order is the second, guilty way. Even if a nun does not commit any Defeat offense explicitly given in the Pātimokkha, leaving the Order and wearing lay clothes itself should make her defeated. This is the only possible conclusion here for Buddhaghosa, and this is why he counts such a nun as one type of Defeated persons at another place:

\[
\text{te gihiliṅge rucin uppādetvā gihinivāsananivatthāya bhikkhu-
\text{niyā saddhiṃ vīsati. sā hi ajjhācāravitikkamaṇṭ akatvāpi
ettāvatāva assamaṇī ... (II 515)}
\]

Those (nineteen Defeated individuals) become twenty together with the nun who gets attached to lay appearance and wears lay clothes. Indeed, even though she does not commit any transgression, she becomes a non-ascetic merely through such an extent (of action).\(^{13}\)

However, I believe Buddhaghosa’s interpretation is problematic. If he were right and accordingly such a nun could not be re-ordained, the Buddha would have explicitly said so.\(^{14}\) To demonstrate my point, I would like to draw the reader’s attention to the case of a nun moving to another ascetic school:

\[
\text{tena kho pana samayena aṅñatarā bhikkhunī sakāsāvā titth-
āyatanaṃ saṅkāmī, sā puna paccāgantvā bhikkhuniyo upasamp-
padāṃ yāci. bhagavato etamatthaṃ ārocesuṃ. yā sā bhikkhave
bhikkhunī sakāsāvā titthāyatanaṃ saṅkantā, sā āgatā na upa-
sampādetabbā ti. (Vin II 279)}
\]

\(^{13}\) This is clear proof that in Buddhaghosa’s opinion, merely wearing lay clothes with attachment is equivalent to leaving the Order (vibbhamati) for nuns, even though they have not yet physically moved away.

\(^{14}\) I have already explained at p. 134 why there is no such a need in my theory.
Now at that time a certain nun, wearing the saffron robes, went over to the fold of a sect; having come back again she asked the nuns for ordination. They told this matter to the Lord. He said: “Monks, whatever nun, wearing the saffron robes, goes over to the fold of a sect, on coming back should not be ordained. (Horner vol. 5, 387)

As seen above, the Buddha explicitly said that a nun moving to another sect cannot be re-ordained. If a nun returning to lay-life cannot be re-ordained too, why should he not say it explicitly?

Moreover, we should note that in the text cited above, the nun moving to another sect is qualified as sakāsāvā (“wearing saffron robes”), i.e., moving to another sect directly, not via lay-life. It probably

15 This term sakāsāvā has another reading, i.e., sakāvāsā (“from one’s own residence”); the Sri Lankan, Siamese and the PTS (Oldenberg) editions have the former, whereas the Burmese edition, the latter (Kieffer-Pülz 9).

Out of those two, I argue, it must be the former that the author of Vjb, the oldest Vinaya subcommentary, has seen and used. Why? Whether one returns to lay life or moves to another sect, leaving one’s own residence (presumably in a nunnery) is inevitable, hence the superfluity of the latter term sakāvāsā. On the other hand, a nun would still be wearing robes (sakāsāvā) when moving directly to another sect, whereas another would be already in lay clothes when joining another sect via lay-life, hence the feasibility of the question whether the latter can get re-ordination, as the Vjb author has pointed out.

Kieffer-Pülz has come to the same conclusion but based on different grounds. She differentiates those two cases by saying that the first case (i.e., that of a nun returning to lay life) is a two-step process of “(i) first, taking white (or any other) clothes (ii) second, informally leaving the community” whereas the second case (i.e., that of a nun moving to another sect) is that of “(i) first, informally leaving the community (ii) second, taking white (or any other) clothes.” Accordingly, “The commentator had before him a Vinaya text with the reading sakāsāvā ‘with her saffron robes,’ not one with the Burmese variant sakāvāsā ‘from her own residence’” (14).
means that it is possible to re-ordain a nun who firstly returns to lay-life, joins another sect later, and comes back at last for re-ordination. Otherwise, if a nun returning to lay-life could not get re-ordination at all, as Buddhaghosa maintains, it would not have mattered whether she moves to another sect directly, or via lay-life, and the qualifier sakāsāvā in this rule would have ended up superfluous. On the contrary, if the qualifier sakāsāvā is meaningful, it is also proof that a nun returning to lay-life without a formal disavowal of the training can be re-ordained.

