THE PLAY OF CHARACTER IN PLATO'S DIALOGUES

RUBY BLONDELL

CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS

THE PLAY OF CHARACTER IN PLATO'S DIALOGUES

Despite the recent explosion of interest in alternative ways of reading Plato, a gulf still exists between "literary" and "philosophical" interpretations. This book attempts to bridge that division by focussing on Plato's use of characterization, which is both intrinsic to the "literary" questions raised by his use of dramatic form, and fundamental to his "philosophical" concern with moral character. Form and content are also reciprocally related through Plato's preoccupation with literary characterization on the discursive level. Two opening chapters examine the methodological issues involved in reading Plato "as drama," and other preliminary matters, including ancient Greek conceptions of "character," the figure of Sokrates qua "dramatic" hero, and the influence of literary characters on an audience. The rest of the book offers close readings of select dialogues, chosen to show the wide range of ways in which Plato uses his characters, with special attention to the kaleidoscopic figure of Sokrates.

RUBY BLONDELL is Professor of Classics at the University of Washington, where she has taught since 1985. She is the author (under the name Mary Whitlock Blundell) of *Helping Friends and Harming Enemies: A Study in Sophocles and Greek Ethics* (Cambridge, 1989) and of many articles on Greek drama and philosophy. She has also translated several plays of Sophocles for the Focus Classical Library. Under the name Ruby Blondell, she is a co-author of *Women on the Edge: Four Plays by Euripides* (Routledge, 1999), for which she translated Euripides' *Medea*. Among other professional honors, she has been a Junior Fellow at the Center for Hellenic Studies in Washington, DC, where the present book had its genesis.

This page intentionally left blank

THE PLAY OF CHARACTER IN PLATO'S DIALOGUES

RUBY BLONDELL

University of Washington

CAMBRIDGE
UNIVERSITY PRESS

PUBLISHED BY CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS (VIRTUAL PUBLISHING)
FOR AND ON BEHALF OF THE PRESS SYNDICATE OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE
The Pitt Building, Trumpington Street, Cambridge CB2 IRP
40 West 20th Street, New York, NY 10011-4211, USA
477 Williamstown Road, Port Melbourne, VIC 3207, Australia

http://www.cambridge.org

© Ruby Blondell 2002
This edition © Ruby Blondell 2003

First published in printed format 2002

A catalogue record for the original printed book is available
from the British Library and from the Library of Congress
Original ISBN 0 521 79300 9 hardback

ISBN 0 511 02032 5 virtual (netLibrary Edition)

In memory of my mother
Hester Whitlock Blundell
12 May 1928–1 January 2000

Every great artist has been such by synthesis. Our strength is transitional, alternating; or, shall I say, a thread of two strands. The sea-shore, sea seen from shore, shore seen from sea; the taste of two metals in contact; and our enlarged powers at the approach and at the departure of a friend; the experience of poetic creativeness, which is not found in staying at home, nor yet in traveling, but in transitions from one to the other, which must therefore be adroitly managed to present as much transitional surface as possible; this command of two elements must explain the power and the charm of Plato. Art expresses the one, or the same by the different. Thought seeks to know unity in unity; power to show it by variety; that is, always by an object or symbol. Plato keeps the two vases, one of aether and one of pigment, at his side, and invariably uses both.

Ralph Waldo Emerson

Contents

Preface *page* ix

1 Drama and dialogue 1
- Reading Plato 4
- Plato the "dramatist" 14
- Why dialogue form? 37

2 The imitation of character 53
- "Character" 53
- The Platonic Sokrates 67
- Mimetic pedagogy 80

3 The elenctic Sokrates at work: *Hippias Minor* 113
- The elenctic Sokrates 115
- Hippias and Homer 128
- Sokrates and Hippias 137
- Rewriting Homer 154

4 A changing cast of characters: *Republic* 165
- Socratic testing: three responses 165
- Playing devil's advocate 190
- Sokrates and the sons of Ariston 199
- Self-censorship 228
- Learning by example 245

5 Reproducing Sokrates: *Theaetetus* 251
- Sokrates and the philosopher prince 252
- Likeness 260
- Difference 270
- Cutting the cord 289
- Becoming Sokrates 303

6 Putting Sokrates in his place: *Sophist* and *Statesman* 314
- Plato's triad 314

The Man with No Name 318
Homogenized, pasteurized respondents 326
The visitor's pedagogy 337
Assaulting the father 347
A place for everything, and everything in its place 357
A word is worth a thousand pictures 365
The visitor and Sokrates 378
Silencing Sokrates 386

Bibliography 397
General index 428
Index of passages cited 438

Preface

Perhaps perversely, in view of the size of the present volume, I begin it by regretting some absences. The body of this book consists of readings of a select number of Plato's dialogues. Even at its present length, issues of enormous importance for understanding these works – especially the longer ones – have inevitably been neglected and other dialogues that would richly repay study from the present perspective have received little or no attention. I particularly regret the lack of a chapter on *Symposium*, and a concluding chapter, originally planned, on *Timaeus-Critias*.

My readers will probably feel, however, that the book is quite long enough as it is. In order to prevent it from bulking still larger I have, with regret, drastically reduced the number of secondary references that were present in earlier versions. For this reason the Bibliography contains many items that are no longer referred to in the text or notes. I hope this will make it useful to anyone who wishes to pursue these topics in more detail.

I write at a time when the canons for orthography and linguistic convention of various kinds are in flux. I therefore take this opportunity to clarify my usage in two such areas. First, when speaking of ancient authors and their views, I normally use the traditional, supposedly "unmarked," pronoun "he," reflecting the norms employed by these writers themselves. To supply them with gender-neutral pronouns would both be culturally misleading and provide credit where it is not due. When speaking of modern writers and interpreters such as myself, however, I use either "he" or "she," with a preference for the latter.

Secondly, any writer on ancient Greek texts must make certain choices with regard to the spelling of proper names. On the one hand, accurate transliterations are both closer to the original and provide a fresh sense of ancient Greek writers that liberates them from the fog of Latinity. This practice reflects various attitudes that have transformed and reinvigorated ancient Greek studies over the last few decades. On the other

hand, many well-known names, such as "Plato," have been "naturalized" in English in ways that depart from the original Greek. To transliterate such names – turning Plato back into Platon – seems not only pretentious but actively misleading (unless pronunciation is to be revised along with spelling). Moreover in many cases, transliterating the names of ancient authors, historical figures, and places impedes the ability of students and less specialized scholars to form connections with their pre-existing knowledge, or conduct further research using standard texts and reference tools.

Since this is a time of transition, each writer must devise some more or less uneasy compromise. My own is as follows. I have transliterated the names of mythological, literary, and dramatic figures, including characters in Plato's works, unless such transliteration would clash with "naturalized" modern English pronunciation (thus Sokrates not Socrates, but Ajax not Aias). I have, however, retained the "traditional" Latinate names for ancient writers and the titles of their works, place names, and historical figures who are not mentioned in the dialogues. This has the somewhat anomalous result that certain names will receive two spellings, depending on whether they occur as the name of a dramatic character or the name of a Platonic work (Theaitetos or *Theaetetus*). This superficial inconsistency seems to me a price worth paying, since it reflects my desire to bring out the "dramatic" qualities of Plato's characters in a way that cuts through many traditional preconceptions, while at the same time acknowledging the scholarly tradition that constructs our reading of his dialogues, and allowing for easy cross-reference to texts of existing works by and about him.

This book started its long gestation in 1991–2 during an unforgettable year at the Center for Hellenic Studies in Washington, DC. For financial support since then I am also most grateful to the National Endowment for the Humanities for a Summer Stipend, and to the University of Washington for sabbatical leave, a Royalty Research Fund Award, and a grant from the Simpson Center for the Humanities. For less concrete but equally necessary forms of support, I have more individual people to thank than I can list here. Innumerable friends, teachers, students and colleagues have helped and encouraged me, during the long gestation of this book, in a host of ways: by reading and discussing my work, inviting me to present portions of it at conferences and colloquia, and generously providing me with written comments, specialized knowledge, and/or copies of their own work. For these and other less tangible services I thank especially Hayden Ausland, Larry Bliquez, Joy Connolly, Dan

Devereux, Michael Halleran, Stephen Hinds, David Keyt, John Kirby, Susan Lape, Pierre Mackay, Mark McPherran, Ann Michelini, Mitch Miller, Gary Scott, and Velvet Yates.

I owe further special debts of gratitude to the late great Gregory Vlastos, who like Sokrates lives on to provoke his intellectual progeny; to David Halperin, for inspiration and encouragement over many years; to my department at the University of Washington, than which no group of colleagues could be more congenial; to my undergraduate and graduate students, especially those who have served as my research assistants; to Nick Smith, who elicited the spark that developed into this book; to Zeph and Diana Stewart, and Lisa Kallet, for their friendship and support during my year at the Hellenic Center; to Jerry Press, who gave me much-needed encouragement at a difficult time; to Debra Nails, Lee Perlman and Kenneth Dorter, all of whom read and commented on the entire manuscript at various stages; to Tom Tuozzo, with whom I spent a memorable summer of wine and Plato; to Diskin Clay and Charles Kahn, who refereed the manuscript for the Press and were both, in their different ways, enormously helpful; to Pauline Hire of Cambridge University Press, who patiently encouraged this project over many years, and Michael Sharp, who took it over with tact, courtesy, and accommodation.

Ultimate responsibility for this volume must, however, lie with those who enabled me to produce it: my cats, my friends, and my therapist.

This page intentionally left blank

CHAPTER 1

Drama and dialogue

The reader of Plato's dialogues is seduced by a dazzling interplay of unity and multiplicity. This is generated in part by a series of interlocking and overlapping dualities, the chief of which is presented most often – and most reductively – as a tension between "philosophical" content and "literary" form. By articulating these two factors as interdependent we have already created an artificial split that distorts the lived experience of reading Plato. This emerges vividly from the way Cornford omitted certain "dramatic" elements from his translations of Plato, whereas Livingstone printed dialectical passages of *Phaedo* in smaller type "so that they can be either read or omitted."[1] Yet the "Western" history of ideas in general, and of Platonic studies in particular, makes some such formulation inescapable. Ironically, Plato himself is in part responsible for this situation, through his focus on the "quarrel between poetry and philosophy" (*Rep.* 607b). Indeed, it has recently been argued that he was the inventor (rather than an inheritor) of this supposedly "ancient" quarrel.[2] If so, he was also the inventor of his own mutually hostile, or at least mutually suspicious, interpretive communities, which may be crudely divided into "literary" and "philosophical" camps.[3]

Throughout the last century, however, increasing numbers of interpreters have acknowledged that it creates a false dichotomy, and one that undermines the specific power of Plato's writings, either to disregard the "dramatic" elements, or to view "the arguments as subordinate to the drama."[4] The challenge posed by this admission is not merely to accord

[1] Livingstone 1938: 73; contrast e.g. Cornford 1941.

[2] See Nightingale 1995: 60–67 and cf. Murray 1996: 230–31.

[3] I use these terms as shorthand for the two main branches of Platonic interpretation recently identified by Nails as "literary contextualist" and "analytic developmentalist" respectively (1995: 24–7, 34–50). On "interpretive communities" see Fish 1980: ch. 13–16.

[4] This was the fundamental insight of Schleiermacher that initiated much of the modern debate about Plato as "literature" (see Dobson 1836: 5–19). The latter view, though much less common, is exemplified by Arieti, who is the source of the quotation (1991: 11).

due weight to both content and form, but to address their interrelationship. The present book attempts to do this by looking closely at Plato's use of characterization. As the site of an intrinsic and indissoluble connection between aspects of Plato that are still often viewed as distinct, characterization provides a unique point of purchase for approaching the interdependence of the "literary" and the "philosophical." Since dialogue form entails the representation of persons, a concern with human character and its portrayal is literally essential to reading Plato's works in a way that takes their form into account. At the same time a concern with human character, its formation and representation, pervades the dialogues on the discursive level.[5] Form and content are further reciprocally related by means of Plato's preoccupation with the effects of literary characterization on the moral character of an audience. His own manipulation of his dramatic characters thus intersects in a unique way with issues of moral philosophy, literary form, cultural tradition, and philosophical and pedagogical method.[6] It is integral both to the "literary" enterprise of representing human interaction in spoken dialogue, and the "philosophical" inquiry into the best form of human life and behavior.

This approach to Plato raises a series of questions that will recur throughout this book. Many of these concern human individuality and its transcendence, which are explored on a dramatic level through Plato's representation of characters ranging from the uniquely particularized to the bland and generic. Not least of the ironies that pervade his writings is the fact that the philosopher who did so much to discredit idiosyncrasy was also the most compelling individual portraitist of the ancient world. Most strikingly, and paradoxically, Sokrates, who is represented by Plato as unique in his commitment to the universal, is characterized with an unparalleled degree of particularity. Plato's varying modes of characterization thus replicate a tension in his thought regarding the value of human individuality as such, its philosophical and ethical significance. This echoes a tension in ancient aesthetics between admiration for richness of detail (*poikilia*) and a restrained ideal of human perfection. And this in turn is related to concerns about the impact of artistic representation on the consumer. Mimesis also provides us with

[5] By this I mean the level of what is said, as opposed to the circumstances in which it is said, which I call the dramatic level.

[6] Compare the way Aristotle's definition of dramatic *ēthos*, or "character," as what reveals a moral choice (*prohairesis*), becomes a site for the intersection of mimesis and moral philosophy, poetics and ethics (Halliwell 1986: ch. 5; Blundell 1992a).

Plato's most notorious model for the relationship between the material and transcendent worlds.

Dramatic characterization thus offers us one way of approaching the Platonic concern with placing the particular, or the individual, in larger contexts. On a metaphysical level, there is the problem of how individual human beings, who are inescapably grounded in the particular, can transcend that condition. On a pedagogical level, the different kinds of individual interaction that Plato dramatizes pose various questions, including how such personal relationships may lead to transcendence of their socio-cultural circumstances. Those circumstances include social and especially familial relationships, both synchronic and diachronic, which may themselves have philosophical or pedagogical significance. When such questions are linked to issues of mimesis, they generate anxiety about reproduction of the philosophic or authorial self for future generations, as a mode of immortality or transcendence. Above all, Plato is concerned with the possibility of Socratic self-reproduction. This in turn raises issues surrounding the significance of various modes of "imitation" of character by author and reader, and authorial strategies for attempting to control the uses and effects of the text.

My first two chapters are devoted to clarifying certain preliminary matters that underlie this way of approaching Plato. I begin, in this chapter, with some general questions about "dramatic" form and "literary" interpretation, which will help to clarify my methodology. Chapter 2 explores issues surrounding literary and philosophical notions of character and its interpretation in ancient texts generally, and in Plato in particular, with special attention to the figure of Sokrates. Subsequent chapters offer readings of a select number of individual dialogues: *Hippias Minor*, *Republic*, *Theaetetus*, *Sophist*, and *Statesman*. These works were chosen in part to exemplify a broad range of Platonic styles and methods, and in part because most of them have received relatively limited "literary" study, but also because their discursive content connects with my particular concerns, especially in their focus on the representation and use of literary character. Thus *Hippias Minor*, besides being an exemplary "aporetic" dialogue, airs an issue of huge importance to Plato: the adequacy of traditional heroes as educational models, and their reform or replacement by a newly philosophical ideal. *Republic* notoriously shares this preoccupation with the ethical effects of the representation of character. It also provides a special opportunity for examining the various uses Plato makes of dramatic form, because of the clearly marked shift in style between Book 1 and the remainder of

the dialogue. *Theaetetus*, *Sophist*, and *Statesman* are of particular dramatic interest because of their interconnections as a triad and the replacement of Sokrates with the Eleatic visitor as the dominant character.[7] This triad is also concerned with issues of likeness and pedagogy, especially *Sophist*, which revisits questions about appropriate and inappropriate imitation and their educational effects on an impressionable audience.

READING PLATO

To approach Plato through his characters is clearly to throw in one's lot with the "literary" camp of his interpreters. It is an article of faith among many such scholars that their approach subsumes the philosophical, since on this view no interpretation that neglects the "literary" or non-argumentative features of dialogue form can count as philosophically adequate. A "philosophical" reader will agree with this, of course, only if she shares the "literary" assumption on which it is based, namely, the fundamental literary-critical axiom that every detail of a text contributes to the meaning of the whole.[8] This assumption has its origins in Greek antiquity. The idea that any discourse should compose an organic whole, with properly proportioned parts, occurs most famously in *Phaedrus* (264c). But it is pervasive elsewhere in Plato, Aristotle, and other ancient authors, and is never challenged within Plato's works.[9] Even the famous story of Plato "combing, curling and rebraiding" his dialogues, suggests an organic model that extends to the minutest detail of the text.[10]

[7] The phrase "dominant character" is adopted from Dickey 1996: 112.

[8] See e.g. Griswold 1986: 11–16. This hermeneutic principle remains axiomatic in the contemporary interpretation of literary texts (see Fish 1980: 322–7). Note, however, that it does not presuppose any one model of what "unity" consists in. As Heath argues (1989), the classical Greek conception of "organic unity" is rather different from e.g. an aesthetic requirement for thematic unity (which was introduced by the neo-Platonists [Coulter 1976: ch. 3]), meaning only that "the text must have all and only the parts proper to it" (Heath 1989: 21; cf. Heath 1987: 98–111).

[9] Cf. e.g. *Gorg.* 503d–504a, 505d, *Phileb.* 64b, *Tim.* 69b, 87c–88b. An organic model is also suggested by the repeated likening of written works to statues or paintings of human beings (e.g. *Euth.* 11b–e, *Rep.* 361d, *Stat.* 277abc, Arist. *Poet.* 1448a1–18, Dion. Hal. *Comp. Verb.* 25). The unity of other kinds of items is also conceptualized in organic terms, including the state (cf. *Laws* 964d–965b, *Rep.* 420cd, 423d, 462a–d, 464ab, d), and the universe itself (cf. *Laws* 903bcd, *Tim.* 30b–31b and below, p. 370). Conversely, in *Tim.* the artistic model is applied to the human body, in which every detail, down to hair and nails, is an artistic "product," and as such has its function as part of an organic whole (76e; cf. *Laws* 768cd, 769a–e). See also e.g. [Longinus] 40.1 and see further Heath 1989: 19–20.

[10] Dion. Hal. *De Comp. Verb.* 25. This and other ancient anecdotes portray Plato as a supremely careful author (Riginos 1976: 185–6). Cf. the Eleatic visitor's declaration that nothing is too trivial to serve the dialectician's purposes (*Soph.* 227a).

Neither Plato nor other ancient authors translated the principle of organic composition into an interpretive principle (cf. below, p. 94). But we are (fortunately) not bound by the canons of ancient criticism. As with other methodologies, the application of the organic axiom to the interpretation of Plato depends on the critic's agenda. If, for example, the goal is to explicate an argument, to assess its validity in abstraction from its interpersonal and cultural context (if such a thing is possible), or to use it as stimulus to philosophical creativity, then such features as scene-setting and characterization may be irrelevant. But such an activity is distinct from the interpretation of the dialogues as such. If one's aim is to gain a better understanding of the Platonic texts in themselves, or to use them as evidence for "Plato's philosophy" as expressed through those texts, then the "literary" principle of organic unity, which is presupposed by this approach, must stand.

This does not, of course, mean that everything in the text matters *equally*. What matters, and how it matters, are always questions of interpretation. The framework within which one understands and assesses the relative importance of details inevitably shapes the meanings that one finds in the text as a whole. Nor does the axiom commit the critic to the impossible task of explaining everything in a Platonic text. Any interpretation can only look at parts of the text from a partial perspective. But whatever one's starting point, the axiom suggests that it is desirable to try to retain an interconnected vision of parts and whole, in ways that respect both the text itself and the insights provided by a range of interpretive strategies. In order to minimize the risk of arbitrariness, the interpretation of details should be supported by their place in the larger web of textual evidence. All this is also true, of course, of interpreting other kinds of writing, including philosophical treatises. (The axiom is not exclusively "literary.") But it has special implications for the Platonic dialogues. For if everything in the text matters, so do its formal and "dramatic" aspects.

A corollary of the "literary" axiom is that any work presented as a whole by author to audience must be considered in the first place on its own terms.[11] Plato himself encourages this approach by the paucity of cross-references in his dialogues.[12] The resulting formal autonomy

[11] On the role of the author-function in determining what constitutes a discrete work see Foucault 1984: 103–4. For Plato, as for many ancient texts, there are sometimes difficulties in ascertaining what counted as a unified text for the author himself (see Haslam 1976: 337–8). But the general principle is clear enough.

[12] Dramatic form of course precludes "cross-references" in the formal scholarly sense, but there are also remarkably few internal links among the various conversations portrayed in the dialogues (see Clay 1988a). On the dialogues' open-endedness see also Schaerer 1969: 84–92.

suggests that the individual dialogue should be the primary object of interpretation on the textual level. Moreover the general principle of the primacy of the individual work applies particularly to works of fiction like Plato's (as opposed to e.g. a treatise), each of which presents us with a freshly-imagined world (even when the subject is historical). We are not entitled to *assume*, for example, that Plato's oeuvre as a whole presents us with a coherent set of characters or ideas. This might turn out to be the case, but such issues cannot be decided a priori. Another way of putting this is to say that the dialogues should not be treated as an ahistorical unity, like a single composite work of art. They may be called a "cosmos" by neo-Platonist commentators, but it does not follow that "*Plato* viewed his dialogues . . . as a kind of literary cosmos held together by a variety of dramatic and thematic devices," at least not the orderly kind of cosmos envisaged by Plato and the commentators from whom the metaphor is derived.[13]

The primacy of the individual dialogue does not, of course, mean that nothing *outside* the text matters, or that Plato's texts are "hermeneutically sealed" with respect to each other or other cultural artifacts of their time. On the contrary, the open-endedness of the corpus suggests that the dialogues should be read against a larger intellectual background. Philosophy itself is presented as an open-ended process, and no single conversation as complete. The dialogue form invites us to locate these events in a web of spatial, temporal and cultural contexts. And despite the lack of dramatic cross-references, there are obvious thematic links among Plato's works on the discursive level, some more explicit than others. As with any author, tracing such interconnections may shed interpretive light on our understanding of individual works and the corpus as a whole. I shall therefore proceed by assuming the hermeneutic primacy of the individual work, but at the same time try to follow Plato's own textual indicators of the relative importance of shared themes and apparent ties to other dialogues.

Plato's works are also dramatically linked through their shared historical framework, most notably in the case of the series of dialogues surrounding Sokrates' death.[14] Some critics, ancient and modern, have taken this particular mode of interconnection as an invitation to read

[13] The quotation is from Howland 1993: 30 (my emphasis). On the neo-Platonists see Coulter 1976: ch. 4. For a sensible weighing of this issue see Griswold 1999b.

[14] The dramatic dates of the dialogues, in so far as they can be ascertained, range from before Plato's own birth (e.g. *Parm.*, *Prot.*) to the death of Sokrates, when Plato was in his mid twenties. The issue is complicated, however, by the fact that some of them are reported or narrated many years later (e.g. *Symp.*, *Tht.*).

these dialogues in the order of the events depicted. One recent scholar writes, for example, of *Theaetetus*, *Euthyphro*, *Cratylus*, *Sophist*, *Statesman*, *Apology*, *Crito* and *Phaedo*, "there is an unbroken dramatic sequence, guaranteed by the speeches of Sokrates himself, that arranges [these dialogues] in that order, a sequence that makes of them an evident entity and thus a true hermeneutic object."[15] But we must be cautious here. Despite their common dramatic setting on the verge of Sokrates' death, these works share no formal links of a kind that invites us to view them as subordinate parts of one artistic whole. There is, of course, a sense in which the entire Platonic corpus constitutes a "true hermeneutic object." Equally, any writer's oeuvre in a sense creates and presents us with a complete authorial "world."[16] But this should not be allowed to obscure the differences between the works viewed discretely as productions over time. We must always bear in mind the possible – though unknown – variety of contexts, both methodological and pedagogical, in which particular Platonic dialogues may have been produced. The fact that we do not know the dates or circumstances of composition of any of them does not mean that we can overlook the more general fact that each was in fact composed in a particular situation, for particular purposes, and at a particular point during an extended period of time in which the author's intellectual and pedagogical concerns are likely to have varied considerably.[17] It is therefore dangerous to put too much weight on simple arrangement by "plot" for works that may have been composed many decades apart, each for its own purposes.

This kind of connection may of course be significant, but without entailing either close coherence among a group of works or an authorial desire to establish a specific reading order. We may contrast, for example, Aeschylus' trilogy, *Oresteia*, with Sophocles' so-called "Theban Plays" – *King Oedipus*, *Antigone*, and *Oedipus at Colonus* – which are connected by their interlinked stories of the house of Oidipous, overlapping dramatis personae, and clear cross-references within each script. The three plays of *Oresteia* not only have a close internal coherence of theme, character and imagery, but were written to be performed together as a single tripartite work of art, like a triptych. Sophocles' three tragedies, by contrast, were

[15] Cropsey 1995: ix.

[16] It is worth recalling, in this context, that as far as we can tell, all Plato's dialogues have survived. But the picture of "Plato's world" that we recover from them will depend on how many of them – and which ones – are deemed authentic.

[17] Though few details of Ryle's imaginative account carry conviction, it has the merit of reminding us of the many possibilities for the circumstances of the dialogues' composition and performance (1966).

composed and produced many years apart, in a different order from the mythic sequence of events that they portray. The interconnections between them, like allusions to other works by Sophocles and other writers, may shed light on the author's shifting purposes. But they do not make the three plays into a single work.

The distinction between triad and trilogy is specially pertinent to Plato's *Theaetetus*, *Sophist* and *Statesman*, which are often referred to as Plato's "trilogy" since they are linked not just thematically but dramatically.[18] In this respect they form a striking (though limited) exception to the absence of clear internal links among Plato's dialogues. But the term "trilogy" remains misleading, in so far as the dramatic model suggests a strong *presumption* of unity that is unwarranted. Since we have no knowledge of the original circumstances of performance of Plato's dialogues (below, pp. 22–5), there is no clear criterion for the employment of this kind of technical dramatic terminology. Certainly there is no reason to believe that simply because the central conversations of *Theaetetus* and *Sophist* are dramatized as occurring on subsequent days, they were therefore meant to be performed together. Nor may we infer that they were *composed* either close together in time, or in the order in which the conversations they dramatize take place.[19] Both these things *might* be true, but to use the dramatic order as evidence for them is analogous to dating Sophocles' *Oedipus at Colonus* before his *Antigone*, simply on the basis of plot sequence. At the same time, the links among *Theaetetus*, *Sophist* and *Statesman* do invite us to read them as a developing set, regardless of the original order or circumstances of composition. In my chapters on these dialogues I shall therefore try to respond appropriately to this invitation.

A closely related problem concerns the way in which one chooses to read the many figures of Sokrates with which Plato presents us. Some critics, both "literary" and "philosophical," are committed to the view that Plato's oeuvre represents a single coherent Sokrates for which each dialogue provides further evidence. Others have seen some avatars of Sokrates as more "real" or "historical" than others. To place this problem in context, it is helpful to compare parallel practices in other ancient Greek genres, such as epic and tragedy, many of whose characters appear

[18] See esp. Klein 1977. For ancient critics see below, p. 15.

[19] Pace e.g. Bostock 1988: 2–3. The fact that *Tht.* refers "forward" to *Soph.* and *Stat.*, and the latter two "back" to *Tht.*, could easily be a product of later editing. In particular, *Tht.* 210d could have been added in revision, or started life as a casual reference to a non-specific future conversation (Friedländer 1964–9: III.243; Bostock 1988: 10, 14; cf. *Phileb.* 50e, *Crat.* 396e).

and reappear in more than one work. A single name and attached identity lead us to expect such figures to display a single coherent character across various works. To the ancient Greeks as well, the name of a well-known mythic or historical figure would evoke certain fairly well defined characteristics that would be familiar, at least in broad outline, to most of the audience. At the same time, such figures are treated in surviving texts with considerable flexibility. In tragedy, for example, a single myth-historical figure may receive strikingly different treatments in different plays, even by the same author. A character like Odysseus retains salient features (such as verbal dexterity or cleverness) from his traditional epic character; but these traits may be interpreted and re-interpreted, often with a varied moral coloring, as with the figures of Odysseus in Sophocles' *Ajax* and *Philoctetes*, or the various Helens in Euripides' oeuvre.

As with Odysseus, the fact that the many Platonic Sokrateses are all named "Sokrates," and linked to a single formal and historical identity, raises certain expectations of adherence to a core identity, expectations that are partly satisfied by the large areas of overlap in the character of Sokrates in different dialogues. Plato's Sokrateses are more than just a collection of figures with the same name who just happen to appear in a variety of works. The accumulation and repetition of numerous, often consistent, details of character contributes to the strong unitary sense of "Plato's Sokrates" experienced by many readers. And the more of these details we encounter, the stronger a presumptive backdrop we acquire against which to assess new avatars of Sokrates. Yet this family resemblance among Plato's various Sokrateses, strong though it is, does not entitle us a priori to treat them as an essentially single or coherent figure. We cannot posit a single Platonic Sokrates any more than a single Oidipous, Odysseus or Kreon in Sophocles' various plays – unless we find that the texts do in fact present us with a single cohesive figure. As it is, his shifting persona remains one of the most significant variables in Plato's works. This does not mean, however, that we may not draw useful comparisons between these Sokrateses, as we can between the two figures of Odysseus in *Ajax* and *Philoctetes*, who share a recognizable core of character traits despite the differences in their dramatic presentation.

Depending on our purposes, then, we are entitled to posit an indefinite number of Platonic Sokrateses, ranging from a "maximal" Sokrates – the figure constructed out of everything attributed to Sokrates in Plato, with all his inconsistencies as well as commonalities – to the particular Sokrates of each dialogue in which he appears. In between lies a range

of overlapping figures who have more or less in common with each other and with the maximal Sokrates. The Sokrates of each dialogue must be assessed both on his own terms, as a fresh literary/philosophical creation, and as a more or less distant relative of these other Sokrateses. Both similarities and differences among these various avatars of Sokrates may be important for understanding individual works and the particular manifestations of Sokrates that they contain.[20] These refractions of the Socratic persona accompany, and are intrinsically related to, Plato's exploration of various approaches to philosophical method and pedagogy, as we shall see.

For my purposes, three of these more general figures will be of special use. One of these, whom I shall call "Plato's Sokrates," "the Platonic Sokrates," or just "Sokrates," is the maximal figure who emerges from the corpus as a whole, who maintains, at a bare minimum, the same identity and name, with all the ideas and traits that are ascribed to him. The second I shall call the aporetic or elenctic Sokrates. This is the figure that dominates such dialogues as *Charmides*, *Euthyphro*, *Hippias Minor*, *Ion,* and *Laches* – works in which Sokrates employs the method of question and answer commonly known as the elenchus, which he describes in *Apology* as his life's mission. This character and his methods will be discussed in more detail below (pp. 115–27). For the present, it suffices to say that he claims to know nothing, his mode of argument is essentially adversative and ad hominem, and its results usually aporetic (though he also has a protreptic side). He appears to a more limited extent in some other works, such as *Meno*, *Republic* and *Symposium*. Though his methods cannot be boiled down to a single formula, and the edges of his dramatic persona are somewhat blurry, he is for the most part quite easily recognizable.[21]

This Sokrates, fleshed out with biographical and personal details from other works – especially *Symposium* and *Phaedo* – is the figure whose personality has dominated the European intellectual imagination, as "a kind of vessel into which men and whole epochs projected their own ideals."[22] But he is not the only Sokrates in Plato's dialogues. In other incarnations Plato's Sokrates can be wildly creative, dogmatic, or a polite

[20] This is also true to some extent of the interlocutors: e.g. Glaukon and Adeimantos appear in both *Rep.* and *Parm.* (cf. Miller 1986: 18–21, 65–7).

[21] The philosophical criteria that distinguish this figure are rigorously – indeed, too rigorously – articulated in Vlastos 1991: ch. 2–3. For a critique see Nails 1995: ch. 5.

[22] Jaspers 1962: 18. For the appropriation of Sokrates by the later European tradition, in particular by Christianity and humanism, see e.g. Priestley 1803; Merlan 1947: 416 n. 33; Marcel 1951; FitzPatrick 1992; Nehamas 1998; C. C. W. Taylor 1998: 83–99; Lane 2001: ch. 2.

and dutiful listener. From this range I extract my third general Socratic figure, whom I shall call "constructive." This Sokrates dominates several major dialogues, including *Phaedo*, *Phaedrus, Symposium*, and most of *Republic*. Despite expressions of uncertainty and misgiving, he is willing to develop positive and sustained ideas. He is usually richly characterized, and discourses positively and at length about a wide range of subjects, with great dramatic and rhetorical power. His ideas are highly original and often controversial in nature. He displays a greater concern with, and a wider range of, philosophical methods than the elenctic Sokrates. He also uses creative imagery and myth, often in a highly poetic style and at considerable length, to elucidate and supplement his ideas. His thinking is not exclusively constructive but, in contrast to the typically ad hominem strategies of the elenctic Sokrates, he often articulates and critiques substantial ideas either in their own right, or as the opinions of absent thinkers or imaginary objectors. This Sokrates may coexist with the aporetic figure, as he does in various ways in dialogues such as *Crito*, *Gorgias, Protagoras, Republic* and *Theaetetus*. But in such cases there is often a tension between these two personas, manifested most obviously in Sokrates' reluctance to produce positive ideas or extended speeches in his own voice.

For the purposes of this book, these various manifestations of Sokrates and his methods, and their interrelationships, are more important than other, more conventional ways of organizing Plato's works, including the traditional grouping into "early" and "middle" dialogues – despite the obvious overlaps between these groups and my portraits of the elenctic and constructive Sokrateses. In general, I accept the findings of modern scholarship showing that chronological claims based on the putative development of Plato's style and/or the content of the dialogues are untenable.[23] I am interested in a dialogue among the dialogues that neither presumes nor proves anything about either relative dating or the internal coherence of the corpus. The purely elenctic works may or may not reflect the philosophical practice of the historical Sokrates. But we cannot know this; nor can we assume or infer that they were all composed early in Plato's life. Thus in the absence of other evidence, the fact that a dialogue presents us with an aporetic or constructive Sokrates does not prove that it was written before or after any other dialogue.

The only exception to this chronological uncertainty is the group of dialogues known as "late." The stylistic similarities among six

[23] See esp. Thesleff 1982; Howland 1991; Nails 1995; cf. also Annas 1999: ch. 1.

works – *Critias*, *Laws*, *Philebus*, *Statesman*, *Sophist* and *Timaeus* – were observed long ago, and have been confirmed by computerized stylometry. There is also some (limited) ancient evidence that *Laws* was written late in Plato's life.[24] The combination of these two facts generates a group of "late" dialogues, whose cohesiveness is the only finding that may be said to enjoy something like a scholarly consensus, even among stylometry's severest critics. From a strictly chronological perspective, however, even this group should be handled with care. The ancient evidence does not *prove* that *Laws* was Plato's last work, or that it was not revised in light of *Republic* or other dialogues. There is independent evidence that Plato worked on and revised his works over an extended period of time.[25] Such revisions may be undetectable. For example, without being told by an ancient commentator, we would be unaware that an alternative opening of *Theaetetus* once existed.[26] The extreme length of some dialogues, including the "late" ones, makes such compositional layers more likely. Even if, then, we accept these "late" dialogues as a group, their similarities may conceal chronological layers of composition, editing or tampering by others. Despite these caveats, I shall continue to refer to this group as "late," and assume that their final versions were generated fairly close to each other in time, somewhere towards the end of Plato's life. But this does not exclude the possibility that Plato may have had his reasons – pedagogical or otherwise – for employing other styles right up to the end of his long life.

Scepticism about our ability to determine the chronology of the dialogues does not mean that the perceived differences between various dialogues, groups of dialogues, or Platonic styles are entirely arbitrary or fictitious, or that Plato's oeuvre may appropriately be treated as an indiscriminate whole. But it does mean that we will need some other way of looking at the interrelationships among Plato's various styles, dialogues and concerns. For example, how are we to talk about the aporetic dialogues if they are no longer a discrete chronological group or a simple reflection of the "historical" Sokrates? One way is to think of them as part of a persistent layer in Plato's thinking about philosophical method. In many dialogues – not just those known as "elenctic" – the critical assessment of ideas deemed false or misleading by the dominant character goes hand in hand with the development of positive ideas. In fact this

[24] Arist. *Pol.* 1264b 26–7; Diog. Laert. 3.37.

[25] See Thesleff 1967: 16–18; 1982: 83–7; Howland 1991: 201–203; Nails 1995: 123–7. For the possible involvement of other hands, and the concept of "semi-authentic" dialogues, see Thesleff 1982: 88–96.

[26] See Thesleff 1982: 85, 152–7; H. Tarrant 1988: 117–18.

interdependence is present in principle in almost every work of Plato, in so far as even the aporetic Sokrates is portrayed by Plato as striving towards positive knowledge. Conversely, there is no sign that Plato ever stopped believing in the value of elenctic argument, in some form, for certain purposes.[27]

There *are*, however, signs that he was sometimes uncomfortable with the elenctic mode of argument as employed by Sokrates the gadfly, more specifically with its ad hominem aspects and failure to generate positive results. Some dialogues, or groups of dialogues, seem to criticize the elenctic Sokrates for such reasons. I shall be arguing in chapter 4 that *Republic* 2–10 constitutes a critique of the method portrayed in Book 1, and a similar case may be made for other dialogues, especially *Gorgias* and *Meno*.[28] The dramatically linked triad of *Theaetetus*, *Sophist* and *Statesman* also moves away from the elenctic Sokrates, while continuing to acknowledge the value of elenctic refutation as one method among many (see ch. 6). This pattern suggests both a critique of the aporetic Sokrates and his methods as a means of reaching positive results, and a striving to go beyond them, without, however, displacing them from their role in clearing away the dead wood of mistaken ideas.

The fact that these works seem to embody a critique of such methods and go on to explore others (such as hypothesis and division) suggests an intellectual movement away from the elenctic Sokrates, presumably coinciding with Plato's own awareness of his inadequacies. This is not a speculation about Plato's personal intellectual development over time as extrapolated from themes within his works. We have no external knowledge of that development, nor can we assume either that it was linear, or that it is reflected in a linear fashion in the dialogues, whose purpose and circumstances of composition are unknown. Rather, the kind of intellectual movement I am suggesting is one that can be inferred from the internal structure of the works themselves, a structure recurring often enough to constitute a pattern. The pattern in question suggests that the elenctic Sokrates and his methods embody a central strand in Plato's thinking about how to do philosophy – a strand of which he was at times critical. In this sense, a case can be made for the *conceptual* priority of this Sokrates to the constructive Sokrates in Plato's thought. This is a claim not about the chronology of particular dialogues, but about Platonic methods and concerns. The pattern does not show that the

[27] See e.g. Davidson 1985.

[28] See Nehamas 1992b: 289–90, 1998: 87–9. On *Meno* see also Vlastos 1991: 118–25. On *Gorg.* see Irwin 1986 and cf. Nightingale 1995: 81–4.

so-called aporetic dialogues are Plato's earliest compositions: it is still possible in principle that *Euthyphro* was written after *Theaetetus*. But it provides *dramatic* evidence, from the internal structure of these works (or groups of works), for a broader kind of development in Plato's thinking.

PLATO THE "DRAMATIST"

The problems bedeviling all attempts at a systematic organization or ordering of the Platonic corpus testify to the diversity that is arguably its most salient trait. Nevertheless, all his works do share one thing: their "dramatic" form. This simple formal fact is fundamental to the approach to Plato adopted in this book. It is therefore important to clarify what a word like "dramatic" can mean in this connection. Such language pervades contemporary discussions of Plato's dialogues, especially the recent florescence of "literary" interpretation. But as we have already seen (above, pp. 7–8), such usage can have misleading implications, and it is rarely examined with any care. Certainly, the philosophical dialogue owes much to ancient Greek drama, including tragedy and Aristophanic comedy.[29] Other dramatic genres for which we have less evidence may also have been important for Plato, such as satyr play, the comedies of Epicharmus, and mime.[30] But Plato's models are not confined to drama. His dialogues also participate, through imitation, appropriation and parody, in a whole spectrum of other ancient Greek literary forms – most notably epic, but also such genres as oratory and lyric poetry.[31] Yet they cannot be neatly aligned with any of these.[32] As Nightingale puts it, in Plato's works "the boundaries between philosophy and 'alien' genres of discourse are created, disrupted, and created afresh." Plato's relationship to the drama of his formative years is particularly complex. He was clearly steeped in it, yet equally clearly the dialogues compose a distinct genre, with salient differences from drama as well as striking similarities. He is concerned to appropriate drama, but also to critique and displace it.

[29] For tragedy see esp. Kuhn 1941 and 1942; Raphael 1960: 79–88; Patterson 1982: 78–81; Nussbaum 1986: Interlude 1; Irwin 1988. For comedy see Mader 1977; Clay 1994: 37–41; Nightingale 1995: 87–92 and ch. 5; Hyland 1995: 128–36; Rowe 1997; Michelini 2000a.

[30] The influence of mime on the dialogues is hard to assess, since our evidence is scanty (though Aristotle links the two at *Poet.* 1447b 9–13; see also Riginos 1976: 174–6). See further McDonald 1931: 80; Haslam 1972; Clay 1994; Gordon 1999: 68–73.

[31] Note that nearly every poetic genre was attributed by ancient critics to Plato himself as author (Riginos 1976: 43–8). His relationship to Homer and the tradition of epic heroism has been much discussed (cf. most recently Hobbs 2000, and see further below, ch. 3). For other genres see esp. Nightingale 1995 (the following quotation is from p. 195).

[32] They do, of course, belong to the genre of Socratic writings (on which see below, p. 32).

Some of the ambiguities of this relationship are nicely captured in an ancient story about the young Plato's literary beginnings. It is said that he composed lyric poems, dithyrambs and tragedies, and also painted; but when he was about to enter the Athenian tragic competition, he heard Sokrates speaking and thereupon consigned his poetry to the flames, with an accompanying line of verse adapted from Homer: "Come here, Hephaistos [god of fire]; Plato now has need of you" (Diog. Laert. 3.5).[33] Such anecdotes, regardless of their veracity, provide revealing evidence about ancient responses to Plato. This one tells us succinctly of the presumed importance of tragedy in his intellectual formation and his potential as a dramatist, as well as his critical stance towards the genre and the potential incompatibility between tragedy and philosophy. It tells us that the dialogues are in some sense a substitute for drama, but also that they are *radically* different. And it suggests that philosophy emerges from the ashes of poetry. The same kind of complex understanding is conveyed by the way ancient critics arranged the dialogues in the tetralogies still used today, even claiming (however unconvincingly) that Plato himself published them like that in response to the tetralogies of the dramatic festivals.[34]

A "literary" approach to Plato must therefore begin by asking exactly what it means to call his dialogues "dramatic." Many proposed explanations do not serve to differentiate Plato's dialogues – or drama itself – from other imaginative works.[35] Chief of these is the notion that the dramatic quality of the dialogues lies in the tension or interrelationship between various views, rather than the clear assertion or dominance of any one view. This accords well with a common understanding of drama, namely that it intrinsically involves conflict. This assumption originates in the practice of the ancient Greek theater, where a substantial number of plays include one or more *agōnes*, or semi-formal debates, between characters taking opposing views on some central issue. Many writers on Plato take some such assumption for granted, viewing the dialogues as "dramatic" precisely because – and in so far as – they embody conflicts of ideas. It is obviously possible to distinguish in this way between various dialogues as more or less "dramatic," and such evaluations are often made, usually to the disadvantage of the "late" dialogues. According

[33] Cf. Aelian *VH* 2.30, *Anon. Prol.* 3.17–20 (Westerink), *Comm. Alc.* 2.76–9 (Westerink).

[34] In the tragic competition each playwright produced three tragedies followed by a satyr-play, so that a dramatist's total entry was four plays, or a tetralogy. For this and other ancient groupings of the dialogues see Diog. Laert. 3.56–62, *Anon. Prol.* 24–6.

[35] E.g. Arieti 1995: 121 ("works whose intention is principally to inspire"). Press acknowledges that by his criteria Dante, More and Cervantes are also "dramatic" authors (1995: 141–4).

to Ryle, for example, "the dramatic form of Plato's dialogues becomes more and more of a pretence. They have no denouements. They are conversations, not combats."[36] The word "combat" is revealing.

This criterion has its practical uses, but does not serve to distinguish what is peculiarly dramatic about Plato's dialogues as a genre. For one thing, it disqualifies many of them altogether as "dramatic" (as Ryle's judgment of the late dialogues shows), since they do not all contain a strong clash of ideas or personalities. Conversely, there is nothing to prevent a conventional treatise from articulating conflicting ideas and thus being "dramatic" in the relevant sense. But the use of "drama" simply for the conflict of ideas is a secondary one, a metaphor derived from interpersonal conflict. To be dramatic in a primary sense, the conflict must be embodied in characters. This is, arguably, the defining feature of drama: the imaginative presentation of persons. This criterion reflects ancient and modern theater practice, and may be traced back theoretically to the Greeks themselves. According to both Plato and Aristotle, poetic mimesis represents *persons* doing things.[37] In *Republic*, the defining criterion of dramatic mimesis is the impersonation of others, so that narrative becomes more or less "mimetic" depending on the quantity of direct discourse that it contains (392d–393d).[38] Modern theories of drama, even when they depart explicitly from ancient conceptions of mimesis, focus similarly on the (re)presentation of persons.[39] In all forms of drama, including those derived from the performer's own life, performers imaginatively project a persona other than themselves. Even a monologue may be dramatic in this sense. If it also ventriloquates other voices, it becomes "dramatic" on a metalevel too, in so far as the imagined character takes on the writer's or actor's role of "impersonating" others.

It follows that dramatic mimesis just *is* the suppression of the authorial voice.[40] A philosophical lecture, or the performance of a treatise in the author's own voice, may certainly be *theatrical*, in so far as it is a conscious self-display, but it is not *drama*, since it does not represent an imagined act, but simply *is* the activity it presents. It may also, of course, be "dramatic" in the secondary sense that it quotes other voices, or in the derivative

[36] 1966: 194. [37] *Rep.* 603c, *Poet.* 1448a 1; see further below, p. 30.
[38] Aristotle is also aware of this sense of *mimēsis* (*Poet.* 1460a 5–7).
[39] Cf. Beckerman 1970: 7–8, 17–21.
[40] I mean this in the sense of the authorial "I," as opposed to the implied author, whose voice can never be suppressed (below, pp. 43–6). Nor do I mean to identify either of these figures with the physical author. On these matters see Booth 1961: ch. 3; Riffaterre 1983: 4–5; Foucault 1984; Nehamas 1987.

sense that it presents conflicting ideas. But it is not "dramatic" in the same fundamental way as Plato's dialogues, whose form is that of a theatrical script.[41] This is presumably what one critic means when he asserts that "the original *text* is a drama," thereby erasing the basic theatrical distinction between script and achieved drama.[42] Another moves directly from "dialogue *form*" to "dramatic *form*" to "Plato wrote *dramas*."[43] It would be more accurate to say that there is a dramatis personae of specific characters, who deliver speeches in their own voices, whose identity is other than that of the underlying author or performer, and who therefore project (in Beckerman's terms) a "fictitious story" or "imagined act." As the Sokrates of *Republic* would say, they are "mimetic," in that a reader or performer must adopt the voice of each speaker in turn. That Plato's dialogues are "dramatic," then, is a simple formal fact about these works as texts. It is this *form*, presumably, which has seemed to some critics "more suited to a stage play than to philosophic argument."[44]

From a purely formal perspective, this resemblance to theatrical scripts is unproblematic, at least in regard to the direct dialogues. The situation with the reported dialogues is murkier, since they feature a controlling narrative voice that quotes or reports the speeches of the other characters. But this voice is never Plato's own.[45] There is therefore always at least *one* dramatic character in the sense that I have defined it. The reported dialogues resemble the kind of novel that employs a fictitious narrative voice, thus establishing a distance between narrator and author. We may also compare the messenger speeches in tragedy, or the Homeric poems, which include a number of lengthy inset tales narrated by one of the characters.[46] Such narratives, like Plato's reported dialogues, usually proceed to put direct speech into the mouths of other characters, as quoted by the narrator. This privileged character thus dramatizes others in the secondary sense noted above. But as long as the narrator is fictitious, these works also remain "dramatic" in a more basic sense, simply in virtue of their form.

[41] Note that the texts of e.g. tragedy were in circulation, so Plato will have known what such a script looked like.

[42] Seeskin 1987: ix (emphasis added).

[43] A. A. Krentz 1983: 33 (emphasis added).

[44] Howland 1993: 25.

[45] I.e. the narrative voice is never identified with the voice of the implied author (cf. Kosman 1992a: 82–5). Contrast e.g. Herodotus and Thucydides, who both begin their histories by naming the author as narrator (cf. Tigerstedt 1977: 93).

[46] Most significant of these is Odysseus in *Od.*, who narrates much of the tale of his own adventures, thus taking on a role analogous to, but distinct from, that of the author. Another important example is the speech of Phoenix in *Il.* 9, which well illustrates how the fictitious narrator's character and personal agenda may color the telling of his tale.

This simple formal fact has logical consequences for the interpretation of Plato, the chief of which is that none of the characters' voices can be identified in any direct sense with that of the author.[47] Since Plato, like a playwright, never speaks in his own voice, none of the views expressed by his characters can be attributed to him directly, any more than the views of Hamlet or Polonius are directly attributable to Shakespeare. Like Homer, Plato "conceals himself" (*Rep.* 393c11). Had he so wished, he could easily have conveyed his "own" ideas through the voice of a character identified as Plato, rather than as refracted through other speakers.[48] As it is, however, the self-effacement of the authorial voice is absolute, the dramatic form unequivocal. He not only excludes himself as a character from all his works, but at times goes out of his way to draw attention to his own absence. This is most obvious when we are actually told that "Plato" was not present (*Phd.* 59b). But this absence is also signaled more obliquely elsewhere, for example through the presence of his brothers in *Parmenides* and *Republic*.[49] In *Theaetetus* he underlines his absence by making Eukleides the "author" of the central dialogue. Still more subtly, some dialogues represent Sokrates alone with his interlocutor, leaving the thoughtful reader to infer that Plato himself could not have been present at the putative historical event that it fictionalizes.[50]

None of this means, of course, that Plato never personally held any of the views explored in the dialogues. Obviously, they all air ideas which were sufficiently interesting to him to seem worthy of inquiry, and it seems prima facie likely that he held many of them himself at some time in his life. He also uses dramatic and rhetorical techniques (especially characterization) to induce sympathy in his audience for some speakers together with their attitudes and views, and distance us from others. These sympathetic characters – most obviously, Sokrates – voice certain persistent and fundamental themes, such as the immortality of the soul, which it is hard to believe were not among Plato's abiding personal beliefs in some shape or form.[51] To put it another way, I suspect that the character of Sokrates voices far more of Plato's own views than the character of Polonius or Hamlet does of Shakespeare's. Yet, for

[47] See Press 2000a, especially his own contribution (2000b).

[48] Aristotle seems to have been a character in his own (lost) dialogues (cf. Cic. *Ad Att.* 13.19.4).

[49] Cf. W. A. Johnson 1998: 583 and below, p. 190.

[50] E.g. *Crito, Euth., Ion, HMaj.* (see Vlastos 1991: 50).

[51] It is highly misleading to claim, as Gerson does, that an "anti-mouthpiece" position means "Plato must be accounted indifferent to the conclusions arrived at by his readers" (2000: 209).

simple *formal* reasons, we are not entitled either to *assume* the equivalence of any of Plato's characters with the voice of the author, or to *infer* it from the dialogues themselves. To do either is a basic methodological mistake.

This point is fundamental to the interpretation of the dialogues as dialogues, and as such is axiomatic to many recent interpreters. But it still requires some emphasis, since it runs counter to the influential tradition of dogmatic interpretation of Plato, which attributes the views of the dominant speakers to Plato personally. This tradition began in antiquity, with the Academy and Aristotle, and remained the predominant current in ancient criticism.[52] It is hardly surprising that ancient critics treat Plato this way, since this is how they routinely treat all kinds of dramatic texts: quoting characters out of context and conflating their sentiments with those of the author (see further below, p. 94). Some modern interpreters of drama have adopted a similar approach, trying to determine which (speeches of which) character(s) speak directly for the playwrights. Thus E. R. Dodds identified the views of Euripides' "philosophical" characters with those of Euripides himself, arguing that "if we find . . . that . . . the thoughts of these various thinking characters spring from the same fundamental attitude towards life . . . then we are justified in assuming that this attitude was the author's."[53] It is no coincidence that this argument forms part of Dodds' attempt to characterize Euripides as a "philosophical" dramatist – as if calling a text "philosophical" required one to identify the author's own views for analysis. This understanding of what it is to be "philosophical" forms part of the legacy of the first-person treatise that has dominated the tradition of philosophical writing since Plato's time, but which he himself eschewed. It is reinforced by the need for professional philosophers in the contemporary academic milieu to have determinate views and arguments, attributable to an identifiable human owner, for their dissection.[54]

In dramatic criticism this kind of analysis now seems naive and outmoded. But it is still commonly found in the study of Plato, where many

[52] E.g. Diog. Laert. 3.52, *Anon. Prol.* 10–11; see further Tejera 1993: 129–35; Press 1997; H. Tarrant 2000. But there is also an anti-dogmatic strand in ancient interpretation (e.g. Diog. Laert. 3.51; see Howland 1991: 190–97; Press 1996a: 508–9, 2000a: 1–2; Cooper 1997: xxiii–xxiv, and below, p. 30).

[53] Dodds 1973: 80 (first published 1929). Cf. also e.g. Bowra 1944: 9–12 and see Ausland 2000: 183–4.

[54] E.g. Kraut seems to argue that we must treat the dominant character as Plato's mouthpiece, otherwise we have no way of knowing what Plato believes (1992: 29; cf. also Brisson 1995: 349). Levi argues that the professionalization of philosophy has led to the demise of the philosophical dialogue as a form (1976: 19–20).

readers take it for granted that Plato's dominant characters, especially Sokrates, serve as mouthpieces for Plato's own ideas, and influential scholars defend this position.[55] There are understandable reasons for this. Besides the fact that the treatise has become the prevalent model of philosophical discourse, the sheer proportion of Plato's text occupied by the dominant character of each work far outstrips that of any single character in extant ancient drama, and most later dramas too. Sokrates is no mere Polonius, or even a Hamlet. But the fact that he occupies a more extensive role than any character in the corpus of a single author, though significant for many reasons, does not alter the basic implications of dramatic form. Nor does the heavily didactic manner of the Eleatic visitor who dominates *Sophist* and *Statesman* show that *he* is Plato's mouthpiece. Pace e.g. Campbell, it does not follow from the fact that the visitor is more didactic than Sokrates, and *his* tone "more in the manner of a treatise than of a dialogue,"[56] that the *dialogue itself* has become a treatise. Dramatic form is simply being deployed in a different way.[57] Despite the diminished sense of "realism" in these works, in strictly formal terms they just are *not* treatises. And the Eleatic visitor just is not Plato.

This argument from form is buttressed by the many signs of Plato's own awareness of the distinction between author and character, and thus of the implications of his own practice. Prominent among such indications are the well-known formal division between mimesis and narrative in *Republic* (392c–394c) and the curious opening of *Theaetetus*, where the distinction in question is explicitly applied to a "Socratic" dialogue composed by Plato but not attributed to him (143bc; cf. *Rep.* 394b). In light of this awareness, Plato's choice of "dramatic" form self-consciously raises the question of whether one person can ever speak for another. He further problematizes the issue structurally through the various uses he makes of the form, for example by using reportage (as by Sokrates in *Republic*), by making one character impersonate another (as Sokrates impersonates Protagoras in *Theaetetus*), or by developing a complex chain of transmission for the ideas and speeches that he dramatizes (as in *Symposium* and *Parmenides*). All these strategies draw attention to the non-identity of author, narrator and character, thereby further distancing Plato as author from the voices of his characters. By his practice, then, Plato

[55] E.g. Rowe 1984: 4; Kraut 1992: 25–30; Irwin 1992: 77–8, 1995: 7–8; Gerson 2000. See the critiques by Nails 1995: 39–42; Mulhern 2000: 225 n.; Press 2000b: 35–7.

[56] Campbell 1867: I.xxiii.

[57] See Stenzel 1940: 75–8; Miller 1980: x–xii and cf. Corlett 1997: 431–2.

indicates a more subtle awareness of the distinction between author and character than the standard ancient view – exemplified not least by his own characters in *their* practice – that the author and his characters are one.

Plato's concern with matters of voice and responsibility is also reflected on a discursive level in a pervasive distrust of the verbal transmission of ideas (whether oral or written) in the absence of their author to explain and justify them.[58] The most notorious example of this is the critique of writing in *Phaedrus*. Another particularly vivid instance occurs in *Theaetetus*, where Sokrates imagines "Protagoras" complaining that instead of speaking for himself he has been represented by an inexperienced boy: "Show a little more spirit, my good man . . . and attack my actual statement itself, and refute it, if you can . . . You keep talking about pigs and baboons; you show the mentality of a pig yourself, in the way you deal with my writings, and you persuade your audience to follow your example. That is not the way to behave."[59] This complaint is a ventriloquation of a ventriloquation, put into the dead Protagoras' mouth by Sokrates, into Sokrates' mouth by the fictitious author Eukleides, and into *his* mouth by Plato – then read aloud many years later, in the dialogue's preamble, by Eukleides' slave.[60] Protagoras is thus unimaginably far from speaking "for himself," either here or anywhere else in *Theaetetus*. The passage evinces – in typically ironic fashion – Plato's preoccupation with the problem of responsibility for one's own words and ideas (especially after one is dead).

This applies even to an author who writes in his own voice, as Protagoras seems to have done. As Sokrates says of another first-person narrator in *Hippias Minor*, he is not here, so we cannot ask him what he means (365c). In such passages Sokrates insists on speaking in one's own voice and thus taking responsibility for one's own utterances – despite the fact that he often seems to avoid doing so himself.[61] Yet the choice of dramatic form is enough to block any easy assumptions about the transmission of the author's own views. Plato's Protagoras may complain that he is not allowed to speak for himself, but Plato himself has been careful to avoid even the appearance of ever doing so, thereby warning us that if we attempt to extract his own views directly from the speeches he places in the mouths of his characters, we too are behaving like pigs.

58 Cf. *Meno* 71d, *Prot.* 347b–348a, *Phdr.* 275de, *Tht.* 171d and below, p. 136.
59 *Tht.* 166c; trans. Levett 1990.
60 Ventriloquism is not simply a modern metaphor (cf. *Soph.* 252c, Ar. *Wasps* 1016–22).
61 See esp. *Prot.* 347b–348a with Griswold 1999a, and cf. below, p. 217.

In considering the "dramatic" character of Plato's dialogues, I have so far been focusing on the hermeneutic implications of their formal resemblance to theatrical scripts. But this designation also raises questions about mode of performance. Such matters might seem irrelevant to philosophical interpretation. But assumptions about mode of performance have been used to underpin various theories about the educational purpose of the dialogues.[62] And they often exert a tacit influence on critics' interpretations of specific dialogues (cf. below, p. 393).

Drama, in its achieved form, is "not a thing made, but an event occurring," an event to which the presence of one or more human performers is essential.[63] Though any text – including novels, poetry, and even philosophical treatises – can be staged, the word "drama" generally implies, first, that a work was originally intended by its composer to be performed, and second, that it achieves its full artistic meaning only in performance.[64] These criteria serve adequately – at least for practical purposes – to distinguish most modern dramatic texts from other kinds of text that are usually read in private, such as novels or philosophical works. In ancient Athenian terms, however, the distinction is hazier, because of the pervasiveness of various forms of performance in daily life. The most culturally privileged dramatic genres were performed competitively in public, in a huge theater, at religious festivals, and included such structural and formal features as a stage building and dancing area, costumes, masks, choral song and dance. They were thus theatrical in the fullest sense, involving both an institutional context and essential visual, aural and kinetic elements. The Platonic dialogues are obviously not theatrical in the same way. But there were many other types of dramatic performance in Plato's Athens – such as the erotic mime of Xenophon's *Symposium*, performed at a private drinking party.[65]

Conversely the "narrative" genre of epic was performed at large public gatherings, often in competition at religious festivals. Performers memorized the lines (as opposed to reading from a script), and were grandly dressed. As far as we know, they did not use costumes or props

[62] E.g. specific assumptions about performance underlie both Miller's argument that the dialogues were intentionally non-histrionic (1999: 254) and Gordon's that histrionic performance made an important contribution to their intended effect (1999: 68).

[63] Beckerman 1970: 12, 6–10.

[64] On the relationship between dramatic text and performance text see e.g. Elam 1980: 208–10. The possibility that Seneca's dramas were not intended for performance, and the scholarly literature this has generated, make them an exception that proves the rule.

[65] Xen. *Symp.* 7, 9. Hershbell 1995: 28–9 rightly suggests the symposium or drinking party as a possible influence on Plato's choice of dramatic form (cf. also Tecuşan 1990).

to distinguish particular characters. But the performance seems to have been highly histrionic and emotional in style, including the "acting out" of direct speeches.[66] Even prose discourses such as interpretations of poetry might be performed in public, competitive contexts at religious festivals like the Olympic Games (below, pp. 128–9). Sophistic discourses and historical narratives were "published" by being read aloud before circulating in written form, and the same may well have been true of Plato's works.[67] Even in private settings one might read a favorite book aloud to a gathering of friends, as Sokrates does in Xenophon (*Mem.* 1.6.14). Like silent reading, solitary reading occurred, but as the exception rather than the rule.[68] In sum, just about all ancient Greek texts were in some sense performed. At a minimum, this means that they were spoken aloud, for the benefit or entertainment of some kind of audience.

On this minimal level, it is highly probable that Plato's dialogues were indeed performed. But this bare notion of performance tells us little about the distinctively "dramatic" qualities of the Platonic dialogue as such, since it does little or nothing to differentiate it from other Greek genres, such as history, which also included direct speech in different voices. We cannot use the fact or concept of performance to define Plato's works as "dramatic" in any more specific sense without knowledge of a particular performance context. But we have no concrete evidence about the dialogues' mode of performance which might assimilate them more or less closely to ancient theater, as opposed to the public or private performance of epic or history.[69] And we have no idea of the extent to which their performance was "dramatic," in the sense that the performer(s) tried to "impersonate" characters through voice, gesture, costume, or other histrionic means.

The distinction between direct and reported dialogues might possibly be significant here, since it is conceivable that it corresponds to a

[66] Cf. *Ion* 535a–e. In *Ion* Sokrates equates the rhapsode with the actor (532d, 536a; cf. Arist. *Rhet.* 1403b22). In *Rep.* he equates author and performer (395c–398b, 392e–393c), whom he speaks of as "imitating" the characters not only in wording but in voice and gesture (397b1–2; cf. *HH Apollo* 162–3). On acting style, as variously applicable to actors, rhapsodes and orators, see Arist. *Poet.* 1461b29–1462a4; Herington 1985: 10–15; Pickard-Cambridge 1988: 167–76; Wiles 1991: 18–26; Boud 1994; Hall 1995.

[67] Cf. E. G. Turner 1952: 19–20; Baltes 1993: 17. For evidence for the oral performance of philosophical works see Ryle 1966: 24–7. For anecdotes about Plato reading aloud his own works see Diog. Laert. 3.35–7.

[68] For the former see Knox 1968; for the latter Harris 1989: 84; Dickey 1996: 31.

[69] It might seem unlikely that they were performed in a religious context, like Athenian drama, but it has recently been argued that they were part of cult ceremonies in memory of Sokrates (White 2000).

difference in (intended) mode of performance. It seems prima facie unlikely that anyone would compose a narrated dialogue, especially one with the complex narrative structure of *Symposium* or *Parmenides*, to be staged as a drama in which different speakers adopt different roles.[70] The analogy with the performance of narrative epic would suggest that in such cases a single actor took on the persona of each character in turn. As for the direct dramatic works, Plutarch reports the practice, newly fashionable at Rome, of having these, as opposed to the "narrative" dialogues, recited from memory by slaves: "They use a mode of performance (*hupokrisis*) appropriate to the character (*ēthos*) of the dramatis personae (*prosōpa*), together with modulation of the voice, gestures and delivery in accordance with what is said" (*Mor.* 711bc). It is not clear from the Greek whether one or more slaves performed the various roles, but the distinction between "dramatic" and "narrative" dialogues seems gratuitous unless a different actor played each part.[71] Athenaeus tells a similar tale, of a host who had his cooks learn Plato's dialogues by heart and recite them while serving dinner, with each cook performing a different part (9.381f–382a). But Plutarch and Athenaeus – writing at either end of the second century CE – scarcely count as evidence for Plato's own time.[72] And even if they did, they would be outweighed by the closest thing we have to evidence from Plato himself, namely the opening of *Theaetetus*. Here, in an impromptu setting, a slave reads aloud to Terpsion and Eukleides a direct dialogue written by the latter (143b). Whether or not such a slave would be expected to indulge in actorly modulations of voice and other mannerisms, this mode of performance, using a single performer for all the "roles," is closer to the ancient performance of epic than to that of drama proper.

Though we have no proof beyond this very tenuous evidence, it seems to me most plausible that even the "direct" dialogues were performed by a single narrator in Plato's own time. But it is perfectly possible, and indeed very likely, in view of the wide variety of styles in his oeuvre, that

[70] The effectiveness of Rush Rehm's 1992 production of *Symp.* (in Atlanta, GA) was much enhanced by the removal of the narrator and markers of indirect discourse, as well as by shortening some of the speeches. The same applies to Leo Aylen and Jonathan Miller's film of *Symp.* (*The Drinking Party*).

[71] For the ancient application of this distinction to Plato's dialogues see also Diog. Laert. 3.50, *Anon. Prol.* 20. Plutarch's internal audience is shocked at the idea of using Plato's dialogues in this manner. But it is not the mode of performance but the setting – over food and wine, Plato as party entertainment – that upsets the company (*Mor.* 711cd).

[72] See de Vries 1984: 144.

Plato composed different works for performance in different contexts, by different performers or for different audiences on different occasions. Nor should we exclude the possibility that some of the dialogues, especially the lengthier ones, were composed for private reading and study. The world of the dialogues themselves treats the circulation and reading of written texts, both poetical and philosophical, as commonplace.[73] In any case, to draw a sharp contrast between theatrical performance on the one hand and private reading and study on the other is to create a false dichotomy. Even poetic texts originally composed for a single performance circulated subsequently in written form and were scrutinized and discussed by their audience and readers. In my own view, it is most plausible to envisage most of Plato's works as occasionally performed, probably by a single narrator, whether for Academy members or a wider audience, but also available in the Academy to be read and studied as texts (as was certainly the case after Plato's own time).[74]

I shall therefore not treat Plato's dialogues as "dramas" in the full sense of requiring performance for their meaning to be complete, but as comparable to ancient epic or history in their circulation and use. But this does not alter their "dramatic" quality in the crucial sense implied by their form. Whether the speakers are present as embodied actors, as embodied readers, or only in the imagination of the silent reader, all the words and ideas in Plato's dialogues come to us from the mouths of speakers envisaged as distinct from the author himself. The most significant difference generated by the various possible modes of performance is the influence of the interpreter (actor, external reader or private reader) on the meaning of the text. Only the private reader's imaginative "staging" of the characters is unmediated by the performance, and so by the interpretation, of a third party. Hence the critic's temptation to provide "stage directions" in support of his or her own interpretations (below, p. 393). To what extent such factors influenced the ancient consumption of Plato's texts, we simply do not know.

The problem of mode of performance is bound up with a further unanswered question important for understanding the purpose of the dialogues: who composed Plato's intended or actual audience? The elitism that pervades these texts suggests they were not written for the masses. But this does not tell us, for example, whether they were meant

[73] Cf. e.g. *Ap.* 22b, *Phdr.* 230de, *Rep.* 606e, 26d, *Tht.* 142d–143b, 152a. Xenophon portrays even Sokrates as a student of written works (*Mem.* 1.6.14).

[74] For the presence of a library at the Academy see Field 1930: 47–8; Riginos 1976: 165–79; Baltes 1993: 10. Arcesilaus is said to have owned a set of Plato's dialogues (Diog. Laert. 4.32).

for members of the Academy or a wider educated public (or both). If Academy members were the primary or sole audience, and also the performers, Plato's works might have been functionally distinct, in an intriguing way, from theater or performance as usually understood. Theater is defined in part by the presence of an audience towards whom it is directed.[75] But if the performers of Plato's dialogues were Academy members themselves, the primary audience may have been (or included) the participants, whose purpose may have been to learn for themselves from the experience.

In Plato's world, performance was generally viewed as shaping the character of the performer as well as the audience – a view that is specially prominent in his own writings.[76] Simply voicing philosophical discussions with a minimum of understanding might therefore be thought to influence the least intellectually engaged reader or performer despite herself. As we have seen, however, ancient performance was highly histrionic and emotional in style, suggesting that an actor or reader would "throw himself into the part," as opposed to passively transmitting his lines. Even an actor is an active "reader" (unlike, for example, a parrot or a tape-recorder). This is why the rhapsode, at least in Plato's account, must understand and interpret the poet's words in order to perform them (*Ion* 530bc). And dramatic producers were "teachers" or trainers, who arguably inculcated civic and military virtues in the performers, especially the dramatic choruses.[77] The possibility that the dialogues were performed by Academy members for their own benefit would therefore make *Republic's* discussion of the influence of performance on the performer self-referential in a tantalizing way. The further fact that the author himself is supposed to be influenced by the characters he creates (below, p. 81) extends these admittedly unanswerable questions to Plato's own involvement in the production and performance of his dialogues.

If the effect on the performer(s) is deemed primary, then no external audience is strictly required for the performance to achieve its principal goal. Theoretically, therefore, these works – unlike drama proper – could have achieved their desired purpose in the absence of any audience other than the performer(s).[78] Just as smoking on stage in a play, night after

[75] Beckerman 1970: 8.
[76] Below, pp. 80–81. See also *Laws* 816e, which implies that the actor is affected even more strongly than the audience.
[77] See Winkler 1990b.
[78] Performance would then be functionally indistinguishable from private reading. For the emotional power of the latter see below, p. 81.

night, may cause lung-cancer, and dancing on stage, night after night, may improve one's physical health, so repeating philosophical dialogues may make us more philosophical.[79] The dialogues themselves would then *become* philosophy, in a way that drama rarely, if ever, *becomes* what it represents (e.g. a suicide or an internecine quarrel). A reader or actor speaking lines composed by another is in a certain sense *doing philosophy*, if she rehearses original philosophical views, in so far as she either internalizes or engages with those views. By contrast, an actor who plays (for example) the part of a king is in no sense directly embodying or transmitting the activity of ruling (though he may "do" political philosophy by airing ideas about such matters). So there is a (limited) sense in which the Platonic dialogues depart from one of the defining characteristics of "drama," namely by closing the gap between the activity represented and its representation. The performance remains a performance, in that the performer/reader does not actually *become* the character in question, but the activity represented and the activity of representing (through reading or performance) arguably converge. And though the perfomer does not "become" the character in any literal sense, she may become the *kind* of person that character is – for example, a philosopher or a sophist. Because word collapses into deed in this case, reading the dialogues with any level of engagement may be viewed as a way of becoming philosophical rather than as *mere* imitation in a pejorative sense. I shall be arguing that Plato himself shows some awareness of this kind of distinction.

Much recent interpretation of drama has focused, in comparable fashion, on the self-referentiality of these texts – the ways in which they are *about* discourse, rhetoric, communication, and drama itself. But this remains much more *explicitly* true of Plato, in whose works the nature of the philosophical life is an overt and constant preoccupation. Of course, drama also represents and critiques the merits of various modes of life. A notable example from tragedy is Euripides' (lost) *Antiope*, which weighed the relative merits of the lives of action and contemplation. It is no accident that this is the one tragedy used by Plato as a consistent subtext for a whole dialogue, namely *Gorgias*.[80] But drama does not occupy itself exclusively with such exploration, or focus relentlessly

79 There is, of course, another kind of actor – the one who smokes a fake cigarette – whose health remains unaffected. But even this kind of performer or reader – perhaps one who speaks words without understanding them – may serve to transmit ideas to a wider audience (cf. below, p. 312).

80 See Arieti 1991: ch. 5; Nightingale 1995 ch. 2. Type-characters embodying different lives, including the intellectual, are a staple of comedy as early as Epicharmus (see McDonald 1931).

on one such paradigm (the philosophical life). Moreover drama does not *instantiate* the way of life and the practices with which it is most profoundly concerned, in the way that the Platonic dialogue instantiates the doing of philosophy. Only an intellectual way of life can be self-referential in this way, since only a participant in this way of life can use the characteristic tools *of that life* (language and argument) to describe, discuss or evaluate her own life in a work that employs language and argument as its primary mode of representation. An exact parallel in drama would involve a single playwright producing dozens of plays all representing playwrights composing plays and discussing the pros and cons of various methods of doing so.

This notion that Plato's dialogues originally collapsed the gap between audience and performer in practice can remain no more than an intriguing hypothesis. All we *can* say for sure is that his notional audience – that is, the audience to whom the works seem to be addressed by the implied author – consists, at a minimum, of educated, intellectually elite (and elitist), philosophically engaged, Greek-speaking men.[81] The wide range of tone and content among the dialogues further suggests that subsets of this group may have provided a variety of somewhat different audiences (both notional and real) for different dialogues, depending, for example, on the level of intellectual sophistication they require. Regardless of the nature of Plato's original audience(s), however, the very act of writing implies an indeterminately large audience, extending down to the readership of the present day. Since Plato was notoriously well aware of this fact (*Phdr.* 275e), it is sufficient, in the absence of other evidence, to justify us for practical purposes in declaring Plato's intended audience to be "everyone."[82]

Our ignorance of the original performance-context and audience for these works undermines any attempt to understand their intended function with any specificity. Were they designed to be protreptic, paideutic, commemorative, or all of the above? We do not know.[83] In the absence of external evidence, we can only speculate on this matter. There is, of course, no pressing reason to limit them to a single purpose. There may have been as many purposes as there are dialogues, or as there were contexts for reading or perfomance. Nevertheless, every function that has been proposed is in some sense educational. I therefore adopt the

[81] They are not, however, necessarily socially elite (cf. below, pp. 76–7). For the idea of the "notional" audience see J. Henderson 1991: 134.

[82] Szlezák 1999: 27.

[83] For anecdotes about the protreptic effects of Plato's dialogues see Riginos 1976: 180–85.

working hypothesis that the dialogues are intended to be educational in a broad sense, in a way that may have been aimed at, or accessible to, different audiences on different levels, including the performers themselves. The choice of dramatic form indicates that the education in question is not intended to take place through a direct expression of the author's views, and hence to be expository or didactic in any usual fashion. But this leaves open the question of Plato's own expectations as to how they would function pedagogically – expectations that may well have altered as he changed his outlook towards such matters as textuality, pedagogy and mimesis. Different attitudes towards these various issues are conveyed on both discursive and dramatic levels in various dialogues, as we shall see. But the overwhelming concern with education in a broad general sense is never abandoned.

This account is based on various facts that I hope will not be disputed: that Plato produced (many of) his written works in the educational context of the Academy;[84] that many of them, if not all, are deeply concerned with educational matters; and that literary works generally – especially the "dramatic" genres of tragedy, comedy and epic – were widely believed to exert an educational effect on their performers and audiences, in large part through the representation of character. Plato explicitly examines this effect in several works. More generally, he returns time and again to the heroic figures of poetry, evincing a deep concern with the enormous cultural influence they exerted through education and other institutionalized fora of public life. As we shall see, he also produces characters of his own that respond directly to the traditional heroic models of epic and tragedy. He can scarcely have been unaware, then, of the presumptive pedagogical effects of his own "dramatic" works. It therefore seems reasonable to assume that he crafted the characters of these works not only with some care, but with an eye to educational purposes of his own.

As the preceding discussion has shown, Plato's dialogues share much in common not only with drama but with epic poetry, whether from the point of view of literary form, performance, or presumed educational function. The ancient commentators were well aware of Plato's

[84] I phrase this cautiously because we have no reliable knowledge of what went on in the Academy, or even evidence that the dialogues were used pedagogically (Sayre 1992: 225–6; Baltes 1993). But there is no good reason to believe that its education was any more dogmatic than the representations of pedagogy in the published dialogues (Gill 1993: 59–64; Baltes 1993: 9, 17–18; Monoson 2000: 137–45).

resemblance to Homer in this and other ways. Longinus, for example, calls him "most Homeric of all," attributing this quality, and Plato's poetical qualities generally, to a young man's eager desire to compete with a veteran.[85] In Aelian's account of Plato's literary beginnings, the youthful Plato tries his hand at epic as well as drama, but gives it up in face of Homer's superiority (*VH* 2.30); and Diogenes' version both invokes and appropriates the authority of the epic tradition through adapting a line of Homeric verse (above, p. 15). Another intriguing anecdote alleges that before he died, Plato dreamed that he had become a swan that eluded those trying to catch it. "Simmias the Socratic said everyone would strive to grasp Plato's meaning (*dianoia*), but no one would be able to; rather each would interpret him according to his own opinion . . . The same thing is true of both Homer and Plato . . . they are accessible to anyone, however one wishes to approach them."[86] The dialogues' formal qualities, specifically their resemblance to Homer, have thus been associated with Plato's elusiveness from ancient times. Such anecdotes establish philosophy as the rival of epic as well as tragedy, and, as we shall see, there are good reasons to believe that Plato himself took such a view of his own writings.

Treatment of Plato the "dramatist" thus turns out to embrace treatment of Plato the "epic poet." This is hardly surprising, in view of the fact that these various genres – epic, tragedy, comedy, prose dialogue – though easily distinguishable in various ways, were not delineated as rigidly in their own time as they have been since.[87] Thus Plato has no difficulty in including Homer among the tragedians.[88] The main point of intersection among these genres, besides the formal features discussed earlier (and not unrelated to them), may be clarified in Aristotelian terms. Epic, tragedy, and comedy are all mimetic, and as such represent "people doing things" (*Poet.* 1448a1). The fact that Plato's dialogues also represent "people doing things" accounts for many of the concerns that they share with drama and epic: the portrayal of various kinds of people and their interactions, the representation of competing points of view, the criticism

[85] Longinus 13.3–4; cf. *Parm.* 128de. On Plato's "Homeric" style see also Demetrius, *On Style* 37; Quintilian, *Inst. Orat.* 10.1.81; Proclus, *in Rem.* i.118–19, 161, 163–70 (Kroll); Blundell 1993a: 30; Haslam 1972: 23, 26; Dörrie and Baltes 1990: section 54.

[86] *Anon. Prol.* 1.29–38; see further Riginos 1976: 21–5. Both Homer and Plato were regarded as "polyphonic" (Ahl 1991: 52; Annas 1999: 13–17).

[87] The most obvious formal difference to the modern eye is that Plato writes prose, not verse. But though aware of this distinction, he does not treat it as significant (cf. *Gorg.* 502c, *Rep.* 393d, *Symp.* 205c, Arist. *Poet.* 1447a28–b24).

[88] *Rep.* 595bc, 598d, 602b, 605c, 607a, *Tht.* 152e; cf. also Arist. *Poet.* 1448b34–49a1.

and appropriation of traditional heroic tales, the pervasive concern with ethics, politics and education.[89] It is therefore not surprising that ancient sources link Plato's character-portrayal (*ēthopoiia*) with the influence of both Homer and comedy.[90] It is this shared concern with human character and its larger implications, along with the cultural centrality of drama, and especially Homeric epic, in his formative milieu, and the importance of these genres as formal models, which makes them Plato's most significant influences. These are accordingly the genres with which he remains most persistently preoccupied, most concerned to reinvent and appropriate. Like Plato himself, then, I shall in some respects treat Homer as "one of the tragedians," and Plato himself as an "epic poet" as well as a "dramatist."

The analogy between Plato's dialogues and tragedy, comedy, epic and other genres also provides a helpful perspective from which to consider Plato's problematic relationship to history. Nearly all his named characters are known to be based on real persons, and the few exceptions (notably Kallikles in *Gorgias*) are likely to have been real as well.[91] To what extent, then, is Plato's literary practice constrained by historical fact? The question is not confined to Plato. The historians, of course, used real people in their narratives. Aristophanes regularly placed well-known public figures from contemporary Athens on the comic stage. The tragedians occasionally dramatized historical events and characters close to their own time,[92] and even their mythic characters were thought to be real people who once existed. Dramatic audiences did not distinguish sharply between myth and history: they viewed the ancient legends as an aspect of history, and individual heroes of the past as their own tribal ancestors.

In all these genres, "real" people are represented with great fluidity. The historical characters of *Persians* are endowed with mythic stature, those of comedy distorted by satire. Even the historians had little access to accurate sources for their characters beyond tradition and gossip, and blurred the modern line between "fiction" and "history" by placing in the

89 Plato also shares with tragedy and epic the focus on a few central characters (Hirzel 1895: 206–11; Clay 2000: 152–6).

90 For Homer see [Longinus] 13.4; for mime see Diog. Laert. 3.18 with Clay 1994: 34–5 and cf. above, n. 30.

91 See Dodds 1959: 12. Diotima in *Symp.* is a special case (she is female, and does not appear *in propria persona*), but some think even she really existed (see Halperin 1990: 119–121; Ausland 2000: 185–6). On the fictionality of the nameless Eleatic visitor see below, p. 321.

92 E.g. Aesch. *Pers.* and Phrynichus' (lost) *Sack of Miletus.*

mouths of their characters verbatim speeches of their own composition.[93] Like these writers, the composers of "Socratic discourses" (*Sōkratikoi logoi*) were not bound by canons of historical accuracy. It is true that they often insist on their historical veracity and eye-witness reportage, but this is a generic trope, to be employed even when the events portrayed cannot not possibly have taken place. As a genre, the Socratic discourses occupied a "zone between truth and fiction . . . between fact and imagination."[94] This liminal literary status is perfectly fitted to the Platonic enterprise of appropriating and reinterpreting tradition.[95] It allowed him, like the dramatists and historians, not only to choose "real" figures that suited his purposes, but to treat them with considerable freedom. The little we know of the sophist Thrasymachos, for example, is rather different from his Platonic counterpart.[96] And it was alleged that when Gorgias read his eponymous Platonic dialogue, he said, "How well Plato knows how to satirize."[97] Another story claims that when Sokrates heard Plato read *Lysis* aloud, he exclaimed, "Herakles, how many lies the young man is telling about me!" (Diog. Laert. 3.35). The Second Letter declares that the writings attributed to Plato belong to "a Sokrates become beautiful and new" (314c).[98] Regardless of the veracity of such sources, they show an understanding of Plato's exercise of authorial licence in the characterization of known historical figures.

There are other ways in which dramatic practice provides a helpful parallel for Plato's use of history. For example, Plato can exploit his audience's knowledge of subsequent events in a way that parallels the dramatic irony of the tragedians. Just as the playwrights' audience knew how the main events of a myth would turn out (Troy always falls; Agamemnon always dies), so Plato's readers knew the prominent events and ideas of late fifth-century and early fourth-century Greek history, and were reading his dialogues in their light. Plato uses this technique, which I call "historical irony," in various ways. For example, Euthyphro's obtuseness is enhanced by his confidence that Sokrates will win his case. And *Republic's* emphasis on the importance of solid geometry as a yet

[93] Cf. Thuc. 1.33. It is worth noticing that Xenophon falls into the ranks of both Socratics and historians (cf. Hershbell 1995: 35).

[94] Momigliano 1993: 46; cf. Pratt 1993: 37–42. On the genre see further Hirzel 1895: 187–97; Chroust 1977: 1–16; Vander Waerdt 1994; Rutherford 1995: 44–6; Kahn 1996: ch. 1; Clay 2000: 3–13.

[95] Cf. Desjardins 1988: 122–5.

[96] See Guthrie 1969: 294–8; Quincey 1981.

[97] Athen. 11.505d; see further Riginos 1976: 93–4. For the next anecdote see Riginos 1976: 55.

[98] Since Sokrates is an old man in nearly all the dialogues, "new" (νέος) here must mean not "young" but something like "renewed," "revived," or "updated" (cf. Edelstein 1962: 2; Reeve 1988: 281 n. 17).

undeveloped field of study (528abc) should probably be read against the background of what had been achieved by Theaitetos between the dramatic date and the time of writing (below, p. 257). Most importantly, by basing his characters primarily on historical persons who were already dead when he composed the dialogues, Plato is able to convey obliquely the results and outcomes of their attitudes and lives.[99]

Another useful parallel lies in the way in which the tragic and comic playwrights both, in their own ways, used the legendary period as a "historical" screen for the projection and interpretation of contemporary issues. Tragedy presents legendary characters of the mythic past, the audience's own tribal ancestors, responding to pressing contemporary concerns, whether social, political or intellectual. Its settings are usually cities from mythic times that remained important historically as neighbors, friends or foes of Athens (e.g. Argos, Corinth, Thebes). Aristophanes' comedies, by contrast, are commonly set in contemporary Athens, but often endow it with surrealistic features. They too may employ mythic characters (like Dionysos and Herakles in *Frogs*), thus comically erasing the temporal gulf between the present moment and the heroic past. Sometimes they also conjure mythic settings, whether traditional, like the underworld, or invented, like the fantasy world of Cloudcuckooland, which help to give even ordinary mortals a legendary gloss. Like these playwrights, Plato treats historical characters with the fluidity of myth. He recreates the Athens of his childhood as a "legendary" past in which he locates "real" people for the exploration of his own concerns. As such it is populated with the heroes and villains of his imagination, and provides an ancestry and aetiology for the problems and concerns, political and ideological, of his own time. In this myth-historical world new tales are spun, of fantasies of the afterlife, the visionary world of the Forms, or the "dream" of the perfectly just state (*Rep.* 443b).[100]

Unlike the tragedians, of course, Plato spent his own formative years during the "mythic" period he dramatizes. In this respect his dialogues resemble the occasional historical tragedies, like Aeschylus' *Persians*, which draws upon a war in which the playwright had himself participated as a young man. Tragedies based on legend employ the ideology of the recent

[99] Below, p. 93. For a dramatic parallel compare Herakles' exhortation to piety directed to the young Neoptolemos, who was, notoriously, about to sack Troy in the most impious fashion (Soph. *Phil.* 1440–44).

[100] For the quasi-mythic quality of *Rep.*'s ideal state cf. 592a, *Tim.* 25e and see Friedländer 1964–9: III. 134–40; Segal 1978: 329–30.

past in less direct ways.[101] But the analogy with other genres is closer. Aristophanic comedy satirizes recent and contemporary political events, and Herodotus and Thucydides elevate the major wars of their own time – including the Persian war dramatized by Aeschylus – to quasi-legendary status. Similarly, Plato's youthful experience of the period and people that he dramatizes does not prevent him from endowing them with myth-historical significance. The success of the ancient writers in this regard is evident in the fact that we have inherited to this day the pivotal significance of these events – the Persian Wars, the Peloponnesian War, and the death of Sokrates – in constructing the periodicity of Greek history.

Given this fluidity in the representation of "historical" characters by ancient authors generally, how far should we assume that Plato's audience were influenced, in their understanding of his works, by their external knowledge of such persons or their familiar histories or traits? The degree to which such information is deemed relevant has heavily affected the interpretation of his dialogues. Thus, for example, Xenophon's claim that Sokrates tried to deter Glaukon from political ambition is pivotal to Leo Strauss's interpretation of *Republic*.[102] Similarly Jacob Klein uses external information about Meno to supplement the picture drawn in Plato's dialogue.[103] This is a thorny and ultimately insoluble interpretive issue. But it is worth observing that ancient literary critics show an awareness of both its parameters. On the one hand, they were well aware that external information might be relevant to understanding the full implications of a text. The technique whereby well-known facts are not mentioned in the discourse but allowed to color the narrative by speaking for themselves was known as *emphasis*. An ancient critic cites an apposite example from Plato's *Phaedo*, where the fact that certain people were on the nearby island of Aegina at the time of Sokrates' death is interpreted as an implicit reproach against them.[104] One should obviously be cautious in drawing such inferences about authorial intent. Yet it remains important to remember that Plato's characterizations do not exist in a historical vacuum. As with tragedy, his original audience not only knew in advance what would happen to the principal characters, but also knew much more than we do about his mise en scène.

[101] See e.g. Blundell 1993b: 301–3 and cf. Loraux 1973.
[102] 1964: 65; see Xen. *Mem.* 3.6.
[103] 1965: 199–202; see the critique by Seeskin 1987: 117–8, 123–5.
[104] Demetr. *On Style* 288; cf. *Phd.* 59c and see further Ahl 1984: 175–9.

A completely different attitude emerges, however, from Aristotle's discussion of character (*ēthos*) in his *Rhetoric*. The use of *ēthos* as a persuasive technique is strongly associated with oratory, which employs the same basic techniques for this purpose as Platonic dialogue, namely the speaker's own words and description by other characters.[105] In his *Rhetoric*, Aristotle explicitly addresses the question of how far the orator should take into account the audience's prior knowledge of the *ēthos* of persons under discussion – persons who, like Plato's dramatis personae, had a historical existence and were more or less well known to the speaker's audience. Chief among these persons is the speaker himself, whose self-presentation constitutes, in Aristotle's terms, a particular form of "proof": the proof from the *ēthos* of the speaker (*Rhet.* 1356a1–13).[106] This kind of "proof" is said to be effective when the speech is such as to render the speaker worthy of trust. Ancient authors occasionally mention the importance of external knowledge of the orator's character in supporting his case.[107] But Aristotle specifically says this effect should derive from the speech itself, as opposed to prior opinions about what kind of person the speaker is. The implication is that the author cannot control the audience's prior prejudices about the dramatis personae, only the impressions of them produced through the work itself. He must therefore ensure that everything essential to the audience's understanding of the character is provided within the text.[108]

As far as we know, Aristotle's views on *ēthos*, like the theory of *emphasis*, were not articulated until after Plato's time. But they reflect the practice of oratory from its origins in the fifth century, and fifth-century drama also supports in practice the application of Aristotle's principle, along with a judicious admixture of *emphasis*, to the interpretation of its characters. As we have seen, playwrights expected the audience to accept their reinterpretations of well-known characters, but to do so in an awareness of their main traditional attributes (above, pp. 8–9). I suggest that Plato's practice should be understood in a similar fashion. He must have assumed that his audience was aware of, for example, notorious political events in the lives of such famous (or infamous) characters as Alkibiades or Kritias or Charmides, some of which he alludes to more or less directly. But that does not mean he expects his representations to be read

[105] On *ēthos* in oratory see Usher 1965; D. A. Russell 1990; Hall 1995: 49–50. On *ēthos* generally see further below, pp. 53–62.

[106] Cf. also *Rhet.* 1366a8–14, 1377b21–31, 1355b19 and see further Blundell 1992a.

[107] Cf. *Eryx.* 399bc, Isoc. *Antid.* 278.

[108] Compare also the dictum sometimes ascribed to the Hellenistic Homer critic Aristarchus that for the interpreter "nothing exists outside the text" (Pfeiffer 1968: 226–7).

as careful portraits that would cohere with every other shred of ancient evidence, or even (necessarily) with other passages in his own works. Such an expectation would be anachronistic for any ancient author and questionable for a modern one. I shall, then, work on the assumption that for Plato, like the dramatists or Aristotle's ideal orator, the specifics provided in the text are primary to our understanding of a character's dramatic function, but that a backdrop of well-known information shared among Plato's audience may affect our larger understanding of that person's role.[109]

The most central and most problematic of Plato's characters in this regard is, of course, Sokrates. Many scholars believe that certain dialogues portray a "historical" Sokrates, in contrast to others where he is simply a mouthpiece for Plato's own ideas. From the perspective of the present work, however, the precise historicity of any of these representations is irrelevant. I am concerned with Plato's various pictures of Sokrates, not with their problematic relationship to other historical evidence. Plato presents us with a wide range of interpretations and reinterpretations of this central figure against a constant background of notorious facts about his life and death. In the present context it is neither necessary nor useful to view any of these figures, or any combination thereof, as simply "historical." Even if some of them do happen to reflect the "real" Sokrates more closely than others, this is not something we can infer from the dialogues themselves. Similarly, it is neither plausible nor useful to view the dialogues in which he participates as reports of actual conversations. Though some of them may well have been built around historical events, they are all Plato's literary productions, and the presence or absence of authentically historical factors is irrelevant for my purposes.

This does not mean, however, that the historicity of Sokrates and his companions is unimportant for Plato or his readers. The grounding of the dialogues in a known historical context, especially one that lies within the memory of the author and his immediate audience – many of whom were related to or descended from the participants – gives them a concrete immediacy that any pure fiction must lack, in so far as they enjoy a causal relationship to actually embodied persons. The historicity of Plato's characters adds another dimension to the tension between abstraction and embodiment that pervades his works. In particular, the life and death of the historical Sokrates render the use of his character

[109] For purely practical reasons, I shall assume that notoriety in our surviving ancient texts corresponds to notoriety in Plato's own world and the minds of his contemporaries.

as a Platonic site for the exploration of concrete human individuality all the more piquant. The historical fact that Sokrates was executed by the Athenians also guarantees the real practical importance of the issues for which he lived and died. The irreducible significance of this may be brought out by the mild absurdity of Isocrates' appropriation of Plato's *Apology* in his *Antidosis*, where the orator *imagines* that he is on trial for his life (below, p. 112).

WHY DIALOGUE FORM?

The analogy with drama, epic, and other related genres is thus a fruitful way of coming to terms with aspects of the "literary" character of Plato's dialogues. But it does not follow that Plato's works really *are* dramas, or epics, in any literal sense. The Socratic dialogue is quite literally sui generis.[110] An over-emphasis on the analogy with theatrical drama in particular can have odd results, such as the judgment that the dialogues are literary failures.[111] We must interpret and evaluate Plato's works on their own terms, remaining sensitive not only to their resemblances to other "dramatic" forms, but also to their differences. The most striking of the latter is the fact that Plato's characters are engaged in "doing" something rather different from most dramatically represented persons. Like the characters of tragedy and comedy, they "do" things like taking walks, getting into arguments, eating and drinking, making speeches and momentous, life-and-death choices, hiccupping and dying; but they also "do" philosophy, in both critical and creative ways, by challenging conventional wisdom and airing original ideas. These philosophical explorations are unequivocally marked as such, and make up by far the largest component of every dialogue (except perhaps *Apology* and *Menexenus*).

The fact that the persons represented in Plato's dialogues are doing philosophy is central to the usual judgment that these are works of philosophy, as opposed to philosophical works of literature. But this criterion by itself is not enough to support such a distinction. "Literary" works may be judged "philosophical" for a variety of reasons without thereby becoming works of philosophy – for example, because they reflect philosophical ideas or influences, or convey a certain view of the world, or

[110] Plato's works are also unique within the genre of Socratic writings, as far as we can tell. But apart from the works of Xenophon (which are vastly unlike Plato), only a few fragments of the genre have survived. Later uses of the dialogue form also have their interest, but none is quite comparable to Plato (see e.g. Levi 1976; Beversluis 2000: 21–6).

[111] See Gonzalez 1998: 145.

represent characters interested in philosophy or living a philosophical life. But Plato's works stand apart from almost all of these, not only for the amount of philosophical discussion that they contain, but also for the originality of the ideas they explore, and the explicitness with which they do so. All these features may be found in varying degrees in much of Greek tragedy and later drama (Shakespeare, Shaw), and more recently in the works of Iris Murdoch or Tom Stoppard. But none of these later "dramatic" texts comes anywhere close to the sheer proportion of overt and original philosophical argument that we find in Plato's works. In the recent push to contextualize Plato's arguments with respect to both literary form and cultural milieu, it is crucial to remember that these arguments are, to an *overwhelming* degree, the main subject matter of his "dramas." "Dramatic" criticism ignores this at its peril.

Why, then, did Plato choose to write philosophy in this peculiar form? There is no straightforward answer to this question, not least because Plato never tells us in his own voice the reason(s) for anything he says or does. This in itself suggests that dialogue form is *intrinsic* to Plato's purposes in a way that it was not for later writers, from Aristotle to Hume, who composed dialogues but also treatises. Nor does Plato ever *show* us in the dialogues how to use the dialogues.[112] The letters are, of course, a different matter, since they are written in the first person. But even when an author speaks in her "own" voice, questions of persona, voice and genre still arise.[113] Plato's Seventh Letter, around which the discussion usually hinges, is not an intimate personal confession but a polished, highly polemical piece, intended for public distribution, with its own authorial persona and rhetorical agenda.[114] Scholars have extracted much about the purpose of dialogue form from its declaration that Plato has never systematically written down his ideas, and its remarks about the pedagogical process (341 a–e). But even if we suppose this letter to be authentic, we must bear in mind that it evidently post-dates many of the dialogues and there is no indication whatsoever that it was composed to be used as a "key" for understanding them. The dialogues, in short, have reached us without an instruction manual. And for good reason. To provide such a manual, even if it advised us to read the dialogues non-dogmatically, would be to adopt the posture of a dogmatist. The Seventh Letter tells us the obvious – that the dialogues are not treatises

[112] Unless, that is, we wish to imitate Terpsion and Eukleides' use of dialogue in *Tht.* (below, pp. 305–7).

[113] Cf. e.g. Kosman 1992a: 80–81, 1992b: 55–7; Press 1995: 141–4; Nightingale 1995: 182; Dewald 1999.

[114] See Ausland 2000: 190 and cf. Momigliano 1993: 61–2.

containing a systematic exposition of Plato's own views. By inference, it also tells us that the meaning of dialogue form is to be found in that form itself. But we do not need the Seventh Letter to tell us this, since it is inscribed in the dialogues themselves, which indicate *by* their form that we can only infer the purpose *of* their form from its effects.

As to those effects, I am in accord with much that has been written in recent decades about Plato's use of dialogue form.[115] To simplify considerably, two of the most conspicuous and inarguable functions of this form, as I see it, are to avoid Platonic dogmatism and to draw in the reader as a participant in the discussion. The avoidance of dogmatism is a simple formal fact, one that accords with the definition of dramatic form as the absence of an authorial or narrative voice. Since Plato never speaks in his own voice, he never adopts a dogmatic or authoritative pedagogical stance towards his audience or readership. This is true of all the dialogues, simply in virtue of their form, but in some of them, as we have seen, Plato draws special attention to it through complex narrative frames that distance the text still further from any claim to authoritative utterance. This places him at the opposite pole from the epic tradition of divine inspiration, in which the Muses' authority endorses the narrator's human wisdom. In such a world, the "master of truth" is the poet, prophet or king.[116] As Eva Stehle puts it, "the Greek cultural construction of a speaker is a man who has or claims authority and presses his character on others as he seeks to increase his honor."[117] The philosophical tradition prior to Plato had appropriated this stance. Parmenides employed a goddess to locate his protagonist's discourse on a superhuman level, and Empedocles even claimed to be a god himself (DK 31 B112.3–4). The claims to knowledge put forward under such auspices tend to be strongly authoritarian in tone. But Plato eschews such models.

Even without divine sanction, unmarked human assertion implies a claim to knowledge, and thus a claim to truth. It also expresses a claim to intellectual authority, especially in educational or argumentative contexts, in so far as it implies that you, the hearer, should believe what I, the listener, say (because it is true).[118] As Grote put it, "the philosopher

[115] A good starting point is the contents and bibliographies of several recent collections: Barker and Warner 1992; Klagge and Smith 1992; Press 1993a, 2000a; Gonzalez 1995a; Gill and McCabe 1996; Hart and Tejera 1997.

[116] Detienne 1996. For the presocratics as "masters of truth" see Clay 2000: 80–83.

[117] Stehle 1997: 10.

[118] I.e. it has a perlocutionary as well as an illocutionary force (see Austin 1962; Searle 1969; and cf. Elam 1980: 156–70).

is assumed to speak as one who has authority; to have already made up his mind; and to be prepared to explain what his mind is . . . Affirmative, authoritative exposition . . . proceeds upon the assumption that truth is already known."[119] More than a century after Grote, I still find this more plausible than Michael Frede's claim that the assertive mode in contemporary philosophy comes with an "implicit qualification," amounting to a (non-existent) preface, "saying that it would be immodest to think that what was going to be said actually amounted to the truth of the matter."[120] The presumption of authority is, of course, still stronger when the discourse emanates from a philosophical "master," such as the head of the Academy.[121] This mode of discourse, in which the author characteristically speaks as one who knows, usually naming himself in the process, was also available to Plato. But he chose instead to avoid claiming personal intellectual authority in this fashion.

In pedagogical or argumentative contexts, authoritative assertion is analogous to a claim to political authority, in so far as the latter implies that you should acquiesce in my orders. The analogy is not a trivial one, given the intense agonism permeating nearly all aspects of Greek culture, and Plato's particular concern with the relationships among knowledge, authority and political power. In politics, such claims are contested through challenges to the exercise of power, and affirmed through its assertion. In the realm of intellectual authority they are tested through argument, the means by which the crown of authority, the badge of intellectual office, is attacked and defended. Thus Sokrates in *Theaetetus* playfully treats dialectical discussion as a way of determining who shall be "king" (146a; cf. 235c1). By implication, those who are not so crowned are metaphorically killed or defeated, in either case subordinated to the winner's intellectual authority. To win the argument is to prove (or be thought to prove) that one is right, and so to defend one's claim.[122] To be silenced is to admit defeat, however reluctantly (see further below, pp. 122–4).

It follows that an extended and continuous speech, which leaves no room for interruption or dissent, is an inherently authoritarian mode of

[119] 1888: I.366–7. Cf. also Lodge's argument that "scholarly discourse aspires to the condition of monologue" (1987: 96).

[120] M. Frede 1996: 142; cf. Gerson 2000: 209 n. For an attempt at non-authoritarian expository writing see Nozick 1981: 6–8. McAvoy employs dialogue form for this purpose, but unlike Plato, explains that this is what he is doing (1999: 25–9).

[121] Nails 2000: 20. For Plato's awareness of the "tyrannical" character of monologic analytical discourse see Nightingale 1993.

[122] Cf. Nehamas 1990: 112–13.

discourse, one that imposes silence upon its hearers and thus enforces intellectual subordination and (the appearance of) agreement. Though Plato himself never uses this mode of discourse, his characters do, in varying degrees. Sokrates uses authoritative monologue most explicitly in *Apology*, where he repeatedly silences the interruptions of his audience (17c, 20e, 21a). Elsewhere, he evades responsibility for such speeches – and hence personal authority – by attributing them to other sources. More often, however, it is his opponents who use (or want to use) expository monologue, thereby claiming the authority implicit in this mode of speech. The elenctic Sokrates fastens on such discourse as evidence of his victims' claims to intellectual authority or "wisdom," which is, of course, precisely what makes them vulnerable to his methods.

