Capital of the imperial borderlands: urbanism, markets, and power on the Ethiopia-British Somaliland boundary, ca. 1890–1935

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ABSTRACT

This article analyzes contests among Ethiopian and British imperial agents and their ostensible Somali (and other Muslim) subjects for control over commerce in the Ethiopia-British Somaliland borderlands. British claims of sovereignty over Somalis and other Muslim merchants operating in Ethiopia created a field of hybrid commercial control in which neither Britons nor Ethiopians held complete dominance. Competition to capture borderlands commerce focused on Jigjiga town as a site where Ethiopian rule and British-backed trade mixed. Amidst crises of warfare and famine in the countryside and the growth of a cash economy shaped by this imperial conjuncture, Jigjiga grew in importance as a site of accumulation and (especially for Somalis) of cultural transformations in understandings of commerce and its relation to political authority. Hybrid commercial sovereignty tended to separate the military-administrative authority of the empires on either side of the border from the Muslim-dominated field of trans-border commercial control, shaping links between ethno-religious identity and fields of power.

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Two very different imperial systems converged during the 1890s on the Somali-inhabited plains that became Ethiopia’s eastern borderlands. The region was soon a testing ground for state-building as the territorially fluid “Abyssinian Empire” (characterized by Amhara and Christian cultural dominance) became the Ethiopian empire, with its fixed cartography and territorially-defined subject population.1 Ethiopian efforts to territorialize sovereignty faced resistance from (largely nomadic) Somalis and other peripheral populations. In the eastern borderlands such challenges were compounded by British efforts to extend their “informal empire” of trade inland from the British Somaliland Protectorate2 – in part by claiming sovereignty over Somalis and other Muslim merchants in Ethiopia. In the twentieth century’s early decades, Ethiopian and British empire-building intersected in one town that was squarely in Ethiopian territory but became an administrative and trading center for both Ethiopian and British regimes, simultaneously. The few existing works on Jigjiga town’s history have detailed regional political-economic change and
documented Jigjiga’s growth and social transformation. Building from these histories, I employ an urban-theoretical approach to the early-twentieth-century history of the Ethiopia-Somaliland border area, conceptualizing the region’s political-economic reorganization in terms of borderlands urbanism in the overlap of empires.

Ethiopia’s territorial definition amidst the European “scramble for Africa” proceeded in tandem with new patterns of urbanization. As military expansion pushed the boundaries of Abyssinian rule eastwards past Harar into the Somali-inhabited lowlands after 1887, imperial organization was shifting from a period of regional autonomy (the Zemene Mesafint) towards a more hierarchical network of towns connected by transport and communication links. Ethiopian urbanization and territorialization connected to new forms of state-building. Though territorial borders officially incorporated peripheral groups into the empire (and demarcated Ethiopian sovereignty from surrounding British, French, and Italian claims), it was largely in Ethiopia’s emerging urban milieu that identity groups came into sustained contact and forged new relationships of subjecthood and belonging. On one hand, Ethiopian cities became sites of “imagining and constructing Ethiopia as a modern and national space” as new linkages began to subordinate regional towns to Emperor Menelik II and his newly-established imperial capital, Addis Ababa.

Ethiopian urbanization and territorialization, on the other hand, also intensified articulations with European colonialism, trade and finance that were consolidating Eurocentric urban links. European efforts to capture the allegiance of minority groups and foreign merchants made concentrations of diverse groups in Ethiopia’s towns potential sites of resistance against Ethiopian nation-building. Italy’s occupation of Ethiopia (1936–41) and subsequent British administration of Somali-inhabited eastern Ethiopia (1941–48) famously exacerbated ethnic tensions as the European powers politicized ethnicity and enabled urban political mobilization, leading toward rebellion in the 1960s and Somalia’s irredentism in the 1970s. I argue here that Ethiopian political reorganization intersected with European power earlier in the century in the Ethiopia-British Somaliland borderlands in ways that made Muslim-dominated commerce a field of hybrid control, neither clearly subject to Ethiopian sovereignty nor to British (nor to any definite agreement between Ethiopian and British officials). This hybridity shaped enduring links between ethno-religious identity, political-economic roles, and understandings of Muslim minorities’ allegiance.

In effect, British efforts to dominate commercial regulation in the trans-border region resulted in a persistent divergence between (highland) Ethiopians’ military-administrative power and the commercial power of Arab, South Asian, and – increasingly during the period – Somali merchants. Amidst the rise between 1900 and 1920 of what Eshete terms “nascent commercial capitalism” in Jigjiga, Somalis, Britons, “foreign” Muslim merchants, and Ethiopians cooperated in some contexts and competed in others over the organization of trans-border commerce. As commercial circulations through towns intensified, so did the devastation of rural areas through conflict and appropriation of Somali livestock wealth, which shaped Somalis’ experiences of urbanism, accumulation, and imperial collaboration. In this conjuncture, urban wealth and power increased even as (and in part because) commerce remained contested between the imperial powers. This undermined both Britons’ and Ethiopians’ efforts to generate a stable economic foundation for state-building as both competed to incentivize – and in a sense transactionalize – Somalis’ allegiances while capturing Somali-borne trade and production.
The study employs data from British archives and travelers’ accounts, regional histories, and early-twentieth-century Somali poetry, interpreted in light of historically-oriented discussions with Jigjigans in the context of research on Jigjiga’s present-day economy. The first section below outlines an urban-theoretical framework that foregrounds Ethiopia’s political shifts and Jigjiga’s extra-regional connections. In the second section, I demonstrate the hybridity of trans-border commercial control attending shifts towards urbanism. In the third section, I turn to discerning the structure of urban-based power amidst the overlap of Ethiopian and British authority. The conclusion suggests how processes that began before 1930 shaped urban fields of power during European occupation (1936–48) and after the region was returned to Ethiopian control.

**Urbanism and capital formation**

Historians have narrated the political-economic transformations associated with ox-plow agriculture’s expansion into the Jigjiga area and commercial growth in the Ethiopian frontier town.10 Extending from these accounts, the urban analytic employed here brings into view a broader landscape of power shaping the growth of regional towns, connected as they were to nascent global capitalist urbanization.11 In the Horn, this meant the intensification of hierarchical connections to “elsewheres”: places distant from immediate experience increasingly impinged on daily life. Within Ethiopia, there was a shift towards an administrative town network formally subordinate to Addis Ababa and its emperor. Simultaneously, British-centered capitalism expanded finance, trade, and migration connections to Aden, Bombay, London, and other ports and administrative centers.