I am not the first one who has sensed the interpretation above; the author of Vajirabuddhi-ṭīkā, the oldest Vinaya sub-commentary, has also said:

\begin{quote}
\textit{Pāliyām kiṅcāpi “yā sā, bhikkhave, bhikkhunī sakāsāvā titth-āyatanaṃ saṅkantā, sā āgatā na upasampādetabbā” ti vacanato yā paṭhamāṃ vibbhamitvā pacchā titthāyatanaṃ saṅkantā, sā āgatā upasampādetabbāti anuṅātāṃ viya dissati.} (\textit{Vjb} 111)
\end{quote}

Even though it is seemingly permitted to give re-ordination to a nun, who has come back after firstly disrobing and later moving to a school of ascetics, given that it is mentioned in the Canon: “Monks, whatever nun, wearing saffron robes, goes over to the fold of a sect, on coming back should not be ordained.” \ldots

Now there can be an objection here. Is there any instance of a former nun’s re-ordination recorded in the Vinaya? The answer is negative, at least, for the Pāli Vinaya. But my argument is based upon the principle: “Whatever, monks, has not been permitted by me, saying: ‘This is allow-

\begin{footnote}
However, as I already said at the footnote (11), interpreting the first case as a two-step process seems not a correct premise; so, I remain unconvinced by her reasoning.
\end{footnote}

\begin{footnote}
I do not mean that he agrees with me; see the next section.
\end{footnote}
able’, if it fits in with what is allowable, if it goes against what is not allowable, that is allowable to you” (Vin I 251; Horner vol. 4, 347). Otherwise, even the Buddhist Councils, which the Buddha had not explicitly sanctioned, would have been impossible, and all modern appliances like computers, etc., would be beyond the reach of monks and nuns.

On the other hand, if a nun can get re-ordained after leaving the Order without a formal disavowal of the training, there is no reason why monks cannot do likewise; this is also another piece of evidence indicating that the older physio-social way for monks has not been superseded by the newer legal way.

To sum up, such discrepancies show that Buddhaghosa’s interpretation has lost the spirit of the earliest Vinaya in this regard, and is only based on a later understanding of the formal disavowal of training.

Other Vinayas

In the previous section, I have shown that the Vjb author has come to the same conclusion as mine when he deals with the case of a nun moving to another ascetic school. However, he does not stick to that conclusion, choosing to oppose it as follows:

_Saṅgītācariyehi pana “catuvisati pārājikāni” ti vuttattā na puna sā upasampādetabbā, tasmā eva sikkhāpaccakhānaṃ nānuññātam bhagavatā._ ("Vjb" 111)

However, because twenty-four pārājikas are mentioned by the Buddhist Council masters, she [i.e., a nun who moved to another ascetic school via layhood] should not be re-
ordained; this is why the disavowal of training is not allowed by the Buddha.

See the details about the twenty-four pārājikas in the appendix and (Kieffer-Püllz 18–19); it is enough here to know that a nun’s act of disrobing is enumerated as one type of pārājika therein, but without any obvious canonical basis.

What is interesting here, on the other hand, is that the Vjb author has chosen to attribute the list of twenty-four pārājikas (Sp II 515–516) to the “Buddhist Council masters.” Given that all items in the list are based upon the Vinaya canon (as shown in the appendix) except the disrobing of nuns, he probably believes that the prohibition of disrobed nuns’s re-ordination has a very early origin, even though without direct canonical authority.

And he has been proved right, for many other Vinaya versions agree in that disrobed nuns cannot be re-ordained. Bhikkhu Sujato (135–138) has found that:

1. The Mahāsaṅghika, Lokuttaravāda, Mūlasarvāstivāda, Sarvāstivāda Vinayas all refuse to re-ordain a former nun;

2. The Dharmaguptaka Vinaya does not have such an explicit prohibition, but Huai Su, its commentator, remarks to the same effect (138);

3. The Mahiśāsaka Vinaya is silent on this case.

This shows that the prohibition of the re-ordination for former nuns has an origin much earlier than Buddhaghosa.