A treatise is the written equivalent of an extended, uninterrupted speech. Thus it is the implicit claim to intellectual authority in Protagoras' treatise that allows Sokrates to argue, in *Theaetetus*, that his relativism is self-defeating. By avoiding this mode of discourse in his own voice, Plato evades the charge of authoritarianism – though he may, at the same time, expose himself to the different charge of evading responsibility.[123] Dialogue form also enables him to avoid the implicit claim that his – or anyone's – philosophical views can in fact be coherently conveyed through assertive discourse.[124] The form thus has certain pedagogical implications, in contrast to a treatise. Some of these are spelled out in the Seventh Letter. But even without that evidence, we can infer from Plato's choice of form that he denies pedagogical value to the authoritative treatise as such. No matter what model of pedagogy Plato's characters enact, the choice of dialogue form saves Plato himself from instantiating the kind of pedagogy that would be implied by a continuous expository discourse in his own voice. Dramatic elements in some of his works reinforce this inference. Most important of these are certain characteristics of Sokrates, especially his undogmatic posture, his intellectual independence, and his repeated discrediting of authoritative assertions by others. His frequent repudiation of extended, authoritative speech (even while in the act of appropriating it) accords with his characteristic self-representation as subordinate to his interlocutors in wisdom and intellectual authority, while simultaneously allowing him to deflate their claims.

Plato's authorial stance as a writer of dialogues endorses on a formal level the philosophical value of this mode of self-presentation and

[123] Cf. Nehamas 1998: 86 and below, p. 163.
[124] See esp. Gonzalez 1998; cf. also below, pp. 247–8.

pedagogical practice. The philosophical dialogue not only reproduces Sokrates' conversational method, but is the formal correlate of Socratic ignorance. The dialogues induce *aporia* in the reader, as Sokrates does in his interlocutors, with the presumed intention of eliciting an active intellectual response, as opposed to passive learning (below, pp. 99–101). Plato's undogmatic mode of discourse allows him to interrogate and interpret tradition in a manner similar to his Sokrates. Conversely, Sokrates, like Plato, exploits the evasiveness of "dramatic form," for example by ventriloquating the Laws of Athens in *Crito*, or Diotima in *Symposium*. These ventriloquations are a primary vehicle for the constructive Sokrates' positive speculations. But they also serve as an evasion of Socratic authority, in a way that parallels Plato's own avoidance of authority through his choice of dramatic form.

There is often a tension, however, between this anti-authoritarianism, which is inherent in dialogue form, and the kinds of views expressed by the characters within the dialogues, which are often highly authoritarian. A related paradox lies in Plato's use of highly individualized speakers – above all, Sokrates – to voice views that are often deeply anti-individualist. There are parallel tensions within the figure of Sokrates himself, who eschews dogmatism but recommends authoritarianism, privileges dialogue but engages in extended rhetorical speech-making, and voices thoroughly elitist ideas from an entrenched position within democratic Athenian culture (below, pp. 75–9). We should not allow the dialogue form to seduce us into ignoring or underestimating the dogmatism and authoritarianism that pervade Plato's works in these various ways, especially since they are among the defining features of "Platonism" in the philosophical tradition. Yet the fact remains that an intrinsic effect of dramatic form, and of the concomitant evasion of authorial responsibility, is that it always presents such ideas as objects for response, rather than propositions disseminated by the voice of the author for our acceptance. *All* ideas aired in Plato's dialogues are thus left open to discussion or revision by their author as well as his readers, allowing Plato himself to escape the charge of dogmatism. The elaborate construction of a "historical" explanation for the production and transmission of many of these Socratic stories further suggests that these verbal "records" are radically contingent, rooted in the here and now (or there and then), their arguments provisional and not to be confused with the transcendent truths they so often explore.

There is, however, another more problematic way in which the figure of Sokrates embodies the tension between authoritarian and undogmatic

discourse. Despite his repudiation of authoritative speech, Plato covertly reinstates Sokrates' authority in most of the dialogues by allowing him to dominate the conversation with his personality and arguments, and by privileging his point of view. This is true of all the dialogues he dominates, including those that use direct dramatic form. But it is most obvious in those works where Sokrates is the narrator.[125] This role gives him further resources for shaping the dialogue in his own interests, controlling the reader's point of view, and creating psychological distance between the reader and other characters.[126] The narrative function may also invest him with a quasi-Homeric authority, as he relates for example, the "epic" tale of Er's Odyssean journey to the underworld.[127] Sometimes Plato draws this controlling function to our attention (cf. especially *Rep*. 350cd). At other times he makes Sokrates even more "omniscient" than his own point of view would seem to warrant.[128] Narration by other characters, as in *Symposium*, provides a different way of making Sokrates the center of attention. And on a more general level, the sheer magnitude of his presence in the corpus as a whole gives him a kind of dominance no other character can equal.

Authority and openness are in tension in Plato in another way as well. Despite his "anonymity" within the dialogues, a named author cannot disappear entirely behind the masque of his characters, eschewing responsibility for what are, after all, *his* productions. The implied author, whose name is acknowledged to be "Plato," remains present, embedded in his text as "superspeaker."[129] Direct dramatic form seems more honest than reported dialogue, since it removes the narrator's mediating voice to create an effect of dramatic transparency, as if we were eavesdropping. This is in part why direct mimesis encourages audience identification more than narrative does (below, pp. 90–91). But in another way, this apparent honesty is specious, since the effect of immediacy, of honest reportage, belies the manipulations of the author behind the scene. In the preamble to *Theaetetus*, Eukleides explains that in his transcription

[125] Sokrates narrates *Charm.*, *Lys.*, *Rep.*, and *Erastai* (usually considered spurious), also *Euthyd.* and *Prot.* after some preliminary conversation. *Parm.* is narrated by Kephalos, *Symp.* by Apollodoros, and *Phd.* by Phaedo (after a short introductory conversation with Echecrates). See further D. Tarrant 1955b: 84–5; Halperin 1992: 95–6.

[126] See e.g. the way he omits Thrasymachos' actual words at *Rep.* 342cd, 350cd. For examples of Sokrates' narrative control see Berger 1984; Tejera 1984: 104–7; Dalfen 1989: 78–80; Burger 1997: 124–8. Note that he also uses prejudicial narrative strategies when he is not the formal narrator (e.g. *HMin.* 368a–d).

[127] See esp. Albinus 1998.

[128] For the former cf. e.g. *Euthyd.* 290e, *Symp.* 212c; for the latter see e.g. Benardete 1989: 9–10.

[129] Maranhão 1990: 14.

of the original conversation he omitted such phrases as "he said" out of convenience (143bc). The moment serves to remind us that even direct dramatic form is always controlled by an underlying authorial and/or editorial voice. The decision to elide overt narrative control is itself a form of control, a fact to which we are alerted by Plato's marking of Eukleides' decision. In this respect, the *narrated* dialogues are paradoxically more honest, in so far as they constantly remind us that the account is shaped by a voice other than that of the participants. This in turn serves to remind us of the author who stands behind the narrator, not necessarily to agree with him, but (necessarily) to create and control him.

In Greek cultural terms, the status of the author is reinforced by the fact that writing itself was generally viewed as intrinsically authoritarian and anti-democratic.[130] It is true that dialogue form may plausibly be seen as an attempt by Plato to circumvent some of the difficulties of writing per se as aired in *Phaedrus*.[131] For example, the written dialogue qua writing cannot answer back, but it can *show* us people answering or reacting to similar conversations. And as contemporary critics have pointed out, writing is potentially *anti*-authoritarian, in so far as it makes possible not only reading but *re*-reading and consequently more detailed analysis and criticism. It is even arguable that the provocative quality of Plato's dialogues *depends* in part on the fact that they are written works, as opposed to overheard conversations, since Plato's readers are in a position to revisit and analyze the ideas and arguments in a way that is impossible for the participants or the internal audience. But the fact remains that written dialogue is never truly dialogical, in the sense that it is always controlled by a single authorial point of view, however chameleon-like that point of view may be. Plato's use of the written dialogue is thus in itself an expression of ambivalence about issues of authority and autonomy.

The authoritative position of even the most self-effacing named author may be brought out by pursuing the ancient analogy between Plato and Homer. Like Homer, Plato is elusive by reason of his anonymity within his works. Yet as Plato himself is all too well aware, this does not detract from Homer's authoritative status. The "anonymous" Homer is

[130] See Steiner 1994 esp. chs. 4–5.

[131] See esp. Griswold 1986: 216–26; cf. also Friedländer 1964–9: I.165–6; Ogilvy 1971; Ophir 1991: 161–66; Gellrich 1994: 303–5. I do not wish to enter into the debate about the attitudes towards writing expressed in Plato's works. But whatever one thinks of this matter, it is important to bear in mind that both *Ep. VII* and *Phdr.* leave open a positive role for writing, and conversely, treat some forms of oral discourse as suspect (cf. *Phdr.* 258d). Books cannot give answers (*Phdr.* 275d), but orators who produce long discourses without being able to answer questions are no better (*Prot.* 329a).

presented by Diotima as the parent of literary "offspring" that will bring him unending glory, implying both a Homeric claim to paternal authority and a bid to immortalize the authorial self for future generations.[132] Plato tacitly claims a similar authority for himself, by producing books that will bear his name down through the generations, offspring in the paternal line of descent.[133] This is confirmed by the many oblique indications that part of his project is to supplant Homer and his overwhelming cultural influence. Like Heraclitus or Xenophanes, he establishes himself as a rival of his predecessors, on the one hand by criticizing their substance and their methods, and on the other by proceeding to do what they do, in his own innovative fashion, and doing it "better." By this behavior he is participating in a prominent aspect of the intense agonism of ancient Greece: vying for cultural authority in a tradition consisting largely of the appropriation and competitive retelling of earlier tales.[134] This competitive spirit often lies close to the surface of the Platonic text, for example when Glaukon declares that no previous discourse, in prose or verse, has ever defended justice satisfactorily, and challenges Sokrates (and thus implicitly Plato himself) to do better (*Rep.* 366e), or in the well-known passages where philosophy is placed in direct competition with poetry.[135]

There is, then, a sense in which Plato is very far from anonymous. It may indeed be true, as numerous scholars have observed, that "his name . . . appears in the dialogues only rarely, and as it were, marginally."[136] But it appears *on* the dialogues times without number, and usually – quite literally – at center-page.[137] Like the ancient dramatists, whose names appear nowhere in their plays but were publicly inscribed on the occasion of victory, Plato's role as puppeteer of all his

[132] *Symp.* 209cd. On writing as reproduction see Steiner 1994: 110–16. For immortality through writing cf. *Phdr.* 258bc. For the parenthood of intellectual "offspring" in Plato cf. *Phdr.* 257b, 274e, 275a, 276e–277a, 278ab, *Rep.* 330c, 534d, 599b–600b, *Symp.* 177d, 209a–e, *Tht.* 164e and see Derrida 1981: 76–84. Cf. also Ar. *Clouds* 137, *Frogs* 1059.

[133] Cf. the pun on his name implicit in the verb *plattō* ("make," "shape"), which can be used for both literary and divine acts of creation (cf. *Rep.* 415a; Diog. Laert. 3.26; Brisson 1998: 40–41).

[134] Cf. above, p. 30. On the Greek "contest system" see Gouldner 1965: ch. 2. On the competitive nature of the literary tradition see e.g. Herington 1985: 5–10; M. Griffith 1990 and cf. E. J. M. West 1995: 45; P. J. Wilson 1996: 317.

[135] E.g. *Laws* 817b, *Ap.* 22ab, *Phd.* 60e–61a, *Rep.* 607b. See also *Symp.*, where Sokrates outdoes both tragic and comic poets (cf. Bacon 1959; Clay 1975; Patterson 1982; Corrigan 1997).

[136] Friedländer 1964–9: I.127.

[137] In ancient times, the dialogues were probably identified by the inscription of Plato's name before titles were assigned to individual works (see Haslam 1976: 337–8). The importance of the authority of the writer's name is also shown by the large number of "forgeries" in the ancient world. On signature as a token of authority and responsibility see Burke 1996 and cf. Foucault 1984: 105–8.

characters invests his name with a higher level of authority than any single voice he dramatizes. By Cicero's time, he had been elevated to the status of philosophical divinity.[138] Cicero is also fond of asserting that to be wrong with Plato is preferable to being right with his opponents[139] – a sentiment that would have appalled Plato's Sokrates, for whom no man, including both Homer and himself, should be valued more highly than the truth.[140] Over subsequent millennia, Plato's name has been resanctified by ceaseless reiteration in the classroom and on the page, not only the title pages of his own works, but the pages of texts like this one. The real significance of Whitehead's notorious remark about the European philosophical tradition, that it "consists of a series of footnotes to Plato,"[141] is not the dubious implication that all subsequent philosophy is a commentary on, or a reaction to, Plato's works, but its inscription of Plato's name on the title page of the "text" of Western philosophy as such. Everyone else, from Aristotle to Derrida, is thereby demoted to a mere entry in the bibliography of the annotated master-text.

Ironically, this canonical authority results in part from Plato's use of dialogue form, which renders his texts so enticing, rich and provocative for readers at every level of sophistication. A varied series of characters, whether in life or on Plato's pages, is more likely than the sober authorial voice of a treatise to provoke modern readers, especially those without formal philosophical training, into emotional engagement and intellectual response. Plato demonstrates *within* his dialogues the power of concrete embodiment to sway an audience in a way that abstract analysis does not.[142] He puts the same thing into practice on the authorial level through his choice of form, which has been instrumental in eliciting audience participation in his dialectic, and hence in fostering the enduring life of his philosophy. Dramatic form has also helped his canonical status to remain entrenched at all levels of education, and among those of the general public who have been educated within the "Western" intellectual tradition. Such status is, of course, subject to cultural variation. Aristotle, rather than Plato, was "the" philosopher of the medieval period,[143] and

[138] *Deus ille noster Plato* ("Plato, our god") (*ad Att.* 4.16). For anecdotes linking Plato with Apollo see Riginos 1976: 9–32 and cf. ibid. 198; see also Stove 1991: xi–xii). Ficino's famous edition of the dialogues in 1602 attributed them to "the divine Plato." For his modern "divinity" see Lane 2001: 136–7. On his canonization as a "classic" see also *Anth. Pal.* 9.188 with the commentary by Dörrie and Baltes 1990: 506–10.

[139] E.g. *Tusc.* 1.39; cf. Dörrie and Baltes 1987: section 30.

[140] See *Phd.* 91bc, *Rep.* 595bc; cf. below, p. 124.

[141] A. N. Whitehead 1978: 39.

[142] Cf. D. Allen 2000.

[143] Cf. C. C. W. Taylor 1998: 83–4. Note too that the most important Platonic work in the Middle Ages was *Timaeus*, arguably the least dialogical of the dialogues.

continues to thrive alongside Plato among professional specialists. But it is Plato, more than any other ancient philosopher, who will most reliably be found today throughout schools and colleges where the European intellectual tradition is taught. Even though Plato has largely been scripted as a villain in recent intellectual history, his choice of dialogue form, and the brilliance with which he employs it, have rendered him open to a vastly divergent array of appropriations.[144] This form is at least part of what renders him so central to contemporary cultural concerns, at a time when dialogue and multiplicity – and so-called "maieutic" education – have in many quarters a higher intellectual currency than the authoritarian voice of an Aristotle.

This stimulation of the reader's emotional and intellectual engagement is by no means coincidental. Rather, it is the second main function of dialogue form, as I – and many others – see it. To be sure, any form of discourse implicitly invites a reader to respond.[145] But dramatic discourse involving more than one speaker invites us to do so in a particular way. This is because "in dialogue, one listens and speaks in the same activity; every remark contains within it the solicitation of a response."[146] By representing a plurality of characters in each of his works, Plato invites a plurality of such responses in the consumer. As an ancient commentator put it – foreshadowing modern reception-theory – our soul inclines itself to each side in turn (*Anon. Prol.* 15.7-13).[147] The stimulating role of such plurality is clearest in the aporetic dialogues, where the reader is left to ponder unanswered questions. But even when a dialogue reaches positive results, the reader's imaginative participation continues to be elicited at the end by the fact that Plato almost never closes the dramatic frame with which most of his dialogues begin.[148] Many of these openings establish a concrete, culturally specific setting for what follows (below, pp. 63–4). But the conversation itself invariably moves towards a more abstract realm, rarely returning to the initial dramatic situation. Plato

[144] See Lane 2001: 135–9; Burnyeat forthcoming.

[145] See e.g. Harding 1962: 139–40; Mecke 1990: 201–4.

[146] G. A. Scott 2000: 44.

[147] Cf. Iser's conception of the reader's "wandering viewpoint," applied to Plato by Gordon 1996, 1999: ch. 2. Note that even *Ap.*, whose genre would lead one to expect a monologue, includes Meletos as an interlocutor and provides indications of audience reaction, which make it "a dialectical interchange between Sokrates and the people of Athens" (Prior 1997: 118).

[148] Cf. Halperin 1992: 96; *Euthyd.* is an exception (its frame both irrupts in the middle and is closed at the end; see Hawtrey 1981: 31). The frame of *Phd.* does the former (88c, 102a) but not the latter. This lack of closure might make "frame" seem like the wrong word. But there is a larger sense in which the initial scene-setting "frames" the whole conversation, by providing the imaginative context within which it is situated. Indications of "frame" in this latter sense may reappear throughout the work.

leaves the reader to continue her own reflections, without severing her sense of involvement by re-emphasizing the distance that divides her from the participants and their internal audience. Thus *Republic*, a narrated dialogue, moves away from indirect discourse to close with direct speech, which tacitly embraces an audience unlimited in space or time.[149] The absence of dramatic closure also enables Plato's characters, in particular Sokrates, to live on imaginatively after the end of the conversation, even in dialogues like *Symposium* or *Theaetetus*, which begin by emphasizing the time that has elapsed since their deaths. This suggestion that the reader forms part of a living conversation is reinforced by the way many of the participants – at least those friendly to philosophy, and especially Sokrates – represent their interactions as part of an unending process, to be carried indefinitely into the future. The history of philosophy attests to the dialogues' effectiveness in stimulating such participation. But as we shall see, Plato's works also betray a profound uneasiness about the propriety and limits of active engagement with the text. This uneasiness parallels his ambivalence about his own eschewal of authority, and is manifested in many of the same ways, especially through the enormous power of the figure of Sokrates (below, ch. 2).

To these two effects (or purposes) of dialogue form I would add a third, complementary, function, one that is central to the reading of Plato adopted in this book. The fact of dramatic form as I have defined it – the representation of persons speaking in a voice other than that of the author – obliges the reader to envisage philosophy as a product of particular human beings located in time and space – as embedded "in the muck of a real, unique historical conjuncture."[150] Drama proper uses literal embodiment as a way of influencing our understanding of the text, e.g. through costume, gesture, choice of actor, and acting style; Platonic dialogue invites us to stage such embodied agents in our own minds. By using dialogue form, then, Plato is co-opting the psychological power of dramatization (below, pp. 80–81, 90). He is also modelling ethical conflict among people as well as ideas, along with its resolution or lack thereof. He thus represents philosophy as constructed by "real" life – not just as relevant to people's lives (though of course it is that), but as both enabled and shaped by the lives and personal circumstances of those who participate in and are affected by it. Plato thus preempts what has been called "the supreme irony . . . that philosophy can lead

[149] See Howland 1993: 34; cf. also Rosenstock 1983: 222–6; Ophir 1991: ch. 4 and 147–60.
[150] Rose 1992: 332.

philosophers to forget its origin in ordinary life."[151] The effect is further reinforced by the way in which the discursive content of the works is often mirrored by their dramatic action, exemplifying the matching of word and deed (*logos* and *ergon*) with which ancient Greek texts are almost obsessively preoccupied. In the chapters that follow, I shall engage with this interplay of dramatic and discursive levels by showing how Plato's use of dramatic representation in each dialogue under discussion mirrors the theories of mimesis and education articulated within that dialogue.

Even a dramatic monologue grounds philosophy in human plurality, in so far as it invites the consumer to acknowledge the gap between author and character.[152] But dialogue, which by definition involves more than one character, *forces* human plurality and difference on our attention. Regardless of the level of detail with which the characters are portrayed, dialogue form necessarily confronts the imagination with more than one person speaking. It therefore leaves us no choice but to acknowledge the particular, simply by obliging us to envisage two or more persons in some kind of human relationship. In strictly formal terms, then, dialogue form is an assertion of human plurality, which focuses attention not only on the intellectual and psychological differences between individual human beings, but on the discrete physicality in which these differences are grounded, and so on our embodiedness and particularity. The result is not simply an anti-totalizing gesture on the human level, demanding that a plurality of voices be heard. As we have seen, the extent to which Plato's various works really are pluralistic in *this* way is problematic, and varies widely from one work to another. But the *minimum* effect of dramatic form is the concrete imagining of two persons, however co-opted their Platonically ventriloquated voices may be. This effect may be enhanced or diminished by the author's treatment of individuality and/or materiality in a certain work. In some cases the world of the particular is simply posited as the medium for the exploration of a disembodied philosophical ideal; in others, it is invited in at every turn. But on the most basic level it is fundamental to Plato's use of dialogue form, and as such remains unimpaired even in dialogues whose characters display little individuality.

151 Rice 1998: 31.

152 A treatise, by contrast, normally presents itself as transcending spatio-temporal limitations (cf. Hyland 1995: 20). But the author of a treatise may acknowledge human plurality by drawing attention to the gap between author and reader, as e.g. Lucretius does by constantly addressing the "you" of the reader.

Plato's choice of form thus represents philosophy and its production as irredeemably grounded in human specificity and difference, even as it erases, on a formal level, the specificity of the first-person authorial voice. This gives a kind of pathos to the many attempts within the dialogues to express a philosophy transcending the human realm. The glimpses of eternity that are offered to us are always embodied in time. The form in itself is thus an acknowledgement of the impossibility of that to which its central characters so often seem to aspire – a condition transcending the multiplicity of the material world. The thinker so renowned for the rejection of what we – though not he – would call the "real world," the world of the senses and of physical embodiment, unflinchingly represents the conception of transcendence as rooted in the very soil of that world. To put it another way, the most notorious defining feature of Platonism is expressed by Plato in a self-defeating form. Despite the evasiveness of this form, it manifests in its own way a rigorous intellectual honesty, by forcing us to acknowledge the inescapable embodiedness of human thought, since this embodiedness is inscribed in the dialogue form itself.[153] Dramatic form thus becomes a medium for exploring the limits of transcendence, and the multiple tensions – between ideal and particular, mind and body, original and image, one and many, being and becoming, divine and human, deduction and persuasion, reason and emotion – which pervade the works of Plato.

By locating the practice of philosophy in a human context in this fashion, the dialogic representation of philosophical activity becomes simultaneously, and inseparably, the representation of human communication, or pedagogy in the broadest sense. Not only is communication of pervasive thematic importance in Plato's works,[154] but *some* communicative model is always implicit in the relationships among the various speaker(s), respondent(s) and listener(s) of each dialogue. In each case, the model in question depends on the particular use that is made of the dialogue form, and especially on the mode of discourse favored by various participants, such as extended speeches, debates, or question and answer of various kinds. Extended speeches may be aimed at persuasion in an overtly rhetorical fashion (as in *Apology*), or at the simple, authoritarian purveying of information, as provided by a lecture, or at some combination of the two. Such speeches do not in themselves require the dramatization of another speaker, since even the continuous

[153] Cf. Sokrates' use of imagery from the material world to describe the immaterial realm of the soul and the Forms (e.g. *Phdr.* 246a, *Rep.* 506de; on the undepictable see further below, pp. 247–8).
[154] See Dalfen 1989.

lecture implies some kind of audience. But a subordinate second speaker may serve to enhance the authoritarian effect, by introducing an explicit hierarchy and reaffirming the principal speaker's dominance. In explicit opposition to such models, Plato's Sokrates emphasizes the collaborative nature of dialectical conversation, which he characterizes with language of equality and cooperation (below, pp. 120–21). But there is more than one kind of collaboration. A "cooperative" but dominant character may acknowledge his own contributions or efface them – as Sokrates so often does – or serve more or less overtly as the leader in a shared journey. He may pressure others to cooperate, or enjoy an authority freely bestowed by the company, either presupposed or won in intellectual combat.

The various pedagogical models represented in the dialogues engage in various ways with their discursive content, in so far as the latter is concerned, as it so often is, with educational methods and substantive issues of pedagogy. This reflexivity poses a whole series of questions about the pedagogical methods and behaviors portrayed within Plato's works. The most pressing of these concern Sokrates' educational effectiveness. To be sure, Plato's Sokrates routinely denies that he is a teacher in a strict sense. Yet Plato portrays him – even in his elenctic persona – interacting with others in contexts that are often overtly educational in a broader sense, and aiming at the improvement, in some sense or other, of his interlocutors (below, p. 118). These representations challenge us to ask whether the Platonic Sokrates, in any of his manifestations, can teach successfully. If so, whom can he teach, and how? If not, why not? They also bring us back to dramatic characterization. For as we shall see, the effectiveness or otherwise of Sokrates and his methods varies along with the characters of both teacher and learner. Questions about proper philosophical method and effective pedagogy thus become inseparable from Plato's own "literary" practice in the portrayal of his characters.

These issues are important not only for Plato and his immediate audience, themselves living and writing long after the death of Sokrates, but also for us, the ultimate audience implied by the Platonic act of writing. The external audience of the dialogues is excluded from Plato's direct representations of pedagogical method by the imaginative equivalent of drama's "fourth wall," which locates the reader outside the imagined world of the "dramatic" action. Plato never explicitly breaks this "wall," as (for example) Aristophanes does, by making his characters address the audience directly. But he does suggest pedagogical implications for his own audience through his many references to bystanders – largely silent

and often anonymous – at the conversations he dramatizes. In keeping with the Greek culture of verbal agonism and spectatorship, the interest of these people in the proceedings may be intense, and their concern is often implicitly or explicitly educational.[155] The accounts of Sokrates' influence on his youthful "imitators" (e.g. *Ap.* 23c) imply that it is never incidental.

The "dramatic" role of these bystanders is analogous in some respects to that of the chorus of Greek tragedy and comedy, which serves as an internal audience for the events on stage. The performers in dramatic choruses were adult citizen men, like most of their audience. In some plays, they also represent the collective citizenry of the dramatic location, in a way that was likely to promote a strong sense of identity in their spectators.[156] Similarly, Plato's imagined bystanders correspond in social status and gender to the majority of his presumptive external audience or readership.[157] As with the dramatic chorus, the presence of these internal audiences blurs the line between the world of the drama and that of its external consumers, thereby implicitly extending the pedagogical effects of the conversation to ourselves. This is clearest in those cases where Plato has his narrator address unknown and nameless "friends," as in *Protagoras* and *Symposium*. In *Republic*, Sokrates' immediate audience is not mentioned explicitly, but is tacitly present in a way that makes it indistinguishable from ourselves. Questions about the influence of Plato's dominant characters on other characters within the dialogues are thus inseparable from questions about the influence on ourselves of all those characters, as orchestrated by their puppet-master, Plato.

[155] Cf. e.g. *Gorg.* 455c, 458b–e, *Phileb.* 16ab, *Prot.* 310d–311a, 316bc; McPherran 1986: 552–3; Blank 1993: 434–7. On the importance of bystanders in the Athenian courts and other rhetorical environments see Lanni 1997.

[156] Cf. Longo 1990; Wiles 1997: ch. 10; Blondell et al. 1999: 39.

[157] Anecdotes claim that some of Plato's students were women (e.g. Diog. Laert. 3.46, *Anon. Prol.* 4.25–6, *Comm. Alc.* 2.147–50) but if so, they were a small minority, like the women and slaves at the Athenian dramatic festivals, and as such do not form part of his notional audience (cf. Csapo and Slater 1995: 286–305; Blondell et al. 1999: 62–3). This is confirmed by the fact that the women in the Academy were said to have dressed as men.

CHAPTER 2

The imitation of character

The various functions of dialogue form considered in the last chapter are all complementary and mutually reinforcing. And all are inextricably bound up with Plato's use of characterization. By this I mean simply his discursive strategies for the representation of persons, which may be summarized as what they say and what others say to them or about them, together with the dramatic context in which they are situated through the discourse as a whole.[1] The entire text of a Platonic dialogue may thus be understood as a vehicle for characterization. In this chapter I hope to substantiate this claim, as well as exploring several related matters concerning various conceptions of "character." I begin by examining the various components of a person's "character" and the distinction between this meaning of the word and "character" as dramatis persona. In the next section I look in greater detail at the "maximal" Sokrates who emerges from Plato's dialogues overall. Finally, I outline some ancient Greek attitudes towards the construction of character in and through dramatic representation, as a matrix for considering how Plato may have expected his characters to influence his audience, and a context for understanding some of the dramatic strategies to be considered later in more detail.

"CHARACTER"

When Aristotle says drama represents "people doing things," he adds that these people are "necessarily" of good or bad character (*ēthos*).[2] One

[1] For the notion that dramatic characters are constituted primarily through their participation in speech acts see Ohmann 1973: 98–102; Elam 1980: ch. 5. Unless the dialogues were performed in a theatrical sense (above, pp. 22–5), Plato's personae are not additionally characterized by actions unmentioned in the text.

[2] *Poet.* 1448a1–9; cf. 1447a28–b29. Since my use of Aristotle here is heuristic, there is no need to press his technical meaning of "doing" (*praxis*), except to note its intimate connection with moral character (see further Halliwell 1986: ch. 5).

might object that some representations of persons endow them with no *moral* qualities. But it is literally impossible to represent a person lacking any qualities of character at all. The simple fact of embodiment (real or imagined) is enough to provide an identity, and hence a minimal degree of character.[3] Speech is not necessary. An acrobat, to use Beckerman's example, conveys a sense of character through physical appearance and slight modulations of behavior, since "character is the interpretation we attach to an individual's activity."[4] It is therefore literally impossible for any dramatically imagined character to lack all determinants of human status and identity. He or she must have those minimal features – notably embodiment and gender – without which, as Parmenides might have said, a person cannot be conceived or spoken of.[5] In so far as dialogue form implies embodied arguers, then, it not only permits but requires the portrayal of character. And as I shall argue shortly, in Greek conceptual terms all such indicators of identity, personality, or "character" are also indicators of moral character, or *ēthos*.

In modern English, the word "character" has both dramatic and ethical meanings, ambiguously denoting (moral) character and dramatis persona. In the former sense, the English word approximates to the Greek *ēthos*, which I take at its broadest and least technical to embrace moral and intellectual qualities, together with the social and personal features (such as age, status, social relationships, gender, way of life, deportment, physiognomy and manner of speaking) that help to construct, embody and convey these qualities.[6] The English "character" is usually narrower in focus. It is often used in a more limited (Kantian) sense for moral character as detached from physical circumstances, or as opposed to individual quirks of "personality."[7] Nevertheless, in this book I shall use the word "character" for the Greek *ēthos*, broadly construed.

The English "character" also means dramatis persona, in which sense it is ethically neutral. Greek normally uses another word

[3] For the body as the most fundamental site of human individuation see Vernant 1989: 40–43.

[4] 1970: 211, 213.

[5] Even the immaterial soul can only be portrayed by means of physical images (Vermeule 1979: 28–30). Likewise ghosts can only, qua persons, make themselves known by manifesting recognizable material human behaviors (voices, knockings, etc.). The same is true, of course, of the Greek gods qua persons.

[6] Other words in this semantic range include *phusis* ("nature") and *tropos* ("way," "manner"); see further Thimme 1935.

[7] For the approximate difference between "character" and "personality," as involving moral content and individuality respectively, see Kupperman 1991: 5–8.

(*prosōpon*) – instead of *ēthos* – to designate "character" in this sense.[8] But despite this difference in vocabulary, the two concepts are intimately linked. As Aristotle's account makes clear, the dramatis personae of epic, tragedy and comedy are conceived of in the first place as bearers of moral character. Nor is this outlook peculiarly Aristotelian. It is implicit in Plato too, most notably in the censorship of dramatic characters as corrupting influences (below, pp. 228–31). Many ancient remarks about literature, notably the debate over the best tragedian in Aristophanes' *Frogs*, are based on the same assumption, as are Plato's representations (however parodic) of sophistic literary criticism (for example in *Protagoras*). It also underlies the story of Nikeratos in Xenophon's *Symposium*, whose father made him memorize the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* in order to become a good man (3.5), and *Hippias Minor*'s discussion of the relative merits of the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* (below, ch. 3). Furthermore, this conception of dramatic character accords with the actual practice of extant tragedy, whose participants are represented not in the first place as idiosyncratic individuals or personalities, but as embodiments of ethical qualities (broadly understood).[9]

The Greek understanding of "character" in this broad sense may conveniently be separated into three main strands: moral character in a narrower sense (*ēthos*), "intellect" (*dianoia*) and "personality."[10] These strands are neither exhaustive nor sharply distinct, nor do they correspond precisely to ancient categories; nonetheless, they are useful for heuristic purposes. The distinction between *ēthos* and *dianoia* is borrowed from Aristotle, who speaks in *Poetics* of *ēthos* (moral character as revealed in purposeful choice) and *dianoia* (rational or rhetorical argument), as two aspects of the persons represented in drama. This distinction is not a straightforward one, since qualities of *ēthos* and *dianoia* are both essential to the Aristotelian good person, in complex interconnected ways. Nor can they be neatly separated in our analysis of dramatic character. But the distinction can still be a useful one. Applying it to Plato, we may say that he attributes to some of his characters Aristotelian *ēthos* in the

[8] Thus an ancient critic defines both Platonic dialogue and drama as "consisting of questions and answers by varied characters (*prosōpa*) with appropriate characterization (*ēthopoiia*)" (*Anon. Proleg.* 14.3–8). Cf. also Diog. Laert. 3.48 and above, p. 24. On the history of the word *prosōpon* (face/mask/persona/identity/person) see Hirzel 1914: 40–53.

[9] For the primarily ethical ancient approach to literary characters see Blundell 1989: 12–25; Segal 1994.

[10] For a full discussion of the broader and narrower senses of *ēthos* and their interconnections with *dianoia* see Blundell 1992a and cf. Blundell 1989: 16–25.

narrow sense, or moral character revealed through purposeful choice and action. The most obvious and insistent example of this is Sokrates' decision to face death, which is used by Plato, much as such choices are used in epic and drama, to express and clarify a set of values.[11] More subtly, dialectical choices may have moral resonance, such as the decision to respond truthfully to questioning. But Plato's characters also display Aristotelian *dianoia*, or "intellect," that is, the rational and rhetorical skills used to express the intellectual outlook that underlies and justifies such decisions, and hence forms part of "character" in the broad sense defined above.[12]

Dianoia as a dimension of dramatic character may include not just obviously moral reasoning but the expression of what Aristotle calls the intellectual virtues, such as intelligence and scientific knowledge. These may not seem intrinsically "moral," but they are often put to work to explain or justify a person's more obviously ethical choices. For example, Euripides' character Melanippe, in his lost play *Clever Melanippe*, is criticized by Aristotle for being *too* "clever" (*deinos*). This character apparently discoursed on natural philosophy in an attempt to save her children, thus showing the intellectual virtue of "cleverness" (*deinotēs*). We may compare Teiresias in Euripides' *Bacchants*, who uses "scientific" explanations of the god Dionysos to justify participating in his cult (266–327). So too, the intellectual arguments employed by Sokrates are intimately related to his decision to die for his beliefs. But *dianoia* also includes philosophical imagination and critical ability. As soon as even the most abstract arguments are attributed to a speaker, rather than presented impersonally, they take on implications for character, action, and the goals of a human life. All Platonic arguments are thus presented in an ethical framework, simply by virtue of his use of dramatic form. All discourse in this form is a mode of characterization. And all philosophy presented in this form is, in this important sense, ethics.

Characterization through *dianoia* has a special place in the philosophical dialogue, not just because of the large proportion of the text devoted to intellectual matters, but because of its specially intimate connection with language as a medium for the representation of persons. It is a commonplace of Greek aesthetics that elements of *ēthos* may be portrayed through

[11] Cf. Blundell 1988: 142–3; 1989: 8–9. Important decisions are also sometimes made (or reported) by other characters, such as Euthyphro's to prosecute his father or Alkibiades' to leave Sokrates and return to politics.

[12] This is a technical meaning of *dianoia* in *Poet.* I use the word here for convenience. It has a wide range of meanings in Plato and elsewhere.

non-verbal media, e.g. visually or in music.[13] The dramatization of these qualities through the representation of persons in action is mimetic in the same way as painting, in so far as it does not intrinsically require verbalization. Even when language *is* used to portray moral qualities, it does not have to elucidate rational thought-processes. Intellectual qualities, however, are a little different. Rational processes have no overt material manifestation and are therefore inaccessible to representation through the visual arts. It is, of course, possible to portray visually the culturally determined tokens of intelligence or a reflective way of life.[14] But the strictly intellectual content of a person's mind, as opposed to the appearance of the activity of thinking, can *only* be portrayed through language, whether descriptively or dramatically.[15]

Since language also constitutes the medium through which real persons express this aspect of the self, in this limiting case a dramatic representation may be indistinguishable from its original. That is, in so far as the philosopher's ideas can be expressed in words at all, a verbal representation generated by repeating those words will be not just similar, but identical in content to the original. In this sense, it is not an "imitation" at all.[16] To hear Aristotle lecture, or to hear another person repeat his lecture, or to hear a tape-recording of his lecture, all provide the consumer with exactly the same access to his *dianoia* – unlike, for example, a photo of his appearance while lecturing. To see a photograph of a philosopher is not to see a philosopher in the flesh. But to hear a philosopher's words repeated by another just *is* to hear the philosopher's thoughts. An exact text or transcription will vary in its meaning from one occasion to another, but only as a result of changes in the consumer or situation, i.e. the presentation and reception of the text, not the text as such.[17] So the representation of *dianoia* is transparent in a way that no other aspect of a person can be. Thus Alkibiades can claim that Sokrates' words (*logoi*) affect all who hear them alike, no matter who the speaker is (*Symp.* 215d).[18] This is, in context, not very plausible, given Alkibiades' insistence on Sokrates' unique personal magnetism (216b), which calls into question

[13] Cf. *Rep.* 398d–401d. For *ēthos* in the visual arts cf. Xen. *Mem.* 3.10.1–5, Arist. *Pol.* 1340a28–b19, Plut. *Alex.* 1.3, *Mor.* 335b and see Pollitt 1972: 43–54, 1974: 184–9; Keuls 1978: 95–109; Rouveret 1989: 129–35. For music cf. *Laws* 655ab and see Walsh 1984: 83–4; Comotti 1989: 29–32.

[14] See esp. Zanker 1995.

[15] Cf. Isoc. *Evag.* 75 with Halliwell 1990: 43–4.

[16] See Genette 1982: 130–32.

[17] This is what happens when a paper presented at a philosophical conference is read aloud by someone other than the author (see Tannen 1988). Contrast the case of the understudy who outstrips the star she replaces; here it is neither content nor authorship that is at issue, but performance.

[18] Dion. Hal. makes a similar claim for the words of Demosthenes (see Stanford 1983: 9–10).

the allegedly independent power of his *logoi*.[19] As we shall see, the *dianoia*, or intellectual content, of a discourse is not so easily distinguishable in practice from the *ēthos* and personal qualities of its speaker. It remains true in principle, however, that if this effect really derives solely from Sokrates' words, then it should not matter who speaks them or through what medium they are transmitted.

Besides *ēthos* and *dianoia*, the third strand of character in the broad sense with which I shall be concerned is "personality." By this I mean particularizing details about an individual, including external quirks, circumstances and behaviors, both physical and psychological. In modern usage, such traits are often viewed – at least in principle – as "non-moral," or irrelevant to assessing a person's character, in so far as the latter is thought of as an intangible ethical "center" independent of physical and other "external" factors. But in ancient Greek terms, all such features have potentially ethical implications, since they are viewed as constituting, expressing and/or representing *ēthos*.[20] This extends in an important way to physical appearance. Ancient Greek vocabulary notoriously does not distinguish clearly between ethical and aesthetic evaluation.[21] Beauty is therefore a sign of moral as well as physical superiority. The body both "expressed a man's physical and ethical qualities," and "celebrated his physical and spiritual perfection and beauty."[22] Since clothing, grooming and accessories are extensions of the body, the body, together with its care and presentation, "takes on the form of a sort of heraldic painting upon which each person's social and personal status is inscribed and decipherable: the admiration, fear, longing and respect he inspires, the esteem in which he is held, the honors to which he is entitled."[23]

Accordingly, physical appearance and self-presentation were of the utmost importance in classical Athens:

The appearance and behavior in public of all citizens was governed by strict rules. These applied to how one should correctly walk, stand, or sit, as well as to proper draping of one's garment, position and movement of arms and head, styles of hair and beard, eye movements, and the volume and modulation of the voice: in short, every element of an individual's behavior and presentation, in accordance with his sex, age, and place in society . . . Almost every time

[19] Contrast Arrian's fear that Epictetus' words will fail of their due effect in the absence of the man (*Pref.* 5–8).
[20] See Blundell 1992a: 163–7 and cf. Goffman 1959; Bourdieu 1990: ch. 4.
[21] The primary evaluative words *aischros* and *kalos* mean "ugly/shameful/bad" and "beautiful/fine/good" respectively.
[22] Zanker 1995: 10.
[23] Vernant 1989: 29.

reference is made to these rules, they are linked to emphatic moral judgments, whether positive or negative.[24]

Such external features express the self to others, becoming thereby the connective tissue of community, which in turn exerts a reciprocal constitutive influence on personal identity. Characteristics that might now be seen as quirks of personality thus tend to be viewed as simultaneously *formative* and *indicative* of both social identity and moral character. Accordingly, Aristotle includes gait or deportment (*kinēsis*), tone of voice and manner of speaking in his account of the "great-souled" man or *megalopsuchos*, who incorporates all the virtues.[25] These external behaviors are tokens of a character that is calm, self-consistent, truthful, unconcerned with trivia, and accurate in his self-assessment. Like Homer's Achilles, the *megalopsuchos* is truthful and open in his friendships and enmities, risks his life for great causes, and performs deeds that are few, but remarkable (*EN* 1123b1–1125a17).

On this model of the self, the outer person is seen as a "natural" expression of the inner. Proverbially, an ugly body is equated with a base character. So Theognis declares that the bearing of a slave's head can never be other than twisted, just as a rose never grows from a squill (Theogn. 535–7).[26] Accordingly a person's ugliness, inappropriate clothing, or improper deportment might all be used as signs of bad character in the Athenian courtroom,[27] and low character goes along with ugliness as suitable material for comedy.[28] A corollary of this set of assumptions is a constant anxiety that the system may break down, in particular, that a fine-looking exterior may turn out to conceal evil within.[29] In most cases, however, attempts to conceal one's "true" or "natural" self by cultivating a deceptive exterior are ultimately doomed to failure.[30] Yet appeals to "nature" do not preclude faith in the formative effects, on the inner and outer person, of acculturation, as can be seen from Aristophanes'

[24] Zanker 1995: 48–9.
[25] *EN* 1123a34–1125a17. For the continuing significance of gait see Gleason 1990: 392–3. The *megalopsuchos* was to became an influential philosophical type (Frischer 1982: 241–6).
[26] For further examples see Papademetriou 1997: 16 n. 18; for exceptions see below, pp. 72–3. On the ancient fascination with physiognomy see Evans 1969 and cf. Wiles 1991: 85–90.
[27] Hall 1995: 51–3.
[28] *Laws* 816d; Arist. *Poet.* 1448a1–18, 1448b24–1449a6, 1449a32–7.
[29] Cf. e.g. *Rep.* 577a, Theogn. 119–28, 963–70; *Scol. Anon.* PMG 889; Eur. *Med.* 516–19, *Her.* 655–672, Lys. 10.29. This kind of duplicity is often viewed as intrinsic to women, as exemplified by Pandora (Hes. *Theog.* 570–93, *WD* 54–82) and Helen (cf. esp. Eur. *Hel.* 262–6). Paradoxically, then, for a woman to be beautiful is to have her female superiority and her feminine inferiority *both* inscribed upon her body.
[30] Cf. Anac. 82 (Gentili) and see Gleason 1990.

caricatures of the young men supposedly produced by old-fashioned and modern education respectively (*Clouds* 961–1022). Manual labor was thought to produce a cramping of mind as well as body.[31] Conversely, socially scorned figures were disfigured or "marked" by branding or mutilation.[32] And the Spartans forced their serfs, the helots, to perform degrading behaviors.[33] In so far as the personae of drama or dialogue are characterized by external details, then, we should expect these traits to be indicative of character in a moral sense, for better or worse. As Plutarch put it centuries later, "a little thing like a phrase or a joke often makes a greater impression of character (*ēthos*) than battles where thousands fell" (*Alex.* 1.2).

Greek theories of character accord with these cultural practices, presenting persons as situated in and constituted by the physical and circumstantial features that regulate their relationships to others, such as social status, gender, age and physiognomy. Typically, these features serve less to identify persons uniquely than to situate them in one of a number of types or classes.[34] Philosophers, notably Plato and Theophrastus as well as Aristotle, show a strong concern with character types and their external expression.[35] This matches literary practice, whereby characters of drama and other genres are represented as relatively unindividualized types.[36] Even in the biographical tradition, persons are seen in the first place as types, and apparent idiosyncrasies denote larger patterns of character and mode of life.[37] The outer appearance and behavior of Aristotle's *megalopsuchos* are thus not signs of individuality, so much as the outer expression of a type of moral and physical perfection.

A similar ideal of harmonious homogeneity, as expressed through the body, is evident in classical portrait sculpture, which frowns upon individuality to represent its subjects in the "stereotyped and monotonous" guise of the ideal citizen.[38]

[31] Cf. *Rep.* 495de, 590c, [Longinus] 44.2–5 and see Burford 1972: 238 n. 334.
[32] Steiner 1994: 154–9. [33] David 1989: 6–13.
[34] An interesting exception is a verse fragment saying that there are as many different human characters (*tropoi*) as there are individuals (Philemon fr. 93 Kassel-Austin). It may not be coincidental that this fragment comes from comedy (cf. below, pp. 61–2).
[35] For Plato see McDonald 1931: 365–79. For the peripatetics see Frischer 1982: 262–72.
[36] Cf. e.g. *Ion* 540b, *Laws* 719cd, and see further Pelling 1990. In theatrical performance, the use of masks and formal gesture further stylized the human personality (cf. Gould 1978: 49; Wiles 1991: 24, 68–9).
[37] Though the latter increasingly became a hook on which to hang gossip and anecdote (see Momigliano 1993).
[38] Zanker 1995: 49; the next quotation is from p. 10. On idealization in Greek aesthetics cf. especially Xen. *Mem.* 3.10.1–5 and see further Pollitt 1972: 3–9, 170–72.

The most important qualities transcended the individual person, for the function of the portrait statue was to put on display society's accepted values, through the example of worthy individuals, for a didactic purpose. Personal and biographical details were of lesser importance.

Painting likewise aimed at an ideal of beauty, eschewing idiosyncrasy in favor of making, for example, a person's hair the "right" color for hair (i.e. black).[39] Conversely just as works of art beautified their subjects, so the beauty of real persons might be praised by likening them to a work of art, especially a statue of a god.[40] Sculpture and painting do not just portray a generalized ideal of human beauty and superiority, but become tokens for it. In a parallel fashion, Plato often uses sculpture and painting as models for the representation of ideal character, especially in *Republic*.[41] Conversely, all aspects of the visual arts serve a didactic purpose in relation to the formation of character (cf. esp. *Rep*. 400c–401d).

A corollary of viewing artistic or aesthetic ideals as generic or abstracted from the individual – even as they are expressed through particular dispositions of the body – is that both variety and idiosyncrasy become undesirable per se. Despite admiration for rich decoration and versatility, or *poikilia*, in the arts generally (below, p. 67), the human ideal remains one of simplicity and harmony. In terms of human character, *poikilia* is associated with lying and untrustworthiness, justified only as protection against the treachery of others.[42] And idiosyncrasy, whether physical or psychological, tends to indicate not special beauty of person or character, but a departure from some ideal and more homogeneous ethical and/or aesthetic standard. In Homer, for example, outstandingly beautiful characters, like Helen or Achilles, receive few, if any, individualizing touches;[43] but Thersites, who is in a single word both "ugliest" and "most disgraceful" (*aischistos*) of the Greeks, is distinguished by a detailed list of specific defects of mind and body: he is a ceaseless chatterbox, bandy-legged and lame, hunch-backed, pointy-headed, and thin-haired

[39] See Dover 1967: 20 and cf. *HMaj*. 290b, *Rep*. 420cd.

[40] Cf. *Phdr*. 251a, 252d, *Charm*. 154c and see Steiner 1996. Epic heroes are also traditionally "godlike" in their superiority to lesser mortals (e.g. *Il*. 2.478–9). The myth of Pygmalion well expresses the conception of sculpture as an ideal of beauty. On the investment of actual statues with speech and "personality" see Burford 1972: 121; Childs 1994: 35; and cf. Hephaistos' golden robots (*Il*. 18.417–20).

[41] *Rep*. 361d, 420cd, 466a, 472d, 500d–501c, 540c, 588a–e; cf. also below, pp. 367–9.

[42] This is the Odyssean ideal. For the correlation between inconsistency, polymathy, lying and *poikilia* cf. e.g. Theogn. 213–8, Pind. *Ol*. 1.28–9, Xen. *Mem*. 4.4.6–7, and see further below, ch. 3.

[43] For Helen cf. Evans 1969: 34–5, 58, 67–8, 69–70. For Achilles cf. e.g. *Il*. 24.629–30. When physical deficiencies are attributed to heroic characters they usually serve as identifying features which play a crucial role in the hero's story, and sometimes betoken deeper moral or social deficits (Odysseus' scar, Philoktetes' wounded leg, Oidipous' scarred feet and mutilated eyes).

(*Il.* 2.212–19). Similarly the physical defects of the ugly monkey-woman – the "worst" of all Semonides' female types – are spelled out in detail (7.71–82 Diehl). Aristophanic comedy uses vulgar idiosyncrasy to portray anti-heroic characters, who, in Aristotle's words, are "worse" than ordinary people (*Poet.* 1448a16–18). Plato for the most part uses little physical portraiture, but identifies Meletos, Sokrates' prosecutor, in a specific and unprepossessing fashion (*Euth.* 2b), and draws attention to Thrasymachos' physicality at the moment of his humiliation (*Rep.* 350d). Elsewhere he likens the corrupt soul to a body that is scarred, discolored, and distorted.[44] Condemnation of the slightest deviation from a rigorous ideal norm of embodied character persisted throughout antiquity.[45]

Idiosyncrasies of personality as well as appearance tend to have a negative valence.[46] Semonides' diatribe on women features nine bad types of woman and just one good one (7 Diehl). Archilochus' "bad woman," Neoboule, is described in far more detail than her unnamed and virtuous counterpart (196A West). Prodikos' description of Vice personified, as reported by Xenophon, is more than twice as long as that of Virtue (*Mem.* 2.1.22). And Theophrastus' *Characters* is devoted exclusively to negative portraits drawn by means of a vivid accumulation of social, moral and aesthetic detail. In tragedy, the most individualized characters are often comical lower-class figures, like the nurse in Aeschylus' *Libation Bearers*, with her talk of cleaning and feeding the baby Orestes (748–60), or the garrulous guard in Sophocles' *Antigone* (223–36). In Plato's *Republic*, Leontios stands out for his peculiar interest in corpses (439e–440a), and the degenerate political types are vividly characterized through details of anecdote and behavior, in contrast to the bland homogeneity of the ideal citizens. The single good type of soul and state is set in relief by four defective types described in increasing detail, culminating in the lavish portrait of the tyrant.[47] "Personality" is thus interwoven with *ēthos* (in its narrower moral sense) and with *dianoia* to comprise a more comprehensive notion of "character." Within a given dialogue or dramatis persona, each of these strands may be wider or narrower, and stand out with more or less prominence from the texture of the whole.

[44] *Gorg.* 524d–525a; cf. also 511a and *Rep.* 611bcd.

[45] Gleason 1990. For the persistent association of moral inferiority with physical ugliness see Evans 1969. To give a twentieth-century example, "one company rejected a candidate [for an executive position] because he had 'teeth that were too square' and others have been disqualified because their ears stuck out" (Perrin Stryker, "How Executives Get Jobs," cited from Goffman 1959: 47).

[46] For the low tolerance of idiosyncrasy in the competitive atmosphere of Greek culture cf. Gouldner 1965: 95.

[47] 547b–580a; cf. also 495cde.

The primary evidence for understanding Platonic characters lies in what is said directly by or about them. But the use of dramatic form also allows Plato to color his speakers' words less directly, through more oblique indications of the kind of persons they are (or are represented as being). A person's name, for example, may convey associations of race and social class, and of course gender.[48] Plato often supplies considerable detail about these kinds of socio-cultural circumstances. For this reason, among others, the settings of the dialogues are important, since they convey the milieu (physical, social, temporal) in which these persons and their conversations are embedded.[49] They contribute to character-portrayal by telling us such things as the participants' origins, tastes, education, and the kinds of places where they choose to spend their time. Specific features of the settings may have different meanings for different characters – for example, Athens for an Athenian or an outsider, a courthouse for a prosecutor or a defendant. These settings – local, temporal and cultural – are usually sketched at the opening of a dialogue, but often filled in during its course as well. In the direct dialogues they are conveyed obliquely, through the conversation itself, since, as with ancient dramatic scripts, there are no stage directions outside the world of the fiction. Reported dialogue form, however, provides a mechanism for more detailed scene-setting and character-portrayal as filtered through the perceptions and agenda of the narrator.

In most cases, the dialogues' settings involve, or allude to, particular Athenian social and cultural institutions: gymnasia (*Lysis*, *Theaetetus*), festivals (*Republic*, *Symposium*), the court and prison system (*Apology*, *Crito*, *Euthyphro*, *Phaedo*), sophistic education (*Hippias Minor*, *Protagoras*), and, of course, the symposium. Such institutions are constitutive of adult Athenian masculine identity, and hence of the identity of those who participate in (or are excluded from) them. Thus the symposium is a site for aristocratic male self-affirmation and character-testing, public festivals for the reinforcement of Athenian democratic ideology, gymnasia for the training of well-bred young men in adult masculinity.[50] Many of these environments were also institutionalized settings for the performance of various poetic and prose literary genres, and thus for the exercise of their

[48] Cf. Carlson 1990: 26–38.

[49] The "introductions" to many of the dialogues may make up as much as half of the text (Nehamas 1998: 197 n. 38). The lack of a concrete setting may also be significant, as with *Meno* (cf. Gonzalez 1998: 154; Miller 1999: 255 n.; see also below, pp. 316–17).

[50] For the gymnasium see *Lach.* 178a–180a and cf. Ar. *Frogs* 727–9. On the dramatic festivals and Athenian democratic ideology see esp. Winkler and Zeitlin 1990 and most recently Monoson 2000: ch. 4.

cultural influence. Plato appropriates all these locations, and the corresponding forms of discourse, for philosophy. Thus the gymnasium, like the palaestra, is "an appropriate setting for the mental gymnastics and a concrete image of the intellectual undressing with which he liked to play."[51] In *Symposium*, conventional entertainment is explicitly displaced by serious discourse (176e), and in *Republic* the visitors to Peiraeus for the festival of Bendis remain all night for a philosophical "feast of words," in which the horse-back relay-race is replaced by the passage from hand to hand of the philosophical torch (cf. 328a, 352b, 354ab). Plato thus competes with the poets for cultural authority not just through the content of his characters' conversations, but through the settings in which he locates them.

Many of these settings are also related thematically to the conversations staged within them, reinforcing the interplay between character and argument, *logos* and *ergon*, discursive and dramatic levels. Beginnings are especially significant.[52] Thus the "descent" to Peiraeus and the festival of Bendis, with which *Republic* opens, is not only an appropriate cultural context for a revolutionary exploration of the nature of the state, but a metaphor for initiation into philosophy, foreshadowing the central images of sun and cave.[53] Several other dialogues also begin with journeys,[54] and some of them – notably, *Republic* – end that way as well. This trope echoes the image of the path of discovery – a pervasive image in Plato, which goes back to the *Odyssey* and, as the controlling image for rigorous argument, to Parmenides.[55] But the road is also a familiar metaphor, in Plato as elsewhere, for the course of life.[56] It thus conveys the hybrid notion of learning from life-experience (cf. e.g. Hdt. 1.30.2). Its repeated use as an opening gambit in Plato therefore serves to ground the doing of philosophy in the *process* of human life, contributing to the pervasive tension between human flux and its transcendence that is inextricable from the dialogue form itself (above, pp. 48–50).

[51] Friedländer 1964–9: I.159; cf. *Charm.* 154de. Intellectuals, especially Sokrates, seem to have frequented such places (cf. *Euth.* 2a, *HMaj.* 286b, *Lach.* 180c, *Charm.* 153a, *Euthyd.* 271a, *Lysis* 203a–204a). The Academy itself was a gymnasium (Diog. Laert. 3.7), as was the Lyceum, where *Euthyd.* is set and Aristotle located his school.

[52] For the significance of Platonic beginnings cf. Press 1993b: 123–4; Proclus *in Alc.* 18–19, *in Parm.* 658–9. For the general importance of beginnings in Greek culture see Clay 1992: 113–4 and cf. *Laws* 722d–723b, *Rep.* 377a, Arist. *EN* 1098b7, *Soph. El.* 183b22–8, Antiph. DK87 B60.

[53] The opening of *Rep.* has been much discussed since antiquity (see Riginos 1976: 185–6).

[54] E.g. *Charm.*, *Ion*, *Laws*, *Lys.*, *Parm.*, *Prot.*, *Rep.*, *Symp.*, *Tht.* and, most strikingly, *Phdr.*

[55] Cf. also e.g. Xen. *Mem.* 2.1.21; Hes. *WD* 287–92 (quoted at *Rep.* 364d); further parallels in M. L. West 1978 ad loc.

[56] Cf. e.g. *Phd.* 85cd, *Rep.* 328e, 365a, d, 435d, 484ab, 497d, 504b–e, 535cd; Louis 1945: 91–5.

Setting also entails location in and over time. The frame of several dialogues, such as *Phaedo* and *Theaetetus*, serves to extend Sokrates' influence through time after his death.[57] Within each dialogue, the temporal interplay of events may be manipulated for dramatic purposes.[58] Plato also exploits the passage of "real" time in the course of the dialogue, for example in *Phaedo*, which leads up to the death of Sokrates, and *Symposium*, which begins before Sokrates arrives at the party and lasts all night. Placing these conversations in a larger temporal framework may further endow the work with the resonances of a determinate historical moment. We should, however, beware of overemphasizing the significance of a specific dramatic date when Plato himself does not do so. Nor should we expect precision or consistency from him in this regard.[59] His audience's (and his own) knowledge of history will have derived primarily from oral sources, such as family traditions, anecdotes and gossip. The heavy modern reliance on textual and material evidence, combined with painstaking chronological and historical reconstruction, implies conceptions of historical accuracy and authenticity which were alien to Greeks of the classical period – even Thucydides, often regarded as a precursor of modern canons of historical accuracy (cf. above, pp. 31–2). Under these circumstances a dramatic date from the previous century is unlikely to have been recalled by Plato, or his immediate audience, in precise relationship to other historical events – unless these events (like the death of Sokrates) were of special importance for that particular audience or for collective memory, and/or marked as such in the text. I shall therefore work on the assumption that if a specific date is important for our understanding of the dramatis personae and their milieu, Plato will provide it unambiguously. Thus *Symposium* can be dated by means of Agathon's first dramatic victory in 416 BCE.[60] Such specific temporal markers would serve to trigger the memories of those among his immediate audience who participated in such events in their youth, or knew personally those who did.

But even in the absence of a specific dramatic date, all Plato's characters share a single historical and cultural context, which binds them to each other in various forms of relationship. It also links them more

[57] For the elision of temporal distinctions in *Phd.* see Gilead 1994: 26–33; Press 1995: 151. On the interplay of temporal levels in Plato generally see Thayer 1997.

[58] See e.g. Friedländer 1964–9: I.159–61; E. West 2000: 107–8.

[59] Cf. Nails 1998: 386–7; Ober 1998: 191–2.

[60] I suspect that *Rep.* is also a case of this kind, since it is clearly dated by the introduction of the festival of the goddess. Unfortunately, however, we no longer know when this took place (cf. below, p. 167 n.11).

or less directly with Plato's original audience, many of whom will have known personally some of the historical figures he chooses to dramatize. Most of his dramatis personae are ordinary people of various kinds, as distinct both from the elevated figures who take center stage in tragedy or epic, and from the buffoons of comedy (though they share points of contact with both). As Bruns observed, the dialogues give us a portrait not just of a series of individuals, but of a society: the Athens of Plato's formative years.[61] One of the benefits of dialogue form is that its loose, conversational structure allows for the representation of a picture of life much richer than the world of formal argument. This picture mirrors the norms of Plato's Athens, as viewed from a "public," elite male perspective, in its use and concealment of various classes of person. Plato's characters are for the most part "masculine, urban, of the leisure or professional class or at least prosperous employers of labor . . . people who do not work with their hands, educated."[62] Such persons, whether Athenian citizens or Greek-speaking outsiders, were free to come and go, to discourse in public, to attend gymnasia and share in symposia. These participants vary considerably in age, and their age-class is often indicated or implied.

Yet Plato describes and mentions a much broader variety of character types than he dramatizes. On the margins of the dialogues, as of Athenian public life, can be found such characters as female entertainers, craftsmen, children, and non-Greek-speakers, all of whom are mentioned frequently in passing. Slaves are present, pervasively but for the most part invisibly, or characterized exclusively by their function in the work in question.[63] Married women and citizen girls are not represented. The only female characters who speak are a courtesan (Aspasia), and a foreign priestess (Diotima), both of whom are licensed to associate with men by their special status, and neither of whom is directly dramatized. But the virtuous wife and mother – one of the least publicly visible participants in the Athenian polis – does make a brief, oblique appearance in the person of Alcestis (*Symp.* 179b). Onto this social fabric is mapped an extraordinarily varied range of ideas, which engage with the whole spectrum of the cultural traditions and intellectual history of Plato's time. The result is a "cosmos" of a slightly different kind from the orderly intellectual cosmos invoked by the ancient commentators: a rich and complex socio-intellectual world created and populated by Plato.

[61] 1896: 238–9; cf. Clay 2000: 15–21. [62] McDonald 1931: 384.

[63] See Gera 1996. A quasi-exception is the former slave, Phaedo (below, n. 114). On the slaves in *Meno* and *Tht.* see below, pp. 223–4 and 305.

THE PLATONIC SOKRATES

So far I have been concerned, for the most part, with the presentation of characters as more or less narrowly defined types, in which the importance of specific details lies in the larger patterns they betoken. This is the primary focus of ancient aesthetic and moral theory, and Plato is no exception. Like most Greek thinkers, he places little if any value on idiosyncrasy or individuality as such. Yet he is concerned in a different kind of way with his characters' relative degree of personal individuality. This concern is implicit in the fact that Plato presents us with a gallery of persons more diverse than those of than any other ancient Greek author. His choice of dramatic form thus links him with the *poikilia* of the poet and the trickster, especially the *poikilia* associated with the portrayal of character.[64] Such variety, and especially the varying degrees of particularity, in Plato's characters is an expression of ambivalence towards human individuality per se and its embeddedness in the complex world of contingency and change. This ambivalence is related in turn to anxiety about the effects of *poikilia* or variety in literature and art on the consumer. Plato's treatment of poetry in *Republic* suggests that *poikilia* is of the very essence of mimesis or "imitation." In this, he is the child of a tradition in which – despite its tendency to idealize in the portrayal of human beings – *poikilia*, novelty and versatility were highly valued in literature and the crafts.[65] The varying degrees of *poikilia* (or lack of it) in his own works, including the degree to which each character is particularized, are thus not just aesthetic choices, but philosophical ones as well.

All literary characters lie somewhere on a scale between the generic and the uniquely particularized.[66] Their place on this scale depends on the accumulation and novelty of detail employed by the author to distinguish them from other representatives of similar types. Plato's least

[64] Cf. Pratt 1993: 81–4; Rankin 1964: 12–14; Thesleff 1967: 160–64. For the ancient critics' ascription of *poikilia* to Plato's characters see Haslam 1972: 26. Contrast the relative lack of individuality in the characters of the historians (see Bruns 1896: Part 1; Pearson 1954; Hornblower 1987: 57–9; Tompkins 1993).

[65] Cf. e.g. Hom. *Il.* 3.358, 6.294, 11.32, *Od.* 1.351–2 (critiqued at *Rep.* 424b), 6.15, 13.11, 15.107, 18.292–6, *Euth.* 6c, *HMaj.* 298a, *Laws* 719cde, *Phdr.* 236b, *Rep.* 557c, *Symp.* 198b, Pind. *N.* 7.77–9; Pfeiffer 1968: 138; Burford 1972: 86, 96–101; Heath 1987: 105–6; 1989: 28–30 and passim. It is worth remembering that the passage of time has minimized the *poikilia* of some ancient Greek art, especially by removing painted decoration from buildings and sculpture.

[66] Strictly speaking, no literary character can be unique, in so far as the construction of the character is confined to a completed text (as opposed to its reception). Fictitious people can therefore always, at least in theory, be replicated, as Don Quixote was by Borges' character Pierre Menard (Borges 1970; cf. also Danto 1987: 16–17). In practice, however, a high degree of individuation can convey an impression of uniqueness.

individualized characters are his anonymous bystanders, followed by such figures as the slaves of *Meno* and *Theaetetus*. The fact that these persons are unnamed is itself significant, since, as we have seen, naming is a basic means of social individuation.[67] Naming an infant, to quote Lucile Charles, is "a careful effort to match potentialities of an actor with qualities of a role, of a lively symbol he is publicly to portray. Naming a child is like casting him for the role he is to play in life."[68] To be nameless is thus to be undifferentiated, and hence, in traditional Greek terms, unheroic.[69] The individuating power of the proper name was reinforced for the ancient Greeks by the fact that most of their names had a transparent semantic meaning. This is regularly exploited by authors, including Plato, who often activate these meanings through puns and word-play.[70] It is therefore tempting for the modern reader to see further significance in all or any of the names of Plato's characters. But we must tread carefully here. First of all, Plato's choice of names was constrained in various ways. (Sokrates' name, to cite the obvious, was established by history.) Secondly, like a modern newspaper horoscope, the meaning of most Greek names is general enough that it is almost always possible to read *some* significance into them that will relate them to the character in question. For example, the aptness of both Polemarchos' and Thrasymachos' names has often been noted, generally to the credit of the former and discredit of the latter.[71] But the two names mean almost the same thing: "war-leader" (or "war-starter") and "bold fighter" respectively. These two names could easily have been reversed and the same meaning read into them for the character in question. It is therefore safer not to read *special* significance into a historical character's name, unless invited to do so by the author through punning or word-play.

Some of Plato's characters embody generic and individual identities simultaneously. Hippias, for example, is a "representative" sophist,

[67] Cf. *Od.* 8.552 and see Vernant 1989: 40. The only named slave mentioned in Plato is Satyros (*Prot.* 310c).

[68] Charles 1951: 34.

[69] The Homeric hero proudly declares his name and lineage. Especially notable is Odysseus' return from the unheroic appellation "Nobody" to his real name in *Od.* 9 (see Peradotto 1990: ch. 6 and cf. Lateiner 1995: 172–4). On naming and social identity see Peradotto 1990: esp. 152–63.

[70] E.g. Soph. *Ajax* 430–3, 474–6, Eur. *Ba.* 367, 508, Ar. *Clouds* 60–74, Hdt. 9.91; see further Sulzburger 1926; Hirzel 1918; Calame 1995: ch. 7. For Platonic examples see McDonald 1931: 185–8; Farness 1991: 58–60.

[71] For Polemarchos see e.g. Dorter 1974: 26–7; Adam 1963 on 331d; Beversluis 2000: 203. For Thrasymachos cf. Arist. *Rhet.* 1400b19–21 and see e.g. Tejera 1997: 75; Gordon 1999: 72; Beversluis 2000: 221.

but at the same time retains a distinctive identity, easily distinguishable from Thrasymachos, Gorgias, or Protagoras. This paradox is most fully embodied in Sokrates, who is simultaneously the ideal type of the philosopher and by far the most fully realized of Plato's characters.[72] Plato's portrayal launched him on his career, in the later philosophical tradition, as a token of unique human individuality.[73] This uniqueness is asserted repeatedly in Plato's pages by Sokrates himself and others. *Apology* is in effect a declaration of his moral and intellectual superiority over all other citizens of Athens.[74] He is further marked as unique among mortals by Apollo's assertion that no human being is wiser, and by his personal "divine sign," which can be equated with no other known religious phenomenon. In *Gorgias* he declares himself the only true politician (521d). In *Crito*, the Laws of Athens themselves declare him unmatched in his devotion to the city (52b). In *Protagoras*, the eponymous sophist admires Sokrates more than anyone he has ever met (361e). In *Phaedo* he shows a preternatural equanimity in the face of death, and is eulogized by his companions as the best, wisest and most just man they have ever known (118b). In *Republic* he is challenged to do what no one, including the ancient heroes, has ever done before (366de). And the speech of Alkibiades in *Symposium* is a paean to his uniqueness.

These assertions are backed up and made credible by various techniques of characterization. Central to these is the representation of Sokrates as intrinsically mysterious, both because of his ironical manner and because of the contradictory nature that allows him to embody the paradoxes of the human condition.[75] These facets of Sokrates' uniqueness are also a function of, and intertwined with, the uniqueness of Plato's style and of the Platonic dialogue as a genre. It is the inextricable synthesis of intellectual and personal in the dramatic dialogue that allows the reader to experience Sokrates as unique; and his uniqueness in turn informs the structure of the dialogues, which reproduce both his evasiveness and the idiosyncratic, open-ended spirit of his modes of inquiry. Plato's style, like his Sokrates, has proved to be inimitable. And

[72] There is an interesting parallel in Aristophanes' use of Sokrates in *Clouds*, on the one hand as an identifiable individual, and on the other as a generic intellectual; this double face of Sokrates is well expressed in the fact that we cannot be certain whether the actor portraying him wore a portrait-mask (see Dover 1967: 26–8; cf. also id. 1968a: xxxii–lvii; Nussbaum 1980: 71–7).

[73] See Clay 2000: 54. [74] Cf. Ober 1998: 166–79.

[75] For this quality of Sokrates' irony see Nehamas 1998: 91–3. On his contradictions see e.g. Grene 1950: 105–9; Ophir 1991: 50–51. Not the least of the paradoxes of this multifarious figure is the fact that he lives for consistency (below, p. 117).

like Sokrates, it is pervaded by the coexistence of contraries, especially a sense of the tragicomic, or "serious play."[76]

It is no coincidence that Plato's Sokrates is also by far the most detailed, concretely imagined and richly embodied personality transmitted to us from Greek antiquity.[77] We hear, often in considerable detail, about such matters as his personal hygiene, his clothes and shoes (or lack there of), his gait, his strange physique, his daily habits, his sense of humor, his drinking capacity, his erotic tastes and sexual behavior, his dreams, and the disposition of his body in all kinds of situations: taking a walk, fighting a battle, paddling in a river, in prison, in pain, and during the very process of death. According to classical canons of beauty, the historical Sokrates' appearance was paradigmatically ugly.[78] These features – thick lips, bulging eyes, and snub nose – are emphasized rather than evaded by Plato, who uses his physical pecularities, in the mouths of Meno and Alkibiades, as tokens of his extraordinary discourse.[79] That discourse is in turn concerned with the mundane, specific and often concrete particulars that contribute to ordinary material human existence: fighting and swimming, cobbling and weaving, pots and pans, horses and donkeys and gadflies. His preference for such mundane examples is parodied by Aristophanes in *Clouds*, and scorned by his critics in Plato.[80] Such matters are also embedded in the narrative of his life, for example through his participation in warfare as a hoplite, and the crafts of "midwifery" and sculpture that he supposedly inherits from his parents (*Tht.* 149a, *Euth.* 11b).

Sokrates' strange features make him look like a satyr – a type of ugliness and sexual licence. Envisaged by Alkibiades as a silenos-statue he reverses the aesthetic and moral idealism of Greek sculpture to embody its opposite.[81] As we have seen, in Greek cultural poetics such physical peculiarities are normally indicative of inferiority, rarely commented on except as signs of deviation from idealized norms of beauty and/or

[76] On "serious play" see e.g. Schaerer 1969: 19–23; Guthrie 1975: 56–65; Mader 1977; Brock 1990; Freydberg 1997.

[77] Cf. Bruns 1896: 203 (note the huge proportion of this book that is devoted to Sokrates).

[78] See Dover 1968a: xxxii–xxxiii; Guthrie 1969: 386–90; Vlastos 1971: 17–18; Brickhouse and Smith 1989: 14–15, 22; Michelini 2000a: 514–15. His relatively short stature (*Phd.* 102bcd, *Tht.* 155b) is a further departure from Greek cultural norms of beauty (cf. e.g. *Rep.* 494c, *Alc. 1.* 104a, Arist. *Poet.* 1450b34–9). In Xenophon and some portraits, he also has a paunch (*Symp.* 2.19; Zanker 1995: 37–8).

[79] *Meno* 80ab, *Symp.* 215ab, 221d–222a. Both these speakers are themselves conventionally handsome, but in contrast to Sokrates we hear no specifics about their appearance (*Meno* 80c, *Symp.* 217a). In Xen. *Symp.* 5, the beautiful Kritoboulos' features are the inverse of Sokrates'. Cf. also *Tht.* 143e (discussed below, pp. 260–61).

[80] E.g. *HMaj.* 288cd, 291a, *Gorg.* 490c–491a, *Symp.* 221e, *Tht.* 166c.

[81] See *Symp.* 215b with Steiner 1996.

moral excellence. Plato's Sokrates himself values physical beauty in others as the ideal complement to beauty of soul.[82] But in his own case, he enhances his "natural" ugliness with an intentional choice of shabby clothing and shoelessness.[83] His particularity, especially his physical ugliness and the peculiar way of life that it signifies, therefore poses a challenge to contemporary ethical and social, as well as aesthetic, standards.[84] This is strikingly demonstrated by the fact that, though Aristotle mentions Sokrates as an example of the ultimate virtue of "greatness of soul" (*megalopsuchia*, *An. Post.* 97b18–21), his physiognomy and body-language, as portrayed by Plato, are almost diametrically opposed to those of the *megalopsuchos* in the Peripatetic physiognomic tradition. In contrast to Sokrates' satyr-like appearance, the "great-souled man" has deep-set eyes, an aquiline nose and thin lips.[85] The threat to contemporary behavioral norms betokened by Sokrates' transgressive appearance is clearly expressed by Kallikles, who views his activities as childish, slavish and unmanly.[86] The same view is reflected more vulgarly in the Aristophanic representation of the Socratic intellectual as pale and physically degenerate, if not an outright *kinaidos* (*Clouds* 1015–23).[87] Judged by many of the conventional criteria of manly excellence, Sokrates' physical deficiences matched a life and death that were resounding failures.[88]

Plato's emphasis on Sokrates' physicality makes him comfortably at home in the mundane world of Aristophanic comedy, which is firmly grounded in the body and its functions – the realm of "Dionysos and

82 Cf. *Charm.* 153d, 154de, *Phdr.* 251e, *Rep.* 402cd, 535a, *Symp.* 210b.

83 Cf. Brickhouse and Smith 1989: 22. The members of Plato's Academy, by contrast, seem to have cultivated a dignified exterior to express their inner superiority (Baltes 1993: 13–14).

84 Cf. Krell 1972: 445; Zanker 1995: 32–9. Even Nietzsche, in *Twilight of the Idols*, used Sokrates' looks as evidence of bad character (Kaufmann 1954: 474–5). A surviving statue embodying the civic re-appropriation of Sokrates minimizes his peculiar appearance in order to present him as a normative "good citizen" (Zanker 1995: 58–62; cf. also 309).

85 See Frischer 1982: 243. Aristotle himself says that non-protruding eyes show the best disposition (*Hist. An.*492a). Compare also the two horses in *Phdr.*: the good horse has a hooked nose, the bad horse a snub one (253de; cf. Evans 1969: 21). The physiognomers' "ideal Greek" likewise has thin lips and a straight nose (Evans 1969: 14–15, 16).

86 See *Gorg.* 485a–e with Wardy 1996: 80–82; Michelini 1998: 54–5; cf. also *Gorg.* 489b, 499bc, *Euthyd.* 282b, 303c, 304e–305b, *Rep.* 328d, 343a. Sokrates' snub nose may be viewed as a childish feature ([Arist.] *Prob.* 963b15), as may the dizziness associated with intellectual confusion (cf. *Laws* 663b6–7; cf. Golden 1990: 9 and below, p. 117). Michelini points out that Sokrates' ironic style also distinguishes him from Hellenic norms of manhood (1998: 52).

87 A *kinaidos* is a man who enjoys being sexually penetrated, and as such a contemptible inversion of proper manhood (see Winkler 1990a). Pale skin betokens femininity in so far as women were associated with indoor life.

88 Solon designates the happiest of all men as Tellos, who lived to see his children's children, died a glorious death in battle, and was honored by the Athenians with a public burial (Hdt.1.30). (I owe this comparison to Ober, unpublished.)

Aphrodite" (*Symp.* 177e).[89] Moreover his satyr-like appearance situates him naturally in the Greek comic tradition.[90] And like the vulgar heroes of such Aristophanic comedies as *Birds*, he strives, against the strictures of society, to establish an idiosyncratic fantasy world where normal societal values are overturned.[91] In both cases, however, there are limits to this violation of conventional norms. Aristophanes avoids attributing to his own robustly vulgar heroes the truly shameful and "unmanly" transgressiveness that he is happy to attribute to those he most roundly abuses, including intellectuals.[92] Similarly, though certain Platonic characters may denigrate Sokrates as unmanly, others strongly emphasize his physical toughness, especially as displayed in the quintessentially masculine arena of warfare.[93] This preserves him from the "femininity" associated with the body as a site of suffering or passivity.[94] At the same time it betokens moral and dialectical courage, validating the practice of philosophy as "manly," in implicit rebuttal of the aspersions of a Kallikles.[95]

Sokrates is, of course, not *merely* comic. He is rather the embodiment of the serio-comic (*spoudaiogeloion*) – a combination of high and low elements that makes him carnivalistic in Bakhtin's sense.[96] This contributes in no small part both to his uniqueness and to his cultural transgressiveness, especially through the dissonance that it establishes between his inner and outer selves, in sharp contrast to the cultural ideal of inner and outer harmony.[97] There are few literary precedents for this dissonance. The principal pre-Platonic instance of heroic ugliness is the bandy-legged but stout-hearted general sketched in four verses by Archilochus.[98] More important for present purposes is Odysseus, who in the *Iliad* is short and

[89] Cf. Krell 1972. For the comic nature of the body and of concrete detail generally see Bergson 1914: 49–53, 127–8, 143–5; Evans 1969: 35; Tannen 1989: 161–2. Uneasiness with Sokrates' personal pecularities and emphatic embodiment may also be seen from the way they are sanitized (literally) by Eunapius, in his portrayal of the Socratic imitator, Chrysanthus, who did not smell bad as a result of not bathing (*VS* 502), and was "all soul," as evinced by the lightness of his body (*VS* 504; cf. *Phdr.* 246d).

[90] Cf. Dover 1967: 26–8; 1968a: xxxii–xxxiii. For Sokrates in other comedies besides *Clouds* cf. *Birds* 1553–5, *Frogs* 1491–2 and see Brock 1990: 40.

[91] Cf. Rankin 1964: 21–2; Irwin 1992: 74–5; Burnyeat 1999: 302–6.

[92] Cf. Dover 1989: 135–47.

[93] Cf. *Charm.* 153abc, *Lach.* 181ab, 189b, *Symp.* 219d–221b.

[94] Cf. Zeitlin 1996: 349–52.

[95] Cf. e.g. *Meno* 81de, 86bc, *Lach.* 193e–194b. For the interconnection between physical courage and intellectual authority cf. esp. *Lach.* 189b and the educational program of *Rep.*

[96] Bakhtin 1984: 132–3.

[97] *Symp.* 216d–217a. At *Phdr.* 279b Sokrates prays for inner beauty matched by proper external behavior, as usual putting his own spin on a conventional sentiment.

[98] Archil. 114 [West]; see further Russo 1974; Clay 2000: 58. On the theme of the "ugly hero" before Sokrates see Papademetriou 1997: ch. 1. Besides Archilochus' general, he finds only a number of proverbial sayings asserting that an ugly body does not entail a stupid or base mind (1997: 27 n.). To his examples should be added Eur. *Or.* 917–22.

unassuming, and seems sullen and stupid, but belies this when he turns out to be a magnificent orator, and in the *Odyssey* spends much of his time disguised as a disfigured old beggar.[99] But Plato takes the tension between appearance and inner character much further than Archilochus or Homer. The ugliness of Archilochus' general is confined to short stature and bandy legs, and does not conceal a brilliant mind. And Odysseus' less than ideal appearance in the *Iliad* is strictly relative: he still stands out as a ram in a flock of ewes (3.195–8). In the *Odyssey*, his ugliness is temporary: Athena beautifies him personally when it is time for him to reveal himself in his heroic persona (23.156–63). Sokrates' transgressive physical appearance, by contrast, is not effaced but validated by the revelation of the beauty that lies within (*Symp.* 216e–217a). The paradox emerges clearly from an anecdote that attempts to defuse it. The physiognomer Zopyrus allegedly declared Sokrates lustful and stupid, because of his thick neck and bulging eyes. When Sokrates' friends laughed at this diagnosis, Sokrates himself defended it, saying that he was indeed naturally disposed to such vices, but had learned to control them by means of reason.[100]

Plato thus defies and inverts the convention that looks in general, and personal peculiarities in particular, are (or ought to be) transparent indicators of character, by denying that Sokrates' pecularities are tokens of this kind. At the same time he reinvents that tradition, by making those same peculiarities emblematic of a new kind of heroic self. In Plato's hands, Sokrates' physical appearance continues to manifest his moral and intellectual character, but in a subversive, provocative fashion. His strange body and self-presentation not only *conceal* a marvellous interior, but actually come to *stand for* his moral and intellectual superiority.[101] This is in large part because of their emblematic relationship to his words, which likewise defy conventional norms of beauty and dignity. The word *atopos* ("out of place," "strange" or "weird") is closely associated with Sokrates throughout Plato, especially with his peculiar mode of discourse and the *aporia* or bewilderment that it engenders.[102] His

[99] See *Il.* 3.192–224; cf. *Od.* 8.167–177, 9.513–16, 13.429–38. For other, slighter Homeric examples see *Il.* 5.801, *Od.* 19.246–8. For further resemblances between Odysseus and Sokrates see below, pp. 158–9.

[100] The story derives from a dialogue by Phaedo (see further Evans 1969: 42–3; Kahn 1996: 11).

[101] Contrast Oidipous, the most "intellectual" hero of myth, whose physical deformities (scarred feet and eyes) betoken the *limitations* of that intellect. On the significance of feet, including Sokrates' bare feet, as markers of divinity and/or heroism, see R. D. Griffith 1996: 80–81.

[102] *Symp.* 221de, *Tht.* 149a. For Sokrates' *atopia* cf. also *Lach.* 195a, *Symp.* 175a, 215a, *Gorg.* 473a, 480e, 494d, *Phdr.* 230c, *Prot.* 361a, *Rep.* 515a, Xen. *Mem.* 2.3.15. See further Plass 1964: 255, 271–6; J. S. Turner 1993; Makowski 1994; Hadot 1995: 56–8; Eide 1996. Note that part of what is signified by *atopia* is the coexistence of contraries (cf. above, p. 69).

pecularities thus come to betoken his philosophically heroic qualities: integrity and superiority to other mortals, resistance to the views of the many and the conventions of his time. His ugliness, instead of being a sign of moral failing, becomes the physical guarantor of an unconventional inner beauty. This validation of physical and social non-conformity in the person of Sokrates initiates a long iconographic tradition whereby certain types of philosopher may be recognized by their bizarre personal appearance.[103]

In his very *atopia*, then, Sokrates re-embodies, in his paradoxical way, the traditional norm of the idealized heroic figure. He turns conventional *atopia* on its head, making his opponents the ones who are decentered or "out of place," while himself reclaiming the heroic norm.[104] He does this in large part by transcending human particularity in the very act of instantiating it. Thus although he exists in time, as an embodied human being, he rejects the normal effects of time on the human organism (such as the need for sleep). Indeed, Plato's focus on the particularities of his body seems to be strongest precisely when Sokrates is overtly expressing most antipathy for the material world. The more abstract Sokrates becomes in his thinking, the more Plato seems to need to show this thinking as grounded in embodiment. Thus *Phaedo*, the dialogue that most radically endorses the separation of body from soul, is also the one that dwells most insistently on the specificity of Sokrates' particular body, the precise disposition, arrangement and rearrangement of its parts.[105] The most fully embodied of all ancient characters is thus made the spokesman for the most uncompromising rejection of the body. Likewise in *Symposium*, where Sokrates' uniqueness is so heavily emphasized, and so successfully conveyed, he serves simultaneously as the *type* of the philosopher-lover who has freed himself of the "mortal trash" of human particularity (*Symp.* 211a). He stands simultaneously on every rung of Diotima's erotic ladder, from unique individuality to quasi-divine abstraction.[106] The principle of continuity from a particular body to the Forms, which structures that ladder, is embodied in Sokrates himself. As an object of desire he is unique.[107] Yet he manifests in material form the abstraction of the divinity (*daimōn*) Eros himself (*Symp.* 203c–204a). As such he belongs to a class with no other members, which makes him unique in quite a different way. Well may he speculate, as he does in

[103] Zanker 1995: 334 and passim. [104] Cf. e.g. *Gorg.* 521d, *HMin.* 368c5, *Phdr.* 229c, *Tht.* 177b4.
[105] See Loraux 1995: ch. 8 and cf. Patzer 1965; Vlastos 1991: 251–3; Gilead 1994: 45–50.
[106] I hope to make this argument in detail elsewhere.
[107] This is emphasized by Nussbaum 1986: 187–8.

Phaedrus, whether his own nature is more complex than the mythical hundred-headed Typhon, or something "tamer," "simpler" and more divine (230a).[108] He embodies in his very person the pervasive Platonic tensions between particular and general, humanity and transcendence, which, as we have seen, are paralleled by tensions between form and content, drama and dogmatism, dialogue and authority.

A similar paradox is evident in Sokrates' ambiguous relationships to his socio-political context. He is thoroughly grounded in a particular historical moment of a distinctive culture – a moment that he himself, thanks to Plato's meticulous dramatic art, has done much to define for subsequent generations. As such he is steeped in Athenian values. As he himself acknowledges, he has been formed by specifically Athenian norms regarding the procreation, nurture and education of citizen children, to which he owes an unpayable debt (*Crito* 50d–51c). He participates in the socio-cultural institutions proper to a free Athenian male, such as symposia, festivals and warfare. He loses no opportunity to declare his devotion to his native city, and leaves life itself rather than flee Athens.[109] In a striking example of self-identification with Athens as a whole, he informs Meno that the entire Athenian population is as ignorant about virtue as he is (*Meno* 71ab). As for politics, he thrives under the democracy, and his language often echoes that of democratic culture. He is rhetorically skilled, attends trials besides his own (*Ap.* 35a), plays his part as a democratic citizen (*Ap.* 32ab), and is an inveterate lover of uninhibited public discourse – arguably the Athenian democracy's signature trait.[110] There is a "democratic" versatility in his mastery of varied genres of discourse, from oratory to literary criticism, and in his remarkably detailed familiarity with various aspects of the material world and the crafts.[111] His ironic manner is connected with "democratic" multiplicity through its ambiguous relationship to falsehood and role-playing. Indeed, his "restless intelligence is itself characteristic of

[108] On the Typhon as an image of plurivocality see Nightingale 1995: 134–5.

[109] See *Ap.* 30a, *Crito* 51c–53e, *Phdr.* 230cd, *Tht.* 143d and cf. *Meno* 80b. On Sokrates' peculiar relationship to the Athenian democracy see further Vlastos 1983b; Kraut 1984: ch. 7; Wood and Wood 1986; Brickhouse and Smith 1989: 167–84, 1994: ch. 5; Euben 1996; Barber 1996; Ober 1998, 2000.

[110] For the Athenian ideology of free speech (*parrhēsia*) cf. *Gorg.* 461e, 487ab, *Lach.* 178ab, *Laws* 641e, *Meno* 80b and see Steiner 1994: 187–93; Monoson 2000: ch. 2; Waugh 2000: 43–7 (note esp. the association with the *agora*). On Sokrates' *parrhēsia* see F. Wolff 1997: 50–51; Nehamas 1998: 164–6; Monoson 2000: ch. 6; G. A. Scott 2000: 145–52.

[111] Cf. Sprague 1984. For Athenian versatility cf. Thuc. 1.71.3, 2.37.1, 2.40.2–3, 2.41.1 and see further below, pp. 156–7. For Sokrates as a "democratic" figure cf. also Farness 1991: 43–7.

the democracy."[112] His insistence on matching words with deeds (below, p. 117) is also fundamental to the democratic Athenian self-image, as promulgated e.g. in Perikles' funeral oration (Thuc. 2.40.2).

Sokrates' philosophical procedures are also anti-elitist in certain respects. His eschewal of writing has a democratic valence (cf. above, p. 44). He denies intellectual authority to social rank, wealth or power (cf. *Gorg.* 471e–472b). Though he occasionally turns people away (cf. *Lach.* 200cd, *Tht.* 151a) he is willing in principle to converse with anyone he happens to meet (*Ap.* 30a), and free to do so because he does not take money as a formal "teacher."[113] He talks to foreigners as well as Athenians, poor as well as rich, craftsmen and poets as well as politicians, slaves as well as aristocrats, women as well as men, prostitutes as well as priestesses.[114] He ignores, to a remarkable degree, the barriers of age, class, and gender, attempting thereby to create a community of reason unbound by conventional social hierarchies (cf. below, p. 86). This range of potential interlocutors is matched by a demotic intellectual personality: his discourse is marked by a homespun style; he avoids technical terminology; and he makes notorious use of analogies from everyday life. His craft-examples cover low or servile activities (cooking), and female skills (weaving), as well as those appropriate to elite male citizens (fighting, farming), and humbler artisans (cobbling). He shares in the pervasive Greek cultural contempt for women. But he also treats them with unusual intellectual respect for a Greek man, and appropriates their activities for his own purposes, feminizing himself in the process.[115] His own class status is ambiguous: like his father, he is a sculptor or stone-mason by training,[116] wealthy enough to serve in warfare as a hoplite, an intimate, and possibly a relative, of aristocrats who could supply funds when needed,[117] yet impoverished by his single-minded

[112] Carter 1986: 186. For Athenian cleverness and love of debate cf. Thuc. 2.40.2–3, 3.37–8, 3.42–3; for restlessness cf. Thuc. 1.70. See further Knox 1957: ch. 2.

[113] Cf. Xen. *Mem.* 1.2.6 and see Blank 1985.

[114] Apollodoros was apparently a sculptor, like Sokrates himself (Burford 1972: 129); cf. also the tradition that Phaedo was a slave and a prostitute (Diog. Laert. 2.31, 105).

[115] On Plato's appropriation of the feminine see further duBois 1985, 1988: 169–83; Halperin 1986, 1990: ch. 6; W. Brown 1988; Henry 1995: 32–40 and below, pp. 294–5, 362–4.

[116] In antiquity certain statues at the Acropolis were attributed to him (Diog. Laert. 2.19, Paus. 22.8).

[117] See e.g. *Ap.* 38b, *Crit.* 45ab, *Rep.* 337d. For the historical Sokrates' socio-economic status, including the possibility of aristocratic relatives, see Brickhouse and Smith 1989: 15–16. At *Lach.* 180de Lysimachos son of Aristeides claims that his and Sokrates' father were intimate friends, which would link Sokrates' family with the foremost politicians of the previous generation.

pursuit of philosophy.[118] As Kallikles puts it, he turns normal human life upside down (*Gorg*. 481c).

Sokrates also inverts pedagogical hierarchies, routinely presenting himself as the student or follower, rather than teacher or leader, of those with whom he associates. In *Symposium* and *Menexenus* he even presents himself as the humble student of mere women – and foreign ones at that.[119] He seeks to learn from children as well as adults (cf. *Gorg*. 470c), and is happy to debunk the claims of the old, thus challenging the presumption that wisdom accompanies age.[120] In several dialogues, Plato presents old men who cannot learn because they are stiff and feeble, intellectually as well as physically, compared to the supple and vigorous young. They enjoy listening to *logoi*, but show no aptitude for the cut and thrust of argument.[121] This leaves the traditional position of wise elder vacant for Sokrates. But he gives this role an intellectual and physical vitality that transcends the limitations of any particular age. His youth, as dramatized in *Parmenides*, is intellectually precocious, and even as an old man he equates himself with teenagers (*Lys*. 223b). At all ages he evinces an inexhaustible appetite for strenuous argument.[122] He even takes up the study of music and poetry, like a child, on the verge of death,[123] thereby embracing the comic persona of the "late-learner."[124] It is scarcely surprising that detractors like Kallikles and Thrasymachos find him infantile and absurd.

Sokrates' "democratic" tendencies thus take him beyond the pale of Athenian ideological hierarchies, making him *atopos* – strange or out of place – even in democratic Athens.[125] Yet in other ways he lies at the opposite end of the political and intellectual spectrum. His deep concern

[118] For Sokrates' poverty and indifference to money see *Ap.* 31bc, 29d, 41e, *Crito* 54a, *Euth.* 3d, *Rep.* 337d, 338b, *Symp.* 173c.

[119] Cf. Nightingale 1995: 128; Waugh 2000: 47 n.; see further Blair 1996 and contrast Xen. *Mem.* 3.11.

[120] For this traditional view see e.g. *Lach.* 181d, 189a, *Tht.* 171cd, *Tim.* 22b, *Rep.* 328de, *Laws* 715de.

[121] *Rep.* 328cd, *Tht.* 162b, *Euthyd.* 304c; cf. also *Lach.* 180d, 189cd, *Laws* 892d–893a, *Crito* 43bc, *Rep.* 536cd. Not all Platonic old men fall under this description. The most notable exceptions, apart from Sokrates himself, are Parmenides (*Parm.* 127b, 136d–137a) and the old men of *Laws* (cf. e.g. 715de). Cf. also *Lach.* 189ab, 201b.

[122] *Tht.* 169abc; cf. 180e–181a, 183d, and e.g. *Euth.* 15c12.

[123] *Euthyd.* 272a–d, *Phd.* 60b–61b. See also *Euthyd.* 285bc and cf. *Laws* 892d–893e.

[124] Cf. esp. Strepsiades in Ar. *Clouds*, and Theophr. *Char.* 27. See also H. Tarrant 1996; Michelini 2000a: 519–20.

[125] The opening of *Ap.* makes this particularly clear (Joly 1992: 14–15). On Sokrates as outsider cf. also Nightingale 1995: 42–3; Howland 1998: 46–8.

about the quality of Athenian public life is complemented by a minimum of formal political involvement.[126] He defies the "many" of democracy as well as the Thirty Tyrants (*Ap.* 32a–d). He has nothing but contempt for the mass audiences of democratic public speech. His modus operandi is the intellectual equivalent of man-to-man combat, evoking the individual, aristocratic Homeric hero as opposed to the democratic mass engagements of the hoplite phalanx. Though Sokrates, qua Athenian citizen, participated in the latter, he is portrayed by Alkibiades as fighting even in retreat with the exceptional individual valor of a Homeric hero.[127] Plato represents him, especially in *Gorgias*, as an intellectual elitist systematically opposed to the values of democratic political culture. Despite his openness to all comers, and the "democratic" character of his discourse, he is notoriously disdainful of the opinion of the many.[128] There is a tension here between the Sokrates Plato's works describe, and the Sokrates he shows in action. In principle, Sokrates will talk to anyone, but in Plato's representations he is primarily concerned with the socially and politically influential free male. His claim to examine anyone he happens to meet gains some credibility from social factors, which would help to limit his constituency to the young, the rich, the idle, professional educators, men and the occasional unconventional woman. But Plato rarely represents him examining vulgar or uneducated persons of a kind that he would certainly meet in the Athenian *agora*, and never – despite *Apology* – craftsmen (contrast Xen. *Mem.* 3.10).

Sokrates' involvement with Athenian democratic culture is further offset by a cosmopolitanism that extends beyond the boundaries of any one city-state to engage with a wider community of elite Greeks.[129] He associates with resident aliens and visiting foreigners as well as Athenian citizens. This is most noticeable in *Phaedo*. Friends from Sicily are present at his deathbed, while several of his close Athenian associates are absent (*Phd.* 59bc). The dramatis personae of this dialogue – and of Plato's works generally – simultaneously centers the philosophical world on Athens and suggests a Socratic transcendence of any such parochiality. This is reinforced in *Phaedo* by an outer dramatic frame that locates the conversation away from Athens, thus showing the geographical spread of

[126] *Ap.* 32ab, e, *Gorg.* 473e–474a. To put it in Greek ideological terms, he exemplifies a strange combination of *apragmosunē* and *polypragmosunē* (see Carter 1986: 183–6 and cf. Ehrenberg 1947).

[127] *Symp.* 220d–221c; cf. *Il.* 11.543–73.

[128] See esp. *Crito* 47a–48a and see Kraut 1984: 196–203.

[129] On the cosmopolitan aspects of Sokrates and Plato's writings generally see Joly 1992: 13–38. Cf. also Ober unpublished, which argues that Sokrates reflects the requirement of Athenian democracy that public speakers be simultaneously demotic and exceptional.

Sokrates' posthumous influence.[130] He even exhorts his followers to seek a replacement for him among "barbarians" as well as Greeks (*Phd.* 78a). And despite his preference for remaining physically located in Athens, he is a metaphorical wanderer, who at times suggests that his true home is not that of human life at all. Thus in *Phaedo* he says the philosopher lives practising for death (64a), and his dream in *Crito* implies that death will be a kind of "homecoming" (44ab).[131] To be Sokrates is to be simultaneously at home and abroad, within and beyond human life.

As his deathbed scene implies, Sokrates' attitude towards familial and personal relationships is equally paradoxical. He transcends or inverts all the most central relationships with others – family, friends or fellow-citizens – that defined Athenian social identity. Family ties are subordinated to the impersonal interests of philosophy: he does not support his family by earning a living in any normal sense, devoting himself instead to philosophy. Personal ties are rearticulated in philosophical terms: he dismisses his wife from his deathbed, keeping his philosophical associates at his side (*Phd.* 60a); refuses to display family solidarity by presenting his children in court (*Ap.* 34cd);[132] and engages repeatedly in the attempted improvement of other people's children with little mention of his own.[133] His fellow-citizens are equated with his children in the concern he shows for them, and his children with fellow-citizens in the treatment they ought to receive (*Ap.* 31b, 41e–42a).[134] As for his erotic life, like many other Athenian men he is attracted to beautiful youths, but he inverts the active and passive roles of lover and beloved (*erastēs* and *erōmenos*), and eschews the customary sexual basis of such relationships (cf. below, p. 107).

Sokrates' interlocutors have a wide range of personal, social, cultural reasons for being where they are at the time and place of these dramatized conversations (attending a festival, exercising, prosecuting an

[130] *Tht.* is the only other dialogue whose dramatic frame locates it outside Attica; cf. Polansky 1992: 35 and below, p. 301.

[131] See Burnet 1924 ad loc. and cf. *Ap.* 40e–41c, *Gorg.* 492e–493a, *Phd.* 85b.

[132] Cf. Hall 1995: 42.

[133] Cf. Beversluis 2000: 65 n. For the popular view that Sokrates' teaching led sons to disregard their fathers see Ar. *Clouds*. B. Strauss argues that he was perceived as usurping paternal authority (1993: 199–211).

I do not mean to suggest here that the historical Sokrates neglected the welfare of his children (though his self-imposed poverty might well have been perceived this way by his contemporaries), but simply that Plato does not present his mission of improving others as directed towards his own sons. For his attitude towards the family cf. also *Crito* 48c, 50d–51e, 52c, 53e–54c, *Euthyd.* 307c, *Phd.* 115b, 116ab, *Rep.* 403b, 461c–465d, *Symp.* 219cd and see Woozley 1979: 10–11; Gilead 1994: 66–8; Nehamas 1998: 166–7.

[134] Cf. also the way he makes the Laws of Athens argue that they deserve the respect due to a parent (*Crito* 50d–51e).

adversary, celebrating a victory). But despite the fact that he too is both constituted by and responding to such cultural institutions, Sokrates is ultimately always where he is for one reason only – the pursuit of philosophy through conversation. This is even what brings him to court. Though he participates physically in such social gatherings as festivals and symposia, he is immune to the effects of wine, and his preferred form of "feasting" remains intellectual.[135] His behavior is the same in word and deed, in public and private (cf. *Ap.* 32e–33a). Regardless of the social context in which he finds himself, he remains a restless seeker and inveterate talker (cf. esp. *Ap.* 37e–38a). He claims that if necessary he would pay people to listen to him (*Euth.* 3d), and converses on the verge of death despite warnings to the contrary (*Phd.* 63de). For Plato's Sokrates, "discourse is life and all the rest are interludes."[136] Yet he also retreats into stillness and solipsistic silence from which his friends know better than to rouse him.[137] In short, he both embodies and transcends the limitations of time, space and culture in which Plato's very choice of dialogue form locates both Sokrates and the practice of philosophy.

MIMETIC PEDAGOGY

What was Plato's purpose in characterizing Sokrates and the rest of his dramatis personae in these various ways? The closest we can come to answering this unanswerable question is by situating the dialogues within a nexus of ideas that is both widely prevalent in Greek culture generally, and a matter of great concern to Plato in particular, namely the relationship between the representation of character (in both dramatic and ethical senses) and education, broadly understood. Almost all ancient Greek writers assume that the representation of persons, especially in "dramatic" form, exerts an emotional effect on its consumers (actors, audience, readers or listeners) that tends to assimilate them to the characters represented.[138] This view, which I call the assumption of mimetic pedagogy, pervades ancient Greek literary theory, which has a heavily moralizing slant. Thus the evidence cited earlier for the ancient perception of literary characters as primarily bearers of *ēthos* all appears in contexts which presume that the characters will directly influence the consumer in this way (above, p. 55). The principal mechanism for this

135 E.g. *Gorg.* 447a, *Rep.* 354ab, 571d; further examples in Berg 1904: 26–7; Louis 1945: 55–7.

136 Ophir 1991: 13; cf. Plut. *Mor.* 796de.

137 *Symp.* 174d, 175b, 220cd; cf. also *Phd.* 84c, 95e. Ophir notes that Sokrates always remains still when philosophizing (1991: 123).