Ethiopia’s intensified contact with European imperialism shaped a transformation in the empire’s spatial organization. Following periods of roving capitals (1400s–1600s) that were essentially redistributive centers and tended to discourage market development, the weak hegemony of Gondar gave way to regionalism (1755–1855) leading up to a shifting locus of power from Magdella to Mekele to Addis Ababa as the empire gradually centralized.12 Addis Ababa’s establishment (ca. 1886) created a permanent site of governance for a modernizing Ethiopia, driven in part by the requirements of sustained contact with European powers under Emperors Yohannes IV (r. 1871–1889) and Menelik II (r. 1889–1913). It also initiated intensified relations with regional towns and – in part through connections with the British-dominated Indian Ocean economy – an economic shift towards investment, finance, and monetary accumulation. The Bank of Abyssinia was established with European support in 1906.13 Merchants and financiers from British India established enterprises in Ethiopia’s growing towns, paralleling Indians’ role as capitalists, customs-brokers, and merchant intermediaries of the British Empire elsewhere.14 Ethiopia’s existing client-patron structures and cultural-economic practices entered new economic realms and a new hierarchy of sustained, spatially-distant relations.

The Ethiopian empire of the early twentieth century was “greatly undercapitalized” (to use Barnes’ phrase)15 in multiple, related senses relative to surrounding European empires. However, imperial elites began appropriating and modifying European models of statecraft, including harnessing trade and finance to accumulate wealth, often in connection with political positions. (This was especially the case with the naggadras system through which Hayla-Giyorgis managed customs administration.)16 The transition can be partly understood in Foucault’s terms regarding European organization: efforts to
establish “a well ‘capitalized’ state, that is to say, a state well organized around a capital as the seat of sovereignty and the central point of political and commercial circulation.” In the context of efforts to territorialize rule and interface with European-centered trade circuits, Addis Ababa and its subordinate towns would ideally serve to conjoin “the state of sovereignty, the territorial state, and the commercial state.” This involved efforts to reorganize regional markets, which until 1900 had been relatively dispersed in the lowland peripheries of Abyssinian control. In the eastern borderlands, trust grounded in shared culture and religion (and clan-based indemnity among Somalis) enabled a geographically fluid system of trade-protectors or abbaan. Spatial concentrations of people and markets occurred seasonally at coastal ports. As they established themselves in the Somali-inhabited lowlands, Ethiopian and British imperial agents sought to capture and force trade and livestock surpluses into predictable forms of capital subject to imperial command, which included establishing permanent market sites amenable to regulation.

In this, imperial agents were not alone, and they were not simply coercive in their relationships with Somalis. Indian and Arab merchants who had long plied eastern Africa’s coasts seasonally were expanding their trade networks farther into the interior. Somalis’ abbaan trade system was shaped by Islamic principles, mediated by qadis (judges), and facilitated by Sufi brotherhoods (tariqas) in ways that facilitated connections with other Muslim merchants. Currents of religion and trade, not only imperial powers, pushed people toward towns. Across the border from Jigjiga, Hargeisa was established by Sheikh Madar (trained under Harar’s Qadiriyah tariqa) and by 1890 was an emerging site of sedentarization and agriculture. Somali traders settled in towns and jostled for positions in emerging markets and imperial structures, playing various roles in the emergence of regional borderlands urbanism. Jigjiga town became, in Lefebvre’s phrase, “the theatre and the stake” of struggles over appropriation and accumulation among various interest groups. Viewed through a Somali concept of cultural-economy (dhaqan-dhaqaale), shifts towards marketization, urbanization, and hierarchical relationships entailed cultural transformations in the intersections of authority, wealth, and identity. Regional commercial change and its effects are examined in the following section.

**Commercial sovereignty in the borderlands**

The distinct strategies and requirements of Ethiopian and British rule over Somalis led imperial authorities to cooperate in some ways and compete in others, creating a situation of overlapping and blurred authority as much as the “competition for empire” that some have described. Treaties that defined social and territorial boundaries between British and Ethiopian sovereignty created a disaggregation between territorial rule, on one hand, and on the other, governance over subjects—along with their production and trade. Historians of Somaliland, drawing on British records, note high taxes in kind and raiding of livestock by Ethiopian authorities as practices introducing new pressures on Somali pastoralism. Some appear to implicitly accept that British commerce-oriented rule was more beneficial, whatever its shortcomings. What is often overlooked is that the Jigjiga administration’s strategies of rule shifted, haltingly and contingently, between the 1890s and the 1920s towards more “productive” avenues of capturing trade circulations. In fact, the interest of local Ethiopian authorities came to partially align with...
British interests in fostering commercial development and even attracting British-protected merchants into Ethiopia.

British imperial representatives had established treaties of protection with Somali coastal clans during the 1880s – including branches of the Isaq, Gadabursi, and ‘Is. In their initial extension into the northern Horn, British authorities recognized Italian claims of a protectorate over Ethiopia: an 1894 agreement with Italy was the first formal territorial delimitation. British claims extended inland to the trade town of Jeldessa (an Ethiopian post on the Harar-Zeila route) and nearly to Jigjiga. These arrangements roughly approximated British Somaliland officials’ understandings of Somali clans’ “natural” boundaries. Menelik’s victory over Italian forces at Adowa in 1896 rendered Italy’s claims over Ethiopia void, forcing the French in Djibouti and the British in Somaliland to deal with Menelik and his provincial rulers in defining their colonial domains. In 1897, Rennell Rodd and Ras Makonnen (provincial ruler of Harar) agreed on a new territorial delimitation between British Somaliland and Ethiopia (Figure 1).

The 1897 Anglo-Ethiopia boundary agreement did not, in Britons’ views, supersede their previous treaties with Somalis. To reconcile territorial delimitation with previous British-Somali treaties of protection, the agreement codified Somalis’ rights to move and graze livestock across the boundary within their “traditional” grazing grounds. As a result, numerous “British Somali” subjects inhabited Ethiopian territory at any given time. (British authorities did not reciprocally recognize Ethiopian sovereignty over any Somalis grazing in Somaliland.) British-protected Somalis, in other words, could cross the border into Ethiopia without their official status as British-protected persons changing. Practically, however, when British-protected Somalis entered Ethiopian territory, British capacity to protect them and their livestock (and trade items) was moderated through the overlap with Ethiopian rule. Britons themselves required permission to cross the

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**Figure 1.** Pre-1897 British Somaliland territorial claim and clan areas, drawn based on Ravenstein’s 1894 map, and regional borders as they came to exist in the early 20th century.
border. More often, it was British consuls in Ethiopia who traveled from Addis Ababa or Harar to Jigjiga to solve issues involving British-protected Somalis. The Ethiopian administration in Jigjiga became, to some extent, arbiters of British power. Borderlands Somalis, in principle subject to one empire or the other, found themselves in practice subject to multiple forms of governance and competing incentives for production, trade, and allegiance.