Then, does it mean that this limitation has been lost from the Pāli canon, but preserved in its commentaries and other Vinayas? I do not think so, for:
1. The *Mahāsaṅghika* and *Lokuttaravāda* Vinayas do not provide any background story to justify the prohibition (135–137);

2. The *Mūlasarvāstivāda* and *Sarvāstivāda* Vinayas offer entirely different background stories (135–137);

3. In the case of *Dharmaguptaka* Vinaya, its commentator, Huai Su, seemingly indicates only “that the matter should be treated in line with the rulings of the *Sarvāstivāda* Vinaya” (138).

As seen above, other Vinayas have nothing in common here except the prohibition itself. Therefore, it is much more probable that this is another instance of how ancient commentarial exegesis has influenced the development of the canonical texts (See Anālayo).

*The modern perspectives*

Regarding the problem of whether disrobed nuns originally had the right to get re-ordained, there seem to be two different opinions among modern scholars, interestingly derived in different ways from the same piece of evidence.

In the canonical commentary to the Sixth Pārājīka rule cited on page 120, we can find the aforesaid evidence: *nāsitā nāma sayaṃ vā vibbhantā hoti aṅñehi vā nāsitā* (Vin IV 217 “Expelled means she herself comes to be leaving the Order or she is expelled by others” Horner vol. 3, 167).

Given that both types of nuns are covered by the term “expelled” (*nāsitā*), Ute Hüsken interprets “leaving the Order oneself” as synonymous with “getting expelled by others” and argues that anyone leaving the Order, monk or nun, cannot get re-ordained (qtd. in Sujato 129). On the contrary, Bhikkhu Sujato disagrees with her, and rightly so, in the
opinions of both Kieffer-Pülz (20) and myself: “However, she herself [i.e., Ute Hüsken] refers to a passage (Pali Vinaya 1.97-8) with a series of cases where a bhikkhu disrobes (vibbhamati) and then is allowed to re-ordain. This is hardly an ‘exception’ as she says; the same usage is found dozens of times in the Samuccayakkhandhaka. Nowhere is it stated that a bhikkhu who is vibbhanta may not re-ordain” (Sujato 129).

Then, how do we explain the term “expelled” (nāsitā) covering both cases? Bhikkhu Sujato answers: “It [i.e., the canonical commentary text] simply states that the term nāsitā in this rule covers both cases. One is ‘expelled’ because the Sangha has good reason to consider a person unsuitable as a monastic. One ‘disrobes’ for all sorts of reasons, many of which do not imply any misconduct as a monastic” (129).

I see a problem with this answer. If two different cases are covered by the same term, these cases must have something in common, which it is our job to find out; just saying that the term covers both cases does not really solve the problem. Kieffer-Pülz also notes: “He, however, failed to see the relevance of this equation of the two terms when saying ‘It simply states that the term nāsitā in this rule covers both cases’” (20).

Then, what is the common property shared by both cases? We can say at least that the nun who has left voluntarily and the one expelled by others are both physically and socially away from the Order. Anything else? Kieffer-Pülz writes:

The word-for-word commentary (padabhājanīya), which comments upon each single word of the rule, explains nāsitā, “excluded”, by either “one who herself left informally” (sayaṃ vibbhanta hoti) or one “excluded by others” (aṭṭhehi nāsitā). Although this does not imply that nāsita and vibbhanta are synonyms, it is obvious that the authors of the word-for-word commentary equated a nun who in-
formally left the community with one who was excluded by members of the Buddhist community. This passage thus is the canonical basis for the inclusion of a nun who informally left the community in the list of the twenty-four pārājikas. (20)

As cited above, Kieffer-Pülz has claimed that the loss of a chance to come back as an ordained nun is the common property shared by both cases; in her opinion, Buddhaghosa’s theory does have a canonical basis.

I do not agree with her, however, for her theory contradicts the very spirit of the Vinaya when she maintains that a nun expelled by others cannot come back. Why? Each and every Vinaya rule for monks and nuns is supposedly transgressed by those only when they do something inappropriate or fail to do something appropriate. Indeed, no one can

17 The Indeterminate (aniyata) rules (Pāt 24–25) call for an interesting question in this context. Those rules (to be exact, their canonical commentaries [Vin III 189–190; Horner vol. 1, 333–335, 338–339]) define a monk’s guilt based upon his own admission. Does it mean that a monk can commit an ultimate pārājika offense, and yet get away by admitting to a lesser offense?