138 See further Gentili 1988: ch. 4; Blundell 1989: 12–16; Halliwell 1992, esp. 58–62. For the actors cf. *Laws* 816e; Zeitlin 1996; Winkler 1990b. For the persistence of such views see e.g. Plut. *Mor.* 26ab.

effect is the audience's internalization of the character's feelings, attitudes and beliefs, which leads to emulation, and thence to reproduction of their behavior. Author, character, performer and audience are united in an emotional and behavioral sympathy.[139] It follows that literature is intrinsically educational in effect. Accordingly, it was a primary instrument of ancient Athenian moral and political education, since it was believed to inspire the young to emulate desirable character-types. This educational model is associated with the oral tradition, and the texts in question were normally performed for an audience.[140] Such performance enhances the power of mimesis by allowing us to gaze upon the person and behavior in question.[141] But similar effects were also thought to be derived from reading, in part through the power of visual imagination. Thus Isocrates speaks of the beneficial effects on the orator or writer of the exempla he chooses for his works, at which he will habitually "gaze" (*Antid.* 277).[142]

This concern about the influence of artistic representation is a natural extension of the view that one learns by imitating other people.[143] The latter assumption is pervasive in Greek texts, which insist repeatedly on the importance of both setting and following a good example (*paradeigma*), and the perils of the opposite.[144] Sons were expected to live up to their fathers by resembling them (below, pp. 144, 275). The culture of pederasty was justified in part by the notion that the older man would serve as a model of adult manhood for the younger.[145] And orators urged the Assembly to use their votes as a way of setting an example for the city's youth.[146] Literature serves as a mechanism for extending the influence of such exemplary behavior. Thus the preface to Theophrastus' *Characters* indicates that the author's purpose is to enable young men to find the right kind of people to associate with and emulate. In Homer, the example of

[139] On emotional "identification" in general see Harding 1962; Jauss 1974; Heath 1987: 15. For epic cf. Havelock 1963: ch. 9; for tragedy Stanford 1983: ch. 1–2; Segal 1996; Wallace 1997; for the actors cf. above, p. 23 n. 66; for the author cf. Muecke 1982: 51–5.

[140] For the association of the paradigm case with oral/traditional ways of thinking and educating, see Jaeger 1945: 32–4, 40–41; Robb 1993: 77–96, 1997: 39–46. For the performance of traditional wisdom see Robb 1994: ch. 6–7; Russo 1997; Martin 1998.

[141] See esp. *Laws* 887de and cf. *Rep.* 400e–401d, 500bc. For the privileging of sight cf. also *Rep.* 507e–508a; Arist. *Met.* 908a22–28. On the associations of "gazing" (θεωρεῖν) see further Rocco 1997: 109 n.

[142] Cf. also Arist. *Poet.* 1462a14–18 with Gordon 1999: 86.

[143] For the homology between responses to fictional characters and responses to real people see Harding 1962; Rankin 1993. On the slippage between tragedy and life in Greek culture cf. P. J. Wilson 1996: 319–24.

[144] E.g. Theogn. 35–8, Andoc. 4.22, Demos. 9.41, 19.245, Soph. *Ant.* 659–60, Antiph. DK87 B62, Arist. *Pol.* 1336b27–33. Cf. also the practice of using the example of divine misbehavior to excuse one's own (e.g. Ar. *Clouds* 1079–82, *Rep.* 391e).

[145] Dover 1989: 89–91. [146] Ober 1989: 161–2.

others is set out for the young in song and story,[147] and the same principle underpins the genres of encomium and invective.[148] Tragedy was thought to function similarly. So Lycurgus asserts that Euripides dramatized the story of Praxithea's sacrifice as a *paradeigma*, "gazing at which they would become accustomed in their souls to love their country."[149] Even after Plato's time, Alexander the Great explicitly modeled himself on Achilles.[150] A natural corollary of viewing such epic heroes as ideals to emulate is the common practice of comparing living people to mythical figures.[151]

Plato is one of our principal sources for such ideas. In *Meno*, Anytos asserts that a young man will be improved by "any Athenian gentleman he happens to meet" (92e; cf. *Ap.* 24d–25a), and Sokrates himself quotes Theognis to the effect that it is important to keep company with the good instead of the bad, in order to become good rather than bad oneself (95de). In *Republic*, Sokrates says that one cannot spend time in the company of something one admires without imitating it (500c), and assumes that those with fine natures are corrupted by the behavior of surrounding crowds (492bc). In *Gorgias*, he claims that people mimic the words of their "beloved," whether human or otherwise (481d–482d), and speaks of the ambitious young man imitating the tyrant (*Gorg.* 510d–511a). In *Laws*, the Athenian speaks of the attraction to evil people that both results from wrongdoing and causes the soul to deteriorate further (728b; cf. 904de), and stresses the power of the visual element in setting a good example for children (887de). The dialogues also richly attest to Plato's concern about the educational influence of literature.[152] The two concerns come together in *Laws*, where good character accompanies superior physique as a criterion for being allowed to dance in a chorus (815d–816d), since such character will "perform itself" and thus, presumably, exert a beneficial influence in its own right.[153] A similar slippage between actions and their imitation is central to Sokrates' critique of the arts in *Republic* (below, pp. 236–8).

Mimetic identification both arises from self-recognition and makes us more like the character represented. It is thus grounded in the pervasive Greek assumption of the affinity and attraction of like to like

[147] See e.g. *Il.* 9.522–8 and Marrou 1956: 12–13; Rabel 1997 passim.
[148] See e.g. *Phdr.* 245a and Walsh 1984: ch. 3.
[149] Lyc. 1.100; cf. id. 102–4, 106–7. On the meanings of *paradeigma* see Patterson 1985: ch. 2.
[150] See Hobbs 2000: 175–8.
[151] See e.g. *Phdr.* 261bc, *Rep.* 468e–469a, *Symp.* 215ab, 221cd and cf. Xen. *Symp.* 6.8.
[152] E.g. *Ion*, *Laws* Bks. 2 and 7, *Phileb.* 48a, *Phdr.* 245a, *Prot.* 326a, 339a. On *Rep.* see further below, pp. 228–45.
[153] Cf. *Rep.* 400cde, [Longinus] 9.3.

(below, p. 265). Thus Aristotle argues that the characters of tragedy must be "like us," in order to induce the tragic emotions of pity and terror.[154] The attraction of like to like and the following of examples are explicitly linked by Plato in *Laws* (904e–905a, 728b). In *Republic*, Sokrates says someone who recognizes injustice as something different from himself will not be corrupted, whereas the bad man is guided by the bad model he carries inside (409bcd). Correspondingly, mimetic identification of a beneficial kind works by confirming desirable qualities in those who already possess them. So Pindar exhorts his listener to become the kind of men that they already are, recognizing their own good qualities in his poetry and thus confirming them (*Pyth.* 2.72). In *Republic*, when a "moderate" (*metrios*) man comes upon the words or deeds of a good man in his narrative, he will be willing to report them "as if he were that man himself" (396c) – presumably recognizing his own affinity to those qualities.[155] The degree of identification with any character, good or bad, will thus depend on one's initial susceptibility, which is a function of one's pre-existing likeness to the character in question.

Yet mimetic pedagogy is often portrayed as a process that changes the character of the audience, for better or worse. In Aristophanes' *Frogs*, for example, Euripides is accused of making "good and noble" men worse, and driving "noble" women to feel shameful desires, by the example of his dramatic characters (1010–11, 1050–51). Similarly in *Republic* Sokrates is primarily concerned with the corrupting effects of poetry on the good soul (395d–396d, 605cd). Even in this kind of case, however, the process operates through the perception and reinforcement of an affinity or likeness. It is, for example, the women of Athens – not the men – who are supposed to identify with Euripides' "shameful" heroines, and their misbehavior takes the "feminine" form of sexual impropriety followed by suicide, thus confirming the pervasive cultural assumption that women are less emotionally controlled than men and more disposed to sexual licence. Similarly in Plato, women and children have a disposition towards varied emotions, and therefore enjoy a corrupting diversity in art.[156] As for men, "the worse one [already] is, the more he will narrate anything at all and consider nothing unworthy of himself" (397a). There is a part in all of us that "hungers for weeping and wailing," and is "by nature such as to desire these things;" this is the irrational part

[154] *Poet.* 1452b30–1453a17; cf. 1454a24.
[155] For the role of "like to like" in education cf. also *Rep.* 425bc.
[156] *Rep.* 431bc, 557c; cf. 387e, 395d, 605de, *Laws* 658d, 817c. For the "femininity" of drama see also Zeitlin 1996: 368–74.

that enjoys tragedy and is fed – even in a good man – by "dramatic" representations of lamentation (387d–388d, 605bc, 606ab). The same applies to the enjoyment of comedy, and representations of sex and the passions generally (606cd).[157] In so far as there is already something bad in all of us, all are open to corruption (*Rep.* 572b; cf. *Tht.* 176a). Even when mimetic identification changes a person's character, then, it does so by reinforcing a part of the self that already has an affinity or likeness to what is represented.

As many of the texts already cited imply, pleasure is a central element in producing and reinforcing these effects. Pleasure often serves as an indicator of an affinity to that which resembles oneself. This is a particular concern of Plato's. In *Laws* the Athenian visitor uses disgust and pleasure as indicators of affinity (or otherwise) when someone comes into contact with good or bad characters (whether in person or through representations) (656b). And in *Gorgias*, Sokrates says people enjoy hearing things that resemble them and match their *ēthos* (513bc). Such pleasure in turn reinforces the original likeness. As the Athenian visitor puts it, "One is forced to become like that which one enjoys" (*Laws* 656b; cf. *Crat.* 403d). In *Republic*, Sokrates repeatedly emphasizes that "bad" poetry brings more pleasure, especially to inferior people, and relates this pleasure to its dangerous effects.[158] In fact to be "poetic" seems to be precisely to exert this kind of influence (387b).

One implication of this complex of ideas is that by adopting "dramatic" form, Plato is setting himself up as a direct rival to Homer and the dramatists in the provision of ethically influential characters as models for emulation.[159] If his representations of persons fail to exert a superior influence on his audience, he will have failed to supplant his predecessors in this crucial respect. As we might expect, then, both the discursive content of the dialogues and the dramatic presentation of the characters evince a concern to locate an acceptable form of dramatic mimesis, one that allows the representation of positive models in philosophically useful ways. We see Plato wrestling in several works with this problem of how to locate and foster a beneficial form of mimetic pedagogy – one that will not be subject to the criticisms aired within his own dialogues. These criticisms are of two kinds. First, and most obviously, we may be damaged by identifying with bad characters. Secondly, and more subtly,

[157] Cf. also *Rep.* 559e, where the oligarch's son is corrupted when one set of his desires is reinforced by similar desires from outside.

[158] *Rep.* 390a, 397d, 606a; cf. *Laws* 667cde.

[159] For Plato's concern with "role-models" see Hobbs 2000: 59–68. On his appropriation of the educational power of spectatorship for philosophy see Monoson 2000: ch. 8 and cf. von Reden and Goldhill 1999.

emotional identification of any kind is dangerous in so far as it promotes a passive rather than an active form of learning. The former concern is one that Plato shares with other ancient writers. The latter, as we shall see shortly, is more peculiarly Platonic.

The most obvious mimetic model in Plato's dialogues is Sokrates, who is commonly, and for good reason, viewed as Plato's heroic ideal, his quasi-mythic philosophical response to the great figures of epic and drama. Plato is his Homer, the author of the *kleos* (glory or renown) that immortalizes Sokrates like an epic hero, by representing him as a "doer of deeds" as well as a "speaker of words."[160] Like Odysseus or Herakles, he is a divinely favored figure who defeats one (intellectual) threat after another; like Achilles, he matches word to deed and is willing to die for his beliefs.[161] And like all these heroes, he is written and re-written by competing authors in their collective, and continuous, exploration of competing ideals of manhood. His dominance of Plato's own oeuvre is such that it is his absence from specific works (as opposed to his presence), or his silence therein, that is felt to require explanation (cf. below, pp. 390–96). By giving Sokrates such extraordinary prominence, Plato enshrines him among the exceptional figures worthy of recording in human memory (cf. *Tim.* 23a). He uses all the resources of characterization to cast over us the spell of Sokrates' charismatic personality by means of the "proof from the *ēthos* of the speaker."[162] He also presents him as the subject of endless tale-telling in his lifetime and after his death, using dramatic framing to foster his *kleos* on a further level.[163] This renown has echoed down the centuries, allowing Sokrates to exert an unparalleled influence on the European tradition of philosophy and literature. He has remained the subject of endless tale-telling, discussion, speculation and reappropriation down to the present. Plato has thus been supremely successful in the Homeric task of immortalizing his hero, giving him a kind of posthumous success to compensate for his failures when alive (cf. *Ap.* 38c–39d). Thus is his death transformed into philosophic victory.[164]

[160] For this heroic ideal see below, p. 98. Note the importance of Sokrates' deeds as well as his words for his followers, as portrayed by Plato (e.g. *Phd.* 57a, 58c, *Symp.* 172c; cf. Clay 2000: 10).

[161] For Sokrates as Achillean and/or Odyssean see below, pp. 158–61. For Herakles see Loraux 1995: ch. 9.

[162] Cf. P. C. Smith 1995: 107 and above, p. 35.

[163] Cf. e.g. *Tht.* 142c–143b, *Symp.* 172a–173e, *Phd.* 58d; Berger 1984: 71–2; Halperin 1992: 106–7. For the gossipy later tradition about Sokrates see Amory 1984.

[164] This is in part because he does not personally view death as a misfortune, but also because his reputation and influence were flourishing at the time of Plato's writing, as they have ever since. Unlike Homer, Sokrates *was* the successful founder of a way of life (cf. *Rep.* 599c–600e). For this reason, among others, the analogy between Sokrates and a tragic (as opposed to epic) hero is

Plato encourages the reader to identify with Sokrates and aspire to become like him, both by privileging his point of view, and by appropriating on his behalf the traditional heroes to whom the Athenian audience was accustomed to look for ethical examples. And Sokrates himself seems to expect and even desire to be imitated.[165] In *Apology* he is well aware that others copy him and shows no sign of disapproval, seeming almost to relish the prospect of their continuing to do so after his death (23c, 39cd; cf. 37d). The claim that Apollo has made him an "example" (*paradeigma*) (23b) strongly suggests that he views himself as a model for the rest of humanity to imitate,[166] and he tries actively to convince the Athenians to adopt his own concerns and practices (cf. *Ap.* 31b, 41e–42a). He is portrayed by Plato as successful in this enterprise to a limited extent, in so far as he succeeds in reproducing his own state of *aporia* in his interlocutors. We hear of individuals under his influence, like Aristodemos, who imitates him down to the last particular, and Alkibiades, who must tear himself away in order to avoid adopting Sokrates' way of life (*Symp.* 173b, 216ab). At the end of *Gorgias* he invites Kallikles to "follow" him to find happiness (*Gorg* 527c).[167] The fact that the dialectical roles of questioner and answerer are in principle interchangeable (below, p. 120) implies that he does not view his own role as unique. And before his death, he urges his friends to seek out another "charmer" to replace him, indicating that such a person may be found in their own midst (*Phd.* 77e–78a). In general, his enterprise may plausibly be understood as an effort to reproduce himself in such a way as to constitute an intellectual community of the like-minded, who will echo his own outlook and values.[168]

This presentation of Sokrates as a model for his companions' (and our) emulation creates a certain tension with Plato's simultaneous insistence

problematic. Like much of tragedy, Plato presents a certain kind of person living with and dying for certain principles. But he transforms what might have been the tragedy of Sokrates into the tragedy of Athens, esp. as incarnated in the figure of Alkibiades. Cf. also pp. 106–7 below.

[165] Cf. Brickhouse and Smith 1984: 194–5, 1989: 267–71; Nehamas 1998: 96–7; Ober 1998: 178–9. Xenophon defensively insists that Sokrates was a good influence on the young, whom he inspired to emulate him (*Mem.* 1.2.3). For a nuanced discussion of how far the imitation of Sokrates may be either desirable or possible see McPherran 1986, who argues that we should behave like Sokrates to the extent that we are already like him in the salient respects – as befits mimetic pedagogy (cf. above, pp. 82–3).

[166] Cf. Stokes 1992b: 44–5. The Laws' argument in *Crito* that escaping from jail will overthrow the state (50ab) also seems to depend on the idea that Sokrates would be setting a bad example. According to Diog. Laert. 3.57, Thrasylus' first tetralogy was designed to provide a paradigm of the philosophic life in the person of Sokrates.

[167] For the association of "following" with "imitation" of a model, cf. *Stat.* 274a, d, *Laws* 934c, *Phdr.* 248a; Hirsch 1995: 184–5; Annas 1999: 56.

[168] See Apelt 1912: ch. 5.

on his protagonist's uniqueness. To remain unique, he must be inimitable in his essence, since successful imitation would eliminate that uniqueness.[169] The point is not the anachronistic one that Plato is committed to Socratic uniqueness per se, as an index of human value. But he does value what that uniqueness betokens. And he has good dramatic reasons for sustaining it. For one thing, doubling tends to have a comic effect, and the doubling of such an idiosyncratic figure would certainly be humorous in a way that would detract from Sokrates' charismatic power.[170] His likeness to such divine figures as Eros and Silenos challenges his uniqueness, but only to reinscribe it: in so far as he is replicable, it is by some kind of divinity.[171] Traditional Greek concepts of agonistic heroism also give Plato reason to avoid showing Sokrates interacting with another thinker of comparable stature.[172] Ancient Greeks were obsessed with identifying the best of its kind – the most beautiful, the noblest, the bravest, the swiftest – to be immortalized in song and story. To pit Sokrates against a real equal would detract from his heroic isolation and supremacy, and diminish his extraordinary status as the uniquely powerful philosophical hero. There can be only one Sokrates, just as there can be only one Achilles – because only one man can be the best.[173]

But if Sokrates is the unique embodiment of the philosopher, and as such incomparable, this establishes a profoundly pessimistic, even tragic, outlook for the future of philosophy. The immortality of his heroic *kleos* depends in large part on the uniqueness and particularity with which Plato endows him, yet this itself contributes to pessimism about the future of philosophy and its ability to transcend the particular. For if he cannot be imitated or reproduced in some essential fashion, the values that he stands for will die with him. If he really is unique, how can philosophy survive his death? This anxiety shadows many of the dialogues. But it is especially prominent in *Phaedo*, where, as we have just seen, this

[169] Cf. Nehamas 1998: 10, 143, and passim; Hobbs 2000: 257; below, p. 127. For the paradox of Sokrates as a producer of students *like* himself see F. Wolff 1997.

[170] For the comic effect of doubling see Bergson 1914: 34. The closest Plato ever comes to doubling Sokrates is in *HMaj.* where Sokrates' "relative" is an imaginary comic double of himself (cf. esp. 304de). The most comic of Plato's dialogues besides *HMaj.* is *Euthyd.*, with its brace of sophists.

[171] Other comparisons in Plato's text emphasize his utter strangeness (Clay 2000: 60–61).

[172] On this problem see esp. Griswold 1986: 225; cf. also Farness 1991: 186–7; Szlezák 1999: 104–6. Only Protagoras even begins to approach intellectual parity with Sokrates. Parmenides is, of course, a major philosopher, but in his dialogue Sokrates is the young interlocutor who, though precocious, is subordinate to the dominant character.

[173] Sokrates' superiority to others far outstrips that of Achilles over his chief rival, Hektor, perhaps because a close loser is more dangerous in philosophy than on the battlefield. Moreover in epic, the winner literally kills his opponent; Sokrates' superiority, by contrast, must survive the fact that he is not only killed by his enemies but arguably fails in his mission (below, pp. 125–7).

uniquely charismatic figure is made to urge his friends to seek out his own replacement. One function of this dialogue is to dramatize the problem of doing philosophy without Sokrates, in the same moment that it grants Sokrates literary immortality as uniquely instantiating the true philosopher's life and death.[174] This gives additional urgency to the idea of somehow reproducing Sokrates *after* his death, in the minds of Plato's readers.

But if Plato cannot – or rather will not – *show* Sokrates successfully reproducing himself, perhaps he himself may succeed in reproducing Sokrates, by somehow transmitting him to us through the dialogues, despite his own death and the deaths of his characters. If Sokrates cannot reproduce himself pedagogically, that is, perhaps Plato can reproduce him in others, by conveying his methods, arguments and ideas to future generations. By this means Plato himself might paradoxically become not only Sokrates' "father" – as his literary creator – but also the son and heir who makes possible his continued reproduction. Mimetic pedagogy could be an avenue by which Sokrates may educate posterity by serving as a moral exemplar, despite his own denials that he is anyone's teacher, without compromising his uniqueness within the dialogues themselves.

The representation of Sokrates as a philosophical hero for our emulation creates certain problems, however. For one thing, presenting a convincing picture of the agonistic intellectual champion at work, defeating inferior exemplars of moral and intellectual character, entails dramatizing these flawed persons, in order to give concrete form to the intellectual and ethical challenges that he faces and so enhance the significance and decisiveness of his victories. Accordingly, not all of Plato's characters provide us with positive models, any more than do the characters of Greek tragedy. His works thus replicate the tension that we find between the *theory* of mimetic pedagogy, which views dramatic characters as models assimilated by the audience, and the *practice* of ancient drama, which is replete with negative models. Unlike drama, however, Plato's dialogues show an enormous internal anxiety about these issues. If throwing oneself into the role of Sokrates makes one Socratic, what of throwing oneself into the role of Thrasymachos?[175] How, then, are such Platonic personae to be justified within the framework of mimetic pedagogy?

174 Cf. Farness 1991, esp. ch. 2; Loraux 1995: 159; Press 1995: 151.

175 The felt need to defend Plato for the inclusion of such "bad" characters goes back to the ancient commentators (see *Anon. Prol.* 14.9–23, 15.20–29 [Westerink]).

One promising idea has been put forward by Mitchell Miller, who argues that, at least in some dialogues, Plato presents his audiences with images of themselves, including their own faults, for the purposes of self-recognition and consequent improvement – a technique he calls "mimetic irony."[176] Miller argues that the very likeness of Plato's implied audience to his dramatis personae will invite self-scrutiny on the part of the former, since they are seeing "themselves" being "staged." But this suggestion is hard to reconcile with the assumptions of mimetic pedagogy, whereby our pre-existing qualities are *reinforced* by witnessing their dramatic representation.[177] The evidence for Athenian theater suggests an audience that, while vociferous in its judgments, was less liable to recognize its own faults as such in dramatic characters than to recognize the faults they believed they did *not* have, just as mimetic pedagogy would lead us to expect.[178] Ancient audiences are expected to disapprove of the characters with whom they do not identify, just because they do *not* think they are like themselves in the relevant respects. Accordingly, tragedy almost always presents Athens and Athenians in a becoming light. As Plato's Sokrates observes, it is easy to win approval when praising Athens to Athenians.[179] Similarly, for the reader of the dialogues, Plato's "inferior" characters are likely to "serve as learning devices . . . for the reader who wants to see herself as *different*, *not* as stubborn, ignorant, dense, or arrogant as the interlocutor."[180] The closer such characters are to our own ideals, the harder it will be to adopt a critical distance from them, and therefore the more dangerous if they are wrong.[181]

How then, are we to perceive and criticize our own faults in characters with whom we identify? Ancient texts suggest some awareness that the aesthetic distance between an audience and the events on stage may free the observer to be critical even of cherished aspects of the self.[182] Athenian comedy eviscerates even the most admired public figures and

[176] Miller 1980: xv–xvi, 1986: 4–9, 65–7, 1999: 254–8.

[177] Note that the Athenians fined Phrynichus for his tragedy, the *Sack of Miletus*, since the disaster it portrayed was too close to them (οἰκηία κακά Hdt. 6.21.2). This implies that closeness to the audience was felt to encourage identification rather than distancing.

[178] Cf. Pickard-Cambridge 1988: 274–5; Wiles 1997: 6–7; Blondell et al. 1999: 29–30.

[179] *Menex.* 235d, 236a; cf. *Gorg.* 513bc, *Rep.* 493a–d, 527e, Gorg. *Helen* 5, Arist. *Rhet.* 1390a25–6, 1395b27–96a2; Ober 1989: 43.

[180] Gordon 1996: 275, emphasis added.

[181] For example, Glaukon and Adeimantos render Thrasymachos more dangerous by showing the grounds on which an ordinary person may identify with him (below, pp. 197–8).

[182] On the tension between sympathetic identification and aesthetic distance, and related concerns about the moral impact of literary characters, see Jauss 1974.

institutions, and tragedy is often more obliquely critical.[183] Even Plato is aware that one may on occasion be exposed to dramatic characters without a dangerous and corrupting emotional involvement – provided one has the "drug" or *pharmakon* of understanding (*Rep.* 595b).[184] He also – as Miller emphasizes – shows an awareness of the relative detachment of the audience in other ways, for example by showing bystanders reacting differently to what is said than participants do. All this suggests that, despite the effects of mimetic pedagogy, the bystander or reader may in certain circumstances enjoy a level of critical detachment that resists passive identification even with characters who resemble themselves. The question faced by Plato as a mimetic artist is how to encourage this kind of emotional distance and rational criticism, while also inducing empathy with appropriate models, and at the same time portraying faithfully the complex world in which the practice of philosophy is embedded.

Collectively, Plato's works may be viewed as exploring different ways of controlling the dangers of mimetic pedagogy that accompany dramatic form, while reaping its benefits – an effort that parallels the philosophical urge to control the world of the particular in other kinds of ways. Various techniques for doing this may be found, more or less obliquely expressed, in our ancient sources. One way is by using representational strategies designed to minimize emotional identification. The most famous such strategy is aired by Sokrates in *Republic*, where he distinguishes between reported and direct (dramatic) mimesis, and disapproves of the latter because it encourages emotional involvement and sympathy with a range of characters. In recounting the words of others, indirect discourse is preferable, because it avoids placing the speaker or audience imaginatively into the position of the literary character, and thus makes less of an emotional impact.[185] This point is economically and convincingly conveyed through Sokrates' flat "translation" into indirect discourse of Chryses' confrontation with Agamemnon in Book 1 of the *Iliad* (393d–394a).[186] Presumably the mediating voice of the narrator will, in Sokrates' view, help to control the emotional effect of any such speech in such a way

[183] See e.g. Blundell 1993b. [184] See Halliwell 1992: 62–4.

[185] Cf. Halliwell 1990: 58. On Plato's use of indirect discourse see Schaerer 1969: 182–209 and cf. D. Tarrant 1955a. For the audience involvement created by dramatic form see Tannen 1989: ch. 4.

[186] It may seem obvious that the substitution of prose for poetry also helps to deaden the impact of the epic lines (cf. Isoc. 9.10–11). Sokrates says his concern is not with meter as such (399e–400d) – he "translates" Homer into prose simply because he is not adept at poetry (393d8). But later he will speak of the "charm" of meter (601ab), and the importance of using correct rhythms even in prose (398d, 399e–400d).

as to reduce the dangers of mimetic pedagogy. In Plato's own dialogues, a narrative voice is often used like this, to distance the audience from certain characters (see e.g. below, pp. 180–81). Overall, however, even his "reported" dialogues include large amounts of direct mimesis of speakers of many different kinds.

Another means of reducing emotional identification is through satire. In the Greek tradition, humor was an important way of putting down an enemy and asserting personal or cultural superiority.[187] In the Athenian courts, for example, it functioned "by establishing a sense of collective 'in-group' consciousness between one of the litigants and the jurors, thus estranging his opponent from the group."[188] Comedy thus inhibits dangerous identification with contemptible characters by making them and their views seem offensive and/or trivial, thus excluding them from the group of the socially approved. In Platonic terms, if one cannot spend time in the company of something one admires without imitating it (*Rep.* 500c), then presumably one becomes *less* like what one despises. When applied to persons with whom one would otherwise identify, these distancing effects may serve the purposes of Miller's "mimetic irony" by opening up a space for self-criticism, just as the satire and invective of Aristophanic comedy may plausibly be seen as part of an attempt "to invite the *demos* to take a good hard look at itself – to reflect upon the ways in which the democratic government and its citizens can go awry."[189] In an anecdote that, though perhaps fabricated, has a plausible ring, Sokrates is said to have declared comic drama to be good for its victims, in so far as it makes fun of their faults (Diog. Laert. 2.36).

Plato often employs such distancing by treating characters with satirical contempt. He uses many comic devices for this purpose, from allowing certain characters to make fools of themselves intellectually to focusing on mundane details of clothing, physical appearance, behavior and deportment.[190] But his primary vehicle for satire is Sokrates' irony (qua participant or narrator), which often serves to humiliate and belittle his interlocutors in the eyes of the larger audience, even (or especially) when it passes unnoticed by its victims. The effectiveness

[187] For the maliciousness of comedy see Bergson 1914: 4–5, 139, 194–200 and cf. e.g. *HMaj.* 291e–292a, *Phileb.* 48a–50a, *Rep.* 395e, Arist. *EN* 1128a17–32. For laughter as a form of social control see David 1989. For Plato's awareness of humor as an index of societal values cf. *Gorg.* 485abc, *Rep.* 452a–e, 516e–517e, *Tht.* 172c, 174a–175b.

[188] Hall 1995: 56. Cf. also Gorg. DK 82 B12.

[189] Nightingale 1995: 183–4.

[190] See above, pp. 61–2, Brock 1990: 44–5, and cf. e.g. *HMin.* 368bc, *Prot.* 314c-316a, *Symp.* 185cde, 189a, 211e–214b. For the humorous character of concrete physical detail see Bergson 1914: 32–3, 164.

of such distancing may be seen from the number of Plato's readers who identify with Sokrates at the expense of his interlocutors, perceiving the latter as ridiculously stupid and conceited. This point has recently been made forcefully by Alexander Nehamas.[191] But Nehamas, writing within a tradition that derives from and privileges Sokrates' own values, overstates the complacency of Plato's readers. In my own experience, many of them are eager to resist Plato's manipulations of his characters, and are at least as likely to be alienated as won over by these prejudicial tactics. Be that as it may, Plato's own texts suggest a persistent uneasiness with the idea that comedy is adequate to contain the threat of mimetic pedagogy. Like tragedy, it is a dangerous thing, to be controlled and limited, both because it may encourage indecorous buffoonery and because the models it presents, being inferior ones, are intrinsically dangerous. Accordingly, in *Republic*, the guardians are not to laugh excessively (388e), people are not to be portrayed ridiculing each other (395e), and comedy is to be used only in small doses, to portray bad men (396d). In *Laws*, it is to be performed by slaves or foreigners, never citizens (816de).[192]

Another strategy for defusing the dangers of mimetic identification with "bad" characters involves placing them in contexts where the consequences of their actions and attitudes may be part of what is learned from the process of identification. In tragedy, highly transgressive characters usually end up dead, or at least suffering horribly (cf. *Laws* 838c). Aristophanes comically suggests the morally educative effects of such outcomes by claiming that the Athenian women stirred by Euripides' Sthenoboia to desire adultery killed themselves from shame (*Frogs* 1050–51). The permissible poetry of *Republic* shows the virtuous being rewarded and the wicked punished (392ab), and this is just what happens in the myths of both *Republic* and *Gorgias*, where such punishment is explicitly designed as an example to others.[193] On a more intellectual level, a similar effect may be produced by refuting negative characters and replacing their ideas with those of more admirable ones. Sokrates' primary targets are the conventional, the young, and those thought clever by themselves or others. Presumably Plato's audience for the most part also falls into these categories, and can therefore sympathize with such interlocutors. If they identify with a character who changes or learns in the course of the drama, they may perhaps undergo similar educational effects. For example, Thrasymachos is portrayed in *Republic* 1 as a serious threat,

[191] 1998: 38. Cf. Bergson's argument that vanity is the ideal trait for comic treatment (1914: 171–5).
[192] Cf. also *Phileb.* 48a–50a, *Rep.* 606c, *Laws* 934e–936b, Arist. *Pol.* 1336b12–23, and below, p. 234.
[193] *Gorg.* 525c, *Rep.* 616a; cf. also *Phd.* 107d–108c, 113d–114c.

but as the work progresses we see him worsted in argument and subsequently falling under Sokrates' spell. Those readers who resemble him may perhaps become angry, but then "tame" (cf. below, pp. 193–6); if they resemble Glaukon or Theaitetos, they will learn the same lessons they do – whatever those may be.

For those who remain unimpressed by these argumentative techniques for contextualizing and defusing negative characters, Plato has another powerful means of conveying a feeling of "poetic justice," using what I have called "historical irony" (above, pp. 32–3). Many prominent persons who appear in his pages flourishing or full of potential had, by the time of writing, incurred public opprobrium or come to a nasty end (e.g. Nikias, Charmides, Kritias, Aristotle of Thorae, Alkibiades, Polemarchos).[194] Well-known public figures may generate a sense of irony simply by their presence. But Plato often draws attention to the larger historical context, either explicitly – as when he mentions that young Aristotle became one of the Thirty Tyrants (*Parm.* 127d) – or more obliquely, as when Sokrates comments on the futility of self-control for the future life of Charmides, who was to be closely linked with the tyrannical regime (*Charm.* 175de). Our knowledge of these events simultaneously distances us from the characters, by giving us information they do not possess, which places us, like a dramatic audience, in a superior position, and at the same time points a philosophical moral. The effect must have been far stronger for Plato's contemporaries. It is further enhanced in certain dialogues by Plato's emphasis on chains of transmission, which draws attention to the continuing reputation of figures from the past.

Ultimately, however, all such contextualizing strategies for containing mimetic pedagogy fall foul of the fact that readers may choose to neglect these authorial signposts in their understanding of a character. Even Plato's most negative characters have always had their defenders.[195] Plato was certainly attuned to this possibility, since ancient writers, including himself, routinely ignore context in their interpretation of other texts. Like Sokrates in *Phaedrus*, they are concerned not so much with explaining stories as with *using* them to explain themselves and others (cf. *Phdr.* 229c–230a). They are therefore less interested in understanding a work

[194] Cf. e.g. Bruns 1896: 248–54; Arieti 1991: 55–6; Halperin 1992: 100; Rutherford 1995: 86, 93–6; Nehamas 1998: 41–2; Wolfsdorf 1998. For a more skeptical view see Irwin 1996: 346–9. Sokrates is, as always, a special case (above, p. 85).

[195] For a defense of many of Plato's more negatively characterized interlocutors see Beversluis 2000. For Kallikles see Dodds 1959: 387–91; Friedländer 1964–9: I.167; and cf. Aul. Gell. 10.22. For Thrasymachos see below, p. 235. For Alkibiades see Nussbaum 1986: ch. 6. For Euthyphro see Machle 1984.

on its own terms than in appropriating it, in whole or in part, for their own purposes. Accordingly, quoting out of context is standard ancient procedure. Demosthenes, for example, quotes Sophocles' tyrannical Kreon for patriotic ends (Demos. 19.246–50).[196] Plato's own characters are no exception. In *Symposium*, for example, Eryximachos misappropriates Heraclitus for his own purposes, and Alkibiades quotes Aristophanes' *Clouds* as a jocular compliment to Sokrates – despite the fact that Sokrates himself treats the play as a causal factor in his prosecution.[197] This led, among other things, to the practice of anthologizing uplifting passages from poets and other writers for educational purposes.[198] Both "contextual" interpretation and the "organic" interpretation of texts as wholes were late in coming and slow to develop.[199]

Moreover, though not unaware of the basic dramatic distinction between character and author,[200] Greek writers generally prefer to ignore it, holding the author responsible for all his characters' utterances.[201] Euripides, for example, is accused of impiety because of the words of one of his characters.[202] Plato's Sokrates likewise holds poets and dramatists accountable for all the sentiments uttered in their works.[203] Such practices are natural to a literary culture, whether oral or literate, based on a tradition of adaptation, appropriation and recirculation.[204] They also accord with traditional Greek assumptions of cultural unity.[205] Ironically, then, those modern interpreters who approach Plato's works piecemeal and appropriate them for their own use are most "Platonic" in spirit in their use of his texts – at least in so far as they acknowledge that this is what they are doing. But they cannot claim to be reconstructing Plato's meaning, or extracting the meaning (or *the* meaning) of his texts

[196] For further examples from the orators see P. J. Wilson 1996: 312–15.

[197] *Symp.* 187a, 221b, *Ap.* 18cd, 19c. Diog. Laert. 2.27 even turns *Clouds* 412–17 into a compliment (see Dover 1968a: 154). See further Halliwell 2000.

[198] Cf. Isoc. *Ad Nic.* 40–41; *Laws* 811a. For Homer see Ford 1997. For Hippias' anthology see below, p. 145. Xenophon even attributes the practice of anthologizing to Sokrates (*Mem.* 1.6.14).

[199] Ford sees traces of the latter in the mid-fifth century (1997: 102–6). Most argues that Sokrates' interpretation of Simonides in *Prot.* is the first example we have of a contextualizing interpretation (1994: 129–31). Another interesting exception is Hippias in *HMin.*, but the instability of his contextual interpretation of Achilles is shown by the way Sokrates undermines it (below, pp. 144–5).

[200] Cf. Gentili 1988: 109–10; Clay 1998; Halliwell 2000: 101.

[201] Augustine even alleges that Apuleius (as opposed to his character Lucius) claimed to have been turned into an ass (*Civ. Dei* 18.18). Cf. also Aristotle's notorious failure to distinguish between Plato and his Sokrates. A further consequence of the conflation of author with character was the construction of poets' biographies directly from their works (Lefkowitz 1981) which finds a modern analogue in the construction of Plato's intellectual biography from his dialogues.

[202] Arist. *Rhet.* 1416a28–34; for more examples see Hose 1998.

[203] See Halliwell 2000: 111–12. Cf. also Xen. *Mem.* 1.2.56–9.

[204] See Heiden 1991.

[205] See Segal 1994: 95–6.

as such, any more than Plato and his contemporaries thought they were interpreting the *Iliad* in an "organic" or contextual fashion.

Plato and his Sokrates are well aware of the dangers that this approach to texts poses to the integrity of dramatic characters, and indeed of the instability of all interpretation, as we shall see. Furthermore, none of these contextual strategies, though addressing more or less satisfactorily the dangers of identifying with negative characters, takes into account the other source of Platonic anxiety about mimesis, namely the dangers of passive identification per se. This concern may be clarified in part by distinguishing between two different attitudes towards tradition: literal-minded subservience versus interrogation and interpretation. These attitudes are reflected in broadly divergent outlooks towards education. Literal-minded subservience is embodied in the paternalistic/authoritarian tradition, which includes the passive imitation of models, mechanical application of rules, rote memorization, obedience to commands and exhortations, and submission to discipline, including corporal punishment. Typically, an uninterrupted discourse by an old or otherwise authoritative figure (teacher, poet, story-teller, nurse, parent or the laws themselves), is to be absorbed and reproduced by the compliant young, whose only task is to listen and remember.[206] Aged "paternal" figures, such as Nestor and Phoenix in Homer, tend to discourse at great and uninterrupted length.[207] Teachers are typically seen as knowledgeable, "wise" and "godlike" authorities (cf. *Tht.* 170ab). Students are the passive raw material, like wax or clay,[208] which the teacher moulds in his own image.[209] This is the education embodied in the old-fashioned "Just Argument" of Aristophanes' *Clouds*.[210] The connection with the idea of learning from example is obvious. In general, ancient Greek methods of instruction seem, to modern eyes,

[206] "Listening" as a mode of learning befits the oral poetic tradition. Cf. e.g. *Crat.* 396d, *Phdr.* 235cd, *Gorg.* 523a (with Dodds 1959 ad loc.) and see Perlman 1964: 156; Brisson 1998: 32–3; cf. also F. Wolff 1997: 40–41. For memorization cf. e.g. *Prot.* 326a, *Laws* 810e–811a. For the telling of tales by old to young cf. e.g. *Laws* 664d, *HMaj.* 285e–286a, *Prot.* 320c, *Rep.* 378c, *Tim.* 21ab and Brisson 1998: 62–3. For the authority of the father cf. *Soph.* 229e–230a and e.g. Aesch. *Supp.* 176–9, 991–3, Ar. *Clouds* 1434–5, 1468 (with Dover 1968a ad loc.). For the laws as agents of paternalistic authority cf. *Ap.* 24d, *Crito* 50c–51c, *Laws* 880d, *Prot.* 326cd.

[207] Cf. Jaeger 1945: 25–8. Nestor was renowned for his educational role (below, pp. 133–4).

[208] Cf. *Laws* 633d, 789e, Isoc. *Soph.* 18, Gorg. *Helen* 13, 15. On *Rep.* see below, pp. 214–15. For the plasticity of the child see Garland 1990: 81–3 and cf. T. Morgan 1998: ch. 7.

[209] Educators of all kinds, from philosophers to craftsmen, were seen as aiming to make their students like themselves. See Dover 1988: 155 and cf. *Gorg.* 449ab, *Prot.* 311d–312a, *Rep.* 500d, 540b, *Tht.* 180b.

[210] Cf. Nussbaum 1980: 50–67.

"tailor-made to stifle originality and self-expression, relying as they did on mimicry and memory."[211] Education was seen "as the transmission of techniques, not as the development of abilities which might issue in independent critical thought."[212] This remained the dominant educational model throughout classical antiquity.[213]

Besides simple paternalistic didacticism, the main vehicle for this mode of education, in its traditional form, is myth, primarily as enshrined in poetry.[214] The most privileged genre here is epic, in which inspiration fills the bard from an outside source and is transmitted by him to his listeners. This poetry embodies ethical examples to be imprinted on the student. Thus Xenophon's Nikeratos claims that his knowledge of Homer enables him to make people "better" by teaching them to resemble Homeric characters (*Symp.* 4.6). This process is more dependent on emotion than reason. The primary model for the effect of poetry is that of enchantment, whereby "the victim loses all awareness of himself and thus all power of judgment."[215] This "magical" effect is produced through pleasure – that of stories in general and poetry in particular,[216] which as we have seen is intrinsic to the functioning of mimetic pedagogy. The emotional power of poetry is further fostered by the mode in which it is traditionally consumed: through oral performance, often to mass audiences. This encourages collective emotion in a way that is liable to overwhelm critical judgment.[217] Poetic education is thus a process to which an active grasping for understanding is inimical. This anti-analytical quality is reflected in the previously-noted habit of attributing to quoted words their most immediate, superficial meaning, without attention to context. The irrationality of the process, and the passivity of the learner, are both captured by Plato's Kallikles, who derides traditional education as a form of moulding, "taming" by means of magic spells, and even enslavement (*Gorg.* 483e–484a).

The teaching of the sophists is often viewed by critics, both ancient and modern, as antithetical to the predominant patriarchal tradition (cf. esp. *Meno* 91b–96d). Nevertheless, there is considerable continuity between sophistic and traditional poetic education. In *Protagoras* the sophists as a group are given a Homeric coloring (314c–316a), and Protagoras

[211] Golden 1990: 65; cf. *Prot.* 324d–326e. [212] Dover 1988: 155. [213] See T. Morgan 1998.

[214] See e.g. Marrou 1956: 41–2; Rose 1992: 338 and cf. *Laws* 810e–811a, *Tim.* 21b, *Prot.* 325e–326a.

[215] Walsh 1984: 20; cf. also Parry 1992: ch . 8; Pratt 1993: 73–81.

[216] See e.g. *Laws* 665c, *Phdr.* 259abc, *Rep.* 607c; cf. also *HMaj.* 285e–286a, *Prot.* 320c, *Rep.* 413bc. For this aspect of the oral poetic tradition see Havelock 1963: 151–8; Gentili 1988: 39–42.

[217] Cf. *Rep.* 492bc. For the collective emotion of the Athenian dramatic audiences see above, pp. 80–81. On the link between passivity and audience size see Segal 1962: 108–9.

actually claims the ancient poets as sophists avant la lettre.[218] Though this is obviously a self-serving anachronism, the connections between the two kinds of teaching are stronger than is often realized, especially in Plato's representation. Plato's sophists are open to discoursing by means of question and answer, but they generally prefer long speeches, the authoritative mode of the paternalistic educator. In Hippias' "Trojan discourse," the aged and wordy Nestor probably advised the young Neoptolemos which Homeric hero to emulate. The sophist's mnemonic technique also has antecedents in both epic performance and the authoritative poet Simonides (below, pp. 141–2). Gorgias declares rhetoric – like Kallikles' view of traditional education – to be a mode of enslavement (*Gorg.* 452de). The Protagorean definition of knowledge as perception in *Theaetetus* posits the learner as a passive, undiscriminating recipient of impressions (151e–152c). And Plato's dominant characters repeatedly liken sophistic rhetoric, as well as poetry, to magic spells.[219] In the case of rhetoric, this is in part an effect of the use of extended discourse, which tends to induce passive acceptance in its audiences by discouraging analysis. Even Sokrates is allegedly "charmed" into silence by Protagoras' long speech.[220] As for the rest of the sophist's followers, he "enchants" them like the legendary poet Orpheus (*Prot.* 315ab).

The overlap between sophists and poets is embodied to some extent in the figure of the rhapsode. The word "rhapsode" was originally applied to oral poets themselves, including Homer.[221] But by Plato's time it primarily indicated the professional reciter of Homeric poetry. Like sophists, rhapsodes traveled from city to city, performing competitively in public. In addition to reciting the poet's verses, they would expound his meaning, in sophistic fashion.[222] Festivals provided a public arena where both types of performer could show off their expertise and display their intellectual wares (cf. *HMin.* 368b). These rhapsodic performances were an important vehicle for the dissemination of Homer's ethical influence. The *Iliad* and *Odyssey* were recited in full, competitively,

[218] *Prot.* 316d–317a; cf. also *Rep.* 492a–493b; *Gorg.* 501e–503a. For the sophists as heirs to the poets see Asmis 1992: 339–40; Notomi 1999: 130–3; V. L. Yates 1998: 102–16.

[219] For the "magic" of sophistry and/or rhetoric in Plato cf. e.g. *Crat.* 403e, *Euthyd.* 277de, 289e–290a, *Menex.* 234c–235c, *Soph.* 234c–235a, 241b, *Stat.* 291c, *Symp.* 203d and see further de Romilly 1975: 25–32.

[220] *Prot.* 328d; cf. *HMin.* 364b, *Symp.* 198bc, *Euthyd.* 276d. For the association of magic with extended discourse cf. also *Phd.* 114d.

[221] See Nagy 1996: ch. 3, 1999: 146–8 and cf. e.g. *Rep.* 600d.

[222] *Ion* 530a–d, 533c. On rhapsodes and their links to poets and sophists cf. *Prot.* 316cd and see further Jaeger 1945: 296; Flashar 1958: 21–6; Pfeiffer 1968: 16; Guthrie 1969: 42–3; M. Griffith 1990: 185–207; Murray 1996: 19–21; Shapiro 1998.

every four years at the major Athenian festival of the Panathenaea. And Xenophon's Nikeratos admits to having heard rhapsodes "nearly every day."[223] At such festivals excellence of mind (as well as body) was on display for the admiration, scrutiny and judgment of all, in keeping with the Homeric ideal of manhood, to be a "doer of deeds and a speaker of words."[224] The most obvious *difference* between the sophists and purveyors of traditional poetic education is the fact that the former charged substantial sums of money for their services.[225] In Platonic terms, payment plays back into the passive model of education by commodifying learning as an inert substance to be transmitted to anyone who can gain access to the teacher with the proper price, regardless of aptitude or intellectual engagement.[226] But successful poets and rhapsodes, even when not formally paid, made large sums of money through prizes and patronage.[227]

The familiarity of this picture of the sophists results in large part from the overwhelming – and overwhelmingly hostile – influence of Plato himself. But the non-Platonic evidence also suggests considerable continuity between sophistry and the poetic tradition. Like the traveling bards of that tradition, the sophists were outsiders, as opposed to integrated members of the polis.[228] Their competitive public performances were a natural outgrowth of the performative context of poetry.[229] At these performances, they would don the rhapsode's purple robe, "as though to emphasize their continuation of the functions of poets in earlier days."[230] They used poetry in general, and Homer in particular, for moral as well as rhetorical training.[231] Gorgias' defense of Helen, despite its sophistic argumentation, owes much besides its Homeric subject-matter to the poetic tradition, notably its emphasis on the instrumental role of pleasure in the quasi-magical power of the *logos*. Gorgias portrays this force

223 Xen. *Symp.* 3. 6 (a passage that attests to Sokrates' low opinion of rhapsodes); cf. also *Mem.* 4.2.10.
224 *Il.* 9. 443; cf. *HMin.* 364a. For the persistence in the sophists of these two kinds of complementary "contest" see Gorg. DK 82 B8 and cf. *Soph.* 225ab.
225 For the sophists' earnings cf. *HMaj.* 282d–e and see Kerferd 1981: 26–8; Blank 1985: 3–5.
226 *Euthyd.* 304bc; cf. *Prot.* 310de, 313c–314b, *Soph.* 224d. For the connection between money and passive modes of pedagogy see Nightingale 1995: 30–40, 47–55.
227 Gentili 1988: 158–67.
228 For the bard cf. *Rep.* 397e–398a and see Gentili 1988: 156.
229 See G. E. R. Lloyd 1987: 83–102.
230 Kerferd 1981: 29.
231 See Pfeiffer 1968: 35–8; Verdenius 1970: 9; Hall 1995: 45. For the sophistic use of legendary figures to purvey moralizing advice to the young see Prodicus' fable of the choice of Herakles (Xen. *Mem.* 2.1.21–34). Cf. also the Homeric works of Antisthenes, who may perhaps be Plato's target in *HMin.* (so Kahn 1996: 121–4). And note that the moralizing interpretation of Homer attributed to Hippias of Thasos by Aristotle (*Poet.* 1461a21–3) may belong to our Hippias (Freeman 1966: 383–4).

as a "drug" that "moulds" the passive listener from without, irrespective of whether it is in prose or verse (*Helen* 8–14).[232] It is true that the sophists used question-and-answer as well as extended discourse.[233] Their thought also included analytical elements and was often critical of received ideas (as parodically exemplified by the Unjust Argument of *Clouds*). But in practice, sophistic teaching made heavy use of straightforward lecturing and model speeches as exemplars, and was strongly authoritarian in tone.[234] Aristotle tells us that Gorgias and the professional teachers of eristic required their students to memorize model discourses, even when those discourses were in question and answer form – a practice he criticizes for failing to impart the underlying principles of their art.[235]

The affinity between sophists, poets and rhapsodes is dramatized by Plato in the person of the rhapsode Ion, who embodies the Homeric tradition and also has close intellectual links to the sophists. Like the sophists, he is concerned with such rhetorical matters as the probable (*eikos*, 540b) and the arousal of emotion (535e). Like the sophists, he wears an elaborate costume for his exposition of Homer (535d), and that exposition is referred to as an *epideixis* ("display") – the standard term for a sophistic rhetorical exhibition (*Ion* 530d, 541d; cf. below, p. 128). Despite his claim to be an interpreter of Homer, he accepts with equanimity Sokrates' suggestion that he is the passive conduit of an irrational divine possession, analogous to an iron ring in a chain suspended from a magnet, who passes on his inspiration to others in an equally mindless fashion.[236] Similarly, though Plato represents the sophists as engaged in apparently active analysis of poetry, he makes Sokrates dismiss even this as a form of passivity, since it concerns second-hand ideas: it is a practice befitting uneducated persons who cannot think or speak for themselves.[237]

In contrast both to the sophists and to the traditional, paternalistic model, Plato's dialogues promote, even as they embody, an anti-authoritarian mode of pedagogy. By removing the authoritative voice of the father, dialogue form stimulates active thinking rather than passive acquiescence. And his dominant character, Sokrates, challenges or inverts traditional pedagogical hierarchies by requiring the active intellectual

[232] On Gorgias' "magic" and his links to the poetic tradition see esp. Segal 1962; cf. also de Romilly 1975: ch. 2; Walsh 1984: 81–5; Parry 1992: 150–3; Gellrich 1994: 278–81.

[233] Cf. *Gorg.* 449bc, *Prot.* 329b, 334e–335c, *Soph.* 225b, 268b, *Tht.* 167d; see further Guthrie 1969: 41–2; Kerferd 1981: 32–4.

[234] Cole 1991: ch. 5.

[235] *Soph. El.* 183b36–184a8. Cf. Keuls 1978: 32; Cherubin 1993: 229–30.

[236] *Ion* 533d–535a; cf. *Crat.* 396d, 428c, *Phdr.* 235cd, 238cd, *Laws* 719cd.

[237] *Prot.* 347c–348a. Cf. also Isoc. *Panath.* 18.

engagement of both parties.[238] He favors active dialectical analysis over the long speeches of the sophists.[239] Nor is he influenced by the opinions of others unless they too follow his principles of active argument (cf. esp. *Crito* 46bcd). Though he does not rule out the possibility of finding a human authority that he could respect (cf. *Crito* 48a), in practice he calls into question even the most "obvious" received wisdom.[240] He does not even submit passively to the authority of Apollo, whose oracle he interprets, in a far from obvious fashion, as a command to inquire actively into the "wisdom" of himself and others (*Ap.* 21b–e). It is scarcely surprising that a mere mortal like Krito thinks the idea of advising him "ridiculous" (*Euthyd.* 304d).

Sokrates is dedicated not only to this personal search for understanding, but to stimulating an equally analytical, active understanding in others. His very denial that he is a "teacher" is predicated on the conventional understanding of teaching as the expository transmission of knowledge to a passive consumer, since he evidently does, in some *other* way, attempt to improve the citizens of Athens (*Ap.* 29d–30b). He does this, however, not by conveying information to his hearers, but by "stimulating" or "provoking" them into discussion.[241] The goal is not the passive absorption of external rules or models, but self-understanding and learning from within through dialectical interaction. This process is long and laborious, requiring many iterations, in contrast to sophistry's intellectual fast food, which can be carried away in a jar.[242] The brevity of dialectical question and answer, and its focus on one person at a time, enable Sokrates to adapt to and engage the individual in an active way impossible for an extended oration aimed at a mass audience.[243]

Besides exemplifying in practice an active, engaged mode of pedagogy, Plato's Sokrates repeatedly voices his opposition in principle to passive conceptions of learning. In *Meno*, for example, this distinction underlies his novel idea that learning is really recollection, something that is not

[238] See e.g. Brumbaugh and Lawrence 1972; Teloh 1986: 7, 104–5; Ferrari 1987: 70–81; Erler 1987: 60–77; Scolnicov 1988; Woolf 1997; Gordon 1999: 95–103; Griswold 1999a. Cf. also the contrast between learning from others and learning for oneself at *Lach.* 186a–187b.

[239] E.g. *Gorg.* 461e–462a, *HMaj.* 304a–d, *Prot.* 335a–336b. The elenctic mode is explicitly contrasted with paternal admonishment by the Eleatic visitor (*Soph.* 229e–230b).

[240] E.g. the justice of retaliation (*Crito* 49a–d), or the excellence of Athens' most respected statesmen (*Gorg.* 515c–517a).

[241] *Lys.* 223a, *Rep.* 329de. For the verb "provoke" (κινεῖν) (which can be sexual in meaning) cf. also *Tht.* 163a10, Xen. *Mem.* 4.2.2, Ar. *Clouds* 745. On Sokrates as teacher see esp. G. A. Scott 2000.

[242] *Prot.* 313c–314c; cf. *Euthyd.* 273d, 303c, e, *Gorg.* 455a, *Tht.* 201ab, and below, pp. 248 n. 262

[243] Cf. e.g. *Gorg.* 502cd. On Sokrates' preference for a small audience cf. Wardy 1996: 65–6, 75–6; see also above, p. 78 and below, p. 129.

imparted by a teacher but elicited from within. In *Symposium*, he jokingly regrets that wisdom cannot be transmitted passively, by siphoning or bodily contact (175d). One of his complaints against writing in *Phaedrus* is that it facilitates mindless learning from an external source, rather than true understanding from within the self (275ab). In *Theaetetus*, he contrasts his own "midwifery" with the sophists' methods (148e–151d).[244] Even in *Republic*, which reinstates many aspects of traditional education, the guardian children are to learn freely and playfully, rather than passively under compulsion (536d–537a). The requirement of engaged discussion, rather than passive transmission, is also reflected in Sokrates' (and Plato's) distrust of the verbal transmission of ideas in the absence of their author to take responsibility for them (above, p. 21).

These two contrasting models of pedagogy find counterparts in two different kinds of memory: rote memorization as contrasted with the active, reconstructive remembering of dialectic.[245] An accurate, retentive memory is obviously essential for dialectic, and is routinely attributed to Sokrates and other philosophically privileged characters, despite Sokrates' ironic protestations of forgetfulness (e.g. *Prot.* 334d).[246] But it must not be used in a passive or mechanical fashion, as it is by rhapsodes, sophists and their ilk. This distinction corresponds in interesting ways to that between the creative memory of the active oral poet who continues to develop new poetry, and the kind of passive, rote memorization required of the rhapsode who in classical times merely reproduces it, which may have played an important role in sophistic education.[247] As this parallel suggests, Plato's ambiguous attitude towards memory is bound up with his ambivalence towards writing. He tends to favor "not the memory of the written word, which is simply a static and retentive memory, but the creative memory of the oral literature which is vital and synonymous with thinking itself."

How, then, can we learn by imitating Plato's characters, yet do so in an active, critical fashion that escapes the passivity of mimetic pedagogy?

[244] Cf. also *Ep.* VII 344b, *Phdr.* 277e–278c, *Prot.* 314ab, 329ab, *Rep.* 345b, 491e–492d, 518bc, 532a–534d.

[245] Cf. *Phdr.* 275a, *HMin.* 369a, *Ion* 539e, *Phileb.* 21a–d, Xen. *Symp.* 3. 6, *Mem.* 4.1.2, 4.2.10; see further Teloh 1986: 151–5 and below, pp. 141–2.

[246] Cf. *Prot.* 336d, *Euthyd.* 272d, 275cd, *Stat.* 257b, *Tim.* 17b, 26bc. The form of *Rep.* and other dialogues narrated by Sokrates gives indirect testimony to his prodigious memory. Protagoras' rebuke of Sokrates for forgetfulness is exceptional (*Prot.* 350c; cf. also the irony of *Menex.* 236bc, *Meno* 71c).

[247] F. A. Yates 1966: 29–31. For the analogy with oral poetry see Notopoulos 1938, from whom the quotation below is taken (1938: 478); cf. also Gentili 1988: 6–8; Brisson 1998: 17–24, 39.

A possible solution may lie in distinguishing some of the various senses of the notoriously polysemic notion of mimesis or "imitation." In *Cratylus*, Sokrates distinguishes between mimesis as mere mimicry, and the imitation of a thing's essence (*ousia*) (422e–424a). I shall call these "slavish" and "structural" imitation respectively. In her work on *Statesman*, Melissa Lane draws a parallel distinction between "first-order" and "second-order" imitation. "First-order" mimesis "expects the superficial appearance of the copies to be quite similar to that of the model"; on this view the imitator copies the appearance and particular, externally observable behaviors of the model. "Second-order" mimesis, by contrast, "focuses on a structural feature which model and copy will instantiate in common even though the resulting appearance of each may be quite diverse." This requires not (just) slavish (first-order) imitation but intellectual analysis and understanding of central principles.[248] "Structural" imitation thus implies an awareness of the salient differences, as well as the similarities, between original and copy.[249] The structural imitator of persons will be like the judge in *Republic* who can see through someone's potentially deceptive surface right into their *ēthos* (576e–577a), as Alkibiades sees below the bizarre surface of Sokrates in *Symposium*.

In the Greek discourse of what I am calling mimetic pedagogy, these two kinds of imitation are not always easily distinguishable. On the one hand, mimicking superficial attributes is supposed to make one feel like the person imitated, and hence internalize and act on their attitudes and principles. Thus Aristophanes' Agathon dresses in women's clothing in order to feel more like a woman (*Thesm.* 148–56). On the other hand, if one has internalized a person's "essential" way of being, one is presumably likely to express this through recognizably similar external behaviors. Nevertheless, the distinction may be useful, especially for the way it matches the contrast between active and passive attitudes towards tradition and education. This parallelism suggests that, despite the deep suspicion of imitation that pervades Plato's works generally, structural, as opposed to slavish, imitation might be put to work for Platonic purposes in order to encourage an active, engaged form of learning. As we imaginatively enter into the roles of the various characters in his dialogues, we may passively assume their emotions, and thereby learn to be

[248] Lane 1998: 108–111, 157–9 (quotations from p. 158). For a comparable distinction see Jauss 1974: 294–5. The distinction between slavish and "constructive" imitation is adumbrated in Isocrates (Too 1995: 184–94). It lived on in Greek and Roman literary theory, which inherited both Plato's disapproval of illusionism and Aristotle's more profound conception of mimesis (see D. A. Russell 1979).

[249] For the importance of this see esp. Gonzalez 1998: ch. 5.

like them for better or worse without discrimination (slavish imitation). Or we may imitate them constructively – by occupying the role of participants in a philosophical argument – and thus become independent thinkers, at least in as far as they do so themselves. The latter form of imitation will lead to active learning in so far as we are imitating the basic principles exemplified by the characters' behavior (that one should learn through interactive discussion), rather than superficial features of their words or doings. It thus frees us to criticize the responses even of sympathetic characters, rather than passively accepting their acquiescence in the argument.

Only if Sokrates can escape functioning as a model for unreflective imitation can Plato avoid reinstating him as an authority figure in the traditional sense, and leave room for structural imitation of a kind that allows us to emulate him without trying to become him. Arguably, Plato tries to protect his readers from such superficial identification with his hero by various strategies. Some of these involve the particular use he makes of dialogue form. As we have seen, dramatic form itself invites engagement with different points of view. Such engagement could be a mindless, passive floating with each wind that blows. But as many critics have argued, Plato employs the form in such a way as to discourage this kind of response, and instead stimulate the consumer to make independent judgments of the issues and provide her own imagined contributions to the discussion. Thus William Johnson suggests that the dramatic frames distance the audience from the "allure" of mimesis, and Mitchell Miller that the dialogues are designed and constructed in such a way as to militate against passivity and produce a self-critical form of mimesis.[250] To these I would add that the very choice of question and answer form (as opposed to other kinds of dramatic interaction, such as debate) invites the consumer to provide her own answers to each question. This stimulating effect is clearest in the case of those dialogues that reach no positive conclusions, where the reader who desires such an outcome is forced to pursue it for herself. But even in the constructive works the reader's responses to specific questions may differ from those of the interlocutors. And the larger presentation of philosophical discussion as an open-ended activity endows even dialogues where positive ideas are aired with an inconclusiveness that constitutes an invitation to philosophize.

[250] W. A. Johnson 1998: 594; Miller 1999. Nussbaum argues that Plato erases from his dialogues the emotional power of drama (1986: 129–34). But she underestimates his own appeals to the emotions and other "poetical" effects (cf. Halliwell 1984: 55–8; Blank 1993; E. J. M. West 2000: 107–8).

Another possible avenue towards protecting the reader from passive imitation of Sokrates involves turning the assumptions of mimetic pedagogy on their head. If the capacity for self-recognition and self-criticism is among the qualities dramatized and recognized, it is possible that the consumer may learn to adopt a critical stance towards herself. Similarly, if I am drawn to identify with a skeptical or critical model, this should in principle lead me to replicate that character's critical evaluation of the world, including the world of the dramatic characters themselves. Thus "Euripides" in Aristophanes' *Frogs* claims that a benefit of his representation of intellectually restless characters was that he thereby taught the audience in turn to criticize and think for themselves (954–8).[251] If "Euripides" can claim this benefit for his representation of "Socratic" intellectuals, then Plato can presumably do the same. Arguably, then, if we identify with Sokrates in this way, we will be protected from passive learning by his own actively critical stance. To put it another way, to critique the dialogues and their characters is to employ a standard that they themselves offer us. Note that Sokrates' own character and ideas are not insulated from such critique by his "heroic" status. As with the epic tradition, Plato's paradigm is liable to the kinds of faults and difficulties that often accompany, and may even be intrinsic to, heroic greatness. Qua hero Sokrates not only exemplifies various models for doing philosophy, but is a site for their critical exploration. Even in the epic tradition, there is at times a tension between these two functions of the hero. In Sokrates' case this is exacerbated by the centrality of critical intelligence to his heroic persona.

This strategy likewise has its dangers. A critical or questioning outlook, if overly encouraged, can destroy other desirable qualities of character (unless, of course, such skepticism is all that one wishes to foster). This is exactly the charge brought by the traditionalist "Aeschylus" against "Euripides" in *Frogs* (1069–73), and Euripides, here and elsewhere in comedy, is linked in this respect with Sokrates.[252] What is to stop mimesis of such skeptical characters from escaping the control of the mimetic artist altogether? How, for example, are we to imitate Sokrates' intellectual autonomy without becoming so independent that we are no longer imitating him at all in any recognizable sense? What if such imitators generate in their own right such morally dangerous and potentially

[251] Walsh rightly contrasts "Aeschylus" and "Euripides" as representing a passive versus an active and detached role for the audience (1984: 85–97), but the position of "Euripides" depends just as much as that of "Aeschylus" on the audience imitating the behavior of his characters.

[252] Cf. *Clouds* 1371–9, 1415, *Frogs* 892–4, 1491–5, with Dover 1968a and 1993 ad loc.; Brock 1990: 40.

destructive arguments as those that Sokrates produces in *Hippias Minor* (below, p. 164)? Plato is well aware of the dangers of this kind of imitation, as can be seen most notably from *Republic*, where Sokrates himself prohibits young people from imitating provocative, questioning ways of a kind reminiscent of his aporetic self.[253] Plato's consciousness of this danger, and of the risks inherent in other strategies designed to foster critical attention to the text, is also apparent from the way the dialogues often (arguably) *dis*courage independent judgment by including a strongly dominant character or a controlling narrative voice, or both.

The pejorative representation of many minor characters, and the portrayal of others as little more than yes-men, reinforces this strong sense of Platonic uneasiness about pluralism. It is true that the presence of any interlocutor at all – however minimal or unpleasant – serves as a formal reminder of the availability of subject-positions other than that of the dominant character. As we have seen (above, p. 93), even the most obnoxious of Plato's characters have found their defenders. And generations of readers and teachers have found that even the most pusillanimous interventions, including apparently rote agreement, may stimulate a critical response to the dominant character's assumptions and claims, often spurring intellectual participation precisely by their inadequacy.[254] The principles of mimetic pedagogy would suggest that one's response to such interventions – whether poisonous or milque-toast – will depend on one's pre-existing likeness to the character who voices them. The more eager and intelligent the student, the more likely she is to identify with the livelier and more intelligent characters, and be irritated by the passivity or obtuseness of others. Conversely, the more Thrasymachean the reader, the more likely she is to sympathize with Thrasymachos, and be blind to his possible defects. But all such figures pale in comparison with the dominant characters (in particular Sokrates). In any case, their responses are as likely to serve that character's agenda as to challenge it. If we identify with Glaukon or Adeimantos, for example, we should find ourselves "fired with the ambition to help achieve justice on earth, and convinced that it can be done."[255] This is reinforced by the fact that, on the discursive level, the dominant speaker *never* encourages his audience to respond to "dramatic" texts by identifying with more than one point of view. On the contrary, the dialogues are pervaded by hostility towards such pluralism.

[253] *Rep.* 537d–539d; cf. also *Rep.* 487bcd, 497e–498c, *Phileb.* 15d–16a, *Tht.* 166a.
[254] Cf. Miller 1980: xv–xvi, 1985; Arieti 1991: 232–4.
[255] Burnyeat 1985: 36.

Furthermore, despite Plato's general contempt for the irrational "magic" of sophists and poets, and the spell it casts over its passive victims, he also appropriates that magic for Sokrates' *logoi*, even at their most rational and analytical.[256] According to Alkibiades, Sokrates' "unpoetical" *logoi* are not only educational, but bring a pleasure as powerful as the singing of the Sirens – mythical female creatures whose song overpowered men's minds (*Symp.* 216a).[257] In the poetic tradition these two functions – pleasure and education – are causally related (above, p. 96). But they also stand at least potentially in tension, as Plato's own critique of poetry makes clear (see especially *Rep.* 607d–608a). Sokrates habitually insists on the primacy of active, analytical reasoning. Yet Alkibiades, like the passive audience of Gorgianic rhetoric, is "enslaved" – deprived of autonomous agency – by the "magic" of Sokrates' words (215e, 219e; cf. 210d). And despite the powerful emotional effect of these (putatively rational) words on Alkibiades – both enchanting and shaming him – they do not suffice to engage him in active Socratic learning. Furthermore, the malicious pleasure derived from listening to Sokrates' refutations of others – a pleasure he himself acknowledges (*Ap.* 33bc) – may lure bystanders into a different kind of slavish imitation. If they appropriate Socratic modes of argument without his underlying seriousness of purpose, they will become indistinguishable from eristic sophists. In *Euthydemus*, we see an impressionable youth quickly picking up the tricks of the sophistic trade through imitation, without analysis or signs of understanding (303e–304a; cf. 300d). This is a form of slavish imitation that is, ironically, also structural, since it captures – at least from a Platonic perspective – an essential aspect of sophistry. Sokrates, of course, disapproves of this kind of learning. But there is no reason why his own techniques should be exempt from such imitators.

Arguably, Plato has foreclosed such slavish imitation of Sokrates by characterizing him as inimitable in his strangeness and his paradoxical nature. Moreover his characteristic irony renders him opaque and therefore inimitable, in so far as he is incomprehensible to others. His peculiar emotional make-up also militates against audience identification.

[256] Cf. *Charm.* 155e–157c, *Crito* 54d, *Meno* 79e–80b, *Phd.* 78a, 114d, *Rep.* 358b, 607e–608a, *Symp.* 215c, *Tht.* 149cd, 157c; see further de Romilly 1975: 32–7; Belfiore 1980; Gellrich 1994; Wardy 1996: 77–80. *Theages* 130de seems to ascribe a quasi-magical power to physical proximity to Sokrates, but this is not paralleled in works more securely attributed to Plato (D. Tarrant 1958; the dialogue's authenticity is defended by Cobb 1992).

[257] For the pleasure aroused by Sokrates' *logoi* cf. also *Ap.* 23c, 33bc, *Phd.* 58d, *Symp.* 173c, *Gorg.* 458d. Alkibiades uses the verb κηλεῖν ("charm") (*Symp.* 215c), used elsewhere for magic spells (Parry 1992: 24), and by Sokrates for the "magic" of poetry and rhetoric (e.g. *Prot.* 328d, *Rep.* 601ab, *Euthyd.* 289e–290a).

Sokrates eschews normal human emotions, reserving the warmth of his feelings primarily for philosophy. This makes him difficult for ordinary people to empathize with, thus depriving mimetic pedagogy of its emotional foundation.[258] If one is both to identify emotionally with Sokrates, and at the same time to imitate him structurally, it must be by sharing his own most powerful emotion – his *erōs* for the impersonal processes of argument.[259] In Plato's representation, such "triangular desire" is indeed intrinsic to the imitation of Sokrates.[260] The powerful emotional effect that he exerts on his followers induces at least some of them to devote themselves passionately to philosophy, from which their pleasure henceforward derives.[261] But such characters tend to project this *erōs* onto Sokrates himself, equating him with philosophy as the object of desire.[262] Aristodemos in *Symposium* is described as one of Sokrates' most passionate lovers (*erastai*), and Alkibiades says Sokrates has the same effect on himself and many others (*Symp.* 173b, 222ab). Plato encourages such desire for Sokrates in the reader as well, through his seductive powers of representation.[263] Like Ion's audience, we are apparently the latest link in a chain held together by the "magnetic" power of Sokrates' *logoi*, as transmitted by the "divine" Plato and his own source of inspiration, Sokrates. But what is to stop this *erōs* from creating a slavish dependence on Sokrates personally that militates against structural imitation and a desire for analytical argument?

The problem is exacerbated by the fact that Plato renders Sokrates uniquely memorable not only by means of his distinctive intellectual style, but also through various external behaviors. These peculiarities, whose primary purpose is to serve as outward tokens of Sokrates' individuality, both encourage emotional identification and make him quite easily imitable in a superficial or slavish fashion.[264] There is little to prevent admirers who are unable to imitate his mysterious interior from mindlessly copying these exterior behaviors, i.e. from being lured into slavish imitation of Sokrates by the wealth of individual detail that

[258] Cf. esp. *Phd.* 58d–59b, 117cde. For the untragic character of Sokrates' emotions in general, and in *Phd.* in particular, see Hirzel 1895: 225–30; Raphael 1960: 80–6; Halliwell 1984: 55–8; Nussbaum 1986: 133–4; Vlastos 1991: 233–5; Gilead 1994: ch. 1.

[259] Cf. *Euth.* 14c, *Gorg.* 481d, *Phdr.* 227d, 228b, 230de, 266b, *Rep.* 495bc, 501d, *Tht.* 146a, 169c; Halperin 1986: 71–2.

[260] For this concept see Girard 1965. It is applied to the Homeric imitation of *paradeigmata* by Rabel 1997: 207–8.

[261] Cf. e.g. *Symp.* 173bc, *Phd.* 58d.

[262] Compare the way Aristophanes' Dionysos expresses his yearning for better poetry as an erotic desire for Euripides (*Frogs* 52–72).

[263] Cf. Kahn 1983: 119–20; duBois 1985: 101–2.

[264] On the way in which concrete detail creates involvement in an audience see Tannen 1989: ch. 5.

surrounds him. This is exemplified in Plato's text by Socratic wannabes like Apollodoros and Aristodemos, who parrot Sokrates' words and copy such idiosyncrasies as his shoelessness.[265]

The goal of such admirers is, presumably, to become like Sokrates in more fundamental ways. But Plato never represents anyone as learning how to be authentically Socratic by imitating him in such a fashion. Such imitators typically make no autonomous intellectual contribution to the dialogues, confining themselves to repeating Sokrates' words verbatim, i.e. employing rote memorization without analysis. In character, the agitated Apollodoros is the antithesis of Sokrates' toughness and emotional restraint.[266] Despite their efforts to imitate Sokrates, such admirers are, like Ion, no more than passive conduits for his *logoi*. Moreover this kind of imitation is intrinsically comic, in so far as it focuses on concrete physical details, such as Aristodemos' short stature and bare feet (173b; cf. above, p. 91). The humorous tenor of such details is not cancelled, as it is with Sokrates, by a correspondingly extraordinary intellect and imagination. In this respect, Plato seems to be making fun of one kind of actual response to the historical Sokrates. Fifth-century comedy already mocked the way students imitated Sokrates' appearance and mannerisms,[267] and admirers imitated his personal behavior in his lifetime and for centuries afterwards.[268]

There is, of course, a special irony in imitating Sokrates of all people in this fashion, since the central qualities of character betokened by his external peculiarites include intellectual and moral autonomy, independence from authority, and resistance to the passive imitation of existing models.[269] Successful imitation of the essential Sokrates must result in independent thought and action. To imitate Sokrates is therefore ipso facto

[265] *Symp.* 173b; cf. *Phdr.* 229a. Though Phaidros is shoeless only by chance, he too has much in common with the superficial Socratic imitators (see Ferrari 1987: 4–9, 27–9). Cf. also the comic figure of Euthyphro, who sees a kinship between himself and Sokrates, is independent-minded and eccentric by Athenian standards and, like Sokrates, does not mind being laughed at (*Euth.* 3bc); cf. also Beversluis 2000: 133 (on Nikias) and Michelini 2000a (on the comic resemblance to Sokrates of the sophists in *Euthyd.*).

[266] See esp. *Phd.* 117d, *Symp.* 173d. On Aristodemos and Apollodoros see further de Vries 1935; Penwill 1978: 166–7; Steiner 1996: 104; Blundell 1992c: 131; Shankman 1994: 17–18; Nightingale 1995: 117–18; G. A. Scott 2000: 4, 21–3; Rowe 2001a.

[267] Cf. *Birds* 1280–83, *Clouds* 500–504, 834–7.

[268] See Clay 1994: 25; cf. also Eunapius 501–4. For the superficial imitation of various philosophers see Zanker 1995: 75 and cf. Plut. *Mor.* 26b, 53cd; Philostr. *VS* 587; Athen. 9.370c). Aristotle mentions disapprovingly attempts at superficial imitation of the "great-souled man" (*megalopsuchos*) (*EN* 1124b1–5).

[269] This problem is a central theme of Nehamas 1998, who focuses on what I am calling "structural" imitation (cf. esp. 11, 97–8, 185–6).

to be un-Socratic, in so far as he himself imitates no human being. What distinguishes an Apollodoros from a Sokrates is precisely the fact that he places Sokrates on a pedestal (172c–173d) – a place where Sokrates himself locates no one, not even Apollo. The paradox resembles a moment in *Monty Python's Life of Brian*. Brian, the film's hero, is being pursued by a huge crowd of fanatical admirers, who imitate him just as the Socratic wannabes imitate Sokrates, by repeating his words and mimicking his appearance. (Like Aristodemos, one of Brian's disciples takes off a shoe in imitation of the master, who has lost one of his sandals.) Brian desperately tries to shake off these followers, who hang on his every word, by shouting out to them, "You've all got to work it out for yourselves." His followers all shout back in chorus, "Yes, we've got to work it out for ourselves!" Similarly, to do exactly as Sokrates does (slavish imitation) militates against adopting the autonomy that lies at the heart of who he is (structural imitation).

In Aristodemos Plato shows us one way in which *erōs* directed towards Sokrates may fail to lead to structural imitation. He shows us another in the person of Alkibiades, whose *erōs* for Sokrates does not prevent him from abandoning Sokrates' company. Alkibiades is represented by Plato as the supreme example of philosophical potential gone to waste. He also exemplifies the further irony that those Platonic characters who assert their independence from Sokrates are in general the most engaging to the reader. This is true intellectually as well as personally. The most talented philosophers among Sokrates' interlocutors are all anti-Socratic to varying degrees (Thrasymachos, Protagoras, Gorgias). As Sokrates observes in *Republic*, the most exceptional natures, when nurtured in a less than ideal state, end up in the most spectacular failure, whereas an insignificant nature achieves nothing great, for better or worse (495a–496a).[270] If Alkibiades is the former, Aristodemos is the latter. Between them, they dramatize the tension between the Platonic appropriation of traditional poetical techniques and Sokrates' own rejection of passive pedagogy.

It is a curious fact, remarked on since antiquity, that the most important followers of Sokrates known to us from other sources are excluded from any significant role in Plato's dialogues.[271] Such figures – including Plato

[270] Many critics have thought that Plato has Alkibiades in mind here (cf. *Alc. 1*. 104abc, 135e). Cf. also *Rep*. 518e–519b, Xen. *Mem*. 4.1.3–4.

[271] Cf. Diog. Laert. 3.34, Kahn 1996: 5 n.; cf. also Riginos 1976: 96–117. The main Socratics, as listed by Diog. Laert., are Plato, Xenophon and Antisthenes; in the second rank are Aeschines, Phaedo, Eukleides and Aristippos (Diog. Laert. 2.47). Of these, only Phaedo and Eukleides

himself – might perhaps have offered more formidable or persuasive examples of Socratic imitation than Aristodemos or Alkibiades. But this would have detracted not only from Sokrates' heroic uniqueness, but from Plato's own unique role as Sokrates' heir par excellence. For his readers, the problem of imitating Sokrates is built into dramatic form by the assumptions of mimetic pedagogy. But for Plato himself, the problem was slightly different. As an admirer of Sokrates the man, whom he represents as committed to active, autonomous learning, how was Plato to find a non-passive way of imitating and hence immortalizing his hero without compromising his uniqueness? How was he to carry on Sokrates' philosophical legacy while being somebody quite different? He did so in part by choosing to live a very different kind of life from Sokrates, exemplifying in his own person the avoidance of slavish imitation. He distanced himself from Athenian democratic culture, not only by eschewing local politics to a far greater degree than Sokrates, but by moving the site of philosophic activity from the public, democratic space of the *agora* to the private sanctuary of the Academy, thereby becoming the founder of an exclusive, institutionalized mode of pedagogy.[272] In contrast to Sokrates' avowed preference for Athens, Plato traveled frequently, attempting to educate non-Athenians in their own land.[273] Remarkably, for a man of his class and culture, he never married or fathered legitimate offspring. He thus turned his back, like the ideal philosopher of *Theaetetus*, on the central institutions that embedded a man in both *oikos* and *polis*.[274]

All of this distances Plato from the hero of his own works. But it is the decision to write that distinguishes him most sharply not only from Sokrates, but from those Socratics who imitated him by writing nothing down.[275] Plato draws special attention to his own departure from Sokrates in this respect not just by writing, but by writing Sokrates' disapproval of writing (*Phdr.* 275cde). The written nature of his works allows him to reproduce Sokrates in his own way, planting the seed of his "father"'s immortality by "writing" him in a different sense, in the minds of future generations.[276] But it also enables him to reciprocate Sokrates' formative "paternal" influence. As author he not only creates Sokrates'

appear among Plato's dramatis personae, and not in dominant or intellectually powerful roles (on Eukleides see below, pp. 306–7).

272 See Ober 1998: 186; Nails 1995: 213–15.

273 For the evidence see Guthrie 1975: 12–32.

274 Still more remarkably, there is no record of his participating in warfare, but this is doubtless accidental. On the philosopher of *Tht.* see below, pp. 289–91.

275 Cf. Clay 1994: 25, 28.

276 Cf. *Phdr.* 276e–277a, 278ab; Brann 1967: 110; Griswold 1986: 224, 233–4; Sayre 1995. On imagery of writing in the mind see Steiner 1994: 100–110.

conversations but controls them in a way no oral interlocutor ever could. Writing enables him, for example, to locate the oral Sokrates in his local milieu, and at the same time to free him from these limitations so that he can reach the universal audience implied by the written word. At the same time, dialogue form allows him to express in his own intellectual practice certain essential characteristics of his Sokrates, specifically the eschewal of personal authority and of an authoritarian pedagogy. He thus, in his own way, establishes himself simultaneously as Sokrates' rival, "father," and most talented "son," and as a rebel against the authoritative status with which he himself has endowed him.[277] Structural imitation of Sokrates thus enables Plato to create himself at the same time as reproducing both of them by fathering his immortal *logoi*.

There is a further sense in which Plato evades slavish imitation of Sokrates. By declining to speak in his own voice or include himself as a character in the dialogues, he refuses to supply us with a portrait of himself of the kind that might encourage us to copy him personally in a mechanical or unquestioning way. Any first-person discourse – even a subliterary treatise, like the surviving works of Aristotle – provides an oblique personal portrait of the speaker qua implied author. And some authors, like Isocrates, explicitly employ self-revelation as a pedagogical vehicle.[278] Plato, by contrast, never overtly constructs or reveals himself through his discourse. One problem with a developmentalist approach to his writings is that it ignores this authorial resistance to pedagogical mimesis, by attempting to recover Plato's own intellectual and/or psychological biography, in other words to recapture his personal *ēthos*.[279] Indeed, this resistance is ignored by anyone who treats the dialogues like treatises, taking the author's representations as expressive of his own persona in any straightforward way. There remains, of course, a larger sense in which the very choice of dialogue form, and the particular uses Plato makes of it, do portray his own persona, representing him as complex and conflicted, a ventriloquizer of many styles and voices.[280]

[277] For some thought-provoking observations on this paradoxical relationship see Derrida 1987.

[278] Too 1995: 190.

[279] Cf. Howland 1991: 197, 204. Gerson explicitly complains that an "anti-mouthpiece" approach "discourages us from trying to know the mind of the philosopher who wrote the dialogues" (2000: 208).

[280] On the form of Plato's writings as expressive of a complex, ever-regenerating self see Merlan 1947: 423–5. His *poikilia* (above, p. 67) also has a "democratic" valence (cf. Monoson 2000: 223–6). In this sense Plato constitutes himself, like his Sokrates, as a "democratic" figure (cf. Euben 1996: 343–54). Cf. the claim of the comic "Euripides" that he is "democratic" because he gave women and slaves a voice in his plays (Ar. *Frogs* 948–52). Note too Plato's remarkably detailed knowledge of various crafts (cf. Guthrie 1978: 164 n. 1; Friedländer 1964–9: III.251; Burford 1972: 130).

Qua superauthor, however, he resists any simple or authoritative form of imitation.

This resistance has been successful, in so far as no later imitations of Plato have been truly comparable to his own works. Nonetheless, innumerable attempts have been made to imitate him qua writer, and qua writer of Sokrates. His influence on the Socratic afterlife can be felt as early as his contemporary Isocrates, who appropriates the Sokrates of *Apology* to construct his own verbal memorial in *Antidosis*.[281] Plato the appropriator of tradition fast became the appropriated, thus sealing his canonical status and success in rivaling the influence of Homer, both as a "heroic" author in his own right,[282] and through the overwhelming influence of his philosophic hero.

[281] See Too 1995: 192–3; Ober 1998: 260–63 and cf. Nightingale 1995: ch. 1. Isocrates' insistence on the unique form or *atopia* of this work is a burlesque of Socratic strangeness (cf. Ober 1998: 257–8).

[282] Cf. [Longinus] 36.2 and see Segal 1987; North 1991: 214–19.

CHAPTER 3

The elenctic Sokrates at work: Hippias Minor

The Platonic corpus includes a series of striking portraits of Sokrates at work using a method commonly referred to as "the elenchus." "Elenchus" (testing, interrogation, refutation) is only one of the words used by Plato for Sokrates' activities, and its use as a technical term has become contested.[1] But it is not necessary to commit oneself to a specific or technical account of his methods in order to identify the elenctic Sokrates, with reasonable clarity, as the figure of the *Apology*, who tests those reputed to be wise, affirms his own ignorance, and reaches few, if any, positive results. Whatever term we choose to describe his use of question and answer, it functions as "a gadfly-sting designed to instill *aporia* in his interlocutors, to stir up the appetite for philosophy, and to show the audience (including the readers) that those who pretend to wisdom . . . are not really wise."[2]

Plato's techniques for characterization are particularly important in his representations of this figure at work, not just because of Sokrates' own peculiarities but because of the ad hominem nature of his approach, which makes the dramatic delineation of his interlocutors especially significant. This Sokrates examines not just arguments but individual people, in ways that cast doubt not merely on their beliefs, but on the personality, way of life, and social roles that condition those beliefs and are in turn conditioned by them. His method is therefore intrinsically ad hominem in a peculiarly personal way.[3] And in so far as his approach requires a person to have some particular expertise, or at least experience, to be scrutinized, his victims are ipso facto individualized. Accordingly, if the force of his method is to be fully appreciated, the interlocutor's

[1] See most recently G. A. Scott 2002. [2] Kahn 1992: 252.

[3] Cf. *Ap.* 29e, *Lach.* 187e–188a, *Gorg.* 472bc, 474a, 475e–476a, *Prot.* 331c, 333c. On the personal character of the elenchus see Robinson 1953: 15–16; Vlastos 1983a: 36–8; Kahn 1983; Teloh 1986; Seeskin 1987; Nails 1995: 198–202; Rappe 1995; Balaudé 1997a: 244–9; Gordon 1999: 21–33. Clay prefers the expression *ad animam* to *ad hominem* since the latter phrase imports some misleading modern connotations (2000: 159–60).

particular character – those aspects of his life and personality that make him respond as he does – must be made present to the reader. The resources of dramatic characterization enable Plato to accomplish this in a particularly compelling way. They also allow him to provide an economical and effective practical illustration of the elenctic Sokrates' responsiveness to the character and circumstances of the individual, thereby conveying a Platonic awareness of the uniqueness of each interlocutor and of the resulting interaction.[4]

A related function of characterization in these conversations is the role it plays in dramatizing Sokrates' constant efforts to identify promising philosophical talent.[5] By inviting us to evaluate the intellectual potential of his dramatis personae, as grounded in their personal qualities and circumstances, Plato makes us a party to the Socratic search for authentic philosophical potential – for someone who may either share his "wisdom" or serve as an effective partner in the quest for truth. This method is rooted in and hence exposes, for better or worse, the individual traits of the interlocutor. The pressure of Socratic questioning brings to light those qualities of character that determine the capacity of each respondent both to profit from Sokrates and his methods and to contribute to the success of the divine mission, expounded in *Apology*, which drives him to try to discover who is really wise (21b–23b). The aporetic dialogues dramatize his generally unsuccessful attempts to do this. Plato thereby provides us with a portrait-gallery of individual Socratic respondents that demonstrates the many and varied human failings – whether moral, intellectual, or circumstantial – which interfere with their ability to respond positively to the Socratic challenge.

In this chapter I shall use *Hippias Minor* to show how Plato puts characterization to work in these various ways. I choose this dialogue as exemplary not only because of its elenctic character, and its vividly characterized participants, but because of its concern on the discursive level with the educational value of traditional literary figures. An integral part of Plato's project generally is to come to terms with such heroic characters as Achilles and Odysseus and their pervasive cultural influence (cf. above, p. 85). To this end he employs various

[4] For this aspect of Sokrates cf. *Alc.* 1. 114a, *Meno* 75d, 86d, *Phdr.* 270bcd, 276a, *Prot.* 333e. Cf. also Ar. *Clouds* 478–80, Xen. *Mem.* 4.1–3, and see further Schaerer 1969: 48–50, 57–62; Teloh 1986; Coventry 1990. But the extent of such adaptation should not be exaggerated. He "always says the same things" (*Gorg.* 490e; cf. 482a, 491b), and makes his interlocutors play his game, by his rules (cf. Roochnik 1990: 164–85), sometimes threatening to abandon an uncongenial discourse (*Prot.* 335c–336a; cf. *Gorg.* 461e–462a, *Ion* 530d).

[5] Cf. e.g. *Charm.* 153d–155b, *Tht.* 143d.

strategies, including critiquing such figures, co-opting them for his own purposes, and supplanting them with different models for our emulation or avoidance. In *Hippias Minor*, I shall argue, he does all these things. And one way in which he does them is by characterizing his own dramatis personae in ways that relate them to the discursive exploration of traditional literary models. In this dialogue, then, Plato's attitudes towards literary character and its place in education inform both his philosophical concerns and his own literary practice in a fundamental way. In general, as we have seen, Plato shows a broad awareness of the potential influence of his characters on an audience (above, pp. 82–4). But in this dialogue the issue is more specifically framed by the Homeric context, and the internal paradigms of literature and pedagogy that it implies. The interplay between discursive and dramatic levels – in this case the discussion of Homer's characters as ethical models, and the impact of Plato's own characters on his audience – is characteristic of Plato, and we shall see it in other dialogues too.

THE ELENCTIC SOKRATES

I begin by sketching in broad strokes the character of the elenctic Sokrates, which is inseparable from his philosophical methods and concerns. This picture is based primarily on the aporetic dialogues and *Apology* (in which Sokrates describes his methods), but includes citations from other works where they coincide in their portrayal of Sokrates. It should be emphasized that this general picture is not intended to be that of the historical Sokrates, or to be entirely consistent in all dialogues, even the elenctic ones, which in any case cannot be clearly demarcated.[6] It is rather a fuzzy outline of one of Sokrates' most important Platonic avatars, against which the Sokrates of specific dialogues may be examined in greater detail.

The elenctic Sokrates is primarily interested in questions concerning virtue, knowledge and happiness. According to *Apology*, he spends his time exhorting others to care for such matters (*Ap.* 29de), i.e. his discourse has a protreptic dimension. But Plato more often portrays him examining his interlocutor's pre-existing views. Sometimes the conversation focuses on a general issue (*Ion*), or a practical decision (*Crito*). More often it starts from the question "what is x?" (where x is a moral term such as "piety" or "justice"), on the principle that one cannot find out what

[6] E.g. *Euthyd.*, *Lys.* and *HMaj.* all lack certain elenctic features but share in others (cf. Vlastos 1983a: 57–8, 1991: 115–7; Kahn 1992: 245–8; Irwin 1993: 3–4).

something is like until one knows what it is.[7] Typically, Sokrates elicits several answers to this question from one or more interlocutors, each of which is critiqued and demolished in turn. The interlocutor's first suggestion is often a list of examples, rejected by Sokrates because it does not pick out what these various cases have in common. In most cases, Sokrates' refutations take the form of uncovering inconsistencies in an interlocutor's set of beliefs. In characterological terms, the goal is to produce a more coherent belief-set, "pinning down" the interlocutor, and making him more "stable" or "uniform."[8] In order for this process to be effective, Sokrates requires that the interlocutor both give his own opinion – as opposed, for example, to that of some authority figure[9] – and answer sincerely.[10] This "sincerity requirement" may be less a matter of expressing deeply-held convictions than "saying what one thinks, now, about the issue in question."[11] And such assent may often be less strongly asserted than Sokrates takes it to be.[12] In principle, however, sincere assent remains basic to the educational aspects of the elenchus.

The predominant tone of elenctic testing is negative, the method ad hominem, and the results inconclusive. Sokrates does express some positive views, especially certain firmly held ethical convictions and a commitment to rational argument,[13] and many of his questions are strongly suggestive of other underlying assumptions or beliefs. But such Socratic views are represented neither as knowledge, nor as resulting – at least in any obvious way – from elenctic inquiry.[14] He repeatedly disavows intellectual authority, denying that he is a teacher or has substantive moral knowledge.[15] To be sure, his admirers view his company as educational (cf. *Lach.* 183bcd, 200cd), and he is concerned to benefit others. But though others may consider him wise, the only "wisdom" he will acknowledge is an awareness of his own ignorance (which admittedly makes him wiser than anyone he has ever met).[16] In line with this denial of knowledge he eschews expository discourse, especially in the form of long speeches, preferring instead to ask short questions to which the respondent supplies brief answers.[17] This also enables him to adapt his

[7] E.g. *HMaj.* 304de, *Gorg.* 448e, *Meno* 71b, 100b, *Rep.* 354b; for detailed discussion see Benson 1990.
[8] Cf. e.g. *Euth.* 11bcd, 15b, *Ion* 541e. [9] Cf. e.g. *Charm.* 161c, *HMin.* 365cd, *Phdr.* 270c, 275bc.
[10] Cf. e.g. *Alc.* 1. 113abc, *Crito* 49cd, *Euth.* 9d, *Gorg.* 495a, 500bc, *HMin.* 375d, *Ion* 535b, *Lach.* 193c, *Prot.* 331cd, *Rep.* 337c, 346a, 349a, 350e. On the exceptions see Irwin 1993; Sayre 1995: 238–9; Nails 1995: 92–5; and below, pp. 182–3.
[11] Rowe 2001b: 1. [12] Beversluis 2000: ch. 2.
[13] E.g. *Ap.* 29bcd, 37bc, 41d, *Crito* 49cde, *Lach.* 194cd, *Meno* 81de, 86b, *Rep.* 339b, 345ab.
[14] See Kahn 1992: 245–8. [15] E.g. *Ap.* 33ab, *HMin.* 372bc. [16] *Ap.* 20c–23b; cf. *Ion* 532d.
[17] E.g. *Gorg.* 447bc, 449bc, 461d–462a, *HMin.* 364b, 373a, *Prot.* 334c–338a, *Rep.* 348ab.

discourse to the particular characteristics of each interlocutor. In the course of his investigation into the views of others, Sokrates does sometimes speak at length, but such speeches are usually hedged with disclaimers or other evasions of personal authority.[18]

The elenctic Sokrates' methods are underpinned by a commitment to several interrelated kinds of consistency, including the matching of words with deeds,[19] the internal and external agreement of questioner and answerer,[20] refusal to change one's beliefs without good reason, and the consistency of rational argument, which in turn generates both internal consistency, external agreement, and intellectual authority.[21] The interconnection of these various kinds of consistency is shown clearly in *Crito*, where Sokrates' refusal to change his mode of argument leads directly to his death (46bc). They are also linked by certain moral implications: consistency of word with word and word with deed underlie the trust, loyalty and reliability that make possible human relationships in general, and the effective functioning of Sokrates' methods in particular. Interpersonal consistency has a positive valence in so far as like-mindedness (*homonoia*) and likeness itself are associated with *philia* ("friendship") and cooperation, whereas inconsistency and change are equated with irrationality, childishness, diseased mental states, lying and untrustworthiness.[22]

Socratic testing is predicated on the interlocutor's prior "wisdom," of which it aims to disabuse him, and it achieves its effects by undermining his confidence. The usual effect on the interlocutor is one of confusion, "dizziness" or bewilderment (*aporia*).[23] Sokrates acknowledges that this upsets people,[24] but deems the infliction of such distress to be central to

[18] E.g. *Crito* 50a, *Gorg.* 465d–466a, 519de.

[19] See e.g. *Ap.* 32a, *Lach.* 188cde, 193cd, *Meno* 86b and cf. Xen. *Mem.* 1.3.1. On this aspect of Sokrates see further Kahn 1983: 119; Teloh 1986: 6–7, 10, 54–6; J. S. Turner 1993: 73–5; Gonzalez 1998: 25.

[20] For the homology between internal and external agreement (i.e. self-consistency and agreement with other persons) cf. *Alc.* 126cd. See also *Rep.* Bk 4, plus the homology between the multiplicity of democracy and the multiplicity of the democratic man. For Plato's use of external dialogue to represent internal dialogue see below, pp. 268–9.

[21] Cf. e.g. *Alc. 1.* 111b, 113bc, 116e–118b, *Ap.* 21d, 27a, *Crito* 46bc, *Gorg.* 472bc, 460e–461a, 466e, 482abc, 490e, 491b, *Meno* 95b–96b, *Prot.* 361abc.

[22] *Crito* 49ab, *Gorg.* 527d, *HMin.* 372e–373a; cf. *Soph.* 242a, *Stat.* 283b. For contempt provoked by disagreement cf. *Crito* 49d, *Rep.* 590d. For the positive valuation of consistency and stability see also below, p. 266, and on likeness and *philia* see below, p. 284.

[23] For *aporia* see esp. *Meno* 80abc and below, p. 122. For intellectual "dizziness" cf. *Crat.* 411b, *Laws* 892e, *Lys.* 216c, *Phd.* 79c, *Soph.* 264c, *Tht.* 155c.

[24] For the hostility aroused by Sokrates see e.g. *Ap.* 22d–23a, 31a, *Meno* 95a, *Tht.* 151c. In *HMaj.* Sokrates acknowledges the perception that others have of him by portraying his "relative" or alter ego as hostile and abusive (304cde). In the later tradition, he is even said to have provoked physical assault (Diog. Laert. 2.21).

his character and mission, as captured in the image of the gadfly (*Ap.* 30e). *Aporia* is a necessary first step towards greater insight, since it eliminates complacency by clearing away dead undergrowth and stimulates further inquiry.[25] Participation in this process, regardless of success, is supposed to make one a better person,[26] and more specifically, a "tamer" one – i.e. more philosophically cooperative and easier to get along with.[27] Sokrates therefore professes to care about others and benefit them by these interactions.[28] At the same time, such questioning is also a form of self-scrutiny. Sokrates shares the interlocutor's *aporia*, confusion and "wandering," from which he too seeks "rest" and stability.[29] The testing of the interlocutor often involves a kind of self-testing, or discovery within Sokrates' own beliefs of a confusion parallel to the interlocutor's.[30] Elenctic argument is thus not just a way of inducing confusion and possible learning in others, but a procedure for Socratic self-examination. Sokrates also seems to believe that his methods will lead to positive knowledge about "how to live," for both himself and his interlocutor, though it is notoriously difficult to work out exactly how this is supposed to occur.[31]

Most of the aporetic Sokrates' interlocutors are more or less promising young men (usually Athenians of good family) or mature claimants to wisdom, especially professionals, patriarchs, and representatives of traditional education, who may or may not be Athenian citizens.[32] Within this assemblage, sophists are prominent for various reasons, including their role as educators, their public availability, their agonism (which both invites and legitimates verbal confrontation), and the importance of their cultural influence. Though none of the most prominent sophists was Athenian, they were attracted to Athens for its intellectual openness and the cultural and financial opportunities that democracy offered them as

[25] See Desjardins 1990: 4–6; Sayre 1995: ch. 2.

[26] *Meno* 86b; cf. Gonzalez 1998: 172.

[27] For the elenchus as a "taming" cf. *Rep.* 354a, 358b, *Tht.* 210c, *Soph.* 230bc. Cf. also *Phdr.* 230a, 275ab.

[28] Cf. e.g. *Ap.* 22a, 30abc, *Charm.* 166cd, *Gorg.* 505e, 521d, *HMin.* 373a, *Prot.* 313abc, 333c; see further Kraut 1984: 225, 294–5; Ober 1998: 168.

[29] See e.g. *Ap.* 21b, *Charm.* 165b, 169c, 175b, *Euth.* 11d, *HMaj.* 304c, *HMin.* 376c, *Lach.* 200e–201a, *Lys.* 223b, *Meno* 80c. Cf. also *Rep.* 532cd, *Soph.* 245e. On Sokrates as a "wanderer" see further below, p. 159.

[30] Cf. *Euth.* 11d, *HMin.* 372de, *Meno* 80c, *Charm.* 166d.

[31] Such a positive goal is rarely stated by Sokrates (though cf. e.g. *Euth.* 11d, *Gorg.* 453b, *HMin.* 369d). But it seems to be implied by his repeated vocabulary of search (Vlastos 1983a: 31). Vlastos' account sparked much of the modern debate between "constructivist" and "non-constructivist" interpretations of Sokrates' elenctic method.

[32] On the range of Sokrates' interlocutors see Nehamas 1992b: 299–303; Beversluis 2000: 28–30; Nails forthcoming.

teachers of rhetoric and other skills.[33] This enables Plato to use them in certain ways as emblematic of democratic Athens. Like Sokrates, then, but with a different valence, the sophists in Plato's pages are simultaneously "Athenians" and outsiders.[34] Their role as professional intellectuals also commits them to certain skills, a degree of intellectual awareness, and basic standards of rational discourse, thus making them fair game for Socratic testing.[35]

When Sokrates talks with such "experts," he purports to assume that, unlike himself, they could succeed in giving an expository account of their knowledge.[36] He treats most of them with an elaborate respect for this putative "wisdom," deprecating his own intellectual skills by contrast.[37] This is the most obvious manifestation of the notorious irony that seems to be intrinsic to his elenctic mode of inquiry, in so far as it is apparently intended to stimulate active engagement, intellectual humility, and eventual philosophical progress.[38] It may do so in part by drawing the susceptible into discussion by appealing to their vanity, and in part by deflating their pretensions in order to make them more open to learning something new. Sokrates adapts this kind of irony to the character of the person in question, excoriating the obtuse, the self-important and the hostile (Hippias, Euthyphro, Thrasymachos, Kallikles), and treating promising and friendly youths more gently (Lysis, Charmides, Kleinias).[39] This accords with the fact that the young have had less exposure to formative experiences, and are therefore generally less sure of their own prior wisdom and hence more susceptible to future influences – more malleable, like wax or clay (cf. above, p. 95). They are therefore more receptive to Sokrates, and offer him less opportunity for elenctic refutation, ironic deflation, and testing, since the lives that are to be so tested are not yet

33 Note that though Hippias was popular in anti-democratic Sparta, he made no money there (*HMaj.* 283b).

34 For the outsider status of the sophists in Plato cf. esp. *Euthyd.* 271bc and below, p. 128.

35 Cf. Stokes 1986: 32. A sophist as such need not be committed to consistency (cf. Rosen 1983: 139–41). Indeed, it is the two sophists' refusal to abide by the criteria of consistent rational discourse that underlies Plato's comic strategy in *Euthyd.* (see Branham 1989: 69–80). But in so far as they profess to teach subjects based on certain standards of rationality (such as mathematics) they are committed to those standards willy nilly.