**Commerce among other forms of power**

Historically, Ethiopia’s political system was ill-equipped to mobilize surplus, and military expansion required that forces live off their surroundings. As the eastern arm of Abyssinian expansion reached pastoralist areas below Harar, this meant forcefully collecting livestock, part of a head-tax or gibir, which by the 1890s was regularly amassed at Jigjiga and sent to Harar. The gibir raised an outcry among Somalis, who “rejected it out of hand,” in the words of one local historian. Taxation in livestock became a fundamental issue for the construction of Ethiopian rule not only because of the force employed by Amhara “outsiders” to secure it, but also because it redirected resources from then-existing forms of power prevalent among Somalis.

For northern Somalis at the turn of the century, command over livestock was a linchpin of social mobilization. Livestock were a material basis for the articulation between kinship, markets, and political power. Camels were given to a bride’s family during marriages (meher), which forged inter-clan alliances. They were paid as restitution (mag) for physical injury or murder. Because of these functions, people who had accumulated livestock wealth could exercise some direction on alliances, conflict, and reconciliation. According to British sources, it was not uncommon by the late nineteenth century for Somali elders to own 1500 she-camels each, along with “innumerable” sheep. Livestock were subject to individual accumulation, but were not purely private resources since (as with other eastern African pastoralist societies) within lineage groups, part of each household’s wealth (xoolo, also livestock) could be claimed in cases of marriage or indemnity for damages. Practices of livestock ownership bred a web of obligations which, in I. M. Lewis’ words, resulted in “considerable variations in wealth” existing within the “fundamentally egalitarian nature of Somali society.”

Livestock holdings, already reduced by rinderpest in the early 1890s, were now subject to new pressures and patterns of accumulation enforced by imperial agents. Not only did Ethiopian officials impose the gibir, but Sayyid Mohamed Abdille Hassan launched his anticolonial Dervish jihad in 1899–1900 and began raiding stock from Somalis who refused to align with him. Britons violently raided Protectorate Somalis who appeared sympathetic to the jihad (labeling these eviscerations as fines). Tensions between imperial authority and Somali modes of command over livestock are highlighted by incidents such as an April 1904 raid in which British forces confiscated camels from Warsangeli followers of Sayyid Mohamed. The recognized Warsangeli sultan, “with true Somali effrontery, subsequently put in a claim for the 800 camels, on the ground of their being tribal property.”

These new valences of livestock wealth combined with the extension of market forces and imperial authority to initiate debates among Somalis about the meanings and morality of accumulation, and the power that attended it. Such debates were urgent in the context
of drought, violence, and environmental degradation that decimated Somalis and their livestock in the years after 1910. In the “Halqabsiyo” poem from around 1915, Ogaden leader Qaman Bulhan warned Sayyid Mohamed:

Haddii inaad taajir tahay, tuhuney urkaaga
Todowga xoolaha ninbaa tulud ku si dheeree
Wallee, ina raggow, talo adduun taada uun maaha!30

If your gut suspected you to be wealthy,
There is a man whose wealth is greater in she-camels
By Allah, o son of man, command over earthly things is not yours alone!

Qaman Bulhan’s critique of Sayyid Mohamed’s livestock accumulation emphasizes the multiple registers in which Somalis valued livestock as well as the unpredictability many felt regarding security of possession during the 1910s. Livestock were potential sources of market wealth and a basis of socio-political mobilization, but they were also subject to communal claims and a broader religiously-infused morality of mutual support – functions that were strained amidst scarcity and competing demands.

Somali leaders’ discourses began to contrast such ideal morals with direct imperial collaboration through which individuals might accumulate wealth and power – but also with emerging market-oriented moralities. Especially early in the period, critiques focused on Somali collaboration with Abyssinian or British authorities. Stories abound of Somalis serving as “facilitators” (waddo-mariyo) and tax collectors for Amhara rulers, sometimes skillfully tricking Abyssinian forces, sometimes betraying their own clan members.31 Both highland Ethiopians and Britons sought to co-opt Somali clan structures, and Britons especially tended to understand clans and chiefship as more stable forms of organization than they likely were. Somali clan organization was a rather flexible system of hierarchies that could be mobilized in different contexts; a repertoire of contractual options existed through which Somali clans forged alliances. In the terms of a Somali saying, Ama buur ahow, ama buur ku tiirsanow: “Either be a mountain or lean on one.”32 Smaller groups could join together at a higher level in the segmentary lineage system, or “lean on” larger groups through alliances, though these were often temporary.

In other African settings where colonial power was bureaucratized, clerks and other African colonial employees were able to work as intermediaries of rule in ways that enabled them to accumulate power and resources.33 In distinction, the power of Somali colonial intermediaries tended to be more fluid. Conceptions of authority among Somalis rarely granted exclusive powers to individuals to determine clan allegiances or mobilize collective payments. Ahmed ‘Abdi Haybe writes that the Bah-Magan “rejected the chiefship” (ugaasnimada ku diideen) of Ugas Hashi after he agreed to pay the gibir.34 British officials likewise occasionally found their appointed chiefs no longer recognized as authorities by their clans. By the 1910s, some Ethiopian and British administrators began to focus more intensely on productive avenues of exercising power, especially attracting Somali trade and capitalizing on insecurity and cross-border conflict rather than only seeking to tax and punish unruly subjects. As Barnes observes, the British referred to the recognized Gadabursi chief’s adjutants in the 1910s as “trade agents” and tasked them with attracting goods and grain away from Ethiopian jurisdiction.35

By the 1910s, market relations and a cash economy began to penetrate farther into the Somali interior, prompting Ogaden poet Isma’il Mire to reflect, “neither my ancestors/Nor
I ever knew money exchange.”36 With much livestock in the border area decimated (or exported), urbanization and marketization unfolded along two axes. On one hand, destitute Somalis flocked to towns, especially in Somaliland, to find aid or to settle and begin farming. On the other, Somalis in positions of leadership such as abbaans who had established trade relations began to settle in Jigjiga and work more in the role of brokers.37 Such shifts towards urbanism became a nexus of Somali debate. “To be a broker and a lackey is business fit for the Arabs,” Qaman warned ‘Ali Duh in the famous Silsilad exchange – a reference to town-based Arab and Indian merchants working with imperial authorities. He continued by suggesting that selling could slip towards selling out: “Allah doesn’t support the man who has sold his brother.”38 Ogaden leaders including Qaman and Sayyid Mohamed demeaned the more commerce-oriented (and British-protected) Isaaq as lidoor – “sell to me.” Specific jabs linked the ambiguous allegiances of marketization to urbanism and inequality: “From here to the towns,” wrote Sayyid Mohamed, the Isaaq “put the poor in a ditch” (Meeshiyo magaaloyinkuu maata doox dhigiye).39 Rural poverty, as Mohamed observes, began to advance the terms of trade in towns over the countryside, concentrating profits among town-based Somali and foreign merchants.40