No, in fact. Those rules are, I argue, only guidelines to show how to use available evidence to judge other monks. “Being judged guilty/innocent of a particular offense” and “being actually guilty/innocent of that offense” can be often different. This is why the language usage in those rules is different from others. For example, the canonical commentary to the First Indeterminate rule says that if a monk admits to have sex with a woman, he should be dealt with that [i.e., pārājika] offense (āpattiyā kāretabbo Vin III 189), whereas the First Defeat rule says that if a monk should engage in sexual intercourse, he becomes defeated, not in communion (pārājiko hoti asamvāso Pāt 24–25). The former manifests how other monks should judge an accused fellow, whereas the latter, a legal fact which all monks should be aware of.

Accordingly, I do not agree with Hüsken, who writes: “Buddhist law as specified in the Vinayapitaka is generally based on the concept that an offence is established only after the offender pleads guilty” (93), nor with von Hinüber, who writes: “Here [i.e., concerning the Indeterminate rules] we find one of the basic principles of early Buddhist law as laid down in the Pātimokkha: that the monk involved has to admit his
make an innocent person guilty without involving some mistake on the latter’s part, nor help a guilty person recover from his or her guilt without his or her willing cooperation. Therefore, if getting expelled by the Order necessarily means that the expelled one has committed an irrevocable offense (i.e., pārājika), this would imply that the Order carries infallible judgment, that whatever it does is right. Such an attitude cannot have prevailed from the very beginning in a community in which groups of members can quarrel with one another despite the Master’s peacemaking efforts. (See the Kosambi crisis at “Kosambi” 693–694.)

On the other hand, if the Order accounts for the fact that it can be wrong, it must be able to take back its innocent members whom it has expelled earlier through wrong judgments. Then, why are there no procedures provided for welcoming back such members? Because (1) their expulsion itself has been legally unsound from the very beginning, and (2) subsequently they have never been legally apart from the Order (even though, physically and socially, they might have been). Cf.:

Just as the great ocean does not associate with a corpse, but quickly carries it to the coast and washes it ashore, so too, the Saṅgha does not associate with a person who is immoral . . . not an ascetic though claiming to be one, not a celibate though claiming to be one . . . rather, it quickly assembles and expels him. Even though he is seated in the midst of the Saṅgha of bhikkhus, yet he is far from the Saṅgha and the Saṅgha is far from him. (AN IV 201; Bodhi 1143–1144 emphasis added)

intention to commit an offense. Consequently the moral standards of the monks are supposed to be very high” (“Buddhist Law” 11).

18 A wrong judgment is not necessarily biased. It can also be a result of the available evidence pointing to the wrong direction.
If we interpret this statement inversely, we can as well say that a pure monk is still “in the midst of the Saṅgha” even though he has been mistakenly expelled and has to live thousands of miles away. There should be no need for an official way to accept him back when the Order comes to know the truth, simply because he has never been legally away from it.

If this interpretation is correct, I argue, we can infer that:

1. A nun disrobing on her own and another who has been expelled share the privilege to come back to the Order if they have committed no irrevocable offense;

2. They are different in that:
   (a) The former needs to be re-ordained;
   (b) The latter does not have such a need.

Seen in this way, this canonical commentary text works in support of my theory, not Buddhaghosa’s.
Appendix

Some remarks on twenty-four pārājikas

Because Kieffer-Pülz has done thorough research on this topic, in what follows I mostly cite her and give my own view only when I do not agree.

What are twenty-four pārājikas? “The idea of twenty-four pārājikas appears only in the commentaries Samantapāsādikā and Kaṅkhāvitarāṇi. They understand the term pārājika in a wider sense, subsuming under pārājika all persons that must not participate in the Buddhist community’s life as monastics” (Kieffer-Pülz 18).

But who are those persons?