36 It is not clear, however, whether he himself thinks this is possible (see esp. Gonzalez 1998: 7–9 and passim).

37 E.g. *Ap.* 21bc, 23b, *Euth.* 5abc, *Euthyd.* 303bc, *Ion* 530bc, 532d, *Lach.* 181d, *HMaj.* 286d, 304c, *Meno* 70a–71b; for *HMin.* see below, n. 131.

38 Compare the way he advises Hippothales to humble his beloved rather than praise him (*Lys.* 210e; cf. also Xen. *Mem.* 4.2.1). On Sokrates' irony see further Schaerer 1941; Vlastos 1987; Nehamas 1998: ch. 2; Michelini 1998; Gordon 1999: ch. 5.

39 He treats Meno's slave, who is a notional child (below, p. 223), with courtesy and patience (Seeskin 1987: 102).

fully formed. Accordingly, Sokrates' youngest interlocutors tend to be less sharply characterized than mature adults.[40]

The irony that is aimed at the deflation of pretension is unmistakable. Other instances of Socratic irony are more difficult to identify with any certainty. In particular, much controversy has surrounded the questions of whether Plato's Sokrates is ironic in his disavowal of knowledge, and whether he intentionally misleads people with arguments that he knows to be fallacious or whose direction he can see despite his own disclaimers – a feeling first voiced by some of his own interlocutors.[41] This is not the place for detailed discussion of these questions. In general I agree with those who take Sokrates' denial of knowledge to be sincere, rather than ironic, since the awareness of his own ignorance is the engine driving his entire philosophical enterprise.[42] But this does not preclude his leading his interlocutors into logical traps of which he himself is aware, as a device – and a very effective one – to increase the victim's awareness of his own confusion. The difficult question of Sokrates' (and Plato's) awareness of particular fallacies must be judged on a case by case basis. But the vast majority of Sokrates' arguments are attributed by him to the interlocutor, who must endorse only what he really thinks to be the case. Though we may often suspect that Sokrates' sympathies lie in one direction or another, he is rarely committed personally to the validity of the arguments or their sometimes strange conclusions.

Despite his personal control of the course of most dialogues, Sokrates routinely presents elenctic inquiry as a joint activity, in which the two participants stand notionally on an equal footing. In principle, either of them may take the role of questioner or answerer.[43] Though Sokrates is standardly the questioner,[44] he sometimes offers to switch roles.[45] He habitually expresses a preference for cooperation over agonism or

[40] Bruns 1896: ch. 3. Even Sokrates displays little distinctive character besides intellectual precociousness when portrayed by Plato as a youth (in *Parm.*). The chief exception here is probably Polos, who is a generation younger than Sokrates, but still no mere boy (see Dodds 1959: 11). Meno is also only a youth (Sharples 1985: 18).

[41] See e.g. *Charm.* 166c, *Rep.* 337a and cf. Xen. *Mem.* 1.2.36. The view that Sokrates intentionally misleads has been held by scholars as different as R. Robinson (1942: 101–2) and Gadamer (1991: 57–8); for a recent defense of it see Beversluis 2000. For a contrary view see Vlastos 1991: ch. 5.

[42] Cf. Brickhouse and Smith 1989: 100–108, 128–37.

[43] Cf. *Crat.* 390c, *Ion* 538de, *Rep.* 534d.

[44] The major exception is *Parm.* 127e–136d, where Sokrates is very young. The mature Sokrates rarely answers questions (but cf. *Crito.* 50bc, *Symp.* 201e–202d, *Gorg.* 462b–463e, *Prot.* 338d–339d, *Rep.* 357b–358a and see Schaerer 1969: 25–33).

[45] E.g. *Alc.* 1. 114b, *Prot.* 338d, 347b, 348a, *Gorg.* 462b; cf. also *Ion* 538de. The interlocutor rarely takes him up on this.

"eristic," countering the rhetoric of conquest with that of agreement.[46] He further effaces his own controlling role by using the first person plural, speaking of what "we," as opposed to "I," are thinking or arguing, even when the other person is clearly the one at fault.[47] He is elaborately (though sometimes ironically) polite, even in response to overt rudeness from others,[48] and insists repeatedly on the importance of friendliness, as opposed to abuse or antagonism.[49] In fact Plato's Sokrates is unique in our surviving Greek texts for the frequency with which he addresses people with "friendship terms," such as "friend" (*philos*) and "comrade" (*hetairos*).[50]

Yet Sokrates' very use of cooperative rhetoric also locates him within the Athenian culture of agonism. Even his use of "friendship terms" is associated with intellectual and personal dominance, in so far as such terms are employed by a speaker who "feels himself to have won the upper hand in the debate."[51] Such forms of address are still polite and friendly. Indeed, "it is precisely because polite and friendly addresses *are* polite and friendly that they can demonstrate the speaker's control of the situation." Sokrates' usage thus forges an intriguing linguistic and cultural bond between two striking aspects of his philosophical persona – his friendliness and his dominance. This helps to explain why his "friendliness" provokes so much hostility. His ironic praise of others serves similarly as an assertion of dominance. Irony implies superiority and disdain for its victim, and Sokrates' elaborate protestations of respect for his interlocutor's wisdom are often thinly veiled expressions of contempt.[52] His self-deprecation likewise serves to shift the blame for dialectical failure more squarely onto his interlocutors.[53] His covert agonism also emerges in other ways, for example through Plato's use of imagery from wrestling, combat, lawcourts, and other forms of contest for the intellectual enterprise.[54] Such imagery serves to heroize Sokrates,

[46] See e.g. *Gorg.* 457c–458b, 462e, 505e–506a, 515b, *Meno* 75cde, 80cd, *Phd.* 60d, 91a, *Phileb.* 14b, *Prot.* 348c–349a, *Rep.* 499de. On eristic and its relationship to dialectic see Robinson 1953: 84–8; Gulley 1968: 22–37; Kerferd 1981: ch. 6; Vlastos 1983a: 31; Nehamas 1990.

[47] Cf. Vlastos 1983a: 54 n.

[48] E.g. *HMaj.* 304bc, *Gorg.* 461bcd, 486cd, *Rep.* 343a.

[49] E.g. *Euthyd.* 288b, *Gorg.* 473a, *Meno* 75cd, *Phd.* 88e–89a, *Phdr.* 268de, *Prot.* 333e, *Rep.* 499a, 500b; cf. F. Wolff 1997: 41–5.

[50] Dickey 1996: 107–27.

[51] Dickey 1996: 117. The next quotation is from p. 121. For friendliness as an expression of social dominance cf. Arist. *EN* 1167b17–1168a27; G. A. Scott 2000: 172.

[52] Nehamas 1998: 49–52, 58, 62–3.

[53] Cf. e.g. *HMin.* 372b–373a, 376c, *Euth.* 11d, *Charm.* 175a, *Lys.* 223b, *Rep.* 354b.

[54] See Berg 1904: 30–32, 34, 38–9, 46–9; Louis 1945: 57–63; Hermann 1995; below, pp. 279–80. The word "elenchus" evokes the agonism of the courtroom (duBois 1991: 112–13; Hershbell 1995:

but achieves this in a way that calls into question his overt rejection of competitiveness, by mapping his philosophic practice onto the various forms of agonism that pervaded Athenian life. Sokrates' implicit philosophical community of the like-minded is predicated on the defeat of alternative points of view.

Plato underlines Sokrates' militant, competitive aspects by repeatedly bringing him face to face with the sophists, who were explicitly agonistic in their skills, way of life and professional outlook. This is reflected in Plato's repeated use of combat imagery for their activities.[55] In *Protagoras* the assembled sophists assume that Sokrates is competing with them, despite his disclaimers,[56] and in *Republic*, Thrasymachos interprets his treatment of Polemarchos as competitiveness (*philotimia*, *Rep.* 336c). Since the sophists' agonistic modus operandi requires the presence of an audience, this provides Plato with a natural context in which to display Sokrates' superiority. The presence of an audience, especially one that is there to enjoy the spectacle of intellectual combat, seals the winner's triumph and the loser's humiliation.[57] Indeed, the word elenchus originally meant "disgrace."[58]

On this combative model the winner is the person who has the last word, and silence betokens defeat and humiliation. The desired effect of a sophistic discourse is one of stunned admiration (cf. above, p. 97). Gorgias boasts that there is no question he cannot answer, and Sokrates ironically praises the "laconic" Spartans' ability to have the last word.[59] In Aristophanes' *Frogs*, "Aeschylus" agrees to respond to "Euripides" only because to do otherwise would give the appearance of *aporia*, or being at a loss for words (*Frogs* 1007–8). This is, of course, precisely the condition to which the elenctic Sokrates so often reduces his interlocutors.[60] In his famous description of Socratic *aporia*, Meno complains that Sokrates has numbed his tongue into silence (80ab). In *Gorgias*, Kallikles complains that Polos has been "bound and gagged" (482e).[61]

34). On Sokrates' competitiveness see also Berger 1984: 73–5; Wardy 1996: 69–71; Rocco 1997: ch. 3; Patterson 1997.

[55] E.g. *Euthyd.* 271c–272b; and see Notomi 1999: 164–6. Plato's larger purpose here is obviously in part to distinguish Sokrates from the sophists. But this itself attests to the difficulty of drawing that distinction.

[56] Cf. Benitez 1992: 244–5. For Sokrates' disclaimers cf. *Prot.* 335e–336a, 339e.

[57] See Notomi 1999: 100–119 and cf. Teloh 1986: 135–6; Sayre 1995: 55–6.

[58] See Lesher 1984: 1–9.

[59] *Gorg.* 447d–448a, *Prot.* 342de.

[60] E.g. *Crito* 54d, *Euth.* 11b, 15e, *Gorg.* 505c–506c, 515b, 519de, *Lach.* 194ab, *Phileb.* 21d, *Tht.* 146a, *Rep.* 331d.

[61] Cf. also e.g. *Ap.* 27bc, *Crito* 54d. According to Eunapius, people dared not speak in the presence of Sokrates' imitator, Chrysanthus, for fear of his questioning (*VS* 502; cf. above, p. 72 n. 89).

In the Greek tradition, silence is by and large associated with subordination, passivity, and deference.[62] Hence its desirability in women.[63] The ability to speak freely (*parrhēsia*) befits a free man generally and a democratic Athenian in particular.[64] Anyone who cannot reply, given the opportunity to do so, is therefore assumed either to agree, or to be unable to object.[65] A silenced subordinate may, of course, be inwardly resistant, as Odysseus is while disguised as a beggar (*Od.* 17.465). But it is assumed that a free man will speak out when he disagrees. To do otherwise is to risk conveying an impression of subordination or defeat. Thus in *Apology* Sokrates variously takes Meletos' silence as assent (27c10), and as something to be ashamed of (24d). Accordingly, silent Platonic bystanders are generally assumed to agree with what is being said. In *Gorgias*, Sokrates invites those present to speak up if they disagree, and at the beginning of *Hippias Minor* Eudikos is surprised at Sokrates' silence, expecting him either to contribute to the general admiration of Hippias or to interrogate him.[66] The constructive Sokrates assumes, for example, that points accepted by Glaukon or Adeimantos are also accepted by the other, who listened in silence, and his friends whisper among themselves when they are unhappy with his conclusions.[67] Agonistic characters like Thrasymachos and Kallikles cannot listen to views they dislike without interrupting (*Rep.* 336ab; *Gorg.* 481b). And when the latter cannot answer, he calls Sokrates "competitive" (*philonikos*, *Gorg.* 515b). By repeatedly confronting Sokrates with such characters, and showing him victorious, Plato establishes him as their agonistic rival. He also makes us, the outer audience witnessing these combats, complicit in this agonism to the extent that he invites us to applaud Sokrates' victories. These victories are often – and rightly – experienced as displays of power by the losers, who are humiliated by a refutation or silencing that makes

[62] Cf. Lateiner 1995: passim; Laird 1999: 1–2, 6–8. In tragedy, silence is a frequent reaction to a situation where no articulate response is possible or effective, and often portends suicide. Silence can also denote e.g. contempt (e.g. *Od.* 11.563–4, *Il.* 6.342).

[63] See e.g. *Od.* 23.364–5, 21.386 (with Russo et al. [1992] ad loc.), Ar. *Lys.* 329–31, 514–15, Aesch. *Seven* 232, Soph. *Ajax* 292–3, Eur. *Heraclid.* 476–7, *Hipp.* 645–8, Democr. DK 68 B274, Arist. *Pol.* 1260a30. Odysseus' strategic use of silence as apparent deference is one of the many ways he adopts a posture of "feminine" subservience (cf. Lateiner 1995: 170, 258, 273–4).

[64] For a man's obligation to speak out cf. Eur. *Med.* 214–18 with Blondell et al. 1999: 162–3. Cf. also above, p. 75. For lack of *parrhēsia* as a token of disenfranchisement and slavery cf. Eur. *Phoen.* 390–92.

[65] Cf. *Phd.* 107a. Compare the argument underlying Sokrates' social contract theory in *Crito* (52a–53a). In both cases, it is assumed that a free man is able to express his disagreement, and the decision not to do so is tantamount to approval.

[66] *Gorg.* 505e–506a, 508b; *HMin.* 363a; cf. *Tht.* 146a.

[67] E.g. *Phd.* 84cd, *Rep.* 449ab. For Glaukon and Adeimantos see Cosgriff 1994: 152, 158.

them feel ashamed, emasculated or infantilized.[68] Sokrates himself, in contrast, seldom falls silent except by choice.[69]

A Socratic victory obliges the loser – in so far as he shares Sokrates' principles of argument – to reconsider who he is and refashion himself on Socratic terms.[70] Not surprisingly, this makes the victim feel coerced or "dragged" by Sokrates' arguments.[71] Sokrates himself presents these terms as those of objective rationality, repeatedly insisting that the truth he seeks is independent of particular persons, including himself.[72] The same applies to the *logos* or argument, which exerts the impersonal compulsion of rational consistency.[73] But as Alexander Nehamas points out, it is difficult in Greek cultural terms to distinguish the truth from the fact that a person has won an argument.[74] In any case, it is only if Sokrates is in fact right about the impersonality of his methods that his arguments may legitimately be viewed as compelling, as opposed to coercive.[75]

It might further be argued that Sokrates' tactics are non-coercive since he is trying, in Pindaric fashion, to make his interlocutors into their "true" or "ideal" selves (cf. above, p. 83). This accords perfectly with the Platonic psychology whereby our goal as human beings is to become who we really are, "to *realise ourselves*, or to become (in actuality) what we already (potentially) are."[76] But again, this is so only if Sokrates is right in believing that the self is the rational soul, as distinct from the body, i.e. if his own views and values prevail.[77] But his view about what constitutes a person's "real" self is very different from that of a Pindar. The more

[68] E.g. *Charm.* 169c, *Gorg.* 482de, *Prot.* 348c, *Rep.* 350e; cf. also *Tht.* 177b. For the shame induced by Sokrates cf. also *Symp.* 216b, 217d, *Gorg.* 461b, 487b (with Kahn 1983) and below, p. 182.

[69] His claims to be silenced by sophistic rhetoric are shown up by their context as ironic (*Prot.* 339e, *Symp.* 198bc; cf. also *Rep.* 336d).

[70] For Socratic testing as a challenge to the ego cf. Vlastos 1983a: 36–8; Patterson 1987: 343–5.

[71] Cf. *Rep.* 350d, 539b6, *Gorg.* 505d.

[72] E.g. *Charm.* 161c, *Rep.* 595bc, *Phd.* 91abc, *Phdr.* 275bc, *Symp.* 201c; cf. also *Soph.* 246d.

[73] E.g. *Crito* 48c, *Gorg.* 453c, 454c, *HMaj.* 293b, *Rep.* 394a, d. Paradoxically, this is often conveyed by personifying the *logos* (e.g. *Phd.* 89bc, *Phdr.* 260e–261a, *Rep.* 503e, *Tht.* 200c); for further examples see Robinson 1953: 8; Friedländer 1964–9: I.108–9; Plass 1964: 267–9; Ophir 1991: 123–4; cf. also below, p. 326.

[74] Nehamas 1990: 7, 10. Note also that Plato (as opposed to Sokrates) does tacitly equate Sokrates with the argument itself, thus suggesting that to become like Sokrates is to transcend individuality (cf. Loraux 1995: 159 and below, pp. 295–6).

[75] See Irwin 1986. On philosophical compulsion see further Waugh 1995: 65; Ophir 1991: 109–10; Nozick 1981: 4–5; duBois 1991: ch. 10.

[76] Lovibond 1991: 46.

[77] The view that the true self is the (rational) soul is found throughout Plato's works (cf. *Alc. I.* 130c, *Ap.* 40c–41b, *Phd.* 115cd, *Rep.* 588b–589b, 611b–612a). See further Patterson 1987: 344–5; Mackenzie 1988: 339–40; Gerson 1992; Brickhouse and Smith 1994: ch. 3; Griswold 1999a: 295–7; D. M. Johnson 1999.

we become our "real" selves in his terms, the more we will lose our individuality, as expressed in faults of the kind to which his interrogations draw attention. For those who do not share this outlook, Sokrates' mode of argument requires the person in question to refashion himself in a specific, and specifically Socratic, manner, coming to resemble not the ideal of humanity as such, but a particular individual – namely Sokrates. From a Platonic perspective this may be viewed as a form of Socratic self-reproduction. But it is quite legitimately perceived as a personal attack by those who do not already share his views and values. For it *is* such an attack, from the perspective of the person whose self-construction is being challenged.

It is scarcely surprising, then, that Sokrates' victims are often provoked not to further thought or philosophical enthusiasm, but to exasperation, resentment or hostility, and are liable to blame him, rather than themselves, for their confusion.[78] Such risks are inherent in a method that is not only negative, confrontational and personal in tone, but designed to show up the inadequacies of its target's established self-concept and change his whole way of life. Instead of "taming" his opponents – a model that posits himself as a superior, more rational being – Sokrates frequently makes them fiercer. He may believe that the gadfly's "sting" is beneficial to its victim, but there is little evidence of such benefit in Plato's texts. Similarly, the irony that is so often a vehicle for Socratic provocation may be intended as a stimulus to self-awareness, but is seldom, if ever, represented by Plato as successful in producing such an effect. Sokrates does succeed in luring interlocutors like Hippias into argument through ironic praise. But Hippias never realizes he is being made fun of. Those who do detect Sokrates' irony – as Thrasymachos notoriously does (*Rep.* 337a) – are angered rather than humbled or stimulated to productive thought. Sokrates, himself, by contrast, insists that he welcomes dialectical criticism, and does not even mind being laughed at.[79] But unlike most of his interlocutors, he has no reason to become angry when refuted, since any such refutation will have taken place on his own terms. His self-concept is constituted through a set of values centered on moral and rational consistency and a commitment to self-exploration through interactive discourse. The further clarification and organization of his

[78] E.g. *Euth.* 11bcd, *Gorg.* 471e, 482e–483b, 489b, 497ab, *HMin.* 373b, *Meno* 80ab, *Rep.* 340d–341b.

[79] *Euth.* 3c; cf. *Euthyd.* 304cd, *Gorg.* 458ab, 506a, *HMaj.* 304e, *HMin.* 372e, *Rep.* 337d. He cheerfully endures quite caustic treatment at the hands of the elenctic Diotima, according to his own account (*Symp.* 202b, 204b, 209e–210a). And his youthful avatar in *Parm.* shows equal grace under fire.

beliefs is therefore no challenge to who he is, but makes him more himself than ever.

The degree of discomfort or outright anger expressed by the elenctic Sokrates' victims depends on various factors, including Sokrates' particular manner, the interlocutor's native prickliness, and the extent to which Socratic refutation constitutes an assault on his deepest convictions and way of life.[80] Those who start out with a sympathetic and admiring attitude towards Sokrates are likely to retain it. Some interlocutors actually claim to enjoy Socratic testing.[81] The lightly-characterized young are treated less harshly, and are correspondingly less likely to become angry.[82] Conversely, those who react most angrily are adult men with a strongly vested interest in the status quo, coupled with a complete lack of desire or intention to change their lives (Anytos, Thrasymachos, Kallikles). Not everyone who fits this profile reacts with hostility. Protagoras, though he is a sophist with widely divergent views from those of Sokrates, not only fights back effectively (*Prot.* 331 c), but remains patient under considerable provocation.[83] But such persons usually respond to Socratic testing by simply giving up, or falling silent, without any sign of turning to a changed way of life. Even those who accept his arguments are not thereby persuaded to abandon their pre-existing convictions.[84] As Kallikles puts it in *Gorgias*, "You seem to me – I don't know quite how – to speak rightly, Sokrates. But I share the experience of the many: I am not really convinced" (413c). Even sympathetic non-Athenians like Meno, or eccentrics like Euthyphro, rarely seem to be improved by the experience.[85]

Despite the range of emotional responses among the aporetic Sokrates' interlocutors, then, the most striking overall pattern is the failure of his elenctic mission, as outlined in *Apology,* to convert anyone who does not already share his outlook to a Socratic way of life – or even to reform

[80] For the range of responses see Rutherford 1995: 79–82.

[81] Cf. *Euthyd.* 304cd, *Lach.* 188abc, 189ab. But Nikias does not seem to "enjoy" being actually refuted (Blank 1993: 433; Beversluis 2000: 131, 133; cf. *Lach.* 200ab). Similarly, Kallikles, like the young men of *Ap.*, enjoys listening to the interrogation of Gorgias (*Gorg.* 458d), but becomes angry when he himself is the victim.

[82] G. A. Scott emphasizes the youth of the interlocutors in the cases of "Socratic education" that he regards as successful (2000: 52–3, 160–61).

[83] Vlastos 1956: xxiv–xxv.

[84] For a comic but instructive parallel see Xen. *Symp.* 5.10, where Sokrates' impeccable logic fails to convince the company that he is more beautiful than the delectable Kritoboulos. Cf. also *Phd.* 107ab.

[85] Gordon 1999: ch. 4 argues that Meno's character is improved for the better, but even if she is right, this is not the result of elenctic testing.

their character for the better.[86] Such failures are underscored by Plato's liberal use of historical irony, which reminds us of the enormous practical consequences of many interlocutors' moral failures (above, p. 93). This even applies to such tractable characters as the charming, talented and youthful Charmides. He is marked as philosophically promising (*Charm.* 154e–155a), is amenable to Socratic conversation, and shows no serious flaws of character within the text. Yet Plato's audience would be well aware that he grew up to be closely associated with the Thirty Tyrants and died fighting with Kritias (Xen. *Hell.* 2.4.19). The sting of the gadfly may be the best teacher for a rare few, but it was not destined to succeed in converting the varied inhabitants of classical Athens to wisdom and virtue. The ultimate token of this failure is of course Sokrates' death. That even he would view it as such follows a fortiori from his own argument that the exile of Kimon and Themistokles proves they were not successful in improving their fellow-citizens (*Gorg.* 516de).

This pedagogical failure of the elenctic Sokrates is a distinctive feature of his representation in Plato, as opposed to e.g. Xenophon (cf. *Mem.* 4.6.15) or even Aristophanes. It also stands in marked contrast to the success of the historical Sokrates, whose most extraordinary pedagogical success was Plato himself. It serves certain dramatic purposes for Plato, including the debunking of all candidates for intellectual, moral or educational preeminence prior to Sokrates, which makes possible the preservation of Sokrates' heroic uniqueness (above, p. 87). After all, if an interlocutor responded by confessing his own ignorance and taking up a Socratic way of life, then it would no longer be true that no one is as wise as Sokrates. It would also make it much more difficult for him to deny tout court that he is a teacher of excellence,[87] since he does evidently think of himself not only as a good man, but as a better one than most. But such considerations do not eliminate the sense of failure that attaches to the aporetic Sokrates' mission as Plato portrays it. If anything, they enhance it, by drawing attention to the interconnections between his uniqueness and his failure, underlining the potentially tragic fact that *even* this extraordinary figure did not succeed in his heroic mission. This sense of failure sets the stage for Plato's reconsideration of the elenctic Sokrates in several works. Before turning to this question, however, I will show how these general claims about the elenctic Sokrates play out in the interpretation of a specific dialogue.

[86] On Sokrates' failures see most recently D. Scott 1999; Clay 2000: 179–84; Beversluis 2000: passim; G. A. Scott 2000.

[87] Cf. Kraut 1984: 294–303; Nehamas 1998: 83–5; G. A. Scott 2000: ch. 5.

HIPPIAS AND HOMER

The opening lines of *Hippias Minor* introduce us to the dramatis personae, establish their cultural milieu, and raise some basic questions about education and literary characterization. Hippias is a well-known, popular, and financially successful sophist, visiting Athens in the course of his career as a traveling salesman of intellectual wares. He makes two substantial appearances in Plato, and a few minor ones as well.[88] Like other sophists, he is represented by Plato as disembedded from Athenian political culture, and cosmopolitan in his lack of close attachment to a particular home. He comes from Elis (an ally of Sparta), rarely visits Athens, often travels to other cities, and is highly successful in the pan-Hellenic forum of the Olympic games, to which his native city played host.[89] At the same time, he has a professional and financial stake in being well-received at Athens, and his Platonic persona reflects that fact. He is further portrayed as steeped in Athenian literary and educational culture, especially its pan-Hellenic aspects, as embodied in Homeric epic.[90] His agonistic spirit accords with the epic tradition as well as the sophistic enterprise.[91] He shows a faith in both Homeric character-models and passive memorization that aligns him with traditional educational methods. And Sokrates contemptuously likens his success at Sparta to that of old women telling stories to children (*HMaj.* 285e–286a).[92] At the same time, his public lecture on Homer is repeatedly called an *epideixis*, or sophistic rhetorical display.[93] Plato thus uses Hippias to exemplify the cultural continuity between epic poetry and sophistry. His failures will reveal the common defects – from a Platonic perspective – of these two interconnected traditions, especially their joint reliance on the passive, unthinking modes of education that underlie mimetic pedagogy (above, pp. 95–9).

When the dialogue opens, Hippias is fresh from delivering his *epideixis* on Homer's characters. This lecture is probably the same one alluded

88 On Hippias and his thought see D. Tarrant 1928: xvii–xxx; Guthrie 1969: 280–5; Kerferd 1981: 46–9. For his large earnings see *HMaj.* 282de and cf. 281b, 300d. On his character in *HMaj.* see Teloh 1986: ch. 11.

89 See *HMaj.* 281ab, *HMin.* 364a and cf. Xen. *Mem.* 4.4.5. Hippias' cosmopolitanism is specially betokened by his Persian belt (368c).

90 For the central importance of Homer in Greek life see Havelock 1963: ch. 4; Verdenius 1970; Murray 1996: 15–21. For the sophists' interest in Homer see above, p. 98.

91 See 364a, 369c; cf. *Prot.* 337c–338e and see above, p. 45.

92 Old women were one of the vehicles for transmitting traditional stories, especially to children (Brisson 1998: 56–7), but they are often treated as such with contempt in Plato (e.g. *Lys.* 205d, *Gorg.* 527a, *Rep.* 350e, *Tht.* 176b).

93 Cf. 363a2, 363c2, 363d2, 364b6, 364b8; cf. also 368c5. For Hippias' interest in rhetoric cf. *HMaj.* 285cd, *Phdr.* 267b.

to in *Hippias Major*, where Hippias mentions that he will shortly deliver a prepared speech at the request of Eudikos, son of Apemantos (*HMaj.* 286b).[94] Be that as it may, the occasion is represented as a public one, and Hippias deems it appropriate to make himself freely available for questioning, just as he would at the Olympic games (363c-364a; cf. *Prot.* 315c). This establishes the context as agonistic, befitting not only a sophistic performance, but a culture nurtured on the *Iliad* and a discussion informed by Homeric values. Since Hippias is both a product of and an expert in Homeric education, the *agōn* in question will be educational. Plato uses this context to bring sophistic modes of teaching into dramatic confrontation with the unconventional pedagogy of Sokrates, thereby inviting his audience, like the internal audience of the dialogue, to choose the winner in a contest of dueling pedagogies.

Sokrates appears at the outset in the atypical role of silent listener (364a). His friend Eudikos is surprised at his silence, especially since all those who are left can make some claim to an interest in philosophy (363a).[95] This silence is contrasted with and directly related to the abundance of Hippias' display speech, which Sokrates claims he was unwilling to interrupt (364b). By suggesting that questions during the speech would have been "troublesome" (364b), Sokrates touches on the silencing effect of this authoritative mode of discourse, and hints at its inadequacy to meet the intellectual challenges of dialectic (cf. above, pp. 40–41). Now that the display is over, however, Hippias is ready to entertain the questions from the audience that were a regular feature of such appearances.[96] And in response to Eudikos' enthusiasm Sokrates agrees to question the sophist, now that the company is smaller (364b). Accordingly, he invites Hippias to "teach" them "clearly" about the Homeric heroes who were the subject of his discourse (364bc), this time using the dialectical method of question and answer. This implies that the display was both deficient in clarity and educational worth (cf. *Rep.* 338d5), and inappropriate to the "teaching" of a small and intellectually serious audience. Hippias rejects these implications by answering that he is willing to explain "still more clearly than before" his views "about both these men and others" (364c).

As a professional intellectual Hippias is committed to consistency: it would be "strange" or "extraordinary" (*deinon*), he says, to deviate from

[94] The connection is strongly suggested by the role of Eudikos and the Homeric subject (Nestor's advice to Neoptolemos).

[95] The particles he uses (δὲ δή) indicate a surprised question (Denniston 1954: 259).

[96] Cf. *Prot.* 318d, *Gorg.* 447c–448a, *Meno* 70bc, and above, p. 99.

his usual availability to all comers (363cd; cf. 364d). This is the first of several uses of this adjective by Hippias, a preference that reveals – for better or worse – a deeply conventional quality of mind and reliance on accepted values: anything that departs from the obvious is "strange" or "extraordinary" to him.[97] Here and elsewhere, he is characterized not as dangerously subversive in an active way, but as a complacent voice of conventional common sense.[98] Naturally, then, he wishes his behavior to be consistent with his words (cf. above, p. 76). Qua professional teacher of rational skills – including mathematics – he is also committed to another kind of consistency: the intellectual consistency essential to rational thought and argument, by which Plato's Sokrates sets such store.[99] This leaves him vulnerable to Socratic attack. Moreover it is he who is responsible for the topic under discussion, on which he is a self-professed expert.[100] His views on the subject have been publicly expressed in the presence of these and many other witnesses,[101] and his language suggests a considered position, not off-the-cuff argument (λέγω, φημί 364c4). The context thus makes him fair game as a Socratic target. He should be strongly placed to resist dialectical coercion, and has less excuse for coming to grief than a more casual, less "expert" interlocutor.

Hippias is confident that he can deal with Sokrates like any other questioner – a confidence that assures the experienced Platonic reader that he is riding for an elenctic fall.[102] His patronizing manner towards Sokrates drips with Platonic irony. But from the point of view of the character himself it should doubtless be construed at least in part as a promotional gambit, a way of instilling public confidence in his professional services. Hippias has an acute awareness of his métier as a sophist and the responsibilities this entails, along with a generally cordial outlook. For him, consistency of word and deed is an obvious matter of propriety

[97] Cf. 363c7, 365c7, 375d3, *HMaj.* 292c1; for the potential optative cf. also 364d3, 371e9–372a2. Sokrates mockingly echoes Hippias' usage at 376c5.

[98] The historical Hippias evidently supported nature (*phusis*) over convention (*nomos*) (cf. Xen. *Mem.* 4.4.14), but does not seem to have drawn the radical conclusions of a Kallikles. His other ethical views were evidently uncontroversial, and Plato does not attack them per se (cf. *Rep.* 493a; Guthrie 1969: 284; Irwin 1977: 26). For Hippias' banality in *HMaj.* see D. Tarrant 1928: xxx.

[99] Above, p. 117. Woodruff rightly emphasizes that Sokrates and Hippias have incommensurable criteria for success (1982: xiii, 125; cf. *HMaj.* 304ab), but does not take this point into account. In Xenophon, however, Sokrates hints that Hippias' polymathy conflicts with the ideal of consistency (*Mem.* 4.4.6–7).

[100] At *HMaj.* 287ab he boasts that he can teach Sokrates to answer even the most difficult questions, in particular those arising from his "Trojan discourse" (286a–287c).

[101] Cf. 368b with Calogero 1948 ad loc.

[102] 363d, 364d; cf. *HMaj.* 286e–287b.

as well as professional pride: to violate it would be not only extraordinary (*deinon*) but shameful (*aischron*, 364d3).[103] He displays in addition the culturally valued social (and philosophical) virtues of tolerance, patience and friendliness (cf. 364d, 373c). He never becomes abusive, despite substantial provocation. And unlike his vituperative fellow-sophist Thrasymachos, he is willing to talk to Sokrates without insisting on a fee: responding to questions is a matter of professional pride, not merely of immediate profit.[104]

Sokrates exclaims in ironic wonder at Hippias' confidence "about your soul with regard to wisdom" (364a).[105] His tone suggests that Hippias' faith in his intellect can scarcely be justified (364a), but here, as throughout the dialogue, the sophist appears oblivious to his irony. He does, however, produce a reasonable self-justification. Using an expression redolent of oratory, he says his confidence is "plausible" since he has never before been beaten in a contest.[106] This self-assurance is fully justified by his own principal criterion for success, namely the applause of an audience, or the judgment of "the many," as illustrated by the reception of the speech he has just delivered.[107] His confidence is rooted in a cultural milieu that fosters and rewards such teachers and performers as himself, both financially and with other public honors (*HMaj.* 281 ab; cf. 282b). But this is precisely what blinds him to his own ignorance from a Socratic point of view. To Sokrates – notoriously disdainful of the opinion of the many – the approval of Hippias' audiences is less than worthless as evidence of wisdom. He hints at this by commenting ironically that Hippias' "reputation" (*doxa*) is doubtless an ornament to his native city (364b). The word *doxa* is ambiguous. It often means public reputation or glory, but it is also the standard Platonic word for mere opinion as

[103] Cf. *Gorg.* 449b, 458d.

[104] The antithesis at 364d3–6 suggests that Hippias is not being paid in this instance (cf. also *HMaj.* 283b–284c and contrast *Rep.* 337d), nor (if Plato is to be believed) was he paid on his frequent visits to Sparta (*HMaj.* 283bc). But such performances might give rise to future commissions or other benefits (cf. *HMaj.* 281 a, c).

[105] This ironic praise is unusually heavy, even for Sokrates (364ab, 366de, 367a, 368bc, 369de, 372a–d, 376c; cf. also *HMaj.* 281 ab, 282e–283c, 286d, 289a, 291 a, 304c).

[106] 364a; cf. *HMaj.* 282e. For "plausibility" (εἰκός) as the aim of rhetoric cf. *Phdr.* 267a.

[107] Cf. 363a2, *HMaj.* 281 c, 284c, 288a and see Woodruff 1982: 128. But at *HMaj.* 284e Hippias also agrees that the many do not know the truth. It is therefore not surprising that he lacks dialectical integrity in that dialogue (292b7, 298b5–6; cf. D. Tarrant 1928: xxx; Woodruff 1982: 132). In *Prot.* he makes a methodological proposal of which everyone but Sokrates approves, based not on concern for the truth, but on compromise and the adoption of an arbitrary umpire (himself!) (338a). This fits well with his portrait in his eponymous dialogues as one whose goal is to satisfy everyone (cf. *HMaj.* 285de, where he says he has been "forced" to learn certain subjects to please his audience). But Woodruff goes too far by elevating this trait into a "philosophy of agreement (1982: 129, cf. 125).

opposed to knowledge. It is as a sophist who knows how to succeed in his métier that Hippias is riding for a Socratic fall.

Hippias' Homeric discourse forms part of his claim to be a moral teacher.[108] Sokrates wants to know whether Hippias thinks Achilles or Odysseus is "better" (*ameinōn*), and in what way (364b; cf. 363bc). The two heroes are linked as a pair in the dual number, emphasizing their paradigmatic status, both as the eponymous heroes of the two greatest epics, and as rival paradigms of manly excellence.[109] Sokrates recalls that Eudikos' father, like Hippias himself,[110] used to call the *Iliad* a "finer" (*kallion*) poem than the *Odyssey* in so far as Achilles is "better" (*ameinōn*) than Odysseus (363b). These judgments, as the concurrence of Hippias and Apemantos suggests, are scarcely idiosyncratic or radical.[111] They are such as would appeal to ordinary Athenians, the "many" whom Hippias wishes to please with speeches like his "Trojan discourse." The mention of Eudikos' father, together with the presence of the son, helps to expand the educational issue from a single sophist's views to Homer's enormous influence over the lives of Athenians generally. Hippias' professed expertise in the evaluation of Homeric characters (364c4), together with his status as a moral teacher and his desire for popular approval, makes him a fitting representative of traditional standards and their dissemination through the study of Homer and his sophistic heirs.

Hippias' popularity makes him a dangerous threat to the young of Athens. In *Apology* Sokrates includes him among those sophists who can win over to their company the youths of any city (19e–20a). There are signs that Eudikos may be one of those susceptible. In *Hippias Major* we are told of his eagerness to hear Hippias speak (286b), and he should probably be taken to have organized the present performance (above, pp. 128–9). He thus exemplifies the Athenian fascination with the techniques and accomplishments of the sophists.[112] This gives his initial question, and

[108] For its didactic moral purpose cf. *HMaj.* 286a, with Woodruff 1982: 89 n. 196. At Xen. *Mem.* 4.4.7 Hippias claims to be irrefutable on the subject of justice. In *HMaj.* he says he can teach Sokrates what is fine or noble (*kalon*) (286e) and claims, like many other sophists, to teach excellence (*aretē*) (283c, 284a) (see further Guthrie [1969] ch. 10).

[109] 363b7, 364c1; cf. 370de. For their rivalry as heroic paradigms see King 1987: 69–71; Knox 1964: 121–2; Nagy 1979: chs. 2–3.

[110] This seems to be the force of καὶ γάρ (363b1).

[111] Achilles was generally acclaimed as the greatest of heroes, whereas Odysseus was viewed with considerable ambivalence (see e.g. Arist. *Top.* 117b10–14 and cf. Stanford 1963: chs. 7–8; Pratt 1993: 94). A moralizing fragment of Hippias accords with this preference (DK 86 B17).

[112] The natural (though not conclusive) inference from Sokrates' acquaintance with the father (363b) is that Eudikos is relatively young. If so, he may be a fifth-century counterpart of Neoptolemos in Hippias' "Trojan discourse" – a young man on the verge of a public career, in need of sound advice. But this must remain speculative, since we know nothing of Eudikos or his father outside these dialogues.

the context in which he poses it, added significance. He not only asks Sokrates' opinion of Hippias' speech, but identifies the present company as interested in philosophy, in contrast – presumably – to the large crowd who attended the performance (363a; cf. 364b). Sokrates will thus be tackling Hippias' pretensions to wisdom and educational worth in the presence of at least one philosophy student who admires Hippias, but also wants to see how he will stand up to scrutiny. Sokrates will refer his own inquiry to Eudikos' original question (364b), and invite Hippias to teach "us" (364c1), suggesting that the company as a whole is eager to hear him examine the sophist's claims. Conversely, Sokrates' own methods and abilities are on display before an audience of the sophist's admirers. The presence of Eudikos and other intellectually serious bystanders raises the stakes for both Hippias and Sokrates, as they compete for cultural authority as well as philosophical allegiance.

Hippias answers Sokrates' question with a triad of Homeric characters instead of a pair. He speaks of both Achilles and Odysseus with epithets straight from Homer: Achilles is "best" (*aristos*), and Odysseus most "versatile" (*polutropos*) (364c).[113] The latter word is, appropriately enough, a flexible one, meaning literally "of many turns," and ranging from "much traveled" to "versatile," "clever," "complex," "shifty," "unreliable," and "deceptive."[114] But Hippias also adds a third hero, Nestor, whom he characterizes as most "wise" or "clever" (*sophos*, 364c).[115] *Sophos* is a notoriously ambiguous word, ranging from "wise" to "clever" or "crafty" in a morally neutral or even pejorative sense.[116] The first of these meanings suits Homer's Nestor, who is a fatherly figure, embodying the wisdom of age and distinguished for his extensive and prudent paternalistic advice.[117] He remained one of the most influential figures of legend, becoming a paradigm of eloquence, self-restraint and sage advice to the young, especially young rulers.[118] His inclusion here makes good sense if Hippias' display speech was

[113] Achilles stands supreme as "best of the Achaeans" (see Nagy 1979: ch. 2). Odysseus is called *polutropos* at *Od.* 1.1 and 10.330.

[114] See LSJ s.v., and for the application to Odysseus see Stanford 1963: 99; Peradotto 1990: 114–16. The associations with travel, versatility and intelligence are all linked (Finley 1978: 30; Frame 1978: xi). In *Stat.* the word is used for the crowd of spurious sophistic politicians (291b2). It is also an epithet of Hermes, the trickster god (*HH Hermes* 13, 439).

[115] This word is not found in Homer and the cognate noun *sophia* – "wisdom" or "cleverness" – appears just once, in connection with carpentry (*Il.* 15.412). But *sophia* was associated with Nestor in later times (cf. Soph. *Phil.* 421–3).

[116] Cf. e.g. *Rep.* 365c5; O'Brien 1967: 33–8; Dover 1974: 116–23.

[117] E.g. *Il.* 1.247–84, 2.336–68, 9.52–78, 92–113, 11.655–803, 23.304–48.

[118] See North 1979: 38, 46, 116, 136. For Nestor's reputation cf. *Ion* 537ab, *Laws* 711de, *Phdr.* 261bc (with Thompson 1868 ad loc.), *Symp.* 221c, Theogn. 714, Ar. *Clouds* 1056–7, Xen. *Symp.* 4.6, Arist. *Top.* 117b10–28; Kennedy 1957: 26–8; Frame 1978: 84–5.

indeed his "Trojan discourse," in which Nestor served (putatively) as adviser to the young Neoptolemos. As such he is a potential ancestor and paradigm for the *sophia* ("wisdom" or "cleverness") of Hippias himself and the sophists generally.[119] The ambiguous word *sophia* is ideally suited to blurring the line between a Nestor and a Hippias. Nestor prefigures not only the sophists' faith in eloquent (and verbose) persuasion, but their role as educators, especially for political life. By delivering his moralizing through the mouth of the "most wise" Nestor, Hippias takes onto his own shoulders the epic mantle of sage paternalism. At the same time, since he is supposed to be providing distinguishing features of each hero (364c), the characterization of Nestor as *sophos* serves to preempt Odysseus' claim to wisdom. Though many a Greek would no doubt have chosen him as "cleverest" of those at Troy, his cleverness characteristically takes the form of the versatile shrewdness captured in the word *polutropia*.[120] Odysseus traditionally shares Nestor's eloquence and self-restraint, but lacks his role as prudent adviser to the young.[121] The use of *sophos* for Nestor thus tacitly devalues Odyssean cleverness by allowing traditional paternalistic teaching to trump its claim to *sophia*.

Hippias seems to rely unthinkingly on the Iliadic values that underpin Achilles' unquestionable claim to cultural supremacy. Different people may be "best" in different respects, and Achilles acknowledges his own inferiority in counsel (*Il.* 18.105–6). Nonetheless, it is the greatest warrior who deserves the unadorned epithet *aristos*, and a fortiori embodies the answer to the question "who is better?" Odysseus' relative inferiority will be a matter for contention. Meanwhile, however, the complicating presence of Nestor suggests a criterion of excellence not encompassed by the Achillean warrior ideal. To a sophist or philosopher, *sophia* (in some form or another) must be of paramount importance. Hippias should be alert to this, for he has just described himself as unsurpassed in his own sphere (364a), and will turn out to be both "cleverest" and "best" at the

[119] The word *sophistēs* ("sophist") is very close, etymologically, to *sophos*. On the shift in its meaning see Guthrie 1969: 27–34. Plato's Protagoras explicitly traces the art of the sophist back to early figures of wisdom, including Homer (*Prot.* 316de; cf. also 341a). Compare the practice among craftsmen of tracing their lineage to a legendary forebear: doctors to Asklepios (*Symp.* 186e with Dover 1980 ad loc.), the Homeridae (a group of rhapsodes) to Homer (see *RE* s.v. and cf. *Ion* 530d), and perhaps sculptors (like Sokrates) to Daidalos (*Euth.* 11b, *Alc.* I. 121a, with Guthrie 1969: 378–9); cf. also Ar. *Frogs* 1032–6.

[120] Antisthenes defended Odysseus' *polutropia* as an aspect of his *sophia* (fr. 51 Caizzi). At Troy he was noted, among other things, for thinking up the wooden horse.

[121] For his self-restraint see North 1966: 40–41, 74–80; for his rhetorical skill see below, p. 155; for his resemblance to Nestor cf. *Od.* 3.126–9, *Phdr.* 261b, Arist. *Top.* 117b25. But in contrast to Nestor, whose son is with him at Troy, Odysseus is absent during his son's maturation.

subjects he professes (366d). He should therefore be wary of parroting the simple Homeric formula that makes Achilles "best," which is not merely inadequate to deal with the various excellences of the heroes he mentions, but threatens the basis of his own way of life and claim to excellence.

Sokrates reacts with amazement to Hippias' perfectly ordinary characterization of the three heroes – which he claims not to understand (364cd).[122] Beneath the irony lies a suggestion that the conventionally obvious may be open to question. Sokrates' immediate problem is not with the characterizations of Achilles and Nestor, which he "thinks" he understands, but with Odysseus and the epithet *polutropos* (364de). He asks Hippias whether Homer does not portray *Achilles* as *polutropos*. A case could be made for applying this epithet to Achilles, with his violent shifts of emotion and hence of language and behavior.[123] In traditional terms, however, the question is absurd, for *polutropia* was firmly associated with the notoriously devious Odysseus, in contrast to Achilles' blunt honesty. Hippias makes this point in his reply to Sokrates, by quoting Achilles' words to Odysseus in *Iliad* Book 9, where Achilles declares his hatred for duplicity.[124] These lines were famous in antiquity, and may have been a commonplace for contrasting the two characters.[125] According to Hippias, they show not only that Achilles is "truthful and simple," but that Odysseus is "*polutropos* and false (*pseudēs*)" (365b).[126] The word *pseudēs* need not mean "lying" or "deceitful," since it can be used for accidental, unknowing, or fictitious falsehoods, regardless of intention. But it is clear from the Homeric quotation that Hippias means here to characterize Odysseus as a liar. And as Sokrates proceeds to make explicit, he too is using *polutropos* in this fashion (365bc).

So according to Homer, says Sokrates, the truth-teller and the *pseudēs* are different (365c). This apparent truism will serve as the refutandum of the ensuing argument. Sokrates is therefore careful to ask Hippias

[122] Cf. his reaction to an equally trite statement at *HMaj.* 291de.

[123] And has been, by Schmiel 1983/4: 41–3. Cf. also Richardson 1993: 334.

[124] *Il.* 9.308–13; *HMin.* 365ab. Hippias omits 9.311 and slightly alters 310 and 314. Labarbe thinks these variations reflect a fourth-century text of Homer (1949: 51–2), but they are better explained as adaptations (conscious or otherwise) to Plato's context. Phillips claims that they misrepresent the intention of the Homeric Achilles (1987: 23), but cf. Stanford 1963: 18. Brennan suggests that they show the weakness of Hippias' memory (1987: 24–5; cf. also Phillips 1987: 24), but cf. Labarbe 1949: 51–2. More attractive is Brennan's idea (loc. cit.) that the alteration stresses intentional action.

[125] It is quoted by scholiasts on *Od.* 1.1 (= Antisth. fr. 51 Caizzi) and Soph. *Phil.* 94. But the former may not be independent of *HMin.* (see Pohlenz 1913: 57–9; Caizzi 1966 ad loc.).

[126] *Polutropos* is not used in the Homeric passage, but the word "much-contriving" (*polumēchanos*) with which Achilles addresses Odysseus, has a similar force (cf. Finley 1978: 34–5).

whether he accepts it (365c6; cf. 366a5–6). The latter quite rightly replies that it would be bizarre (*deinon*) to think otherwise (365c7). He and Homer, from whom the view is derived, stand side by side as representatives of ordinary common-sense opinion. At this point, however, Homer is temporarily abandoned, since, as Sokrates says, we cannot ask him what he had in mind when composing these lines (365cd).[127] This reflects Plato's (and his Sokrates') characteristic distrust of the verbal transmission of ideas in the absence of their author. Yet Hippias must continue to answer on Homer's behalf as well as his own, both because this is the responsibility he has assumed, and because he himself agrees with what he claims are Homer's views (365d). Hippias cannot serve as a real mouthpiece for the real Homer (that is impossible), but he does represent Homer as Hippias, Homerist, moralist and educator, understands him. By going to battle for this Homer, Hippias is implicitly defending the whole practice of Homeric interpretation and the educational and cultural milieu in which it flourishes. He has learned the lessons of Homeric education so effectively that he and Homer (as a cultural institution) will stand or fall together.

Socratic scrutiny of Hippias thus has a more than personal significance. Not only does he stand in for Homer, but his language, values and mentality characterize him as a mouthpiece for the unreflective common sense of ordinary people nurtured on a cultural tradition to which Homer was central. At the same time, he also stands for sophists as a class.[128] In two methodological passages Sokrates counts him as one *sophos* among many (369de, 372abc). And his closing comment will broaden the implications of Hippias' discomfiture to *sophoi* generally, who, as contrasted with the "lay person" (*idiōtēs*, 376c4), are presumably other professional sophists (376c). He thus embodies the public success of a certain kind of claim to wisdom, and his dialectical failure will be shown to result from this success and the status attending it, as well as from his personal limitations. Sokrates is not merely worsting an individual sophist, but displaying the intellectual and educational superiority of his own methods and goals over those of his most influential rivals. If Plato also invites us

[127] For the difficulty of ascertaining Homer's underlying meaning cf. *Ion* 530c4, *Prot.* 347e, *Rep.* 378de, Xen. *Symp.* 3.6. Contrast passages where a living, present person is asked to explain what he means (e.g. *Lach.* 196c, *Rep.* 430abc).

[128] Plato groups Hippias with other sophists in *Prot.* (cf. esp. 358a–359a), and at *HMaj.* 281a–282e, *Ap.* 19e, *Phdr.* 267b. He serves as a "generic sophist" for Plato, because of his versatility, and because he focused on rhetoric and pleasing the many, charged fees, and professed to teach excellence (see Woodruff 1982: 114–15, 131). In some ways, however, Plato's Hippias is not a "typical" sophist: his moral views are conventional, his practical skills are exceptional, and his skill at logic-chopping is non-existent.

to laugh at Hippias, this is not because he and his ilk are not dangerous competitors, but because one way to disarm the threat he represents is by dramatically asserting his essential triviality. His enormous professional success shows us why he constitutes such a threat, and hence why Plato devotes himself to a deflation that is scarcely justified (if Plato's picture is to be believed) by the sophist's intellectual credentials.

SOKRATES AND HIPPIAS

The stage is now set for the dialogue's first main argument, in which Sokrates "proves" that, contrary to the common-sense opinion of Hippias/Homer, the *alēthēs* or truth-teller is in fact the same as the *pseudēs* or false-speaker. He begins by winning Hippias' agreement to the proposition that the *pseudēs* is someone "capable" (*dunatos*) (365d). This exploits both the fact that the word *pseudēs* may express habitual activity, and hence a capacity, and the association of lying with manipulation and pragmatic success – associations particularly appropriate to Odysseus.[129] These connotations are evoked by Sokrates' association of *pseudēs* with the Odyssean words *polutropos* and *panourgia* ("unscrupulousness" or "villainy") (365e).[130] Hippias agrees that deception and versatility arise not from foolishness and ignorance but from "some kind of *panourgia* and wisdom (*phronēsis*)," and hence that deceivers know what they are doing (365e). The *pseudēs* hence turns out to be *sophos* in his own sphere: the sphere of lying (365e; cf. 366ab). But since the expert in any field of knowledge is the one best able to speak both truth and falsehood, the *pseudēs* and the truth-teller turn out to be the same person (366c–369b). Hence both Achilles and Odysseus are simultaneously "liars" and truth-tellers, and thus the same as each other, rather than opposites as Hippias had initially believed (369b).

The erstwhile verbose and self-confident sophist is reduced by this argument to inconsistency and confusion, as reflected in his brief, insubstantial answers. At least since Aristotle, however, the argument has been justly criticized as fallacious, especially for its equivocation on *pseudēs* as a capacity and as a disposition giving rise to intentional action (*Met.* 1025a6–13). It can be defended only at the price of neglecting the ambiguity of *pseudēs*, and treating it as denoting simply a capacity.[131]

[129] For the association of lying with intelligence and power see Pratt 1993: 60.

[130] On *panourgia* and its association with Odysseus and with multiplicity see Blundell 1987: 315–16; cf. also Pohlenz 1913: 71.

[131] As Weiss does (1981: 288–94). See contra Waterfield 1987b: 277; Zembaty 1989: 52–8.

But the price is too high, ignoring as it does the argumentative context. Since the question at issue is one of character, we naturally expect the epithets to refer to purposeful behaviour or disposition, rather than mere capacity. This expectation is confirmed by the language of both participants. Hippias says Homer often portrays Odysseus as being "of such a kind" (τοιοῦτου, 365c1), and Sokrates' word for "deceptive" (ἀπατεῶνες) cannot be restricted to mere capacity (365e3). Hippias even touches on the moral significance of intention with his casual observation that it is liars' knowledge that makes them reprehensible (365e). He does, however, accept Sokrates' move from "false-speakers are *among* the capable and clever" to "false-speakers *are* those clever and capable of falsehood" (366ab). Once *pseudēs* has been *defined* like this, in terms of pure capacity, the argument is technically valid.[132] But only at the price of "a brazen departure from common usage,"[133] and furthermore, a departure that neglects the original terms of the discussion.

It is impossible to be certain whether or not Plato meant to represent Sokrates as aware of this equivocation.[134] But the peculiarity of his definition of *pseudēs* indicates that Sokrates is at least conscious of the ambiguity underlying the fallacy – unless we are to suppose him oblivious to ordinary usage. Since the argument is most emphatically derived from Hippias, Sokrates is not personally committed to its soundness.[135] Moreover his upcoming "literary criticism" will indirectly reveal the flaw in this first argument. At the very least, his absurd claim in that subsquent discussion, that Achilles outdoes Odysseus as a purposeful liar and cheat (371a), will strongly suggest the importance of intention. It even seems to prompt such an understanding in Hippias (below, pp. 146–7). In my view, then, Plato does not mean to represent Sokrates himself as taken in by the argument he extracts from his interlocutor. It is an ad hominem argument whose crudeness displays Hippias' obtuseness, in ignominious contrast to his initial pretensions.

This does not mean, however, that Sokrates intends to win a cheap dialectical victory through deceit. Just as intention is the key to distinguishing Achilles from Odysseus, it is also fundamental to the difference between Socratic dialectic and eristic, as portrayed by Plato. The mission

[132] Cf. Zembaty 1989 (though she places the pivotal moment at 366a2). [133] Vlastos 1991: 277.

[134] That neither Plato nor his Sokrates is aware of the fallacy is argued by Vlastos 1991: 275–80. Sprague argues for conscious use of fallacy (1962: ch. 4; cf. also Friedländer 1964–9: II.138–46; Klosko 1983: 372–3; Kahn 1996: 113–19; Balaudé 1997b).

[135] This is a standard feature of Sokrates' elenctic method (above, p. 120), but it receives exceptional emphasis here. The phrase κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον ("in accordance with your argument") occurs four times, three of them in connection with this argument (365e1, 366a8, 370a2; cf. 373b7). Cf. also 365c6, 366ab, 367b2–3, 367b4, 368e3, 369a2.

of the elenctic Sokrates is not to mislead or deceive, but to prompt in the interlocutor an *aporia* parallel to his own, which may be the first step towards better understanding. Unmistakable echoes of *Apology* make it clear that Sokrates' manner in *Hippias Minor* should not be considered alien to the elenctic Sokrates' overall philosophical mission to improve the souls of his interlocutors (cf. *Ap.* 21c, 30a). His provocative arguments form part of this educational strategy, by challenging common sense and providing openings for Hippias to come to its rescue. This strategy is rooted in the individual, as we can see from the way Sokrates evidently adapts the argument to Hippias' personality, in an effort to goad the sophist towards a better understanding of his own limitations. This view is confirmed by his suggestion that the dialectical method will benefit Hippias (373a5).[136] The purpose is not to mislead the sophist, but to provoke him into thinking for himself. Thus even Hippias sees that something is wrong with the present argument (369bc). The absurdity of its conclusion is a challenge to him, to the audience of bystanders, and ultimately to ourselves, to try to disentangle it.

One particularly striking feature of this argument brings out the intimate relationship between Socratic refutation and the character of his interlocutor. That is the way Sokrates uses Hippias himself as the source of all his examples. This offers the sophist ample opportunity to raise questions from his own experience concerning the behavior and disposition of the *pseudēs*. Since Hippias is experienced in arithmetic, he is "most capable, clever and excellent" at it, and hence most capable of lying about it at will; it follows that the *pseudēs* and the truth-teller are the same (366c–367d). The same conclusion is drawn from his abilities in geometry and astronomy (367d–368a). The argument is then extended to all branches of knowledge (368a), and Sokrates proceeds to report Hippias' own boast that he is "cleverest of all human beings in the greatest number of skills" (368ab). According to his own self-estimation, then, Hippias is uniquely qualified to confirm Sokrates' argument from the standpoint of his extraordinarily extensive knowledge. Since he accepts without question that to be *pseudēs* is reprehensible, we may assume that he would not claim this epithet for himself.[137] Yet he fails to identify the flaw in the argument, despite the fact that he himself is Sokrates' Exhibit

[136] This passage is neglected by those who exclude Hippias from the educational beneficiaries of the conversation (e.g. Friedländer 1964–9: II.145; Sprague 1962: 78–9). The possibility that Hippias was still alive when the dialogue was composed (cf. Pohlenz 1913: 69) adds an intriguing further dimension to Plato's educational goals.

[137] See n. 171 below, and cf. Xen. *Mem.* 4.4.7. Hippias never entertains the possibility of justifiable falsehood (e.g. for pedagogical or diplomatic purposes), or acknowledges any potentially positive aspects of the Odyssean paradigm.

A – and perhaps in part because of it. His own success is of a kind that glorifies the use of morally neutral skills for personal ends.[138] As Sokrates sums up his position, the "capable" man (*dunatos*) is one who "does what he wants when he wants to" (366bc). His inability to distinguish capacity from disposition is an indictment, from a Socratic perspective, of this preoccupation with the ability to achieve one's goals rather than the state of character that establishes them. His Socratic inadequacy is displayed not just by his dialectical failure but by the *kind* of mistake that he makes, and the attitude towards *sophia* that this reveals. The argument is structured around the man himself in such a way as to highlight this inadequacy.

Plato selects this strategic moment for Sokrates to expatiate on Hippias' impressively versatile polymathy, which so far has only been hinted at (363c1–3, 364a9).[139] As a Homerist, Hippias shares his master's encyclopedic "wisdom."[140] This kind of versatility was admired by the general public, as Hippias' pride in it makes clear.[141] But by extolling it at just this point in the argument, Sokrates uses it to underscore the sophist's dialectical inadequacy and the paltriness – from a Socratic perspective – of his claims to wisdom.

In listing Hippias' accomplishments Sokrates begins with practical skills. He recounts the sophist's boast that he once came to Olympia with "everything concerning the body" – jewelry, shoes, clothing, oil-bottle and scraper – all of his own workmanship (368bc). The list of items reaches its climax with the Persian belt he wove himself, which everyone agreed was "most extraordinary" (*atopōtatos*) and evidence of "the greatest *sophia*" (368c). Plato could scarcely make it clearer that the

[138] Like other sophists, he values rhetoric as a tool for winning personal success by defeating all comers (*HMaj.* 304ab; cf. esp. *Gorg.* 456c–457c). In *HMaj.* he views capacity or power, especially in the political arena, as something "fine" (*kalon*), and values *sophia* for similar reasons (295e–296a; cf. also *Prot.* 319a1).

[139] For Hippias' polymathy see *HMaj.* 285c–e and above, n. 88. Contrast Ion's specialization in Homer (*Ion* 531a, 533c).

[140] Compare 368b2–3 with Xen. *Symp.* 4.6–7. For the wide range of skills "taught" by Homer cf. *Ion* 536e–541b, *Rep.* 606e, and above, p. 90.

[141] Cf. e.g. Ar. *Wasps* 1174–5. Hoerber alleges that polymathy was a matter of ridicule to "the Greeks" (1962: 124). But besides the famous polemical remark of Heraclitus (DK 22 B40) and a reference to the *Margites*, which does not condemn polymathy per se (Margites is an utter fool who fails at everything; see especially fr. 2–3 Allen), all his examples come from Plato. The value of polymathy was in fact a matter of some philosophical debate (see Kerferd 1981: 41 and cf. *Sept. Sap.* DK 10.3.a.3, Hippon DK 38 B3, Anaxarch. DK 72 B 1, Isoc. 1. 18, Democr. DK 68 B 64, 65, 299; Democritus was himself a notable polymath). It was also admired in many artistic contexts (above, p. 67).

ambivalent word *sophia* is no guarantee of philosophical wisdom, if it can be used for such an ingenious but trivial and even decadent item, fit only for the admiration of the many. Moreover all the relevant crafts are banausic, womanly or barbarian, and as such would be despised by many Greeks, especially elite males.[142] Weaving, in particular, was strongly associated with the female.[143] In properly Homeric fashion, Hippias is concerned with the body as well as the soul, but only in a superficially glamorous way.[144] He focuses on external trappings rather than physical health and vigor, just as he prefers rhetoric and the commonplaces of popular morality to the strenuous intellectual exercise of dialectic. Plato matches the inner man to the outer through a profusion of external details, creating a memorably individualized picture by means of a material and intellectual gallimaufry redolent of comedy (cf. above, pp. 61–2). In Hippias' case – in contrast to Sokrates himself – breadth of knowledge, cosmopolitanism and the transcendence of class and gender are rendered vulgar and contemptible.[145]

Sokrates expands his catalogue by adding Hippias' literary compositions and "the subjects I mentioned earlier" (namely arithmetic, geometry and astronomy), followed by "rhythm, intonation, orthography and very many other things besides."[146] Some of these subjects – especially the mathematical – are highly valued by Sokrates elsewhere in Plato. But they are trivialized here by their placement within his speech, which locates them on a par with the practical and decorative crafts with which he began.[147] The list is capped with the ironic mention (Sokrates "almost forgot" it) of Hippias' mnemonic technique (368d). This was no doubt useful for memorizing Homer, as well as the rest of Hippias' vast

[142] Cic. *De Orat.* 3.32 contrasts Hippias' practical skills with his *liberales doctrinae atque ingenuae* (learning befitting a free-born gentleman). Cf. also *HMaj.* 291a with Woodruff 1982 ad loc.

[143] Hippias weaves his clothes as well as his belt (368c). In Greek life, men participated in some of the processes associated with fabric-production, and some weaving was done by men (cf. Skemp 1952: 44 n. 1; Lane 1998: 167). And Plato's Sokrates often uses male weavers as craft examples (*Rep.* 369d, *Crat.* 388c, *Gorg.* 490d, *Phd.* 87bc; cf. also Arist. *Pol.* 1291a13, and below, p. 360.). But weaving per se was strongly associated with the female. For a man to weave is a frequent marker of gender-reversal (cf. Hdt. 2.35.2, *Diss. Log.* 2.17, Ar. *Lys.* 529–38, *Birds* 831 with Dunbar 1995 ad loc.).

[144] For the contrast between soul and body cf. 364a, 372e–373a. Cf. Sokrates' contempt for Ion's costume, expressed as ironic praise (*Ion* 530b).

[145] For Sokrates see above, pp. 75–80. Note in particular that despite his familiarity with many crafts, he rarely *practises* even the one in which he is trained (stone-carving).

[146] 368cd (trans. Waterfield 1987b).

[147] Note too that the mathematical subjects are not explicitly listed, but skimmed over. Hippias' various mathematical skills recall the propaedeutic studies of *Rep.* (cf. D. Tarrant 1928: xxxi; Grube 1933: 203–4), but his versatility is the antithesis of the specialization that underlies Kallipolis (*Rep.* 370c; cf. also *Charm.* 161e–162a).

store of knowledge, and the sophist is especially proud of it (368d7).[148] A good memory is, of course, essential for dialectic, but not in the form of the memorization of lists, as Sokrates' subsequent irony implies: when the sophist fails to recall the implications of the argument, Sokrates remarks that he must not be using his mnemonic method – perhaps he thinks it unnecessary? – so he, Sokrates (a living interlocutor rather than a mechanical technique), will prod his companion's memory (369a).

Sokrates concludes his speech by inviting Hippias to generalize over this whole diverse group of skills, and other people's as well, and indeed any kind of *sophia* or unscrupulousness (*panourgia*), and conclude that in every case the *pseudēs* and the truth-teller are one and the same (368e–369a). The catalogue of skills establishes a painful contrast between Hippias' pretensions and the conclusion to which Sokrates has driven him, a conclusion that not only contradicts his previously stated view but clearly violates common sense (as Hippias' rather tentative agreement at 369a3 indicates). Sokrates' strategically located speech makes clear that it is the quality of Hippias' mind and character, as displayed in his diffuse and vulgar interests, his delight in material trivia, and his concern for public admiration, that impedes his ability to understand and criticize the argument. With his vast range of knowledge and celebrated mnemonic technique, the sophist is living (or dramatic) proof that dialectical insight is not reached through the rote acquisition of merely factual information. At the same time, Sokrates implicitly validates not only memory of the right kind, but even polymathy of a sort. He does this by putting Hippias' wide variety of crafts to work in the service of philosophy: by making them grist to his elenctic mill, he implies that breadth of knowledge has its own value, if properly used and placed within the hierarchy of values established by dialectic. Here, as throughout Plato's works, Sokrates displays his own kinds of polymathy and *poikilia*, but this multiplicity is subordinated to his larger philosophical goals.[149] Hippias' use of the crafts is, by contrast, not only focused primarily on the body, but encyclopedic as opposed to synoptic and hierarchical.[150]

[148] At *HMaj.* 285e he says he can memorize fifty names at one hearing. Cf. also Xen. *Symp.* 4.62. The lyric poet Simonides was said to have invented the art of mnemonics, but his methods were probably derived from the oral poetic tradition (F. A. Yates 1966: 1–2, 29).

[149] Even Heraclitus, the most notorious opponent of *polymathiē*, says the philosopher must inquire into many things (DK 22 B35). The question is what kind of intellectual cosmos they compose: an orderly system (DK 22 B30) or a "pile of sweepings" (DK 22 B124).

[150] The same is true in *Rep.* of the diverse learning of the sight-lovers (475c–476b) and the *poikilia* of the democratic state and man (557bc, 561a–e). There is also a parallel with the superficial learning of those who use books at *Phdr.* 275ab.

Hippias' encyclopedic accomplishments include various literary compositions: epic, tragic and dithyrambic poetry, and "many prose speeches of different kinds" (368cd; cf. 363c).[151] These are listed with his other home-made items, right after the Persian belt, thus placing the poet's and speech-writer's arts on the same level as the cobbler's and weaver's. The conflation of these different kinds of artifact – the intellectual with the material – is reinforced both by the traditional view of poetic composition as the "weaving" of words, and by the literal (and not uncommon) meaning of the word he uses for poetry (*poiēmata*, 368c8) as "things made" (cf. *Symp.* 205bc). Hippias' role as a poet, in particular of epic, also recalls his special relationship to Homer, another poetical "maker," who is at this moment being compromised by the intellectual inadequacy of his spokesman (cf. 365cd).[152] The student of Homer has learned his master's craft – both his encyclopedic knowledge, and his ability to delight an audience with pleasurable "falsehoods."[153] Yet he has acquired neither rational consistency nor dialectical insight. His inability to criticize the argument, and the state of contradiction to which it reduces him, show the failure of his Homeric training and his multifarious "wisdom" to equip him for dialectic. In Socratic terms, only the latter can yield the genuine ethical understanding to which Hippias thinks his Homeric studies give him professional access.

After Sokrates has "proven" that the liar and the truth-teller are the same person, the dialogue is punctuated by an outbreak of resentment from Hippias (369bc). This is the first sign that his equanimity has been ruffled.[154] Like many of Sokrates' victims, he is unable to find specific fault with the argument, yet still feels something is wrong (cf. above, p. 126). He therefore withholds assent to the final paradox, protesting at the way Sokrates habitually "weaves" his arguments (369bc). The metaphor is a pejorative one, since weaving is a frequent image not only for verbal composition, but for *poikilia* and deception, especially crafty schemes to trap or ensnare.[155] In Hippias' mouth it suggests a contrast between Socratic dialectic and Hippias' own kind of cleverness, to the advantage of the latter – a suggestion reinforced by the echo of Hippias'

[151] Only six lines of his verse survive (see D. Tarrant 1928: xxiv).
[152] The verb "make" (ποιέω) is used repeatedly of Homer (e.g. 364c5, 364d8, 364e2, 365c1, 369c4, 370e1, 371a4).
[153] On fiction as "falsehood" see Heath 1987: 39–40; Pratt 1993.
[154] Except for a touch of impatience prior to the argument proper (365d5).
[155] Both of these are in turn associated with the feminine (see Bergren 1983 and cf. Zeitlin 1996: 361–3).

literal weaving of his clothing and belt (368c). At the same time, it reminds us that Sokrates, as a weaver of words, is Homer's rival as well as Hippias'.

Worsted by question and answer, the sophist understandably wishes to revert to a more congenial mode of discourse. In an agonistic spirit appropriate both to his métier and to his epic subject, he continues to seek a single "winner" in the contest of Homeric characters, ignoring Sokrates' claim that Odysseus and Achilles are "the same," and taking him instead to be defending Odysseus' superiority. Accordingly, he proposes a rhetorical debate, effectively transposing the question of which Homeric character is "better" into the question of who can speak "better" in the eyes of the audience, Hippias or Sokrates (369c). The relative merit of Homer's characters is to be established by an *agōn*, or formal rhetorical contest, between Plato's characters, whose outcome will be determined by the applause of the many. Hippias is proposing that the reputation of Homer's heroes should depend on the skill of their battling advocates in the court of public opinion. Since this is the arena in which he shines, he can hope to salvage his professional honor with a victory.

Sokrates evades this manoeuvre by pleading "no contest" to Hippias' superior "wisdom," and reiterating his desire to learn and benefit from it (369de; cf. 372bc). We are thus reminded both of the recently-discomfited Hippias' claims as a teacher and of the two men's contrasting goals and methods. There is indeed an *agōn* of literary characters in play throughout the work, but one of a different kind from that envisaged by Hippias (see further below, pp. 154–62). Yet Sokrates does not disappoint Hippias in his request for a more substantial speech. Adopting the sophist's own manner, he proceeds to quote Homer in defense of the paradoxical conclusion that Achilles and Odysseus are both liars and truth-tellers, and hence the same (369b). As he rightly observes, Achilles' famous words from *Iliad* Book 9 are poor evidence by themselves for Odysseus' duplicity (369e–370a). Achilles himself, on the other hand, contradicts himself more than once in this portion of the *Iliad* (370a–371c). Since he was surely too well born and educated to do this inadvertently, Sokrates concludes that Achilles outdoes even Odysseus as a "magician" (*goēs*) (371a–d).[156]

This farcical treatment of Homer, which blithely ignores the bulk of the poetic evidence, displays Sokrates' adeptness at the common cultural practice, employed in both sophistic and traditional education,

[156] Plato routinely uses this word for liars and charlatans, and especially associates it with sophists, rhetoricians and poets (Louis 1945: 73–4; cf. also above, p. 97).

of selective quotation from the poets for literary-critical and pedagogical purposes (above, pp. 93–4). Hippias himself composed an anthology, presumably for some such reason (DK 86 B6). Here as elsewhere, then, Plato shows Sokrates beating the sophists at their own game (as well as his own). But this does not make the passage merely an amusing bagatelle. If the game is the interpretation of Homer, Sokrates beats Hippias at a rather different one, since the sophist's readings of Homer are much more convincing than his. Despite Hippias' praise for Sokrates' sophistic handling of Simonides in *Protagoras* (347a), his interpretations of Homer in our dialogue are perfectly plausible. Sokrates is competing with him not for some imaginary crown of contextual Homeric exegesis, but for the larger prize of cultural authority. By reducing to absurdity the unreflective educational use of Homer, Sokrates shows the intellectual limitations of a method whose highly successful practitioner is so easily trapped and confused.

Sokrates' manipulation of Homeric quotations also shows the inadequacy of even the most plausible contextual interpretations, like that offered by Hippias, to protect literary characters from misappropriation by readers and critics who may ignore, accidentally or willfully, indications of character within the text.[157] The ancient practice of quoting out of context simply exemplifies at its most extreme the selective attention to texts that underlies *all* interpretation. This has potentially serious implications for Plato's own dramatic practice. Yet Plato's Sokrates elsewhere does not treat this kind of selective, decontextualized manipulation of literature as *intrinsically* frivolous. This is clear from his treatment of Homer in *Republic*, where the distortions of Achilles and his motives differ only in degree from those in *Hippias Minor* (compare 371cd with *Rep.* 391c). In the present dialogue too, Sokrates' superficially absurd conclusions have serious implications. He will go on to address without frivolity the suggestion arising out of this argument, that the purposeful wrongdoer, exemplified by Odysseus, is superior to the inadvertent one, represented here by Achilles.

Sokrates' foray into literary criticism returns him, he says, to the *aporia* in which he posed his original question. He asked that question, he now says, in the belief that there was little to choose between Achilles and Odysseus in regard to honesty or "the rest of excellence (*aretē*)" (370de). By collapsing the distinction between two traditionally different paradigms of excellence – honest warrior and devious trickster – Sokrates

[157] The same point is suggested by Sokrates' "interpretation" of Simonides in *Prot.* (cf. McPherran 1990: 220).

lets us know that he is operating with a different notion of excellence, one that can encompass both these divergent paradigms and hold them to a single standard. At the same time, he has now reintroduced Achilles and Odysseus as a pair of competing ethical models. Hippias too reverts to his original demeanor, having apparently regained his initial composure.[158] He is confident that Sokrates is wrong, and provides the common-sense solution to his difficulty: Odysseus and Achilles are to be distinguished by their intentions (370e, 371de). Achilles speaks a "falsehood" in Sokrates' first example because he is "forced" by the army's plight to stay and help them (370e), and in the other case because he is "persuaded by good will" (371e1).[159] Such self-contradictions, Hippias implies, do not indicate a lying (and so reprehensible) disposition, if they arise inadvertently from commendable motives, as opposed to deliberate calculation. The same view is suggested by Sokrates' ironic characterization of Achilles as "nobly scorning truth-telling" (370d).[160] A further clue may be glimpsed in his mischievous claim that someone educated, like Achilles, by a "most clever" (*sophōtatos*) teacher (371d1) will not be forgetful (371c6). The implausible suggestion that a well-trained memory is sufficient for consistent truth-telling recalls not only Sokrates' mockery of the "clever" Hippias' mnemonics (368d), but the first inquiry, with its conspicuous neglect of disposition, motive and intention. Hippias' failure to grasp the significance of such factors prevented him from pinpointing the fallacy. But faced with the absurdity of Sokrates' Homeric analysis, he grasps the key.

As with the first refutation, the purpose of Sokrates' Homeric exegesis can only be fully understood in the light of Hippias' character. Plato does not simply use Sokrates to discredit the sophistic practice of poetic interpretation in general. Both the choice of particular Homeric exempla and the direction of the argument are tailored more specifically to Hippias' professional claims, his need for dialectical prompting, and his particular inability to distinguish capacity from disposition. The playful excursion into literary criticism thus serves a serious pedagogical purpose, for its claims are so ludicrous as to prod even Hippias into grasping a vital factor missing from the preceding argument. But if Hippias now sees the

[158] This ability to retain his self-confidence is one of his salient features in *HMaj.* (cf. 291b, 295a, 297e, 300c, 301d).

[159] Reading εὐνοίας ("good will") with Burnet and others. Most MSS have εὐηθείας ("simplicity"), which is accepted by Vancamp 1996, but see Calogero 1948 ad loc.

[160] The irony is compounded by the fact that "noble" (*gennaios*) normally connotes frankness (cf. 366e3). Sokrates' locution hints at the idea that falsehood may have positive value, as with the "noble falsehood" of *Rep.* 414b (see further below, pp. 158–9).

importance of disposition, this is only because, like the ignoramus who lacks the skill to tell a deliberate falsehood (367a2–3), he has been lucky enough to stumble upon it, thanks to Sokrates. He never relates his new insight to the earlier discussion, or shows any understanding of how the fallacy arose. Nor does he display any awareness of the implications of this insight for his own life. Among these is the implication that people like himself and Odysseus, so well endowed with manifold skills, must give careful thought to the ends for which they employ their impressive capacities. It is in this part of the dialogue that Sokrates teasingly accuses Hippias of "deceiving" him and "imitating" Odysseus (370e10–11). The verb "imitate" (μιμῇ) suggests that Hippias' deception results from his Homeric education, while "deceive" (ἐξαπατᾷς) implies that it is calculated.[161] The latter is strenuously denied by Hippias (371a1): whether he speaks truth or falsehood, his dialectical performance remains that of an ignoramus (*amathēs*).

Sokrates seems to accept this defense (since he drops his suggestion that Achilles is a deliberate liar). But by prompting it, he has also got Hippias where he wants him for his second main argument. Odysseus, Sokrates now declares, is "better" than Achilles, since the purposeful liar has been shown to be "better" than the inadvertent one (371e). This proposition has not been explicitly affirmed, but it can easily be derived from the assumptions of the earlier argument, and serves to tie together the two main stages of the dialogue.[162] After provoking Hippias into identifying the weakness of the first argument, Sokrates juxtaposes this new perception with those earlier assumptions, giving Hippias an opportunity to apply his insight into the importance of intention retrospectively. The sophist is now well placed to respond that deliberate liars were proved only to be better at their subject matter, and hence at lying, than inadvertent "liars," not to be better people. Indeed, the discussion of Achilles' intentions has given him the materials to argue that the inadvertent "liar" may actually be superior, if, like Achilles, he or she acts from admirable motives. And this is indeed the path that Hippias takes. But he does not articulate his objection in terms of the earlier argument, appealing instead to custom and common sense, as enshrined in general opinion and the laws.[163] He is shocked by the threat that Sokrates' argument poses to

[161] Cf. *Ion* 541e4, *Gorg.* 499c. [162] See Weiss 1981: 295–6 and cf. Calogero 1948: ix, xiii–xvi.

[163] For this "law" or custom cf. *Ap.* 26a. Ritter points to the irony of Hippias' words, given his support elsewhere for nature over convention (1933: 39; cf. n. 98 above). But a universal opinion may qualify as an unwritten (and hence "natural") law (cf. Xen. *Mem.* 4.4.19–20). If indulgence

conventional notions of responsibility and punishment. Using his favorite grammatical construction for such moments, he asks how Sokrates' conclusion "could possibly be so" (371e–372a; cf. above, n. 97).

Hippias' common-sense statement prompts another lengthy speech from Sokrates, which balances his first discourse on Hippias' accomplishments (372a–373a). This time the subject is Sokrates' own search for wisdom, as the dialogue's emphasis shifts from Hippias' goals and methods to those of Sokrates. The two speeches crystallize the counterpoint between Sokrates' avowed ignorance, confusion, and willingness to learn, and Hippias' reputed wisdom, complacency, self-confidence and refusal to accept the consequences of the argument.[164] It is Sokrates' present opinion, he says, that deliberate wrong-doers are superior, yet sometimes he thinks the opposite and "wanders around," obviously out of ignorance (372de).[165] Unlike Hippias, however, who blames disagreement and confusion on his interlocutor, Sokrates blames no one but himself and the argument.[166] At a comparable stage in other elenctic dialogues Sokrates sometimes nudges the interlocutor in a more fruitful direction.[167] Here too the subsequent argument points towards a solution to the central problem of motivation. It also assumes a new tone, as Sokrates abandons his heavy emphasis on the person of Hippias as the source of every step. In keeping, however, with his pose as Hippias' student, he maintains that it is up to Hippias to "heal" his soul from the "fit" or "seizure" visited on it by the argument (372e–373a).[168]

By emphasizing that his present opinion is "opposite" not only to Hippias' common-sense view (372d4) but to his own judgment on other occasions (372d7), Sokrates reminds us of the inconsistency with which Achilles said "the opposite to himself" (371a6–7). By the standard applied to Achilles, then, Sokrates is identifying himself as the same kind of *pseudēs* – someone who verbally contradicts himself, but does so from integrity rather than duplicity. The analogy between Sokrates and Achilles (as opposed to Odysseus) is reinforced by Sokrates' denial of knowledge, since, according to the earlier argument, his ignorance disqualifies him

for inadvertent wrong-doing falls into this category, then custom and positive law would provide evidence for its universality.

[164] Cf. 364b6, 364c9, 370d7, 372bc, 372d–373a, 376c.

[165] At *Ap.* 26a he appears to hold that opposite view. Sokrates' perplexity here does not show (pace Vlastos 1991: 275–80) that Sokrates is unaware of the equivocation underlying the first elenchus, since the paradox that provokes his confusion does not rest on the ambiguity of *pseudēs*.

[166] 372de; contrast 369bc, 370e5, 373b.

[167] Cf. *Euth.* 11e, *Meno* 81a.

[168] The medical analogy was popular with the sophists (see Guthrie 1969: 167–9), and may have been used by Hippias himself (cf. *Prot.* 357e).

from being a calculating *pseudēs* on the Odyssean model. This connection is brought out by linguistic echoes associating Sokrates' avowal of ignorance with the ineptness of the *amathēs* at deliberate falsehood, in contrast to the "cleverness" of Hippias.[169]

Hippias will accuse Sokrates of causing a disturbance in the argument and "doing wrong" (κακουργεῖν 373b), by which he presumably means manipulating the argument in a calculated way.[170] But Sokrates underlines his own resemblance to Achilles by mischievously replying that this behavior is not purposeful, and hence, according to Hippias' own argument, merits forgiveness. To the reader, Hippias' complaint may seem well justified, if Sokrates is indeed aware of the fallacies in the preceding argument. But even if he is manipulating the argument on purpose, it does not follow that he is "doing wrong," either deliberately or otherwise, as long as he views his manipulations as serving a beneficial pedagogical purpose.[171] Moreover there is no reason why the personal confusion to which he attests must be insincere in any obvious sense. He is still wrestling with the idea that justice is a kind of craft, and pursuing its paradoxical consequences.[172] Sokrates, like Achilles, is living proof that inconsistency and *poikilia* are not the same as lying or deception.

At this transitional point, the dialogue is punctuated by the brief reappearance of Eudikos (373abc). Though Homer and his characters were left behind formally two pages earlier (371e), Sokrates' invocation of Eudikos as "son of Apemantos" (373a6), serves to remind us of the Homeric inquiry that initiated the discussion, the setting among philosophically-interested bystanders, and the educational implications of both.[173] Eudikos' reply also evokes the opening, as he reminds Hippias of the professional consistency by which he originally set such store, and begs him to answer, for the sake of the company and his own earlier assertions.[174] Besides adverting to the sophist's initial claims, this appeal touches discreetly on the presence of an interested audience, on

[169] Ἀμαθία 372c1, 373a1, cf. 367a2; διὰ τὸ μὴ εἰδέναι 372d8–9, cf. 367a3.

[170] Cf. 371e–372a. On the significance of the verb see Weiss 1981: 300 n. 49.

[171] As Weiss notes (1981: 296, 300), it is Hippias who associates deliberate falsehood with "injustice" (371e–372a, 375d3; cf. also 365e, 369c; Calogero 1948 on 375cd; and above, n. 137). O'Brien claims that both Hippias and Sokrates "unhesitatingly" classify lying as "immoral" (1967: 104). But the evidence for Sokrates (370e2–3, 372d5) does not exclude the possibility of justifiable falsehood (as opposed to deception).

[172] Cf. Haden 1997: 154–5.

[173] Calogero 1948 ad loc. suggests that this appellation has a mock-Homeric ring.

[174] 373abc; cf. 363cd, 364d. Waterfield 1987b translates τῶν προειρημένων σοι λόγων (373c2) as "the previous discussion." But this misses the antithesis (ἡμῶν . . . σοι), and the echo of 373b 1–2 (τὰ προειρημένα). Cf. also *Rep.* 344d4.

whose approbation Hippias' professional success depends.[175] When he does agree to continue, it is for Eudikos' sake (373c4). It was Eudikos, after all, who prompted Hippias' original assertion of professional consistency (363c), and it was probably he who sponsored the present occasion. If Hippias backs out now, he faces the potential loss of an admirer and client, and perhaps of others like him who are awaiting his response. Failure to live up to his own professions will further undermine the claim to wisdom on which his livelihood depends.

Pride, consistency, and his very métier as a sophist thus oblige Hippias to continue. But the same professional pride will seal his humiliation, as Sokrates proceeds with his argument to prove the superiority of the purposeful wrong-doer. The argument takes the form of a massive *epagōgē*, or inference from examples, based on an extensive list of human activities. These range from a wide variety of physical accomplishments, to tool-using skills and capacities of the human soul (373c–375d). The numerous examples seem carefully chosen to lure Hippias gradually from the apparently obvious to a far from obvious conclusion.[176] In each case Sokrates argues that those who purposefully perform an activity badly are "better" than those who do so despite themselves. Hippias agrees with each step, though his responses are always brief, and often limited or grudging.[177] But he balks at the ultimate conclusion: that the soul that does wrong deliberately is superior to the one that does so despite itself (375d).

Hippias is right to have misgivings here. Sokrates is not justified in extending the argument from specific skills to conclusions about the human soul as such. If he proves anything about human excellence, it is that it is best to be in control of achieving the goals one sets oneself.[178] This would be a fair way to summarize the *sophia* of an Odysseus, but it does not necessarily coincide with human excellence as such, in particular with moral excellence. Each skill has internal goals (such as hitting whatever one aims at) but societies establish other, external goals (such as hitting a proposed target) which affect their evaluation of the performer. This is implicitly acknowledged in Sokrates' argument, when he speaks of running slowly, taking a wrestling fall, ugliness of posture, and poor

[175] On ἡμῶν ἕνεκα (373c2) see Calogero 1948 ad loc. and cf. *Gorg.* 497b.

[176] Cf. Robinson 1953: 43; Calogero 1948 ad loc. The wide range of examples recalls Hippias' polymathy, but there is little overlap with his skills. Haden notes the Odyssean associations of the bow and the rudder (1997: 167 n. 15).

[177] E.g. 374a1, 374a6, 374b3, 374d7.

[178] Cf. the earlier definition of *dunatos* (366bc; cf. also *HMaj.* 295e–296a).

musicianship as "shameful" even when purposeful.[179] The slowest runner may in fact be the most skilled at running, but she will never win the race. Likewise Odysseus may be most skillful at accomplishing his own goals, but unless these coincide with societal values he will never be endorsed as "best."

The earlier discussion of Achilles' motives offered Hippias a clue that might have helped him isolate these difficulties. But instead he simply protests, using his characteristic idiom: "it would be *deinon*" if this were so (375d3–4). His response to the paradox has not altered since it was first aired (cf. 371e–372a). He has stuck to his guns, but made no progress in understanding. He cannot see why the conclusion follows (375d6); but nor can he identify any flaw in the argument or give reasons for his opposition. Sokrates therefore tacitly shows him what is wrong with the argument, by supplying a vital missing premise. Is not justice necessarily, he says, "some kind of capacity (*dunamis*) or knowledge or both"? (375de). Hippias agrees. Given his character and profession, such agreement is to be expected. It reflects the confidence of the polymathic educator who professes to be skilled, and able to impart his skill, in all manner of subjects, including human excellence.[180] But the admission is fatal. Armed with this concession, Sokrates can extend his list of examples to include justice: the juster soul will be wiser and more capable, and thus have a greater capacity for opposites; hence when it performs unjust deeds it will do so purposefully; hence he who does wrong purposefully (if any such person exists) is the good man (*agathos*) (375e–376b). This argument has been criticized for passing illegitimately from functional to moral excellence. But the introduction of justice as a kind of knowledge or capacity successfully bridges the gap and justifies Sokrates' paradoxical conclusion.[181]

Justice remains, however, crucially different from other skills.[182] As a kind of knowledge or capacity it has its own internal goals like any other craft. But unlike other skills, it cannot be used "badly" for immoral goals outside its own sphere of activity, since its internal goals are precisely those of virtue. Nor can one simply decide not to use this skill,

[179] 373e, 374a, 374b6, 375c2. On this aspect of the argument cf. Calogero 1948 on 373e; Weiss 1981: 297–8. On the distinction between knowledge of a skill and knowledge of aims cf. Gulley 1968: 88.

[180] See above, n. 108, and cf. Moreau 1939: 107–8.

[181] The argument is defended along these lines by (among others) Friedländer 1964–9: II.143–4; Penner 1973: 139–42; Weiss 1981: 298–302.

[182] Cf. A. E. Taylor 1960: 38; Gulley 1968: 85–7; Gould 1955: 43–4.

like a helmsman who lets the ship drift against the rocks (as opposed to deliberately steering it there). We may compare Sokrates' own example of the man who deliberately lames himself (374cd). As Aristotle points out, this case is poorly chosen, since such a person would scarcely be considered superior to one who became lame accidentally.[183] No one, it is assumed, would choose to inflict such unequivocal evil on herself. The case is even clearer with the soul, which is, in Socratic terms, the seat of true human excellence and well-being, and whose "health" is justice (cf. *Crito* 47d–48a). While one might deliberately choose self-inflicted physical harm in certain situations, no possible circumstances could justify knowingly committing an injustice and so harming one's own soul (cf. 372e–373a). For it is a fact of human nature that we all seek our own good – namely happiness – and in Sokrates' view this is notoriously inseparable from virtue.[184] Hence there can be no such person as one who voluntarily does wrong (though if there could be, this person would also be truly wise and good). This is the familiar Socratic paradox, taken into account by the proviso that the voluntary doer of "unjust and shameful deeds" is the good man, "*if indeed there is such a person*" (376b5– 6).[185] This proviso – which would be pointless if Sokrates accepted the conventional view that such people are legion – brings the argument into line with the Socratic paradox, and thus saves it, despite appearances, from flouting Hippias' common-sense view in a Socratically offensive way. For it succeeds in evading the morally repugnant conclusion that people who *appear* to do wrong purposefully are superior to those who do so inadvertently. Here is Sokrates' own oblique solution to the problem of motivation. But it can succeed only at the expense of common sense, since it abandons any conventional notion of voluntariness, with disturbingly counterintuitive consequences.

The proviso also has interesting implications for the earlier part of the dialogue. The whole discussion was based on the assumption that Odysseus is indeed "such a one."[186] But the last stage of the argument, by identifying justice as a skill, has suggested that the *polutropos* who lies and deceives without regard for virtue is – despite appearances to the

[183] *Met.* 1025a9–13; cf. also *EN* 1129a11–16.

[184] See Penner 1973: 142, 147–8; and cf. Gulley 1968: 87, 91–2; Santas 1979: ch. 6.

[185] Cf. also 376a6–7 (ὅτανπερ ἀδικῇ) and Calogero 1948 ad loc. As several commentators have noted, Sokrates uses similar provisos elsewhere for commonly accepted premises to which he does not want to commit himself (*Euth.* 7d8, 8e6, *Gorg.* 480e5–6; cf. also *Rep.* 381c1).

[186] It is primarily Hippias who takes this view of Odysseus (cf. above, n. 171), but Sokrates too classes purposeful lies with injustice (372d5). Cf. also the pejorative view of Odysseus at *Ap.* 41bc (below, p. 159).

contrary – deficient in this skill, and hence does not really know what he is doing (cf. 365e). The earlier analysis of Odysseus as a deliberate wrongdoer must therefore have been, in Socratic terms, mistaken. Like the archer who deliberately misses the target, Odysseus achieves the goals he sets himself. But he fails to understand the significance of the common target, for he is deficient in the craft of justice. Achilles, on the other hand, aims at the goals of popular morality – truth-telling, loyalty and friendship. But his aim is sometimes shaky, which leads him into unplanned self-contradiction. There turns out, then, to be an elusive truth in Sokrates' claim to find the two heroes indistinguishable "in respect of falsehood and truth and the rest of excellence" (370e2–3). Sokrates knows very well the characterological differences between the two Homeric heroes, but grants neither of them the skill required for success at virtue.

To Sokrates the conclusion "is apparent" from the argument, and he expects a similar commitment from Hippias (375d), who has agreed – albeit briefly – with each step, and is therefore bound by the conclusion unless he can succeed in challenging it. But the sophist once again firmly rejects the conclusion (376b7). His way of life as a professional sophist, his personality, views and methods, evidently induce a complacency that stubbornly resists the effects of elenctic bewilderment. This failure bears witness to the inadequacy of the professed polymath and educator, from a Socratic perspective, as a student of both ethics and dialectic. In Socratic terms true dialectical courage requires one to persevere in a difficult argument, to accept radical conclusions and to admit it when one is proved wrong.[187] Consistency is also a value to which Hippias, qua professional educator, is committed (above, p. 130). His refusal to accept the consequences of an argument to which he has agreed at every stage, and which he is unable to criticize, therefore undermines his professional integrity, as well as his Socratic credentials.

Yet Hippias does display a different kind of courage – the courage of his convictions – to the bitter end. Moreover, unlike some of Sokrates' other interlocutors, he continues to display the conventional social virtues: he does not grow angry, accept the argument only with an ill grace, or agree merely for the sake of argument or to escape from Sokrates. At the very least, all this bears witness to the effectiveness of traditional education in "dyeing" the soul with the outlook it purveys (cf. below, p. 212). This has definite value, given the morally dangerous aspects of Sokrates'

[187] See Patterson 1987: 345–9; and cf. 366e3 with Calogero 1948 ad loc.

argument and the provocative quality of his demeanor. But that value is limited by the fact that Hippias never produces *arguments* for his resistance. He may have passively absorbed certain worthwhile conventional values from his Homeric studies. But Homer has not taught him to think analytically or engage actively with ideas. Time and again he is shown incapable of defending his conventional moral intuitions rationally.

The latter is crucial for Sokrates, as the dialogue's ending clearly reveals. When Hippias declares for the last time that he cannot agree, Sokrates stops insisting that he abandon his intuitive views in face of the argument (contrast 375d). Instead he rather surprisingly endorses Hippias' resistance by responding once again that he too is unable to agree with himself (376b; cf. 372e). From a Socratic perspective, then, resisting the argument is not in principle a failing. Sokrates himself will not lightly dismiss the claims of common sense upheld by Hippias.[188] Hence his genuine uncertainty about the direction in which his arguments lead. Both participants remain caught in the same elenctic trap, between the "necessity" of the argument (376b8) and the demands of intuitive moral conviction. Yet Sokrates' response to this dilemma is in significant contrast to Hippias' inability or refusal to engage the issue. He displays his intellectual integrity by pursuing the paradoxical implications of the notion that virtue is a kind of knowledge – including the implication that no purposeful wrongdoer exists – and facing its counterintuitive consequences.[189] Common sense still resists, embodied in Hippias and part of Sokrates himself. But unlike Hippias, Sokrates is not content to leave these intuitions unexamined. Common sense and tradition, the indispensable starting-points for ethical inquiry, must not be abandoned too readily, yet they remain open to elenctic scrutiny. Sokrates responds to bewilderment not by stubborn or dogmatic rejection of the argument, but by continuing his inquiry in the hope of further progress.

REWRITING HOMER

Hippias Minor interweaves its critique of the sophists and their use of Homer, as exemplified by Hippias, with Plato's own exploration of the educational value of the two supreme Homeric paradigms. As we shall see, he appropriates both Achilles and Odysseus for his own use in the portrayal and implied evaluation of the characters within the dialogue. He follows the educational traditions of his culture not only by using the

[188] On this aspect of Plato's Sokrates cf. Kraut 1984: 220. [189] See Kraut 1984: appendix.

archetypal heroes to examine aspects of moral and intellectual character but by presenting us with latter-day ethical models for our perusal.

Like Achilles and Odysseus, the two central characters of *Hippias Minor* are presented as competing models of character. As such, they have both been formed by the kind of education that they espouse. Hippias is not just a sophistic Homerist and representative of Homeric education, but emerges as himself a Homeric figure in the most dubious sense. We saw earlier that he is Homeric in his encyclopedic knowledge and his power to charm his listeners. But as a devotee of Homeric epic, he may be expected to manifest the character not just of the poet himself, but of that poet's creatures, especially those heroes with whose ethical significance his discourse has been concerned. As we have already seen, he begins by tacitly claiming a kinship with Nestor, on account of his *sophia*. And Achilles is the Homeric character that he most admires. But his versatility, hammered home so mercilessly by Plato, aligns him most closely with Odysseus. Even supposing that he could acquire the salient traits of three such different characters (an inherently doubtful proposition), he would in so doing revert to just one: Odysseus *polutropos*. This is fitting, since Odysseus is the Homeric hero who has most in common with the sophists generally.[190] He is also the hero most closely identified with Homer himself. Homer's poetic function makes him *polutropos* as well as *pseudēs*, and Odysseus' skill at story-telling is an aspect of his *polutropia*. Like both poets and sophists, Odysseus is a wandering master of persuasive language (whether fact or fiction),[191] with which he successfully "charms" his audience.[192] So Hippias' Odyssean character is a reflection and reaffirmation of both his Homeric and his sophistic aspects.

But the parallel between Hippias and Homer's Odysseus runs deeper than this. Sokrates' speech represents the sophist, like Odysseus, as a versatile man of all trades, always pursuing novelty,[193] and eager for material gain (368e–369a).[194] Like Hippias, Odysseus is a master not only of persuasive speech but of such practical skills as the construction of his own raft (*Od.* 5. 228–261). Further, by building his argument on Hippias'

[190] See Stanford 1963: 95–100, and cf. Blundell 1987: 326–9.

[191] Cf. *Il.* 3.216–224, *Phdr.* 261bc, Xen. *Mem.* 4.6.15 and see Stanford 1963: 71–2; Finley 1978: 33–4; Kennedy 1957: 26–8. His narrative of his adventures gives him the role of epic poet, and twice he is likened to a skillful bard (11.368, 17.518–21).

[192] Cf. *Od.* 11.333–4, 13.1–2, 17.514–21, 19.203–4.

[193] For this quality in Odysseus see Stanford 1963: 75–6. The goal of the real Hippias' anthology was to be novel and varied (καινὸν τε καὶ πολυειδῆ, DK 86 B6). At Xen. *Mem.* 4.4.7 Hippias says he always tries to say something novel (καινόν).

[194] For Odysseus' interest in profit cf. Stanford 1963: 76; Finley 1978: 32–3; for Hippias see above, n. 88.

own skills, Sokrates has shown that Hippias has the same capacity to lie that was originally ascribed to Odysseus (above, pp. 139–40). Both therefore exemplify a morally ambivalent "wisdom" which may be used for lies and villainy (*panourgia*) as well as truth (368e5; cf. 365e4–5). Homer's Odysseus chooses to employ his capacity for falsehood, whereas Hippias evidently does not. Yet the sophist remains unable to pinpoint the flaw in the argument "proving" that he above all other people – in his own view (368b2–3) – is *pseudēs*, namely the confusion of capacity with disposition. His failure to identify this fallacy prevents him from distancing himself from Odysseus and disowning his disreputable brand of *sophia*.

Like Odysseus *polutropos*, Hippias has been highly successful in conventional terms, using his versatile cleverness to defeat numerous opponents and achieve his own goals, and hence winning the admiration of the many. But he also resembles Homer's Odysseus (as represented in this dialogue) in lacking a true understanding of the aims to which his cleverness should be put. The inadequacy of his goals from a Socratic perspective is made clear by his dialectical humiliation, which puts a stop to his career of Odyssean success by eliciting opprobrium, instead of acclaim, from a larger audience (including the typical modern reader). The resultant inconsistencies make Hippias an inadvertent *pseudēs*, like the ignoramus of the first argument, who stumbles on truth or falsity without expert understanding of his subject. Such self-contradiction is not only philosophically shameful and professionally damaging, but unheroic by the Achillean standard that Hippias posits as his own ideal of excellence. Ironically, then, Hippias' instantiation of Odyssean *polutropia* corroborates his own relatively low assessment of that quality.

The dialogue's critique of the Odyssean character has implications that extend beyond the discrediting of Hippias, or even of the sophists in general. Versatility, variation (*poikilia*), cleverness and love of debate were central aspects of the democratic Athenian self-image.[195] "The democratic viewpoint (typically that of a seafaring and commercial community) is Odyssean – an ideal of versatility, adaptability, diplomatic skill, and intellectual curiosity, insisting on success combined with glory rather than sacrificed for it."[196] Despite the fact that he came from oligarchic Elis, Hippias fits this description perfectly.[197] The same versatile character type, seen with a more jaundiced eye, lies behind Plato's hostile

[195] Cf. above, pp. 75–6. Plato's response to this ideal includes *Menex.*, of which Hippias is said to have been a butt (DK 86 A 13; cf. Untersteiner 1954: 275 n. 5).

[196] Knox 1964: 121–2. For Odysseus as the embodiment of certain Athenian virtues cf. Irwin 1988: 69–71; North 1979: 75.

[197] He was even a successful diplomat (*HMaj.* 281 ab). On the sophists and Athens see above, pp. 118–19.

portrait of the democratic man, with his "multifarious" (*pantodapos*) life and emotions (*Rep.* 561 e3).[198] It is likewise the emotional and inconsistent character, rather than the truly wise (*phronimos*) and self-consistent, which appeals to the ignorant and "multifarious" masses who make up the Athenian theatrical audience (*Rep.* 604e). It is therefore that poet "who is able through his *sophia* to become multifarious" (398a1) who will win the approval of the crowd (605a).[199] Hippias too uses his "multifarious" speeches, his poetry and other skills, to win both applause and other more practical rewards from the many (368d2; cf. 363c1). As we have seen, his inability to use these Odyssean skills in defence of his intuitive judgments calls their value into question.