**Commercial sovereignty and extraterritoriality**

Supposedly beneficent British protection of Somalis’ trans-border mobility and pastoralist livelihoods against loudly denigrated Abyssinian taxation had a motive force in Somaliland’s export markets. “The primary responsibility of the Somaliland administration,” writes Samatar, “was to ensure the reproduction of the organic linkage that had developed between the pastoral society and merchants’ capital.”41 Much of the pastoralist production and other trade that fed the coast was generated in Ethiopia. According to trade records from 1899 to 1902, the largest single source of merchandise exports through Somaliland was Harar, which mainly traded with Zeyla’. By the 1902–1903 fiscal year, exports from Zeyla’ had halved in value due to the Djibouti railway and the Dervish War. Exports from Berbera and Bulhar, which had nearly doubled from 1900 to 1902, also stagnated. A geographic visualization of Somaliland’s trade based on trade records from 1899 to 1902 reveals how much of this trade originated along the Protectorate’s western border or – more likely – in Ethiopian territory (records refer to “tribal areas” rather than specific geographic locations). Most non-livestock exports in merchandise in the records originated either beyond the Ethiopian border or with the Habr Awal (Isaaq) and Gadabursi, who straddled the border (Figure 2).

Small stock (sheep and goat) exports were more evenly distributed, with a significant amount originating in the eastern Protectorate (Figure 3). Still, the largest single origin of small stock to both Berbera and Bulhar was the Habr Awal, whose grazing lands stretched westward to Jigjiga. They were also the largest suppliers of cattle for export (over 4000 head), but 1000 head of cattle were also reported to originate in Ogaden country (Figure 4). Firsthand accounts suggest that the borderlands between Jigjiga and Hargeisa hosted large herds of livestock seasonally, regarded by British Somaliland officials as a source of Somaliland’s wealth. Describing his return journey from Jigjiga to Berbera in April 1905 – early in the rainy season, when Habr Awal herds would have begun moving into the Haud – Somaliland’s Commissioner Swayne estimated that “between our border and Jigjiga we could not have seen less than 40,000 camels and
Figure 2. Origins of merchandise exports through Somaliland ports, 1899-1901. Source: F.O. 2/802/248. Locations are approximate and place/clan names are maintained as originally recorded.

Figure 3. Origins of small stock exports through Somaliland ports, 1899-1902. Source: F.O. 2/802/248.
20,000 cattle, as well as very large flocks of sheep. It is impossible,” he concluded, “to overestimate the value of these Haud pastures …”

The western Protectorate and eastern Ethiopia also comprised the main markets for imports (Figure 5). Habr Awal areas received the largest share of imports between 1899 and 1901. It is likely that much of this merchandise was destined for Ethiopian territory. Even as British administrators posed claims about protecting “their” Somalis in terms of Somalis’ “traditional” grazing grounds, British-protected (predominantly Isaq) merchants were pushing deep into Ogaden territory to trade imported goods for livestock, skins, and gums. During the Dervish Wars, when Ogaden caravan trade stopped, the British mourned the loss of access to Ethiopian territory that “has always been looked upon as our most profitable market.”

Though Ogaden traders were barred from Somaliland, Isaq merchants continued to ply Ethiopian trade routes: “Despite the attendant risks to life and property, many of our Ishak traders could not resist the large profits to be obtained by taking food supplies to a country whose caravans could no longer enter the Protectorate.” Later in 1901, despite a formal ban on British-protected Somalis entering Ogaden areas, Maj. Hanbury-Tracy (a British officer accompanying Ethiopian forces during the Dervish campaigns) was approached by traders from Bulhar claiming to be British subjects and requesting the restitution of assets taken by “the Abyssinians.” Over the coming decades, the British Consul at Harar would repeatedly travel to Jigjiga to resolve such disputes over British-protected Somalis’ trade as well as claims for livestock restitution between British- and Ethiopian-protected Somalis. That Isaq merchants utilized Britons as intermediaries in their dealings with Ethiopian authorities highlights the fluid nature

Figure 4. Origins of cattle exports through Somaliland ports, 1899-1902. Source: F.O. 2/802/248.
of commercial regulation, in which British and Ethiopian officials reached no clear agreement on joint customs collection or rights to tax borderlands pastoralists and merchants.

**Towards urban-centered power**

Somalis’ trade was stimulated and captured not only by British authorities, but also by Ethiopian officials in Jigjiga who leveraged their position in the growing trade economy. External (“international”) and internal customs imposed at trade-gates or *kella* were gaining importance alongside *gibir*. By 1900, the institution of *naggadras* or head customs official was becoming an important source of monetary capital for the Empire and its core politicians, including Hayla Giyorgis, who oversaw customs administration from Addis Ababa. According to Garretson, the increasing importance of cash reserves promoted centralization of power in Addis Ababa and customs posts leading to the capital, including Harar.

British subjects, agents of the “informal empire” of Indian Ocean commerce, were both financiers and beneficiaries of this political centralization. As early as the mid-1890s, Harar’s Governor Ras Makonnen reportedly joined an Indian merchant known as Mohamedally as a financial partner.47 Launching operations in Addis Ababa, Dire Dawa, Jigjiga, and elsewhere, Mohamedally Shaikh Sharafaly and his partners – relatives and fellow members of the Dawoodi Bohra (Shia) community – utilized their connections to Aden and British Somaliland as well as political patronage in Ethiopia to establish a thriving trade enterprise. While these Indians were British subjects, they were evidently regarded
as close allies by Ras Makonnen and his descendants: photographic evidence shows Ras Tafari visiting Mohamedally, likely in the 1920s shortly before the former’s coronation as Emperor Haile Selassie I.48