These are not only the persons who commit one of the eight pārājika offences [four for both monks and nuns and another four unique to nuns], but also the eleven individuals mentioned in the Vinaya as being unqualified for full ordination into the Buddhist community (abhābapuggala). Together with the eight individuals who committed pārājika offences they are nineteen. As the twentieth, the commentaries list a nun who informally left the community. The twenty-first to twenty-fourth pārājikas are the so-called analogous pārājikas referring to cases where sexual intercourse is carried out orally or anally with oneself or with a male person. (18)

Kieffer-Pülz has not found the canonical origins of the last two types: “While the first two [out of the last four] have counterparts in the Vinītavatthu section of the first pārājika rule, the counterpart of the third is only found in the youngest part of the Vinaya, the Parivāra, and the last is not found in the Vinaya at all” (18–19).
I do not agree that the last two have no canonical basis; to explain my view, I will firstly enumerate the last four (pārājika) persons:

1. A monk whose back is flexible enough to enable him putting his penis into his own mouth, and who actually does that (Vin 35; Horner vol. 1, 55);

2. A monk whose penis can be bent enough to enable him putting his penis into his own anus, and who actually does that (Vin 35; Horner vol. 1, 55);

3. A monk who takes another male’s penis in his mouth (Sp II 515 parassa āṇga-jātaṁ mukhena gaṁhāti);

4. A monk who sits on another male’s penis (II 515 parassa āṇga jāte abhinisīdati).

As cited above, Kieffer-Pülz has not found the canonical basis for (3) and (4), but here it is:

_bhikkhu suttabhikkhunhi vippaṭipajjati. paṭibuddho sādiyati:_
ubho nāsetabba. Paṭibuddho na sādiyati: dūsako nāsetabbo.
_bhikkhu suttasāmaṇeramhi vippaṭipajjati. Paṭibuddho sādiyati:_
ubho nāsetabbā. paṭibuddho na sādiyati: dūsako nāsetabbo.
sāmaṇero suttabhikkhumhi vippaṭipajjati. Paṭibuddho . . .
nāsetabbo. sāmaṇero suttasāmaṇeramhi vippaṭipajjati. Paṭibuddho . . . nāsetabbo. (Vin III 33)

A monk commits sin with a sleeping monk. Awakened he agrees; both should be expelled. Awakened he does not agree; the defiler should be expelled. A monk commits sin with a sleeping novice. Awakened he agrees; both should be expelled. Awakened he does not agree; the defiler should be expelled. A novice commits sin with a sleeping monk. Awakened . . . should be expelled. A novice com-
mits sin with a sleeping novice. Awakened . . . should be expelled. (Horner vol. 2, 50–51)

In the text cited above, the phrase “commits sin” (vippatipajjati) is ambiguous. To understand this, let us consider some scenarios.

Suppose that the former monk puts his penis into the sleeping monk’s anus. A male’s mouth and anus are among the organs officially designated as being able to earn defeat for a monk whose penis goes into it. Therefore, the offender clearly faces defeat.

How about the violated monk who has been sleeping? If he wakes up and gives his consent to the violation, he is also defeated. But what exactly does he consent to? Another male’s penis entering his anus. This is of the same nature as of the monk sitting on another male’s penis, the last of the twenty-four pārājikas.

Or suppose the violating monk puts his penis into the sleeping monk’s mouth. The violator faces defeat, and the violated goes the same way by consenting to another male’s penis entering his mouth, which is of the same nature as of the monk taking another male’s penis in his mouth, the second last of the twenty-four pārājikas.

To sum up, all items in the list of twenty-four pārājikas, with the exception of the twentieth (the nun who disrobes and leaves the Order), are actually based on the Vinaya canon.

19 [bhikkhusa sevanacittam upaṭṭhite] manussapurisassa . . . amanussapurisassa . . . tirac-chāṇagatapurisassa vaccamaggam—pa—mukham aṅgajātam pavesentassa āpatti pārājikassa. (Vin III 29)

For a monk who, having thought of cohabitation, lets his male organ enter the anus of a human male, of a non-human male, of a male animal, there is an offense involving defeat . . . the mouth of a human male, etc.
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(The Pali text titles are abbreviated per the Critical Pali Dictionary system.)


**Kacc** “Kaccāyanabyākaraṇaṃ.” *Chaṭṭha Saṅgāyanā Tipiṭaka* 4.0, Vipassanā Research Institute, 2008.


**Mogg** “Moggallānabyākaraṇaṃ.” *Chaṭṭha Saṅgāyanā Tipiṭaka* 4.0, Vipassanā Research Institute, 2008.


**Vjb** “Vajirabuddhi Ṭīkā.” *Chaṭṭha Saṅgāyanā Tipiṭaka* 4.0, Vipassanā Research Institute, 2008.
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