The discrediting of the versatile Hippias thus constitutes an assault on the Odyssean type as a cultural paradigm, and with it on the democratic character for which Plato harbored such deep suspicion. But Hippias is not exclusively Odyssean in character. Most importantly, he lacks Odysseus' lying disposition: he explicitly rejects the analogy between himself and Odysseus by denying that he (deliberately) deceives (371 a1). Moreover he both admires Achilles and shows an Achillean aspect of his own by sticking to conventional ethical views even though they snare him in inconsistency. This makes him, like Achilles, an unintentional *pseudēs*. Yet despite his instinctive respect for certain moral values, Achilles too falls short as an ethical model in Socratic terms. The inherent weakness of his character type is erratic behavior arising from the indulgence of violent emotion.[200] In *Republic* he is blamed among other things for his "womanish" tears (387e–388b), insubordinate rudeness (389e), defiance of the gods and violent lack of self-control (391 abc).[201] In *Hippias Minor* too he seems to lack the rational skill and evenness of temper to speak and act consistently. Thus each hero is in his own way philosophically and ethically deficient, and hence inappropriate, in Platonic terms, as an educational model. And both kinds of deficiency are echoed in Hippias.

[198] Cf. Too 1998: 55–9. *Pantodapos* is often used pejoratively in *Rep.*, for the emotions of the masses (431 b9, 493d1, 588e5), for poetry (397c5, 399e10), and for the mythic transformations of the gods (381 e4, 381 e9). Cf. also *Ion* 541 e, where it is linked with deception and intellectual inconsistency. The Homeric equivalent (*pantoios*) is used both for divine transformation (*Od.* 17.486) and for Odysseus' wiles (*Od.* 3.122, *Il.* 3.202).

[199] Similarly Sokrates remarks in *Gorg.* that the successful orator must come to resemble the Athenian populace (513b; cf. also 481 de).

[200] In the myth of Er this type is represented by Ajax, who chooses the life of a lion (*Rep.* 620b). Cf. also below, pp. 230–31.

[201] For other criticisms cf. *Rep.* 379d, 386c, 390e. For the centrality of Achilles to *Rep.*'s censorship program see D. Tarrant 1951: 60; Hobbs 2000: ch. 7.

But neither of these heroes always fares so poorly at Plato's hands. Sokrates treats Achilles with respect in *Apology*, where he is portrayed as an antecedent and model for Sokrates' own courageous refusal to abandon his principles even in the face of death (28cd).[202] Elsewhere in Plato, Sokrates several times alludes admiringly to Achilles' self-sacrifice for Patroklos.[203] As for Odysseus, his self-exhortation to endurance is cited more than once with approval.[204] He also makes a characteristically prudent choice in the myth of Er, deciding to rest from his previous ambition with its accompanying troubles, and choosing the life of a private citizen (*Rep.* 620c). This quiet (*apragmōn*) life is a departure from the meddling in multiple roles (*polupragmosunē*) that constitutes injustice and characterizes the decline of the ideal state.[205] It also makes Odysseus the only reincarnated soul in the myth of Er who does not persist in the behavior of his previous life, but learns from and reacts against it.[206] This is consistent with his characteristic rational prudence. But it is also an essential step towards philosophical wisdom (cf. *Phd.* 82c, *Gorg.* 526c). Each of the two great heroes thus has potentially admirable aspects from a Platonic point of view, and these, as we have seen, are adumbrated in Hippias and Sokrates' discussion of their relative merits: Achilles' inconsistencies arise from commendable moral instincts, while Odysseus embodies rational skill in pursuit of his chosen goals.

These positive aspects are redeemed and united by Plato in the figure of Sokrates, who shares the virtues of both characters without their corresponding defects.[207] His skill at speaking purposeful "falsehoods" obviously has much in common with the slippery, persuasive and verbal Odysseus, as opposed to Achilles, the truthful man of action who falls short of others in discussion.[208] But as the dialogue shows implicitly, the skill that makes such "falsehood" possible must be used by the right people for the right ends, ends that must be established externally to

[202] On this passage see Irwin 1988: 77; Blundell 1988: 142–3; Vlastos 1991: 233–4; Hobbs 2000: 178–86; Rubino unpublished. Cf. also *Crito* 44b with King 1987: 106–8.

[203] *HMaj.* 292e, *Symp.* 179e, 208cd. For other Platonic references to Achilles' pursuit of honor and principle see Calderini 1906: 1006–7.

[204] *Od.* 20.17–18, quoted at *Rep.* 390d, 441b, *Phd.* 94d; cf. also *Symp.* 220c. For other favorable Platonic references to Odysseus see Stanford 1963: 261 n. 30; Calderini 1906: 1007–9; cf. also Nussbaum 1986: 105–6.

[205] See *Rep.* 434abc, 444b; cf. 433a, 443cd, 433d, 551e–552a.

[206] Hirst 1940; cf. also Hobbs 2000: 239. In this he also differs from those reincarnated at *Phd.* 81e-82b.

[207] Cf. Irwin 1988: 77–83; Haden 1997: 162–4; Hobbs 2000: 193–8. Compare the appropriation of both heroes by the Pythagoreans (Detienne 1962).

[208] Cf. Schneidewin 1931: 31–4; O'Brien 1967: 102–3; Haden 1997; Howland 1998: 176–81; Rubino 1991: 64–5.

the skill itself. Hippias' principal goals for his physical and intellectual wanderings, namely personal profit and the approval of the many, are in certain respects Odyssean. But Sokrates' goal is more deeply so. His "wandering" is directed not at the acquisition of worldly wealth and fame, but at a highly specific terminal goal, the intellectual "homecoming" of truth. As he says in *Apology*, he is quite literally "wandering" in search of wisdom.[209]

Sokrates' search is linked allusively with the journey of Odysseus at the end of the dialogue. By now he is in the same boat as Hippias and other professional *sophoi*, with whom he shares the "wandering" of intellectual confusion and inconsistency (376c; cf. 372de). This "wandering" is marked as Odyssean in his case by his reluctance to embark on it and his desire to reach a place of rest. To this end, Sokrates employs his Odyssean cleverness in the one crucial area where the multi-talented Hippias fails: dialectic. Like the lies of Odysseus, his "falsehoods" contain hidden truths.[210] Dialectic is his path towards an overriding goal to which, like Odysseus, he subordinates the desire for heroic renown (*kleos*). The pursuer of wisdom pays no heed to the approval of the many, and embraces a life and death that the many would view as a failure (above, p. 71). In the course of his travels, Sokrates proves more willing than Hippias or even Odysseus himself to become a "nobody" in the eyes of the world;[211] he succeeds in resisting the "spell" of sophistic rhetoric, just as Odysseus resists the enchantment of Kirke and the Sirens;[212] And like Odysseus, he accumulates a certain kind of wisdom from those he encounters, even (or especially) those whose beguilement he resists (*Ap.* 21de).[213] This search will continue even in the underworld, where he hopes to examine the notorious *sophia* of a more formidable Hippias – Odysseus himself (*Ap.* 41bc). In the context of this larger journey, Hippias is just one port of call along the way (376c5).

Sokrates' focus on this ultimate goal also marks him as Achillean in the terms of this dialogue. Even though his values do not precisely match the instincts of tradition or common sense, he pursues them with the heroic single-mindedness of an Achilles. Like Achilles, he falls into self-contradiction, but his inconsistencies arise "nobly" and from "good will" towards others (cf. 373a, *Ap.* 30a). Unlike the lies of Odysseus, this kind of

[209] 22a6; cf. 23b and above, p. 118; the first passage also alludes to the labors of Herakles, another heroic wanderer.

[210] On Odysseus see Pratt 1993: 85–93.

[211] By rejecting his identity as "Nobody," Odysseus delays his return home (cf. above, p. 68 n. 69). (I owe this parallel to Lee Perlman.)

[212] See Walsh 1984: ch. 1 and cf. above, p. 97.

[213] For Odysseus see e.g. Finley 1978: 41–54.

"falsehood" is not designed ultimately to deceive, and so is not duplicitous in any ordinary sense.[214] Sokrates thus emerges as fundamentally Achillean in his matching of word with deed and his "good will" towards others. Despite superficial "inconsistencies," like those in Book 9, the Homeric Achilles eventually dies for his underlying principles, including a concern for his responsibility to others. Consistency of word with deed thus trumps superficial consistency of word with word. Hippias, in his interpretation of Achilles, shows how Achilles can contradict himself without being inconsistent because he has changed his mind. But Sokrates, in manipulating this interpretation, brings out the more important underlying consistency of word with action which legitimizes such superficial verbal "inconsistencies." In contrast to Hippias' Achilles, however, Plato's Sokrates never does change his mind on the fundamentals. His life displays a consistency both of word with word and of word with deed, including a heroic consistency in the face of death, surpassing even that of Achilles. His Odyssean ability to both use and transcend an array of contradictions in the cause of consistently held principles enables him to trump both *Iliad* and *Odyssey* to become the ultimate (philosophic) hero.

Plato thus exploits the fluidity of the Homeric paradigms, testing their usefulness as ways of understanding and interpreting different character types, and recasting their traditional attributes in the persons of a new kind of hero and his opponent. While condemning Odysseus as a master of unprincipled contradictions in pursuit of personal gain, and Achilles as one who adheres to his values without rational analysis, the dialogue also validates Odysseus qua active, restless seeker after understanding, and Achilles qua principled upholder of goals transcending the conventional values of life and material profit. In keeping with the cultural practice of quoting out of context, of *using* literary texts selectively, rather than interpreting them as integrated wholes, Plato picks and chooses the characteristics of the traditional heroes – whether positive or negative – that he wishes to exploit at any one time. As Alkibiades says in *Symposium*, there is no one such figure to whom Sokrates can be compared (221 cd). We therefore do not receive, and should not expect, a coherent preference for any single Homeric hero. Sokrates' Odyssean personality and arguments tease and challenge the intellect, while his philosophical and pedagogical integrity characterize him as an Achillean model truly

[214] Cf. above, pp. 138–9. The lies of Homer's Odysseus may also be defended in terms of his goals (see Stanford 1963: 20–1 and cf. Blundell 1989: 83), but in contrast to Sokrates' "falsehoods" they remain, unambiguously, lies.

worthy of our emulation. By simultaneously rejecting and embracing aspects of these two paradigmatic figures, Plato both displaces and incorporates the Greek poetic tradition, reinventing and harnessing it in the cause of philosophy.

These different modes of participation in the Homeric paradigms, dramatized in the figures of Sokrates and Hippias, are related to the pedagogical models that they embody and promote. Hippias' feeble dialectical performance makes it clear that Homeric studies, as practised by him and so many others, are an inadequate education for philosophy and hence real excellence. This mode of teaching and learning is not without effect, especially in imbuing the recipient with the values it promotes, but it has left Hippias unable to scrutinize or defend those values. Sokrates' critique of Hippias implies that the kinds of passive imitation and memorization associated with mimetic pedagogy are intellectually hollow and even detrimental to philosophical progress. Sokrates himself, by contrast, exemplifies a structural form of mimesis (cf. above, p. 102) that entails grappling with the Homeric models and the values they represent, rather than unthinkingly imbibing them, using them for self-discovery as opposed to passive self-formation (cf. *Phdr.* 229e–230a). Thus in Plato's representation, Hippias "imitates" the Achilles of the *Iliad* superficially, both by adhering stubbornly to his pre-established values and by saying things that are on their face contradictory (slavish imitation); but Sokrates, though he too ends up contradicting himself, does so as a result of the basic Achillean principle of matching words with deeds, and is motivated by "nobility" and "good will" (structural imitation). Similarly, Hippias imitates Odysseus through the superficial polytropism of versatility, *poikilia* and self-contradiction, but Sokrates imitates the active intelligence and ultimate purposefulness that underlie his apparent inconsistencies.

In place of a Homeric education based on the uncritical acceptance of stereotypical models, Plato offers us a Socratic one which challenges the audience as well as the interlocutor to seek to understand the issues for themselves. This challenge is most clearly posed by Sokrates' perplexity at his own conclusions (372a–373a, 376bc). Sokrates' audience, including ourselves, may also learn by witnessing Hippias' limitations that authentic philosophical progress requires real intellectual engagement, not superficial familiarity with literary models or with "quantities of miscellaneous information."[215] This encourages the reader too to imitate

[215] F. A. Yates 1966: 31.

Sokrates structurally rather than slavishly, by practising the same kind of dynamic "imitation" of Homer and a correspondingly active mode of learning. If Plato can succeed in reproducing Sokrates in *this* fashion, he will have compensated for the elenctic Sokrates' pedagogical failure with Hippias himself, by enabling him teach a larger audience, including ourselves.

In representing these characters as he does, Plato too, qua author, exemplifies through his literary-philosophical practice the appropriation of certain aspects of these heroic figures and rejection of others. Plato's choice of dramatic form constitutes him, in Odyssean fashion, as democratic and versatile, *poikilos* and *pseudēs* (cf. above, p. 111). Like Odysseus, Sokrates, and Homer himself, he has the skill of the *polutropos* to speak either truth or falsehood at will and to engage in the "lies" and charms of poetry. Yet the presumptive educational agenda that underlies his polytropic representations of character endows his works, and hence his own persona, with a determinate goal beyond the accumulation of profit. Like Achilles, he seeks *kleos* on his own behalf as well as Sokrates', but does it "nobly" and from "good will."

The dialogue thus offers us both a challenge to the superficiality and "common sense" instantiated by Hippias, and a philosophical protreptic embodied in the character and methods of Sokrates. Nevertheless, *Hippias Minor* leaves many readers with a sour taste in the mouth.[216] It may be hard for the reader to see Sokrates' Odyssean manipulations as intrinsically preferable to Hippias' polymathy. This was presumably even more true for many of Plato's contemporaries, in whose terms Hippias was extremely successful. And Hippias' views have merit on their face. One may sympathize with him not only because one wants to be conventionally successful (rich and admired), but because some of his views – especially his understanding of Homer – seem more plausible than Sokrates' disturbingly paradoxical arguments. We are especially likely to take his side when he voices common sense (370e), resists Sokrates' bizarre conclusions (375d, 376b), or blames him for generating confusion (369bc, 373b). Sokrates' arguments, with their frighteningly amoral implications, give the reader, like Hippias, good reason to mistrust his methods as much as he mistrusts the sophist's. In particular, the reader who misses or disagrees with the Socratic proviso that "saves" the final argument from immoralism will have good reason to rally to Hippias'

[216] Even the generally good-natured Guthrie is provoked by its "manifest absurdities" (1975: 195).

defense. These responses may be enhanced by the fact that Hippias is not an actively mean or unpleasant character. He has many commonsense virtues, and his primary intellectual fault – stupidity – may evoke sympathy rather than contempt. If we sympathize with him, we may leave the dialogue trying to defend him rationally, in full awareness that his inability to respond to Sokrates is an artifact of Platonic characterization. We may wish to object, as Sokrates so often does himself, that it does not matter who the speaker is, if what he says is true.

Plato manifestly tilts the balance in Sokrates' favor not only by showing Hippias as a fool, but by making merciless fun of him, primarily through Sokrates' exceptionally heavy irony. This is presumably intended to distance the audience from Hippias, by inducing contempt as opposed to empathy. Hippias himself, like so many elenctic victims, is oblivious to this treatment, and therefore unaffected by it.[217] But the main target of this mockery seems to be less Hippias himself than Plato's larger audience. We are invited not only by the irony, but by its victim's obliviousness, to despise him all the more, thus confirming our own sense of superiority. The effectiveness of this strategy is apparent in the responses of many of Plato's commentators. But it may easily backfire. Irony, as an expression of superiority and contempt, may cause us to sympathize or even identify with its victim as much as, or even more than, we would if he were presented more even-handedly.

Besides inducing sympathy for Hippias, the Socratic manner may alienate us from Sokrates. It may be perceived less as a valuable stimulus to active thought than as an expression of contempt or an evasion of personal responsibility on his part or on Plato's. This may contribute to a more general suspicion of the elenctic Sokrates' pedagogical tactics, which fail, here as elsewhere, to induce any discernable dialectical improvement in their immediate target. To be sure, the dramatic strategy of the dialogue blames this primarily on Hippias. Plato characterizes the sophist, like most of Sokrates' interlocutors, in such a way as to suggest that his own deficiencies of character and intellect are to blame for his dialectical failure. But the real Hippias' intellectual abilities must have been considerable. In fact it is presumably these abilities, and the influence they exerted, that give him a claim, from Plato's point of view, on Sokrates' pedagogical attention – a claim that is arguably evaded by Plato's prejudicial tactics. The reader may therefore suspect that Sokrates' pedagogical failures are also attributable, at least in part, to his own personality and

[217] Only in Xenophon does he complain of Socratic mockery (*Mem.* 4.4.9; cf. 4.4.11).

methods. Aside from anything else, a pedagogy that cannot allow for and surmount the deficiencies endemic in human nature is doomed to failure in practice. The reader who responds in this fashion may learn the primary lesson of active engagement with the argument. But the Platonic attempt – if that is what it is – to prevent identification with Hippias, through characterization, satire, and philosophical one-upmanship, will have failed.

Ironically, a similar outcome may result from a different kind of reader's admiration for Sokrates, which may give rise to a kind of slavish imitation. If we are attracted to Sokrates' verbal and intellectual dexterity we may copy it uncritically, learning to produce similarly dangerous arguments without the underpinnings of Socratic ethics. The reader who is not guided by Socratic principles may infer, for example, that liars really are superior to those who tell the truth. Such readers may try to imitate Sokrates' autonomy and individuality in destructive ways that are ultimately un-Socratic in their aims and effects. This is consistent with, and even encouraged by, the suggestion that we should imitate Sokrates through "structural" imitation, which would require us to scrutinize Sokrates just as he scrutinizes others. In this particular dialogue, he does this not only on the dramatic level, in his treatment of Hippias, but on the discursive level, in his treatment of Homer's characters. The use he makes of these characters implies that we should not accept his own argumentative superiority in an uncritical spirit.

Scholars have not been slow to take up this challenge. If Plato intended to provoke criticism of Sokrates in this dialogue, he has succeeded. But the danger of thus exposing his hero to critical evaluation is that we may reject him entirely, if we find his persona, methods or arguments unpalatable. Whether we imitate him slavishly or structurally, the character will have escaped authorial control, in a way that Sokrates' own arguments within the dialogue suggest is inevitable. While co-opting and transforming the traditional use of epic paradigms, then, Plato has not done so in a way that makes it safe to expose his philosophical hero to the kind of use that either he or Hippias makes of those paradigms.

CHAPTER 4

A changing cast of characters: Republic

Republic provides a unique crucible for examining the relationship between the figures of Sokrates that I have called "elenctic" and "constructive," and their interactions with others. The fracture line in his character between Books 1 and 2 allows us to examine the relationship between these two different avatars of Sokrates on the basis of the internal structure of a single work, without making any assumptions or inferences about the relative chronology of various dialogues. This remains true regardless of the circumstances of *Republic*'s composition. I do not share the view that Book 1 was written earlier as a separate dialogue. But this issue is irrelevant to interpretation of the mature work as a whole. Since Books 2–10 are structurally a continuation of Book 1, we may expect the stylistic changes they present to tell us something about Plato's own shifting attitudes towards philosophical method and its literary expression. I shall begin this chapter, then, by looking at the dramatis personae of Book 1, in which the elenctic Sokrates faces three varied interlocutors, before turning to the radically different dramatic style of the rest of the work and considering some possible reasons for this transformation.

SOCRATIC TESTING: THREE RESPONSES

The conversation takes place on a summer evening in the house of Polemarchos, son of Kephalos, at Peiraeus (328b). Sokrates is there, as he tells us in the dialogue's famous opening words, for the first Athenian festival of "the goddess," usually thought to be the Thracian goddess Bendis (327a; cf. 354a). In the course of Book 1 he engages in turn with Kephalos, Polemarchos, and the sophist Thrasymachos of Chalcedon. These respondents represent the elenctic Sokrates' three primary types of interlocutors in Plato generally – types marked by conventional wisdom, youthful enthusiasm and professional expertise respectively

(above, p. 118). They also embody the three main forms of response to the elenctic Sokrates. As Mitchell Miller observes (in an entirely different context), "The possible forms of resistance are countless and diverse, ranging from immediate hostility [Thrasymachos] through less deliberate kinds of evasion like boredom or loss of attention [Kephalos] or even an immediate agreement or deference which preempts the examination of real disagreement [Polemarchos]."[1] By dramatizing these three kinds of response to Socratic testing, *Republic* Book 1 offers a commentary on this Sokrates and his effectiveness (or lack thereof) at both philosophical inquiry and pedagogy.

The historical Kephalos was not an Athenian citizen but a wealthy Syracusan, who had settled in Attica with his sons as a resident alien or metic.[2] This particular metic family was unusually well known as such, thanks to its victimization by the Thirty Tyrants.[3] In socio-political terms, this status is an ambiguous one. Metics were not, of course, enfranchised members of the polis, and were sometimes viewed as a kind of "anti-citizen." As such they were associated with crafts, *banausia* (manual work) and money-making. The setting of *Republic* at Peiraeus recalls the fact that metics could not own property within the city walls of Athens without special dispensation.[4] There is no mention of metics in Kallipolis, and Sokrates speaks of both metics and *banausia* only with scorn.[5] But metics served Athens in various capacities, and many were rewarded – some with citizenship – for their role in the Peloponnesian war. Many, like Kephalos, were not only wealthy but well-connected. Plato never mentions that Kephalos and his family are foreigners, and in real life they seem to have moved in the highest Athenian democratic circles.[6]

[1] 1980: xiv; names in square brackets added.

[2] Kephalos' sons had a shield-factory employing a hundred and twenty slaves (Lys. 12.17–19), which they presumably inherited from him (cf. Dover 1968b: 30). He has been described as "the 'ideal' fifth-century metic" (D. Whitehead 1977: 160). Thrasymachos was probably a metic too, since he spent most of his professional life in Athens (see Quincey 1981: 301).

[3] On metics and the Thirty see D. Whitehead 1977: 154–9.

[4] Lys. 12.16–17 suggests that Lysias and Polemarchos may have had this right at the time of the latter's death (cf. A. R. W. Harrison 1968: 237–8). Be that as it may, the setting of *Rep.* at Peiraeus emphasizes rather their status as outsiders. Polemarchos' name may also be read as a reminder of his metic status, since *polemarchos* was the title of the Athenian official responsible for metic affairs (*Ath. Pol.* 58).

[5] 562e–563a, 590c. On Plato's contempt for *banausia* see Burford 1972: 238 n. 334; Nightingale 1995: 55–9. Foreignness and money-making are also combined in the sophists (cf. H. Joly 1992: 31–2).

[6] Kephalos was a friend of Perikles (Lys. 12.4, Plut. *Mor.* 835bc). Lysias and Polemarchos took part in the foundation of Thurii. For complete evidence on all the characters see Nails forthcoming, from which some of the following details are derived. For the historical background see Munn 2000.

Plato emphasizes their commercial and banausic associations more than their political impotence.[7]

Besides Polemarchos, Kephalos' other two sons are also present: Lysias (the well-known orator), and Euthydemos (not to be confused with the sophist of that name). Also in attendance are Plato's brothers Glaukon and Adeimantos, and three other Athenians: Kleitophon, a supporter of Thrasymachos, whose single interjection is of some philosophical significance (340ab); Charmantides, a wealthy contemporary of Plato's from the rural deme of Paiania who was active in public life; and Nikeratos, son of the wealthy and prominent democratic leader Nikias (327c, 328b). The company thus combines a variety of intellectual figures with an assemblage of relatively youthful Athenians, who are the products of an elite background and traditional education,[8] and may be expected to play a significant role in public life. The educational dimension of the dialogue is enhanced by the presence of a number of silent bystanders who are mentioned from time to time, often at pivotal moments.[9]

All those present – besides the usual invisible slaves – are free, adult, Greek-speaking males, but they include Athenians and metics, rich and poor, urban and rural, aristocrats, manufacturers, and a stone-mason.[10] Their ages range from very old (Kephalos) to youthful (Glaukon and Adeimantos).[11] They also cover the Athenian political spectrum. On the one hand they include a spokesman for tyranny (Thrasymachos), close relatives of the Thirty Tyrants (Glaukon and Adeimantos), and the most famous victim of the democracy (Sokrates). On the other hand some

[7] Note that the family carried out the same financial duties as wealthy citizens (Lys. 12.20). Cf. also D. Whitehead 1977: 19. *Rep.* as a whole does not condemn those who voluntarily abstain from political activity in an imperfect state (cf. 496a–497a).

[8] Nikeratos' father made him memorize the whole of Homer, and he listened to rhapsodes "nearly every day" (Xen. *Symp.* 3. 5–6).

[9] E.g. 336b, 338a, 344d, 368c, 427d, 498cd, 544b.

[10] I.e. Sokrates. On his ambiguous socio-economic status see above, p. 76. Unusually, a slave actually speaks in the opening frame (327b).

[11] Since we do not know when the festival of Bendis was established, and other evidence is inconclusive, the dramatic date of the dialogue is problematic (see Nails 1998). The exact ages of the characters are therefore uncertain. Depending on the dramatic date one favors, Plato's brothers are young men in their twenties or thirties, Kephalos' sons are either the same age as Glaukon and Adeimantos, or some twenty years older, and Sokrates is between fifty and sixty years of age. Thrasymachos falls somewhere between Sokrates and the sons of Ariston (his dates are unknown but cf. Slings 1999: 58). Moreover if the dramatic date is a later one, the real Kephalos may actually have been dead by this time. But the approximate relationships between age classes (esp. old vs. young), as marked within the text, are more important than determining a precise historicity that would probably have been lost on most of Plato's immediate audience. E.g. the fact that Polemarchos' father is present marks him and his friends as belonging to a younger generation (cf. 328d).

of the tyrants' most prominent victims are also present (Polemarchos, Nikeratos), together with the democracy's staunchest non-citizen defender (Lysias).[12] Kleitophon – who will have been better known to Plato's audience than he is to us – was apparently a political opportunist on the model of Theramenes.[13] What holds this diverse company together are the bonds of *philia* or "friendship" (cf. esp. 328d) – a bond to be tested by both argument and history.

This setting and dramatis personae establish a milieu that is Athenian, but outside of Athens proper, and as such beyond the limits of Sokrates' usual haunts (328c). As the port of entry for foreign goods, and Athens' principal link with the wider world, Peiraeus signifies wealth and commerce, and befits Sokrates' cosmopolitan sympathies.[14] As foreign friends of Sokrates, Kephalos and his family bear witness to this cosmopolitanism and make an appropriate audience for the construction of his ideal state, in so far as this constitutes an "anti-Athens."[15] But Peiraeus also had strongly democratic associations, both because it served as a kind of melting pot and because democratic resistance to the Thirty had been based there. The setting is also a religious one. The festival of Bendis, a foreign goddess, combined with Kephalos' sacrificial role within the household (328c), creates a religious environment that looks both inwards, towards the family, and outwards, towards the Athenian state and beyond its borders. All of this makes it an appropriate setting in which to portray a family of metics entertaining a mixed group of Athenian citizens and foreigners of wide-ranging social status and political sympathies. The overall milieu – intellectual but domestic, Athenian but pan-Hellenic, pedagogical, religious, and political – sets a scene for the critical scrutiny of Athenian values and the educational processes by which they are transmitted.

Kephalos, Sokrates' first main interlocutor, plays a relatively minor role, but is characterized with some depth and individuality.[16] Moreover his brief conversation with Sokrates broaches central themes: the nature of justice, the value and proper use of material goods, the authority of

[12] Lysias aided in the restoration of democracy, and as such was one of the foreigners whom Thrasybulus attempted to reward with Athenian citizenship (see Osborne 1982: 26–43).

[13] See *Ath. Pol.* 29.3, 34.3 with Slings 1999: 56–8. He was well enough known to be mocked by Aristophanes in the same breath as Theramenes (*Frogs* 967).

[14] Cf. 327a, *Laws* 705ab, and above, p. 78.

[15] Ober 1998: 224.

[16] He has been described as "closer to being identifiably human than any other elderly person in Greek literature" (Garland 1990: 272).

poetic tradition, the nature of life after death, and even the importance of psychic harmony (cf. 330a). As a character, he is clearly and closely linked with the dramatic setting, with a valence that is initially hard to read. On the one hand, his place at the center of the circle, crowned and enthroned, and his sacrificial role, locate him in a symbolic position of authority evocative of Nestor, the legendary archetype of the wise old patriarch.[17] His advanced age further suggests that he deserves the respect that the Greeks accorded to age and tradition – an expectation activated by Sokrates.[18] On the other hand, his decrepitude, and the fact that he has apparently ceded legal control of the household to Polemarchos, suggest that his day is past.[19]

A similar ambivalence colors the portrayal of Kephalos' character. Most readers have taken a more or less positive view of him,[20] and Plato does endow him with a certain modest appeal. In Socratic terms, he is not a *bad* man. He respects the gods, rejects materialism in its more vulgar forms, and emphasizes the superiority of equanimity over passionate emotion. As someone guided by traditional authorities, he may be thought to embody the unphilosophical virtue of the ordinary citizen (430c). But this likeable impression is undercut in various ways.[21] To begin with, Kephalos' bodily feebleness is a trope for moral and intellectual inadequacy. When he was vigorous enough to visit Sokrates, he lacked the motivation to do so; now he must beg Sokrates to call on him instead (328bcd). This enforced passivity parodies the authentically bizarre tranquility of Socratic introspection, much as the agitation of Apollodoros caricatures Socratic vigor (above, pp. 80, 108). Moreover it is to his advanced age, with its fading of bodily pleasures, that Kephalos attributes this newfound desire for, and pleasure in, *logoi* (ἐπιθυμίαι τε καὶ ἡδοναί, 328d). Such a lust for *logoi* is, of course, characteristic of Sokrates himself. But coming from Kephalos, the compliment to Sokrates and his pursuits is a back-handed one, in so far as it implies that philosophy is a fitting hobby for those whose health and vigor are waning. Sokrates' own stamina, by contrast, is equal not only to walking from Athens to Peiraeus and back with Glaukon (a round trip of about ten miles), but to talking the

[17] Cf. Howland 1993: 57. For the parallel with Nestor see Cosgriff 1994: 10–11. The effect may be enhanced by the pun on his name (which means "head") at 328c (cf. Brann 1967: 3).

[18] 328de; cf. 378c and above, p. 77.

[19] Cf. 328b. The exact situation is unclear, but cf. MacDowell 1978: 91–2.

[20] See e.g. Giannantoni 1957: 132–3, esp. n. 29; Kakridis 1948; E. L. Harrison 1967: 28–9; Rankin 1964: 116–19; Reeve 1988: 5–7; Beversluis 2000: 189–97.

[21] Cf. Annas 1981: 18–23; Teloh 1986: 85–8; Lycos 1987: 26–32; Howland 1993: 59–63.

night away with these "youths," as Kephalos calls them (cf. 328d).[22] The ideal philosophical character of the guardians in Kallipolis will similarly be marked by the complementarity of bodily and mental vigor.

Given this contrast, along with Sokrates' lack of respect for conventional age-categories, and notorious preference for the company of the young, there is surely some irony when he tells Kephalos that he enjoys conversing (διαλεγόμενος) with the very old.[23] The claim recalls Sokrates' habitual irony at the expense of other "experts." In this case, the interlocutor's "expertise" derives simply from his age, which has taught him about life's "journey" (328d), and given him a privileged perspective on the afterlife.[24] But his eschatological perspective is, it turns out, a distinctly childish one (330d–331e). And as the dialogue proceeds, Sokrates will undercut the idea that age and tradition are sufficient for wisdom, insisting on the one hand that youth is the time for vigorous learning (536cd), and on the other that old age is the time of life when one should be most fully devoted to active philosophizing (498abc). In these terms, Kephalos is literally a dialectical non-starter. When Polemarchos breaks in, the old man abandons the argument without a murmur and leaves the gathering altogether (331d). By doing so, he symbolically abandons his claim to patriarchal authority over his sons. His departure thus opens up a paternal vacuum to be filled by Sokrates – or Thrasymachos.

When Kephalos departs to see to his sacrifice, he is quite literally retreating to traditional values rather than face elenctic scrutiny. The sacrifice signifies his preference for conventional religious cult and feasting over their Socratic replacements. Equally conventional is the way in which his moral judgments are based not on inquiry but on the authority of tradition, as enshrined in poetry, myth and anecdote.[25] He treats discourse not as a means of insight, but as a source of authority and fear (330de). His preferred level of intellectual exchange is indicated by the fact that he enjoys the company of other old men, even though most of

[22] It is unclear whether this refers to the young men from Athens, to Kephalos' sons, or to both (cf. Dover 1968b: 29 n. 2). Kephalos' sons may be considerably older than Plato's brothers (above, n. 11), but an old man might refer to his sons of any age as "youths." Sokrates himself definitely falls into the category of *presbutēs*, or "elder," even if he is not yet a *gerōn*, or "old man," like Kephalos. On these age categories see below, n. 163.

[23] 328de; cf. 329ab and above, p. 77.

[24] For the notion that those on the verge of death have a clear or prophetic vision denied to others (alluded to by Kephalos at 330e) cf. *Ap.* 39c, Xen. *Ap.* 30, and e.g. *Il.* 16.851–4, 22.358–60.

[25] 329bc, 329e–330a, 330d, 331a. Cf. also the proverbial wisdom of 329a. Sokrates too quotes Homer (e.g. 328e), and at *Meno* 81bc cites Pindar in support of the immortality of the soul (cf. *Rep.* 331c). But he does not use the poets as moral authorities without further discussion (cf. Halliwell 2000: 107–9).

them do nothing but reminisce about their lost youth and complain that their life is a living death (329ab). His own opening speech is marked by the prolixity and confident expository tone that Greek stereotype attributes to the aged (328cd). Kephalos is, then, a lover of *logoi* after the fashion not of Sokrates, but of Nestor. The censorship program of Books 2–3 will suggest that his character has been shaped for the worse by the poets he likes to quote, and the traditional *muthoi* he believes in (below, p. 229).

The calm evinced by Kephalos verges on self-righteous complacency, as betrayed by his overt sense of moral superiority (329b, e, 330d). This appears to be a natural consequence of his life-long wealth (cf. 329e, 330b). Though his property was partly inherited, he has increased it for himself and plans to leave more to his children through his own money-making efforts (330ab). Despite the banausic source of his wealth, this desire to pass on a little more than he himself inherited is compatible with conservative Athenian attitudes towards prudent management of the *oikos*, and echoes the ideology of the *polis* as enshrined in the ephebic oath.[26] Kephalos' reliance on money is thus part and parcel of a traditional understanding of the patriarchal family (cf. 330ab, 331d). In more personal terms, he sees wealth as a necessary (though insufficient) condition for being "at peace with oneself" (329e–330a). This is because old age, while eliminating erotic passion, brings increased susceptibility to another violent emotion – the fear of punishment after death (330de). Money can assuage such anxiety by enabling a person to avoid cheating and lying, and to pay his debts to both gods and fellow humans (331b; cf. 329d4). So despite his rejection of vulgar materialism, and his emphasis on the importance of virtue for equanimity, Kephalos treats virtue as something that money can buy.[27] Even if he does not love money for its own sake, then, his wealth is fundamental to his personality and moral character, for it underlies both his claim to virtue and his vaunted equanimity in the face of death.

It is true that Sokrates commends Kephalos for his contentment in old age (329d), for not being excessively fond of his wealth (330bc), and for using his money for virtuous ends (331c1). But given the Platonic Sokrates' notorious indifference to money, alluded to in this very book (337d, 338b), we should suspect some irony in these compliments. Such suspicions are confirmed with the development of Kallipolis, in which the

[26] Cf. Thuc. 1.144.4, 2.36.2–3; Siewert 1977: 104.

[27] As Irwin notes, it is possible to construe Kephalos as actually privileging money over justice (1995: 170).

virtuous person is supremely indifferent to material wealth (416a–417a) and retailing is the province of the feeble and otherwise useless (371cd). Private property, especially in abundance, is represented over and over again as a cause of strife, which must be abolished, at least for the ruling class, in order to create a just society.[28] Wealth is deeply implicated in each stage of the decline of the ideal state, in ways that underline its ties to the traditional patrilineal family. In describing the decline from timocracy to oligarchy, in particular, Sokrates is highly censorious of wealth and commerce, and emphasizes the disastrous effects on the timocrat's son of the father's losing his property (550c–555a).[29] Like Kephalos, the oligarch is a self-protective wealthy man, who controls his appetites, but for the wrong reasons (554cd). Sokrates concludes that such a person is "more seemly" than many, but "the true virtue of a single-minded and harmonious soul far escapes him" (554e; trans. Reeve).[30]

Kephalos presents himself as an independent thinker superior to the many (329b, 329e, 330d). But he is less exceptional than he seems to imagine. Metic though he is, he embodies the values of a rich, traditional-minded, conventional Athenian male, who is steeped in traditional culture (as shown by his quotations from poetry), and whose perspective is colored by his considerable personal wealth. His reliance on money for virtue reflects the traditional view that full human excellence lies beyond the reach of the materially deprived.[31] And his instrumental view of virtue itself, as something that serves (like money) to provide equanimity in this life and escape from punishment in the next, makes him one of the "many" who – so Glaukon and Adeimantos will complain – value justice only for its consequences (358a, 363a). The specific virtuous deeds that Kephalos mentions – telling the truth, paying one's debts to gods and mortals (331ab) – are equally conventional. This is exemplified on a dramatic level by his role as sacrificer. Sacrificing, a concrete instance of the kind of behavior he applauds,

[28] Cf. 372d–373e, 390de, 415e–417b, 464c–e, and see Morrow 1960: 101–3; Okin 1977: 346–9.

[29] There is a nice irony in the fact that Sokrates' proposal to abolish private property and the family is initiated through the intervention of Polemarchos, Kephalos' son and heir (449b).

[30] Some have seen Kephalos as representing the oligarch, Thrasymachos as the tyrant, and Polemarchos as the democrat (see L. Strauss 1964: 74; Rosenstock 1983: 228–9; Teloh 1986: 85). Dorter sees Kephalos, Polemarchos and Thrasymachos as perversions of the three classes in the ideal state – producers, soldiers and rulers respectively (1974: 26–7). Reeve equates Kephalos and Polemarchos with the money-lovers, Thrasymachos with the honor-lovers, and Glaukon and Adeimantos with the wisdom-lovers (1988: 35, 40–41). Such analogies are clearly useful. But I hesitate to map the dramatis personae directly onto any of the character types explored later in the work, since the former are carefully individualized, especially in Book 1.

[31] Cf. esp. *Od.* 17.322–3, Arist. *EN* 1099a31–1101b9.

is not only a clear example of the kind of virtuous deed that money can buy, but reflects the traditional view of religion as a quid pro quo between gods and mortals (331b).

This view of religion will be discarded in Kallipolis (cf. 390e),[32] along with many of Kephalos' other attitudes. As the dialogue develops, it becomes increasingly clear that the old man stands for several of the conventional assumptions that Sokrates is out to combat. For example, Kephalos' relief at having escaped from the "frenzied masters" of erotic passion (329d1; cf. 329bc) foreshadows Sokrates' vividly pejorative image of reason as a slave to the desires (589cde), and the tyrant's own subjection to *erōs* (573a–d, 574e). The equanimity on which Kephalos now prides himself does not rule out enslavement to the passions, but merely implies that he does not mind being rid of them (cf. 329a). He thus seems to exemplify Sokrates' observation that there are "terrible and wild and lawless" desires inhabiting even those who appear to be moderate (*metrios*) (572b).[33] He may seem superficially to have achieved the rule of reason over such desires, but he has done so quite incidentally, in the wrong way, and for the wrong reasons. Instead of schooling his passions in the service of reason, he has merely allowed them to wither and die with the passage of time. Such a personality is scarcely conducive to Socratic dialectic, with its strenuous life-long commitment to philosophy.

The ultimate inadequacy of unthinking, rule-bound virtue is shown climactically in the myth of Er, where a man who lived his previous life virtuously in a well-ordered state, "from habit and without philosophy," impulsively chooses a life of tyranny (619c).[34] If Kephalos is to save himself from such unfortunate post-mortem choices, he must challenge conventional wisdom through the kind of philosophical investigation of which he is clearly incapable. The old man's outlook is indeed, as he says in self-congratulatory fashion, a product of his personality (*tropos*, 329d3), but Plato represents neither outlook nor *tropos* uncritically. The rest of the work will validate the implication that the right kind of character is essential to happiness, but in doing so confirm that Kephalos' own character, as well as his version of happiness, beneath its good-natured veneer, is deeply suspect. He is, to be sure, a well-meaning and even a good man in a limited way, but he is a commonplace soul whose faults, as we have seen, become increasingly apparent in retrospect.

32 There will be sacrifices in the ideal state (415e, 459e, 461a, 468d), but the details are left to Apollo (427b).

33 Cf. also 572d1; for Kephalos as *metrios* see further below p. 188.

34 Cf. also the association of Polemarchos' values with tyranny (below, p. 176).

Much is made of the fact that Polemarchos is Kephalos' son and therefore the "heir" to his argument" (331de). He is also, of course, an heir to his father's fortune (330b), and therefore – presumably – to the clear conscience it can buy.[35] The inheritance theme evokes Kephalos' conventional values and their associations with the traditional family, and raises the question of what Kephalos' heir will be like as a result. In the Greek tradition, fathers standardly express the hope that their sons will embody the father's values into the future, specifically by sustaining his friendships and carrying on the struggle against his enemies.[36] As his father's "heir," Polemarchos lives up to such expectations by entering the conversation to defend his father's point of view (331d). And as the conversation proceeds, he continues to do so by articulating the very principle on which it is based, when he proposes "helping friends and harming enemies" as a definition of justice. The morality of helping friends and harming enemies was pervasive, rarely questioned in the ancient Greek world, and strongly associated with family loyalty.[37] By making this code explicit, Polemarchos articulates Kephalos' views more fully and effectively. In particular, he develops the question of how one should treat one's friends, first adumbrated in Sokrates' conversation with his father (331c).[38] The way he does so shows an outlook as conventional as his father's, as Sokrates' critique makes very clear. At the same time, Plato dramatizes the positive aspects of such values by showing Polemarchos in friendly and hospitable relationships to his father and brothers and the various friends assembled at his house – a set of relationships that transcends both familial and political loyalties. Sokrates will co-opt these positive features for his own purposes, as we shall see.

In other ways too, Polemarchos' views are a development of his father's. Thus his acceptance of the idea that justice is a craft (*technē*) useful in daily life (332d, 333cde) is a natural extension of Kephalos' view of virtue as a set of practical rules, perhaps reflecting the strong association

[35] Not *the* heir, since Athenians did not employ a system of primogeniture. (As metics the family would be bound by Athenian law.) Polemarchos may have been chosen by Plato because he had a particular interest in philosophy (cf. 327b–328a), in contrast to his brother Lysias (cf. *Phdr.* 257b). His name may also be significant (above, n. 4). In adition, Lysias was thriving in the fourth century, leaving less scope for historical irony.

[36] Cf. *Il.* 6.476–81, *Od.* 4.204–11; Soph. *Aj.* 545–51, *Ant.* 641–44; Eur. *Med.* 920–21, *Hel.* 941–3; Golden 1990: 101.

[37] See Blundell 1989: ch. 2.

[38] See Tuozzo unpublished 11–15. The link is made clear when Sokrates offers Polemarchos the same counterexample that prompted Kephalos' exit (331e–332a).

between metics and craftsmanship.[39] The conversation continues to be colored by the importance of money and its relationship to virtue.[40] And like Kephalos, Polemarchos underpins his views with the authority of the poetic tradition, by quoting the lyric poet Simonides. Simonides, along with Homer and Hesiod, was one of the most authoritative of the traditional poetic "teachers" of the Greeks.[41] Plato represents Polemarchos as a product of this kind of old-fashioned education, both by making him speak for Simonides, and by having Sokrates suggest that he has "learned" from Homer.[42] Sokrates also couples Simonides' authority with that of two of the quasi-legendary Seven Sages (335de). In other words, he treats Simonides as a spokesman for traditional wisdom generally, and poetic wisdom in particular. By challenging Polemarchos, he will be inviting him to reject not just Simonides, but the whole poetic tradition.

Like his father, then, Polemarchos represents the kind of popular ethical outlook that is a principal target of *Republic* as a whole. Both embody the threat of the conventional and commonplace, of unthinking deference to authority, and of self-interested loyalty to self, family and friends, as enshrined in, and reproduced by means of, traditional poetic education. But Polemarchos' engagement with contemporary philosophical trends, as indicated by his interest in Sokrates and the presence of intellectuals like Thrasymachos as guests in his house, allies him with the more "modern" version of the poetic tradition embodied in the sophists. It is not surprising that he argues so much more effectively than his father. Yet his interest in all kinds of intellectual fare, and the presence of Thrasymachos in his house, suggest that his philosophical allegiance is still uncertain. This gives his conversation with Sokrates a particular educational urgency. Will this wealthy enthusiast ultimately favor Socratic dialectic or the kind of wisdom that money, like his and his father's, can buy?

The other differences between Polemarchos and his father also correspond to their relative ages. In contrast to the moribund Kephalos, the opening scene shows Polemarchos as good-natured but forceful, eager for spectacle, and quick-witted (cf. 331d), with the stamina, both physical and intellectual, that his father lacks (327b–328a). His philosophical

[39] Above, p. 166. Cf. also the banausic Hippias' difficulty in distinguishing technical capacity from issues of character (above, pp. 139–40).

[40] Cf. 332ab, 333b, 336a and see Friedländer 1964–9: II. 55–60; Blyth 1995.

[41] He is one of the poets whom the newly "Socratic" Pheidippides refuses to recite for his appalled father (Ar. *Clouds* 1353–62). Cf. also *Rep.* 489b, *Prot.* 339a–347a.

[42] 331e, 332a, 332c, 334ab. Compare Hippias' role as Homer's spokesman (above, pp. 135–6).

enthusiasm is reflected in his eagerness to catch and detain Sokrates. He breaks impetuously into the argument, is self-confident in tone, and often emphatic in agreement.[43] He is rarely at a loss for an answer (333a12, c7), grasps the point quickly, recognizes the importance of consistency (332d), shows initiative in revising his errors (334e), and has the stamina to pursue the argument indefinitely. When others take over the role of respondent he remains an attentive listener (cf. 427d, 544b). He even shows a certain initiative in challenging Sokrates and instigating the discussion of Books 5–7 (though he is not bold enough to speak up for himself). This gives him a modest structural role in shaping the subsequent course of the dialogue.

Polemarchos also seems to be that rare creature, an elenctic success. Unlike most interlocutors, he responds to Socratic scrutiny and the experience of *aporia* by rejecting his own unreflective views and enthusiastically embracing the procedures and results of Socratic dialectic. He balks just twice at Sokrates' argument, first when it seems to show that the just man is an expert thief (334ab), and again when it appears that it can be just to harm those who have done you no wrong (334d). But both times he ends up accepting the argument, and in neither case does he abandon the conversation or show anger or embarrassment at being refuted. In the first case he returns to square one (334b), and in the second he detects a previous error of his own and goes back to correct it (334e). On both occasions he starts out (like, for example, Hippias) by rejecting conclusions that run counter to his own moral instincts. But unlike Hippias, he revises his views once Sokrates has shown him a conflict within them. By accepting the unusual notion that it is never just to harm anyone (335e), he displays the intellectual courage that enables one to depart from conventional opinion.[44] He even agrees that his own standard moral code must have been thought up by some wealthy tyrant (336a).[45] In rejecting this ethic as tyrannical, Polemarchos is learning to question his father's assumption that virtue can be purchased. He also seems to be learning not to rely unreflectively on authority, accepting Sokrates' refusal to use Simonides and the Seven Sages to sanction the old morality (335e). In short, Sokrates has succeeded in dispelling his partner's conventional views and acquiring a willing ally in the search for truth.

[43] E.g. 335b1, d3, 340ab. For his self-confidence see e.g. 332c4 with Jowett and Campbell 1894 ad loc. He will interrupt again at 340a.

[44] Cf. Griswold 1999a: 297.

[45] The implied link is that the old code validates the rich man's power to do whatever he feels like (cf. 343e, 362bc, Xen. *Hiero* 2.2).

After Sokrates has eviscerated Polemarchos' unthinking allegiance to the traditional code, he continues to uphold these values in a new, Socratic fashion, becoming Sokrates' eager ally in the "fight" against the common enemies of philosophy (335e). He will put this conversion into practice by joining forces with Sokrates against Thrasymachos and Kleitophon.[46] The inescapable relationships of the "natural" family are thus displaced by the actively chosen "family" of philosophical community, where helping friends and harming – or rather refuting – enemies remains the rule.[47] By winning Polemarchos' loyalty to his own allegiances and enmities in this fashion, Sokrates appropriates Polemarchos' traditional morality, under the plausible rubric of military alliance (cf. 332e), for philosophy. He also becomes Polemarchos' intellectual "father," adopting him from his "natural" father, Kephalos. He does this, paradoxically, by weaning him from the old morality in its conventional form, and making Polemarchos resemble himself – as a son should resemble his father – in being critical of that tradition. He thus fills the paternal void left by Kephalos, but does so, paradoxically, by leaving it empty in a more conventional sense, in so far as he has undermined Polemarchos' deference to the authority of tradition.

Unlike most of Plato's representations of the elenctic Sokrates in action, this one focuses our attention on his success in winning an ally to his cause, as opposed to their joint failure to define the subject under discussion. Polemarchos' performance shows the conditions under which the elenctic Sokrates may succeed in clearing away unthinking assumptions and preparing the ground for progress. His character qua interlocutor is clearly crucial to this success. He demonstrates ostensively the moral and intellectual qualities with which the successful interlocutor must be endowed: vigor, intelligence, stamina, honesty, the courage to scrutinize his established opinions and abandon some of them if necessary, and a friendly cooperative spirit. He also shares Sokrates' fundamental outlook, most importantly a commitment to consistent rational argument (cf. 340ab) and a willingness to reconsider established views, both of which are essential to Sokrates' success in changing his mind. Equally important, however, is his fundamental conviction that justice is worthwhile (335c). Without the right basic (Socratic) convictions, such

[46] 340ab; cf. 336b, 336e, 427d.

[47] Sokrates will also endorse "help your friends and harm your enemies" for the limited context of warfare (375bc; cf. 332e), where it is most plausible (cf. Blundell 1989: 52–3; Donohue 1997: 246–7). On the way the later books incorporate elements of character and ideas from all the participants of Book 1 see N. D. Smith 1999a and cf. Kenny 1973: 5.

discussion will degenerate into eristic. These convictions must include a commitment to justice, even in the absence of a proper understanding of what it is. Polemarchos thus shows a minimal degree of the firmly-grounded right opinion (*orthē doxa*) that is an essential preliminary for dialectic in Kallipolis.[48] Under these circumstances, it seems that even the conventionally raised son of a conventional father can respond positively to the stimulus of Socratic questioning. Polemarchos' continuing presence as an engaged bystander offers the promise of further progress.

But although Sokrates succeeds in winning Polemarchos as his ally, he does so using notoriously dubious arguments that leave many readers uncomfortable at the speed and eagerness of the younger man's conversion.[49] Despite the problematic nature of these arguments, Polemarchos shows no inclination towards the criticism, common among other interocutors (such as Hippias), that Sokrates is merely logic-chopping or playing with language – a point that will even be reiterated by the sympathetic Adeimantos (487bc).[50] Polemarchos' lack of resistance also underlines Plato's failure here, as in many dialogues, to present Sokrates with a serious intellectual challenge. Instead, he allows the interlocutors' weaknesses to impose limitations on his portrayal of the elenctic Sokrates, or uses those weaknesses to evade the need to give Sokrates more persuasive arguments. Since this particular interlocutor is already enthusiastic about Sokrates and his methods, Sokrates has no "excuse," as he does e.g. in the case of Hippias, for using bad arguments deliberately in order to shake up his complacency.

Polemarchos' easy acquiescence tacitly illustrates the danger of exposing someone with a conventional education and without secure convictions to slippery logical maneuvers that he lacks the skill to analyze – a danger of which Plato will later show himself acutely aware (cf. 537e–539d and below, p. 192). Certainly tractability and respect for authority are necessary philosophical virtues, forming as they do part of the constellation of traits summed up as "gentleness" (cf. below, p. 211). Nor are they incompatible with Polemarchos' lively enthusiasm – he embraces Sokrates' suggestions with whole-hearted vigor. But pliability is dangerous in so far as it encourages passivity rather than analysis,

[48] Cf. e.g. 377b, 378d, 429c–30b, and see further Stokes 1987 (with Inwood 1987); Gill 1996a: ch. 4.

[49] Cf. e.g. Guthrie 1975: 439–41; Page 1990: 243; Howland 1993: 65–6; Reeve 1988: 7–9; Beversluis 2000: 205–20. For a more charitable view of Sokrates' arguments here see Annas 1981: 23–34.

[50] 487abc; cf. e.g. *HMin.* 369bc, *HMaj.* 301b, 304a.

and exposes the bearer to every intellectual wind that blows.[51] Eager compliance will later be validated as an excellent quality under the right conditions. But in the context of Book 1, it is potentially dangerous. It is presumably Polemarchos' pliability that has rendered him open to the dangerous influence of the poets. In Kallipolis, this danger will be forestalled by curtailing such influences, but the same cannot be said for democratic Athens. Not coincidentally, extreme flexibility will be a feature of the negative exemplar of the democratic man (561a–e).

Polemarchos' pliability also stands in tension with the elenctic Sokrates' commitment to intellectual independence. With Sokrates' help, he begins to challenge the authoritative influences of his upbringing. But his disturbingly easy acquiescence in Sokrates' own arguments seems to replicate his previous deference to poetic authority. The spectacle of a compliant character facing the unchecked power of Sokrates' mind and personality is a disturbing one, and points, in its own fashion, to certain deficiencies in the Socratic method. Such at least is the reaction of Thrasymachos, who is provoked to interruption by Polemarchos' compliance (336c), and Kleitophon, who seems equally irritated (340a). Sokrates will deny Thrasymachos' complaint that such agreement is mere mindless acquiescence (336e). But lack of ability and experience may be functionally equivalent to mindless acquiescence, no matter how sincere and eager the interlocutor may be. The elenctic undermining of traditional authorities gives Plato's Sokrates an opportunity to supplant these authorities with his own influence. But there is a danger that he may himself take on the role of such an authority, despite his own best intentions. His success with Polemarchos is thus as disquieting in its own way as some of his more obvious elenctic failures.

In his portrait of Kephalos, Plato thematized the old man's advanced age and impending death, his wealth, and his conventional, unintellectual views of morality, religion, and the afterlife. And his son's most striking features are an eagerness and pliancy that make him an easy convert to Socratic argument. All this takes on additional significance in the light of history. For by the time Plato wrote, not only was Kephalos dead, but Polemarchos had been killed by the Thirty Tyrants and his family financially ruined. Kephalos' second son Lysias

[51] Cf. Miller 1980: 34; Teloh 1986: 88–9; above, p. 103. Polemarchos does show some traces of autonomy (Page 1990: 250–51), but they are quite limited. Note that pliability is far from being a reliable predictor of moral or intellectual success in Plato's dialogues generally (cf. above, p. 127). As Friedländer notes, the tractable young Aristotle in *Parm.* became one of the Thirty (1964–9: III.244).

(also present in *Republic*), avoided death only by fleeing Athens. The fate of this family provides a particularly clear example of *emphasis* or historical irony, owing to the renown of Lysias' prosecution of Eratosthenes. In his speech, Lysias speaks of himself as "destroyed for the sake of my money" (12.14) and reminds us repeatedly of his brother's role as the quintessential victim of the Thirty.[52] Later, Sokrates will maintain that the good man is not perturbed by the loss of a friend, son, brother, money, "or any other such thing" (387de). Lysias, for one, was not unperturbed. This historical background raises unspoken questions about the adequacy of Kephalos' smug reliance on money, especially inherited money, for virtue and equanimity – questions that will be more fully explored in the course of the dialogue. As for Polemarchos, history provides no evidence that his suspiciously speedy conversion to Socratic values had a lasting effect. His historical counterpart was a "democratic man" who both lived and died by the old code of helping friends and harming enemies in its most destructive form. Nor did Lysias learn from his silent presence at their conversation to eschew that code.

Plato's more critical readers may well sympathize with Thrasymachos' sense of frustration at the conversation between Sokrates and Polemarchos. To at least some of them, the sophist's interruption comes as a breath of fresh air.[53] His intervention makes explicit within the work the kind of irritation often experienced by readers of such dialogues as *Hippias Minor* (above, p. 162). By dramatizing this annoyance, Plato acknowledges the potentially alienating affect of the elenctic Sokrates on his own readers. Yet Thrasymachos himself is systematically denigrated by Plato and his narrator from his opening words onwards.[54] This prejudicial representation serves, among other things, to discredit the sophist's arguments. As with Polemarchos and Kephalos, Plato, through Sokrates his narrator, represents the sophist's personality, demeanor, views, arguments and philosophical methods as mutually reinforcing. In Grote's words, his portrait "is calculated to present in an odious point of view the doctrines which he advances: like the personal deformities which Homer

[52] Nikeratos son of Nikias had also been killed for his money, despite his good character and civic prominence, in a murder arguably "even more notorious than that of Polemarchus" (Sparshott 1957: 60). On *emphasis* and "historical irony" see above, pp. 32–4.

[53] See e.g. Reeve 1988: 9–10.

[54] Contrast his entrance at 336b with the way Polemarchos, Kleitophon, Glaukon, Adeimantos, and even the improved Thrasymachos are described as breaking into the argument (331d, 340a, 347a, 357a, 362d, 449a–450b). Ironically, the real Thrasymachos seems to have specialized in swaying the emotions (DK 85 B5–6; cf. *Phdr.* 266c, 267cd).

heaps on Thersites in the *Iliad*."[55] For example, the opening image of the sophist as a marauding wild beast (336b) not only indicates an absence of rational agency, self-control, and respect for others in Thrasymachos as a character, but prefigures his picture of the exploitative relationship between the shepherd – or ruler – and his flock (343ab).[56]

Thrasymachos also provides a concrete demonstration of the way in which a commitment to injustice undermines the will and ability to participate in dialectic. As one who glorifies the untrammeled, godlike power of the successful tyrant, he has nothing but contempt for Sokrates and his collaborative style.[57] Instead, he is overtly confrontational: he favors the method of opposed speeches,[58] relies on intimidating outbursts of abuse,[59] and views argument as a violent battle in which he asks no quarter.[60] His didactic stance also befits the autocratic values that he applauds. His long speech exemplifies, in both form and tone, an authoritarian mode of pedagogy that posits a passive audience, as Sokrates implies by likening the speech to a flood of bathwater (344d; cf. 348ab). The sophist then sarcastically proposes placing his views directly into Sokrates' soul – an idea the latter hastily rejects (345b). Thrasymachos' character thus finds expression not only in his ethical views but also in his approach to argument and pedagogy. The champion of injustice, with his hostile and confrontational manner, bears out, on the level of philosophical practice, Sokrates' view that injustice generates hatred and quarrels (351d). As Sokrates forces him to admit, even two people – the number needed for dialectical discussion – require justice in order to cooperate (351e).

The degree to which the sophist's views are constitutive of his identity emerges at a pivotal moment in the argument. Up to this point, Thrasymachos has resisted Socratic silencing in a whole range of ways: when he cannot answer, he responds with offensive personal abuse; after his long speech he wants to leave without hearing a reply; when he is losing, he makes brief, often impersonal responses; he answers "very

[55] Grote 1888: IV.7. For Thersites see above, p. 61 and below, n. 86.

[56] For other animal imagery used to describe Thrasymachos see 336d, 341c, 358b and cf. 588b–590d. Beast imagery is used elsewhere for anything hostile to reason (e.g. 411de, 439b, 493bcd, 496d, 535e, 572b, 565d–566a, 573a, 573e, 590b). The taming metaphor allies Thrasymachos' intellectual progress with the subjugation of desire (cf. 358b, 501e–502a, 589b, 591b).

[57] Cf. 336cd, 337a, 337e, 338b, 338d, 340d, 341ab. Ophir calls him "the tyrant of discourse" (1991: 107–8; cf. 49). As Michelini points out, his rudeness also chimes with his contempt for conventional morality (1998: 56).

[58] 343b–344c; cf. 350de.

[59] 336bc, 340d, 343a.

[60] 341ab; cf. 342d2–3. On his agonism cf. Sparshott 1966: 427–8, 439.

reluctantly," "fights back," and must be "dragged" by Sokrates.[61] Many of these reactions are manifestations of *thumos*, the seat of both anger and shame, which is closely involved with a sense of personal identity and is a marked feature of Thrasymachos' character.[62] The climax, when he is effectively silenced, comes when Sokrates has forced him to conclude that it is the just man, as opposed to the unjust, who is both good and wise. When Thrasymachos realizes he is losing the battle, he responds with intense physical symptoms of discomfiture. Sokrates tells us, as narrator, that he saw the sophist not only break into an amazingly copious sweat, but actually blush – an unprecedented occurrence (350cd). This visceral response to intellectual criticism, as if to an emotional assault or even a physical threat, vividly and concretely displays not only the sophist's dialectical inadequacy in Socratic terms, and his agonistic outlook, but the degree to which Socratic argument constitutes an assault on the victim's self-concept. Thrasymachos' involuntary physical manifestations of shame show that he is unable to adapt to the search for "objective" Socratic truth without destroying his sense of his own identity.[63]

The subsequent course of the argument confirms this inability, or lack of desire, to change. For it is from this point onwards that Thrasymachos refuses to cooperate with Sokrates, except superficially, insincerely, or at best sporadically.[64] As the conversation proceeds, a wedge is driven more and more deeply between Thrasymachos' convictions and his dialectical responses. Sokrates makes it clear that he would prefer, as always, for the respondent to say what he really thinks. But it becomes progressively clearer that Thrasymachos is not always doing this. Indeed it is often impossible to determine whether or not he is supposed to be giving his real opinion. The moment of refutation, which should theoretically lead to *aporia* and then to new progress, leads instead to a divorce between the interlocutor's convictions and his responses. It is only when Thrasymachos insincerely accepts the Socratic view that justice is something good (353e; cf. 345ab), that Sokrates is able to bring him round, equally insincerely, to the view that justice is beneficial and brings happiness (354a).

Thrasymachos' personal investment in his existing views, and his consequent rigidity, are intimately related to his role as a professional

[61] 342cd, 343a, 344d, 346cd, 350bcd.

[62] Cf. *Rep*. 440c and see further Tait 1949: 209–11; Patterson 1987: 338–49; Williams 1993: ch. 4–5; J. R. S. Wilson 1995; Hobbs 2000.

[63] Above, pp. 124–5. On the blush as a sign of loss of face see Lateiner 1998: 171–2.

[64] 350e, 351d, 352b, 353e, 354a–d.

educator. Like Hippias, he literally cannot afford to admit defeat.[65] Under these circumstances, evasion of an argument he cannot rebut is a prudent maneuver. But the silencing of his true voice constitutes a refutation of a different kind, one that does more than expose weaknesses of argument: it reveals, in addition, the poverty of his intellectual skills, methods and achievements, and the corresponding inadequacy of his character for cooperative and fruitful rational inquiry. He abandons both intellectual integrity and consistency rather than face defeat (cf. 345b7–9). His withdrawal from committed argument therefore helps to undermine further his credibility as a thinker and educator. It is true that a sophist might sometimes eschew or evade the Socratic principles of consistency and sincerity (as we see most notably in *Euthydemus*). But this is not Thrasymachos' position here. Though he never explicitly subscribes to these principles, they are implicit in the way he speaks of his own enterprise. He claims that his account of justice is a "demonstration" (337d) based on "right reasoning" (339a), and later implies that he is indeed serious about the subject under discussion (344e).

This abandonment of the sincerity requirement deprives Socratic testing of one of its principal functions – the education of the interlocutor. Without serious commitment, there can be no substantive pedagogical progress of the personal kind to which the elenctic Sokrates is dedicated. Thrasymachos' refusal to answer sincerely does not, of course, in itself invalidate Sokrates' arguments. But it does vividly dramatize the fact that an inability to refute Sokrates the man does not automatically translate into acceptance of his arguments or their convictions.[66] Even when it becomes "apparent to all" that he has been inconsistent, Thrasymachos does not agree with Sokrates, responding instead with some particularly offensive personal abuse (343a). The point he goes on to make is a legitimate one, however, and his abusive tone powerfully conveys the frustration experienced by one who cannot escape the argument yet remains utterly unconvinced. The tone of his last remark in Book 1 makes it clear that he is still unpersuaded by Sokrates' elenctic method – as unpersuaded as Sokrates was by the sophist's lengthy speech (345a). Sokrates claims that Thrasymachos has been made "gentle" by his methods (354a), but this "gentleness" is a sulky silencing rather than a true conversion to Socratic values. Despite the fact that winning is Thrasymachos' own primary goal, his insincere responses suggest an inchoate resistance to the idea that winning an argument proves you are right.

[65] Cf. 337d, 345a, and above, p. 150.
[66] Cf. Sesonske 1969: 68–9; Annas 1981: 56–7; above, p. 126.

As the case of Thrasymachos vividly dramatizes, Sokrates' failure to win converts for dialectic often results, in Plato's representation, from the fact that the interlocutor's inability to rebut the argument does not eliminate the feeling that it is nonetheless flawed. One way of responding to this sensation is exemplified by Hippias, who sticks to his guns with apparent equanimity, regardless of his inability to clarify where Sokrates may have gone wrong. Other possible responses include admitting one's own deficiency, demanding further arguments, or accusing Sokrates of cheating. The last of these is the path taken by Thrasymachos. He asserts that Sokrates is merely striving for victory (336c), calls him a quibbler (340e2), repeatedly charges him with willful cheating,[67] and views his "irony" as dissembling (337a; cf. 490a). Many of Plato's readers have agreed with him, especially on the last point. Others have devoted much time and effort to analyzing the flaws in his arguments, flaws that sometimes give the impression of ad hominem manipulation, if not outright dishonesty.[68] Sokrates himself is very careful to deny the charge of cheating or deceit (341bc; cf. 336e, 337c). But deception is notoriously hard to disentangle from his irony. He even responds to Thrasymachos' charge of insincerity with a typical instance of the latter, ironically praising his interlocutor's "wisdom" (337a). Thrasymachos' angry response unveils this kind of irony as an expression of contempt (cf. above, p. 121). This is confirmed, for Plato's larger audience, by the contempt Sokrates displays openly for Thrasymachos in his narrative voice, which betrays the true import of his ironic compliments within their conversation. By so doing, it also shows up Sokrates' ironic praise of such oblivious victims as Hippias, and Plato's representation thereof, as a cheap shot.

Thrasymachos' resistance also points towards some of the weaknesses of the elenctic Sokrates' habitual mode of inquiry. Any skillful arguer may lead a less skilled one to agree with his conclusions, whether enthusiastically, like Polemarchos, or grudgingly, like Thrasymachos. But such agreement is obviously not enough to establish either argument or conclusion as sound. The elenctic scrutiny of one individual by another is thus flawed by its personal character, its reliance on the sincere participation of particular people. Of course any form of discourse is limited by the skills of the participants. But Sokrates' mode of testing is particularly vulnerable, in so far as his *own* moral and philosophical progress

[67] 338d, 340d, 341a, 341b.

[68] On the weakness of Sokrates' arguments against Thrasymachos see e.g. Annas 1981: 50–56; Beversluis 2000: 228–42.

is supposed to depend on the examination of others (above, p. 118). If none of Sokrates' opponents is his intellectual equal, any insight he acquires through questioning them will be circumscribed by their level of comprehension and critical capacity.

This problem is exacerbated by the requirement that the interlocutor say only what he really thinks. In so far as the elenctic Sokrates aims to convince each individual of his own inconsistencies or errors, he is constrained not only by that person's intellectual capacity but by his particular interests and convictions. The strength of the results – however the method is supposed to work – thus depends on the interlocutor's personal qualities of character, both moral and intellectual. In an important sense, then, it is the interlocutor who controls the elenctic Sokrates' inquiry.[69] At the end of Book 1, it is Thrasymachos who has served Sokrates his "feast" of arguments (354a). Plato underlines these limitations by refusing to let Sokrates ever meet his argumentative match. That he fails to do so in *Republic* 1 is clear from the end of the book, when everyone else has been silenced, and no one but Sokrates can find fault with his argument (354ab).

On the dramatic level, of course, it is always Plato who controls the argument. He is free to endow Sokrates' interlocutors with whatever abilities and interests he pleases, and thus give his protagonist access to a wide range of ideas. He may also give a particular refutation broader significance by characterizing the interlocutor as representative of a larger class or broader social and intellectual trends, as we saw in the case of Hippias. He may even take the argument far afield from what the interlocutor might in "real life" be expected to understand. By such means he gives the particularity of Socratic refutation more general significance for his own audience. But the fact remains that the Sokrates he portrays is committed to the refutation and/or improvement of individuals.[70] This methodological restriction is reinforced by Plato's particular use of dialogue form, in which each conversation is dramatized as a confrontation between Sokrates and one respondent at a time. The personal character of Socratic testing is thus a serious limitation not only because it is tied to the beliefs, outlook, and intellectual caliber of the particular respondent, but also because it depends on the impossible project of winning over each person one by one.

If Sokrates is to escape these limitations, and gain access to a broader and more speculative intellectual canvas, he must be allowed to scrutinize

[69] There is, of course, a sense in which the interlocutor controls the argument in any Platonic dialogue. But only in the elenctic dialogues is he the overt source of the ideas under discussion.
[70] Cf. Griswold 1988b: 156–7; Gonzalez 1995b: 11–12.

ideas not just because a particular interlocutor happens to hold them, but for their own sake. Defending a view for the sake of argument is usually viewed as a sophistic technique, and as such is generally frowned upon by Plato's Sokrates. But it may on occasion be necessary, if one is to give influential ideas full weight and a correspondingly convincing refutation. Plato tacitly acknowledges this in *Republic* Book 1 by representing Sokrates as uncharacteristically willing to continue the argument without the sincere cooperation of his interlocutor. Though he would obviously prefer to have Thrasymachos say only what he sincerely thinks, he is willing to ignore the respondent's manifest disengagement in order to press on with the argument, even going so far as to say that it does not matter to him whether he refutes the speaker or simply the *logos* (349ab).[71] The moment highlights the tension between two of the elenctic Sokrates' principles: the independence of the *logos*, or the truth, from particular persons, and the crucial importance of winning the agreement of the individual respondent. As Thrasymachos says, the argument must be dealt with in its own right (349a), regardless of who does or does not believe it, or of whether or not a believer happens to be present. Sokrates does not even protest when Thrasymachos turns the tables by agreeing only "according to *your* argument" (κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον) – one of Sokrates' standard phrases emphasizing that the *interlocutor* is both committed to and refuted by the argument in question (353e).[72] Although this disengagement derails the educational purpose of the elenctic Sokrates, it frees him to take the argument wherever he wishes, winning Thrasymachos' improbable "agreement," for example, to the proposition that justice is the excellence of the soul (353e) – a good example of the kind of proposition that is *not* satisfactorily demonstrated by elenctic testing.

Of the three interlocutors scrutinized in Book 1, only Thrasymachos complains of the negativity of Sokrates' methods and tries to make him examine his own assumptions about the subject under discussion. He points out that it is easier to ask questions than to answer them, demands a positive definition of justice, and sneers at Sokrates' "wisdom" for its lack of positive teaching, in language that clearly evokes Sokrates' account of his own mission in *Apology*.[73] At one point, he declares that

[71] For the similar function of other exceptions to the sincerity requirement see Irwin 1993. In *Gorg.* Sokrates becomes his own respondent (cf. also *Prot.* 354e–56c), and then resorts to continuous discourse (*Gorg.* 505d–509c; cf. the discussion of Irwin 1986: 68–72). *Prot.* 333c is only a partial parallel, since Sokrates warns Protagoras that examining the views of the many will lead to scrutiny of themselves (see Vlastos 1983a: 38–9).

[72] Cf. 339d, 389a and above, p. 138 n. 135.

[73] 336cde, 337de, 338b; cf. *Ap.* 23b.

he dislikes the argument and could answer it, were it not that Sokrates would call his argument demagoguery (350d). In other words, he remains unconvinced not only by the argument but by a method that eschews the exposition of positive views in substantial speeches. His own positive statements, including his long oration, are, of course, picked apart by Sokrates. But whatever his faults, he does at least take the risk of expressing substantive ideas. Sokrates' brand of argument in Book 1 is, by contrast, essentially critical and negative. This negativity makes it inadequate as a way of conveying positive ideas, and thereby exacerbates the failure of Socratic logic-chopping to address its victims' deeper convictions. Even Polemarchos learns primarily to adopt a negative, defensive argumentative posture (cf. 335e). Thrasymachos thus serves to point out some serious weaknesses in the elenctic Sokrates' methods, despite the prejudicial way he is characterized.

Sokrates responds to all three interlocutors with his usual patience, "friendliness," and persistence, adapting his manner to each interlocutor in turn. His treatment of the rich old Kephalos is exceptionally friendly and respectful.[74] He flatters him (328de, 330bc), draws him out with a series of innocent inquiries,[75] quotes Homer to him (328e), and tactfully represents an objection as coming from "the many" whom Kephalos scorns (329de). He tries to "provoke" the complacent old man (329e1), but his irony is lightly applied. He treats Polemarchos, who is clearly on his side, rather differently, responding positively to the younger man's high spirits, pressing home the advantage in argument, encouraging him in a cooperative way, and occasionally moderating his vigor.[76] Thrasymachos, by contrast, is lavished with the kind of ironic praise reserved for Sokrates' most unpromising interlocutors.[77] But Sokrates is also conciliatory towards him (336e), allows him to change his mind if he wishes (340bc), coaxes him to remain in the argument,[78] and compliments him for doing so (351cd, 354a), while also leaning on him when necessary (339e, 350d).

Plato's dramatic art works here, as so often, to place the onus for dialectical failure on the interlocutors, rather than Sokrates or his methods. Like Hippias, though in very different ways, the three main interlocutors of *Republic* Book 1 are all shown to be problematic as Socratic interlocutors for reasons that are rooted in their individual characters. Each, in his own way, substantiates Kephalos' claim that his outlook is a product

[74] Dickey 1996: 114. [75] 328e, 329de, 330a, d. [76] 327c, 331d, 336a, 335e, 340bc.
[77] 336e, 337a, 338a. [78] 350e, 351cd, 352b.

of his personality (*tropos*, 329d3). These personalities are conveyed with a varying degree of detail, which, perhaps surprisingly, is not directly proportionate to the extent of each speaker's role in the argument. Though Kephalos plays the smallest part and Thrasymachos the largest, both of them are portrayed in rich and memorable detail. Indeed, aside from Sokrates himself, they are the most fully realized characters of the entire work. In both cases, this carefully developed characterization serves to provide a full and convincing explanatory picture of their intellectual and personal inadequacies from a Socratic point of view. In contrast to both these figures, Polemarchos is relatively bland and unmemorable. He is both less developed as a dramatic character than either Kephalos or Thrasymachos, and less seriously flawed as an interlocutor. This is not a coincidence, as we shall see.

I argued earlier that Kephalos' failings are corroborated on the discursive level as the dialogue proceeds. The same thing is obviously true of Thrasymachos, whose ideas are the target of the remainder of the work. But both these figures are also repudiated in another way: by their implicit failure to live up to the ideal philosophical character required in Kallipolis. This ideal, as described later in *Republic*, combines qualities of both "spirit" and "gentleness" (375a–e). Sokrates himself may be thought of as displaying this combination throughout the dialogue, the former being manifested in his argumentative boldness,[79] and the latter in his diffidence and refusal to dogmatize.[80] Kephalos and Thrasymachos, by contrast, polarize these aspects of the ideal character rather than uniting them. Kephalos is friendly, moderate, and orderly,[81] but caves in at the first whiff of argument. He thus demonstrates a becoming gentleness, but a complete lack of philosophical spirit. His feebleness of mind and body are the converse of what is called for in the athletic, intellectually vigorous guardians. Thrasymachos is a more substantial opponent, in part because of the very nature of his flaws. He is a vigorous and enthusiastic arguer – at least when it suits him – but is also rude, undisciplined and hostile. He has a superabundance of *thumos*, but a marked deficiency of gentleness. The guardians, by contrast, are to be spirited, but not crudely and excessively spirited (as Thrasymachos is), and gentle, but not pusillanimously gentle (as Kephalos is).

As for Polemarchos, he is both eager and pliable, and thus, like Sokrates (though far less colorfully), displays aspects of both character types. He is

79 E.g. 335e, 376de, 473c, 501e, 503ab, 534a–e, 577b.

80 E.g. 331e, 394d, 415cd, 416b, 472a, 506cde, 517b, 533a.

81 *Metrios* ("moderate") and *kosmios* ("orderly") are key words both for Kephalos (329d5, 331b1) and for the philosophical character (399b8, 399e11, 410e3, 486b6, 500c4, c9, 503c4, 539d4).

sandwiched in more ways than one between Kephalos, the pusillanimous traditionalist, and the savage innovator Thrasymachos. The respectable, traditionalist father and the iconoclastic sophist embody the two groups of "teachers" of excellence most prominent in Athenian life, between which younger men like Polemarchos were routinely pulled (cf. above, pp. 95–9). Yet in a way the old man and the sophist present two sides of the same coin, as Sokrates' later equation of sophistry with standard cultural education will suggest (492a–495b). Both are self-satisfied rather than self-critical, and both have gained or maintained wealth as societal reward for their attitudes. Thrasymachos is an admirer of tyrants, and Kephalos a potential tyrant (above, p. 173). Glaukon and Adeimantos' restatement of what they take to be Thrasymachos' views will also extend to Kephalos and his brand of prudential consequentialism (below, p. 198).

The interlocutors of Book 1 can be viewed as a developing sequence: Kephalos represents the unreflective acceptance of conventional morality and Polemarchos the uncertain prospects of a child of that tradition, with Thrasymachos standing for its explicit rejection. This sequence is commonly seen as a decline, and Thrasymachos is certainly the most *obviously* deficient of the three. But from a different point of view, each interlocutor improves on the last, since each is more actively engaged with fundamental issues of ethics, politics and education, and each a more articulate, intelligent, and effective arguer. Polemarchos is a clear improvement on his father in these respects. And Thrasymachos, one of Plato's most vivid and memorable characters, seems to embody, more than any other character within the dialogue, Sokrates' later remark that the most talented natures risk ending up in the most disastrous failure.[82] It is true that the sophist's faults are set in high relief by their juxtaposition with the genial Polemarchos; but the reverse is also true: the active, recalcitrant Thrasymachos shows up the problematic aspects of Polemarchos' compliance and passivity. If Sokrates is to exert a real influence on his contemporaries, he must convince not just meek and cooperative respondents like Polemarchos, but tough, influential and independent-minded opponents like Thrasymachos as well.[83] I have been trying to suggest that Plato obliquely shows an awareness of this problem within Book 1. This suggestion will be confirmed by Book 2, to which I now turn.

[82] 495a–496a; cf. 491ab, 518e–519b; Rauhut 1997: 64–6.

[83] Cf. Sokrates' ironic but not necessarily insincere claim that the outspoken Kallikles is his ideal interlocutor or "touchstone" (*Gorg.* 486e–487e; cf. Nightingale 1995: 84–5).

PLAYING DEVIL'S ADVOCATE

Republic Book 2 presents us with an unequivocal shift in philosophical method, accompanied by an equally radical change in dramatic style. This transition is marked among other ways by a change of interlocutors. Sokrates' respondents for the rest of the work will be two young men, Adeimantos and Glaukon, who also happen to be Plato's brothers. Sokrates puns on the word *aristos* ("best") as he commends the nature (*phusis*) and "divine" lineage of these "sons of Ariston," who are not only bold in battle but can also speak eloquently without believing what they are saying (367e–368b; cf. also 362d). It is tempting to detect oblique authorial self-reference here. Plato too is a "son of Ariston," who of course has the eloquence to create all these speeches and many others, but is not thereby committed to the views they promulgate.[84]

Perhaps the most striking feature of Plato's double portrait here is his brothers' shared detachment from the case they make with such vehemence. There is a sharp contrast here with the usual sincerity requirement of the elenctic Sokrates. Glaukon makes clear throughout his speech that he does not agree with the point of view he is defending, and Adeimantos echoes him (367a).[85] This separation between conviction and argument was foreshadowed in Book 1, when Thrasymachos declined to answer Sokrates' questions honestly. At the beginning of Book 2, however, Plato dissociates the arguments to be refuted from the personal character and beliefs of the interlocutors in a different way. Thrasymachos claimed to care about the question at issue (344e), but withdrew from sincere participation in the argument. Plato's brothers, by contrast, are committed to the argument, but not to the views under scrutiny. Sokrates confesses that his own *aporia*, caused by the brothers' dissatisfaction with his arguments in Book 1, is exacerbated by their detachment from the views they have put forward for his refutation (368ab). Since these are not their own ideas, he cannot refute the interlocutors themselves, in the elenctic manner, but must show what is wrong with such views regardless of who holds them. By making an eloquent case for a position they do not believe in, Plato's brothers insist on the positive value of intellectual disengagement.

[84] If Plato also fought in the battle at Megara mentioned here, then the praise of the "sons of Ariston" for their courage includes him as well (Rose 1992: 334). The address "son of Ariston" is only used twice elsewhere in *Rep.*, once for Adeimantos (427c6–d1) and once for Glaukon (580b9), both times at pivotal moments in the argument (cf. Rose 1992: 343–4; Sedley 1995: 4–5).

[85] For Glaukon see 358c, 359b, 360c5, 360c8, 360d2, 360d4, 361e.

Glaukon and Adeimantos are prompted to enter the discussion by their dissatisfaction with the refutation of Thrasymachos – a dissatisfaction that echoes and endorses Thrasymachos' own reaction to the refutation of Polemarchos. In their role as devil's advocates, they restate Thrasymachos' most serious charges against Sokrates and his method in a way that dissociates these charges from Plato's prejudicial characterization of the sophist.[86] They do not accuse Sokrates of dishonesty. They understand that his irony is not, as Thrasymachos thinks (337a), a form of outright lying (cf. 362e1). Thus when he implansibly claims to have been overwhelmed by their speeches Adeimantos tartly replies that he is talking nonsense (362de). Yet they are no more convinced than Thrasymachos was by the arguments of Book 1. By complaining that Thrasymachos was prematurely "charmed like a snake" (358b), Glaukon evokes the silencing power of Sokrates' "magical" *logoi*.[87] He also implies that Sokrates might have fared less successfully with a different – possibly less snake-like – interlocutor. Adeimantos will later make the same point, on behalf of the average Socratic listener, comparing Sokrates to a draughts-player who defeats his opponent by removing his ability to move, or more literally, to speak (487abc). Though the brothers never accuse Sokrates of cheating, their restatement of Thrasymachos' views implies that Sokrates' focus on a particular interlocutor has allowed him to get away with arguments that might not survive more rigorous scrutiny. To prevent discontent, skepticism and hostility from interlocutor and audience, the case for justice must be made not just in a way that silences the interlocutor, but in the most convincing manner possible, by refuting not merely the interlocutor's personal best efforts, but the best arguments by the best speakers.

Glaukon and Adeimantos also restate Thrasymachos' other main complaint – that Sokrates refuses to give a positive account of his own views. A convincing defence of justice requires a positive alternative to Thrasymachos' position, some substantive advice on "how to live the most profitable life" (344e; cf. 352d). The explicit purpose of their vehement defense of injustice is to elicit this kind of response from Sokrates (358bcd, 367ab). Glaukon wants to hear such an account from him in

[86] Thrasymachos' role is thus comparable to that of Thersites in *Il.* In both cases a character who is demeaned and mocked (by the author and other characters) voices hostile views that have considerable force and are subsequently restated by an important and sympathetic character (Achilles, in *Il.*). In both cases, characterization and social status affect the way their complaints are received.

[87] The verb is κηλεῖν (above, p. 106 n. 257). For snakes as "vicious and courageous" see Richardson 1993: 116.

particular (358d), and Adeimantos regards him as having a special responsibility to provide one, because he (Sokrates) has devoted his life to this question (367d; cf. 506b). Adeimantos even links him with other self-styled "praisers of justice," all of whom have failed to provide young men like himself with a satisfactory account of justice and its consequences (366d–367a). The implication that Sokrates is one of those who have praised justice only for its consequences is a surprising one, since it does not seem to fit him in any of his guises. But it is a rhetorically effective way of bringing him face to face with the poetic tradition for which he elsewhere shows such contempt, and thereby challenging him to provide a substantive alternative. It implies that his denials of knowledge are pedagogical evasions, and that he has an obligation to do more than critique the ideas of others. By debunking so-called experts like Thrasymachos, Hippias and Homer, the elenctic Sokrates creates an educational vacuum in the minds of the young. This (arguably) gives him a responsibility to fill that vacuum with something substantial enough to prevent them turning into sophistic immoralists (cf. 538b–539c). The production of *aporia* is a dangerous thing.[88]

Sokrates is accustomed to scrutinizing the lives of others, but now his own way of life is on trial (367d).[89] This time, however, the jury is composed not of hostile or indifferent fellow-citizens, but of people who share his philosophical concerns, including some clever and impressionable young men from the governing class, whose own futures hang in the balance. Glaukon and Adeimantos' response to Book 1 underlines the importance of other silent bystanders, both Sokrates' listeners and Plato's readers. Their intervention, like that of Thrasymachos, shows that such listeners may refuse to accept Sokrates' arguments, and may have independent reactions diverging from those of the suspiciously compliant or silenced elenctic interlocutor. Sokrates acknowledges the importance of proving his point to this larger audience when he claims to be defeated by Glaukon's case for injustice, applauds the brothers' eloquence, and confesses the magnitude of his task in face of their dissatisfaction with his previous arguments (362d, 368abc).

Glaukon and Adeimantos challenge not only the arguments of Book 1, but the efficacy of the elenctic Sokrates' general approach as a means of discovering and teaching moral truth. In doing so they are endorsing

[88] Compare the complaints in *Cleit.* that Sokrates' lack of positive teaching turns people to Thrasymachos.

[89] A courtroom atmosphere has already been established in Book 1 (337d, 340a, d, 348ab), in part by Thrasymachos' agonistic outlook (cf. Quincey 1981: 308; Ober 1998: 216–7 and above, p. 181). Cf. also the later allusions to Sokrates' death (below, p. 218).

some of Thrasymachos' complaints against the Socratic method, in particular its negativity and its exploitation of the interlocutor's philosophical weaknesses. Their admirable *phusis* and firm convictions enhance the significance of this dissatisfaction. That such gifted and benevolent interlocutors take Thrasymachos' ideas seriously shows the extent of the threat he poses. That they find Sokrates' refutation inadequate poses serious questions about the efficacy of his methods. That they adopt Thrasymachos' own method – the long rhetorical discourse – suggests that Sokrates' rejection of such techniques was at best premature. The elenctic gadfly turns out to be an inadequate teacher not only for the ill-tempered sophist, but for Plato's brothers too.

Book 1 concluded with Sokrates declaring that they must find out what justice is before investigating what it is like (354b). The proposed question, and the methodological stricture, are both typical of the elenctic Sokrates. But once Glaukon and Adeimantos have issued their challenge, the question is pursued quite differently, and the methodological stricture abandoned.[90] Sokrates now voices positive and sustained ideas about justice, tacitly legitimizing not only the brothers' dissatisfaction, but Thrasymachos' complaints about Socratic negativity as well. That these complaints are effectively answered by Sokrates' new approach is shown by the sophist's reaction. Once Sokrates starts to develop substantial theories, Thrasymachos is converted into an attentive, interested and even friendly listener. At the beginning of Book 5 he will ally himself with the rest of the audience, implicitly invoking Sokrates' own avowed philosophical values of agreement and friendship.[91]

As this acquiescence makes clear, an intransigent interlocutor is more likely to cooperate when his own concerns are addressed. In Book 1 Sokrates adapted his manner, but not his method, to each respondent. Now he has conformed much more drastically, and successfully, to Thrasymachos' demands. Consequently, the sophist is happy to cede him the dominant role. Thrasymachos does not abandon the conversation like the lightweight Kephalos. Nor is he merely "charmed" into an unconvinced silence, as he was at the end of Book 1 (358b). In Book 2, Plato obliquely acknowledges that such silencing is not an effective way of producing either persuasion or true learning. In Glaukon's words, it was merely a "seeming" persuasion (357ab). What wins the sophist's close attention and sincere cooperation for the rest of the work is Sokrates'

[90] On the first point see Schofield 1993: 184–6; on the second Annas 1981: 39.
[91] 450a; cf. 450b, 498cd.

change of tactics. This transformation suggests an implicit critique, by Plato, of the elenctic Sokrates' refusal to play by anyone's rules but his own. Yet the concession to Thrasymachos is made indirectly, thanks to the intervention of Plato's brothers. If we are shown in Book 2 what it really takes to "tame" a Thrasymachos, we are also shown how Sokrates can accede to his demands without loss of face.

It is this change of tactics, rather than Sokrates' gentleness and good will in Book 1,[92] that accomplishes the "taming" of Thrasymachos. Sokrates remained "friendly" and unruffled throughout that book, yet the sophist was harshly sarcastic to the end (354a). In any case, there is no reason why we should expect the "friendliness" of the elenctic Sokrates to convert a Thrasymachos. As we have seen (above, p. 121), the ad hominem character of this mode of argument makes his "friendliness" into an assertion of personal dominance. In case there is any doubt in the matter, Sokrates' ironic respect for Thrasymachos throughout Book 1 indicates that his "friendly" language is indeed of this kind. Thrasymachos, with his intensely agonistic outlook, is well aware of this, as his complaint about Sokrates' irony makes clear (337a). The implications of Sokrates' "friendly" language change, however, once he leaves behind his elenctic mode. Abandoning the focus on the individual, with the competitiveness it entails, creates room for a different kind of dialectical "friendship," manifested in Sokrates' acceptance of key aspects of the sophist's terms of discourse. This is a more authentic expression of cooperation and friendship than the ironic praise, coupled with ad hominem argument, of Book 1.[93] It is this that gives credence to Sokrates' claim that he and Thrasymachos have now become "friends" (498cd). Note that this claim seems to imply that they were not, in fact, "friends" previously (cf. 354a). To be sure, Sokrates hastily revokes this covert admission, adding, "not that we were enemies before" (498cd). But this simply points up the slipperiness in his own use of "friendly" language.

The notion that true dialectical friendliness is not just a matter of superficial civility, but of addressing the interlocutor's concerns and trying to convince him in a positive way, is indirectly confirmed when Adeimantos observes that someone who properly understands justice will not become angry with those who are unjust (366c). Coming as it does on the heels of Thrasymachos' explosive anger in Book 1, this suggests that the way to disarm a Thrasymachos is to produce the kind of substantive explanation that may instill such understanding. Sokrates himself will later

[92] As argued by Patterson 1987: 341–2.

[93] Note too that Sokrates is willing to express open anger at his imaginary opponents in a way he never does with actual interlocutors (536bc).

insist on the power of general explanations, which abstain from focusing on the individual, to remove personal hostility.[94] He draws an explicit contrast here with "love of victory" (*philonikia*) (499e). The context of these utterances links them more or less obliquely with Thrasymachos and his views. The substance of those views is still, of course, Sokrates' primary target. But he now addresses them in an impersonal fashion. The conversation has become a struggle with the argument itself, no matter who voices it, rather than with an individual spokesman.

When the sophist's views are re-aired, it is by devil's advocates or imaginary objectors, not named individuals who are present at the conversation. These imaginary persons are sometimes spoken for by the compliant Glaukon or Adeimantos, who are happy not only to cave in on their behalf, but to do so far more completely than such persons might be expected to do in real life.[95] This use of abstract, imaginary persons to speak for Thrasymachos and his ilk removes the discussion from the personal arena of Athenian masculinity, in which the respondent is driven by honor and the fear of shame to defend himself at all costs. An individual, like Thrasymachos, who hears his ideas discredited in this fashion may be *more* willing to accept the consequences for his own world-view, precisely because his ego is not on the line.[96] Since his pride is not directly at stake, he can think about the argument and draw his own conclusions under his own control. Ironically, this is a more "Socratic" outcome (in its emphasis on personal autonomy) than the kind of puzzled or grudging acquiescence that the elenctic Sokrates often elicits. At the same time, the elimination of Thrasymachos from the central conversation neutralizes the threat that he poses as an individual speaker (as the taming metaphor implies), by preventing the power of his personality from rivaling that of Sokrates dramatically.

All this renders Thrasymachos' conversion to "friendliness" after Book 1 quite plausible. But there is never any suggestion that he has actually been *convinced* by Sokrates. Though he no longer defends his earlier views, he retains a sardonic tone and shows no sign of conversion to Sokrates' values.[97] If his "taming" were as complete as is sometimes claimed,[98] we might expect Plato to bring him back into the discussion in order to make his own surrender. His failure to do so is highlighted by Sokrates' casual mention of Thrasymachos and his arguments just a few lines after one such capitulation (590d). The sophist's silence at these moments is deafening. But it is also both psychologically and dramatically

[94] 499d–500e; cf. 476de, 480a, 501c–502a, 589cd. [95] 501c–502a, 588e–590a.
[96] In Miller's terms, Thrasymachos is indirectly "staged" to himself (above, p. 89).
[97] Cf. 450b, 498cd, 545ab. [98] E.g. by Bruns 1896: 326–7; Bloom 1968: 400–401.

appropriate. It is hard to imagine a full capitulation by Thrasymachos being rendered at all convincingly. This is more than an incidental artistic difficulty, or a simple matter of common-sense plausibility. Rather, it is inseparable from the dialogue's discursive exploration of human psychology. A full conversion would be profoundly at variance with the psychological and educational theories proposed by Sokrates within the dialogue. It is possible to "convert" the eye of an intelligent person's soul towards true understanding (518cd), but only if that person has been miraculously preserved from the damaging effects of an inferior cultural and political milieu, as Thrasymachos manifestly has not. To turn him into an eager and convinced interlocutor would be a philosophical as well as a dramatic betrayal. But to turn him into an engaged listener is neither. Rather it is a dramatic acknowledgement of the conditions under which even the most hostile person may be induced to pay attention.

Glaukon and Adeimantos' dissatisfaction with Sokrates' methods, combined with Plato's own change of tactics, also suggests another kind of criticism of Book 1. In that book, Plato represents Thrasymachos' response to the slipperiness of Sokrates' arguments not as a legitimate uneasiness, but as crass and offensive rudeness that discredits the sophist personally. Plato lets Sokrates exploit his role as narrator to portray Thrasymachos as a contemptible beast or bath-house attendant (344d), and subject him to an editorial mockery that belittles his objections.[99] Sokrates is as rude about Thrasymachos as the sophist is about him, but because he does not direct his insults to the sophist's face they seem more "objective" and urbane. They thus serve to deflect criticism of Sokrates' own tactics. Further, Sokrates qua narrator interprets Thrasymachos' motives for us, telling us, for example, that the sophist has been "made angry by the *logos*" (336d) – when otherwise we might be forgiven for supposing that he had been made angry by Sokrates. Later he informs us that Thrasymachos' reluctance to speak was a pretense, since he "clearly" wanted to show off (338a). This kind of editorial interpretation of the sophist's motives undermines the legitimacy of his rage at what he perceives as philosophical sharp practice.[100] This is the counterpart, on an authorial level, of the complaint, or problem, that the elenctic method is constrained by its personal character from pursuing the argument for its own sake: Plato's

[99] For animal imagery see above, p. 181. Bath-keeping was a low-class occupation, viewed with contempt and mistrust (cf. Ar. *Frogs* 710–14 with Dover 1993 ad loc.).

[100] Cf. E. L. Harrison 1967: 29–37 (though his concern is with the historical Thrasymachos).

own portrayal of Thrasymachos' personality trivializes and undermines any attempt to criticize the elenctic Sokrates and his methods.

In response to the sophist's other main charge, that his method is too negative, Sokrates intimates that he would have given a positive definition of justice if he were allowed to, but that Thrasymachos prevented him.[101] He also tells us, qua narrator, that Thrasymachos is dishonest in claiming that he wants to take the role of questioner (338a). Plato thus lets the elenctic Sokrates both have his cake and eat it, deploying Thrasymachos in such a way as to suggest that Sokrates does have a positive account to give – and would give it if permitted to do so – without abandoning his habitual claim to know nothing (cf. 337e, 354c). Once again Plato uses literary means (a blocking character) to evade a serious methodological challenge. On an authorial level, this is the counterpart to Thrasymachos' complaint about the negativity of the elenchus. The problem is not just that *Sokrates* avoids constructing positive ideas, but that *Plato* manipulates his characters in such a way as to excuse and justify that negativity, thus deflecting responsibility from his Sokrates.

In both these cases, Plato has mobilized the resources of dramatic characterization, rather than philosophical argument, to exonerate Sokrates for his failure, by belittling and discrediting his opponent. This is a technique more commonly associated with rhetoric than with philosophy (above, p. 35), and the intervention of Glaukon and Adeimantos suggests that it is unfair and inappropriate in the present context. Rather, so their speeches imply, potential criticisms of Sokrates and his method should be evaluated independently of the character of those who utter them. By introducing his brothers as intelligent, eloquent and good-natured spokesmen for injustice, Plato thus implicitly criticizes not only the elenctic Sokrates' philosophical practice, but his own prejudicial literary practice in representing it.

Another function of Sokrates' narrative role, as Plato exploits it, is to undermine the legitimacy of Thrasymachos' views by representing them as inseparable from his peculiarly offensive character (above, p. 180). According to Plato's brothers, however, it is not just Thrasymachos who holds such views, but all kinds of ordinary people as well. In "renewing" the sophist's argument (358b), they represent his outlook not as that of an idiosyncratic extremist, but as part of a complex of ideas widely held by the general Athenian public and closely linked with traditional Greek values as embodied in literature, religion and the

[101] 337abc, 337e, 339ab.

family.[102] This anonymous multitude includes fathers and guardians, ordinary people and their leaders, begging priests and poets, ancient heroes and even Sokrates himself[103] – a crowd embracing all the most powerful sources of acculturation in conventional values. The brothers thus link Thrasymachos' ideas with the consequentialism of ordinary people such as Kephalos, who might at first glance seem very different.[104] Like Kephalos, Glaukon's perfectly unjust man uses his wealth to win over the gods with sacrifices and to reciprocate friendship and enmity (362bc; cf. 364b). As for Adeimantos, his speech is linked to Kephalos' by his focus on money,[105] religion as a quid pro quo,[106] family and friends,[107] and people whose just behavior derives from fear, lack of manliness, or old age.[108] The speeches also incorporate the traditional values of Polemarchos by their focus on friendship and enmity (see esp. 362bc). The brothers' speeches thus bring out clearly the close relationship between conventional morality, as shaped by traditional culture, and Thrasymachean immoralism.

It is true that the sophist's active aggression, iconoclasm and intellectual independence suggest that he has not been subjected to the "moulding" of traditional Hellenic culture. (Unlike Kephalos and his son, he neither mentions nor betrays his formative influences.) But Glaukon and Adeimantos make it clear that in their view, at least, the ideas he purveys are part and parcel of a general cultural outlook for which poets and mythologers must take a large share of the responsibility. The real threat posed by Thrasymachos is that almost everyone – or so it seems – believes some version or another of what he stands for. Glaukon and Adeimantos thus reposition the concerns of this iconoclastic "outsider" at the heart of Athenian political culture and educational tradition. It follows that such views cannot be successfully impugned by focusing on the peculiarity or personal unpleasantness of this one spokesman. Plato – and Sokrates, qua narrator – must do more than paint him as a cheap stage villain and dismiss him. Plato's self-awareness on this matter is

[102] The point is taken by Sokrates, if 368a1 means he is calling the two brothers "offspring" of Thrasymachos (below, n. 162).

[103] 358a, 358c, 362e–365a, 366b, 366de.

[104] The questions of how far Glaukon and Adeimantos' speeches are philosophically consistent with the views of Thrasymachos, and of whether the sophist himself represents a single consistent view, have been much discussed but are irrelevant here. What matters is that Glaukon and Adeimantos treat all these views as part and parcel of a pervasive outlook. As E. L. Harrison points out (1967: 32), Thrasymachos does not object to anything the brothers attribute to him (contrast 340abc).

[105] 361b, 364ab, 366a.

[106] 362bc, 363a–d, 364b–365a, 365e–366b.

[107] 361b, 362b, 363d.

[108] 360d, 366d; cf. 330de.

suggested by the failure of such prejudicial techniques even within his own "drama." The presence of Kleitophon shows that Thrasymachos has admirers despite his deplorable manners, and even Glaukon is open to his influence, as Sokrates in his ironic fashion acknowledges (338a).[109]

Plato therefore offers us a way of reading Book 1, and other elenctic dialogues (such as *Hippias Minor*), which resists his own prejudicial use of characterization. He does this by making Glaukon and Adeimantos re-present Thrasymachos' ideas as powerfully as possible, without personal ridicule or abuse. Though their tone conveys a general contempt for those holding such views, they do not attempt to discredit them individually: their importance lies in their numbers. Like Thrasymachos, then, and in contrast to Kephalos and Polemarchos, Plato's brothers offer Sokrates a real intellectual challenge, but they do so in a way that has been uncoupled from the sophist's personal hostility and competitiveness. Only if Thrasymachos' views are successfully refuted under *these* conditions can we be sure that his anger at Sokrates – as opposed to the argument – is not well founded. Later, Sokrates will maintain that personal abuse is alien to the philosopher, who should be just, tranquil and orderly (500bcd).[110] This alludes most obviously to the rudeness of Thrasymachos, but it also applies to the treatment meted out to Thrasymachos himself by Plato and his narrator.

SOKRATES AND THE SONS OF ARISTON

In response to the challenge posed by Plato's brothers, a newly constructive Sokrates takes charge of the conversation. This Sokrates remains committed to cooperative dialectic, and continues to employ the rhetoric of shared struggle.[111] He treats Glaukon and Adeimantos as full collaborators in the argument, eliciting their agreement at every step, attributing to them even the most outlandish of his own ideas (e.g. 463c), and repeatedly characterizing them as co-founders and legislators of his ideal state (below, p. 206). The "founding" of Kallipolis is thus represented as a collective enterprise in which the three are engaged as putative equals. Sokrates' use of "friendship terms" continues to signal his argumentative superiority, but since he is no longer challenging his respondents'

[109] Cf. 337d, 358c and below, p. 213. Lysias may also have been an associate of Thrasymachos (Dover 1968b: 52–3; Nails 1998: 389).

[110] For the philosopher's aloofness from personal details see *Tht.* 173d, 174b–75b, Arist. *EN* 1125a5–9.

[111] E.g. 432bc, 453d; contrast *Laws* 892d–893e.

fundamental personal convictions or self-concept, this does not signify agonistic dominance, instead reinforcing the collaborative nature of the enterprise.