The contingent convergence of the interests of Britons, Muslim merchants and Ethiopians in the Harar area was highlighted when Menelik named Dejazmach Balcha Governor of Harar in 1907. Balcha seems to have appointed his own, very unpopular, naggadras.49 “The relations between Balcha and the European and other merchants could not be worse,” observes one report, “and, as by far the greater number of these – 90 to 95 per cent – are British subjects, this to all intents and purposes means the relations between Balcha and British interests.” The result was “a never-ceasing struggle between our representative, Mr. Gerolimato, and Balcha.”50 Balcha also halted the restitution of livestock to British-protected Somalis,51 but Britons were so confident of their influence that Gerolimato evidently believed he held “the Somali tribes of this district, so to speak in the hollow of his hand ….”52 British officials pushed for Balcha’s removal. In 1911, Hayla Giyorgis named his brother Besrate as Naggadras of Harar, and the two “sought to increase their revenues by expanding Ethiopian trade through Somaliland ….”53 “Hayla Giyorgis, and perhaps the Naggadras as a group,” Garretson suggests, seem to be among the first within the Ethiopian feudal system to have been deeply involved in a money economy. In a country where taxes were still almost wholly in kind, they were among the largest handlers of liquid capital in the empire.54

Jigjiga’s administrators benefitted from the expansion of British-protected trade, most visibly by the early 1910s. Britain abandoned the Somaliland interior in 1910 facing mounting costs and the protracted Dervish War’s unpopularity. On their return in 1914, officials found that Jigjiga’s governor Abdullah Taha had imposed a yearly tribute on clans along the border, and also employed clan leaders to work with Jigjiga’s administration. While protesting these relationships between “British” Somalis and Ethiopian authorities and complaining of taxes imposed to maintain these representatives, Dodds (British Vice-Consul in Ethiopia) expressed his intention “to recapture the trade now passing through Jig Jigga for the benefit of our Somaliland protectorate.” “The Somali would prefer to deal through a British town,” he wrote, “where he well knows that he will always meet with just treatment and a small taxation, which he cannot expect to enjoy at the hands of the Abyssinian authorities.”55 Contention between Britons and Ethiopians in the borderlands had largely come to revolve around the management of trade and mobility, the management of circulations – and the “capitalization” of governance through the capture of these circulations in towns.

Urbanism and power in the borderlands
By 1915, Jigjiga’s function as an administrative site was paralleled by its growing centrality in cross-border commerce, which attracted groups other than Abyssinians, Somalis, and Britons. The imperial convergence in the eastern borderlands refigured and localized ethnic and religious differences in market participation. According to Pankhurst, Muslims had tended to dominate trade in Ethiopia for three reasons: (1) trade was “held in disrepute by the Christian majority of the highlands”; (2) “the principal trade routes led through Islamic areas”; and (3) Orthodox doctrine restricted Christians’
participation in the lucrative slave trade.\textsuperscript{56} Now, Somalis, Arabs, and South Asian merchants entered Ethiopian commerce with the benefit of being able to claim British protection. This shaped the emergence of a multi-ethnic urban milieu in which military-administrative power under Amhara leadership tended to diverge from Muslim groups’ commercial influence and connections to Somaliland. In Jigjiga from about 1900–1920, however, administrative and commercial power converged under an Arab-dominated administration that loosely conjoined British and Ethiopian interests.

Diverse ethnic groups congregated in regional towns amidst eastward Abyssinian expansion. On the eve of Jigjiga’s establishment as a permanent outpost, Jeldessa dominated Harar-Zeila trade. Visiting Jeldessa in 1892, the Swayne brothers – British “explorers,” one of whom would subsequently become Somaliland’s commissioner – encountered a lively scene: “a swarm of people of mixed eastern races blocked the way, bartering cloth, tobacco, coffee, and other articles of trade; and among the Abyssinians, Gallas, Somalis, and Hararis I observed several men of the black Soudanese type.”\textsuperscript{57} An “Abyssinian guard-house” featured centrally, reflecting recent Amhara expansion into this space. Yet in Jeldessa the Swaynes also discovered ostensible British subjects: Adeni Arab merchants brought them gifts, and Somalis claimed to be British subjects – including an elderly Ise man who “had been to London and Bombay as a ship’s fireman.”\textsuperscript{58} After the 1897 border delimitation, Jeldessa all but disappeared from British records while Jigjiga’s position in the borderlands solidified. Along with the permanent establishment of an Amhara-dominated garrison at Jigjiga, the town began to take on Jeldessa’s multi-ethnic and commercial character.

\textbf{Conflict and trade under Abdullah Taha}

In 1898, two other Britons visited Jigjiga en route to Harar during separate “expeditions” to explore the terrain and liaise with Ethiopian officials. They found permanent structures and rudiments of a town administration.\textsuperscript{59} Abdullah Taha, a Muslim of Yemeni descent and long-time Harar resident, employed a strategy of establishing links between Ethiopian and British imperial interests, seeking to capture the benefits of his borderlands position and maintain friendly relations with Britons as well as his Ethiopian superiors. His status in Jigjiga under Ras Makonnen’s Harar administration testifies to the degree of ethnic and religious openness in the region, even if Amhara rulers bore ultimate military and judicial authority.\textsuperscript{60} Abdullah Taha built Jigjiga’s central mosque, the \textit{Masjid Jama’}, seeking to build relationships in what Eshete calls “a reversal compared to other scenes of imperial expansion in the Hararghe region,”\textsuperscript{61} where government officials constructed Orthodox churches as a symbol of Amhara dominance. In Jigjiga under Abdullah Taha’s administration “The Arabs … dominated commercial life,” their position “strengthened by the active support they received from the governor.”\textsuperscript{62}

Complementarities between military-administrative and commercial interests emerged amidst British-Ethiopian cooperation against Sayyid Mohamed’s Dervishes. The Dervishes attacked Jigjiga in 1899, and for the next two decades Jigjiga served as an advanced base for supplying Ethiopian forces as well as for Ethiopian-British military coordination. The ravages of war created new opportunities for accumulation, three of which are prominent.
First, Somalis’ livestock gained new significance to urban-based accumulation. While pastoralists’ livelihoods were decimated, Samatar argues, Somaliland’s revenues “improved markedly as a result of the increase in trade of skins, sheep and goats, and food imports.” Some Britons almost celebrated the insecurity that promised to drive cheap goods toward Protectorate ports, via Jigjiga: “In the general insecurity of life and property which now prevailed in the Ogaden,” wrote Somaliland’s Vice-Consul to his superior in 1901, “accumulations of property were a constant source of anxiety to their owners…. Was it not better to make their peace with the Abyssinians and be able to send their property up to our ports out of harm’s way…” Insecurity fed livestock accumulation at Jigjiga in another way as well: as cross-border and inter-clan conflict resolution came under imperial control, Abdullah Taha employed Somali clan representatives at Jigjiga. By 1910, “traditional” dispute resolution through livestock payments became an expensive affair, costing British-protected clans each an annual tribute of at least 300 and – Britons claimed – up to 1000 sheep to cover overhead expenses including the payment of clan representatives (caakils). Despite British complaints about Abdullah’s employment of British Somalis, he was essential to Somaliland administrators’ capacity to advance their extraterritorial Somalis’ interests. British officials recognized that there was “a better chance of obtaining a settlement locally … than by approaching the Central Government, whose power in the outlying districts is extremely shadowy.”

Second, South Asians and Arabs – including Abdullah Taha’s relatives – moved in to capitalize on the war effort. Mohamedally & Co. initially supplied Ethiopian forces, foreshadowing South Asian merchant presence in Jigjiga that grew to about 15 firms by 1935. Even though such merchants were British subjects, their financial interests aligned rather obliquely with those of Somaliland authorities. Their connections with Aden and Bombay expanded Somaliland’s transit trade, to be sure; yet some firms’ presence in Harar and Dire Dawa meant they also sought to capitalize on economic growth surrounding the French-controlled Djibouti railway which transited Dire Dawa. While Eshete notes the growing Arab and Indian presence in Jigjiga before 1930 – and the importance of Arab links with a growing Habr Awal merchant class – he pays little attention to the fact that many Arabs, Indians, and Isaq were British subjects. Migration and increasing connections between Jigjiga and extra-regional cities in the British Empire, from Aden to Bombay, Suez, Cardiff, and London, had important political implications.

Third, British-Ethiopian cooperation in the Dervish conflict enhanced Jigjiga’s position as a linchpin of cash circulations connected to the Indian Ocean economy. While taxation in kind continued, Britons who passed through Jigjiga observed that Abdullah Taha had also imposed cash taxes, potentially incentivizing Somalis’ participation in Somaliland-centered monetary circuits: as Hanbury-Tracy observed in 1901, a tax of 10 annas (a division of rupees) per camel as well as taxation in kind made Abdullah Taha “a very wealthy man in these parts.” That Hayla-Giyorgis sought within the following decade to expand Somaliland trade and capture the customs revenue from it, as indicated above, suggests the increasing circulation of cash among merchants and officials in Jigjiga as elsewhere in Hararghe. Indeed, numerous Somalis by this time were involved in an international cash economy, moving between wage-work abroad (often in British shipping) and pastoralism – or, increasingly, trade – in the northern Horn.
Migration, cash and British colonial connections

The political-economic implications of Jigjiga’s emerging transnational character in the early twentieth century have been largely overlooked in regional historians’ focus on Ethiopian state-building. British colonial subjects including Indians and Arabs were intensifying Jigjiga’s trade connections with Aden and Bombay. That a British representative visited Jigjiga in 1930 and met with British-Indian traders indicates the persistent importance of Jigjiga’s foreign merchants for Somaliland’s commerce.71 The commercial ascendency of Habr Awal merchants in Jigjiga, noted by Eshete72 and still discernible in present-day markets, also drew the town into circulations associated with labor migration.

Somali migration had extended the northern Horn’s economy into Britain even before the British attempted to extend their imperial political economy into Ethiopia. Somali and Arab seamen seem to have settled in Britain after the Suez Canal opened (1869), in ports including Cardiff and South Shields.73 In the World War I shipping boom, Somalis served as stokehold crews on British ships, a fact that emerges in official records when the shipping boom ended and the now-unemployed Somalis were deported.74 Whether through voluntary return or deportation, nascent patterns of return migration were converting wages earned abroad into livestock and other forms of capital in the Horn, not only in the north but also in Kenya, where an Isaaq merchant class strategically utilized their British connections to establish themselves.75 British observers tended to write off return migration as a reversion to timeless Somali pastoralism. Secretary to the Somaliland Administration Douglas Jardine, wrote in 1923 that successful Somali migrants eventually “find their way back to their tribe with one ambition in life, namely, to be once again the normal nomadic tribesman.”76 Rather than a simple return to timeless nomadic pastoralism, however, these dynamics were one element of shifting loci of power towards extensive urban-centered networks. From a regional perspective, patterns of return migration were generating a racialized counter-system in which wages abroad could be converted into capital within the Horn’s cultural economy. London and Cardiff could become, as it were, a periphery of the eastern Ethiopian borderlands for Somalis who accumulated resources abroad and established themselves as wealthy nomads or town-based traders.77 It is likely that some of Jigjiga’s Isaaq merchants accumulated cash from extra-regional migration; at the very least, some were probably connected to return migrants’ commercial enterprises in Somaliland.

Whereas in places like Britain and Egypt, colonial subjects faced marginalization in labor competition with nationals during the 1920s,78 in Ethiopia, British authorities could work to advance Somalis’, Indians’, and Arabs’ commercial competition with locals. By the 1920s, the intersection of ethnicity and British subjecthood was gaining increasing political importance throughout eastern Ethiopia. Ethiopia’s Special Court, established in 1922, saw a growing number of eastern Ethiopian court cases involving claims by Indian, Arab, and Somali British subjects trading in Ethiopia.79 Abdullah Taha and his successors, insofar as they encouraged Jigjiga’s commercial growth through such trade, invited hybrid forms of governance into the region. While administrative and military power rested primarily with Amhara officials, Arabs, South Asians, and (by the 1920s) Somali merchants with links to Somaliland controlled commerce. This shaped subsequent ethnic politics in Jigiiga and its surroundings.
Notes on transactionality and ethiopianization

While Ethiopian administration began with punitive tax-collecting expeditions, Abdullah Taha initiated a much more commerce-based effort to attract Somali allegiance to Jigjiga’s administration. The most productive Ethiopian efforts to govern Somalis hinged during the 1910s–1920s on commercial development that would attract Somali affiliation, rather than unproductive efforts to forcibly subject Somalis who could escape across the border – or just claim to be British subjects. In the fluid borderlands political economy, commerce became effectively a mode of governance through which Ethiopians and Britons competed for the presence and loyalty – even if ephemeral – of merchants and mobile Somalis. Under Abdullah Taha’s governorship, Jigjiga became a commercial town but hardly an “Ethiopian town” in the sense of Amhara cultural dominance and clear subservience to the imperial urban network centering on Addis Ababa. This is not to denigrate market-oriented interests as somehow less honorable than enduring political loyalty, but to argue that struggles between British and Ethiopian interests, their lack of resolution, and the decimation of pastoralist production made political filiation less relevant in everyday life than market opportunities for Somalis in the Jigjiga area. To uncover cultural understandings of the relationship between marketization and imperial authority would require more in-depth study than has yet been undertaken, but prior to concluding, I offer some brief reflections on this topic.