Despite this collaborative tone, however, the dialectical enterprise has now become unabashedly hierarchical. The elenctic Sokrates did, of course, dominate his conversations. But his dominance was both veiled in self-deprecation and subject to the constraints imposed by the interlocutor. In Books 2–10, by contrast, Socratic dominance is openly acknowledged by all concerned. Plato's brothers have expressed their personal admiration for Sokrates, and explicitly called for substantive discourse. They therefore owe him a respectful hearing (cf. *Laws* 746c). He, on the other hand, must now accept some degree of intellectual responsibility (cf. esp. 506b–507a). Accordingly, he adopts a much more authoritative pedagogical posture than his Book 1 counterpart. The elenctic Sokrates and his interlocutors both (in principle) learned from dialectic in a similar fashion, as equals (above, p. 120), but this new method posits two distinct modes of learning for leader and follower. Sokrates himself is still seeking new understanding (cf. 354bc, 432bc), but he does so (presumably) by thinking aloud, the others by listening, questioning and absorbing his ideas. Although he continues to seek contributions from his respondents, in practice the production of positive ideas is his exclusive responsibility. Positive discourse and its reception are represented as complementary elements in a hierarchical system. The result in dramatic terms is not, as many have thought, a merely "token" use of dialogue form, but a representation of a different kind of interaction, in which the primary (though not exclusive) responsibility of the subordinate partner is to understand what he is told and help to develop it constructively. This mode of pedagogy requires not only compliance but faith in the authority of the teacher – the faith that Thrasymachos lacked, even when he could not fault the argument.

All the participants seem to know their places within this system. All three agree that the task of defending justice belongs to Sokrates.[112] Glaukon insists that he take the role of leader, and Sokrates accepts it without question.[113] In striking contrast to the elenctic Sokrates, he explicitly presents himself as a "teacher" (392d8; cf. 489ab), who lays claim to "truth" (499ab, 502d), trying to "demonstrate" his ideas (504b4) and "define" concepts (διορίσασθαι) in a substantive fashion (474bc). He

[112] Cf. 358d, 367d, 368bc, 427de, 449b–50a, 506b. Sokrates himself thinks it would be impious for him not to "come to the aid" of justice (368bc; cf. 427de).

[113] 432c; cf. 445c, 533a, 534b.

does not shrink from providing explanations (e.g. 523c), or telling his respondents what to think (e.g. 493a4). His interlocutors correspondingly expect "demonstration" (474b2), "explanation" (δίελθέ μοι, 508c3), and detailed exposition (449c–450a), all of which Sokrates proceeds to supply. In contrast to the elenctic Sokrates, with his ironic praise for his interlocutors' "wisdom" and deprecation of his own, this new Sokrates lays claim to "keener vision" than his respondents, and they in turn (especially Glaukon) are happy to acknowledge his intellectual superiority.[114] The results – notably the completion of the ideal city and eventual "discovery" of justice – have an entirely different tone from the aporetic Sokrates' inconclusiveness (cf. 427de, 432de).

The newly hierarchical character of the relationship is reflected in Plato's use of dramatic structure. Despite the interrogative form of so many of his speeches, Sokrates' style becomes largely expository, punctuated by expressions of formulaic agreement from his respondents. The blurring of the line between dialogue and continuous discourse is betrayed in a revealing moment, when Sokrates has determined to give his views on poetry, and says to Glaukon "listen – or rather, answer" (595c5). This brief moment of methodological self-consciousness brings out the tension between the Sokrates who interrogates his companions' views and the Sokrates who uses those companions primarily as a sounding board for his own ideas. The interlocutors' responses show occasional moments of similar awareness, for example when Sokrates tells Adeimantos that certain lines of Homer must be excised "according to your argument" (κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον), and Adeimantos replies, "if you wish to call it mine" – but then agrees with it anyway (389a); or Sokrates asks a question and Adeimantos replies in "playful" fashion, "that's what *you're* going to tell *me*" (573c); or Sokrates uses the theory of Forms in an explanation, and Glaukon agrees, but with the caveat "at least that's how it would seem to those who spend time on this kind of argument" (597a8–9).[115]

Yet the Sokrates of Books 2–10, though much more authoritarian than his elenctic avatar, is not simply, as many have said, "dogmatic." The elenctic Sokrates' profession of ignorance is sustained through the constructive Sokrates' protestations of personal uncertainty about the reliability of his ideas and his own ability to expound them adequately.[116]

[114] 595c–596a; cf. 432c, 453c, 533a.
[115] Cf. also 396bc (Adeimantos must ask Sokrates to explain what Sokrates has just attributed to Adeimantos himself); 475a (Glaukon agrees for the sake of argument, even though the subject is his own erotic tastes).
[116] E.g. 368b, 416bc, 450a–451b, 497de, 506c–507a, 517b, 533a, 596c.

He makes it very clear that his hearers, including ourselves, should not simply imbibe his ideas in a passive, unquestioning fashion. In particular, he is acutely aware of the risk entailed in dogmatic exposition of views that lie within the realm of opinion rather than knowledge. Ironically, this applies most emphatically to his exposition of the metaphysics that underwrites the authoritarian pedagogy of the ideal state, and thus casts into question the very absolutism that he proposes (506c–507a, 509c). His sustained ideas must be taken seriously, but so must his explicit avoidance of dogmatism, which tempers his newly authoritarian manner with an element of dialogic openness.

The shift to positive discourse brings with it certain changes in Sokrates' character. A single mention of his divine sign (496c) reminds us stipulatively of his uniqueness. But he now displays far fewer of the intellectual and personal tics, so strongly associated with his elenctic avatars, which give dramatic substance to that uniqueness elsewhere. Though he still has playful moments, his manner becomes less complex and elusive – less ironic and *poikilos* – and correspondingly more paternalistic, didactic and earnest in tone. The contrast with the manner of the elenctic Sokrates is revealing. Although the latter employs an elaborately anti-hierarchical rhetoric, his consistent dominance of the argument establishes a superiority that reinscribes the hierarchy he eschews. The Sokrates of *Republic* Books 2–10, by contrast, is simultaneously more open about his dominant role in the pedagogical hierarchy and more genuinely cooperative in spirit. Since all the participants are now committed to the same methods and goals, their dialectical interaction has lost the agonistic flavor of Book 1. The result is a more sincerely collaborative and friendly atmosphere among the group as a whole.

This Sokrates is still at times ironic, especially at his own expense (e.g. 362d, 392d); but there is none of the acerbic irony so often aimed at his interlocutors in the elenctic dialogues. The ironic compliments of Book 1 – which did not deceive Thrasymachos, but merely angered him (337a) – have given way to evidently sincere compliments to the sons of Ariston (367e–368a). The warmth of Sokrates' praise for these new interlocutors forms a striking contrast with his elenctic mode.[117] Since his new respondents do not suffer from false pretensions, and are already interested in his pursuits, Sokrates has no reason for attempting to provoke or deflate them in that often alienating manner. Nor is he now

[117] Cf. Beversluis 2000: 381.

in the business of provoking *aporia* through irony, since his interlocutors have acknowledged their own bewilderment on the matters in question. To eliminate any risk of misunderstanding, even the most heavy-handed irony is on occasion "corrected" by Sokrates' earnest interlocutors. When he declares it "charming" that sick but self-indulgent people view those who tell them the truth as their worst enemy, Adeimantos replies that it is "not charming at all" (426ab). And when Sokrates introduces the question of the tripartite soul by saying "we have stumbled into a trivial matter," Glaukon responds solemnly, "It does not seem at all trivial to me" (435c).

The character of Sokrates' chief interlocutors has changed even more radically than his own.[118] To start with, the metics of Book 1 have been replaced by Athenian citizens, that is, fully enfranchised participants in the life of the polis.[119] Besides being citizens, they are members of a socially and politically empowered aristocracy, which gives extra urgency to the matter of their beliefs and proper education. It also means that they may be expected to be open to the elitist program that Sokrates will put forward. Glaukon, the more prominent of the two, is lightly but clearly characterized as a well-bred Athenian: he disparages Sokrates' primitive society as a "city of pigs" (372cd), assumes that a citizen-army will be adequate (374a), is well educated in music,[120] knows how to breed hunting dogs, birds and horses,[121] has had (or still has?) an older male lover (*erastēs*), and himself takes an erotic interest in boys.[122] Adeimantos is less thoroughly characterized as a member of a particular socio-cultural niche. But his complaint that Sokrates has not made the guardians very happy (419a) echoes Glaukon's aristocratic objection to the "city of pigs." And the fact that they are brothers implies an equivalent socio-economic standing.

Many of Glaukon's qualities are possible harbingers of philosophical success. Sokrates' political and educational program will transform and endorse the aristocratic idea of inherited excellence,[123] as well as the importance of "music," eugenic breeding (especially of dogs), and properly directed *erōs* (490ab, 501d). Glaukon shows signs that he is developing

[118] For a similar change in *Phileb.* see D. Frede 1996: 219–21; cf. also Gill 1996b: 287–9, 305–8.

[119] There is a similar shift in *Gorg.* (cf. Ober 1998: 197–8). Cf. also the contrast between the Athenian Theaitetos and the foreign Theodoros in *Tht.*

[120] 398e–399a; cf. 400a, 531a.

[121] 459ab; cf. also 451de.

[122] 368a, 402e, 474d–75a; cf. 468bc.

[123] 415abc; cf. also 535c. On this aspect of *Rep.* see Rose 1992; cf. also Wood and Wood 1986: 75–9.

these traits in a Socratic direction, for example by opining that erotic desire should be aimed at the soul rather than the body,[124] and eschewing musical pedantry.[125] An occasional moment of urbane humor befits the philosophical enterprise of "serious play" (451b). Even his interest in the spectacle at Peiraeus, which he shares with Adeimantos and Polemarchos, may point to a taste that might be directed towards the novelty and "spectacle" of the Forms.[126] Sokrates will subsequently declare him exceptionally well qualified to understand the crucial distinction between philosophical vision and the love of mere sights (475de). When he briefly takes the role of questioner, Glaukon uses typically Socratic examples, suggesting that he may have learned from observing Sokrates in action.[127] His further intellectual credentials range from an excellent memory to an ability to see the charm in solid geometry (528d), and he is able to give a competent summary of the Divided Line (511cd).[128] Adeimantos' intellectual virtues are less marked than his brother's. But he too has a good memory (504ab), knows Sokrates' ironic ways (362e1, 487e), and can himself be both mildly ironic and "playful" (487e, 498d5, 573d). Though he participates less actively than his brother, he does make minor contributions, and is quite good at anticipating where Sokrates' argument is heading.[129] In particular, he has some inkling in advance of what justice really is (372a; cf. 443c).

Glaukon is unquestionably "gentle" in character. He is portrayed from the outset as good-natured, compliant and cooperative.[130] He is the peacemaker who undertakes that the company will pay Thrasymachos' fee (337d). In contrast to the sophist, he accepts teasing and even rebukes with equanimity, and learns from his mistakes.[131] He is aware of the limitations in his own understanding (517c, 534b). He accepts most of Sokrates' views compliantly, allowing them to replace his own (e.g. 530b). He even lets it be known that if he did have an independent thought, he would not have the courage to voice it in Sokrates' presence (596a). Sokrates does not reprove him for this (as the elenctic Sokrates would surely do). Adeimantos is likewise pacific on principle (366c), and

[124] 402de; contrast the limitations in Kephalos' attitude towards *erōs* (above, p. 173).
[125] 400abc, 531a; cf. 399e.
[126] 328ab; cf. 500bc; cf. Clay 1992: 128; Monoson 2000: 213–17.
[127] 357c; cf. e.g. 341c–342e.
[128] For the ability to summarize the argument as a sign of attention and memory cf. 340ab, *Tht.* 208c. For Glaukon's memory cf. 441de, 511cd, 522ab, 543b–544b. Note however that it is sometimes imperfect, on important points (519e–520a) as well as trivial ones (474cd).
[129] Cf. e.g. 371cd, 381c, 394d, 497c.
[130] E.g. 327bc, 328b, 358b7, 435d, 451b. Note especially his use of the word *metrios* as a criterion for argument (e.g. 484b8, 518b5; cf. above, n. 81).
[131] 475a, 527d–528a, 528e, 529c.

cooperates in the argument in a good humored way. The brothers serve as Sokrates' willing accomplices, encouraging him in the daunting task they have set him, and drawing him out on obscure points.[132] They never seem affronted, nor do they ever weary of hearing him talk. The question is not, as it was in Book 1, how Sokrates can benefit from his respondents' purported wisdom, but how they can best aid him in the construction of his own ideas, by answering, as Glaukon puts it, "more harmoniously than another."[133]

Glaukon is spirited as well as gentle.[134] He is enthusiastic about both philosophy and Sokrates. In Book 1 he serves as the representative eager bystander who begs Thrasymachos and later Sokrates to speak (338a, 368c), and interrupts the argument even as a listener when he does not understand (347a). As the conversation proceeds he betrays occasional touches of impatience with Sokrates' hesitancy, and sometimes errs through over-confidence.[135] He shows a persistent desire to learn (e.g. 517b, 544b), and demands a complete and thorough account.[136] He remains unflaggingly alert as the conversation strays at great length over a wide range of subjects, and even shows a certain philosophical and conversational initiative of his own.[137] Moreover he has the courage to revise his unexamined views. As for Adeimantos, he breaks vigorously into the conversation in Book 2 to reinforce his brother's case, thus exemplifying the philosophical version of "helping friends and harming enemies" endorsed by Sokrates in Book 1 (362de).[138] He puts considerable pressure on Sokrates to provide a full account of his views.[139] And like Glaukon, he remains attentive, encouraging, enthusiastic and committed to the argument.

Besides this combination of "spirit" and "gentleness," Plato's brothers display another feature crucial for philosophical success: a fundamentally Socratic outlook. Both of them share Sokrates' interests and convictions, and clearly admire him, as he does them (cf. 358d, 367d).

[132] E.g. 369b, 374e, 430de, 435cd, 445bc, 474ab, 491c, 497e, 508c, 509c, 528d.
[133] 474a; cf. 475e, 595b.
[134] Note the verb προθυμηθῆναι at 596a, which suggests that his *thumos* is appropriately directed and controlled.
[135] 432e8, 472b, 474c4, 523b, 529ab.
[136] E.g. 430d, 471c–472b, 509c.
[137] E.g. 357bcd, 402de, 441a, 445ab, 467b, 468bc, 479bc, 526cd. For Glaukon's boldness cf. Xen. *Mem.* 3.6. In *Rep.* he is carefully distinguished from the timocratic man whom he resembles in certain respects (548de). For both brothers' philosophical spiritedness cf. Patterson 1987: 343, 348–9.
[138] Note especially the proverbial wisdom ("brother supports brother") of 362d, which evokes the old code (below, p. 284).
[139] 497e, 449c–450a, 504e.

Most importantly, like Polemarchos before them, and in contrast to Thrasymachos, they share Sokrates' fundamental belief in the superiority of justice over injustice.[140] Even in Book 1, Glaukon takes Sokrates' side against Thrasymachos, thus establishing that he has "right opinion" about the value of justice (347e–348b). In Book 2, both brothers agree with Sokrates that his task is not to discover *whether* justice is better, but to "come to its aid" by showing *that* it is so (368bc; cf. 362d). According to Sokrates, this commitment to justice is displayed not just verbally but through the brothers' character (*tropos*, 368b2), reiterating the interplay between character and outlook that we saw in Book 1. This is dramatically confirmed by the brothers' cooperative attitude towards dialectic. Their basic similarity of outlook, and commitment to Sokrates' methods and arguments, is signaled by their role as "co-founders" and "legislators" of the "city in words."[141]

Glaukon and Adeimantos thus exemplify the kind of respondent that Sokrates needs if he is to move towards a more positive kind of dialectic. We saw the beginnings of such an interlocutor in Polemarchos, whose approval of justice, as well as his cooperative "friendly" spirit, made Socratic testing unusually successful in his case. But these requirements are developed more fully in Glaukon and Adeimantos. Most importantly, their "spirit" includes a much higher degree of intellectual vigor and critical capacity than was evident in Polemarchos. These talents are displayed most forcefully in their long speeches at the beginning of Book 2. The contrarian vigor with which Glaukon enters the fray in this book embodies an implicit critique of both the feebleness of Kephalos and the over-compliance of Polemarchos. He even briefly takes on the role of questioner, putting Sokrates into the unaccustomed role of docile respondent (e.g. 357b9), and going on to "demonstrate" the method that Sokrates should now follow (358d). By briefly reducing Sokrates to passive responses (357b), he allows Plato to give the lie to Thrasymachos' complaint that he never plays this part (337a), thereby indirectly acknowledging that complaint's validity. This brief reversal of dialectical roles is followed by Glaukon and Adeimantos' long speeches, which play a crucial role in sparking Sokrates' own creativity. After that, the brothers become more passive. But their "brilliance" in Book 2 has provided us with a matrix for interpreting this acquiescence, by assuring us that they do have a character capable of criticizing Sokrates' elenctic

[140] Cf. 347e–348b, 358c, 366e, 392ab.
[141] Cf. 374e, 379a, 403b, 409e, 420b, 421ab, 427bc, e, 434e, 443b, 453b, 458c, 470e, 486b, 497cd, 502c, 519cd, 595a.

procedures, as well as the ideas of Thrasymachos and popular culture. This implies that they are articulate and capable, if they see fit, of also offering resistance to Sokrates' positive ideas.

This implication is confirmed by the fact that they continue to offer a low but significant level of resistance.[142] Glaukon is willing to stand up to Sokrates and even criticize him.[143] Adeimantos resists more strongly, continuing, in particular, to express a concern about his methods which recalls Book 1 and the opening of Book 2.[144] Nor does he underestimate the opposition, or forget about Thrasymachos (498c, 499d). Sokrates paradoxically legitimates his concern about method, going out of his way to explain why it is ill-conceived, and making Adeimantos his emissary of the truth about philosophers (487d, 489ab). He also acknowledges the point less directly, through the constraints he places on the practice of dialectic in Kallipolis (531d, 539bcd). As Sokrates' reactions make clear, such friendly objections are entirely proper to the dialectical character, suggesting as they do both engagement and intellectual vigor. He compliments Adeimantos on his persistence, in particular on not settling for second-hand opinions (506abc) – a compliment implicitly contrasting him with Kephalos and Polemarchos. This serves to remind us that Sokrates' sway over his interlocutors does not mean that we, or even they, must necessarily be convinced by his arguments, even when we cannot explicitly fault them. In contrast to Thrasymachos, however, the brothers' objections are never voiced in a hostile or personally offensive manner.

The brothers' resistance also plays a crucial role in eliciting the constructive Sokrates' creativity. It is their resistance to Book 1 that sparks the rest of the dialogue, and as the work continues, their questions and objections serve to prevent Sokrates from getting away with things without explaining them to their satisfaction.[145] In contrast to the objections of a Thrasymachos, which led to a dead end (or a Pyrrhic victory for Sokrates), Plato uses these moments to facilitate the further development of the argument. Glaukon's objection to the "city of pigs" (372cd), for example, prompts the development of the ideal state. The brothers' more frequent – and often well justified – failures to catch the drift of his argument oblige Sokrates to clarify and develop his ideas.[146] Their incomprehension also accentuates the bizarreness of much of his discourse,

[142] See Miller 1985 and cf. Clay 1988a: 141–2, 1988b: 21–3; Rutherford 1995: 210.
[143] E.g. 347ab, 358b, 372d, 427d, 432e8, 471cde.
[144] 449b–450a, 487a–d, 506b.
[145] E.g. 427de, 449b–451b, 457de, 471c–472b, 506b–507a.
[146] E.g. 368de, 375a, e, 377a, 377d, 382a, 392c, d, 398c, 413b, 438b, 508c, 510b, 523b.

justifying the reader's own sense of bafflement and enabling us to identify with Glaukon and Adeimantos, to put ourselves into the interlocutors' shoes and approach the argument from their perspective. Sokrates' creative flights seem to require the provocation of interlocutors who, though fundamentally supportive, retain a modest level of resistance.

When expressing objections to Sokrates' argument, the brothers, in particular Adeimantos, sometimes slip back into the role of devil's advocates.[147] This ensures that their habitual agreement does not allow him to evade the larger challenge posed at the beginning of Book 2. It also enables the brothers to voice the objections of ordinary people without committing themselves to ideas that might undermine their Socratic credentials, or, conversely, taking his criticisms as a personal assault. The device of the devil's advocate helps to maintain a harmonious atmosphere, in which any serious disagreement has been silenced (by Plato), so that Sokrates need face no committed opposition. It also presents the interlocutors as more convinced by Sokrates, more committed to "right opinion" and Socratic reasoning, than if they proposed such objections in their own voices. When Adeimantos worries about the way unnamed objectors react to Sokrates' methods (487bcd), Sokrates can respond not by correcting Adeimantos himself but by enlisting him as a "teacher" for such benighted souls (489ab), recalling his earlier treatment of Polemarchos (335e). A similar technique is later used with Glaukon (588e–590a).

Even at their most compliant, however, Glaukon and Adeimantos remain implicated in the argument by their acquiescence, and concerned about its outcome for their own lives (cf. 527e–528a). This commitment to the argument is an important survival from the method of the elenctic Sokrates. But now that Sokrates is exploring his own ideas with the help of sympathetic and supposedly intelligent interlocutors, it imposes little restriction on his newfound creativity. He is still limited by his respondents, but only in the sense that they never present him with a serious challenge of a kind that might force him to modify his views in any fundamental way. Instead, they leave him free to develop his argument however he chooses. The constructive Sokrates needs as respondents not flawed individuals but talented, eager and sympathetic listeners, whose characters will not interfere with the creative flow of his ideas, but instead show what circumstances foster positive thought.

It is this sympathetic support that enables Sokrates to run the risk of exposure entailed by positive discourse – the risk that Thrasymachos jeered

[147] E.g. 419a, 487bcd; cf. 438a, 499d.

at him for avoiding.[148] Only in an atmosphere of friendship, cooperation and trust (unlike that of Book 1) can one afford a sustained exposition of controversial ideas. This is underlined by Sokrates' reiterated fear that his ideas will arouse skepticism, ridicule and even hostility.[149] Such fears betray the defensive posture of someone expecting an eristic or confrontational attitude in others – the attitude that Thrasymachos both exemplified and attributed to Sokrates himself. Sokrates' willingness to take intellectual risks despite these fears is contingent on the cooperative character of his new interlocutors. When he hesitates, Glaukon tells him to speak "without fear" (414c), promises to "defend" him with good will and encouragement (474a), and reminds him that his audience is "neither unsympathetic, nor untrusting, nor hostile" (450d). His outlandish ideas are greeted for the most part with support and admiration. The assembled company is even willing to forgive him for misleading them (451b).

The emergence of the newly authoritative Sokrates is thus inseparable from the character of the new interlocutors provided for him by Plato. This is not only a reflection of the personal circumstances in which positive philosophical discourse may best occur, but also an indirect comment on the behavior of Sokrates in Book 1, which has scarcely earned him the right to such support. It is all too easy to imagine how his elenctic self might have treated some of the highly speculative and controversial, even shocking, ideas that he proposes in the rest of the dialogue. On the other hand, his very willingness to make himself vulnerable to attack in this fashion engenders greater trust in him as a teacher, thus in turn validating his companions' support and respect.

Plato's transition to a different style, and representation of a different Socratic character and method, provide clear benefits not only for Plato and his Sokrates, but also for ourselves as readers: principally the detachment of the argument from the individual, which opens up wider intellectual horizons, and the move to more positive exploration facilitated by the trust and cooperation of the interlocutor. All this makes sense as a response to the limitations inherent in the methods of the elenctic Sokrates – limitations dramatized in Book 1 and endorsed by Glaukon and Adeimantos in Book 2. Prominent among these, as we have seen, are the negativity and inconclusiveness of the elenctic Sokrates' procedures. It was no doubt partly, as many have suggested, a desire to ameliorate these problems that prompted Plato to provide Sokrates with a broader

[148] 336c, 337e, 338b.
[149] E.g. 414c, 450a–451b, 452a–453a, 457bc, 472a, 473e–474b, 497de, 499ab.

canvas on which to develop positive ideas. In this sense, Books 2–10 clearly constitute a critical response to the elenctic Sokrates as represented in Book 1 and elsewhere.[150]

But if Sokrates' change of method and Plato's change of manner succeed in evading some of the problems raised by the practice of the elenchus, as exemplified in Book 1, they have not eliminated the effortless superiority with which Sokrates manipulates his interlocutors. On the contrary, this problem is exacerbated by the outlandishness of the ideas that the interlocutors now accept, for the most part with equanimity, despite their moments of resistance. We continue to face the difficulty, foreshadowed in Sokrates' conversation with Polemarchos, of over-facile agreement to the most controversial ideas. The interlocutors of Book 1 were silenced by Sokrates' effortless dialectical superiority. In the rest of *Republic* they are silenced by a different, and more effective, authorial strategy: co-optation. This emerges clearly from the way in which the most substantial opposition to Sokrates' ideas is voiced by his own imaginary objectors, while his "real" respondents remain at a loss (e.g. 453abc; cf. 438a). Indeed, Plato seems to bypass, quite willfully, some obvious opportunities to let his brothers shine, especially Glaukon, even though he seems to be the more talented of the two.[151] Sokrates is thus represented as a more acute and effective critic of his own ideas than either Glaukon or Adeimantos.

Furthermore, at no point do Glaukon and Adeimantos show any talent for constructive thinking. Despite their putative role as "co-founders," it is Sokrates, almost exclusively, who conceives the vision of a new society and generates it in the role of philosophical "artist" or "poet" (below, pp. 231–2). Sokrates' own creativity is so powerful that it seems to erase rather than foster his interlocutors' intellectual imagination. This apparent stifling of the respondent's creativity was not unavoidable. The construction of the ideal state could easily have been a dramatically lively venture, with real objections raised and discussed, and real contributions from several individualized characters.[152] But Plato seems unable, or rather unwilling, to dramatize for us in this dialogue an interlocutor with a positive creative intelligence or critical capacity that can even begin

[150] For *Rep.* 2–10 as critical of the method of Book 1 see e.g. Giannantoni 1957: 138–41; Sparshott 1957; Sesonske 1961; Nussbaum 1980: 86–8; Reeve 1988: ch. 1; Beversluis 2000: 379–83. Cf. also Robinson 1953: 16–19; Nehamas 1990: 12–14; Vlastos 1991: ch. 4.

[151] For such missed opportunities cf. 375d, 522b, 528a, 530c.

[152] Contrast the extensive and varied contributions of *Symp.*, Protagoras' "great speech" in *Prot.*, and the substantial speeches of *Tim.-Crit.*, which is in one sense the most truly "dialogic" of Plato's works, since there is no single dominant character.

to match that of Sokrates. To do so would detract from a central preoccupation of Plato's dialogues generally: the uniqueness of Sokrates (above, p. 69), which is manifested in Books 2–10 in the form of an unparalleled philosophical creativity. This in turn implicitly justifies these books' explicitly hierarchical model of philosophical discourse (cf. 515a).

Both the merits and the limitations of Glaukon and Adeimantos' characters may be understood better if we assess them by the dialogue's internal criteria for the ideal philosophical character. This is the ideal proposed for the rulers of Kallipolis, who like Glaukon and Adeimantos are engaged in the pursuit of wisdom and virtue. The guardians must be just, self-controlled (*sōphrōn*) unmaterialistic, "magnificent," gracious, calm, reliable, orderly, noble and hard-working; they must be mentally and physically bold, learn quickly and easily, have a good memory and a keen mind, and love truth and all kinds of knowledge.[153] By repeatedly listing these qualifications, Sokrates spells out on the discursive level much of what Plato has implied dramatically about the qualities desirable in a dialectical partner.[154] Those qualities may be summarized as vigor and gentleness in mind and body. The difficulty of combining such normally antithetical sets of traits is a constant concern of Plato's.[155] But, as we have seen, they are combined in Glaukon and Adeimantos, as well as Sokrates himself. The dramatis personae of Books 2–10 also mirror the inhabitants of the ideal city in being cooperative, friendly, and harmonious in their personalities, convictions and philosophical goals. Like the present company, the ideal state is to be united by justice, mutual good will and friendship among all its citizens.

Not surprisingly, the traits in Plato's brothers that are linked to their dialectical promise – courage, cooperation, memory, initiative, good humor, enthusiasm for learning, stamina and good breeding – overlap substantially with the qualifications for guardianship, and ultimately for rulership in Kallipolis. Sokrates makes the equivalence explicit when he prescribes the guardians' education for the interlocutors themselves, including himself (402bc).[156] Later he declares that the purpose of the whole enterprise is to assess their own degree of virtue and happiness

[153] See 455b, 475bc, 485a–487a, 489e–490c, 494b, 503bcd, 504c, 535a–536b.

[154] The interplay between the two levels is exemplified neatly when references to Adeimantos' memory bracket that requirement in the guardians (503b, 503c, 504a).

[155] Cf. *Rep.* 375a–e, 503bcd, *Stat.* 306a–311b, *Tht.* 144ab, *Tim.* 87e–88c, *Laws* 731bcd. Cf. also the project of combining the opposed heroic paradigms of Achilles and Odysseus (above, ch. 3).

[156] Cf. 504b–e with Sider 1976: 346.

by their degree of similarity to the guardians (472cd). He even hints that Plato's brothers may be among the special few who might rise to preeminence in the ideal state. In virtue of their role as legislators, they are equated with the ruling class of philosophers, thus eliding the gap between politics and its representation (497cd).[157] A further dimension is added when the philosopher-rulers are described, like the interlocutors themselves, as "painters" creating images of good people.[158]

It remains to be seen, however, whether Glaukon or Adeimantos, or even Sokrates, can live up to the lofty expectations implied by this analogy. Unlike the philosopher-rulers, Plato's brothers start out with a set of conventional attitudes, as made clear by their concern that the ideal state does not include comfort or "happiness" as conventionally understood (372d, 419a). This outlook reminds us that aristocratic birth, wealth, and political involvement are all potentially dangerous for the philosophic nature (494bc; cf. 537e–538a). Glaukon and Adeimantos' lineage may suggest a potential for philosophical rulership, but it also links them with the tyrannical aspirations of such aristocrats as Kritias, their uncle.[159] Similarly Glaukon's erotic nature, which may be transmuted into philosophical *erōs*, also potentially links him with the master passion of the tyrant (572d–575a). Sympathy for the Socratic enterprise is not, by itself, sufficient for philosophical virtue. Good character coupled with right opinion must still be fortified by "giving an account" of justice and its opposite through dialectic.[160] Conversely, such questions should not be addressed until right opinion has been dyed indelibly into their souls.[161]

How "deeply dyed" are the convictions of Glaukon and Adeimantos? They seem to have passed the initial test of exposure to Thrasymachos and his arguments. Yet they are still interested in Thrasymachos' views (338a), and Glaukon has been reduced to *aporia* by the sophist and others like him (358c). As Adeimantos reproachfully tells Sokrates, if "all of you" had told "us" a different kind of story from childhood, then no one would now be threatened by injustice (366d–367a). Adeimantos even aligns himself with those naturally talented young men who are in danger of learning that it is more important to *seem* just than to *be* just (below, pp. 240–41). And he acknowledges that he and his contemporaries

[157] Cf. e.g. 427c6–d1, 527c2, and see Too 1998: 78–81.
[158] 484cd, 500c–501c; for the dramatis personae as "artists" see below, pp. 231–2.
[159] We know nothing for certain about Glaukon and Adeimantos' later lives (cf. Brann 1967: 110). But Munn speculates that Glaukon may have died fighting at the side of the tyrant Kritias (2000: 239).
[160] Cf. 505e–506e, 531e, 532ab, 534b, 535b, *Meno* 98a.
[161] 429c–430b; cf. 503a–e, 536d–540c.

lack the "guardian in the soul" that an autonomous sense of justice would bestow (366e–367a) – an internal "guardian" foreshadowing the secure convictions of the guardian class in Kallipolis. Their speeches, especially that of Adeimantos, also remind us of the powerful effects of education and culture. Their ability to defend injustice elicits Sokrates' praise (367e–368b), but this praise itself implies that, despite their apparent detachment from such views, they retain the potential to become Thrasymachoi.[162] Moreover the primary talent displayed in these speeches is a gift for rhetoric, the province of Thrasymachos and other sophists. The form of the speeches, as well as their content, thus displays the extent to which they have been steeped in contemporary Athenian education. Despite their resistance to Thrasymachos, Sokrates has not yet completely won the battle for their allegiance.

At the same time, despite these deficiencies and despite their lack of substantive philosophical creativity, there continue to be *narrative* indications that Glaukon and Adeimantos have the capacity for greater autonomy, and with it a more active dialectical role. The trainee guardians are not to begin the study of dialectic until the age of thirty,[163] and it is not clear whether Glaukon and Adeimantos have yet attained that age (537cd).[164] But there are signs that they are ready to pursue a higher level of understanding. Specifically, both of them seem to be familiar with the notion of Forms, though neither is well-versed in such ideas.[165] A crucial passage in this regard, as in others, is the approach to the Form of the Good, arguably the heart of the entire work. As Sokrates leads up to this topic, he worries about misleading his interlocutors with inadequate explanations (506c–507a; cf. 504b–e). He feels unable to give his opinion, turning instead to images or "offspring" of the Good (506de). When the time comes to move away from images towards the truth, as it appears to him, he cuts his discourse short, since even Glaukon will be unable to follow him any further (533a; cf. 534b). Glaukon's inadequacy

[162] Some editors think that at 368a1 Sokrates is calling the two brothers "sons" of Thrasymachos (cf. also Dickey 1996: 52 n. 13). If so, they are linked with Thrasymachos much as Polemarchos is linked to his father's views. But the passage may simply allude to their biological parentage.

[163] For the pivotal cultural significance of this age of thirty, at which (approximately) a man passed from the ranks of the *neoi* ("young men") to those of the *presbuteroi* ("elders") see Garland 1990: 242–3; Golden 1990: 107–8. Note particularly that an Athenian man could not serve on the Council or juries (like the one that condemned Sokrates) until that age. According to Xenophon, the Tyrants ordered Sokrates not to speak to anyone under thirty (Xen. *Mem.* 1.2.33–7).

[164] Above, n. 11. But the correspondence should not be pushed too far, since (i) they are obviously not operating within the ideal state, and (ii) it is far from clear that the dialectic engaged in by the guardians would resemble the conversation between Sokrates, Glaukon and Adeimantos.

[165] 475e, 596a, 597a, 504e–505a.

is thus clearly marked. On the other hand, the narrative also assures us that both the brothers are on the brink of further understanding. Even though they are willing to settle for mere opinion from Sokrates (506bcd), and for the "shorter road" rather than the "longer road" prescribed for the guardians (535cd), this is evidently provisional. Glaukon looks forward to hearing about the Good itself rather than its "offspring" (506e), and to further conversations that will clarify the apprehension of the Good through dialectic, accepting the allegory of the cave only subject to future reiteration (532d). Sokrates himself implies that they may hear more about the Good from him some other time (506de). Although they are not yet ready for the higher reaches of dialectic, the present conversation is conceived of as a part of the continuing process that will lead them all to greater understanding. Glaukon and Adeimantos are thus poised at a pivotal stage in their moral and philosophical development.[166]

The similarities and differences between the dramatis personae and the guardians may be further elucidated by comparing the modes of education to which they are exposed. The inhabitants of Kallipolis are to be subject to draconian control, on one level by Sokrates and his partners, as the city's "founders," and on another by the philosopher-rulers (466a, 500d–501c). In the early stages of the young guardians' education, their characters are to be "moulded" by the right kind of poetry and story-telling, in highly traditional fashion, through habituation and emotional identification.[167] Their passivity in this process is underlined by Sokrates' preferred analogy with dog-training (375a–376b, 451c–e). There is no sign that they will be encouraged or even permitted to adopt an actively analytical attitude towards their carefully selected literary diet. They are envisaged not interpreting poetry, but simply imbibing it along with other beneficial artistic influences (401bc). This image of the youthful guardians "grazing" from one plant to the next recalls both Adeimantos' picture of conventional poetic education (365a), and the use of anthologies (literally, "flower-collections") in traditional pedagogy.[168] Note too the way in which Sokrates explicitly rules

[166] Note Glaukon's possible status as both *erastēs* and *erōmenos*, which would place him at a liminal moment in the process of maturation to manhood (see above, p. 203, and cf. Dover 1989: 87; Halperin 1990: 47).

[167] 377c, 378de, 395cd, 396d, 401bcd, 409b, 412a, 424d–425a, 500d, 522a, 603c–604a, 605c–606c; cf. above, pp. 95–6. For the traditional character of the guardians' primary education cf. 376e and see Robb 1997: 46–50. On literary education and the production of identity in *Rep.* see also Too 1998: ch. 2.

[168] Such passages also evoke the image of the bee, which persisted in ancient education (cf. T. Morgan 1998: 262–3).

out allegorical interpretation, on the grounds that the minds of the young are incapable of discerning hidden meanings (378d).[169] As he puts it, it must not even enter their heads to say or do anything inappropriate (388d). They must learn to be steadfast, compliant, and respectful of authority before they are permitted to move on to independent thinking (cf. 590d–591a). These qualities are inculcated by music and poetry, which do not turn the soul "upwards" towards rational thought (522a). All this forms a striking contrast with the elenctic Sokrates' emphasis on intellectual and moral autonomy. That other Sokrates pursued his own method at the cost of his life; in Kallipolis the death penalty will be imposed for "incurable" deviance (410a).

This authoritarianism also seems to extend to the guardians' higher education, including the philosopher's progress towards the vision of the Good. Sokrates and Glaukon, qua founders, will "compel" the guardians towards this vision (519c), by means of studies chosen to exert the "compulsion" of reason.[170] In the allegory of the cave, which serves, among other things, as an image for the guardians' education, the prisoners are to be "dragged" outside (515e8), just as the higher educational program is to "drag" the guardians' souls.[171] An unspecified agent is to release the prisoners and "compel" them to look towards the light (515cd; cf. 518cd). The experience seems to be envisaged as passive and impersonal, as opposed to an individual self-awakening. As such it might be expected to arouse resistance rather than compliance, on a par with Thrasymachos' resentment at being "dragged" to unwelcome conclusions by the elenctic Sokrates (350d1; cf. 539b6).

Yet the ultimate goal of the founders of Kallipolis is autonomous, self-generated virtue, which will function as an active force or "guardian" *within* the user's soul (366e–367a; cf. 443cd). Accordingly, intellectual autonomy and even creativity are necessarily elements in the "nature" of the guardians, who must be not only quick, but "inventive" (εὑρετικός) in their studies (455b7).[172] Even as young children, they are encouraged to pursue intellectual activities eagerly and freely, by practising mathematics as a form of play (536d–537a). But the inventive aspect of their

[169] Cf. *Phdr.* 229d and see further Brisson 1998: ch. 12.
[170] Cf. 523d3, 524a2, 524c7, 524e4, 525d6, 526e, 529a1.
[171] 521d3, 523a2, 524e1, 527b9, 533d2.
[172] At *Stat.* 286d–287a this word is used for dialectical skill, skill at the method of division, and the ability to demonstrate the truth in words. Though its verbal root means "find," it is routinely used for modes of "discovery" that are strongly imaginative or creative. Archimedes' famous cry was ηὕρηκα and the standard term for an inventor is πρῶτος εὑρετής (e.g. Theuth the inventor of writing, *Phdr.* 274c; see further Kleingünther 1933). It is also used for "inventive" poetry and craftsmanship (e.g. *Ion* 534e, *Symp.* 209a5; cf. Gentili 1988: 50–51, 53–4) and the "discovery" of philosophical answers (e.g. *Rep.* 429a).

natures receives little emphasis until they reach the higher stage of their education.[173] At this point the passive pedagogy of approved poetry is followed by a further curriculum, largely mathematical in nature, whose purpose is explicitly to stimulate the soul towards autonomous, active or "wakeful" intellectual activity.[174] Sokrates has already contrasted passive, mindless adaptation to the whims of the masses with the hard work of active thinking that is required by dialectic (493a–d, 494d). And in his account of higher education, the language of compulsion is complemented by a presumption of voluntary, active participation on the part of the learner. The recommended studies are to "drag" the learner's soul, but to do so "gently" (533d2), to "compel" it to turn *itself* round (526e), to "encourage" the mind and "awaken" understanding (523abc, 524d), and to "turn the eye" of the soul in a way that assumes active, voluntary engagement of the "eye's" owner.[175] This procedure is associated with intellectual *aporia*, clearly recalling the elenctic Sokrates' emphasis on active learning (524ab, 524de).

The result is a combination of compulsion and autonomy, like the state of the cave-dwellers who are "released," somehow "naturally," by a mysteriously indeterminate agent, and "forced" to make their own way out into the light (cf. 515c, 532bc); or like the philosopher-rulers who are "forced" to return to the cave, yet clearly do so voluntarily (519c–520a).[176] In both cases a kind of compulsion is fused with a kind of freedom. This complex view of motivation results from the two levels of the guardians' education, reflecting an acknowledgement of the need for both passive and active modes of learning. The outcome is a synthesis of the two, whereby the "moulding" of traditional education, in which the student is shaped by the teacher, eventually becomes a self-moulding, in which the same person serves as both scuptor and clay.[177] Thus the philosopher ruler will mould himself, as well as shaping others in his likeness (500d, 540ab). The result is true freedom (ἐλευθερία) – the personal autonomy that befits a free man, as opposed to a slave.[178]

The relationship between teacher and learner represented in *Republic* on the dramatic level is much less starkly authoritarian than

[173] On the two stages of education and their relationship see Gill 1985, 1996a: ch. 4; Cooke 1999. For the idea that autonomy may result from a highly authoritarian education, as the achievement of an elite few, see T. Morgan 1998: 262–70.

[174] 524ab, 524d–525a, 525d, 526ab, de, 532bc.

[175] 521c, 525c, 527de, 529d.

[176] For a recent treatment of this much-discussed issue see Gill 1996a: 287–307.

[177] There is even a hint of this idea in Book 3 (396d).

[178] 536de; cf. 329c, 344c, 387b, 395c, 404e–405c, 557b. Ἐλευθερία also connotes frankness, courage and generosity (cf. e.g. 391c5, 402c, 499a4; *Tht.* 144d, 173ab).

the guardians' moral training, despite the fact that it concerns justice, not geometry. As we have seen, Sokrates leaves open for his interlocutors – and audience – a degree of autonomy that is permitted to the guardians only at the highest intellectual level, when their moral character has been fully and indelibly formed. This disanalogy between the dramatis personae and the inhabitants of Kallipolis reminds us that the parallel, though fruitful, should not be pressed too far. For one thing, none of them has attained the vision of the Forms which alone would provide certain knowledge. Only this would legitimize absolute authority and educational control of the kind accorded to the philosopher ruler. Sokrates' opinion about the truth lies beyond Glaukon's understanding, but even Sokrates remains confined to the level of opinion.[179] Like Plato's brothers, he is portrayed not as someone who has achieved full insight, but as caught in the particularity of a specific moment of development, a moment of the kind that traps, but also constitutes, each human being.

This is scarcely surprising, since Sokrates has not been subjected to the guardians' higher education, which is supposed to stimulate progress towards the Forms, any more than Glaukon and Adeimantos have.[180] Nor have their characters been formed by the necessary training in proper poetry. Their conversation takes place not in an ideal state, but in democratic Athens, as the dialogue's setting so heavily emphasizes. All three of them have therefore had a life-long exposure to the corrupting influence of traditional education, as enshrined in its pernicious poetry. The musical Glaukon has been exposed to all the modes, bad as well as good (398e–399a, 400a). Even Sokrates is susceptible to Homer, and loves him, precisely because of his upbringing under the corrupt Athenian mode of government (607c–608b).[181] Glaukon and Adeimantos' long speeches, and Sokrates' detailed knowledge of Homer, give abundant evidence of their exposure to such cultural influences. This kind of education, if absorbed in one's youth, is extremely difficult to eradicate (cf. 377ab, 378d). It may, of course, have certain positive effects (383a). For example, they could all have learned courage and stamina from the example of Homer's Odysseus.[182] But, in general, the influence of existing poetry is presented as overwhelmingly negative.

[179] 505a, 506b–e, 509c, 533a.

[180] According to some, the process of "conversion' is dramatized in the dialogue itself (Brann 1967: 89; Bloom 1968: 406–7; cf. N. D. Smith 1999a: 202); but if so, Glaukon and Adeimantos' "conversion" bears no resemblance to that of the guardians, whose "turning around" of the soul through mathematics followed by dialectic is equated with the experience of the cave-dwellers.

[181] Cf. Ober 1998: 241–3.

[182] 390d; cf. 441b, *Symp.* 220c.

Sokrates does allow that in extraordinary cases, with the help of the gods, a special few may escape unscathed, though these natures are very rare, and if raised outside the ideal state are normally corrupted.[183] The "divine" escape from such corruption (492a, e) alludes most obviously to Sokrates himself. The "divine sign" that serves as a marker of his uniqueness arguably makes him an exception to the rules by which ordinary mortals are governed (496c). And to a large extent, Plato does present him as uncorrupted by the culture of Athens. He is an exception to mimetic pedagogy, remaining uncorrupted by traditional poetry, just as in Plato's representation (if not in the eyes of most Athenians) he remains untainted by those with whom he associates. But elsewhere he himself treats the notion of excellence as a gift from the gods ironically, in so far as it makes virtue a passive accomplishment, removed from the purview of rational understanding.[184] He is far from relying on any divinely bestowed token of superiority, as the story of Apollo's oracle makes clear. He interprets that mark of divine favor as a command to self-improvement, making intellectual activity central both to the superiority pronounced by the oracle and to the uniqueness betokened by his *daimonion*. In any case, even someone who has been divinely preserved from Athenian cultural influences evidently needs further training in order to attain to a vision of the Forms. For that, he would require a cultural matrix that would foster his divinely-preserved character – as opposed to executing him for it.[185]

Sokrates also hints that Glaukon and Adeimantos may be among those who share in such an extraordinary nature. The terms in which he praises their *phusis* (367e–368a), and their "divine" ability to resist the view that injustice is better than justice, echo the "divine *phusis*" to which Adeimantos attributes the rare ability to reject injustice.[186] Plato thus suggests that they not only have the rare and extraordinary talent necessary for Socratic philosophy and virtue, but have been "divinely" preserved from corruption by the damaging education that anyone raised in contemporary Athens must have received (491a–493a).[187] But to place too much weight on this suggestion would be to undermine the whole basis of *Republic's* insistence on the cultural process of character-formation.

[183] Cf. 366c, 490e–491b, 492a, 492e–493a, 496a–d, 503b, 595b, 605c.

[184] Cf. *Meno* 100b, *Ion* 542ab.

[185] Sokrates' fate is clearly alluded to at e.g. 474a, 492d, 496c–497a, 517a.

[186] 366c; cf. 492a, 518de, 520b2–3, 558b. For the "divine" nature of the ideal philosophy student cf. e.g. *Ep. VII* 340c and below, p. 270.

[187] Were they not somehow divinely favored, the implication would be that they are merely mediocre, since they have not turned into the worst kind of person (above, p. 189).

To be sure, a "divine" element in one's natural character is indispensable. But if this served by itself as adequate protection, it would scarcely be necessary for Sokrates to recommend the guardians' education for the participants, including himself (402bc; cf. 504b–e), or to prescribe a long and arduous training even for the "best" natures. The guardians' "god-like" quality is the result – not simply the cause – of their education (383c). Sokrates excludes no one present from the assertion that everyone, even the most apparently orderly, has lawless desires sleeping within (572b). The failure of all the participants in Books 2–10 to have reached perception of the Forms is thus an inevitable consequence of their immersion in Athenian culture, as opposed to the moral, mathematical and dialectical education of the ideal state. Paradoxically, this means that the educational program from which the philosopher-ruler emerges cannot be promulgated by the founders of Kallipolis with the same kind of absolute authority exercised by this ruler within it.

So far I have been speaking of Plato's brothers as a pair, and emphasizing their similarities. But they are not identical. Glaukon is more fully and explicitly characterized than Adeimantos, and more closely linked to Sokrates and his concerns. He accompanies Sokrates at the opening of the dialogue, whereas Adeimantos joins them later along with Polemarchos and the rest (327abc) and speaks only once in Book 1 (328a). Despite the fact that Adeimantos is the elder, he is introduced *as* Glaukon's brother, and referred to that way repeatedly, whereas the converse is never true.[188] In Book 2, Glaukon jumps in first and Adeimantos follows as his ally (362d). During the rest of the work Glaukon plays a progressively larger role than his brother and participates in many of the most philosophically challenging parts of the work, including the central discussion of metaphysics.[189] He is also the explicit addressee of the myth of Er,[190] which responds to his own tale of Gyges (cf. 612b). Adeimantos, by contrast, needs to ask as late as 506b whether Sokrates thinks the good is pleasure. Glaukon is also more strongly and positively characterized than his brother with respect to all three "parts" of the soul – spirit, appetite (as represented by *erōs*) and reason – and both sides of the philosopher's ideal character – vigor and compliance (above, pp. 204–5).

[188] Cosgriff 1994: 272.

[189] He is the interlocutor for about two thirds of the constructive portion of the dialogue. For the distribution of parts and Glaukon's progressive "encroachment" see Diès 1947: xxiii-vi.

[190] 615a, 618b, 621c. Note, however, that the plurals concluding the entire dialogue can embrace all those present, and Plato's readers too (cf. above, p. 48).

Furthermore, during Sokrates' program for the guardians' higher education, he shows signs of an ability, or at least eagerness, to follow the curriculum that will eventually lead to knowledge of the Good, in particular by showing a curious enthusiasm for the esoteric subject of solid geometry (528d). The respondent for the earlier educational stages is Adeimantos, who, as we shall see, is more closely associated both with the dangers of conventional education and the measures needed to reform it. Indeed, this is one of the few portions of the work where he is the respondent for an extended period (376d–398c). But for higher education, Glaukon takes the interlocutor's role – a contrast marking the brothers' relative places on the path to understanding.

All this suggests, as many commentators have observed, that by Socratic standards Glaukon shows greater philosophical promise than his brother. A possible reason for this distinction may be suggested by the most notable point of contrast between their two long speeches. Though Adeimantos' speech adds little of substance to Glaukon's, there remain significant differences between them, the most striking of which is the prominence Adeimantos gives to poetry and its influence. This shows the enormous importance of the educational theme and prepares us for Sokrates' censorship program, for which, as we have seen, Adeimantos rather than Glaukon is the interlocutor. It also suggests, however, that Adeimantos is more susceptible than his brother to the dangerous influence of poetry (see further below, pp. 240–41). This may explain both his stronger resistance to Sokrates, and his lower potential for Socratic philosophizing.

Apart from Glaukon's greater promise, however, the brothers are marked less as intrinsically different than as variations on the same character type, with Glaukon serving as a superior and more fully developed example of that type.[191] This basic similarity is heightened by contrast with the highly varied interlocutors of Book 1. The relative blandness of these new interlocutors allows Plato to speak through them to a larger audience of the philosophically inclined, who may be expected to identify more easily with these generically promising respondents than with more idiosyncratic and highly particularized figures such as Kephalos or Thrasymachos – who are quite different from each other, as well as from Glaukon and Adeimantos. As we have already seen, Plato's brothers have much more in common with the less colorful but more philosophically promising Polemarchos. Where they differ from him, it is mostly in

[191] Others have seen more substantial differences between them, but in my view they overburden the evidence.

manifestations of greater philosophical vigor: the firmness of their prior convictions, their sustained eloquence, their ability to defend a position, the pressure they bring to bear on Sokrates, their degree of resistance, and their demand for positive, substantial argument. Like Polemarchos they are sympathetic to Sokrates, but like Thrasymachos they offer him a real philosophical challenge. Polemarchos is more unreflectively conventional at the outset, and more easily led – as we would expect from the son of Kephalos, as opposed to the sons of Ariston. He thus represents an earlier stage of intellectual development, as befits his earlier position in the dialogue. But overall, he shares similar qualities of character with Plato's brothers, as signified by his alliance with Adeimantos not only in Book 1 (327b) but again in Book 5 (449ab). The difference between him and the brothers, like the difference between Glaukon and Adeimantos, is primarily one of degree, rather than kind. Their common aptness for philosophy seems to impose a uniformity that militates against the more developed and individual kind of characterization that we saw in Kephalos and Thrasymachos.

I argued earlier that certain aspects of the transition in style after Book 1 make sense as a response to the limitations inherent in the methods of the elenctic Sokrates, especially their negativity and inconclusiveness. But the shift to positive discourse is not enough to explain this movement towards greater homogeneity in the dramatis personae. Even Thrasymachos, when he speaks, has lost the offensive traits that make him so distinctive in Book 1. Plato could easily have developed extensive positive ideas using a variety of richly detailed speakers. Yet he chose not to. This makes perfect sense, however, when seen as a response to the *personal* character of the elenctic Sokrates' methods. In sharp contrast to *Republic's* vision of a generic, homogenous ideal of human character, the elenctic Sokrates embodies, in important respects, a preoccupation with the particular. And it is this that causes at least some of his failures. His method is rooted in the scrutiny of individual souls of every kind, in the optimistic hope that each in turn can be converted to the philosophic life. If he constantly fails, and succeeds primarily in alienating others, that is because his testing is of a kind that shows up the particular weaknesses of character and intellect that incapacitate most people for such a life. In so far as he is assaulting the individual ego, he will never convert anyone who does not already share his basic outlook. His egalitarian search for the potential wisdom in respondents of all kinds therefore seems doomed to failure. The move towards homogeneity in the characterization of *Republic* suggests that he has been wasting his time talking to just anyone he happens to meet.

One might well ask why Sokrates is not, in fact, more selective about who to talk to in other dialogues, given the emphasis throughout Plato's works on the need to have the right character for philosophy.[192] The point is dramatized at the opening of *Republic*, when Polemarchos points out that it is impossible to persuade people who will not listen (327c).[193] As Isocrates would have said, there is no way of implanting virtue and justice in people of naturally bad character (*Antid.* 274). But the elenctic Sokrates is not trying to "implant" virtue in anyone – at least not in any conventional or obvious sense. And according to *Apology*, he does have a criterion for choosing to converse with certain people rather than others: he goes after those with a reputation for wisdom. In the context of the elenctic Sokrates' intellectualism, real wisdom will be something that is accompanied by real excellence of character. So *Republic*, which obviously critiques that intellectualism on the discursive level, may also be read as doing so dramatically. The successful interlocutor must have other excellences of character besides intellectual skills.

The constructive Sokrates thus becomes less personal in his methods than his elenctic avatar, as well as more didactic, authoritarian and hierarchical. His positive brand of dialectic still calls in principle for a sympathetic response to the individual interlocutor, in particular adjustment to the latter's level of understanding.[194] But in practice successful dialectic appears to call for qualities that militate against individuality. If all Sokrates' respondents have the rare, but limited set of qualities needed for such success, then he has no need to tailor his method to their particular personalities. And Plato has no need to demonstrate this to us dramatically. It was the personal aspects of Socratic testing that made Plato's previous dramatic style uniquely appropriate to portraying this figure in action. As Plato moves his protagonist away from such methods, the lively characterization of this style becomes redundant. Since Sokrates is not engaged in refuting ideas as held by particular persons, the proper representation of the argument does not require individual characterization of the participants. Indeed, as Plato abandons the elenctic Sokrates, the personal dramatic style becomes not only unnecessary but pernicious. For individual characterization privileges the kind of personal idiosyncrasy

[192] See Teloh 1986: passim; Patterson 1987.

[193] For the distinction between teaching the converted and converting the skeptical cf. also *Euthyd.* 274de.

[194] Cf. e.g. 533a and Tecuşan 1992: 76, 81. Cosgriff 1994 discusses some of the ways in which Books 2–10 are tailored to the characters of Glaukon and Adeimantos. The other side of this coin, however, is that these characters are well designed (by Plato) to allow Sokrates scope for his positive agenda.

that interferes with philosophical progress – on *Republic's* own educational model – and undermines the universality of the argument. That is why Glaukon and Adeimantos exemplify an essentially similar character type. What matters about them is not their idiosyncrasies, but their philosophical receptiveness, which differs more in degree than in kind. This is one effect (if not also a cause) of Plato's use in Books 2–10 of two alternating but relatively similar interlocutors, as opposed to the sharply differentiated serial interlocutors of Book 1.[195]

The point may be brought out by looking briefly at Sokrates' interaction with the slave in the geometrical portion of *Meno*. This conversation is often seen as a "scale-model" and defense of the Socratic elenchus, "a paradigm of question and answer dialectic in [a] friction free environment."[196] In contrast to Meno himself, the slave himself has been called "the perfect respondent," who is not only "a better respondent than his master," but "far better than most of the rich and famous men Sokrates questions elsewhere."[197] This has potentially egalitarian (if not democratic) implications for the applicability of the elenctic Sokrates' methods to all social classes (above, p. 76). But the implications for the success of those methods are more sinister. The slave is not just a humbly characterized person who turns out to succeed where his aristocratic master fails. He is a nobody, both socially and dramaturgically.[198] As Teloh puts it, "he has no vested interest in the topic, and no prior education as an answerer."[199] Qua male, his gender is unmarked, and he has no character or individuating features beyond the minimum requirement for conversing with Sokrates: he is a home-born slave and therefore a Greek-speaker (82b), and willing to cooperate (or do his master's bidding). In contrast to most Platonic characters, we do not even know his age (or age-class). This is presumably irrelevant to his function, since qua slave he is a notional child.[200] He is a nameless cipher, as close as he could be to a non-person and still participate. But why must he be a slave at all? The "perfect" respondent's slave status (i.e. non-status)

[195] Diès 1947: xxvi speaks of Plato reducing the number of interlocutors "le plus possible," a self-evident falsehood that makes the question "why two?" all the more pointed. Clay suggests that the presence of two interlocutors allows for divergent responses to Sokrates (1988b: 22).

[196] For "scale-model" see Irwin 1977: 139; for the second quotation, Teloh 1986: 12. Cf. also Vlastos 1991: 118–19; Irwin 1995: 132–5; Nehamas 1985: 16.

[197] Seeskin 1987: 98; cf. Teloh 1986: 158.

[198] Cf. Seeskin 1987: 111. Tellingly, he is not listed or discussed under "characters" by Sharples (1985: 17–19). See further Gera 1996: 97–101.

[199] 1986: 12.

[200] "Boy" was a common way of addressing adult slaves, in ancient Greece as in the American South. For this reason the usual assumption that Meno's slave is a child is unjustified.

and lack of personality beyond a dutiful compliance suggest not only the need for a flawless and featureless respondent, if the elenctic Sokrates is to be effective, but a disturbingly authoritarian model for its successful application.[201] If the aristocratic Meno is to succeed in learning from him, he must model himself on his own slave.[202]

It should not surprise us if dialectically desirable qualities turn out to be less individual than the countless traits leading to failure. For one thing, it is much harder to breath life into virtuous characters than into flawed or wicked ones.[203] As Sokrates will put it in Book 10, the simple and virtuous *ēthos* is harder to represent than the complex and inferior (604e).[204] This difficulty is not merely a matter of literary skill. Plato proves his capacity for portraying a "virtuous" *ēthos* in many of his dialogues, above all through the figure of Sokrates. In *Republic*, however, the successful portrayal of a wide range of idiosyncratic but virtuous people is ruled out not simply by the literary challenge it presents, but by a theory presenting virtue as uniform and vice as variegated.[205] As Sokrates will subsequently affirm, "there is one form of virtue, but the forms of vice are unlimited" (445c; cf. 500c).[206] By this he means not only that there are many more ways of being bad than being good, but that within each individual, complexity and variation of character are to be frowned upon, in contrast to the simple and homogeneous.[207]

Plato's lack of concern with personal details in Books 2–10 is echoed in Sokrates' assertion that the true philosopher consorts with what is tranquil, orderly, just and divine, and does not indulge in hostile abuse or focus on the affairs of actual human beings (500bcd). Sokrates' educational program likewise curtails individuality. He shows no interest in idiosyncrasy, and does not focus on specifics even to reform them. Instead, the philosopher will "wipe the slate clean" and design a new

[201] This effect is enhanced by the fact that this is an "atypical" elenchus since Sokrates knows the answer, which is indubitably correct, ahead of time.

[202] Cf. Gordon 1999: 104. Gordon notes that after the slave demonstration, all personal references to Meno cease (ibid. 110).

[203] Compare Dante's *Paradiso* and Milton's *Paradise Regained* with *Inferno* and *Paradise Lost* respectively. A related notion is voiced in the oft-quoted remark from ch. 1 of Tolstoy's *Anna Karenina*, "All happy families resemble each other, each unhappy family is unhappy in its own way."

[204] Presumably he means harder to portray in a compelling fashion. It is easy to present someone virtuous in a dull way. But the virtuous man does not display the kind of powerful and varied emotions that can be used to draw the audience into sympathetic identification.

[205] For Sokrates' disapproval of variety (*poikilia*) of *ēthos* in art and life cf. 404e, 539d, 557c, 558c, 561e, 611b–612a. Cf. also Segal 1978: 316–17 and above, pp. 156–7.

[206] This is echoed by Aristotle, who quotes a line of verse of unknown origin to the same effect (*EN* 1106b27–35). Cf. above, pp. 61–2.

[207] Cf. Annas 1981: 96–8; Halliwell 1992: 67–70.

ideal from scratch (500d–501b). The guardians who conform to this ideal are differentiated only by their level of progress on a linear scale.[208] The unitary character of Sokrates' ideal is made clear by his repeated arguments about what it *must* be like (489e, 490c, 490d). This quest for a single perfect character is a central aspect of the dialogue's pervasive concern with stability, homogeneity and unity, and hostility to plurality and change.

It is true, of course, that the construction of the ideal state starts from an acknowledgement of individual human differences (370ab), which Sokrates uses to generate a limited number of functional types. Each craftsman will continue to pursue the craft for which his individual *phusis* is fitted (cf. 369e–70c). But this diversity is itself a token of the inferiority of the craftsmen as a class, just as variety within and among characters is a token of the degeneracy of democracy. In any case, the rulers of Kallipolis will control such diversity as far as possible, making each person as internally consistent and harmonious as their nature will allow. Through the authoritarian structure of the state, even the craftsmen, in their limited way, will come to resemble the ideal character-type that is most fully realized in the philosopher (590cd). Analogously, multiplicity is built into the individual by means of the tripartite soul, but is controlled and unified as far as possible by the imposition of the proper hierarchy, on the same model as the state itself.[209] Similarly, the arbitrary and superficial polymathy of the sight-lovers (475c–476d) is replaced by a curriculum for the young guardians that is diverse, but unified through a synoptic understanding (537bc).

These hierarchies will be overseen by the philosopher-rulers, who are defined by their ability to see beyond the distracting multiplicity of the phenomenal world to the homogeneous unity of the Forms (474b–476d). The same vision informs their characters as well. In so far as all of them have gazed upon the Forms, they must all be intrinsically alike. They are thus the fullest expression of the ideal character type. It is no accident that Glaukon likens Sokrates to a sculptor, in praising the image of the philosopher-ruler as "completely beautiful" (540c). He is alluding to the Greek aesthetic outlook that rejects idiosyncratic detail in favor of the representation of idealized types.[210] Like the statue of the perfectly just man (361d), the undifferentiated model of the philosopher-ruler lacks

[208] Literally, in the image of the divided line (509d–511e); cf. also the image of the ladder (511b; cf. *Symp.* 211c).

[209] Cf. above, p. 142; compare the hierarchical organization of various character types in the myth of the metals and the myth of *Phdr.*

[210] There may also be an allusion to the historical Sokrates' own training as a sculptor.

distracting personal detail altogether, providing an impersonal ideal of philosophical perfection. The guardians thus embody a collective ideal of heroism, in contrast to the individualism of an Achilles or a Sokrates.[211] Their heroic status is made clear both by their characterization as "godlike" (e.g. 383c), and by the fact that they are to receive the honors paid to a Homeric hero, including cult honors after their death (468c–469b; cf. 414a, 540bc). We too are encouraged to aspire to such "heroism" by the narrative focus, which privileges this class to the virtual exclusion of the producers. There is a further implication which will be developed in *Theaetetus*. In so far as the ideal character is "godlike," in striving for this ideal we are also attempting to become like gods (cf. 613ab). This gives additional meaning to the proper representation of divinities in Books 2 and 3 – especially the requirement that they be "simple" (*haplous*) as opposed to polymorphous (380d).[212]

If Glaukon and Adeimantos are less interesting than Thrasymachos, then, it is not because Plato has stopped caring about the qualities required for successful philosophizing in a specific human context, and the faults that impede it, but because his dramatic style continues to reproduce the views and methods explored by his Sokrates within the dialogue. The Sokrates of Books 2–10 views those qualities as essentially uniform, and has become increasingly suspicious of the kind of personal idiosyncrasies with which his former self once wrestled in his opponents. He applies this overtly to the dramatis personae themselves, when he declares that "we" must all be as alike as possible (590d). This shift away from the personal matches the change we have already observed in Plato's presentation of the ideas to be refuted. These are not only voiced by detached rather than committed spokesmen, but generalized and abstracted from the vivid individual who first gave them utterance. It is not enough to refute the views of individuals one at a time, in the manner of the elenctic Sokrates of Book 1. The changing style of *Republic* displays in practice a critical stance towards the personal, egalitarian nature of Socratic testing, and simultaneously towards the lively dramatic style in which Plato presented it.

This implicit critique extends not only to the characters of the interlocutors but to the elenctic Sokrates himself. The transition after Book 1 implies that his failures cannot be blamed exclusively on the diverse faults

[211] Contrast Xenophon's more traditional presentation of an ideal of authoritarian rule through the life and character of a single paradigmatic leader in his *Cyropaedia* (cf. Grote 1888: IV.41). For the guardians as philosophic heroes see Gill 1996a: 279–83; 316–21.

[212] Cf. Scolnicov 1988: 114–16; Rankin 1964: 65–7.

of his interlocutors. His own idiosyncrasies are also part of the problem. His single-minded pursuit of his elenctic mission precludes constructive use of the remarkable intellectual skills with which Plato has chosen to endow him. His characteristic irony is lost on the more obtuse of his interlocutors, like Hippias, and justifiably irritates others, like Thrasymachos, provoking none of them to a healthy awareness of their own limitations. Even his "friendly" manner can serve as a subtle form of dominance, inducing a perfectly justifiable sense of alienation (above, p. 121). So Sokrates too is cleaned up, in a way that makes his personality much more similar to his interlocutors, despite the huge gap in creativity that divides them. In the process, he becomes less provocative of personal hostility, and as a literary character less susceptible to debased imitation, divergent interpretations, and other forms of (mis)appropriation. The bland, generic character of his interlocutors allows him in turn to present a more generic face, since he has less need to adapt to their individual quirks. This gives him, as well as them, a more universal mimetic function for Plato's audience, in so far as the latter may be hoped to display generic qualities of reason and philosophical promise.

Like his interlocutors, then, the constructive Sokrates of Books 2–10 is homogeneous and bland by comparison with his portrait in Book 1. But this does not mean that either Plato or his Sokrates has abandoned "literary" (as opposed to "philosophical") creativity. Rather, Plato has transferred the *poikilia* of his discourse away from the characters as such onto the ideas they express. The energy that was, in the elenctic dialogues, focused on the vivid interplay of individual characters is transfused into "beautiful and magnificent speeches," like those produced by the lover on the higher and more abstract rungs of Diotima's erotic ladder (*Symp.* 210d).[213] Like that lover, Sokrates in *Republic* shifts his attention away from the individuals of Book 1, towards "laws" and "institutions" and "kinds of knowledge," culminating in the vision of the Forms. And his mode of discourse, like Diotima's, simultaneously moves away from elenctic dialectic towards extended expository discourse. Some of these long speeches, such as the allegory of the cave, are punctuated by his respondents. But the work as a whole culminates in the myth of Er – one of the most "beautiful and magnificent" uninterrupted discourses in the whole of Plato.

Plato's own literary skills are now dedicated less to the production of individual portraits of particular persons than to the glowing portrayal of

[213] See Blundell 1992c: 126–8. For "magnificence" (*megaloprepeia*) as a property of extended speeches cf. *Meno* 70b.

large abstract ideas, in part by means of powerful but impersonal images such as the sun, the cave, and the myth of Er.[214] Human beings do feature in these narratives. But these people – including Er himself, the inhabitants of the cave, and those who escape it – are featureless ciphers, representations of Everyman.[215] These images continue to characterize Sokrates as unique. They do so, however, less by individuating him as an embodied person than by endowing him with a philosophical intellect of unparalleled power and imagination – one that strives to reach beyond the confines of his own historical and political moment. This imagination is, of course, the crucial difference between Sokrates on the one hand, and Glaukon and Adeimantos on the other, a difference that bulks larger and larger as the work proceeds, simply by means of the increasing grandeur of Sokrates' growing intellectual edifice. But its power resides in the discourse itself, rather than in details of the particular speaker's personality. By means of such creativity, the emotions stirred by Sokrates' discourse are directed away from his own person towards the argument itself, together with the life to which it exhorts us.

SELF-CENSORSHIP

It is no coincidence that this dialogue, which dramatizes such an unequivocal shift away from the elenctic Sokrates, is also profoundly critical of mimesis in general and the traditional representation of character in particular. The correct portrayal of literary character is central to the education that will produce the uniquely gentle and spirited character of the guardian class.[216] As we have seen, Polemarchos, Glaukon and Adeimantos all fall short of this ideal to varying degrees, in ways that may be attributed to their deficient education. Judged by the same standard, both Kephalos and Thrasymachos are far worse. It is therefore plausible to suppose that their defective education is likewise to blame for this, at least in part. In particular, their deficiencies may be attributable to the influence of the traditional Greek acculturation through poetry, especially Homer.

[214] These images are not illusionistic imitations, but *eikones* (cf. e.g. 514a, 588b), or figures for the unrepresentable (cf. 510de). They therefore are not subject to the Platonic strictures against illusionism, and encourage active interpretation rather than passive acquiescence (cf. below, pp. 366–77).

[215] Note that Er is not Greek but from Pamphylia (614b), which means "land of all tribes." Cf. also Nussbaum 1986: 131–2.

[216] Early education through poetry is directed primarily towards their moral character and physique, rather than intellect as such, but it has clear implications for their philosophical futures (cf. 375e–376c, 399b, 401e–402a, 498b).

This supposition is confirmed by the censorship program of Books 2 and 3. Many of the passages excised from traditional myth are thought to induce undesirable qualities that just happen to be displayed by Kephalos and Thrasymachos in Book 1. Thus Kephalos recalls his slavish subjection to *erōs* in his younger days (329bcd); but proper education is to eliminate such "frenzied" desires even from the young (402e–403c) – for example by forbidding poets to portray scenes of divine seduction (390bc). The use of the word "frenzied" (μανικός, 403a6, 10) in this connection echoes Kephalos' description of his own desires (μαίνομαι, 329d1), and foreshadows those of the tyrant (573bc, 574d–575a, 578a). Kephalos also thinks the gods can be appeased by sacrifice (331b), and is dramatically portrayed in the role of sacrificer (328c, 331d); but Sokrates censors the idea that the gods can be persuaded by gifts (390e). Kephalos has spent his life making money, which he regards as essential to virtue and equanimity (330b–331b); but censorship is to eliminate from literature both any desire for money (390d–391a), and any suggestion that a good man is not self-sufficient for happiness. Kephalos believes the stories (*muthoi*) about the afterlife, which instill terror into those with a guilty conscience (330de); but Sokrates censors out the traditional view of the underworld, as inducing fear of death and general "softness" (386a–387c; cf. 381de). Finally, Kephalos sees divine punishment as something dreadful to be avoided at all costs (330de); but Sokrates says divine punishment should be represented as good and beneficial (380b).

It is true, in this last instance, that Sokrates does not specifically expurgate the kind of infernal tales that Kephalos presumably has in mind, such as the punishment of Tantalos or Sisyphos. He confines his strictures to the general misery of the underworld, which induces a fear of death as such. And Kephalos does not fear death as such, since the poets have also given him hope that virtue will be rewarded (331a). But Adeimantos will complain explicitly about verbal depictions of the gods rewarding the good and punishing the bad in this world and the next, which are commonly used to encourage just behavior (363a–e) – effectively, it seems, in Kephalos' case. Why then does Sokrates not only fail to expurgate such tales, but even hint that they may serve a legitimate moral function, through the promise of posthumous blessings (386b, 387c9)?[217] Plato has placed his protagonist in a delicate position here. He is presumably unwilling to have Sokrates censor such ideas, since he is reserving them

[217] They may also serve as a deterrent, if we follow Jowett and Campbell's interpretation of Sokrates' remark that such tales may be "good for some other purpose" (1894 on 387c). But Adam thinks it refers to poetic pleasure (1963 ad loc.).

for his own use later, in the myth of Er. On the other hand, he does not want to endorse them explicitly at this point, since they suggest a consequentialist view of virtue and piety of the kind that Sokrates has been challenged to rebut (cf. 392ab).[218] The myth of Er is postponed until Sokrates has demonstrated to his own and his interlocutors' satisfaction that virtue is its own reward, and vice its own punishment (612abc). At that stage it may serve to appeal both to a broader, less intellectual audience, and to the lower parts of the soul that reside in even the most virtuous and intellectual persons, as a means of arousing them to *erōs* for philosophy, and a supplement to (though not a substitute for) the work of reason.

Thrasymachos likewise embodies many of the character traits and attitudes that Sokrates censors out of the young guardians' literary education. Though nothing is said of his educational background, and he is not Athenian, every educated Greek would be famililar with traditional poetry, and the censorship program of Books 2 and 3 makes it clear that his faults are of the kind inculcated by such means. His validation of injustice, and contemptuous view of justice as "another's good," are associated by Sokrates with poets and tale-tellers, and expurgated from the curriculum of Kallipolis (392ab). Like Kephalos, though in a different and more obviously offensive way, the sophist is materialistic, refusing to participate in the discussion without payment, and valuing the conventional benefits that money can buy.[219] He glorifies the theft, violence and injustice of the tyrant – behavior that is, of course, to be excised from myth and legend.[220] He condones sacrilege and temple-robbing (344ab); but even verbal defiance of the gods, as exemplified in Achilles, is to be censored from the *Iliad* (391ab).[221] He is nothing if not quarrelsome; but the quarrels of the gods are to be censored as setting a bad example (378bc). He and those like him consider the unjust to be happier than the just, but, in an obvious allusion to this view,

[218] Cf. 381de, where he censors the idea of divine disguise without mentioning that in the Homeric passage he quotes the gods are behaving like this to enforce human morality (cf. Jowett and Campbell 1894 ad loc.). He apparently wishes to avoid either endorsing or ruling out the notion that divine reward or punishment is an appropriate motive for virtue.

[219] 337d, 343b–344e; cf. 362abc, 364ab.

[220] 344a; cf. 377e–378b, 391bcd. Other potentially tyrannical behaviors, such as uncontrolled indulgence in food, drink and sex, are also to be censored (390abc; cf. 402e–403c).

[221] Cf. also the tyrant's "frenzied" attempt to control the gods (573c). Thrasymachos shows no sign of religious belief. The speakers associated with him by Glaukon and Adeimantos say that the gods may not exist or care about mortals (365d). Both these views are censored a fortiori by the requirement that gods be portrayed as good and sending only good things to mortals (379a–380c). If they do exist, according to the Thrasymacheans, they send evils to mortals, including good men (364b), but can be bribed (362c, 364b–365a, 365d–366b) – two more views that are to be censored (379b–380c, 390e).

Sokrates says poets should not represent the unjust as happy or vice versa (392ab). Finally, an absence of self-control (*sōphrosunē*) is not only indicated by his lack of self-restraint, but reflected in his ideas, which entail disrespect for anyone other than the uninhibited tyrant. To induce this virtue in the guardians, however, Sokrates rejects any portrayal of insubordination to duly constituted authority, such as Achilles' abuse of Agamemnon in Homer (389e). Thrasymachos, who in his own way reembodies the assertive, individualistic warrior ideal, would presumably approve of the mighty hero's defiance.[222] Certainly, Achilles' insulting language provides an antecedent for the sophist's own outspoken rudeness.[223] According to Sokrates, Achilles suffers from two "diseases": an ignoble love of money, and supreme arrogance towards gods and mortals (391c). Thrasymachos seems to have acquired both of the two worst aspects of this violent and unruly nature. Both these failings will also characterize the worst of human characters, the tyrant of Book 9 (573c, 574a).

The homology between the traditional characters and the dialogue's own dramatis personae is underlined by Plato's presentation of the company as self-conscious makers of "stories" in their own right. Sokrates, Glaukon and Adeimantos are not only characters in but creators of a work of fiction. They too, like Plato, are constructing both human characters and a fictional world out of language ("in the *logos*"),[224] just as poets and story-tellers do (cf. 363c5). This also aligns them with the visual arts, in so far as *logo*s is, in Glaukon's words, "a more plastic medium than wax" for fashioning stories (*muthoi*, 588d).[225] This awareness of the fictional status of their ideal polis and its inhabitants draws oblique attention to the participants' own fictionality, while further enhancing the analogy between themselves and the guardians of their creation. In case we should miss this equivalence, their own discussion of education is explicitly likened to the activity of those "myth-makers" whose works

[222] For the Iliadic heroes as the epic ancestors of tyrannical, self-indulgent fifth-century figures cf. Adkins 1960: 238; Kraut 1992: 58; Hobbs 2000 passim. Sokrates is unfair to Homer's Achilles (below, n. 233). But his own distorted Achilles provides a more fruitful parallel with Thrasymachos, which may help to explain the form these distortions take. Plato and his Sokrates are perfectly capable of using Achilles approvingly elsewhere (above, p. 158).

[223] Calling Sokrates a sniveling child (343a) is the rough philosophical equivalent of calling a Homeric warrior a drunken coward (*Il.* 1.225).

[224] Cf. 361b6, 369a6, c9, 376d10, 472e1, 501e4, 534d3, 548c10, 588b10. On *logoi* as a medium for imitation cf. Patterson 1985: 28–9. When Sokrates says "we are not at present poets, but founders of a city" (378e–379a), he is not denying this poetic role but merely remarking that they are not just now composing poetry to be used in the ideal state (as they will do later, with the myth of the metals).

[225] Cf. 431b, 472cd, 488a, 504de, 588b–e.

are to be expurgated (376d9). The rulers are both artists and products of another's art, just as Sokrates and his interlocutors, the artists of the ideal state, are Plato's own artistic products. The role of the latter, as the artist standing behind these curtains, is hinted at in the pun on his name when Sokrates speaks, in recounting his "noble falsehood" (415a), of the "moulding god" (*theos plattōn*) who shapes the ideal citizens (414b).

By such means does Plato signal an awareness of the literary status of his own myth-making, with all the possible effects that this may entail. One of the most important of these effects is the potential influence of his dramatis personae on the reader through the process of mimetic pedagogy. If poetic representations of inferior characters will "mould the soul" (377c) of composer, performer, reader or listener, shaping their habits, *phusis*, body and mind for the worse (395cd), will not Plato's characters exert a similarly pernicious influence on the souls of his readers?[226] As we have seen, even Glaukon and Adeimantos, who explicitly dissociate themselves both from the corrupting literary tradition and from Thrasymachos, retain the potential to be seduced both by it and by him. Kephalos and Thrasymachos therefore represent types of character that are prime targets for Sokrates' censorship program. True, his first concern is with the representation of gods and heroes and "famous men," who should be portrayed as superior to ordinary mortals.[227] Kephalos and Thrasymachos do not (presumably) fall into this category, though each in his own way is a prominent figure in fifth-century Athenian life, and each, as we have seen, stands for an important educational model (the paternal and the sophistic). But it soon becomes clear that Sokrates' strictures do not apply exclusively to such extraordinary figures. The young guardians must imitate from childhood only virtuous men, and not women, slaves or bad men (395c, 395e). These men's qualities – courage, self-control, piety, and "freedom" (*eleutheria*) – are the same traits aimed at in censoring the literary treatment of gods and heroes. And all of them are absent from – or deficient in – either Kephalos, Thrasymachos, or both. These two characters clearly set an entirely unacceptable example for the aspiring philosophers of *Republic*, and by extension, for ourselves.

Two passages in particular will serve to bring this point home. In the first, Sokrates declares that the young guardians must not imitate

[226] Note that prose is to be censored as well as poetry (379a, 380bc, 392a, 392d, 394b, 398b; cf. also 365e).

[227] Specifically gods and kings (390e), heroes and children of gods (391cd), relatives of gods (391e), and other distinguished men (387de, 388e, 390d).

men abusing and making fun of each other or saying "shameful things" (395e) – an apt enough description of Thrasymachos. In the second, he says old people should tell young children, and poets should tell older ones, that the citizens have never quarreled.[228] But *Republic* Book I represents even philosophers not only quarreling, but diverging on the most fundamental ethical and political issues. Worse still, the superiority of justice is not established to the satisfaction of Thrasymachos, or even of Glaukon and Adeimantos.

The rest of the work tries to rectify this, by offering the new kind of story that Adeimantos demanded. Most obviously, Sokrates responds to Adeimantos' complaints about the damaging effects of poetry by providing positive, non-consequential arguments for the value of justice. But Plato also addresses the dangers of such literature dramatically, on two different levels: by excluding negative character models both from the remainder of his own tale, and from the tales told by those represented within it. He entrusts the conversation to speakers who, both as characters and as myth-makers in their own right, portray qualities and behavior worthy of our emulation. In contrast to Book I, as we have seen, these characters verge on homogeneity, as the true nature of virtue requires. The structure of the dialogue as a whole thus reproduces Sokrates' concern about the educational risks inherent in certain kinds of representation. Plato seems to have censored his own literary production as ruthlessly as his Sokrates censors Homer.

Certain objections might be raised to this argument. First, we ourselves are obviously not young guardians in the ideal state.[229] But it is equally obvious that Plato's preoccupation with the effects of language and literature on character is not confined to the citizens of Kallipolis. A concern with such influences on his own society is implicit in the very existence of the dialogues, unless these are to be denied any serious educational function at all. It is manifested more explicitly in several dialogues, most importantly *Republic* itself, where it underlies, in particular, the speech of Adeimantos, Sokrates' condemnation of conventional education, and Plato's portraits of real Athenians whose characters have been shaped by poetry and myth. Moreover the tacit equivalence between the dramatis personae and the young guardians is voiced most explicitly in connection

[228] 378bc; cf. 386a. The censorship of literature is aimed in the first place at young children (cf. 378de), but also extends to adults (380bc, 387b; cf. also 397de, 424de).

[229] If we were, *Rep.* would not be on our curriculum (cf. 379a). Since it reveals the deception of the people by their rulers, it could only be used, if at all, at the highest and most select level of education (perhaps after sacrificing a pig or something else expensive: cf. 378a).

with proper education. "We shall not be educated (*mousikoi*), neither we ourselves nor those guardians whom we say we must educate, until we recognize the forms of self-control and courage and liberality and magnificence" (402bc; cf. 504b–e). Despite Sokrates' lack of dogmatism about the details of the guardians' education (416b), his strictures on education in general are clearly applicable not only to the ideal state, but to any corrupt society, whether Plato's or our own, which is to stand a chance of improvement in Socratic terms.

It might also be objected that even in the ideal state, the occasional portrayal of bad men is permitted, so long as it is done for amusement (396e2).[230] For example, it is apparently acceptable to portray Zeus lamenting, provided this representation is not taken seriously (388cd).[231] But this is scarcely adequate to explain the prominence of inferior characters in Book 1. It is true that Sokrates, qua narrator, invites us to laugh at, and hence to despise Thrasymachos, which should (presumably) discourage us from identifying with him (above, p. 91). But the sophist's role is much too substantial for the limited quotient of comedy in the ideal state, where more than a little laughter is considered intrinsically damaging (388e–389d; cf. 606c). In any case, despite Socratic mockery, on the most fundamental level Thrasymachos is obviously no joke. He is a fierce and serious opponent, and the threat he poses does not end with Book 1.[232] On the contrary, the seriousness of this threat is the raison d' être for Books 2–10. To dismiss either him or Kephalos as merely humorous would be to undermine the entire basis of *Republic*, which develops in response to the dual threat these characters represent: the threat of the complacent and commonplace, plus the more obvious threat posed by the savage enemy of justice.

A more substantial objection is likely to occur to most modern readers. It might be argued that there is no cause, even in Sokrates' own terms, to expurgate Kephalos or Thrasymachos, since their views must be interpreted in the context of *Republic* as a whole. In this larger context, both of them are thoroughly discredited through argument and characterization. Certainly these tactics are important. But in the last resort, they cannot be relied on, since a character's ideas can always be taken out of

[230] Thrasymachos is explained thus e.g. by Ferrari 1989: 119.

[231] Neither of these passages strictly implies that the young guardians will actually "imitate" bad men or ignoble actions, merely that they will take an amused view of such things (cf. 452d). But the fact that mimesis of inferior men and women is permitted at all (387e) suggests that this kind of "imitation" is allowed primarily as a kind of comedy.

[232] For allusions to Thrasymachos and his ideas after Book 1 cf. e.g. 445a, 545a, 588b, 588e, 589ab, 590d, 591a; see further Rauhut 1997.

context, and indeed, this is standard practice in ancient literary criticism (above, pp. 93–4). Plato and his Sokrates are no exceptions, as we have already seen in the case of *Hippias Minor*, and as *Republic* itself makes very clear. If Sokrates in *Republic* itself can misrepresent Homer's Achilles as greedy and materialistic (390e, 391c),[233] then what is to prevent Plato's readers from extracting Thrasymachos' views from the prejudicial context in which they are embedded? If context can save Thrasymachos, then it can save Achilles.[234] Worse still, there may be readers for whom this context is no deterrent, or who are actually spurred to sympathy by Plato's prejudicial treatment of the sophist (cf. above, pp. 163–4). As we have seen, *Republic* itself conveys an awareness on Plato's part that such tactics cannot be relied on to disarm a character's influence (above, pp. 198–9). The responses of a significant number of readers to his hostile portrait of Thrasymachos bear out this suspicion.[235]

Kephalos is at first sight more innocuous, yet there is a sense in which this apparent harmlessness actually exacerbates the threat posed by his complacency, since his defects are so closely bound up with his merits. As modern scholarship clearly – if inadvertently – has shown, his character is open to a wider range of interpretations than that of Thrasymachos, since it is much less clearly marked as "good" or "bad" (above, p. 169). He therefore cannot be relied on as a clear-cut ethical model, or anti-model. The ambiguity with which he is portrayed helps to make him a vivid and individual character, but also exacerbates the interpretive openness that renders the reading of any literary character problematic. It follows, in Socratic terms, that the responsible literary artist should not represent such characters at all, since dramatic context manifestly lacks the power to neutralize the dangers they embody.

Sokrates follows up his censorship of content with complementary strictures on literary form. He begins with the famous tripartite division of forms. In simple narrative, the poet speaks in his own voice; in mimetic narrative, he "tries to make us believe" that someone else is speaking,

[233] For the injustice of this cf. Jowett and Campbell 1894 on 390e. Cf. also 381de with Jowett and Campbell 1894 ad loc.; 568ab, which Adam 1963 ad loc. calls "malicious" and "perverse;" Sokrates' treatment of Achilles in *HMin.* (above, pp. 144–5); his Homeric quotation at *Symp.* 174bc (with Dover 1980: ad loc.); and in *Tht.* his use of Homer (152e; cf. Polansky 1992: 88–9) and especially Protagoras (Ford 1994: 209; cf. below, pp. 307–9). Other such distortions in *Rep.* include Glaukon's quotation from Aeschylus at 361bc (discussed below, p. 240).

[234] Cf. also Sokrates' rejection of allegorizing (378d), which seems to rule out subtleties of interpretation.

[235] See e.g. Russell 1945: 117–18; Sparshott 1957; Dahrendorf 1968; T. Y. Henderson 1970; White 1995.

i.e. renders the words of a character in direct speech; in mixed narrative, he uses both types, as Homer does (392e–394c). It is agreed that the guardians should not be mimetic, but should do and imitate only what conduces to their job and to good character (394e–395c). Sokrates then proceeds to a rather different analysis. This time there are two kinds of style: one for the good man, one for the bad (396bc). The approved speaker will "imitate" in his own person the words and deeds of a good man, using direct speech; he will be unaccustomed to "imitating" bad men or bad actions, and will avoid doing so except perhaps in jest; he will employ a Homeric mix, but with only a small element of mimesis (396cde). The bad style, by contrast, imitates everything, and is mostly mimetic, with little if any third person narration (397ab). Both these styles are versions of the original "mixed" or Homeric type, but both of them are now called "pure" or "unmixed," in contrast to a new "mixed" type that combines them both (397c). Of these three, the guardians should employ only the "unmixed" style that imitates the good man and uses little direct mimesis (396b–e, 397d). Despite the confusing language and shifting classifications, Sokrates' general point is clear. "Imitation," i.e. the use of direct speech to "take on" a character other than one's own, is pernicious, since it encourages emotional identification with a range of characters rather than just one. This will both divert the guardians' energies from their specialized task, and mould them to a variety of character models, including inferior ones, rather than the single, simple (*haplous*) character of the good man.[236]

At the same time, the preferred style of the good man will include a modicum of direct speech, or "imitation," primarily that of good men. The idea that direct dramatic mimesis of a good man is acceptable stands in some tension, however, with the idea that this kind of mimesis is to be minimized per se (396b–e, 397d). The former should allow for extensive dramatization of good men, whereas the latter should exclude dramatization of any kind. The confusion derives in part from Sokrates' failure to distinguish between imitation as deception, and imitation as a form of self-fashioning (e.g. at 393c). Sokrates, and Plato's other dominant characters, most commonly view mimesis highly critically, as a form of illusionism that aims to deceive (e.g. *Phdr.* 275d and below, p. 366). In *Republic* too, Sokrates assumes that the goal of visual art is verisimilitude, that acting is a form of impersonation, and that both are most successful, in their own terms, if they actually deceive people (393a, 598bcd). But

[236] On mimesis as self-alienating see Gadamer 1980: 63–6. The other side of this coin is the idea that the multiplicity of fiction enlarges our experience (see Annas 1981: 96–8; Harding 1962: 144–5).

imitation may also be a form of becoming: if I successfully imitate the movements of a dancer, and do so repeatedly, then I am no longer *imitating* but *becoming* a dancer, by developing the appropriate muscles and skills. The implications for education are obvious. As Sokrates himself puts it, "imitations" practised from childhood are *constitutive of* one's "nature" and habits in body, voice and intellect (395d).[237] This kind of mimesis harks back to the tradition of "following an example" that underlies mimetic pedagogy. It is in this sense that an older person, as opposed to a disputatious young "puppy," will "imitate" the serious practitioner of dialectic, and by so doing become one himself (539c). The distinction overlaps, though it does not precisely coincide, with that between "slavish" and "structural" imitation (above, p. 102).

Plato shows an explicit awareness of this kind of distinction in other dialogues. In a famous passage of *Cratylus*, Sokrates says that if an image reproduces every feature of the original, then it is no longer an image (432bc).[238] The end result of such a process, paradoxically, is a form of imitation that no longer counts as imitation at all, since, in the words of the Eleatic visitor, "it is no longer an imitation but most truly the thing itself" (*Stat.* 300e).[239] If the medium of this kind of imitation is the self, then the result will be not mimicry but self-formation.[240] Hence the special significance of performance. As we have already seen, such self-formation is a goal of the philosopher's education. If one uses materials other than oneself for such imitation, the product is reproductive, as opposed to merely imitative, of its model. This may be exemplified by the practice of ancient Greek craftsmen, who sometimes modeled architectural elements, such as a capital, on a specimen element that would itself be used in the final building.[241] Similarly, the philosophical law-maker, like an artist painting

[237] εἰς ἔθη τε καί φύσιν καθίστανται καὶ κατὰ σῶμα καὶ φωνὰς καὶ κατὰ τὴν διάνοιαν. Cf. also the blurring between imitation and "doing" that occurs in children's play as a mode of character-formation (*Rep.* 558b; cf. 536de, *Laws* 659de, 793e–794a, 797a–798c, *Stat.* 308d). On these two aspects of mimesis see esp. Vernant 1991 ch. 9; cf. also Keuls 1978: 23–4, and above, pp. 80–84. The slippage between object and image, imitation (especially through performance) and action, is central to the psychology of poetry in *Rep.* (see esp. Nehamas 1982: 60–63, 1988; Ferrari 1989: 136–9).

[238] On statues as blurring the line between imitation and (re)production cf. above, p. 61. Representation and original are blurred in a different way by the practice of attaching real jewelry or weapons to statues (cf. Kesner 1995: 118, and for a Greek example, Hurwit 1999: 20–21). On this kind of fusion of the signifier with the signified cf. also Wiles 1991: 13–14, 17.

[239] μιμεῖσθαι has a similar force at *Prot.* 348a; cf. also *Gorg.* 513abc. On *Stat.* see further below, pp. 366–75. Aristotle's awareness of this paradox is evident in his discussion of becoming virtuous through habituation (*EN* 1105a17–b12).

[240] Since the object of imitation is character, rather than e.g. uncontrollable physical details such as height, this is a kind of structural mimesis; cf. also Bourdieu 1990: 73–5.

[241] Patterson 1985: 13–14, 30–31; Cohen and Keyt 1992: 197.

an image of the "model" within his own soul (484cd), produces others like himself, to replace him when he dies (540ab). He is a craftsman of virtue, not merely its illusionistic imitator (500bcd).[242] Like Pygmalion, he produces a "statue" that is no statue.[243]

I believe that this conception of mimesis as a mode of becoming (or reproduction) tacitly underlies the discussion in *Republic* Book 3, and if acknowledged by Plato, might have eliminated some of its notorious confusions. For example, the reason we must not imitate bad people is because *all* imitation is assimilated to self-formation (cf. e.g. 396cd). Conversely, the construction and development of the guardians' characters takes place by *performing* appropriate behaviors in both senses of that word: by "doing" as well as "imitating" them.[244] To put it another way, "imitation" or identification with a good character will not divert the young guardians from their own proper character and role. In "imitating" models that resemble their future selves, they are forming their own characters, rather than fragmenting them – an idea expressed by Sokrates, with some awkwardness, when he says they should neither "do" nor "imitate" anything but their proper qualities or activities (395bc). The result of such activity is not imitation, but self-construction. In Pindar's words, they are becoming who they already are (above, p. 83). And that which they become – the virtuous *ēthos* that is their authentic selves – will necessarily be simple and homogeneous, not prone to mimicking a variety of types.

The formal distinctions articulated in Book 3 have some interesting implications for the Platonic reader. Sokrates observes that the original mixed style of composition, which uses both "imitation" and narrative, is employed in epic and "many other places" (394c). These "other places" happen to include *Republic*, along with the rest of Plato's "reported" dialogues. In the terms of Book 3, these dialogues are less "mimetic" than the purely dramatic ones, since their direct speeches are linked by a first person narrator in the Homeric manner. But compared to the approved or "pure" style, which has only a small amount of direct mimesis and focuses mostly on good men, even the reported dialogues use a great deal of direct mimesis and "imitate" a wide variety of persons, including bad ones. Both these things are certainly true of *Republic* Book 1. With its

[242] He cannot, of course, reproduce the Forms themselves, but he can reproduce them in himself and others in so far as human materials are capable of such participation.

[243] Nehamas speaks of the "metaphysics of Pygmalion" (1999: 285).

[244] Cf. 388d, 394e, 395c–396a, 444cde, 606b. Conversely, they should be as inexperienced of bad people and behavior as of bad representations (409ab).

mixture of narrative and direct speech, and its wide array of characters, this book resembles the work of Homer, the "first teacher and leader" of the tragedians (595c), who is to be politely escorted out of the ideal state (398a).

The Sokrates of Book 3 thus eliminates from the young guardians' curriculum some of the most salient features of Plato's own dramatic style, as exemplified in Book 1. When he insists that despite our admiration, we must expel the poet whose skill (*sophia*) enables him to become multifarious (*pantodapos*) and imitate all things (398a), he seems to be banishing the author of Book 1 himself from the ideal state. The paradox is extended to a further level by Sokrates' role as narrator, which makes him, in a sense, the "dramatist" or "imitator" of all these characters. He is therefore banishing from his ideal state not only Plato, his own creator, but himself. This means, among other things, that the paradox cannot be dissolved by distinguishing in any simple sense between Plato and his Sokrates.

After Book 1, as we saw, Plato seems to heed the restrictions on literary characterization that he places in the mouth of Sokrates. The same applies to the censorship of literary form. In this respect, as in others, the long speeches of Glaukon and Adeimantos at the beginning of Book 2 are transitional. As devil's advocates, Plato's brothers make what they consider to be the best possible case for Thrasymachos' views, but they do so without dramatizing any offensive personalities and thereby fostering emotional identification with particular spokesmen for injustice. Glaukon, who speaks first, purports to restate the views of Thrasymachos, but does so in his own person, without speaking "mimetically" in the voice of a champion of injustice. By reporting such views in indirect speech, he enables us to learn "about" bad men without directly "imitating" them, or making us do so internally (cf. 396a). He further objectifies and depersonalizes the ideas he represents, by attributing this indirect discourse to vague subjects,[245] and using less vivid conditions and other distancing gestures.[246] He does, in effect, to Thrasymachos what Sokrates will do to Homer when he translates Chryses' speech into indirect discourse, thereby draining it of the dramatic life and emotional power that derive from identification with a particular engaged speaker.

Glaukon gives the tale of Gyges' ring the same treatment (359d–60b). This narrative of theft, adultery, murder and usurpation, all put forward

[245] 358c, 358e–359b, 359d–360b, 360c, 361e–362c.

[246] For the former see 359bc, 360bc, 360d. For the latter see e.g. 358c6, 359b5, 360d2, 361e. Cf. also Jowett and Campbell 1894, and Adam 1963, on 360b4 and 361c3.

as universal human desires (360bcd), is an obvious example of the kind of traditional tale that Sokrates would erase from the guardians' curriculum.[247] Glaukon neutralizes its mimetic appeal by recounting it in indirect discourse and making Gyges a token of human nature – for better or worse – as opposed to an individual personality. The process of objectifying and impersonalizing the models of virtue and vice is taken still further with Glaukon's two "statues" of the good and the bad man (360e–361d). These are abstract types, generalized embodiments of justice and injustice (361d), not individual portraits or concrete examples or even emblematic named heroes like Gyges. The idiosyncratic characters of Book 1 are thus replaced not just by Glaukon and Adeimantos themselves, but by Glaukon's ideal types, which prefigure Sokrates' own "patterns" (472c), or "statues" (540c), of the just and unjust man, the philosopher and the tyrant.

The only direct quotation in Glaukon's speech is a passage from Aeschylus' *Seven Against Thebes* (592–4), employed in such a way as to underline the ambiguous uses to which quotation can be put. First Glaukon merely alludes to Aeschylus, when he characterizes the good man as "one who does not wish to *seem* but to *be* good (*agathos*)" (361b).[248] Further on, he allows the admirers of the unjust man to exploit the passage for their own purposes, this time through direct quotation (362a). Glaukon thus indirectly demonstrates the elusiveness of poetry, and its availability for interpretation and appropriation by all comers. Adeimantos' speech, by contrast, is saturated with poetry, in a way that displays its dangerous influence more directly. Like Glaukon, he distances himself from the ideas he expresses (367a), and conveys them largely through indirect discourse attributed to poets or vague and anonymous subjects (362e–365a). But he also breaks into direct quotation of Homer and Hesiod (363abc, 364cde). This meshes with his explicit concern with the effect of literature on the souls of naturally talented, educated young men, who, he says, flit from one saying to another, accumulating opinions about what path in life to follow (365a). We may recall here the silent presence of Nikeratos son of Nikias, who seems to have been strongly influenced by traditional poetry (above, p. 167 n. 8).

At this point Adeimantos, who is himself a naturally talented, well educated young man with a wide knowledge of literature, starts to identify with those of his peers who have been led astray. Taking on the first person voice of such a youth, he quotes or refers to Pindar, Simonides

[247] Sokrates later links it with Hesiod and Homer (612ab).
[248] On his use of this allusion see Williams 1993: 200 n. 47.

and Archilochus, to support the conclusion that an appearance of justice is all that matters (365b). As we would expect of a child of the Greek literary tradition, these quotations are taken entirely out of their original context.[249] In response, Adeimantos imagines an anonymous opponent intervening with a series of prudential objections, of the kind we might expect from a Kephalos,[250] all quoted in direct speech.[251] Adeimantos answers this objector in equally pragmatic terms, using arguments derived from myth, poetry and common opinion, and again quoting directly from Homer.[252] The third of these responses is placed in the mouth of an anonymous youth (366ab). In the first two, however, Adeimantos identifies fully with the clever young men, using a whole series of first person plural verbs to express what "we" will say in reply to such objections (365d, 365d–366a). He concludes by asking Sokrates why, under the circumstances, "we" should choose justice over injustice (366b), and reproaches him, along with everyone else, for failing to tell "us" youths the right kind of story about justice (367a).

The net result is a lively little dialogue between the impersonal objector and the clever young men, for whom Adeimantos himself is the direct spokesman. The speech thus reintroduces the dramatic form eschewed by Glaukon and brings out its dangerous implications for young men like Adeimantos himself. He quotes more poetry than Glaukon, appears more influenced by it, is more mimetic, and possibly less firm in his own opinions than his brother. This accords with other indications in *Republic* that despite the similarity in the two brothers' characters, Glaukon has made greater philosophical progress (above, pp. 219–20). Adeimantos' use of quotation suggests one reason why he may be less well prepared for dialectic than his brother: like Polemarchos, he may have been overinfluenced by traditional literature. If he and others like him are to profit from their Socratic education, it is imperative that this power be neutralized. It is no accident that after sketching the foundation of the ideal state, Sokrates' first topic will be education and in particular censorship. Nor is it a coincidence that for this part of the conversation, his respondent is Adeimantos. If Sokrates' strictures were heeded, Adeimantos and his peers would be preserved from the pernicious influence of such traditional tales and their mimetic representation.

After expelling the versatile (*pantodapos*) and pleasing poet, Sokrates declares, "we shall make use of the more severe and less pleasing poet

[249] See Cosgriff 1994: 66–8 and cf. above, pp. 93–4.
[250] E.g. this person is concerned about divine punishment in the afterlife (366a; cf. 330d).
[251] 365c, 365d, 366a. [252] 365e, 366b, 365e4.

and story-teller (*muthologos*);" this person will imitate the speech of good men and follow the rest of Sokrates' stringent guidelines (398ab). Books 2–10 of *Republic* have their own stylistic merits, but from the point of view of dramatic characterization, they might well be described as less "versatile," more "severe," and less "pleasing" than Book 1. (Certainly many readers respond to their use of dramatic form, in contrast to Book 1, much as they do to Sokrates' dull "improvement" of Homer.) The speakers are fewer in number, their characters are not developed in detail, and they vary little either internally or from each other. The narrative form is superficially unchanged – it is still a first-person narrative reporting the words of others "mimetically," i.e. in direct speech. But there is a significant difference here too. The vast majority of what is reported now consists of Sokrates' ideas put forward in his own voice. Like the young guardians, he is not only imitating a single model but imitating a good model, who is, in fact, himself. His "imitation" of other people is limited in extent, and is in any case a representation of good men, or at least of philosophically promising ones, namely Glaukon and Adeimantos. Such mimesis will not fragment the characters of narrator, reader and listener, or encourage them to identify with dangerous models; it will rather guide them towards a single, consistent and virtuous *ēthos*: it is a form of Socratic self-construction, and encourages similar self-construction in the consumer.