Jigjiga became a locus of efforts to “Ethiopianize” Somalis during Lij Yasu’s ill-fated effort to attract Muslim support during his brief rule as designated emperor (1913–1916). The effort backfired, resulting in violent battles around Harar and Babile as Lij Yasu was ousted, and in the flight of Somali men from Jigjiga. This initial effort at political rapprochement between Somalis and Ethiopian authorities appeared less successful than Abdullah Taha’s focus on commercial links.

Tekle-Hawaryat’s administration sought to ease ethnic relations again by creating economic opportunities that would benefit Somalis and provide a tax base for local administration. Raised in Russia, Tekle-Hawaryat brought European approaches to the task of centralizing trade and administration. Along with establishing a market site and stone customs office, Tekle-Hawaryat led the way in promoting agriculture as a means of aligning Somalis’ interests with the Jigjiga administration. He operated a model farm and sought to stoke competition for grain production among Somalis. He reports working to expand trade, with the benefit that local taxes funded local administration rather than being forwarded to Addis Ababa. Writes Barnes, “grain supplies encouraged settlement and attracted Somalis to the Jigjiga markets. In some ways this had led to an ‘Ethiopianisation’ of Somali life.”

Yet the expansion of grain cultivation also brought into relief the reality that commerce – and Ethiopian efforts to govern it – remained under significant British influence, even in “Ethiopianizing” Jigjiga. During Balcha’s enforcement of grain export prohibitions a decade earlier, and persistently in the face of Ethiopian efforts to tax trade, Britons subtly encouraged and legitimized cross-border commerce that in Ethiopians’ eyes constituted smuggling and tax-evasion. When grain cultivation expanded during the 1910s–20s, demand for grain in Somaliland encouraged Britons to tacitly incentivize grain smuggling and to combat Ethiopian efforts to tax borderlands Somalis in Ethiopia’s Special Court. British influence placed the field of commerce beyond exclusive Ethiopian sovereignty,
creating incentives for merchants and trans-border Somali populations alike to reject Ethiopian efforts to tax and govern the borderlands.

Relations between Abyssinian highlanders and eastern Muslims had been less than friendly for centuries, but British influence over the region’s commerce increasingly precluded the very possibility of rapprochement: it was not only Somalis’ supposed “unruliness,” but British involvement, that contributed to Ethiopian administrators’ views of the Somali as “a problem,” in Carmichael’s terms. As Britons protected Somalis’ and foreign Muslims’ commerce from Ethiopian taxation, their inclusion in British-favored markets tended to mark them as either loyal to non-Ethiopians or loyal only to their (market) interests, as “fickle” subjects in a primarily economic relationship with Ethiopian authority.

By the eve of Italy’s 1936 invasion, Jigjiga had assumed the most vibrant multi-ethnic and transnational character that it would exhibit until the 1990s. While European occupation from 1936 to 1948 drove some other aspects of urbanization, including expanded transport infrastructure connecting Jigjiga to Italian and British Somalilands, from another perspective Jigjiga’s subsequent history was a reversion to the “garrison town” status it held before 1900. Italians’ ousting of Indian firms and their favoritism towards Somalis over highlanders created space for the rise of Somali merchants, but Italian rule’s brevity and the return of Ethiopian administrators under British tutelage after 1941 only enhanced the functional division between “Somali” commerce and “Ethiopian” (colonial) governance.

Somalis in Ethiopia, according to local histories, recognized by the 1940s that their full political inclusion in either Somaliland or Ethiopia had been effectively proscribed. Ogaden leaders rejected Isaq dominance — understood in terms of their role as “brokers” for the foreigners and as “townspeople” (reer-magaal) with extra-regional connections advanced by their British alliance. According to (perhaps apocryphal) histories voiced by current political elites in Somali Region, however, Ogaden leaders also submitted to Ethiopian authority in their own transactional terms: Ushada nin aad ka qaadan kartaa loo dhiibtaa (“The staff [of authority] is given to a man from whom you can take it away”) is a phrase that famously describes Ogaden alignment with Ethiopia. In other words, alliance with Ethiopian power was strategic and contingent. Mid-century Ethiopian policy focused on incentivizing Ogaden allegiance by providing salaries to chiefs and appointing them advisors. If Ogaden leaders were hoping for favorable Ethiopian policies towards their own interests in commerce and livestock production after years of competing with British-protected clans, however, they were soon disappointed. A livestock tax was re-imposed in 1963 and leaders who had contested British and Isaq dominance rebelled against Ethiopian taxation.

**Looking forward: ethnicity and power in urban society**

Between 2016 and 2018, during research on present-day urbanization in Jigjiga, I sat down with several Jigiigans who had grown up in the town between the 1950s and 1970s and investigated their recollections. All recalled Jigjiga’s segregation, differentiating the town into (1) the northern “Ethiopian” section, (2) an Arab and Harari section to the southeast, and (3) a Suq Somali to the southwest. Musa (a pseudonym), a Somali businessman who grew up in Jigjiga during the 1960s, motions to the central market: “This is the Mel’Arab,”
he tells me. “The Yemeni arrived here … so there are Arab homes here. This is the Somali side” – he motions to the southwest – and the town’s southern side “is the Muslim side altogether.” Musa and others recognize northern Jigjiga’s central feature as St. Michael Orthodox Church. “That’s where Ethiopians, you know, they buried – their cemetery for them, church for them.”

88 If Ethiopian towns were sites for “imagining and constructing Ethiopia as a modern and national space,” the Ethiopian nation seemed foreign to mid-century Jigjiga. Jigjiga’s ethno-religious segregation could be interpreted within the frame of colonial urbanism as a reflection of Amhara-dominated urban-centered rule imposed on Somalis. Indeed, this is a common feeling among Jigjigans today.

To be clear, I have argued not that Ethiopian rule over Somalis was in no way colonial or violent, but rather that the intensification of Abyssinian-Somali relations was fundamentally shaped by the divergence between formal Ethiopian territorial sovereignty and Muslim-dominated commerce, a field of power indelibly marked by the influence of British administrators and British-protected merchants. The hybridity of borderlands urbanism that I have described gave way under Italian and British administrations to more racially- and territorially-defined domains of sovereignty which were reinscribed in urban space. Eshete’s analysis suggests that much of this spatial layout and intensified ethnic segregation is an artifact of European rule during the 1930s–1940s. By 1940, the town was divided into a “native district” (corresponding to Musa’s “Muslim side of town”)

Figure 6. Spatial layout of Jigjiga, 1930s-1940s. The grey background and map text are drawn based on a 1938 Italian urban plan reprinted in Eshete’s M.A. thesis. Buildings and roads from 1941 are drawn based on map EAF 357 in the Royal Geographical Society Archives, London.
and a “national district” dominated by European presence (and Amhara who remained in Jigjiga under an unfriendly Italian administration) (see Figure 6).

British protection of Muslims’ commerce – including trans-border trade regarded as smuggling by Ethiopian authorities – shaped the distribution of power among urban ethnic groups. By mid-century, Jigjiga was both an administrative center for Ethiopian governance over Somalis and, paradoxically, a capital of “contraband” trade. Conflict between these two functions played out as ethnic tensions between “bureaucratic” Ethiopians and “unruly” Somalis, heightened by secessionist sentiments and Somalian irredentism. Continuing his description, Musa highlights that ethno-religious segregation was equally a segregation in domains of power. “Mostly people never crossed to [the north] side,” he asserts, “unless you have something to do with the government or anything, because everything here is …” he trails off. But he and others who discussed Jigjiga’s urbanism frequently completed the thought that everything on the north side was “Ethiopian” – associated with state administration, military, and occupation. In contrast, Musa’s father was a cross-border livestock broker and sometime smuggler. “We – you know, mostly Somalis did contraband.”

In the eyes of numerous informants, historical urban ethnic relations were framed in terms of Amhara military-administrative power and Somali dominance over commerce, and especially “contraband.” Yet when elders look back beyond the British and Italian occupations, many narrate oral histories of leaders like Abdullah Taha and Tekle-Hawaryat in fond terms, tracing Jigjiga’s market growth and multi-ethnic character to that brief period, and notably to its pro-trade policies. As evidenced through British archival sources and Somali poetry examined here, Jigjiga’s history is not strictly one of ethnic antagonism, nor of harmony: Jigjiga rose from eastern Ethiopia’s plains amidst a crisis of conflict and drought, and through a much more contested transnational conjuncture than historians oriented towards either Ethiopian or British Somaliland perspectives have explained. One element of this was British efforts to govern trade circulations through their “extra-territorial subjects,” which kept cross-border commerce always partially beyond the reach of “Ethiopian” regulation. This had enduring results for the town that was by the end of the twentieth century both the capital of Ethiopia’s Somali Regional State and the capital of Ethiopia’s contraband trade.

Notes

4. “Abyssinian” is used for continuity with source materials. It intends Ethiopian highlanders or Habesha (including Amhara).
9. The use of the terms “Britons” and “Ethiopians” has some slippage between officials and individual citizens. However, I intentionally use these terms to disaggregate the empires and observe that their policies were pursued in the borderlands by individuals loosely affiliated
but not always acting in unison. The study also seeks to place “Britons” and “Ethiopians” on the same analytic plane as “Somalis,” as individuals tied to broader cultural and political organizations rather than as homogeneous groups.

19. Bosaso or Bandar Kasim reportedly doubled in population from 5-600 to 1000 during the trading season, when Warsangeli and Dhulbahante traders brought gums, frankincense, ostrich feathers, sheep and ghee (Great Britain War Office, Official History, 29). Drake-Brockman estimated that Berbera’s population had grown due to wartime displacement, but still fluctuated between 8–10,000 in the summer and 20–40,000 in the winter (Drake-Brockman, British Somaliland, 35).
20. Lefebvre, Writings on Cities, 105.
23. In 1891, Somaliland’s Consul Stace suggested, for example, that the Gadabursi boundary “is naturally defined by the “Bin,” or treeless arid tract separating them, as by a long broad strip, from the Somali tribes under Harrar …” British National Archives (BNA), F.O. 403/155, Inclosure 1 in No. 60, “Memorandum on proposed delimitation of the Somali Coast Protectorate with the Italians on the South,” 43. All archival citations are from BNA.
24. Eshete, Jijiga, 10–12.
27. Lewis, A Pastoral Democracy, 197.
28. On the British side, “[a] large number of transport spearmen were paid entirely in camels, and wounded men and the relatives of the dead were in the same manner compensated.” Returning from an offensive against Halin village in 1902, a British force drove “about 12,000 camels, 35,000 sheep, besides cattle”; an estimated 25,000 camels were captured during the 1902 summer campaign (Great Britain War Office, Official History, 81; 100; 108).
31. Ibid., 27–8.
34. Haybe, Qamaan Bulxan, 28.
37. Eshete, Jijiga, 30.
38. Quoted in Andrzejkewski and Galaal, “A Somali Poetic Combat - II.”
42. F.O. 401/18, Inclosure 1 in No. 87, Swayne to Lyttelton, April 8, 1905, 62.
43. F.O. 403/313, No. 56, Sadler to the Marquess of Landsdowne, July 21, 1901, 48.
46. E.g. F.O. 401/10, No. 277, Gerolimato to Clark, Dec. 12, 1907; F.O. 401/14, Nos. 59 and 61; F.O. 401/15, Enclosure in No. 3, Manning to Crewe, June 2, 1910.
48. Ibid., 293.
50. F.O. 401/13, Inclosure 2 in No. 51. Notes on Political Situation at Harrar.
51. F.O. 401/12, No. 50, Hervey to Grey, February 13, 1909, 33.
52. F.O. 401/13, Inclosure 2 in No. 51, Notes on Political Situation at Harrar.
54. Ibid., 438.
55. F.O. 401/16, Enclosure 1 in No. 70, Dodds to Doughty-Wylie, June 29, 1914, 71.
57. Swayne, Seventeen Trips, 136.
58. See ibid., 141–2.
60. Carmichael, “Approaching Ethiopian History.”
62. Ibid., 16.
64. F.O. 403/313, Inclosure 2 in No. 56, Cordeaux to Sadler, April 30, 1901, 59.
65. F.O. 401/8, Inclosure 2 in No. 87, Report of discussions between Somaliland Commissioner and Ras Makunen at Jigjiga, March 1905, 66.
66. F.O. 401/12, No. 10, General Report on Abyssinia for the years 1907–1908, 11c.
67. Jennings and Addison, With the Abyssinians in Somaliland, 132.
68. Eshete, Jiijiga, 30.
69. Ibid., 30.
70. Hanbury-Tracy, Expedition from Abyssinia to Somaliland, 32.
71. Eshete, Jiijiga, 32.
72. Ibid., 31.
74. See C.O. 535/60/39077 on “Removal of undesirable Somalis.”
75. Weitzberg, We Do Not Have Borders, 56–63.
78. See Byrne, “The 1930 ‘Arab Riot’ in South Shields.”
79. Scholler, The Special Court of Ethiopia; Thompson, “Border Crimes.”
83. Thompson, “Border Crimes.”
86. Eshete, Jiijiga, 38.
90. Eshete, Jiijiga, 38.
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