Despite the prohibition against "imitating" bad men, even the young guardians need to learn *about* such people.[253] This will presumably be accomplished through indirect narration, and perhaps humor. Similarly, Books 2–10 of *Republic* discuss the non-virtuous, but without using the direct mimetic style of Book 1. Sokrates employs third person description to delineate such flawed figures as the anonymous puppet-like cave-dwellers (514ab) and the types of the corrupt rulers in Books 8 and 9. And the myth of Er in Book 10, which includes the punishment of the wicked, is the longest passage of indirect discourse in Plato.[254] When Sokrates puts words in the mouths of imaginary objectors, he mostly uses indirect discourse. With a few exceptions, he also avoids introducing hostile ideas in the mouths of sympathetic characters and thereby giving them credibility

[253] 396a; cf. 409a–d, 576e–577a.

[254] So D. Tarrant 1955a; cf. also Gadamer 1980: 68–9; Laird 1999: 76. In the myth of Er, the souls' choice of new lives reindividuates them along with their reembodiment (619b–620d; cf. Too 1998: 59). In these cases, most of the souls of named individuals choose animal identities which embody various human types (620abc; cf. Semonides 7). The exceptions are two changes of gender and function (620b), and Odysseus, whose choice is emblematic of a philosophical life (620c; cf. above, p. 158).

or influence over the audience. Inferior characters are mentioned, but not brought to life or allowed to speak for themselves as they are in Book 1. The negative features of Thrasymachos and Kephalos that evoke the tyrannical and oligarchical natures are transferred to the abstract figures of the tyrant and oligarch. These are generalized symbolic types rather than particular individuals who might arouse our sympathetic interest.[255] The original champion of injustice, Thrasymachos, is still present, but he no longer speaks up on its behalf. By denying such characters a voice, Plato discourages dangerous emotional identification on the part of either the internal audience or ourselves. Instead their views are entirely filtered through Sokrates' controlling narrative voice. As with Glaukon and Adeimantos' speeches at the beginning of Book 2, this narrator is not only uncommitted to these ideas, but opposed to them from the outset.

Notoriously, Sokrates also revisits the question of appropriate mimesis in Book 10, producing a theory of artistic representation that looks rather different from that of Books 2–3. Instead of distinguishing between "good" and "bad" forms of mimesis, as he does in Book 3, he denounces mimesis *per se* as standing at a "third remove" from the ultimate reality of the Forms (598e). This would seem to rule out the legitimacy of *Republic* altogether as a meritorious work of art, regardless of the changes inaugurated in Book 2. But as recent scholars have argued, the treatments of mimesis in Books 3 and 10 are not necessarily incompatible.[256] This is not the place to discuss the matter in detail. But from the perspective of the present inquiry, one essential fact stands out: some poetry is always allowed in Kallipolis. Even in Book 10, Sokrates still permits "hymns to the gods and the praises of good people."[257] This creates a clear thread of continuity with Books 2–3. In both cases, limited kinds of poetry are considered appropriate, and even valuable, in the ideal state. And there is no good reason to doubt that the poetry approved in Book 10 is coextensive with the limited forms of mimesis approved in Books 2–3.[258] In other words, poetic mimesis remains acceptable if it is

[255] Contrast the naming of four specific tyrants in Book 1 (336a). As we have seen, the inferior rulers are individualized in proportion to their deterioration (above, p. 62). They thus take on some of the idiosyncrasy that has been banished from Plato's own dramatis personae. But they remain at bottom exemplary types.

[256] See e.g. Moravcsik and Temko 1982; Rosenstock 1983; Belfiore 1984; Halliwell 1997; Nehamas 1988; Ferrari 1989.

[257] 607a; cf. also 459e, 468d.

[258] Note that both of the approved genres could include elements of appropriate direct discourse, but with a large portion of narration, as favored in Book 3 (396e). Cf. also 394c where dithyramb (a kind of hymn) is mentioned as an example of pure narration.

not imitative in the deceptive sense, but constructive of one's proper identity.[259] Indeed, direct dramatic form may even be preferable to indirect discourse. If saying what a good man says is constitutive of being a good man, then such "imitation" stands at a second remove from the Forms (like the work of the craftsman), as opposed to a third remove (like the work of the painter).

This distinction is not articulated or argued for in Book 10, any more than it is in Books 2–3. But it does help, once again, to clarify the confusions surrounding the discussion of mimesis. To be sure, there is no room for a concept of constructive imitation in Book 10's notoriously problematic example of artistic imitation, where the craftsman "imitates" the Form of Bed or Chair, and the painter is consigned to a third level of reality (596e–598b). Yet if the artist in question were a sculptor, as opposed to a painter, his "imitation" of a chair might turn out to *be* a chair, just as the "imitation" of a stone capital *is* in fact a stone capital (above, p. 237). We may think, for example, of the carved stone thrones on which priests were seated at the festival of Dionysos. Similarly, if the consumer incorporates the qualities of character conveyed in encomia of good people and hymns to the gods (who of course are completely good), then the consumption of such poetry will lead to the self-construction, instead of corruption, of the good man. In other words, such mimesis would just not be mimetic in the pernicious, illusionistic sense. But in so far as Plato's thinking is dominated by the deceptive form of imitation, he seems uninterested in articulating what such a beneficial, constructive form of mimesis might look like. Had he done so, it would be easier to defend the widespread view that his own works constitute Socratically acceptable "poetry." In order to place *Republic* itself in this category, it is necessary to ignore the conflation of self-fashioning with deceptive imitation that underlies Sokrates' rejection of mimesis per se.

In Books 2–10, then, Plato adjusts his use of literary form, as well as content, to fit the prescriptions of his Sokrates in Book 3. In doing so he makes Sokrates, qua narrator, act upon his own prescriptions, thus maintaining his portrait of Sokrates as a man who matches words with deeds. This means that the style and characterization of Book 1 are implicitly expurgated as setting negative examples in a negative style. Why, then, does Plato retain this book, in this style, at all? First of all, we must bear in mind that the view of literature expounded by Sokrates is not necessarily endorsed by Plato. (One might argue, for example, that this

[259] The notorious phrase ὅση μιμητική (595a5) would thus refer to poetry that is deceptively rather than constructively mimetic.

experiment shows not the superiority of Sokrates' views on literature, but their impoverishment.) Rather, *Republic* explores on a dramatic level some of the theoretical concerns about literature addressed discursively within it. It illustrates the costs and benefits, both literary and philosophical, of a certain kind of literary theory and practice. The retention of Book 1 might therefore signal some ambivalence, on the dramatic level, towards the Socratic program that Plato is enacting within his dialogue. Even if Plato were personally committed to Sokrates' program, however, his larger commitment to dramatic form would necessitate the retention of Book 1's negative characters. Since he has chosen never to speak in his own voice, the only way to convey a reconsideration of his dramatic style is by further dramatization. No other form of critique could transcend the partial perspective of a particular character. Plato could, of course, simply have composed a different kind of dialogue; but only by incorporating Book 1 as an elenctic dialogue could he indicate dramatically that the change is a response to the perceived inadequacies of that more varied style.

LEARNING BY EXAMPLE

Plato thus offers us in *Republic* a series of characters at various stages of philosophical development. The places occupied by the dramatis personae on this scale correspond roughly to the extent to which they have been moulded by conventional education. In Book 1, Kephalos' values were entirely constructed by tradition, and he was completely incapable of critiquing them. Polemarchos' views were derived from similar sources, and he displayed the passivity in face of authority that is often associated with poetic education. Unlike his father, however, he was open to Sokrates' critique of conventional ideas, while at the same time retaining his father's "right opinion" that justice is something good. Nor is such passivity censored by the constructive Sokrates during his critique of poetry in Books 2 and 3. Rather it is harnessed in the service of the ideal state, which will inculcate its own kind of "poetic" education into the passive young guardians. The dangers posed by such passivity are eliminated, it is implied, by an ideal educational environment. Thrasymachos, by contrast, shows the independence necessary for the higher levels of the guardians' education, but lacks the right opinion inculcated by the earlier stage (cf. especially 348e). This makes him hostile and resistant to the fundamental Socratic values that must precede that higher education.

Glaukon and Adeimantos show more resistance to their own culture than Kephalos, and more respect for tradition than Thrasymachos, while retaining Polemarchos' fundamentally Socratic outlook and openness to new ways of thinking. As we have seen, they also show some resistance to Sokrates, in a way that is both salutory in a less than ideal state, and a harbinger of intellectual independence in the future. Of the brothers, Adeimantos is more susceptible to the influence of conventional education, and less thoroughly engaged in Sokrates' methods and ideas than his brother. Glaukon, by contrast, has reached a point where he is enthusiastic about the higher education that may lead him to dialectic and ultimately to the Forms. Sokrates himself, thanks in part to the divine sign betokening his exceptional nature, is at a higher level still. He not only adheres firmly to the view that justice is something good, but seems to have derived no damaging effects either from the company he keeps or from mimetic pedagogy. His detachment from traditional education is demonstrated by his own rigorous censorship program, which induces him to reject even his beloved Homer (cf. 607c); he instantiates the intellectual autonomy that must be part of the philosopher's eventual character; and he has gained at least some conception of the Good beyond the images he offers his audience (533a). Just over the dramatic horizon lies the mysterious vision of the philosopher-rulers, who have been formed exclusively by this revolutionary educational program, and therefore lack any of the defects of contemporary Greek identity in general, or Athenian identity in particular.

What is the significance of this continuum for the reader? The principles of mimetic pedagogy, insisted on so strongly at the dialogue's discursive level, suggest that like the lovers of *Phaedrus*, we will each be attracted to, and identify with, the character who is most like us, and learn to do as they do.[260] The range of characters in *Republic* provides various points of access for this process. By identifying with the speaker who strikes in us most strongly the chord of likeness, we may participate in any progress they may make. Those who resemble Kephalos may drop out or lose interest in the discussion. Those who resemble Thrasymachos will be be annoyed by Book 1 but may perhaps become attentive – if not sympathetic – readers after that. But Plato's primary audience is composed of those readers who have pre-existing Socratic sympathies and "right opinion," like the dramatis personae of Books 2–10.

[260] Cf. *Phdr*. 252d and above, pp. 82–4; Lang 1973: 232–5, 239; Gill 1996a: 312–3.

Readers who resemble these characters in the relevant respects will presumably prefer the latter books to the livelier Book 1, in contrast to those readers who are drawn to multiplicity and particularity, like the "lovers of sights and sounds," or like women and children (475c–476b, 557c). The elimination of Kephalos and Thrasymachos from Books 2–10 removes the threat they might pose to the lower parts of such readers' souls. Meanwhile their potentially good qualities (Kephalos' gentleness, Thrasymachos' intelligence and resistance) are re-embodied in superior form in other characters with whom properly "Socratic" readers will feel more affinity. Of such readers the more malleable will identify with Polemarchos, the more skeptical with Adeimantos, the more vigorous with Glaukon, and the more independent-minded and constructive thinkers with Sokrates. But like the young guardians in Books 2–3, all of them will be identifying ultimately with their own desired philosophical character, albeit at different stages of development.

Presumably it is also possible for the reader to proceed from one of these stages of philosophical development to the next. The possibility of a Polemarchos or even a Thrasymachos progressing as a result of exposure to Socratic dialectic is dramatized within the work. Similarly, Plato's brothers apparently undergo a change in their understanding, and a strengthening and deepening of their convictions. The embracing of Sokrates' ideas by Glaukon, in particular, arguably shows that he has developed the level of "right opinion" and the kind of character that allow one to ascend to a higher level of autonomy. And Sokrates' praise for the brothers hints that they may indeed have the requisite character for further progress. But this possibility is not dramatized. There remains an unbridged gulf between the supportive role of Plato's brothers and the extraordinarily fertile philosophical imagination of the constructive Sokrates. Plato presents teacher and students as distinct models, thereby displacing onto his dramatic characters the tension between acquiescence to authority and creative autonomy that pervades his works generally, and this work in particular.

But if Glaukon really has the potential to bridge this gap, why does Plato not dramatize the process, by allowing him to take a constructive part in the discussion? On a dramatic level, this may be explained by Plato's desire not to compromise Sokrates' uniqueness. But it also makes sense on a discursive level. Sokrates' educational program suggests that the moment of transition to philosophical creativity cannot be dramatized, because it is impossible to represent in words. Like the sudden,

transcendent moment when the Forms are glimpsed, such moments are ineffable.[261] They may be arrived at through the discursive *medium* of *logoi*, in the form of discussion, but the moment of transition cannot itself be *represented* that way. Plato literally could not, in Socratic terms, show Sokrates conveying to Glaukon a truth that cannot be verbally expressed. As we have seen, Sokrates is unable to impart even his "opinion" about such mysteries in any direct or explicit fashion to those who do not already comprehend them. And even if he could, this would undermine his commitment to active, autonomous learning at the highest educational level.

Plato could, of course, have used dramatic means to show the *results* of such a transitional moment, by making Glaukon move to Sokrates' level of imaginative creativity. But this would be to trivialize the long and arduous process that leads to such insight. All the evidence of the dialogues, including this one, suggests that a major leap in philosophical understanding or imagination must be earned by continuing participation in a life-long process that cannot be represented within the confines of a single conversation.[262] Since each dialogue is only a snapshot of a single moment in the lives of its dramatis personae, it cannot show a complete person, a complete life, or a single moment of transformation as decisive. Sokrates' own extraordinary creativity comes at the price not only of a miraculous preservation from the ill-effects of Athens, but of an entire life devoted to active inquiry.[263] This is not merely asserted within *Republic* (367de), but given credence by Sokrates' many reappearances in Plato's works. It is this that justifies his transformation, within the confines of this dialogue, from elenctic gadfly into creative thinker.[264] To represent Glaukon attaining such creativity within the dialogue would cheapen Sokrates' unique dedication to the philosophical life by suggesting that its fruits are easily accessible to more ordinary persons. It would be as untrue to the psychology and pedagogy of *Republic* to show a conventional Athenian aristocrat transformed overnight (literally)

[261] *Rep.* 490ab, 511b, 516b, 532a–533d; cf. *Symp.* 210e, *Ep. VII* 341c. On the unrepresentable moment of understanding see further Gonzalez 1998 passim; V. L. Yates 1998 ch. 3.

[262] Cf. above, p. 80. On the need for time and reiteration for learning to occur see 368c, 374cde, 450b, 504b–e, 532d–533a, 536c–537d, 539d–540a, 621c, and cf. e.g. *Ap.* 19a, 24a, *Ep. VII* 341c, *Gorg.* 513cd, *Laws* 968c, *Meno* 85c, *Parm.* 135cd, *Tht.* 172d, 186c. As Gaiser points out (1984: 44–5) this is the model of magic spells, which often depend on reiteration for their effect (cf. esp. *Rep.* 607e–608a, *Phd.* 77e, 114d and above, p. 106).

[263] The passive stage of his education (if he ever had one) was presumably confined to childhood (cf. *Crito* 50de).

[264] Plato dramatizes this shift in a different way through Diotima in *Symp.* (cf. Blundell 1992c: 127–30).

into a fully fledged Socratic figure, as it would be to show a fully converted Thrasymachos.

All this might help to explain why Plato should redeploy, at a climactic moment, a dramatic technique that he seems to have eschewed since Book 1, namely the use of the interlocutor to impose limits on Sokrates' philosophizing. In Book 1 he used Thrasymachos to allow Sokrates to avoid giving a substantive definition of justice (above, p. 197). In Book 7 Sokrates attributes a comparable constraint to the limitations of Glaukon and Adeimantos (cf. especially 533a). This lets both Sokrates and Plato off the hook, so that no one is obliged to give a full explanation of *Republic's* arcane metaphysics. Such an evasion makes sense, however, if that metaphysics is ineffable and incommunicable through language, and if the process through which it is apprehended cannot be expressed in a single dramatic moment. What seems like a cheap trick in Book 1 is legitimized here as the only possible way to dramatize the moment when pedagogical limitation becomes inevitable, and further progress ineffable. The "blocking" use of the interlocutor's character has thus become self-justifying in terms of the theory it is used to explore.

Even if Glaukon and Adeimantos have not yet gained access to Sokrates' level of creativity, let alone to the truth it adumbrates, they still exemplify the character needed by one who wishes to work towards it. The reader who shares their transitional level of philosophical development is invited to emulate these virtues, including the determination to keep striving for something that may lie forever beyond their reach. The brothers' receptiveness to Sokrates' truly bizarre ideas is obviously important here. Such openness is a necessary aspect of dialectical courage (cf. above, p. 153). It is the brothers' ability to listen patiently and receptively that permits the constructive Sokrates to flourish in the first place. But their skeptical, critical capacities are also crucial. Sokrates' own denials of dogmatism, reinforced by his self-criticisms and use of imaginary objectors, warn us *not* to take the ideas or philosophical practice of *Republic* on faith. This licenses us, as it licenses Glaukon and Adeimantos, to adopt a critical stance towards the conversation. In the ideal state, this kind of intellectual autonomy is permitted only to those with indelibly dyed right opinion. But those attempting to philosophize in a less than ideal state must exercise their critical faculties from the outset.

The exercise of such faculties licenses criticism not only of Sokrates' ideas, but of Glaukon and Adeimantos' limited resistance and lack of intellectual creativity. From the reader who enjoys greater critical acumen or creative ability than Plato's brothers, even their most wooden

responses invite further resistance, leaving us space to question what they unhesitatingly accept, and encouraging us to question Sokrates in ways that they seem unable or unwilling to do. Plato gives his Sokrates free rein within the dialogue, but by committing his work to writing, he also invites his readers to do a better job than Glaukon and Adeimantos as critics. For example, when Sokrates warns his internal audience to be on their guard lest he mislead them (507a), we may plausibly see this as a warning to ourselves to do the same. This helps to compensate for the strictly limited degree of opposition experienced by Sokrates within the dialogue, and to urge us beyond simple acquiescence to pedagogical authority. By responding to this challenge, we may hope to replicate the higher level of critical ability exemplified in Sokrates himself, which may in turn lead to the formation of positive ideas to rival his. Paradoxically, we may identify with Sokrates most authentically by remaining critical of his proposals and responding to the provocation he offers, just as he responds to the provocation of Plato's brothers. The stimulus of dialogue form thus offers a possible means towards leaping the gulf that divides Sokrates from even the most talented of his students.

CHAPTER 5

Reproducing Sokrates: Theaetetus

Theaetetus stands out among Plato's dialogues for its blurring of the boundaries between various proposed groupings of his works. It is self-consciously "Socratic" in the elenctic manner,[1] uses the rich scene-setting and characterization, substantial argumentation, and eloquent Socratic speech-making associated with the constructive Sokrates,[2] and overlaps with the "late" dialogues in important aspects of both style and content.[3] In a more methodologically innocent age, its aporetic structure was taken by some as evidence of an early date; more recently, *Theaetetus* has been seen as anomalous among the later dialogues, prompted perhaps by a desire to pay homage to the eponymous interlocutor after his death.[4] But whatever other reasons there may be for its unusual combination of

[1] Elenctic features include: the "what is x?" question; the offering of several definitions by the interlocutor; Sokrates' rejection of a list of examples (146cde); his use of mundane illustrations like clay (147abc), archery (194a), medicine (178c), and pigs (161c); his emphasis on consistency (154de, 200d); the sincerity requirement (e.g. 145c, 155a, 157cd, 171d, 181c, 182c, 182e, 184e); his profession of ignorance (150c, 157cd, 161b, 189d, 210c); his alleged dislike of long-windedness (195bc; cf. 151b, 163d); his claim that one should not discuss what knowledge is like without first discovering what it is (196de, 200cd; cf. Burnyeat 1990: 105–6); the emphasis on *aporia* (cf. 145d6, e8, 151a7, 158c3, 168a3, c1, 174c5, d1, 175b6, d4, 187d2, 190e9, 191a4, 196c9, 200a12); the impasse of self-contradiction (e.g. 154cd, 162d, 164b, 165d); the final demolition of all proposed definitions (210ab); the idea that elenchus is also a form of self-scrutiny (155a, 181c, 182e, 187c, 203a); Sokrates' welcoming of criticism, as indicated by his ventriloquism of the complaints of "Protogoras" (165e–168c) and his demolition of his own suggestions; the production in the interlocutor of an awareness of his own ignorance, which clears the ground for further inquiry (210bc; cf. also 155cd).

[2] Sokrates is vividly portrayed, and Theaitetos is exceptionally fully characterized for a Platonic youth (Bruns 1896: 245–7). Sokrates also displays a powerful philosophical imagination, both in the representation and critique of complex ideas and in the use of extended and richly-imagined discourse (esp. the midwife image, the defence of Protagoras, and the digression).

[3] The argumentation is sustained and complex; there is a strong concern with method; the discursive content is not overtly ethical (though it has ethical implications), and deals with such problems as false opinion and non-being (cf. esp. 188c–190e).

[4] For instances of the former see Thesleff 1982: 152 n. 128; for the latter see e.g. Guthrie 1978: 61. The diverse features of the dialogue have also been explained in terms of Plato's intellectual development from the self-confidence of the "middle" dialogues to a renewed scepticism (Bostock 1988: 13–14), and by the hypothesis of revision, which is based in part on the existence of an alternative opening to the dialogue (above, p. 12).

elements, it displays a richness of characterization that serves to mark Plato's continuing preoccupation with the relations between personality, literary form, philosophical method and Socratic pedagogy. Through Sokrates, Theaitetos, Theodoros, and their interactions, Plato explores yet again the conditions under which Socratic pedagogy may successfully take place. *Republic* Book 1 asked, in dramatic terms, who could hope to learn from the elenctic Sokrates, while Books 2–10 showed what kind of interlocutor could enable Sokrates to move towards positive discourse. *Theaetetus* addresses similar issues but in a slightly different way, examining what kind of interlocutor can not only benefit personally from Socratic testing, but enable Sokrates to be productive without formally departing from an elenctic structure.

In the course of exploring these matters, *Theaetetus* also examines several interrelated characterological themes, including the paradoxical way Sokrates combines uniqueness and transcendence of the individual, and his capacity for pedagogical self-reproduction. The temporal setting, on the verge of Sokrates' death, gives a special urgency to this latter question.[5] And the deployment of his character gains an additional dimension from the discursive material of this particular work – epistemology. As with other dialogues, this central subject is explored on a dramatic as well as a discursive level. Through the characters and their interactions, abstract epistemological issues are shown to play themselves out in the world of specific, particularized human beings, with their varied abilities to learn from the world, themselves, and each other. It is this personal dimension of epistemology – the fact that we are particular, embodied individuals – that generates most of the problems explored in the dialogue (especially the reliability and subjectivity of sense-perception). This makes *Theaetetus* peculiarly self-referential in a dramatic sense, in so far as its subject is the very process in which the participants are engaged. For example, the significance of memory for learning links the capacities of the dramatis personae with both epistemology and issues surrounding personal identity.[6]

SOKRATES AND THE PHILOSOPHER PRINCE

Theaetetus is quite defensive concerning the elenctic Sokrates' procedures and demeanor. The allusions to his trial and death that frame the dialogue invite us to assess the charge of corrupting the youth of Athens by

[5] The dialogue is framed by references to Sokrates' death (142c, 210d), which is also alluded to at 172c.
[6] Cf. 163c–164b, 166a–d, 191d, 192a2, b6, 194d, 196a, 209c.

the standard of his interaction with young Theaitetos.[7] Sokrates himself insists strongly on the progress the young can make in his company (150d–151a). Indeed, he claims a degree of success for his methods unparalleled elsewhere in Plato, since the benefits he offers extend to the discovery within oneself of "fine" (and presumably positive) ideas. He blames those who leave him too soon for their own deterioration (cf. *Symp.* 216ab), and, in an echo of *Apology*, attributes the hostility of others to their failure to appreciate his benevolence (151cd; cf. *Ap.* 21e). His agonism is hinted at, however, when Theodoros represents him as a fighter of monstrous legendary proportions (169ab; cf. below, p. 280). Sokrates himself takes care to distinguish himself from the eristic arguer (*antilogikos*), but this person, who would scold them for talking about what knowledge is like when they do not yet know what it is, sounds much like the elenctic Sokrates himself (196d–197a). Indeed, Sokrates has already admitted to crossing, albeit inadvertently, the fine line between dialectic and "antilogic" (164cd).[8] His interlocutors may therefore perhaps be forgiven for failing to appreciate at times which side of the line he is on.

There is also a confrontational tone in the digression at the center of the dialogue, where Sokrates eloquently compares his ideal of the philosopher to its antitype, the orator.[9] When the philosopher "drags" the orator up to his own level, the latter becomes dizzy and dismayed, an object of mockery to others and "no better than a child" – much like the elenctic Sokrates' victims (175cd, 177b; cf. above, p. 122). This passage suggests that "dragging" is not the most promising way to win a benign partner for discussion and philosophical progress. It is scarcely surprising, then, if Sokrates' interlocutors find themselves, like the orator of the digression, to be pressed for time (172cd), or refuse, like Theodoros, to be "dragged" into the ring (162b; cf. 181a), for fear they may also be "dragged" towards unpalatable conclusions. According to Sokrates, when the orator of the digression does gain the courage to sustain the argument, he becomes dissatisfied with his own previous concerns (177b). But Plato never chooses to dramatize such a conversion. The evidence of the dialogues – including this one – is that reducing politicians to a state of childish absurdity leads not to their philosophical conversion, but to the death of the philosopher in question.

[7] Polansky 1992: 35–6; cf. also Long 1998: 122. [8] Cf. 154de, 184c, 197a.

[9] The digression is tailored towards Theodoros in important ways (cf. 173c7, 173e5–6, 175e1, 177c). But it is clear both that its philosophical ideal extends beyond Theodoros (cf. 174b), and that Sokrates shares it to a significant extent (cf. 172c, 173b3–4; Long 1998: 127–8).

These reproaches are voiced within *Theaetetus* by Protagoras, as ventriloquated by Sokrates. In his eponymous dialogue, Protagoras patiently endures a good deal of provocation.[10] Here, however, he scolds Sokrates for his abrasive and counterproductive dialectical manner, telling him that in order to win people over to philosophy he should not be hostile and confrontational, but benevolent, and investigate the issues genuinely, rather than producing *aporia* by exploiting verbal quibbles and "dragging" arguments around (167d–168c).[11] "Protagoras" speaks, of course, from a non-Socratic, even an anti-Socratic position. His complaint therefore arguably places him in the ranks of those who fail to understand the true nature of Socratic dialectic.[12] But the fact that Sokrates himself is ventriloquating these complaints, and supposedly giving Protagoras his strongest possible case, suggests that this is not just a hostile attack but a form of Socratic self-criticism, or at least an acknowledgement of the problematic effect he produces on others. If Sokrates is really giving Protagoras the best defense he can muster, there is no reason why this should not include potentially justified criticisms of Sokrates himself and his methods.[13] He is careful to obtain the company's endorsement in principle of the methodological points "Protagoras" makes, and uses them to lure Theodoros into participation.[14]

Plato himself obliquely acknowledges the possible merit of such complaints against Sokrates' elenctic persona by eliminating the more problematic aspects of that persona within this dialogue. Sokrates bends over backwards in *Theaetetus* to show that the reproaches of "Protagoras" are not applicable to the case in hand. He avoids any of the behaviors that make his applications of the elenchus counterproductive in other dialogues, becoming, in Gregory Vlastos' words, "a new, much improved, Socrates, who has laid to rest the demon of contentiousness within

[10] Cf. *Prot.* 350c–51a, 360e, 361de.

[11] For the "dragging" of arguments (as opposed to people) cf. 195c3, 199a5.

[12] He also reproaches Sokrates with indulging in rhetorical rabble-rousing (*dēmēgoria*) and "plausibility" instead of mathematical rigor (162de), and cheap and unfair rhetoric rather than question and answer (166c–167d) – precisely the kinds of complaint that Sokrates makes elsewhere against the sophists. In Protagoras' mouth these criticisms are self-defeating, since plausibility is notoriously the foundation of the kind of rhetoric that Protagoras himself taught, as Sokrates has reminded us a moment before (162d; see further Lee 1973: 228–8, 234–41). Rather than undermining their general value, this reinforces it, in so far as they form part of Plato's strategy for discrediting the sophist.

[13] Cf. Blank 1993: 430–31. He even implies that Theaitetos' impressionable youth has made him susceptible to his own rhetoric, as well as that of Protagoras (162d; cf. 157d).

[14] 146a, 162d–163a, 168cde.

him."[15] Intellectual midwifery, we are assured, is not an antagonistic but a joint project, calling for friendliness, cooperation and mutual respect, gentleness, good temper, honesty and true self-examination alongside the examination of others.[16] This of course is nothing new. Nevertheless, Sokrates' tone here towards his interlocutors is very different from the ironic "friendliness" with which he addresses a Thrasymachos, bearing a closer resemblance to the constructive Sokrates of *Republic* 2–10. Above all, it lacks the mocking irony that enrages so many interlocutors.[17] His most characteristically ironic moments are aimed at inferior students (who are not present) and sophists, including the absent Protagoras and the "wise" generally (151b, 152c, 210c). He is only mildly ironic towards the recalcitrant Theodoros.[18] Though Theodoros' skills and deficiencies overlap substantially with those of Hippias, the former is not mocked or trivialized for his polymathy. Rather the value of his studies as a foundation for dialectic is implicitly acknowledged through his role as the teacher of Theaitetos. Sokrates is even serious and courteous in his imaginary exchanges with "Protagoras," despite the considerable narrative mockery with which he colors them.[19]

Sokrates' treatment of Theaitetos in particular is consistently encouraging. He is rarely ironic at the boy's expense, except in partnership with himself (cf. 181b, 197a), and clarifies at least one more generally ironic moment for his benefit.[20] He applauds his courage, warmly praises his intellectual alertness, and takes his bewilderment as evidence of philosophical talent.[21] He even refrains from challenging him at times, in order to promote his intellectual growth (163c, 189d). When he does correct him, it is always in a gentle, encouraging and complimentary fashion (184c, 199e). This attitude bears fruit, for Theaitetos himself declares that it would be shameful (*aischron*) not to do his best with the encouragement Sokrates has given him (151d). We may contrast the counterproductive shame induced by Sokrates' methods in such respondents as Thrasymachos. It is true, of course, that cooperative young men are usually well-treated by Sokrates (above, p. 119). In *Theaetetus*, however, the combination of such treatment with a defensive tone about the hostility Sokrates arouses elsewhere suggests that the kind of irony

15 1991: 155. Long calls him Plato's "most compelling and attractive image of Socrates" (1998: 116).
16 E.g. 146c, 154d–155a, 162b10-c1, 181bc, 197b.
17 Compare 146d with *Meno* 72a; 162c2 with 151b5–6 and e.g. *Euth.* 12a.
18 145b, d, 161a, 168e–169a. In fact it is questionable how ironic any of these passages really is.
19 See Lee 1973: 255–9. 20 145d, 148c; cf. above, p. 203. 21 148b, 154d, 155d, 185e.

Sokrates directs towards more recalcitrant characters, such as Hippias and Thrasymachos, serves no useful purpose.

Even the most benign and irony-deficient Sokrates cannot succeed without the right kind of interlocutor. But in Theaitetos he has found a worthy respondent. The negative way in which Plato so often presents Sokrates' elenctic interlocutors is offset in this dialogue by a more optimistic picture of the potential of an individual *phusis*, when nurtured by the proper education and environment, to benefit from Socratic scrutiny. Theaitetos is much like Glaukon and Adeimantos in character and background: he is an Athenian citizen from a propertied family, who will subsequently distinguish himself in war. But he is a good deal younger than Plato's brothers,[22] and has been less obviously exposed to the hazardous aspects of Athenian culture. He is also much more similar to a youthful member of *Republic's* guardian class.[23] Theodoros' emphasis on the boy's extraordinary combination of gentleness and manly courage (144ab) recalls not only the guardians' necessary qualifications, but also the difficulty, so heavily emphasized in *Republic*, of finding a nature equally well equipped in both. Plato invites this comparison when Sokrates opens his inquiry by suggesting that whoever succeeds in argument will rule them as a "king" (146a). The direct reference is to a children's game, but the image suggests a more profound agenda: whoever excels in the argument will be entitled to dialectical kingship, like *Republic*'s philosopher-rulers.[24]

Theaitetos will vindicate Theodoros' praise by combining both sets of qualities. We meet him in a palaestra after physical exercise (144c); he will grow up to be a fine warrior (142b); he is eager to learn (148d, 191d), and wins praise for fighting intellectually "in a manly fashion" (205a; cf. 144a5); one of his most salient qualities is philosophical endurance. At the same time, he is exceptionally "gentle" and modest. He is docile and obedient to his elders (161a, 183d), compliantly accepting his teacher's prompting (165b), and welcoming correction (146c). He awaits Sokrates' seal of approval on his mathematical idea (147e), and is modest about his ability to extend it to a more challenging problem (148bc). He admits it when he does not understand (e.g. 192cd), does not blame his

[22] Theaitetos is a "child" (*pais/paidion*, 162d3, 166a3, 168d8, 184d1, 209e7) or "stripling" (*meirakion*, 142c6, 143e5, 144c8, 146b2, 168e3; cf. 173b). This makes him about fifteen at the dramatic date of his conversation with Sokrates in 399 BCE.

[23] Note that this point does not require *Tht.* to have been composed after *Rep.*, simply a cross-fertilization of ideas within the two works. For other evocations of *Rep.* in *Tht.* cf. Harrison 1978: 116; Ford 1994: 209 n.; Sayre 1995: 211–14.

[24] The verb is βασιλεύσει. For the way this evokes *Rep.* see below, p. 335.

aporia on Sokrates, and responds to the experience of bemusement not with hostility, but with renewed enthusiasm – a sign, in Sokrates' view, of a truly philosophical nature (155cd). Sokrates fosters both sides of his character, simultaneously encouraging his boldness in argument,[25] and submitting him to a process designed to increase his intellectual gentleness and *sōphrosunē* (210c).

Besides this emphasis on the rare complementarity of courage and gentleness, Theaitetos recalls the young guardians in many more specific details. Like them he loves learning and truth, is quick to learn, has a good memory, comes from a sound lineage, is generous, unconcerned with material possessions, and "noble" in character (*gennaios*, 144d; cf. *Rep.* 535b). But what links him most closely with the young guardians, in contrast to such successful elenctic interlocutors as Polemarchos, is his intellectual substance and promise of future achievement. One way this is indicated is through his prior education. His training for philosophy receives heavy emphasis, in contrast to other Socratic interlocutors, whose education has usually been of a dubious, mostly literary character.[26] He has already started studying all the areas specified in *Republic* as necessary preliminaries to dialectic, including calculation (*logismoi*), geometry, astronomy and harmonics (145cd).[27] Among these various studies, his special talent is for geometry. This field of inquiry is held in *Republic* to be earth-bound in so far as it relies on physical diagrams (510c–511b). But although Theaitetos casually mentions the use of diagrams by his teacher (147d; cf. 169a), it seems that he himself (in collaboration with his friend, young Sokrates) has managed to make further progress by means of abstract thought alone.[28] The case in point displays his quick intellect (cf. 144a), and marks an exceptionally substantial intellectual contribution for any Socratic interlocutor. Though the originality and significance of this youthful "discovery" have been debated, on almost any interpretation it is a dramatic harbinger of his future as a great mathematician.[29] His expertise in solid geometry (148b) is especially significant. This subject forms one of the most advanced stages of the guardians' curriculum in *Republic*, where it is marked as something exceptionally difficult and as yet undeveloped because generally undervalued (528abc). This means

[25] 141e, 151e, 157d, 204b, 205a. [26] Plochmann 1954: 226.

[27] Cf. *Rep.* 522a–531e, 533a, *Tht.* 173e–174a. Note that the guardians are to study mathematics in their childhood (*Rep.* 536de), as Theaitetos has apparently been doing. Cf. also *Laws* 747b with Burnyeat 1978: 491.

[28] Cf. Miller 1980: 124n. 8.

[29] See e.g. Sachs 1914; M. Brown 1969; Burnyeat 1978; Desjardins 1990: 77–9; Polansky 1992: 54–7. For a more skeptical view see Thesleff 1990.

he may qualify as someone who combines the best nature with the best education (cf. above, pp. 218–19).

In addition to paying so much attention to his prior training, the dialogue contains dramatic indications of Theaitetos' intellectual substance and promise of future creativity. In conversing with Sokrates he displays an active intelligence that far outstrips that of other young and compliant Socratic interlocutors.[30] Like other elenctic interlocutors he generates the ideas to be discussed, but unlike most of them he does so with increasing sophistication. Though he evokes a Meno or Euthyphro by first answering the "what is x?" question with a list of examples (146cd), unlike them he is extraordinarily quick to understand Sokrates' objection to this answer. Moreover he is the only Platonic interlocutor to provide a complex example demonstrating such understanding.[31] Not content with merely agreeing to each point that Sokrates makes, he explains that he has already considered an analogous problem and produced a solution of the right general kind (146d–148b). As the dialogue proceeds, we are periodically reminded of this intellectual strength. When Sokrates introduces his first objection to Protagoras, Theaitetos deals with it easily (163abc). Later, his spontaneous understanding of a Socratic point obviates the need for lengthy argument and wins him special praise (185e).[32] He is always quick on the uptake,[33] proves capable of positive contributions (199e, 207de), and is able to remember and summarize the argument (208c; cf. *Rep.* 511cd). He also shows considerable initiative in producing the third suggested definition of knowledge (201cd). Nor does he allow Sokrates to lead him by the nose: he observes when he is being painted into a corner, and avoids self-contradiction, thereby earning Sokrates' warm approval (154cd).

In *Republic* Book 7, mathematicians are said to grasp "what is" to a certain extent, but to remain in a dreamlike state as long as they fail to give an account of the foundations of their own discipline (533bc). As an accomplished young mathematician, Theaitetos seems to be on the threshold of waking from that dream. This is suggested imagistically when he volunteers an obscure, dream-like idea, which evokes the constructive Sokrates through its imagery and the style in which it is introduced, and whose meaning will be explained to him by Sokrates (201cd; below, p. 264). In *Republic's* terms, he is on the verge of that synoptic view of the propaedeutic studies which is the final step towards dialectic, the "coping stone"

[30] "Outstrip" is Sokrates' own metaphor (148c). [31] Cf. Sayre 1969: 57–8.

[32] Cf. the compliment to Kleinias at *Euthyd.* 282c; but Kleinias' point is both slighter and more obvious.

[33] E.g. 185cde, 190d, 191b; cf. 144a3.

of all previous education (*Rep.* 534e).[34] He is facing the question, "What is knowledge?" That is, he is asking what all the different branches of knowledge (such as those pursued in the propaedeutic studies) have in common (cf. *Symp.* 210c). As a mere boy, however, Theaitetos is not yet old enough to answer that question. In *Republic*, Sokrates heavily emphasizes the danger of approaching dialectic too young.[35] And in *Theaetetus* he says a long and arduous education is needed in order to learn to deal properly with sense impressions (186c). Theaitetos has taken the first essential step, by going beyond Theodoros' diagrams in pursuit of dialectic, but he still has further to go.

Even in *Republic*, however, youth is essential for the studies preliminary to dialectic, since it is accompanied by greater facility in learning (536cd). A youthful pliability is obviously necessary for the young guardians, if they are to be open to the systematic conditioning of their early education (cf. *Rep.* 377ab). Similarly in *Theaetetus*, the flexibility of youth is Theodoros' reason for proposing one of the boys as Sokrates' respondent.[36] Theaitetos' youth thus gives him the intellectual suppleness essential for argument, and a pliant openness to Socratic influence (cf. 155e, 187ab). But this same pliancy also leaves the impressionable young susceptible to dangerous outside influences. As the author of the Seventh Letter puts it, their desires are changeable and often self-contradictory (328b; cf. 338bc). In Sokrates' diatribe against the orator, the tender souls of the young fall easy victim to intimidatation and corruption (173ab; cf. 168ab). Theaitetos himself tells Sokrates that he was initially very impressed by Protagoras' arguments, and Sokrates attributes this to his youth (162cd). Yet in contrast to Glaukon and Adeimantos, with their sturdy – if uncommitted – defence of Thrasymacheanism, Theaitetos has not yet been "dyed" deeply enough with sophistic views or rhetorical methods to make use of them or defend them for himself. "Protagoras" dismisses this "child" as an adequate spokesman for his ideas (166a), and Sokrates has no trouble in directing him away from such views. Moreover, unlike Glaukon and Adeimantos, Theaitetos never appeals to the authority of poetry or other traditional cultural influences. In contrast to the orator, whose mind has become "bitter and twisted" under the influence of Athenian democratic institutions (172e–173b), he has not been warped by circumstance. Not

[34] On the relationship between mathematics and dialectic cf. also *Euthyd.* 290bc.

[35] *Rep.* 537d–539d; cf. 487bcd, 497e–498c, *Phileb.* 15d–16a. For the limitations of youth cf. also *Alc.* 1. 105e–106a, *Euthyd.* 275b, *Prot.* 314b, *Gorg.* 502d, *Laws* 663b, 658cd, *Parm.* 130e; cf. also Szlezák 1997: 90–91.

[36] 146b; cf. e.g. 162b, 168e, *Alc.* 1.127de, *Parm.* 137b, *Rep.* 377ab.

only is he no expert in the ideas he generates, but the pattern of his adult life is as yet unformed.

All this makes Theaitetos the perfect interlocutor to complement the benign elenctic Sokrates of this dialogue. In dramatizing their relationship, *Theaetetus* offers us an idealized (not to say sanitized) representation of the elenctic Sokrates at work, and an implicit justification for his methods. Like other Platonic representations of this process, however, the dialogue fails to achieve any positive results, despite Theaitetos' superiority as an interlocutor. This implies that the interlocutor cannot be blamed for Sokrates' failure, as they so often are elsewhere, if only implicitly.[37] At the same time, Sokrates' newly benign nature suggests that the quirks of *his* personality are not to blame either. There are no impediments of character in either participant to interfere with the elenctic process. The value of the elenctic approach under ideal conditions is thus under scrutiny – and the results are mixed. It proves successful in the aporetic work of clearing away dead undergrowth and preparing the mind to discover new truths (210bc). But that success seems contingent on there being little such undergrowth to remove. Moreover it remains unclear just how, if at all, this mode of inquiry can go on to furnish new truths to Sokrates or his companions.

LIKENESS

As a paradigm of the promising young philosophical nature, Theaitetos is closely assimilated to Sokrates. One of the most striking dramatic features of this dialogue is their remarkable physical resemblance. Theaitetos is an ugly boy, Theodoros tells us, with the same snub nose and bulging eyes for which Sokrates was notorious (143e). Sokrates says he wants to look at Theaitetos in order to examine his own appearance,[38] and makes their facial likeness the subject of his first teasing introduction to the question of knowledge (144d–145b). When the resemblance reappears, it is to illustrate the difficulty of differentiating named individuals (209bc; cf. 210d). This philosophical use of their physical likeness at beginning and end of their conversation both signals the interrelationship between the dialogue's form and content, and exemplifies an intellectual movement away from the material / sensible / somatic world towards the abstract world of Socratic philosophy.

[37] Cf. Sayre 1995: 200.

[38] The image of the mirror, implied here, also occurs twice on the discursive level (193c, 206d; cf. *Soph.* 239d–240a and below, pp. 285–6).

Physical appearance is, of course, strictly irrelevant to philosophical ability, but this very fact gives Sokrates' notoriously peculiar appearance totemic importance for Plato (above, pp. 70–74). As every reader of *Symposium* knows, his comical outward appearance conceals an extraordinary interior that makes him truly beautiful, and thus an object of desire (*Symp*. 210b). In *Theaetetus*, Plato hints at this by making Sokrates tacitly liken himself to Helen, the type and paragon of erotic beauty (183e).[39] The inner beauty of Theaitetos is marked more explicitly (185e; cf. 194bc). As with Sokrates himself, the boy's intellectual and moral quality, his beauty and nobility of soul, shine forth from a body whose ugliness symbolically guarantees their authenticity (cf. 144e). If Sokrates can learn about himself by scrutinizing Theaitetos (144d), the reverse is presumably also true.

The physical resemblance between Sokrates and Theaitetos betokens many other similarities of character and circumstances. Several of these are indicated in the dramatic frame in which Terpsion and Eukleides exchange news of him as an adult. Theaitetos' courage in battle on behalf of Athens (142b; cf. 144a) evokes Sokrates' military courage, so often emphasized by Plato. And the ailing Theaitetos' eagerness to return to Athens – presumably in order to die there – recalls Sokrates' devotion to his native city (cf. 143d). The suggestion that there is some kind of parallel between their deaths is reinforced by the way Eukleides, when speaking of Theaitetos' death, links it with that of Sokrates (142c).[40] Theaitetos' straitened material circumstances provide a further Socratic touch (144cd; cf. 184c).

Theaitetos is also marked in various ways as a kind of alter Sokrates intellectually. The fact that Theodoros recommends him to Sokrates in the first place suggests a pre-existing intellectual affinity (cf. 144d–45b).[41] This is corroborated by what we hear of his past. Theaitetos has already achieved marked mathematical success in collaboration with a young friend, who is also present at this conversation, and whose name just happens to be Sokrates (147d1).[42] Prima facie, we should expect this homonymy to be significant. Greek culture attached great significance

[39] Cf. Benardete 1984: I.142. The distinction between beauty and ugliness, both physical and moral, is also thematic on the discursive level (cf. 186a, 189c, 190bc, 194c, 195c, 209e; Burnyeat 1990: 80–83).

[40] Note that Eukleides and Terpsion are among those present at Sokrates' death (*Phd*. 59c).

[41] Theodoros is wrong about Theaitetos' ugliness (185e), but his assessment of the boy's intellectual capacity will be tested and affirmed by Sokrates (e.g. 148bcd, 155d), and borne out by Theaitetos' own behavior.

[42] On this character, a member of the Academy who may still have been alive when Plato wrote *Tht*., see Skemp 1952: 25–6; Guthrie 1975: 63–4; Miller 1980: 5; Jatakari 1990.

to verbal similarities, which were often presented as imaging a more profound resemblance (cf. e.g. *Tht.* 194c9). Boys were often given the name of their father, or more often a grandfather, "to cause the grandfather's virtues to be reborn in the grandson."[43] And in *Statesman*, Sokrates observes that he and young Sokrates share a kinship (*oikeiotēs*) on account of their names. This passage, which alludes clearly to *Theaetetus* (257c), and another from *Sophist*, where young Sokrates takes over Theaitetos' role (218b), draw attention to the kinship linking all three characters. It therefore seems plausible to view young Sokrates in *Theaetetus* as some kind of stand-in for *the* Sokrates. I suggest that he signifies Theaitetos' natural capacity for Socratic dialectic.[44] His dramatic role thus resembles that of Pylades in Aeschylus' *Libation Bearers*, Orestes' silent companion who speaks only once and represents a vital strand of the hero's own motivation. In addition, young Sokrates' silent presence at Theaitetos' conversation with *the* Sokrates signifies continuity between the present conversation and Theaitetos' previous efforts – a continuity to which Theaitetos himself draws attention (147cd). Theaitetos has brought his Socratic tendencies along with him to the next stage of his education.

Before ever encountering Sokrates, then, Theaitetos has successfully been practising a form of cooperative inquiry with a kind of personal Sokrates-substitute, showing that such inquiry may produce valuable results even in the hands of two young and inexperienced people. Given the strong resemblance between Theaitetos and the adult Sokrates, his relationship to young Sokrates becomes not only, as Friedländer calls it "a kind of youthful, natural prefiguration of the true Socratic dialogue,"[45] but also a kind of embryonic self-dialogue of two embryonic Sokrateses. We are challenged to believe that Sokrates is not after all unique, that two non-Sokrateses may eventually turn out to be Sokrates replicants and assist each other's philosophical progress on an equal footing. A native talent for Socratic behavior, plus a like-minded companion, may perhaps render Sokrates himself redundant. Paradoxically, this is a hopeful

[43] Sulzberger 1926: 419–20; cf. Alford 1987: 74–8. For Greek examples of homonymy showing kinship and solidarity see Hirzel 1918: 30–35.

[44] Jatakari 1990 argues that young Sokrates is a fictional character to be identified with Plato himself. Dorter sees young Sokrates and Theaitetos as representing Sokrates' name and his appearance respectively, and thus standing for constancy and change (1994: 95–6). According to Lee, young Sokrates and Theaitetos are both projections of Sokrates himself: young Sokrates represents Sokrates' body, as opposed to both his mind (represented by Sokrates) and his perceptive self or "mind-in-body" (represented by Theaitetos) (unpublished: 26–31).

[45] 1964–9: III.153.

message, since it challenges the uniqueness of Sokrates with its tragic implications for the future of philosophy after his death.

No sooner is Sokrates' uniqueness so challenged, however, than it is reasserted by Theaitetos' failure to progress with his personal inquiries into knowledge (as opposed to mathematics) until he makes direct contact with the adult Sokrates (148e). These earlier attempts were apparently conducted on his own, spurred by reports of Sokrates' discourse (*logoi*, 148e). Such hearsay is evidently no substitute for personal contact. But it does prompt Theaitetos to try to do as Sokrates does on his own initiative, thus "imitating" him in an active, structural fashion (above, pp. 102–3). Nor were Theaitetos' solo efforts entirely futile, since they induced the "labor pains" that Sokrates equates with healthy *aporia*.[46] Moreover the fact that the dialogue as a whole fails to produce positive results suggests that the difference between this Socratic conversation and Theaitetos' previous efforts is one of degree, rather than kind. *Theaetetus* thus conveys a certain ambivalence regarding the necessity for the adult Sokrates to be physically present if Socratic inquiry is to take place. This exemplifies a larger tension in Plato's works generally: can the absent Sokrates be an effective presence in Plato's texts, and if so, how? Theaitetos' predicament is also that of Plato's readers, who can only make contact with Sokrates through reports of his *logoi*, including, of course, *Theaetetus* itself.

The pre-existing intellectual kinship with Sokrates suggested by Theaitetos' prior history is confirmed by the way his character is presented within the dialogue. Like Sokrates, he is friendly and cooperative from the outset, starts with no pretensions to knowledge and admits his own ignorance (148b). He shares Sokrates' superior memory (144a, 208c), his sense of *aporia* (above, n. 1), and his concern with intellectual consistency (154cde; cf. 186d). He allies himself with Sokrates' call for arguments based on more than plausibility (162e–163a), does not fear embarrassment at being refuted (146c; cf. 151d), and introduces, unprompted, the typically Socratic example of the craft of cobbling (146cd). His mathematical example employs a model of reasoning to which Plato and his Sokrates attach great importance.[47] He is alert to Sokrates' elenctic techniques, and even turns the tables by asking him whether he is saying what he really thinks (157c). His "well-bred" neglect of quibbling distinctions wins Sokrates' approval (184c). And he prompts Sokrates to recall his own principle of philosophical leisure (187d). Even his failure to produce viable offspring gives him a certain likeness to Sokrates, the "barren"

[46] 148e–149a, 151a; cf. Burnyeat 1977a: 11. [47] Cf. 143d, 163a, 173e.

midwife (contrast 150d) – an image that feminizes both of them (below, p. 294). On the other hand, Sokrates' expectation that Theaitetos' growing confidence will produce valuable results of one of two kinds, either positive or aporetic (187bc), tacitly aligns him with the constructive Sokrates as well, despite the latter's "official" absence from this particular text.

A basic harmony also underlies their substantive contributions to the discussion. In general, Sokrates wants, expects and receives Theaitetos' agreement. The boy's vaunted flexibility takes the form of sympathy with a typically Socratic perspective (155e). When Theaitetos suggests the important point that the soul can examine certain topics without the aid of the physical senses, Sokrates says he has done him a favor: this was already his own opinion, but he wanted to win Theaitetos' agreement independently (185e). In another remarkable passage, Theaitetos introduces the idea that knowledge is true belief plus an account (*logos*) as something he once heard from an unnamed person, which is just now coming back to him (201cd). His non-specific attribution of the idea to "someone" recalls the style in which Sokrates elsewhere in Plato often introduces novel or creative ideas.[48] With its mysterious external source, the idea in question betokens an embryonic Socratic imagination. When Sokrates rephrases the idea, he too says he heard it from certain unknown persons, calling his own version "a dream in exchange for a dream" (201d). This striking phrase suggests some kind of mysterious connection or psychological unity between the two co-dreamers.[49] Sure enough, Sokrates' "dream" turns out to be, in Theaitetos' own opinion, "just like" the one he heard himself, and is in fact an elaboration of it.[50]

This unanimity is reinforced by Sokrates' habitual use of the first person plural for the conclusions that he and Theaitetos have reached, even when the arguments have come from Sokrates himself and Theaitetos has simply agreed to them. This is, of course, standard Socratic technique in Plato, but the close identification between these two particular characters makes the device seem less coercive than it often does. Sokrates even holds Theaitetos responsible for wording that he himself has just introduced (184bc). Then, after putting words into Theaitetos' mouth

[48] E.g. *Euthyd.* 290d–91a, *Gorg.* 493a, 524a, *Meno* 81ab, *Phd.* 61d, 108c, *Phileb.* 16c, 20b, *Phdr.* 235bcd, *Symp.* 201d.

[49] Dreams have a mysterious or prophetic air, and as such are linked with the use of "mantic" language at pivotal moments in the dialogues (cf. Miller 1980: 130 n. 47). For other dream images in Plato cf. *Charm.* 173a, *Crat.* 439c, *Phileb.* 20b, *Symp.* 175e, and see further Gallop 1971; Rorty 1973: 229–30; Desjardins 1990: 146–8.

[50] 202c; cf. 164a, 191b, and see Burnyeat 1970: 103, 105–6.

in this fashion, he checks himself, as if to emphasize that his ideas must be understood as belonging equally to Theaitetos: "Perhaps it would be better if you stated the answers yourself, rather than that I should busy myself on your behalf."[51] The moment succeeds in emphasizing their like-mindedness, while simultaneously drawing attention to the fact that it is actually Sokrates who is producing the ideas. Sokrates also repeatedly employs imaginary objectors, which helps to maintain intellectual harmony by projecting any possible disagreements onto absent outsiders.[52] A similar effect is produced by the use of fighting imagery, which serves not to pit the interlocutors against each other but to represent them as united in their confrontation with absent opponents or the recalcitrant *logos*.[53] Sokrates even includes Theaitetos in his customary expressions of ironic self-deprecation, in striking contrast to the usual polarization between Socratic ignorance and the "wisdom" of the elenctic interlocutor (cf. 181b, 197a). The inadequacy of Theodoros, the only other speaker, further cements this special bond of like-mindedness between the two principal characters (cf. 202d and below, pp. 278–80).

Theaitetos is thus represented as significantly similar to Sokrates from many different points of view: physical, circumstantial, intellectual, moral and methodological. Their remarkable resemblance resonates strongly with the notion that like is attracted to like. This idea is an ancient and pervasive one in Greek thought, both popular and philosophical, and appears in a wide range of contexts (e.g. ethical, political, epistemological, scientific).[54] In *Theaetetus* it underlies the peculiar theory of vision articulated by Sokrates (156bc), and also has important pedagogical implications. Sokrates reflects common Greek educational views when he takes it for granted that the Heracliteans desire to make their students "like themselves" (180b). One is attracted to what resembles oneself, and as a result one becomes correspondingly more like it – for better or worse (cf. above, pp. 82–3). On a dramatic level, Plato characterizes the adherents of various philosophical positions in ways that echo their outlooks, suggesting that people are drawn to philosophies that in some

[51] 184e (trans. Levett 1990).

[52] The most striking example is Protagoras redivivus (171cd), but see also 165de, 188d, 195cde, 200abc, 202e, 205e–206b.

[53] E.g. 163c, 164c, 165de, 180e–181a, 191a; cf. 167e–168a, 179d, 180ab, 191bc, 195c, 200c.

[54] See e.g. *Laws* 716cd, 837a, 904e–905a, *Lys.* 214a–d, *Gorg.* 510b, *Rep.* 490b, *Symp.* 195b, *Stat.* 310bcd, *Tim.* 45d, 53a, 80b, 81a–d, 88e, Hom. *Od.* 17.218, Arist. *EE* 1235a5–29, [Xen.] *Ath. Pol.* 3.10; Plut. *Mor.* 51a–52a; further examples in Rankin 1964: 59–60; Lloyd 1966: 270–71, 340, 347, 351; Blundell 1989: 42 n. 82, 1990: 228–9; Price 1989: 9. Cf. also the significance attached to verbal similarities (above, pp. 261–2). "Opposites attract" is also traditional wisdom (cf. Arist. *EN* 1155a32–b8), but receives vastly less emphasis in our sources.

way resemble themselves: "The Heraclitean portrait is . . . a witty matching of the men to their philosophy. So too the materialists at 155e–156a are tough, hard fellows like the bodies they believe in, and the 'One' who is Parmenides has the unruffled composure of his one unchanging reality (183e–184a)."[55] And the Heracliteans are in perpetual motion (179e–180a).

The attraction and assimilation of like to like also underpin the "likeness to god" (ὁμοίωσις θεῷ) towards which the ideal philosopher strives,[56] which depends in turn on keeping the right kind of human company (177a7; cf. 167e–168a). "Likeness to god" is an idealized state of epistemic, ethical and personal self-consistency and stability.[57] Since the aspect of a person that already bears some resemblance to god is the soul, it is this that both strives for and is capable of such assimilation.[58] This is, of course, a form of structural imitation, since a human being cannot take on the superficial attributes of god, or to put it another way, the superficial attributes of humanity (such as whether or not one wears shoes) are inapplicable to divinity as such (unless it is anthropomorphic).[59] Philosophically, this state recalls the One of Parmenides, whose characterization in this dialogue as static and revered suggests an affinity with the philosopher of the digression (177a).[60] The ideal is voiced by Sokrates, who himself shows striking similarities to that philosopher (below, pp. 298–9), and may therefore be envisaged as striving personally towards the abstraction of "likeness to god."

That Sokrates is approaching this condition is suggested playfully through the famous image of the midwife. In this capacity he is said to resemble the goddess Artemis, who "honors" those who are like her.[61]

[55] Burnyeat 1990: 47. For the Heracliteans cf. Branham 1989: 72. Cf. also the characterizations of different philosophical types at *Soph.* 242e–243a, 246a–d, and the assimilation of writing style to character at Ar. *Thesm.* 146–71.

[56] 176b; cf. *Rep.* 613ab, *Laws* 716cd, 904d–905a, *Phdr.* 248a, 252d–253c, *Tim.* 29e–30c.

[57] For the association of self-sufficiency, simplicity, stability, and consistency with virtue and divinity cf. *Laws* 821b, *Phdr.* 230a, 250bc, *Phileb.* 33b, 59c–60c, *Rep.* 380c–383c, 431bc, 500bcd, 590d, *Stat.* 269de, *Tim.* 34ab, 40ab, 42c, 47c, 62e, 68e–69c, 92c, *Phd.* 79d. The combination of self-consistency and the principle of like-to-like also generates self-love (cf. *Tim.* 34b), which is in turn a manifestation of self-sufficiency (see further below, pp. 287–8).

[58] For the soul's kinship with the divine cf. e.g. *Laws* 899b, *Phd.* 79d, 84ab, *Phdr.* 246de, 247d, *Rep.* 589e, 611e, *Stat.* 309c, *Tim.* 41c.

[59] Contrast the declaration of Empedocles, that he has, while still alive as a human being, become a god (DK 31 B112.4).

[60] The Homeric phrase "reverend (*aidoios*) and awe-inspiring (*deinos*)," used for Parmenides at 183e, may also evoke divinity (cf. *Il.* 18.394, 18.425, *Od.* 8.22).

[61] τιμῶσα τὴν αὑτῆς ὁμοιότητα (149bc; cf. *Rep.* 613b). On the appropriateness of Artemis, as a goddess of maturation, for the Socratic enterprise see Howland 1998: 84–6; cf. also Wengert 1988: 6; Polansky 1992: 63.

His work as midwife is carried out at her command and with her help (150cd). In these passages she is not named but referred to simply as "the god," recalling the way in which Sokrates refers to Apollo in *Apology*.[62] But used of Artemis, the masculine gender generalizes her role into that of a non-specific divinity. Later he refers to her just as "god."[63] Rather than identifying this divinity with either Apollo or Artemis, it seems most plausible to view it as an indeterminate divine force,[64] which sanctions the association of like with like through gender symbolism: Sokrates takes care of pregnant boys, his mother of the girls. As such it echoes the indeterminate "god" to whom the philosopher of the digression assimilates himself (176b1). If it seems far-fetched to perceive such a link between the digression, with its elevated, aristocratic rhetoric, and the bizarre image of a seventy-year-old man working as a midwife, we need only think of Alkibiades' assimilation of Sokrates to the vulgarly comic yet divine figure of a satyr (*Symp.* 215a–e).[65]

On the dialogue's discursive level, likeness and identity (especially self-identity), the differences between one person and another and between various embodiments of one person at different times, internal and external agreement and disagreement, are constant preoccupations.[66] Human beings, specifically the dialogue's participants, are often used as examples, raising metaphysical and epistemological issues of self-consistency and identity that complement the methods and goals of Socratic argument.[67] While the dramatis personae concern themselves with ethical and argumentative self-consistency (e.g. 154de, 186d), the reader is invited, through the use of them as examples, to reflect on the interconnections between these kinds of self-consistency and the problems of attributing a stable identity to each speaker. At one end of the spectrum lies the epistemic and argumentative chaos of the Heracliteans, who are said to be utterly incapable of internal consistency (180abc; cf. 157b). At the other lies "likeness to god." The transition from one state to the other can only take place through dialectic.[68] When the orators of the digression submit to such argument they discover that they are at odds

[62] ὁ θεός, 150c8, d4, d8.; cf. e.g. *Ap.* 21e–22a, 23b, 33c. [63] θεός without the article (210c7).

[64] Cf. Campbell 1883: 51 n. 12; Burnyeat 1977a: 16 n. 19; Howland 1998: 82.

[65] In *Symp.* Sokrates is also implicitly (and humorously) likened to the divinity Eros (above, p. 74).

[66] E.g. 154a, 155a, 159a–160b, 166bc, 168a, 178de, 181c–183b, 185abc, 186ab, 188b, 189d–191b, 192d–193e, 209abc. By "internal" and "external" I mean agreement with oneself and others, both of which are fundamental to the operations of the elenctic Sokrates (above, p. 117).

[67] E.g. 159b–160b, 188b, 191b, 192d–193e, 203a–d, 207a–208b, 209abc.

[68] Note that likeness and difference are among the fundamental elements judged by the soul (185b–186b), and the primary material of the true philosopher's dialectic in *Soph.* (253de). Cf. also *Phdr.* 273d, *Tim.* 37ab, 44ab, Desjardins 1990: 72–4.

with themselves in what they are saying.[69] This new self-awareness is a necessary preliminary to self-consistency, a first step on the path towards "likeness to god."

The Heracliteans are not only internally inconsistent but literally incapable of reaching consistent agreement with other people, even those supposedly of their own philosophical persuasion (180a). This follows directly from their lack of epistemic stability and internal consistency. Both these forms of inconsistency have ethical implications, in so far as internal and external harmony are associated with virtue in Plato (and elsewhere), and both are rooted in the same fundamental difficulty. It is human particularity and difference that lead both to failures of like-mindedness or agreement with others (*homologein*), and to the relativism of Sokrates' Protagoras or the epistemic chaos of his Heracliteans. The famous argument that Protagoras' epistemology is self-defeating hinges precisely on failure to reach such agreement (*homologein*).[70] This word and its cognates are frequent in the dialogue, and the thematizing of "likeness" (*homoiotēs*) activates their etymological meaning: to speak, reason, or calculate something alike.[71] This in turn feeds back into the principle that like is attracted to like, with its pedagogical implications. Those who are similar will be attracted to each other (as like to like) and, through the process of discussion/differentiation (*dialegesthai/dialegein*),[72] will reach verbal and intellectual agreement (*homologein*), thus mirroring the internal consistency of the soul that has fostered its divinity to become like god.

The relationship between external and internal consistency may be clarified by looking at a place in the text that clearly links the argumentative and dramatic presentation of these issues. This is the famous passage where Sokrates defines thinking as a dialectical conversation of the mind with itself, in which an opinion is formed when two internal voices agree (189d–190a).[73] The idea that cognitive processes may be understood as an internal dialogue is very ancient and widespread in

[69] οὐκ ἀρέσκουσιν αὑτοὶ αὑτοῖς περὶ ὧν λέγουσι (177b).

[70] Cf. 171a9, b2, b7, b11.

[71] Brandwood 1976 lists forty occurrences. For the calculative aspect of the *log-* root cf. 186a11, c3. Sokrates emphasizes that philosophical agreement should be more than merely verbal (164c).

[72] The two senses of the verb (active and middle) are explicitly linked by Xenophon's Sokrates (*Mem.* 4.5.12).

[73] Cf. also *Soph.* 263e–264a, *Phileb.* 38c–39a. Multiple viewpoints within the soul are emphasized at 189e, which leads into this definition of thinking. The soul can also calculate and compare things within itself (186abc). Its self-sufficiency for this activity is emphasized (185de, 187a). One may also count abstract items within oneself (198c), and this may be a way of "learning from oneself" (198e). Later Sokrates will define speech itself (*logos*) in terms of thought (206d) (see Polansky 1992: 223–4).

Greek, prominent from Homer onwards, and commonplace in the idioms of ordinary language.[74] At 187d7, for example, Sokrates says he is "in two minds" (διστάζων) – a verb that also appears in the definition of thinking as a dialogue in the soul (190a4).[75] This conception of internal processes may plausibly be seen as manifesting a model of the self which sees it as constituted through dialogue with others.[76] It also underlies Aristotle's conception of self-love, which he says is possible only in so far as a person consists of two or more parts.[77]

The close identification between Theaitetos and Sokrates suggests that their conversation may be read as an external representation of this conception of thought as an internal dialogue. A general homology between the internal conversation that is thought and the conversations of Socratic dialectic is suggested by the vocabulary of question and answer used for the soul's internal dialogue, which is also standard language for dialectical exchange (190a).[78] The structural equivalence is also highlighted in other ways. Thus a cluster of words for agreement, referring to the interlocutors themselves, follows immediately after the definition of thinking as an internal dialogue.[79] Sokrates also observes that agreement within the soul may be reached either swiftly or slowly (190a), and this too is exemplified in his conversation with Theaitetos. Both of them are slow at times (cf. 195c), but elsewhere, in a passage where their agreement is strongly marked, Sokrates says the young man's spontaneous understanding obviates the need for a lengthy argument (185e).[80] (It may be significant that this latter passage concerns the nature of the soul.) In a harmonious person, then, the dialogue within the soul will presumably resemble that between Sokrates and Theaitetos: a friendly conversation aiming at a self-consistent set of conclusions. We may contrast the inability of the Heracliteans to reach secure conclusions either in their souls or with each other (180ab) – they cannot participate in dialectic (cf. 161e), or even succeed in thinking.[81]

[74] Cf. e.g. *Ion* 534e2, *Stat.* 278a2, *Laws* 897b4, *Ep. VII* 328b7; numerous literary examples in Pelliccia 1995; Gill 1996a.

[75] Cf. also e.g. *Soph.* 235a2, 236c, *Stat.* 291b8.

[76] Gill 1996a; cf. also Tejera 1997: 72–3.

[77] *EN* 1166a33–1166b1; see further below, pp. 287–8.

[78] Many have pointed out that dialogue form generally may be seen as a representation of the dialogue within the soul. But the likeness between the two dialectical partners gives it special pertinence here.

[79] *homolog-* words appear at 190e6, 191a1, a8, a9, e8, e9.

[80] Contrast the passage where Sokrates imagines a person talking to himself and asking himself questions, and coming up with an answer that differs from that of someone else who has presumably been through the same internal process (196a).

[81] On the impossibility of language and/or rational thought for the Heracliteans see e.g. Desjardins 1990: 95–7.

In this representation of an idealized philosophical relationship, then, Plato ends up suggesting not only that the self is constructed by internalizing our relationship to others, but the converse: that a philosophical conversation with someone outside the self is homologous with the inner processes of the mind. Indeed, it is sometimes unclear from Sokrates' language whether internal or external agreement is at issue – or both. This confusion is exemplified near the beginning of the dialogue, when Sokrates declares that their mutual goal is to look at "our thoughts themselves in relation to themselves, and see what they are – whether, in our opinion, they agree with one another or are entirely at variance."[82] The process for pursuing this aim is one of self-scrutiny, an examination of "what these apparitions (*phasmata*) within us are" (155a). Such scrutiny in this case reveals that three "agreements" are "fighting one other within our soul."[83] Throughout this passage the Greek obscures the distinction between internal and external intellectual agreement.[84]

Ultimately, however, whether agreement is internal or external is irrelevant. In so far as the harmonious internally consistent conclusion is the most rationally viable, such a conclusion will be agreed on both by the parts of one's soul and by the effective philosophical partnership. These two results are mutually reinforcing. The effect is to collapse the interpersonal dimension of dialectic into a conversation with the self. One consequence of this is an erasure of the truly personal in its particularity. Theaitetos' extraordinary resemblance to Sokrates, together with his enthusiasm for Sokrates' methods, suggests that if he proceeds with dialectic he will become more and more closely identified with Sokrates. As a natural Socratic, he is attracted to Sokrates, which will lead to even greater resemblance and eventually to the "likeness to god" that lies just over the horizon for Sokrates himself.[85] If both participants were to attain this goal of "likeness to god," they would become so abstract as to be qualitatively indistinguishable.

DIFFERENCE

In attempting to dramatize a successful and harmonious philosophical interaction, Plato comes close to suggesting that personal difference must

[82] αὐτὰ πρὸς αὑτὰ τί ποτ' ἐστὶν ἃ διανοούμεθα, πότερον ἡμῖν ἀλλήλοις συμφωνεῖ ἢ οὐδ' ὁπωστιοῦν (154e, trans. Levett 1990).

[83] ὁμολογήματα τρία μάχεται αὐτὰ αὑτοῖς ἐν ἡμετέρᾳ ψυχῇ (155b).

[84] Note especially the singular ἡμετέρᾳ ψυχῇ. Although this is standard Greek for "each of our souls" (cf. e.g. *Stat.* 258c7, 278c9), it is grammatically indistinguishable from "our (single) soul."

[85] At one point Sokrates praises Theaitetos' response as "godlike" (154d; cf. also above, pp. 218–19).

be eliminated altogether.[86] To do this, however, would be to remove the dialectical model on offer from the realm of the ordinary human experience of difference, which the dialogue form purports to represent, and in which it is inescapably grounded. As dramatic characters, Theaitetos and Sokrates are not abstractions but concretely imagined persons, necessarily located within, and defined by, specific socio-cultural parameters. In as much as they are not numerically identical, we are obliged to confront them as two distinct individuals, whose particular relationship is defined by the cultural coordinates governing relations between men in classical Athens. Such models of relationship, and Plato's use of them, will inevitably color our reading of the two characters' likeness. As we shall see, they will also feed back into the interpretation of that likeness suggested earlier in this chapter.

The individuation of human beings is a discursive theme of this dialogue, and Theaitetos himself serves as the prime exemplar.[87] How then is he differentiated from Sokrates, whom he so closely resembles? Most obviously, and most importantly, Sokrates is an old man on the verge of death, whereas Theaitetos' youth is emphasized repeatedly. Their other differences – in experience, confidence, philosophical sophistication, and so on – may plausibly be seen as stemming from this age gap. Since a normative homoerotic relationship takes place between an older man and an adolescent,[88] this disparity suggests an obvious model for their intellectual and pedagogical partnership: the philosophical "pederasty" (*paiderastia*) of *Symposium* and elsewhere. Plato leads us to expect this by making Sokrates praises Theaitetos' intellectual "beauty" (185e; cf. 210d). This beauty, along with his youth, identifies Theaitetos as a potential philosophical "beloved" (*erōmenos*) to Sokrates' indefatigable "lover" (*erastēs*).[89] We might therefore expect them to be represented as philosophical lovers and even co-parents of shared intellectual offspring in the manner of *Symposium*,[90] especially considering the recurrence of erotic and reproductive images within the fabric of the argument.[91]

[86] Cf. Dyer 1901: 178–9.

[87] See e.g. Burnyeat 1990: 218–34; Miller 1992: 100–102; and cf. above, p. 267.

[88] See Arist. *EN* 1157a3–8; Dover 1989; Halperin 1990: ch. 1.

[89] Cf. esp. *Charm.* 154de. The mirror image employed by Sokrates (144d) also has erotic overtones (below, pp. 285–6).

[90] In both works the ideas come directly from the mysteriously pregnant male. The main difference is that in *Symp.* the pregnant male is the *erastēs* (tacitly equated with Sokrates, with his interior "marvels" [*agalmata*]), who reproduces in the beloved as medium, whereas in *Tht.* it is the junior partner, who discovers beautiful things within himself (150d), and whose offspring is brought to birth with the help of a third party. See further Burnyeat 1977a: 8–9.

[91] See Desjardins 1990: 37–42, 52–4; Dorter 1994: 76–9, 94–6.

This avenue is foreclosed, however, by the midwife analogy, which Sokrates, notoriously, uses to deny that he is involved with Theaitetos' intellectual "children" in any procreative fashion.[92] He insists on his own infertility, confining his role in the processes of intellectual intercourse and reproduction to that of midwifery. Those who are not already pregnant have no need of his services, so he sends them to wise people like Prodikos for "intercourse" (151b4).[93] The implication is that intellectual "intercourse" with a sophist can lead to pregnancy, and the subsequent argument will suggest that Protagoras, if anyone, is the father of Theaitetos' first child (cf. 152a). This does not exclude others from playing a similarly paternal role: the seed of Theaitetos' mathematical discovery was planted by Theodoros (147d), and later we hear how another conception was initiated by an unnamed person (201c). All these figures stand in evident contrast to the infertile midwife.[94]

Yet the dialogue's linguistic texture suggests that this is not quite the whole story. As we have seen, Theaitetos' previous attempts at inquiry were spurred by reports of Socratic questioning (148e). Sokrates is thus assigned a role in his intellectual development prior to the "midwifery" of the present dialogue – a role that clearly serves as *some* kind of fertilizing stimulus. Within the work itself, the "dream" theory strongly evokes ideas found elsewhere in Plato, especially *Meno*, thus hinting that the mysterious person from whom Theaitetos heard it (201c) may have been Sokrates himself.[95] And though Sokrates qua midwife sometimes serves as matchmaker (149d–150a), in this case it is Theodoros who has identified the mutual compatibility of Sokrates and Theaitetos and brought them together as intellectual partners – a role he will play again in both *Sophist* and *Statesman* (*Soph.* 216a, *Stat.* 257a). This leaves the role of "father" of at least some of Theaitetos' ideas quietly available for Sokrates himself. Furthermore the job of "testing" the "baby" and deciding whether or not to expose it (160e–161a), which has been called

[92] His own *erōs*, so he says, is for the process of argument itself (169c; cf. 146a6 and above, p. 107).

[93] His term is συγγίγνομαι, which, along with related words (esp. σύνειμι, συνουσία) can have both social and/or sexual meanings in ordinary Greek (see Robb 1993), an ambiguity often exploited by Plato (cf. 149d7, 182b5, *Ep. VII* 341c; Halperin 1986: 78 n. 59). Compare also Sokrates' use of μίγνυμι ("mingle"), which is often sexual in meaning (cf. e.g. *Laws* 930d, *Rep.* 490b, *Stat.* 265e, *Symp.* 207b9), for his encounters with both Parmenides (183e7) and Theaitetos (*Stat.* 258a4).

[94] At the end of the dialogue Sokrates mentions that Theaitetos may "*try* to become pregnant" again (210bc). This leaves open the mechanism for such an occurrence, suggesting that it is to some extent up to the boy himself, but without excluding the possibility that he might consort with others in order to reconceive.

[95] So e.g. Koyré 1945: 44. For links between *Tht.* and *Meno* see Burnyeat 1977a: 9–10, 1990: 235–6; Desjardins 1990: passim; Dorter 1994: 70–72.

"Sokrates' most important task, and one that has no analogue in ordinary midwifery,"[96] is one that in Athenian life belonged not to the midwife or the child's mother, but to the father.[97] Sokrates even suggests that after delivery the "mother" of the idea should remain in his company in order to make sure that the child is properly brought up. This tacitly assigns a continuing quasi-parental role to himself, in contrast to the sophists, whose neglect causes the "mother" to miscarry or the "baby" to perish (150e; cf. 149e). By the end of the dialogue, he has shifted his talk of pregnancy into the first person plural: "Are *we* still pregnant and in labor, my friend, concerning knowledge, or have *we* given birth to everything?" (210b). And Theaitetos replies that he has given birth to *more than was within him*, on account of Sokrates (210b).

The distinction between co-parent and midwife is further blurred by Sokrates' use of the language of "intercourse" for his maieutic activities (150d–151a). According to Eukleides' account in the prologue, his praise for Theaitetos' *phusis* was voiced after spending time with him in dialectical intercourse.[98] This is the "intercourse" dramatized in the central portion of the work, which enables Theaitetos to "give birth" to various concepts. When "Protagoras" alludes to the dangers of the wrong kind of intellectual "intercourse," it is unclear whether this refers to the role of a co-parent or a midwife.[99] But when he ties his remarks explicitly to Sokrates, his language becomes transparently erotic: the proper kind of "intercourse" with the young will lead them to "pursue and love" Sokrates (διώξονται καὶ φιλήσουσιν), and at the same time flee from themselves towards philosophy (168ab). In this passage Sokrates is implicitly equated with philosophy itself, and in the process becomes the dialectical object of desire. The equivalence is reinforced by a verbal echo in the digression, where "likeness to god" is defined as "fleeing" from the mortal world towards wisdom and virtue (176a). This strengthens the equation of Sokrates both with philosophy and with divinity itself. Such passages blur the lines between Sokrates and philosophy as objects of desire, and between Sokrates and others (particularly the sophists) as both impregnators and midwives for the young. The effect is to equate Sokrates with philosophy, and to credit him as a seminal producer of ideas, while simultaneously denying all this through the evasive metaphor of the midwife.

[96] Burnyeat 1977a: 8.

[97] At 160e–161a Sokrates collapses this stage in the birth process with the ceremony of the Amphidromia, which also involves paternal acceptance of the child into the family; note, however, that the midwife was often the *agent* of exposure (see further Garland 1990: 89–90, 93–4; Golden 1990: 23, 94).

[98] συγγενόμενός τε καὶ διαλεχθείς (142c; cf. 143d8).

[99] 168a1; cf. 150e5, 177a7.

These repeated hints at a more productive role for Sokrates chime with the inescapable fact that, despite his own disclaimers, he is in fact the source of most of the substantive ideas in the dialogue, whether in *propria persona* or by ventriloquating others. Like the constructive Sokrates of *Republic* Books 2–10, he often speaks in a didactic or expository manner,[100] and both he and Theaitetos accept that the latter's role is to follow wherever he leads.[101] The derivation of Protagoras' views from Theaitetos seems like an elenctic figleaf to disguise the fact that Sokrates is in fact critiquing a widespread and influential point of view on its own merits in a manner that parallels *Republic* 2–10.[102] He even, in the digression, provides a positive account of wisdom and virtue (176c),[103] in striking contrast to the midwife analogy, with its denial of his own intellectual productivity. The reader may therefore sympathize with Theaitetos' inability to tell whether Sokrates is actually voicing his own opinions, and need to be reminded of the "midwife's" purported barrenness (157c). We may also sympathize with Theodoros' view of Sokrates as a "bag of arguments" (161a), given his ability to pick out the views of Protagoras, the Heracliteans, and others one by one for refutation.

Why, then, is Plato at such pains to deny Sokrates' evident intellectual fertility? No doubt this is one way of attempting to negotiate the tension between the elenctic Sokrates, who claims not to know anything, and his constructive counterpart who is bursting with substantive theories – two avatars of Sokrates represented here in a slightly uneasy alliance. It also enables Plato to avoid attributing to Sokrates an authoritarian, or sophistic, mode of pedagogy. And it clearly serves to eschew Socratic responsibility for Alkibiades and his ilk. The midwife metaphor enables Sokrates to acknowledge some kind of educational involvement with the young of Athens, while denying responsibility for both their ideas and their behavior. The emphasis on Theaitetos' ideal character is also important in this regard. Plato uses it to make clear that Sokrates cannot control the raw nature that fits a young person for philosophy: such a *phusis* must pre-exist before effective Socratic pedagogy can even begin (cf. 143de).

[100] E.g. 152d, 156a, c, 158b, e, 164a, d, 191a5–6, 192d3, e2, 198a4–5.

[101] E.g. 185d4, 192c8, d2.

[102] Burnyeat thinks "the discussion in Parts II and III makes no pretence to exemplify Socrates' art of midwifery" (1977a: 8). If so, Sokrates' "fertile" role is all the more obvious. But continuing reminders of the midwife metaphor (157cd, 160c–161a, 184ab, 187ab, 210bcd) suggest that the whole conversation should be construed as the delivery and testing of Theaitetos' ideas.

[103] This important point is noted by Friedländer 1964–9: III.188–9; Rue 1993: 81.

So there are several possible reasons for Plato to elide Sokrates' potentially erotic relationship with Theaitetos in favor of the model of the infertile midwife. To these I would add one more, which may perhaps be less obvious, but helps to make sense of the distinctive likeness to Sokrates that Theaitetos shares with no other Platonic character.[104] The kind of relationship most strongly suggested by their physical resemblance, combined with the large age difference between them, is, of course, parenthood. Even the fact that Theaitetos has Sokrates' distinctive features to a lesser degree (143e) suggests that he is an immature version of Sokrates. In ancient Greece it was routinely expected, or at least hoped, that children would resemble their parents, and in particular that a son would resemble his father.[105] This is connected with the commonplace in Greek ethics (both popular and philosophical) that a child is not just a product, but a part or extension of the parental self. This means that a child simultaneously is and is not identical with its parent.[106] In *Theaetetus*, the expectation and implications of father-son resemblance are activated by Sokrates at the outset, when he observes that Theaitetos resembles his (biological) father Euphronios in character (144cd). This invites us to speculate on the symbolic meaning of his resemblance to Sokrates, which, as we have seen, extends not only to moral and intellectual character, but to the physical appearance that would normally be expected to link him to his biological father. We may compare Sophocles' *Philoctetes*, where Achilles' son Neoptolemos is described as indistinguishable from his father in appearance – a resemblance that focuses the larger issue of whether he will live up to him in character, and if so how.[107] I suggest, then, that Sokrates is presented as the symbolic father not of the ideas under scrutiny, but of Theaitetos himself.

More than one of Plato's characters refers to the founder of his own special expertise as a "forefather" (above, p. 134 n. 119). By tracing his own lineage to his mother, with no mention of a father (149a), Sokrates posits himself similarly as the founding "forefather" of philosophy. In order to fill this role, however, he must function successfully as a "father" of future philosophers, of whom Theaitetos might possibly

[104] At *Symp.* 192a5 Aristophanes uses "like to like" in a homoerotic context, but the point here is simply that male is attracted to male.

[105] Such resemblance was seen as a sign of a stable social and familial order (see Theophr. *Char.* 5.5, Hesiod *WD* 235 [with West 1978 ad loc.]; Loraux 1993: 209). Cf. also *Lach.* 181a, *Laws* 775de, *Euthyd.* 298e, *Meno* 93b–95e, *Prot.* 319eb, *Parm.* 126c, *Stat.* 307e, Hom. *Il.* 5.800–813, *Od.* 1.206–9, 4.141–50, 14.175–7, Soph. *OT* 740–43, *Aj.* 462–5, Eur. *Helen* 940–3.

[106] See further Blundell 1990.

[107] *Phil.* 356–8; see further Blundell 1988.

be one. Only thus can the philosophical enterprise produce results extending beyond its founder's death. In *Theaetetus,* this kind of concern about the future is signalled not only by the frame conversation – which takes place many years later – and the allusions to the death of Sokrates, but also by Sokrates' concern with Theaitetos' intellectual growth (below, p. 281), which may be construed as a search for his own philosophical heir. A procreative model for philosophical pedagogy in general is implied during the discussion of the Heracliteans. Sokrates suggests that these people save their teaching for their followers, whom they wish to make in their own likeness, and Theodoros dismisses the idea by saying they are not each other's students, but "spring up" randomly of their own accord, i.e. without intellectual parentage.[108] The implication is that self-reproduction in one's followers is the "natural" educational norm, violated by the fantastically anti-philosophical Heracliteans. This model is used explicitly in the dramatically linked dialogue *Sophist*, when the Eleatic visitor refers to Parmenides as his "father" (below, p. 320).

As Sokrates' younger self and philosophical offspring, Theaitetos is also his heir, and thus a potential link in a chain connecting him to future generations. This is suggested by the way Sokrates meets Theaitetos just before his own death, and "prophesies" the youth's future success, as if passing on the philosophical torch (142c).[109] As we have seen, Plato plays briefly with this kind of idea in *Republic*, where Sokrates "adopts" Polemarchos from Kephalos, and enlists him in the traditional son's role of fighting his father's battles (above, p. 177). Similarly, the present dialogue suggests that in Theaitetos we have a potential Sokrates for the future, who may carry on his struggle on behalf of philosophy. In this case, however, the process of Socratic "adoption" is aligned with "natural" inheritance by the emphasis on Theaitetos' pre-existing Socratic nature and physique. In his "paternal" role, Sokrates is taking a "naturally" Socratic child, who has already shown a tendency towards actively Socratic behavior, and educating him to resemble his adoptive "father" in occupation, as well as looks and character, just as Athenian fathers regularly passed on their own trade to their sons.[110] Nature, training, and practice are thus brought to bear on his formation as a future Sokrates (cf. *Meno* 70a). This has optimistic implications for the future of Socratic philosophy. If others besides Sokrates have the potential to

[108] αὐτόματοι ἀναφύονται ὁπόθεν ἂν τύχῃ ἕκαστος αὐτῶν (180c).

[109] For the prophetic powers of those on the verge of death see above, p. 170 n. 24. For Sokrates as prophet cf. *Phdr.* 242c, 278e–279a; see also Howland 1998: 45, and above, n. 49.

[110] Cf. *Prot.* 328a; Burford 1972: 82–7; and above, p. 95 n. 209.

philosophize, a potential that may perhaps be realized through interaction with other offspring or avatars of *the* Sokrates, then the Socratic legacy may be transmitted indefinitely to equally extraordinary natures in future generations.

Plato thus uses Theaitetos to assert dramatically that though Sokrates is dead, Sokrates lives. At one point, Sokrates even hints that Theaitetos might one day surpass him. As a mere boy, Theaitetos is currently shorter than Sokrates, but he may grow "bigger" than him, without any loss to Sokrates himself (155b). This image suggests that the dialogue may be read, like Sophocles' *Philoctetes*, as a kind of coming-of-age drama. Like Neoptolemos in Sophocles' tragedy, Theaitetos has an admirable nature (*phusis*) derived from superior ancestry, but his biological father has died, he has fallen into the hands of dubious guardians, and he has reached an educational crossroads. Both young men have an absent (dead) biological father, of whose material inheritance they have been deprived – Neoptolemos of his father's weapons, and Theaitetos of his father's wealth or "substance" (144d).[111] And for both of them this symbolizes a threat to their moral inheritance as adult men. Both are exposed in the course of the drama to a pair of competing father-substitutes, who may or may not succeed in helping them to develop the potential inherent in their superior *phusis*. And both meet one of these potential father figures when they have already started to be shaped by the other, at a moment when they require a new influence to usher them into adult independence. In the case of Neoptolemos, these competing father-figures are Philoktetes and Odysseus. In Plato's drama, they are Sokrates and Theodoros.

Unlike Sokrates, Theodoros is not an Athenian but a Greek from Cyrene in North Africa (143d). Like the sophists, and the metics of *Republic* Book 1, he is a foreigner, unengaged with the political life of Athens. He is one of many intellectuals attracted to Athens from elsewhere, embedded in Athenian culture not through citizenship, but through his popularity as an educator. Like the sophists and Sokrates himself, he is one of those adult men around whom Athenian youths are eager to gather for intellectual "intercourse" (143de). He is praised not only as a mathematician, but as multi-talented. His skills include geometry, astronomy, calculation, harmony, music and literature (*mousikē*), and "everything

[111] As critics have noticed, the word "substance" (*ousia*) suggests that Theaitetos' psychological as well as his material inheritance may be at stake (see esp. Benitez and Guimaraes 1993: 308–9). On Soph. *Phil.* see Blundell 1988, 1989: ch. 6.

to do with education" (*paideia*).[112] He is also familiar with the teaching of Protagoras (162e), with Homer (170e), and with myth (169ab). Though his exact age is uncertain, he is probably a few years younger than Sokrates. For the purposes of the dialogue, however, he and Sokrates are both presented as old men, and thus equivalent in authority and status. And in relation to Theaitetos they start out on an equal footing: Sokrates assures the boy that both will do their best to correct him (146c).

In the event, however, this role belongs exclusively to Sokrates. Theodoros is able to serve as matchmaker, and perhaps even impregnator, but takes no part in the birth or testing of Theaitetos' ideas. His inadequacy as an adoptive intellectual parent or guardian for the orphaned Theaitetos is indicated through his relationship to the intellectual "orphan" of Protagoras, which he is both unwilling and unable to defend (164e–165a). Pleading that he turned too soon from "pure argument" (*psiloi logoi*) to the study of geometry, he proposes Theaitetos as a respondent in his place (165ab). This marks the boy's conversation with Sokrates as a step beyond Theodoros and his teachings, and specifically beyond mathematics. Theodoros covers the range of propaedeutic studies prescribed for the young guardians of *Republic*, but has not reached the synoptic vision essential for dialectic.

In contrast to Theaitetos' precocious promise, Theodoros is marked in numerous ways as a Socratic failure.[113] Fighting imagery is used to mark his relationship to Sokrates as a confrontational one (169abc, 183d), as opposed to the latter's close alliance with Theaitetos (above, p. 265). He also expects Sokrates to be annoyed at an insinuation of ugliness (143e), apparently unaware of the philosophical irrelevance of physical appearance. Immediately after praising Theaitetos' powers of memory, he shows the weakness of his own, in contrast to that of Sokrates (144ab).[114] And in contrast to Theaitetos' docility, he declines, initially, to serve as an interlocutor (146b). Sokrates does make a certain amount of headway with him, eventually getting him into the role of respondent, and engaging his interest through the digression (cf. 181b8).[115] But when he grudgingly agrees to participate, it is only to a limited exent (169c), and he quits as soon as possible (183c). He is weak in defensive argument, and in attack is nothing but a yes-man. He prefers the digression to the cut and thrust

[112] 143de, 145a, cd, 169a. On the historical Theodoros see Skemp 1952: 23–4; Vlastos 1991: 274.

[113] Cf. Miller 1986: 22–3. On the tension between Sokrates and Theodoros see Benitez 1996: 29–31; Miller 1980: 3–5, 8–10 (though it should not be exaggerated). For a more positive view of his role see Friedländer 1964–9: III.151, 161, 164.

[114] McPherran 1993a: 321–2.

[115] Cf. Klein 1965: 28–9, 1977: 107–8, 113.

of real argument (177c; cf. 176a), without seeming to understand that dialectic is the path to the life it eulogizes.

Sokrates purports to view Theodoros as a potential source of learning for himself, positioning him as an "expert" in the way that so often precedes a Socratic debunking (145d), and praises him as a lover of *logoi* (161ab). But the larger context undercuts both compliments.[116] In another apparent compliment, Sokrates says that Theodoros does not have the character (*tropos*) of someone "childish" or "playful" (145bc). But this seriousness is not necessarily to his credit, since an element of play is essential to the Socratic philosopher.[117] In the digression, the brave man who undertakes dialectic will come to seem no different from a child (177b). To be sure, Theodoros is also childlike, but not in an appropriately Socratic fashion (cf. 169cd). He is further infantilized by his reduction in the course of the dialogue from respected teacher to inadequate student, in counterpoint to the maturation of Theaitetos. He tries to avoid answering Sokrates, substituting Theaitetos in his place and deferring to the boy's responses.[118] He shirks the responsibility of his age and promotes Theaitetos to the role of intellectual "elder" by declaring that the latter can do better at argument than numerous long-bearded adults (168cde). He even seems inferior to his students in mathematical skill (above, p. 257).

This emphasis on age, and age-appropriate behavior, is reinforced by the imagery of physical exertion, especially wrestling, that runs through the dialogue.[119] Theodoros likens Sokrates' dialectical "wrestling" to that of the monstrous villains Skiron and Antaios (169ab), and uses the metaphor of a wrestling-match to excuse himself from participation. He argues that he is too old and stiff to be "dragged" into the ring (162b), resisting dialectical compulsion in language that anticipates the orator of the digression (above, p. 253). He is embarrassed to take a "fall" (165ab; cf. 151d), treating dialectic as an eristic struggle in which his personal vanity is at stake. Neither Theaitetos nor Sokrates, by contrast, suffers from such embarrassment (146c, 151d). Sokrates, in particular, has a passionate appetite for bouts of argument, no matter how often he is defeated.[120] Plato does not, of course, choose to dramatize any such defeats. But Sokrates claims he has often endured them, at the hands

[116] In the latter passage, Theodoros has misunderstood Sokrates' account of his own dialectical role (cf. 165a, 177c, and above, pp. 169–71).
[117] Cf. e.g. 146a, 168cde, 181a; see further Polansky 1992: 44–5 and above, p. 70.
[118] 165ab; cf. 146b, 162bc.
[119] See Hermann 1995.
[120] 169bc; cf. 180e–181a, 183d, 190e–191a.

of a dialectical Theseus or Herakles – the heroes who conquered the monsters to which Theodoros has just likened him (169ab). He thus reinstates dialectical wrestling as the noble art of heroes, but one in which "defeat" and even monstrousness are, paradoxically, no disgrace. Despite his advanced age, Sokrates approaches such "wrestling" like the young and vigorous Theaitetos, rather than the stiff old Theodoros, presenting, as usual, a living illustration that age per se is no disqualification for dialectic. In complementary fashion, Theaitetos – like the precocious youthful Sokrates of *Parmenides* – displays a wisdom beyond his years. When Theodoros yields to the young Theaitetos, Sokrates returns to the latter, calling him "wise" – a condition that is supposed to belong to the old.[121] Philosophical maturity, with the proper admixture of "childishness" or play, transcends age and its limitations at both ends of the spectrum.

After serving his time as interlocutor, Theodoros is only too eager to bow out. Like Kephalos abdicating to his younger "heir," he orders Theaitetos to return to the role of respondent (183cd; cf. *Rep.* 331d). When Theaitetos reminds him that they have not completed this part of the inquiry, Theodoros mockingly exerts the authority of age, chastising the youth for "teaching" his elders to violate their agreements (183d). But this is precisely the charge that Theaitetos is bringing against Theodoros himself – that he has violated his own agreement – and the latter does nothing to answer this challenge to his integrity. His appeal to the authority of age is thus vitiated by his failure to live up to its responsibilities. (Theaitetos, by contrast, abides by his initial agreement made at 145c.) Unlike Kephalos, Theodoros does not actually leave the gathering, but he does depart from the conversation. We shall not hear from him again. Just as Odysseus successfully influences Neoptolemos early in *Philoctetes*, but is ignominiously dismissed before its end, so Theodoros exerts an important early influence on Theaitetos, but is silenced two thirds of the way through the dialogue, defeated by his rival for the position of surrogate father.

The parallels between Theodoros and both Kephalos and Odysseus should not be pressed, however. Kephalos' positive qualities as a paternal figure were confined to the limited benefits derived from absorbing traditional attitudes towards justice. He displayed no intellectual potential whatsoever. Theodoros is several steps ahead of him philosophically. He stays in the conversation much longer, as both participant and listener,

[121] 162c; cf. 168e, 202d.

and is an expert in the propaedeutic studies. As for Odysseus, he is presented by Sophocles only as a bad influence on Neoptolemos, which threatens to derail the latter from the fulfilment of the heroic potential signified by his Achillean inheritance. Theodoros, by contrast, represents a valuable and indeed necessary stage in the education of the truly philosophical nature. Nevertheless, it is a stage that must be left behind if that nature is to reach its full potential.

This reading of *Theaetetus* as a coming-of-age drama is reinforced by its concern with the transition to adult manhood, as expressed both by "Protagoras" and by Sokrates himself (168b1–2, 173ab). The same kind of concern underlies the emphasis, noted earlier, on the ability of the young to progress under Sokrates' influence. Such progress is not easy: the ability to reason about abstractions is something developed with difficulty, over time and through education (186bc). It even requires divine favor (150d). But it is not impossible. Early in the discussion, when Theaitetos is discouraged by his inability to discover by himself what knowledge is, Sokrates heartens him by suggesting that he already has a potential setting him apart from the other boys, which will be fully realized only in his prime (148c). As the conversation proceeds, Sokrates attributes Theaitetos' present uncertainty to his youth, and explicitly concerns himself with the boy's growth.[122] The opening conversation gives us further reason for optimism about Theaitetos' future, for he is eulogized at the time of his death, when he is well past the age of "youth."[123] And we are reassured that Sokrates' "prophecy" of his future excellence was not misplaced (142d).

This optimism about Theaitetos' potential for intellectual growth is not merely asserted, but dramatized. His conversation with Sokrates takes him on an educational journey requiring a progressively more sophisticated level of understanding and intellectual engagement.[124] His memory also improves as he goes along.[125] And like Neoptolemos in Sophocles' play, he becomes progressively more assertive as his youthful

122 162d, 163c, 187b, 189d.

123 He probably died in 369 BCE, i.e. at about the age of forty-five (see Guthrie 1978: 63 and cf. below, p. 304). He thus attains the age of an "elder" (*presbutēs*) but not that of an "old man" (*gerōn*). On these age categories see above, p. 213 n. 163.

124 Burnyeat instructs the reader, "Your task in Part I is to *find* the meaning in the text and follow the argument to a satisfactory conclusion. In Part II you are challenged to *respond* to the meaning in the text by overcoming the problems and paradoxes that it leaves unresolved. In Part III the task is nothing less than to *create* from the text a meaning which will solve the problem of knowledge" (1990: xii–xiii). He further suggests that Part I of his own discussion is aimed at undergraduates, Part II to graduate students, and Part III to colleagues (1990: xii).

125 Cf. 144a7, 157c7, 197a8, 201c, 205c, 207de, 208c, 209e.

hesitation is overcome. This increasing boldness is encouraged and applauded by Sokrates.[126] Shortly after Theodoros has been silenced, Sokrates praises the boy's increasing confidence, as boding well for the future (187bc). During the progress of this argument Theaitetos takes an active role, in particular by producing a characteristically Platonic supporting example to reinforce his agreement with Sokrates. At this, Sokrates comments on Theaitetos' lack of awe for him (189cd). Although he speaks here in a teasing vein, drawing attention to an oxymoron in Theaitetos' language, the comment suggests that the boy is progressing towards argument on an equal footing with Sokrates himself (who stands in awe, of course, of no-one). This impression is confirmed when Sokrates refrains from challenging his paradoxical language, so as not to undermine his confidence (189d). Part of Sokrates' role, it seems, is to overcome Theaitetos' youthful bashfulness and shape his development as a good father might be expected to do.[127] He ends the dialogue by commenting on the boy's progress and planning to resume the following day (210bc).

Theaitetos' specially intimate relationship with Sokrates, together with these signs of growth under his influence, help to position him as Sokrates' rightful heir, his hope for the future of dialectic. The nature and significance of this relationship may be further clarified by looking at both Sokrates and Theodoros in relation to their own intellectual forebears. Theodoros' "teacher" from the previous generation was Protagoras, to whom he shows a strong personal allegiance (179a; cf. 171c11).[128] But it was Parmenides who influenced the youthful Sokrates (183e–184a). Sokrates implies a quasi-filial relationship towards the aged Parmenides, together with a suitably filial respect, by describing him in the words used by Helen in the *Iliad* to her father-in-law Priam, king of Troy. Like Priam, Parmenides is "reverend and awe-inspiring" (183e; cf. 181b).[129]

[126] 141e, 145c5, 151e, 157d, 200c, 203e, 204b, 205a.

[127] In Athenian culture education was generally viewed as the province of the father, in complement to the nurturing role of the mother (Golden 1990: 103; cf. *Soph.* 229e–230a).

[128] See further below, pp. 286–7. Protagoras was some twenty years older than Sokrates. One might expect Theodoros' outlook, qua mathematician, to be very different from that of Protagoras. But he is unable to see anything wrong with the Protagorean definition of knowledge (161a), and his outlook can be linked with Protagoreanism in various ways, such as his taste for long speeches (cf. 177c) and incapacity for disinterested argument. In a strikingly Protagorean touch, Theodoros claims to rely on persuasion to get out of both wrestling contests and dialectical arguments (162b). Like Theodoros, "Protagoras" is not a playful character (168cd; cf. Lee 1973: 257–8 and above, p. 279), and is sensitive to the embarrassment of being refuted (166a). See further e.g. Miller 1980: 5; Polansky 1992: 72, 110–11, 117–18; Howland 1998: 50–51, 65–75.

[129] At *Parm.* 130e Parmenides addresses Sokrates in a paternalistic tone similar to Sokrates' own manner towards Theaitetos (cf. *Tht.* 162d).

Theaitetos is thus poised not only between two father-figures, but between two intellectual "grandfathers." He has already been influenced by Protagoras, whose works he has read (152a), and whose "orphan" is also his own first "child," as "delivered" by Sokrates. But now he is eager to hear about Parmenides (183cd). We are thus offered two alternative lines of intellectual reproduction: Parmenides–Sokrates–Theaitetos versus Protagoras–Theodoros–Theaitetos.

These two lines of descent are marked by sharply different attitudes towards pedagogy. Theaitetos' description of Theodoros' teaching suggests straightforward demonstration, and within the dialogue, Theodoros seems to endorse an unthinking acceptance of authority.[130] Qua learner, he prefers listening passively to the extended speech of the digression over active participation in argument. Similarly, though familiar with the ideas of his teacher, Protagoras, he is neither willing nor able to engage with them, and for this reason loses his own pedagogical authority over Theaitetos. As for Sokrates, he seems to endorse Theodoros' authoritarianism (146bc), suggesting, perhaps, that this is appropriate to an earlier, more passive stage of the boy's development. But he treats the teachings of his own father-figure as something to be not passively accepted, but examined when they have due leisure (183e–184a). Despite the fact that he declines to undertake this project in the present dialogue, it is clear that Sokrates does not view Parmenides as immune to scrutiny.[131] And he does teach Theaitetos to engage in an active fashion with his other potential "grandfather," Protagoras. He thus intervenes in the passive conveyance of "knowledge" from sophist to impressionable youth, counteracting the paternal authoritarianism of Theodoros' pedagogy. He fosters critical thinking in the young Theaitetos, and explicitly discourages the boy from holding himself in awe (189cd). And though he blames those associates who leave his company too soon, he does so in terms implying that there is a proper time for such independence (150e). So despite his appropriation of the paternal role, Sokrates is not paternalistic in a conventional, authoritarian sense. Rather, he becomes Theaitetos' "father" by eschewing any such role. Paradoxically, it is only by encouraging a *lack* of passive reverence for a father-figure that the irreverent Sokrates can hope to reproduce himself in Theaitetos.

As we have seen, there are risks in encouraging this kind of imitation of Sokrates. Intellectual independence may lead to rejection of the deeper

[130] 147d; cf. 146bc, 162a, 165b.
[131] He will receive such scrutiny at the hands of the Eleatic visitor in *Sophist*, without any hint of Socratic disapproval.

values that Sokrates stands for (above, pp. 104–5). But this danger is short-circuited by the pre-existing likeness between Sokrates and Theaitetos. The independence that Sokrates encourages will develop within a matrix of fundamentally Socratic values. Their likeness also circumvents another kind of risk, which we saw adumbrated in the case of Polemarchos. The power of Sokrates' personality and argumentative skills is such that it may induce over-eager acquiescence in his methods and arguments as opposed to real intellectual independence – a loss as opposed to a development of self. But the fact that Theaitetos already resembles Sokrates in fundamental respects, coupled with his youthful potential for growth, makes his adoption of Socratic values into a form of self-construction. For Theaitetos to become more like Sokrates is to become, paradoxically, more like his "true" self.

The "parental" relationship between Sokrates and Theaitetos is a species of *philia*, a word that is usually translated "friendship," but embraces all kinds of reciprocally beneficial relationships, including family ties and political alliances.[132] Like the erotic model, the parental model of *philia* is normally construed as asymmetrical, and as such accords with the evident differences in age, experience and authority between Sokrates and Theaitetos.[133] But *philia* may also obtain between equals; indeed, this is its most highly idealized form.[134] In contrast to asymmetrical forms of *philia*, the friendship of equals is modelled on the relationship of brothers.[135] It reaches its mythical apotheosis in Castor and Pollux, twin brothers and patrons of aristocratic friendship, each of whom was willing to die for the other, and who ended up eternally united as a pair of stars (the constellation Gemini).[136] The principle that like is attracted to like is often posited as the foundation for such friendship (above, p. 265). Aristotle even says "equality and likeness" *are* friendship (*EN* 1159b2–3). Aristotle's own view of *philia* is distinctive, but it is grounded in the traditional views expressed by the proverbs he cites: a friend is a "second self," and friends share a single soul.[137] These expressions capture the shared identity of

[132] See Connor 1971; Blundell 1989: ch. 2.

[133] The benefits given by the parent – life and nurture – are deemed so great that they can never be fully repaid (cf. Blundell 1989: 40–42).

[134] For the proverb "equality is friendship" see *Arist. EN* 1168b8, *EE* 1240b2, and cf. Eur. *Phoen.* 535–40; Cooper 1980: 307.

[135] Cf. *Rep.* 362d and see Blundell 1989: 42 n. 81. Note that the absence of primogeniture placed brothers on an equal footing in Athenian law.

[136] Burnett 1983: 129; Golden 1990: 115–8.

[137] Arist. *EN* 1166a31–2, 1168b7, 1169b6–7, 1170b6–7, *EE* 1240b1–7, 1245a29–35. For further examples see Blundell 1989: 40 n. 66; Price 1989: 110.

two friends, just as the idiom of the divided soul (discussed above) conveys the possibility of internal divisions that should be resolved in harmony. In an ideal friendship, both these criteria will be met.

Aristotle grounds fraternal *philia* in the many sources of likeness between brothers: likeness of origin, blood, age, character, upbringing and education; this makes it an extreme case of the *philia* of "comrades" (*hetairoi*).[138] This word is often used for groups of "friends" (*philoi*) outside the family, whether social, political or philosophical. Thus in *Theaetetus* the followers of Heraclitus are called his "comrades,"[139] as are Theaitetos' age-mates.[140] Protagoras is a "comrade" of Theodoros,[141] and Theodoros of Sokrates.[142] The word is not confined to age-mates, but it does suggests a relationship of peers – brotherhood or comradeship – rather than a hierarchical dyad.[143] It may therefore be significant that with one exception (149a7), Sokrates addresses Theaitetos as "comrade" only in the final pages of the dialogue, and then does so repeatedly.[144] Such a shift in usage may give further credence to the notion that Theaitetos is growing towards a relationship of greater equality with Sokrates.

This offers us a third paradigm onto which to map the resemblance between Theaitetos and Sokrates. Their physical and philosophical likeness not only posits Theaitetos as Sokrates' "son," but reinforces a sense of reciprocal identity between them. He is Sokrates' alter ego, not simply as a child is an extension or "part" of the father, but as a friend is "another self." In so far as conversing with Theaitetos is like conversing with Sokrates (and vice versa), they are partners in an ideal friendship of equals. This equation of self with other is reinforced by Sokrates' implication that Theaitetos is a mirror in which he may learn about himself (144d). In *Alcibiades 1*, the image of the mirror is used to explore the concept of self-knowledge, specifically the self-understanding achieved by a soul regarding another soul.[145] The same metaphor appears in an

[138] *EN* 1161b30–36, 1162a9–15. Aristotle even denies that "brotherly" friendship exists if brothers are far apart in age (*EN* 1161a4–6). Cf. also *Phdr.* 240c.

[139] 179d8; cf. 180b6, *Soph.* 216a3. [140] 144c2; cf. *Soph.* 218a8.

[141] 161b8, 168c3, 168e7, 171c8, 183b7. The historical Protagoras was considerably older than Sokrates and Theodoros, but he is envisaged in the dialogue at the age he was at death, i.e. around seventy. His resurrection thus produces a kind of spurious equality of age between all three older men.

[142] 161d8, 168c8, 177b1, 180e5, 181e5.

[143] Members of the aristocratic political clubs known as *hetaireiai* (i.e. groups of "comrades") were "usually of roughly the same age and social standing" (Connor 1971: 26).

[144] 203b9, 207c6, 208b8. Note also that references to Theaitetos' youthfulness, though they persist, are reduced in the latter part of the dialogue (above, n. 22 and p. 259).

[145] 132d–133b; see Halperin 1986: 69–70. Eades suggests that the likeness between Sokrates and Theaitetos points to the importance of self-knowledge in this dialogue too (1996: 250).

erotic context in *Phaedrus* (255d), where it underwrites the perfect identity and reciprocity of the ideal lovers.[146] It is also used in the Aristotelian *Magna Moralia* in an exploration of the idea of a friend as a second self.[147] Its philosophical significance for our dialogue is enhanced by Sokrates' repeated emphasis on the fact that his "testing" of others is also a form of self-scrutiny (above, n. 1). With inferior interlocutors, as we have seen, this use of the other to examine the self imposes limitations on the elenctic Sokrates' ability to test, improve, or learn about himself. Only if he can explore the ideas of someone who is in some sense equal to himself can these limitations be overcome.

There is an obvious tension between the idea that Theaitetos is Sokrates' alter ego and the parental model, which posits him as Sokrates' junior and inferior partner. But this is mitigated, at least to some extent, by the suggestion that Theaitetos is growing up. We should also recall Theaitetos' relationship to young Sokrates, who represents his potential to participate in a Socratic relationship on an equal footing (above, pp. 261–2). We may suppose that Theaitetos, besides being drawn to Sokrates because of their likeness, is growing towards increasing assimilation to the Socratic paradigm. This will be a loss of self, as it is for the orator of the digression (177b), and in general for those who flee from their former selves towards philosophy (168a). But for one who so closely resembles Sokrates, the loss of self is only superficial. On a more profound level, it is a kind of self-discovery and self-formation. To put it another way, Theaitetos, like Sokrates and the guardians of *Republic*, willingly cooperates in being "dragged" towards the truth (cf. 181a). This process takes place through dialectic, for which Theaitetos has a pre-existing talent precisely because he is already like Sokrates. Continuing practice will lead him to internal and external consistency of thinking (*homologein*), enabling him to move away from the quagmire of subjectivity towards the abstract philosophical ideal of "likeness to god." By becoming more and more like his philosophical friend, he will become more and more like the god that Sokrates already resembles.[148]

The nature of philosophical friendship between equals, like the parental model, is further explored through the contrasting figure of Theodoros. Theodoros refuses to be implicated in the refutation of Protagoras, his friend and "comrade," despite the fact that he apparently

[146] For later uses of the mirror image in erotic contexts see Halperin 1986: 62–3.

[147] 1213a10–26; see further Cooper 1980: 320–24.

[148] Similarly the lover of *Phdr.* is attracted to a beloved who resembles himself and his patron god, then strives to make the boy still more like himself and that god (252d–253c).

does not share his views (162a).[149] Yet he cannot defend this "friend," since he agrees with the Socratic principle that one should not answer contrary to one's real opinion (162a). When Sokrates goes on to assault Protagoras relentlessly, Theodoros can only say that his "comrade" is being pushed too hard, to which Sokrates replies that the question is how far to push towards the truth (171c).[150] The only time Theodoros perks up and has plenty to say is in his enthusiastic disparagement of the Heracliteans (179d–180c). According to Sokrates, their incoherent views are intimately linked with Protagorean relativism. Yet Theodoros is eager to undertake the "danger" of critiquing them (181b), now that the direct object of scrutiny is no longer his own friend (180b). His philosophical *philia* is deficient, not because he lacks the general friendliness necessary for dialectic, but because he allows personal ties to stand in the way of the honest rational scrutiny of ideas. He exemplifies, from an intellectual perspective, one of the deficiences of the morality of helping friends and harming enemies, as critiqued in *Republic* Book 1, namely uncritical loyalty to a personal friend (cf. *Rep.* 334b–e). He thus provides us with a negative exemplar through which to understand the nature of authentic philosophical *philia*, which should combine personal loyalty, friendliness, and respect with an intellectual detachment that allows one to criticize the ideas of a friend, whether in the guise of "comrade" or "father."

All three models for the relationship between Theaitetos and Sokrates considered so far – philosophical pederasty, fatherhood and *philia* between equals – provide ways of configuring the relationship of the self with others. To these a further, paradoxical, model may be added, namely that of self-love, or *philia* with the self. For Sokrates, conversing with Theaitetos is like conversing with (a part of) himself, in so far as Theaitetos is his "son" and alter ego. Their relationship thus dramatically enacts a form of self-love, as well as the internal dialectical relationship that just is thinking. As a form of *philia*, self-love approaches the ideal of friendship between equals. But this is obviously problematic. In as much as *philia* is an intrinsically relational concept, the very notion of self-love, as it appears in Greek thought, expresses the fundamental tension between self and other. Self-love is generally assumed to be natural and valuable, but also (at least potentially) selfish, and thus destructive of *philia* towards

[149] Cf. 164e–165a. Sokrates, however, views him as implicated in Theaitetos' answers (162e–163a).

[150] This parallels Aristotle's famous remark about friendship and philosophy ("though both are dear, piety demands that we give greater respect to the truth") (*EN* 1096a16).

others, which depends on valuing another person as oneself and even giving them precedence at times.[151]

This difficulty emerges sharply from Aristotle's discussion of *philia* towards the self. On the one hand, he derives the fundamentals of *philia* from one's relationship to oneself (*EN* 1166a1–b2). On the other hand, he is well aware of the common association of self-love with selfishness, and the resulting tension between *philia* towards self and other.[152] He must therefore wrestle with such paradoxes as whether a virtuous person will "selfishly" seize for himself all opportunities for virtuous action, or generously offer some of them to his friend, who is, after all his "second self" (*EN* 1169a16–b1). A similar tension is apparent in his "deduction" of all kinds of familial *philia* from the basic parental model, whereby the child is an extension or "part" of the self (*EN* 1161b16–1162a4). In *Theaetetus* Plato engages with the same set of paradoxes in a rather different way, both through the dialogue's epistemological concern with individuation, and on the level of dramatic form, where it has implications for the ethics of dialogue. In both authors these paradoxes arise from an attempt to view the other as self and the self as other. Just as Aristotle, along with traditional wisdom, defines the friend as another self, to be treated as such and valued for his or her own sake, so Plato represents Sokrates' conversation with a friend as a conversation with a mirror of his self. And just as Aristotle worries about the right way to treat both one's self (viewed as other), and another (viewed as oneself) in an ideal philosophical friendship, so Plato worries about how to converse dialectically with that self-as-other and other-as-self.

These anxieties take on further significance in the context of Plato's more general concern to individuate Sokrates as unique. This concern is memorably and forcefully expressed in this particular work through the image of the midwife (cf. 149a). Theaitetos too is unique, at least in Theodoros' experience (144ab; cf. 145b). But as we have seen, he is represented as significantly similar to Sokrates in many different ways (above, pp. 260–65). Most strikingly, only he, of all Plato's characters, shares in the strangely ugly features that betoken Socratic uniqueness. But, of course, the closer Theaitetos approaches to Sokrates in these various ways, the less unambiguously unique Sokrates becomes. The resemblance between them thus works against the overall Platonic picture of an incomparable Sokrates. This tension is mitigated (or evaded), however, by Theaitetos' extreme youth. Although he has the same features as Sokrates, he has

[151] See Blundell 1989: 35, 39–40, 50.

[152] *EN* 1168a28–1169b2, *EE* 1240a9–b38. See further Annas 1977; Blundell 1990.

them to a lesser degree (143e), thus reinstating Sokrates' uniqueness and cautioning us not to identify Theaitetos with him too closely. If he is, in a sense, Sokrates, he is a future Sokrates, who at the moment cannot compete with *the* Sokrates in either skill or imagination. Plato thus manages to present us, as usual, with a unique Sokrates, while simultaneously suggesting that Theaitetos will one day end up as his equal. His employment of dramatic rather than argumentative techniques for this purpose, together with the absence of authorial assertion entailed by the dialogue form, enables him to have his cake and eat it, to evade – but not to resolve – the tension between Sokrates' uniqueness and his capacity for self-(re)production.

CUTTING THE CORD

The larger philosophical significance of these tensions emerges from the digression that lies at the heart of the dialogue. Factors that confer a particular human identity are here associated not with the philosopher, but with his antitype, the orator. This person is a "slave" operating on the level of the personal, his performance circumscribed by temporal constraints, the institutional procedures of the lawcourts, and the personal agendas of specific individuals: his opponent, his audience and himself (172d–173b). The philosopher, by contrast, is incompetent and ridiculous in court, knowing of no personal abuse or praise to use as ammunition (174cd).[153] He also eschews the other cultural institutions that defined the identity of an adult male Athenian citizen: the *agora*, the city council, laws and decrees, political clubs (*hetaireiai*) with their struggles for office, and social events such as parties, dinners and revelry with flute-girls (173cd). He has no respect for birth, wealth, status or ancestry (whether male or female), seeing no significant difference between a king and a slave or a foreigner and a Greek (173d, 174d–175b). He is incompetent in social "intercourse" with individuals (συγγιγνόμενος . . . ἑκάστῳ), in private as well as in public, and cannot even recognize his neighbor as a human

[153] He evokes in many ways the philosopher of *Rep.*, who has no time to "look down" from eternal realities to quarrelsome human affairs (500bc), endures mockery on returning to the cave, especially in the courtroom (517d; cf. also *Gorg.* 484cde), has no personal interest in public life (519c–521b), and studies astronomy and geometry (526c–530c). Most of the features of Athenian life eschewed by the philosopher of the digression have also been banished from the guardians' lives (cf. Nightingale 1995: 59). It is sometimes claimed that the ideal philosopher of the digression lacks the societal involvement of the guardians, but the latter are notoriously reluctant to participate in governing the *polis*. In any case, the philosopher of the digression does not live in an ideal state. He is more like the philosopher who sits out the storm under a wall (*Rep.* 496d).

being (174abc). Temporal, physical and numerical assessments of worth are trivial to him (174e–175b). In short, his values are utterly at odds with those of his community, as his aberrant sense of humor signifies.[154] Moreover he spurns all the features that make a person individual: body, gender, class, material possessions, community values, birth, social hierarchy and human interaction, practical occupations and pastimes, political and civic identity, Greekness and even humanness itself. All these are "particulars . . . lying at one's feet," which must be abandoned as obstructions to the philosophic life.[155] Oblivious to the physical world, he pursues such abstract and universal studies as geometry and astronomy (173e–174a). He is actually said to leave behind his body – and the particularity it entails – in the *polis*, while his mind (*dianoia*) flies off to seek out the universal and distant (173e). In Thomas Nagel's famous phrase, he seeks a "view from nowhere."[156]

Though posited as human, then, the ideal philosopher is explicitly deprived of the traits composing a recognizable human being. He therefore remains off-stage in the Platonic drama, not simply out of artistic choice, but from necessity. His absence clarifies the way in which Plato's dramatic – as opposed to discursive – explorations of better and worse philosophical types are circumscribed by the need to attribute individuating qualities to his dramatis personae. Like the abstract divinity to whom he is assimilated, the philosopher who cannot recognize his neighbor as a human being is literally unrepresentable as a dialectical partner, since it is impossible to envisage him participating in rational discourse.[157] This emerges vividly from the fact that on a literal interpretation of the digression, the ideal philosopher can only be understood as dead, since his mind has left his body and winged its way under the earth or into the sky (173e).[158] Or perhaps he is merely blind and deaf, since he cannot read or hear written or spoken laws (173d). By normative human

[154] 174d, 175b, 175d.

[155] τὰ δ' ἐν ποσὶν . . . καὶ ἐν ἑκάστοις (175b). On the interplay between particularity and rational abstraction on the discursive level of this dialogue see esp. Desjardins 1990: 164–7.

[156] Nagel 1986; cf. also Nightingale 1995: 51–2. All this helps to account for the comic aspects of the description, since comedy often explores fantastical ideal (or surreal) worlds (cf. above, p. 72). But these elements do not disqualify the philosopher of the digression from serious consideration as an ideal, any more than do the comic touches in Plato's various portrayals of Sokrates. Indeed Sokrates often emphasizes that the philosopher will seem comic by conventional standards – a point stressed in the digression itself (172c, 174a–175b).

[157] Contrast the ideal philosophers of *Rep.*, who are kept off-stage, but are not in principle unrepresentable as sane and rational human beings.

[158] This aspect of the digression may have originated with the Pythagoreans (R. Joly 1994). It evokes ideas about the separate existence of the mind or soul to be found both in Plato (e.g. *Phd.* 67c–68c, *Phdr.* 249d–250c) and elsewhere (e.g. Eur. *Helen* 1014–16). Cf. also the comic view of Socratic philosophers as "half-dead" (Ar. *Clouds* 504).

standards he is also, if not dead, clearly insane: he hears people talking, but he cannot understand them, and thinks that kings are goatherds (174de).[159] We may recall Theaitetos' examples of obviously false opinions: the insane believe that they are gods, and dreamers that they are flying.[160] To become "like god" is to depart from lived humanity as such. From Socrates' idiosyncratic perspective, to become more like god is apparently to become more fully human.[161] We may therefore be more truly "ourselves" after death, when the soul has indeed been separated from the body.[162] But by normal Greek standards a living person who does not need human society is, in Aristotle's words, either sub-human or superhuman, "a beast or a god."[163] By seeking to evade the groundedness of knowledge and identity in specific human experience, Plato seems to strive to break the boundaries of the framework he has set himself through his choice of dramatic form. Yet he never does abandon that framework, choosing instead to extol through Sokrates an ideal that cannot be dramatically represented, and thus implicitly acknowledging the inadequacy of the ideal in question as a model for actual human life. As always, Plato's employment of dramatic form obliges us to acknowledge the specific circumstances that condition every human attempt to transcend humanity.

The price of detachment thus seems to be the philosopher's very humanity. High though this price undoubtedly is, the call for such detachment can be better understood in light of the dialogue's critique of the views of Protagoras and the Heracliteans. For it is specificity and variation, especially as related to embodiment, that generate disagreements among human beings, which in turn lead to a chaotic and unstable epistemic outlook (cf. especially 170a–172b). It is to escape this quagmire that the philosopher must "flee" human particularity (176a–177a). Moreover the fact that the philosopher of the digression is incoherent as an actual human being does not necessarily disqualify him from serving as some kind of abstract ideal or *paradeigma* for living, embodied persons (cf. 176e). Nor does it make him into an anti-model or a proof of the impossibility of philosophy. Like the ideal state of *Republic*, this *paradeigma* may be inaccessible to embodied human beings in any literal sense, yet still valuable as a source of inspiration lying beyond what it is in our embodied

[159] For the inference from "mindlessness" to "insanity" see e.g. *Ion* 534cd, 536d. For philosophical "madness" cf. *Phdr.* 249de, *Symp.* 218b.

[160] 158b; cf. 162c, *Soph.* 263ab.

[161] Lovibond 1991: 55; see further Annas 1999: ch. 3; Hobbs 2000: 158–62, 249; above, p. 124.

[162] Cf. *Gorg.* 524d, *Phd.* 523c, *Rep.* 611bcd.

[163] *Pol.* 1253a27–9; cf. 1253a4, *Rep.* 329a8.

nature to become.[164] Through structural as opposed to slavish mimesis, it is possible to emulate it without seeking to become precisely what it is.

Sokrates himself, in the digression, acknowledges the impossibility of his own ideal of complete philosophical detachment for embodied human beings. At the exact center of the dialogue, he observes that evil (τὸ κακόν) is ineluctible, and intrinsically bound up with the material world, the particularity of human life within it, and the possibility of goodness.[165] Such particularity, together with the multiplicity it engenders and the evil it bears with it, is intrinsic to the human condition. The ultimate goal of "likeness to god" is only to be attained "as far as is possible" under these circumstances.[166] How is this to be achieved, or fostered in others? Within the dialogue, Sokrates enacts the latter by leading Theaitetos away from the misapprehensions introduced by the embodied nature that unites him with, but also divides him from, other human beings. The dialogue dramatizes this difficult but crucial first step away from the particular by exploring the inadequacies of a view of knowledge based directly on sense-impressions. The problem of transcending human individuality, explored on a dramatic level through Theaitetos' resemblance to Sokrates, is played out on a discursive level through his struggle to reach a concept of knowledge that acknowledges the evidence of the senses while transcending them.

For this process to be effective, however, one must be endowed with certain qualities of character, which enable one to negotiate between human commitments and the disembodied ideal. Just as the ideal philosopher lacks personal attachments to the *polis* or its members, so the Socratic interlocutor must lack any such attachment to ideas that have been shaped by his particular human perspective. The digression suggests that such a person will be radically abstracted from the specifics of human life that constitute the individual self, in direct contrast to Protagoras' radical subjectivism.[167] Just as Theaitetos' beauty or ugliness should play no part in an impartial judgment of his philosophical potential, so we should rid ourselves as far as possible of the other biases to which we are prone simply as a result of inhabiting human bodies. These two forms of detachment, from embodied human life and from our own ideas, are

[164] Cf. *Rep.* 472b–473a; Polansky 1992: 144–5.

[165] 176a; cf. also *Stat.* 273bc. The location of the passage is pointed out by Polansky 1992: 141. On the significance of mid-points in Plato's dialogues cf. Thesleff 1993: 19–36.

[166] 176b; for the qualification cf. *Ep. VII* 344bc, *Laws* 697b1, 713e8, *Phd.* 66a, *Rep.* 383c, 613b1, *Symp.* 212a, *Stat.* 273b2–3, 274a6, 311c5, *Tim.* 90c.

[167] On the digression as a response to Protagoreanism see Lee 1973; Barker 1976; Niehues-Pröbsting 1982.

related, since embeddedness in human community, with its hostilities and loyalties to particular people and institutions, is what generates an inappropriate emotional attachment to one's own point of view. This is exemplified in Theodoros, with his fear of being thought biased by physical beauty (143e), and the distorting attachment to Protagoras that prevents him from critiquing the latter's ideas in a disinterested fashion.

Yet just as true philosophical friendship requires loyalty along with detachment, so too emotional detachment from one's individual point of view must be accompanied by a sincere commitment to the argument as such. Personal attachments must be subordinated to a new kind of loyalty, to philosophy or the *logos* in its own right. Yet personal attachments are not completely eliminated. Rather they are subsumed, as a necessary prerequisite for philosophical progress, into a community of like-minded lovers of argument and truth, like the community portrayed both dramatically and discursively in *Republic*. Just as it is hard to distinguish *erōs* for philosophy from *erōs* for Sokrates (above, p. 107), so too Sokrates' own love of argument (*philologia*) is implicated in his desire for everyone present to become "friends" by sharing in dialectic (146a). Theodoros, by contrast, represents the participants' *logoi* as their slaves, suggesting that he lacks not only a proper detachment from personal ties, but also the right kind of intellectual commitment, which involves not enslaving the argument but submitting to its authority and following where it leads (173c; cf. 191a).

The twofold demand for commitment and detachment is implicit in Sokrates' image of the midwife. In Greek cultural terms, biological motherhood is the most powerful of all natural bonds of *philia*.[168] By positing the interlocutor in this role, the midwife image establishes an exceptionally close personal involvement between the idea under scrutiny and the person from whom it is elicited. Even if the argument is derived from, or "fathered" by, someone else (such as a sophist), and "delivered" by a third party (such as Sokrates), it remains the interlocutor's *own* offspring. Yet once a child is born, it becomes an individual distinct from its mother. Similarly, after the interlocutor's offspring has been "delivered" for public scrutiny, it exists in detachment from him. Despite his "pregnancy" and "motherhood," he must have the (manly) courage to sever his personal involvement once the umbilical cord is cut, exposing even his own most cherished beliefs to impartial examination

[168] See Blundell 1989: 40–51; 1990: 224, 226–7; Golden 1990: 97–9. Sokrates gives motherhood further symbolic significance in his account of his own genealogy (149a).

(160e–161a).[169] The midwife image helps Sokrates to clarify the notion that it is the idea rather than its bearer that is under scrutiny, while retaining the close relationship between "offspring" and "parent."

The midwife analogy is one of a series of Platonic images that feminizes Sokrates, conveying thereby one aspect of his paradoxical, socially transgressive character. But it also feminizes the interlocutor, to whom it ascribes the quintessentially female processes of pregnancy and birth. This analogy is potentially highly demeaning for a free Athenian male. "Labor pains" (151b), in particular, are strongly evocative of the female body's association with weakness and suffering.[170] This places the Socratic interlocutor in a delicate position, reminiscent of that of the stereotypical boy "beloved" (*erōmenos*) in classical Athens. As an object of male desire, presumed to be erotically passive, the *erōmenos* has a quasi-feminine role; but as a citizen boy, he will grow up to be a "real" man, and must therefore not be physically penetrated, since this would "feminize" him beyond redemption.[171] Similarly, Theaitetos' extreme youth makes it appropriate – rather than demeaning – for him to be dominated intellectually by Sokrates. In contrast to more adult interlocutors, he has no reason to feel his manhood challenged and grow angry. But just as Plato ultimately insists on Sokrates' manly prowess, so too the interlocutor must not be excessively "feminized" by the implications of the midwife analogy.

Sokrates circumvents this risk by several means. To begin with, by taking on himself the role of midwife, instead of father, he saves his interlocutor from the humiliation of an erotically "passive" or "feminine" sexual role – the role that enables real women to reach the state of pregnancy.[172] He also acknowledges the delicacy of his interlocutors' position by emphasizing the peculiarity of his own role as a male midwife of men, assigning the female (physical) realm to his mother (210cd). Finally, the successful interlocutor is remasculinized through his participation in the "testing" of the "baby." The interlocutor who behaves like a biological mother misunderstands the true nature of dialectic by acting as if a

[169] The cutting of the cord was a function of the midwife, and a crucial moment in the rituals of birth (Garland 1990: 63). Philosophically, it is the moment at which one person becomes two, when the infant moves from being a "part" to "another self" (cf. above, p. 288). Compare Theodoros' desire to "seize" an argument (*logos*) from the Heracliteans – who will not give it up of their own accord – and objectify it by treating it like a mathematical problem (180c).

[170] For the "femininity" of the suffering body see Zeitlin 1996: 349–52.

[171] He would lose his civic rights for adopting such a "feminine" sexual role (Dover 1989: 103–5; Halperin 1990: 94–9).

[172] Plato performs a similar maneuver in *Symp.* by having the lover be pregnant before he meets his object of desire (206c).

real part of himself were under assault. But the ideal interlocutor remains unperturbed at the prospect of critically examining and even repudiating his own "offspring." He thus moves from the role of the mother to that of the (putatively more rational and detached) father, whose decision it was, in Athenian practice, to expose unwanted children after birth. He collaborates in this "paternal" role with Sokrates himself. But the denial of an *overtly* "paternal" role to Sokrates leaves the role of "father" of his own "offspring" tacitly available for the interlocutor as well. Characteristically, Plato's use of sexual and reproductive models transcends gender roles in a way that simultaneously appropriates and displaces the female.[173] Women's generative power is appropriated for men, while the procreative function of the female is elided, and the "feminine" is repudiated as an irrational subjective attachment to one's "own."

As we have seen, Theodoros violates the criterion of detachment by refusing to critique the ideas of his personal friend Protagoras. It is violated in a different way by "Protagoras" himself, with his "personal, proprietary concern for the well-being of his own offspring."[174] He thus resembles the many Socratic interlocutors who grow angry when their offspring is disposed of, "like women after their first birth" (151 cd). As we saw earlier, this kind of reaction is neither surprising nor unreasonable (above, pp. 124–5). Since one's ideas form part of a self constituted by such factors as birth, social status, and various public and private roles (the very factors spurned by the philosopher of the digression), the interlocutor is often quite right to feel himself to be under assault. Similarly, there is no reason why the orator of the digression, who occupies a position diametrically opposed to that of the philosopher, should acquiesce in the latter's "dragging."[175] In so far as this undermining of the unreconstructed self is intrinsic to the functioning of the elenctic method, the interlocutor's resentment is perfectly justified. Why *should* a Theodoros let himself be "dragged" into the ring?

How, then, can any interlocutor respond other than with "maternal" emotion to a method that assaults himself and his whole way of life? How can he cut the cord and graduate from a maternal to a paternal role? The shift will be possible only for a character in whom these roles are not intrinsically opposed; one, that is, whose central values are *not* radically challenged by Socratic questioning. Such a person's commitment to himself will also be a commitment to the Socratic pursuit of "objective" truth through dialectic. The freer he already is of non-Socratic attachments,

[173] See esp. Halperin 1986, 1990, and below, pp. 362–4.
[174] Lee 1973: 231; see further ibid. 233–39, 253–4. [175] Cf. Rue 1993: 84–6.

the less his identity will come under attack at Sokrates' hands, and the less his "maternal" emotions will be activated in self-defense and the defense of his "offspring." Like Sokrates he will welcome elenctic refutation, since this will contribute to the construction, rather than the destruction, of his self-concept. His character is therefore less a target for elenctic criticism than a necessary precondition for its successful practice. This means that Sokrates is no longer attacking the individual in his ad hominem elenctic fashion. In fact, he is arguably no longer employing his familiar method at all. Socratic questioning has become a mode of self-affirmation for the interlocutor as well as for Sokrates himself, in so far as the interlocutor's particular self is also constituted through commitment to Socratic principles (including the principle of detachment). Instead of destroying the self, Socratic testing becomes constructive of such a person's authentic identity.

Since Theaitetos manifests the necessary traits to enable the elenctic Sokrates to work this way, he is not challenged to transform his view of the world (and hence his way of life), but only to strive more successfully towards the ideal he already shares with other Socratic natures. This is borne out by his behavior within the dialogue as a "parent" of ideas. He is properly committed to his own responses (cf. 157d), but when his "offspring" is finally brought to birth he shows no "maternal" partiality, and is willing to subject the wretched babe to scrutiny (161a). After this first-born has been found wanting, he quickly produces a new suggestion (187a), without needing to have it dragged out of him by Sokrates (as more hostile interlocutors often do). He is ready to treat this idea as provisional from the start (187b). The third idea – the "dream" theory – is initiated by Theaitetos and developed by Sokrates. But it is explicitly attributed to an outside source, and neither of the participants is personally committed to it (as opposed to the argument). The three definitions thus move progressively in the direction of detachment from the interlocutor or "mother," in step with the increasing level of abstraction from the senses involved in the definitions themselves.

The rhetoric of the digression implies that the Socratic values under discussion – especially commitment to reason and detachment from personal biases – are impersonal absolutes, unconstrained by particular experiences or points of view. This in turn suggests that the ideal interlocutor, in becoming like Sokrates, is approaching as close as anyone can to an abstraction transcending the particularities of human nature. Theaitetos' progress in philosophy, in detachment, and in Socratic growth should therefore coincide. Because we are inescapably embodied

arguers, however, we must retain some identifiable human characteristics. Only the right *kind* of person can follow this path. And in fact, the digression's ideal of detachment is itself informed by specific cultural parameters. Despite the alleged insignificance of such factors as class and birth, it is solidly based on a set of aristocratic, elitist, masculinist, Greek assumptions. Rather than becoming progressively more detached from specific human circumstances, views, feelings and prejudices, the "ideal" Socratic interlocutor must come to share the specific circumstances, views, feelings and prejudices of one very particular person: Plato's Sokrates.

Despite Sokrates' appropriation of the female through the midwife image, the activities by which the (presumptively male) philosopher is defined are those of a particular wealthy, high-class, masculine milieu. Thus the philosopher places a high value on leisure, as necessary to the unfettered pursuit of philosophy.[176] In doing so he appropriates the aristocratic connotations of leisured wealth, while relegating the free Athenian politician to symbolic "slavery."[177] The philosopher does, of course, choose to employ his leisure rather differently from the typical aristocrat. Nevertheless, his way of life is just as dependent on freedom from earning his keep or caring for his bodily needs. Accordingly, the philosopher does not know how to cook or make a bed (175e) – tasks performed for wealthy Athenians by their slaves. The most extreme and bizarre of these appropriations of the rhetoric of aristocracy for the philosopher is implicit in Sokrates' claim that the orator does not know how to play and sing at a symposium (175e), an upper-class social institution that was an important locus for political power-mongering and intrigue.[178] Orators and politicians, at least those of aristocratic family, would be very much at home at such events.[179] By excluding the orator from the symposium, Sokrates implicitly dismisses all democratic politicians as vulgar and uneducated.

This whole set of cultural parameters, which underwrites the supposedly detached, abstract, philosophical ideal of the digression, is succinctly conveyed through the story contrasting the unworldly philosopher

[176] 154e, 175de, 176c, 187d.

[177] 172c–173b; cf. *Soph.* 253c; Nightingale 1995: 55–9. As commentators have noted, the praise of leisure has ironic implications in light of Sokrates' impending death (cf. e.g. Burnyeat 1990: 34; Rue 1993: 93).

[178] See e.g. Connor 1971: 25–9.

[179] Cf. Alkibiades' arrival at *Symp.* 212c. The guests at Xenophon's rather more conventional symposium include Kallias, a wealthy and prominent public figure, and Nikeratos, son of Nikias (on whom see above, p. 167).

Thales with a witty Thracian serving-girl (174a). The philosopher, so oblivious to material life that he falls down a well, is mocked by the servant whose job is to fetch water from that well (thus serving the practical purposes of material life).[180] As a foreign female slave who laughs at philosophy, this anecdotal serving-woman defines the philosopher's values by inverting them. Sokrates' ideal philosopher is as culture-bound as his anti-type, the orator.

On the discursive level, Sokrates endorses this picture of the ideal philosopher. From a dramatic perspective, however, his relationship to his own ideal is a complex one. As we have already seen, the figure of Sokrates is Plato's primary site for dramatic exploration of the tensions between the particular and the universal, the material and the abstract, which pervade his work as a whole. In *Theaetetus* too, he literally embodies the tension between the unattainable ideal of disembodied abstraction and the inescapable influence of our embodied nature: the aspiration of human particularity to transcend itself without denying its own embodiment. As a result, there are both marked differences and important similarities between the Sokrates of this dialogue and the ideal philosopher of the digression.

The differences, which have often been pointed out, are in some ways more obvious than the similarities.[181] To begin with, this Sokrates is, as usual, very interested in his human neighbors and what lies close at hand, including the most mundane everyday activities (contrast 173c–174a). He cares more about Athens than anywhere else (143d; cf. 144b), and knows Theaitetos' father's name (144c). He tailors his conversation to the particular characters of others – not only the compliant Theaitetos but the recalcitrant Theodoros as well. And of course, he claims to know nothing (contrast 173e). He even resembles the philosopher's antithesis in certain respects. He is pressed for time because he must go to court (172e), and is a skilled orator, as the the eloquence of the digression itself attests. In other ways, however, the Sokrates of *Theaetetus* differs markedly from the orator, and resembles rather the philosopher. Unlike the orator, he does not view himself as "clever and wise" (173b), is not embarrassed by his own (alleged) rhetorical ineptitude (174c, 175e), and

[180] See Cavarero 1995: ch. 2. The woman is not so precisely identified in other versions of this tale (cf. Niehues-Pröbsting 1982: 18): e.g. she is simply an old woman at Diog. Laert. 1.34. But her namelessness and pluralization (175d) make her exemplary of all "uneducated" persons. For Plato's symbolic exclusion of the female cf. also *Symp.* 176e *Phd.* 60a, and see duBois 1995: ch. 4.

[181] For a thorough and balanced treatment of this question see Rue 1993.

takes as much time as he wants for discussion (172d). Like the philosopher, he is a figure of fun to undiscerning mortals (cf. 153a, 161e, 181b); he is indifferent to physical concerns (as opposed to beauty of soul); he is interested in general questions (174b); he is very much concerned with the nature of justice and human happiness (175c); and he thinks one should strive to resemble god (176ab). His intellectual methods also reflect the philosopher's values, in as much as he repeatedly moves from particular instances towards abstraction (146e).

If we widen the lens to include portrayals of Sokrates in other Platonic dialogues, an equally ambiguous relationship emerges. Unlike the philosopher of the digression, Plato's Sokrates spends time in the *agora* (*Ap.* 17c; cf. *Gorg* 447a), participates in politics (*Ap.* 32ab), has often attended trials (*Ap.* 35a), and participates in symposia (*Symp.*). But he also converges with the philosopher of the digression, often in the self-same dialogues. For example, his own trial is the first at which he has spoken (*Ap.* 17d, cf. *Euth.* 2ab); he repeatedly likens human education and government to animal training (cf. *Tht.* 174de); and he is notoriously indifferent to material possessions (cf. *Tht.* 174e). Many of his conversations take place not in the agora or another public place, but in private houses. He and his fellow symposiasts are entertained by philosophy, rather than flute-girls;[182] his participation in Athenian political life is minimal; and he speaks with all comers regardless of high or low birth, noble ancestry, gender, wealth or poverty – even with slaves – provided they may further the search for wisdom.[183] He is interested in mathematics and astronomy (cf. *Tht.* 173e),[184] and at times his mind absents itself from immediate circumstances, leaving his body standing still, oblivious of physical conditions.[185] He knows very well how to praise the true happiness of gods and mortals,[186] and can even "strike up a song like a free man;"[187] yet his understanding of a proper encomium, like that of the philosopher, differs radically from the symposiastic norm.[188] And like the philosopher, his sense of humor is often unconventional (cf. *Tht.* 174d, 175d).

This peculiar relationship between Sokrates and his own ideal may be attributed to the fact that, in contrast to the philosopher of the digression, he serves as an embodied exemplar for other embodied persons.

[182] *Symp.* 176e; cf. *Prot.* 347d. [183] Cf. *Tht.* 173d, 174e–175b.
[184] This is largely untrue of the elenctic Sokrates (cf. *Ap.* 18abc, 19bcd, *Phd.* 96a–99e), but the Sokrates of *Tht.* itself, as well as dialogues like *Meno* and *Rep.*, is very interested in these subjects.
[185] *Symp.* 175ab, 220cd; cf. *Tht.* 173e. [186] E.g. in *Symp.* and *Rep.*; cf. *Tht.* 175e–176a.
[187] *Tht.* 175e; cf. *Euthyd.* 272bc, *Phd.* 60b–61b.
[188] *Symp.* 198c–199a, *Prot.* 347c–348a; cf. *Tht.* 174d.

His ideal is unattainable precisely because it is detached from the circumstances of human life as actually lived. Sokrates therefore resembles his own *paradeigma* not through superficial slavish imitation (which would be impossible for any embodied human being), but by pursuing the same central values in a manner that is both possible and appropriate for a person whose concrete situation diverges radically, and fundamentally, from that of the ideal in question – that is, by means of structural imitation. Unlike the philosopher, he can speak about the material and social world; yet unlike the Heracliteans (with whom the orator is associated), he can speak coherently. He and Theaitetos stand on the problematic ground between the concerns of oratory and disembodied philosophy, the ground where both goodness and discourse are inevitably contaminated by evil (176a, 196de). This liminality is captured in the ironically self-deprecating term *phaulos* ("inferior") which he applies to himself and Theaitetos in contrast not only to the monists and pluralists (181b), and the cleverly disputatious (197a), but also to the philosopher of the digression (173c7–9).

The maximal Platonic Sokrates, qua embodied philosopher, indicates ostensively how this inescapable embeddedness in material life must be *used* if one is to move in the direction of an abstract ideal. Even the dialectician, qua human being, must make use of the body.[189] But he approaches as far as a particular human being can to becoming an abstract model for our emulation, not by flying away from the city, but by the use he makes of his place within it. This negotiation between particularity and abstraction can be seen in the specifics of his relationship to both philosopher and orator. Unlike the philosopher, he spends time in the *agora*; yet he does so not for political, legal or commercial purposes (cf. 173c8–d2), but to pursue philosophy in his own distinctive idiom (*Ap.* 17c–18a). Like the orator, he goes to court on a matter of life and death (cf. 172e); but he eschews the constraints of conventional courtroom behavior (e.g. *Ap.* 34b–35b), and uses the opportunity to extol and justify the philosophic life, heedless of the consequences for his own survival. Unlike the philosopher, he participates in politics; but he does so only as far as he is called upon to do so by civic duty, and in a way that upholds abstract values of justice and law even against the will of the majority to whom the orator panders (*Ap.* 32bcd). Unlike the philosopher, he attends symposia; but he uses the occasion not to become drunk or lecherous, but to explore a theory that moves away from the particularity of embodied desire.

[189] Cf. Gellrich 1994: 302; Gilead 1994: 83.

This kind of philosophically appropriate use of the body is also dramatized within *Theaetetus* itself. Unlike the philosopher, Sokrates is skilled at oratory, as displayed in the digression; but he employs it to condemn ordinary uses of rhetoric and promote an ideal of philosophical abstraction. Unlike the philosopher, he is specially interested in his own fellow-citizens; but his concerns transcend any particular location in time and space (cf. 173e), including the constraints imposed by local political feuding. (This is implied by the dialogue's setting many years later at Megara, a neighboring city hostile to Athens.) Unlike the philosopher, he knows and cares who his neighbors are; but unlike the orator, he uses these personal details for philosophic ends, both to discover worthwhile partners for dialectic and to explore the meaning of human life and happiness. Thus he is interested in Theaitetos' personal circumstances not for purposes of malicious gossip or social ranking, but as a factor in assessing his philosophical promise (cf. 145b). He is also interested in ancestry, both male and female (Theaitetos' father and his own mother), but primarily for its symbolic value as an indicator of intellectual promise on the one hand, and functioning on the other.

Sokrates also exemplifies the proper philosophical use of the material world in a different way, through the content of his creative imagination. Unlike the philosopher of the digression, he is interested in many features of ordinary embodied life – mud, wax, birds, midwifery – through which he creates pictures expressing a particular, not to say unique, intellectual outlook and world-view. Unlike the vivid images of *Republic*, the most famous of which strive to transcend the limitatations of embodied human life, Sokrates' images in *Theaetetus* are primarily devoted to explaining that life, as part of the immediate subject of their discourse. The midwife image is obviously central here. Like Achilles comparing himself to a mother bird (*Il.* 9.323–7), Sokrates uses cross-gendered imagery to express something remarkable about himself, qua philosophic "hero." But most of his images characterize him less directly, simply as forms of self-expression. We may compare the use of imagery as a vehicle for characterization in Athenian tragedy. In Sophocles' *Antigone*, for example, both Antigone and Kreon are characterized, among other ways, by the systems of imagery that they favor.[190] And the richness of Klytemnestra's language in Aeschylus' *Agamemnon* conveys a character of enormous psychological and dramatic power, embedded in a particular mental, moral and emotional universe.

[190] See Goheen 1951 and cf. Gould 1978: 48.

Similarly, the rich range of imagery used by Sokrates in *Theaetetus* embeds him in a specific universe, one in which the complex interplay between material particularity and intellectual abstraction is always at issue, as an essential, indeed *the* essential, defining feature of humanity. Sokrates' imagination not only situates him as an inhabitant of the material world, but uses the particularity of that same world in an effort to transcend it intellectually. His elenctic self elsewhere likewise uses sensory phenomena as raw material for abstract thought. But in *Theaetetus* his imagery is extraordinary in its range and variety – even by Platonic standards – and performs much more complex philosophical work.[191] Collectively, his far-reaching and creative images imply an extensive picture of the world we live in as material for philosophy – material extending from particular components of the most mundane sort (such as mud or wax) to the heavenly bodies and the cosmos itself, with a wide variety of lesser creatures lying somewhere in between. Within this tapestry there is a special emphasis on the specific, and especially problematic, nature of human beings – the soul, the body, and the operation of the mind and senses through which we perceive and understand our world. Numerous images of human crafts, products and activities link us in multifarious ways to animals, gods and other aspects of the world in which we live, from the many varieties of mud to the cosmos as a whole.

The overall effect is a vivid expression of the fact that human epistemology cannot be explored in abstraction from who we are as complex beings at the juncture of the material and the divine. Some of Sokrates' more unusual images explicitly link the worlds of mind and body, abstract and concrete, particular and universal in this way, providing "poetic" (as well as philosophical) accounts of the complex tensions between specificity and abstraction that we have seen at work on many levels in this dialogue. The midwife image, for example, provides a powerful way of expressing the dilemmas of human embodiment and our ability to explore abstract ideas in detachment from personal circumstances, as we have seen. To gauge the full meaning of these images would be the task of a different study.[192] Collectively, however, they perform a function analogous to that of the Homeric simile. Like epic similes, they provide

[191] For the continuum between exempla and imagery in Plato see R. Robinson 1953: 41–2. The images that are used most extensively in *Tht.*, and work the hardest, are the midwife and reproductive group, the reading/writing group, the aviary and the block of wax.

[192] It would be necessary e.g. to see which images are used by Sokrates in the mouth of Protagoras, rather than his own; to look at differences between simile, metaphor, and philosophical exemplum; and to examine the specific uses of each system of imagery (e.g. the predominance of animal images is clearly linked with the discussion of Protagoras' "man-measure" dictum).

glimpses through the fabric of the dramatic foreground – the world of warfare at Troy, a specific conversation at Athens (or Megara) – to remind us of what lies in the background, and hence what is at stake: the larger world of human experience in which these particular events are situated.

This is most obviously true of the most sustained image of *Theaetetus*, namely the digression, which works more like the central imagery of *Republic* in its attempt to convey the possibility of transcendence. Here Sokrates provides an inspiring synoptic vision of the place of human beings in an intellectual and moral cosmos, which underlines the insoluble paradox of our place at the crossroads of particularity and abstraction. In this respect, the digression is comparable to an image that lies at the heart – if not exactly the center – of the *Iliad*: the shield of Achilles in Book 18. In this book, the gods create a shield covered with depictions of human life and the cosmos that surrounds it. It is a unique armament and an emblem of supreme heroic status, which Achilles will carry as he goes to face his destiny. But it is also "Western man's first microcosmic model of a unified and coherent world order."[193] As such it provides a comprehensive picture of the world in which the events of the epic unfold, locating this particular struggle in a series of larger contexts: human life at peace and at war, the natural world, and the cosmos as a whole. Just as Sokrates' digression complements its ideal with an image of his world as it really is, so Achilles' shield includes a city at war as well as a city at peace. In each case, the "real" world carries an inevitable burden of evil, yet this necessity of evil is inescapably bound up with the possibility of heroism, whether military or philosophical (cf. 170ab). The analogy should not be pressed too far – the world of the ideal philosopher, for example, is unattainable in a rather different sense from the world of the shield's city at peace. Yet each excursus frames the work's central action within a larger picture of the world, and in so doing shows us what is at stake in that action. In both cases – each in its own way – this is a matter of life and death.

BECOMING SOKRATES

The extraordinary richness of Sokrates' philosophical imagination brings us back to the problematic question of his capacity for self-reproduction – and hence immortality – by obliging us to confront the irreducible

[193] Segal 1978: 317.

differences between him and Theaitetos. In light of the enormous intellectual gulf that divides them, how can we be confident that Theaitetos, however strong his youthful resemblance to Sokrates, can bear the heavy burden of functioning as the hope for the future of Socratic philosophy? As we have seen, Plato evades these issues dramatically, both by presenting Theaitetos as a mere boy, who may grow to future greatness, and by assuring us, through Terpsion, that Theaitetos did indeed live up to his potential before dying (142d). But the possibility of a new generation of Sokrateses is never actually demonstrated. As long as Plato refuses to represent anyone quite like Sokrates, he can have his cake and eat it too: he can proclaim the uniqueness of Sokrates, and at the same time represent him as a type of which there just happens to be only one example. This evasive strategy enables Plato to immortalize Sokrates both as an unforgettable, uniquely characterized individual and as an idealized philosophical model for our emulation. Only thus can he satisfy, however fleetingly, his evident desire to represent the absolute and ideal embedded in the very particularity that his Sokrates seems to be trying to escape.

But such a strategy also leaves certain questions unanswered – questions rendered more pressing, and more complex, by the fact that Theaitetos as well as Sokrates is dead by the time of the dialogue's recitation at Megara. What does the death of Theaitetos signify? There are places in Plato where Sokrates implies that death is a homecoming for the philosopher (above, p. 79). This notion fits in well with the ideal of philosophical abstraction in the digression, which, on one reading, can be achieved only in death. And independent evidence suggests that the historical Theaitetos died not far from the age of fifty, when the philosopher of *Republic* finally gazes upon the Form of the Good, before dying and proceeding to the Isles of the Blessed.[194] Indeed, those guardians who die as Theaitetos does in defense of the *polis*, and other members of the "Golden Race," are to be revered after death as "divinities" (*daimones*).[195] In light of the close links between Theaitetos and the philosopher-rulers, this could be taken to suggest that the dead Theaitetos is now in the Isles of the Blessed, which in Plato serve not only as the home of dead philosophers, but as an analogy for the contemplation of the Forms (*Rep.* 519c). There is also a note of transcendence in Sokrates' "prophecy" of Theaitetos'

[194] *Rep.* 540ab. These mythical islands were the traditional destination of dead heroes such as Achilles. For their use in Plato as the home of dead philosophers cf. 498c, *Gorg.* 523ab, 526c, *Phd.* 111abc, 114bc, 115d, *Crat.* 398bc.

[195] *Rep.* 468e–469a; cf. 414a, 540bc.

greatness, with its mantic and epic overtones. It is therefore possible to read his death, along with that of Sokrates, as signifying transcendence of the mortal body by the immortal, rational soul.

But this suggestion does not provide a useful answer to the question of whether Theaitetos really can, or will, live up to his Socratic potential in life, and if so, whether direct contact with Sokrates is necessary for this purpose. Such a dramatic demonstration would require the portrayal of a Theaitetos who actually *becomes* Sokrates' philosophical equal. But Plato never actually shows Theaitetos – or anyone else – becoming a second Sokrates under Socratic tuition. It is even arguable that, despite Sokrates' "prophecy," Theaitetos' subsequent career showed him failing as a Socratic, since as far as we can tell his subsequent achievements were exclusively mathematical.[196] By the time he died he should at least, by *Republic's* standards, have become an expert in dialectic. But unless our evidence is deficient on this point, the possibility of a new generation of Sokrateses remains dramatically asserted, rather than demonstrated, whether explicitly (through the dialogue itself), or implicitly, through the audience's presumed knowledge of Theaitetos' future.

Yet the possibility remains open that Plato may succeed in reproducing Sokrates in future generations through the medium of his writings. This strategy depends, of course, on the problematic idea that a written discourse can somehow transmit a living reality to its readers in the absence of its originating "parent." This possibility is foregrounded in the present dialogue by the opening scene between Eukleides and Terpsion at Megara.[197] This dramatic opening emphasizes not only the death of the central participants, but the fact that the events described took place long ago, and have been written down with considerable care. Eukleides needed notes to remember the details, and checked these with (the now dead) Sokrates in order to ensure an accurate record. Uniquely among Plato's dialogues, the substance of the conversation is portrayed as read aloud from a written script. The reader is Eukleides' slave, a completely uncharacterized functionary, who serves solely as a mouthpiece or passive conduit of the discourse to his audience.[198] The frame thus raises questions about how far a transcriber, reader or auditor can profit from

[196] Cf. *Phdr.* 278e–279b where Sokrates prophesies greatness for his "beloved" Isokrates. In this case, our knowledge of the orator's life and writings inevitably colors our understanding of the "prophecy."

[197] These Megarians are also present in *Phd.* (59c). Eukleides wrote Socratic dialogues, and Plato is said to have stayed with him in Megara after Sokrates' death (Diog. Laert. 2.106, 2.108, 3.6). See further Guthrie 1969: 499–507; Rankin 1983: 190–95; Kahn 1996: 12–15.

[198] Cf. Howland 1998: 44–5. He is even less characterized than Meno's slave (above, pp. 223–4).

ideas and arguments presented in isolation from those who gave them birth, and more generally, how successfully an idea can be defended or criticized in the absence of its progenitor.[199]

The immediate audience for this reading consists of Eukleides, who wrote it, and his companion Terpsion, who has never heard it before. Like Aristodemos and Apollodoros in *Symposium*, both these characters are keenly interested in Sokrates and his doings, but neither shows any sign of dialectical promise by the internal standards of the dialogue. Neither of them evinces the active enthusiasm, quick wit, memory, dialectical initiative, or "courage" required for Socratic philosophizing. They do display "wonder" at Sokrates' prescience regarding Theaitetos,[200] but this is a far cry from Theaitetos' own philosophical "wonder" (155cd), since it is directed at the doings and sayings of persons, as opposed to abstract problems. In contrast to Sokrates himself, who reported the whole conversation to him from memory, Eukleides is utterly incapable of producing an oral account, focusing rather on obtaining an accurate verbatim transcription (142c–143a).[201] And in contrast to Theaitetos, he expresses his enthusiasm for Sokrates by repeating his words, rather than attempting to answer his questions (cf. 148e). He and Terpsion treat the reported conversation neither as a vehicle for ideas, nor as a stimulus to thought, but as a glorified specimen of philosophical gossip. As auditors, they remain completely passive, showing no interest whatsoever in actually participating in such discussions. For example, they show no engagement in any of the epistemological issues that Sokrates raises. After the prologue they drop out of sight with no indication that they learn from the experience of writing or listening.

The passivity of Terpsion and Eukleides foreshadows that of Theodoros, who prefers listening to a lengthy elevated discourse, in sharp contrast to the active intellectual engagement of Sokrates and Theaitetos.[202] And like Theodoros, they are tired and eager to rest (143ab). This might seem innocent enough, since it provides them with a plausible context for listening to the dialogue. Sokrates himself lies down to listen to Lysias' speech (*Phdr.* 230e). But when Sokrates sits still in Plato, it is for thought or conversation.[203] After hearing

[199] Cf. Ford 1994: 205–14. [200] 142c4; cf. 142a3, 142b9.

[201] Cf. Dorter 1994: 69–70; Polansky 1992: 36–7; Tschemplik 1993: 173–4; for more positive views see Koyré 1945: 34–5; Polansky 1992: 35. On rote memorization, as opposed to productive memory, see above, p. 101.

[202] The parallel with Theodoros may be enhanced by the fact that, by the dramatic date of the reading, Terpsion and Eukleides are old men, though this is not marked within the dialogue (cf. Thesleff 1990: 149).

[203] Above, p. 80; cf. also *Laws* 625bc.

Lysias' speech, he engages in extensive analysis. The sedentary behavior of Terpsion and Eukleides hints rather at intellectual laziness and passivity, especially in light of the homology between mental and physical attributes so strongly emphasized in this dialogue (above, pp. 279–80). This hint is corroborated by other details of their behavior. Terpsion has let as many as thirty years pass before asking about this conversation that he is supposedly so keen to hear (143a). And Eukleides has left out the narrative portions of the discourse in order to avoid "trouble" (*pragmata*, 143c) – a concern never expressed by Sokrates qua narrator.[204] They thus seem to exemplify *Phaedrus'* notorious claims that books impair the memory, cannot teach or answer questions, and are liable to fall into the wrong hands.[205]

The idea that a script detached from its author can transmit methods and ideas to future generations thus receives a pessimistic coloration from the outset of this dialogue. The theme recurs in the treatment of various absent philosophers, such as Parmenides and Heraclitus. But Protagoras is the figure who raises these questions most insistently. Much of *Theaetetus* is preoccupied with the fact that this particular dead philosopher cannot be present to make his own case or reply to criticism – preoccupied, that is, with the status of his intellectual "orphan."[206] The starting point of the discussion is the sophist's own words, as recorded in his writings (which seem to have been a treatise written in the author's own voice) (152a, 162a). But if Protagoras' ideas are to live on, it must be in the minds and words of other thinkers, who can only express their own understanding of his arguments (171d). And in a living dialectical conversation, all such thoughts must be voiced by a speaker. Anyone who can answer Sokrates' questions (unlike a book) brings to the discussion his or her own set of experiences, commitments and prejudices. Protagoras' death therefore places him at a distinct dialectical disadvantage (cf. 166a). This is acknowledged by Sokrates, who both assumes that an idea's "parent" is best equipped to defend it, and professes to believe that Protagoras could refute them both, were he present in person (164e, 171d; cf. above, p. 136).

Yet Plato conspicuously avoids introducing either Protagoras himself or even a committed Protagorean for this purpose. He draws attention to the absence of Kallias, the well known patron of the sophists, who is (according to Theodoros) the proper "guardian" of Protagoras' offspring

[204] Eukleides seems oblivious to the possible narrative impact of his preference for direct discourse (cf. Benardete 1984: I.86–7; Polansky 1992: 37; Tschemplik 1993: 171, 177; Howland 1998: 44).

[205] 275a–e; cf. *Ep. VII* 341abc, 344ab, *Prot.* 329a; Xen. *Mem.* 4.2.1.

[206] 162d–163a, 164e, 169de, 171d.

(164e). Instead, he introduces a succession of spokesmen for the sophist, all of whom who fail to speak for him adequately: Theaitetos, Theodoros, and Sokrates himself. This forms a sharp contrast with *Republic*, where Glaukon and Adeimantos defend Thrasymachos' ideas more powerfully than he does himself. Plato is well aware of the game he is playing with the absent sophist here. "Protagoras" complains that the young, inexperienced Theaitetos is inadequate to defend his ideas (166a). And when Sokrates insists on addressing Theodoros *as* "Protagoras" (170a, c; 178b), this makes us acutely conscious of who he is not. To place Protagoras' ideas in the mouth of their "parent," or even of another equally competent and committed speaker, would be to deny the death of the author, and thus to evade the problem at issue: how does an intellectual infant fare on its own in the harsh world of "disinterested" inquiry? Plato thereby challenges us to consider how any dead writer (such as himself) may succeed in transmitting ideas to future generations (such as ourselves).

Eukleides and Terpsion offer us one model of how to use an absent author's writings: passive, uncritical respect. Sokrates himself offers us another, by using Protagoras' book as raw material for analysis, discussion, and eventual intellectual destruction. Like any Greek, he uses Protagoras' text for his own purposes, in a fragmentary and arbitrary fashion, showing no interest in the integrity of the text. This kind of use is predicated on acknowledging the radical absence, or death, of the author, which denies us access to his living thoughts and his own ways of defending them, and consequently denies him control of the uses we may choose to make of his words. Sokrates claims, however, that he actually *is* heeding Protagoras' complaints, by attempting to refute his ideas at their strongest rather than simply discrediting their author.[207] And the equation of Sokrates with philosophy itself suggests that his view is privileged as transcending others in reason and objectivity (above, p. 273). This is reinforced by the "midwife"'s denial of productivity, which presents Sokrates as a *tabula rasa* against which all views may fairly and "objectively" be tested. By placing the defense of Protagoras into Sokrates' mouth, then, Plato seems to endow it with the maximum independent weight and detachment.

As we have seen, however, Sokrates has his own pre-established personal perspective, which of course is shared by his look-alike, Theaitetos. In the absence of its "parent," Protagoras' "orphan" does not stand a chance against discussants whose outlook has already been shaped

[207] 165a, e, 168de, 179cd.

by their investment in Socratic dialectic, since this is fundamentally opposed to the outlook that gave it birth. Accordingly, Sokrates represents Protagoras' views in ways that are subtly self-defeating precisely because they are not dispassionate in a Socratic sense. Sokrates' role as the ventriloquist of this farce enables him to defeat "Protagoras" in a way that he could never have defeated Protagoras (except in the unlikely event of the latter making the same concessions as the former). To attain real objectivity, it might be argued, *no* embodied person should be present at the conversation. Like the philosopher of the digression, the participants should lack all recognizable human features, and scrutinize Protagoras' ideas from "nowhere." But the ideal of the view from nowhere is itself Socratic, and as such the antithesis of Protagorean relativism.

"Protagoras" complains at not being allowed to speak for himself (166abc), but in fact this is true of all the characters. One effect of the dramatic prologue is to remind us that all of them are ventriloquations of Eukleides, and hence of Plato who stands behind him. Within the central conversation, Plato's repeated references to the dead Protagoras' absence,[208] and thus to his fictionality as a ventriloquation of Sokrates, draws attention more obliquely to the death of those characters who are "present," including Sokrates, and hence to Plato's creative presence behind them as well. This is especially true of the moment when Sokrates introduces the extraordinary image of Protagoras poking his head up from the earth (171cd) – presumably from the underworld to which death has consigned him.[209] This forcefully reminds us that it is the power of Plato's imagination that is conjuring and controlling all the characters, including Sokrates, and hence that his representations too are inescapably colored by a personal perspective and agenda. If no one is adequate to defend Protagoras, in his absence, on the basis of his written words, how much less is anyone adequate to defend Sokrates, in his absence, on the basis of the written words placed into his mouth by Plato. The dialogue thus bears out the misgivings voiced by Sokrates and "Protagoras" about the possibility of speaking for another. In doing so, it also casts doubt on the usefulness of committing Plato's own works to writing – unless he too is willing to expose his offspring to the depredation of unsympathetic "defenders." The dialogue as a whole seems pessimistic, then, about the possibility of transmitting Sokrates through the medium of the written word. To use such writings passively is un-Socratic, whereas to use them creatively is, it seems, to expose the

[208] 162d, 165e, 171cd. [209] On this image see esp. Lee 1973: 242–61; Ford 1994.

author and his characters to intellectual assault in such a way that they risk a second death.

Yet Plato's use of dramatic form leaves open another possible avenue towards Socratic reproduction, through the mechanisms of mimetic pedagogy. Unlike the dialogues we have looked at so far, *Theaetetus* does not concern itself with mimesis as such. But it strongly thematizes questions of likeness, with special emphasis on the role of likeness in learning, which underlies both mimetic pedagogy and this dialogue's concern with intellectual self-reproduction. In particular, *Theaetetus* implies that to learn from Sokrates one must already be like Sokrates. It does this by dramatizing a potential Sokrates learning from his actualized self. In addition, the dialogue activates the traditional view of thinking as a dialectical process involving more than one internal voice. In combination with the unique resemblance between the two main characters, this suggests a different way for Plato's readers to approach the problem of Socratic reproduction.

To the extent that Sokrates and Theaitetos share the same qualities of character, the properly Socratic reader – who also shares those qualities – will be able to identify with both these Socratic figures. As a result, she may end up with a genuine dialogue "written" in her soul, not just by mechanically accepting Sokrates' arguments, but by participating in and continuing the discussion. Since more than one such figure is represented, this internal dialogue can be open and productive rather than fixed or mechanical. This both reduces the risks of passive identification and helps to compensate for Sokrates' continuing intellectual dominance. At the same time, the age difference between Sokrates and Theaitetos – with their consequent differences in experience, creativity, and argumentative skill – leaves open a range of possibilities for the path such a dialogue might take, depending on the age and experience of the Socratic reader. The fact that the dialogue's own discussion is inconclusive is also important here. Since thought is defined as reaching agreement between two conversational parts or partners, and since Sokrates and Theaitetos never do agree on the nature of knowledge, a person who absorbs both of them as models is obliged to continue the dialogue independently in her own mind. Such a person will end up with a truly Socratic, yet at the same time truly independent, internal dialogue. She will thus imitate Sokrates not in a superficial or passive fashion, but in the active way that Theaitetos does, reproducing central Socratic principles (structural imitation) in a way that parallels Sokrates' own imitation of god.

Just as Theaitetos can learn from Sokrates only because he is already like him, so too, the dialogue suggests, reading this text may result in the reproduction of Sokrates in the reader, but only if that reader is *already* of the right character. Here we return to the paradox that like is attracted to like, and thus becomes more like it. One must already be Socratic (as Theaitetos is) if one is to internalize the character of Sokrates and thus become progressively more Socratic, in accordance with the pedagogical implications of likeness. It follows that we will only be attracted to Sokrates, and further assimilated to him, if we are already sufficiently like him, and like him in the right ways.[210] And only if we are the right kind of people will we succeed in internalizing his dialogue with Theaitetos. Again, Theaitetos' resemblance to Sokrates is crucial here. For in order to internalize a properly dialectical argument, i.e. one involving exchanges between two voices, one must be able to identify with *both* the characters involved. And a corollary of Theaitetos' ideal intellectual character is that all and only those readers or listeners with the right philosophical credentials can identify with him. Specifically, we must share his resemblance to Sokrates in order to internalize both him and Sokrates as aspects of ourselves. Theaitetos' presence and his particular character thus enable the sufficiently Socratic reader to identify with two Socratic figures in discussion, with the result that he or she can internalize two dialogic voices as authentic parts of the self without straying from the Socratic ideal. A range of individuality among different readers is possible, but it must be on the scale of potentiality and actuality that links Theaitetos to Sokrates. A fundamental likeness between Sokrates, ourselves, and Theaitetos is therefore necessary if we are to attempt to reach beyond personal and even human limitations towards the ideal philosopher's "likeness to god."

But what of the non-Socratic reader? The unusual prologue of this work, together with its treatment of Protagoras and his book, suggests in Plato a certain resignation about exposing his Sokrates to the various forms of abuse to which written texts are open. The passive reader will remain passive, and fail to learn how to become Sokrates in any way other than the superficial. The active but hostile reader will use him, as he uses Protagoras, for his or her own ends. This is part of the price to be paid for creating a text to which the active, Socratic reader may respond in an active, Socratic fashion. By consigning Sokrates to writing, then,

[210] Alkibiades, for example, is attracted to Sokrates and resembles him in certain non-superficial ways, but it is hard to imagine him getting very far with *Theaetetus*.

Plato is also offering him up for re-execution by the unsocratic reader. Such readers do, of course, participate in a dialogue with Plato in their own way, as they have been doing for thousands of years. In this sense the written word remains out of the control of the author, who, along with his characters, is destined to be rekilled and reconstituted innumerable times. As history makes plain, dialogue form as such cannot prevent this, and indeed may plausibly be seen as encouraging it (cf. above, p. 44). But Plato's decision to *write* his dialogues implies that this is a price worth paying, if the dialogue is to find truly Socratic readers in the future. The right kind of reader will learn from the dialogue how to do *Socratic* dialectic, thus allowing Sokrates to be reborn through the agency of Plato's text. In view of Plato's portrayal of the uniqueness of Sokrates, this prospect must remain dim. But if such a person were to arise in a different time and place, she could be unique on her own terms: there would be no danger of any unheroic doubling of Sokrates in his own cultural moment. The imitation in question would be structural, rather than slavish.

This brings us back to Terpsion and Eukleides. Like Apollodoros and Aristodemos in *Symposium*, these enthusiasts lack the proper qualities to benefit from their own taste for Socratic tales. But both dialogues exemplify by means of their dramatic structure the value of such Socratic wannabes for transmitting these tales to others. Perhaps there is a positive role after all for the mindless memorizer, the rhapsode or the book, for Eukleides and even for his slave.[211] Such quasi-automatic recording devices may transmit the conversations of Sokrates from those who were there at the time down to a new generation of readers, just as iron rings transmit "magnetic" inspiration from the Muses, who were "there" at Troy, to the rhapsode and his audience.[212] Plato, a member of the rhapsode's audience, was evidently inspired by such transmissions to emulate and transform Homer in an active, critical fashion. So too the text of Sokrates' conversations, even when transmitted by a slave or a book, may once again light the spark of philosophy in appropriate minds, perhaps even in a mind equal to Sokrates' or Plato's own. Given the scarcity of genuinely Socratic readers – a scarcity presumed by the intellectual elitism of Plato/Sokrates – the passive transmission of the text may even be an essential stage in permitting Sokrates to be reborn in future generations.

[211] Cf. also Antiphon in *Parm.*, who acts as a kind of reluctant philosophical parrot, and so gives us the substance of that dialogue (126c–127a; cf. Miller 1986: 17–18).

[212] *Ion* 533d–536d; cf. Hom. *Il.* 2. 484–93.

The importance of such transmission, as well as the personal insignificance of its agents, is indicated by the structure of the prologue. On the one hand, Terpsion, Eukleides, and the slave control the whole of the ensuing conversation. On the other, they are entirely forgotten as the work proceeds, while we, the readers, are drawn into the philosophical argument as if it lacked any such intermediaries. This results in part from Eukleides' preference for direct dramatic form, which utterly erases him from his own account. Plato never takes us back to these passive characters, or closes the dramatic frame in such a way as to suggest a final ending to the Socratic conversation. The participants are to reconvene the next day (210d), and in Plato's fictional world they will do so for the conversations portrayed in *Sophist* and *Statesman*. These techniques also indicate that the discourse transmitted by such a means is one that we are invited to continue in our own fashion. The argument can only live on if it is granted independence from the original living human beings who gave it birth.

But we, its readers, are likewise inescapably embodied arguers, whose practice of dialectic is unavoidably colored by our personal and cultural circumstances. This will prevent most of us from responding Socratically to Sokrates, as Plato's Socratic works en masse make very clear. If we are to be among the few exceptions, we must already share the qualities that inform Sokrates' outlook in this dialogue. His true heir will be the reader who embraces the essential features of the Socratic character, and continues the conversation of *Theaetetus* within herself. This interior conversation must display the intellectual independence that is essential to Sokrates' persona, but without repudiating the other Socratic values expressed, discursively and dramatically, within this work. In order to philosophize Socratically, we must, it seems, first *become* Sokrates, then look into the mirror of our own minds.

CHAPTER 6

Putting Sokrates in his place: Sophist *and* Statesman

PLATO'S TRIAD

The last chapter was concerned with *Theaetetus* on its own terms. But it is also the first of a triad of dialogues, completed by *Sophist* and *Statesman*, which are linked by a variety of thematic and structural connections.[1] These three works are also bound together by formal features, in a way that is unparalleled among Plato's works. These features include dramatic sequencing, explicit cross-references, and an overlapping cast of characters. At the end of *Theaetetus* Sokrates looks forward to continuing his conversation with Theaitetos and Theodoros the next day (210d); at the beginning of *Sophist* Theodoros alludes to "yesterday's agreement" to continue (216a); and in *Statesman*, Sokrates refers back explicitly to his first meeting with Theaitetos and the previous day's discussion (257a, 258a). The explicitness and the dramatic character of these links distinguish them from other forms of Platonic intertextuality, and invite us to read these three works together, in a certain sequence, and in each other's light.

These interconnections, both thematic and dramatic, draw attention to the differences in form and content among the three works, as well as the similarities. The most striking of these is a series of discontinuities between *Theaetetus* on the one hand, and *Sophist* and *Statesman* on the other. The latter are markedly similar to each other in style, and unlike *Theaetetus*, form part of the group of Plato's dialogues known – relatively uncontroversially – as "late."[2] Dramatic indicators also make it plausible to view *Sophist* and *Statesman* as a "diptych," more closely tied to each other than to *Theaetetus*.[3] Not only do they take place on the same day, but

[1] On the thematic unity of this triad see esp. Dorter 1994; cf. also Campbell 1883: lv–lix; Sayre 1969: 138–40; M. Frede 1996: 145–8. They are often called "Plato's trilogy," but the dramatic analogy is misleading (above, p. 8).

[2] See Campbell 1867: I. i–xlv and above, pp. 11–12.

[3] See Lane 1998: 6–8; Haslam 1976 even argues that they are parts of a single work.

they are linked by Sokrates' initial interest in the figures of sophist and statesman (*Soph.* 217a). *Statesman* represents a clear and explicit continuation of the conversation begun in *Sophist*, to which it repeatedly alludes.[4]

There is also a marked break between *Theaetetus* on the one hand, and *Sophist* and *Statesman* on the other, in the identities and roles of the dramatis personae. In *Theaetetus*, the dominant character is Sokrates and his interlocutors are Theaitetos and Theodoros, with young Sokrates and perhaps some other unnamed youths present as silent bystanders (cf. *Tht.* 144bc). In *Sophist*, Theaitetos, Theodoros, Sokrates and young Sokrates are all once again present, with the possibility of additional silent bystanders (*Soph.* 217d, 218a). But they are now joined by the visitor from Elea, who takes the "Socratic" role of questioner and remains the dominant character throughout this work and the next. In both dialogues Sokrates himself plays a part similar to that of Theodoros in *Theaetetus*, introducing the young interlocutor and then standing by silently for the rest of the conversation.[5] This dethroning of Sokrates is the single most striking change between *Theaetetus* and *Sophist* – not to mention a striking departure from the bulk of Plato's oeuvre.

As for the interlocutors, Theaitetos and Theodoros, the engaging and sharply differentiated participants of *Theaetetus*, are replaced first by Theaitetos alone and then, in *Statesman*, by his friend, young Sokrates. This switch is the only major dramatic change between *Sophist* and *Statesman* (the identities of all the dramatis personae remain exactly the same). Theodoros is elided entirely from the substance of both dialogues. In so far as he is characterized, however, he retains traits similar to those he displayed in *Theaetetus*. In *Sophist* he is portrayed, as in *Theaetetus*, as deficient in Socratic irony and play, through his correction of Sokrates' exalted speculations about the visitor (*Soph.* 216b). *Statesman* also briefly recalls his role in *Theaetetus* by signaling his earnestness, his philosophical inadequacy, and his view that the young make the best respondents (*Stat.* 257abc). His foreignness is also emphasized, as in *Theaetetus*, this time by his invocation of the African god Ammon (*Stat.* 257b).

This brief survey of the triad's dramatis personae shows a striking pattern of substitutions in the main participants. Sokrates is replaced by the visitor in the second and third works, and Theaitetos by young Sokrates

[4] *Stat.* 266d, 284b, 286b, 291c, 299b, 303bc.

[5] *Soph.* 217d, *Stat.* 257e–258a. Some editors (most recently Rowe 1995b) assign Sokrates the final comment in *Stat.*, but I see no good reason for this (cf. Campbell 1867: II. 191, Friedländer 1964–9: III. 304 and 525 n. 2). Aside from other considerations, the dramatic frame is almost never closed in Plato's works, including the other two members of this triad (cf. above, p. 47).

in the third – a pattern sharpened by the squeezing of Theodoros into a minor role. These overlapping substitutions not only link the dialogues dramatically, but place the second and third members of the triad in a very different dramatic light from the first, since their reading is colored by our knowledge of these substitutions. Reading the dialogues in dramatic sequence reveals an unmistakable move towards blandness and lack of individuality in the characterization of both the dominant speaker and his interlocutors. In *Theaetetus* the participants, in David Bostock's words, "are deftly characterized, there are many touches of humour and a little by-play . . . and above all we have a genuine conversation."[6] The characters of *Sophist* and *Statesman* seem dull and lifeless by contrast, and their conversations are scarcely compelling representations of particular human interactions. This shift is often seen in terms of a Platonic literary decline. Thus Bostock speaks of "a distinct falling off in Plato's dramatic powers."[7] Campbell rather delightfully suggested that this was caused by Plato's desire to address the problem of non-being, since "pure Eleaticism has no doubt a great effect in drying up the springs of imaginative expression."[8] But this way of understanding the significance of Plato's altered style is not particularly useful. Though not to the taste of many "literary" readers, these changes have their own implications, both literary and philosophical, some of which I shall be exploring in what follows.

The movement towards the generic in characterization is accompanied by a parallel move towards indeterminacy in the dramatic setting. *Theaetetus* opens with a narrative prelude indicating that the original conversation took place in Athens, but was written down by Eukleides and is now being read aloud to him and Terpsion in Megara, many years later. Since the three dialogues are dramatically linked, this prologue introduces the whole triad. Some interpreters have therefore assumed that the Megarian frame should be taken to persist in *Sophist* and *Statesman*. But there is no dramatic evidence for this. Had Plato wished to clarify the point, he could easily have added young Sokrates and the Eleatic visitor to the list of persons with whom Sokrates tells Eukleides that he conversed on this occasion (*Tht.* 143b). *Sophist* and *Statesman* thus detach themselves into a diptych of direct dialogues, whose formal simplicity invites us to

[6] 1988: 12.

[7] Bostock loc. cit.; cf. e.g. Rutherford 1995: 280. Most readers have shared this dim view of these two dialogues' literary merits (cf. Lane 1998: 1–2), though some have rallied in their defense (cf. Campbell 1867: I. xliii; Guthrie 1978: 124, 164; Benitez 1996: 27–8).

[8] 1883: lvi.

read them as dramatically transparent, erasing such contextual factors as the process of transmission, geographical location, and the passage of time. This erasure of any reminder of editorial influence has the further effect of eliding Plato's controlling authorial role.

Plato's silence, in these two dialogues, regarding the Megarian frame leaves us with a disconcerting indeterminacy, a kind of imaginative vacuum. There is a parallel move from explicitness to indeterminacy in the representation of the circumstances of the original conversations, including their exact location. It is usually assumed that *Sophist* and *Statesman* take place in the same gymnasium or palaestra as the central conversation of *Theaetetus*. Yet there is no evidence for this beyond the promise of a renewed discussion at the end of *Theaetetus* (210c).[9] Even the assumption that these conversations take place in Athens must be extrapolated from *Theaetetus* (though this is easy enough to do, since we would certainly need to be told if the company had left Athens overnight). Similarly, the central conversation of *Theaetetus* is clearly marked as occurring on a highly significant date – the day that Sokrates is to face the indictment of Meletos. Accordingly, his death casts its shadow over the conversation as a whole. *Sophist* and *Statesman* are supposed to take place the day after. Accordingly, many critics have emphasized the continuing importance of Sokrates' death for understanding this pair of dialogues as well.[10] Yet much more noteworthy, to my mind, is the *absence* of explicit dramatic references to his trial and death in the latter pair of works.[11] Without the existence of *Theaetetus*, we would have no idea at all of their dramatic date or its potential significance. This creates a temporal indeterminacy paralleling the conversations' indeterminate location.

These issues may seem extraneous to our understanding of the central conversations of *Sophist* and *Statesman*. But in fact they exert a significant impact on interpretation, by shaping the way in which the two dialogues are dramatically imagined – written or oral, reported or direct, spoken by a slave or the dramatis personae themselves, taking place in Athens during Sokrates' lifetime, or at Megara many years later. In what follows, I shall try to pay due attention to these various factors, including both the similarities and the differences among all three dialogues, and also the resulting tensions.

[9] Campbell notes that Plato could have taken the opportunity to introduce a reference to such surroundings at *Stat.* 294d, but did not do so (1867: I. xxii, II. 138–9).

[10] Cf. e.g. Miller 1980: 2; Griswold 1989: 142; M. Morgan 1993: 85–6; Sallis 1996: 457; Gonzalez 2000: 162–3.

[11] This does not rule out less explicit allusions to these events, some of which I shall discuss below, pp. 388–9.

THE MAN WITH NO NAME

I turn first to look more closely at the marked shift towards the generic, between *Theaetetus* and *Sophist*, in the characterization of the dominant speaker. *Theaetetus* was much concerned with the uniqueness, or strangeness, of Sokrates, marked both by his midwife's mission and by his famously ugly appearance. Despite Theaitetos' resemblance to him, this uniqueness was maintained through Sokrates' intellectual dominance. The introduction of the visitor, however, indicates by dramatic means that Sokrates is no longer unique, or at least that he is dispensable as the controlling speaker in a sustained philosophical discussion. By doing so it uncovers the dramatic sleight-of-hand whereby Theaitetos, in his eponymous dialogue, both is and is not Sokrates' equal, and Sokrates both is and is not replaceable in Plato's text. In *Sophist* and *Statesman* Plato calls his own bluff, acknowledging dramatically that in order to suggest that Sokrates is replaceable, he must actually replace him, not with a young and malleable look-alike, but with a comparably powerful, creative and mature philosopher.

The introduction of the visitor suggests that the philosopher may be a generic type, not limited to or intrinsically bound up with the unique figure of Sokrates. This effect is produced in at least two ways. First, the simple fact of substitution, especially while Sokrates himself remains present, suggests that Sokrates is no longer uniquely qualified for the practice of philosophy. Second, the visitor lacks personal individuation. In contrast to Sokrates, we hear nothing about his appearance. Nor is he even given a name. The latter is not some kind of dramatic convenience. If anything, it is the opposite. In ancient Greece, only when a man's name was unknown was he addressed by a generic marker like "visitor," even if he was a foreigner. Moreover "the use of address by name was so expected in certain situations that authors sometimes felt uncomfortable if they did not know the name of the person addressed."[12] Accordingly, the visitor's namelessness generates a certain awkwardness when he first appears. He is brought into the conversation at the opening of *Sophist* in an oddly abrupt way. The other participants identify and discuss him in the third person, without greetings (which commonly serve to establish identity), introductions (which would require names), or explanations as to what this person is doing in their company. He is not addressed directly until a philosophical question is raised, and does not speak until invited to answer that question (*Soph.* 217ab). The same pattern recurs at the

[12] Dickey 1996: 44. For the above points see ibid. 43–50, 146–9.

beginning of *Statesman*, where it is closely followed by some word-play on Sokrates' part regarding naming and kinship (*Stat.* 257b–258a). This not only echoes the visitor's intellectual concern with likeness, "kinship" and proper "naming," but draws attention to his personal namelessness.[13]

What is the effect of this anonymity? Naming is a profoundly important means of bestowing both individuality and cultural identity (cf. above, p. 68). In the theatrical tradition, according to Marvin Carlson, even apparently generic names like Lady Sneerwell "always maintain a pretense of individuality," whereas labels like The Father, The Son or (we may add) The Visitor, stress "the typical at the expense of the individual."[14] It follows that to deny a literary character a name is to deny him acknowledgement of an individual identity within the cultural universe of the work in which he or she appears. Thus the common dramatic – and Platonic – practice of leaving slaves and underlings unnamed confirms their status as functionaries or members of a class.[15] We may also compare the practice of referring to women in public only as the daughter or wife of their male guardian (*kurios*). This too indicates a functional identity (though with different implications concerning gender, status and decorum). The Eleatic visitor is identified in comparably generic, functional terms. He is (a) "some kind of a foreigner/visitor" (*xenos*); (b) an Elean by race or kind (*genos*); (c) a "comrade" (*hetairos*) of the circle of Parmenides and Zeno; (d) "a most philosophical man" (216a). His defining features – besides his unmarked masculinity, Greekness and class – are thus his non-Athenianness, his Eleatic intellectual associations, and his occupation as a philosopher.[16]

The labelling of the visitor as a *xenos* or non-Athenian reinforces the lack of a determinate identity suggested by his namelessness.[17] A *xenos* is a visitor, stranger, friend, guest, host. The term thus captures this character's ambiguous status as both friend and outsider, in Athens but not of Athens.[18] We are reminded several times of his outsider status, not

[13] On "naming" and division cf. Lane 1998: 25–6 and passim; Notomi 1999: 74–6. The "naming" sought by division is a naming of kinds, not individuals, but this too is relevant to the visitor, whose *kind* of identity (sophist, statesman, philosopher) is in question (below, p. 325).

[14] 1990: 36.

[15] For Aristotle, slaves are notionally not even human beings, but "living tools" (*Pol.* 1253b27–33).

[16] We are not told until later that he is an old man (*Soph.* 232e).

[17] The qualifying τις adds a further element of indeterminacy that is not strictly translatable.

[18] I prefer "visitor" to the more usual "stranger," since (a) it captures this friendly yet liminal character more aptly; (b) it conveys the asymmetry of *xenos*, which is used only "by natives of the place in which it is spoken, to addressees who come from somewhere else" (Dickey 1996: 146); (c) it avoids the misleading resonances of the English "strange." I leave the word uncapitalized in order to maintain its generic character as distinct from a proper name.

just by the repeated address to him as "visitor" (*xene*) – which occurs a dozen times in each dialogue – but by various conversational details (e.g. *Stat.* 294d). On the negative side, he lacks the defining features that situate nearly all Plato's characters within the fabric of Athenian life. Even non-Athenian named characters usually have a social status, civic identity or métier that are clarified in relation to Athenian social and intellectual structures. Theodoros, for example, is a foreigner whose cultural niche is defined by his professional status and social connections. Even visiting sophists, who as a class are disembedded from Athenian political institutions, have a function and vested interest in the democratic process (cf. above, pp. 118–19). The Eleatic visitor, by contrast, seems entirely unengaged in Athenian life. He pays no attention to his own citizenship or that of others, and speaks of contemporary constitutions for the most part in very general terms, even when alluding to Athenian practices.[19] While confirming by his presence the status of Athens as the center of the philosophical universe, at the same time he transcends any such intellectual parochialism.

The visitor lacks not just Athenian ties, however, but virtually *all* the social and personal ties that serve to embed an individual in a particular society at a particular time – most notably the ties of family. This is related to his namelessness, and the concomitant absence of personal introductions and greetings. Naming entails family connections, and "son of So-and-So" is one of the commonest Greek forms of identification and address. It is therefore hardly surprising that the nameless visitor's only acknowledged human tie is a philosophical one, to his intellectual "father" Parmenides. He shows enormous respect for this "father." Nonetheless, he will "disobey" and even "assault" him, by criticizing his most distinctive views.[20] Attacking one's father is, of course, the ultimate crime, frequently used in ancient Greek texts to betoken social, ethical and personal decline.[21] Aristophanes presents this kind of physical assault as a direct consequence of intellectual rebellion (*Clouds* 1353–79). The visitor's lack of deference towards his intellectual "father" is thus a disavowal of the paternalistic educational tradition. It also symbolizes a rejection of the power of the personal, embodied world to influence the force of argument – a rejection of the inevitable groundedness of philosophy in the particular.[22]

[19] See Rowe 1995b on *Stat.* 298d7–8, e6–7, and cf. Narcy 1995: 231.
[20] *Soph.* 241d, 242a, 258c.
[21] Cf. *Crito* 50e–51c, *Euth.* 4e, *Phd.* 113e–114a, *Laws* 931a–e, *Rep.* 465ab, 574bc, Hes. *WD* 185–8, 327–334, Ar. *Clouds* 1321–33.
[22] Contrast Theodoros' reluctance in *Tht.* to attack his "friend" Protagoras, a reluctance that conveys his commitment to standard cultural values (above, pp. 286–7).

The visitor is not even identified as a strict Parmenidean. He comes from Elea and is associated with Eleatic philosophy, but does not have a sharply defined philosophical identity, being simply one of the circle of "comrades" surrounding Parmenides and Zeno. His most prominent method – that of division – is appropriate in various ways to a follower of Parmenides, and his use of myth has Parmenidean antecedents. But neither of these modes of discourse is distinctively Eleatic. Rather, "Elea" stands for philosophy as such, or at least for philosophy in the sense inaugurated by Parmenides, as a rigorous analytical practice grounded in verbal precision and logical consistency.[23] As several interpreters have observed, it is unclear, when Sokrates wonders what people in "that region" think (*Soph.* 217a), whether he is referring to Elea or to "the place from which the true philosophers look down," an ambiguity that suggests an identification of Elea with the true philosopher's realm.[24] The visitor's home, as well as his "lineage," abstracts him from personal ties and commitments.

This minimal and symbolic identity, along with his namelessness, strongly suggests that the visitor is fictional.[25] Though this cannot be proven, it is a plausible enough hypothesis. Whether or not he is fictional, however, his namelessness and lack of individual personality make him so for practical purposes. Even at the time of composition, no one outside the most intimate of Platonic circles could possibly have identified him with any confidence. Conversely, if he *was* known by such insiders, we would expect him to be named if his identity was important to his dramatic role. We must therefore ask ourselves what Plato gains by introducing a fictitious (or effectively fictitious) character as the central player in these two works.

The most obvious such benefit is that it frees Plato from the baggage of historicity. A real person, the specifics of whose life and character would be more or less well known to Plato's audience, can be researched, attacked or defended, and might even, if still alive at the time of writing, critique his own representation in Plato's text (cf. above, p. 32). Plato does, of course, use fictionality in all kinds of ways in his dialogues. But this particular kind of fictionality – the creation of a character ex nihilo – serves a special purpose, in that it detaches a character from the audience's background knowledge of personages already familiar from other sources, including historical fact, legend, gossip, and other texts, fictional or otherwise, by Plato himself and other writers. To put it

[23] Cf. Sedley 1995: 6.
[24] Cf. Benardete 1984: II.72–3; Scodel 1987: 22 n. 4; Benitez 1996: 35–6.
[25] This common view can be traced back at least to Diog. Laert. 3.52.

another way, the visitor's anonymity and lack of historical identity confine his character to the limits of the text, thus eliminating the possibility of *emphasis* (above, p. 34). Most importantly, this strategy enables Plato to jettison the baggage of Socratic characterization, baggage that he himself had largely created by making Sokrates the central player in so many of his dialogues.

In other contexts (such as the modern novel) fictionality may serve as a licence for the creation of individual characters through the concatenation of idiosyncratic elements. But Plato uses it to opposite effect, that is, to eliminate the constraints of concrete specificity, which underwrites idiosyncrasy by embedding it in the "real" or historical world. As we have seen, his varied treatments of Sokrates vividly illustrate the difficulty of embodying an ideal philosophical character in a concrete historical individual, and of using that single figure to explore a changing model of the philosopher. Fictionality, then, aids Plato in the production of a generic philosophical figure lacking any extraneous features of the "real" world. It is true that some of Plato's non-fictional and named characters may seem equally generic in personality (e.g. the characters of *Timaeus* and *Critias*). But despite their lack of personality in Plato's text, most of these people did have historical identities more or less well known to his audience. These may be – and often are – pursued by the eager interpreter even when Plato gives us little more than a name to go on.[26] The visitor's namelessness and putative fictionality add a further dimension, by signaling that the search for an underlying historical person is, in his case, not just difficult but meaningless. Plato thereby invites us to ask not who the stranger is, but what he stands for.

While short-circuiting the search for personal identity outside the text, the visitor's namelessness simultaneously encourages the construction of a larger identity of a different kind: that of a generic ideal. Thus the namelessness of Clint Eastwood's character in the "spaghetti" Westerns (alluded to in the heading of this section) contributes to his iconic status as a "Western" hero. Similarly, the visitor's namelessness, by reinforcing his lack of civic or personal identity, helps him to function as a blank screen onto which a generic model of the philosopher may be projected. Accordingly, he lacks any idiosyncratic character traits of a kind that might suggest departure from an ideal aesthetic or moral standard (cf. above, pp. 60–62). He himself regards his distinctive method (the

[26] Cf. the scholarly attempts to identify which Kritias is the Kritias of *Critias* (Welliver 1977: 50–57; Brisson 1998: 27–9; Lampert and Planeaux 1998: 95–100). For a dubiously successful attempt to individualize the characters of *Tim.-Crit.* see Welliver 1977.

method of division) as definitive of the true philosopher (*Soph.* 253cde). He is, then, in Rowe's words, "a representative *par excellence* of philosophy."[27] As such he embodies a generic philosophical ideal, not by being perfect or infallible – qualities unattainable by any human being – but by embodying certain desirable philosophical qualities that strive to transcend particularity, including flexibility, breadth of scope, and detachment from personal and cultural circumstances.

That the visitor functions in some such way is signaled at the outset, when Sokrates suggests that he is a god – identifying him specifically with Zeus, supreme god of the Greek pantheon, in his cosmopolitan role as god of strangers – then accepts Theodoros' amendment: qua philosopher, the visitor is godlike rather than a god (*Soph.* 216abc). The use of such exalted language by Plato's Sokrates is sometimes obviously ironic.[28] But it often voices a powerful, and intensely serious, association of philosophy with divinity.[29] In the present case, he neither mocks nor challenges the Eleatic visitor's philosophical or "godlike" credentials. We therefore cannot assume that Sokrates' praise for the visitor is ironic. And later there will be signs that this identification has serious implications. The visitor's access to the myth and his links to the "divine" figure of the ideal statesman both give him superhuman associations (below, pp. 356, 325). He even resembles the divine demiurge in his "construction" of a cosmos in words.[30]

This understanding of the visitor is supported by a clear allusion to the digression of *Theaetetus*, with its philosophical ideal of "likeness to god," its opposition between the ideal philosopher and his inferiors (the *phauloi*), and the philosopher's detachment from the concerns of individual cities. At the beginning of *Sophist* the visitor is described, qua "godlike" and genuine philosopher, as one of those who wander around "looking down from on high at life below," in contrast to the rest of the company, who are his inferiors (*phauloi*) (216abc).[31] His disembeddedness from Athenian life allows him to travel like the free-floating *dianoia* of *Theaetetus*' ideal philosopher. Other echoes of the digression include

[27] 1995b: 11; cf. also H. Joly 1992: 90–91; Szlezák 1997: 93–6.

[28] E.g. *Euthyd.* 273e–274a, *Rep.* 331e.

[29] Division in particular is associated with divinity by Sokrates at *Phdr.* 266b, 273e; cf. *Phileb.* 16cde. On the divinity of the philosopher see also M. Morgan 1993: 108–111; McPherran 1993b: 116–21.

[30] Cf. Rosen 1979: 65, 75 and below, pp. 357–65. Note also the role played by "division" in the divine organization of the world (*Stat.* 271d).

[31] Detachment and "looking down" also suit the "friends of the Forms," who are characterized as "gods" in the "battle against the giants" (*Soph.* 246ab; cf. also *Rep.* 500b); Dorter suggests a link between these "gods" and the "godlike" visitor (1994: 180). The god of the myth in *Stat.* also "looks down" on a world apart (*Stat.* 272e3–5, 273d5; cf. Campbell 1867: II. 63).

the visitor's insistence on speaking at whatever length is appropriate,[32] his bewilderment in the face of contemporary politics, which makes ordinary politicians seem like centaurs, satyrs and multifarious beasts,[33] his characterization of division as "free men's knowledge,"[34] his erasure of the distinction between Greeks and "barbarians,"[35] his lack of interest in social status,[36] and in individual human beings as such,[37] and his potential to seem like a lunatic.[38] All this makes it plausible to view this visiting philosopher, with his unrootedness and minimized human particularity, as an attempt to dramatize certain features of the ideal in the digression.

The visitor himself says that the philosopher dwelling in divine light is hard for the many to perceive, suggesting that he is not a readily recognizable human figure (*Soph.* 254ab). And full divinity, in his myth, is immaterial, homogeneous, unchanging, and uniform in motion (*Stat.* 269d; cf. above, p. 266 n. 57). As we have seen, however, it is impossible for a dramatized character – as opposed to the abstract figure of the digression's philosopher – to lack *all* normal determinants of human status and identity. The visitor's blandness takes him a considerable distance away from human *poikilia* towards "divine" consistency. But if he is to participate in human conversation, the godlike visitor can neither dwell in divine light nor depart from his body and fly into the heavens. Though no reference is made to his physicality or looks, we cannot envisage him without any body at all. In contrast to the undramatized philosopher of the digression, who does not, qua living human being, exist, the visitor travels the world with his feet on the ground, engaging in intellectual discussion with the *phauloi.* Like the Homeric gods to whom Sokrates likens him, such a person must adopt concrete human form in order to interact with other humans. He is thus forced to take on some specific identity. Sokrates suggests three such identities for the embodied philosopher: sophist, statesman and madman (*Soph.* 216cd). This suggests that the philosopher per se – that is to say, the undisguised philosopher – is as unrepresentable as the philosopher of the digression.[39]

[32] Below, pp. 368–70; cf. *Tht.* 172d. [33] *Stat.* 291bc; cf. *Tht.* 173cd, 174b–e.

[34] *Soph.* 253c; cf. *Tht.* 172e–173c. [35] *Stat.* 262c–263a; cf. *Tht.* 175a and below, pp. 361–2.

[36] *Stat.* 261c–268c; cf. *Tht.* 174d and below, p. 362.

[37] As Campbell observes, the nameless visitor names no one in his analysis (1867: I. ii). Cf. *Tht.* 173d–174b.

[38] *Soph.* 216d, 252a; for *Tht.* see above, pp. 290–91.

[39] Cf. Sallis 1996: 460–61. Note that the verb used at *Soph.* 216d1 is φαντάζομαι, which anticipates the "phantasms" or false images discussed later (below, pp. 366–7). Compare the view that Plato never wrote the dialogue *Philosopher* because to represent the philosopher adequately would be impossible (cf. Friedländer 1964–9: III.281; Miller 1980: 10; Dorter 1994: 235–6). I am sympathetic

The same passage also invites us to pay attention to any likenesses or differences between the dialogue's dramatis personae (especially the visitor), the figure of the philosopher, and the other identities – sophist, statesman, and madman – in which he may appear. The Eleatic visitor superficially resembles the sophist in a number of ways (e.g. by traveling from city to city purveying wisdom); he also incorporates various "sophistic" elements in his methods.[40] But we should bear in mind the visitor's own warning to treat likenesses with great caution.[41] His resemblance to the ideal statesman is less obvious, but deeper. Like the statesman he discriminates between similars and dissimilars, he is authoritarian or "epitactic" in manner (cf. *Stat.* 260c and below, pp. 337–8), and he harmonizes the characters of the young (below, pp. 330–36). Like the visitor, kings are traditionally "godlike," a word that might also be applied to the ideal state described by the visitor (*Stat.* 303b).[42] The epithet "moderate" (*metrios*), applied to the visitor by Theodoros (*Soph.* 216b), may hint that he, if anyone, has the capacity to employ the ideal ruler's standard of the mean.[43] There is even a suggestion that he might be viewed as philosophically "frenzied" or insane (*manikos*) – the philosopher's third disguise (*Soph.* 242a). Qua visitor, he is none of the above, but he lurks behind these figures as Zeus does behind his various human disguises. Perhaps this is a hint that the generic figure of the visitor transcends particular identities to embody the essential philosophical nature that is disguised or distorted in others.

In so far as the essential philosophical nature is divine rather than human, however, it cannot be represented dramatically without some element of human "disguise." There therefore remains a tension between the ideal of the philosopher and his particular manifestation, even in a figure like the visitor.[44] Like the heroes of Homeric epic, he may be

to this view, but the visitor, for one, speaks as if such an inquiry is possible (*Soph.* 254b), and even if the ideal philosopher cannot be staged, he can still be discussed. More plausible is the suggestion that *Philosopher* was never written because the nature of the philosopher is revealed implicitly in *Soph.* and *Stat.* or other dialogues, but there are problems with this view as well (cf. Skemp 1952: 20–22; Griswold 1989: 163 n. 13).

[40] Below, p. 365. For his sophistic features see further Cherubin 1993; Benitez 1996; Howland 1998: 173–6.

[41] *Soph.* 231a; cf. *Rep.* 454b, Robinson 1953: 215–6. Notomi 1999 plausibly sees the problem of distinguishing the sophist from the philosopher as the organizing theme of the dialogue as a whole.

[42] Cf. Miller 1980: 41. On the ideal ruler's resemblance to god in the myth see Carone 1993: 109.

[43] Cf. Miller 1980: 12. As we shall see, this kind of adaptability is an important feature of his persona. Cf. also *Phdr.* 272a and Lane 1998, where the expert ruler's ability to do things at the proper time is emphasized.

[44] Thus the philosopher of the digression cannot distinguish things from each other in the phenomenal realm, but the visitor does little else.

godlike, but he is not in fact a god. This accords with the digression's acknowledgement of the inextricable presence of evil in the human world, which prevents any living person from actually attaining "likeness to god" (above, p. 292). The myth of *Statesman* fleshes out this limitation, implying that any human being will have weaknesses, including deficiencies of memory, and hence of reason (below, pp. 353–4). Accordingly, even the visitor, like Sokrates in other dialogues, makes mistakes,[45] and admits to fatigue, fear and hesitation.[46] And while the interlocutors follow the visitor as their leader,[47] his own ultimate leader is the *logos*, or the argument itself.[48] This philosophical "king" gives orders that must be followed as a matter of impersonal "necessity."[49] The visitor has a much better grasp of the course of the *logos* than his young interlocutors. Yet as long as the philosopher is embodied, rather than united with divinity and brightness, he remains liable to error, and thus a more or less successful follower of the *logos*. Stripped as these two dialogues are of human idiosyncrasy in their dramatic personae, they nonetheless portray faithfully the ambiguous and troubled relationship between human beings, reason, and the natural world, from which not even the visitor, qua human, is exempt.

HOMOGENIZED, PASTEURIZED RESPONDENTS

The Eleatic visitor's two respondents also show a newly generic character as compared to the interlocutors of *Theaetetus*. In *Sophist* and *Statesman*, Theaitetos and young Sokrates are presented as a barely differentiated pair. They are inseparable companions, age-mates, and "fellow-gymnasts" of mind and body.[50] They thus embody the principle of like-to-like as a foundation for friendship, particularly friendship among

[45] Most striking of these are the many "errors" concerning the myth (*Stat.* 274e–275a; cf. 263e–264b, 268bcd, 275d4, 276cde, 277abc). I am inclined to view these concerns about the myth as sincere (as opposed to strictly pedagogical), since this is one of the visitor's independent contributions (cf. below, p. 356).

[46] *Soph.* 231cd, 241c7–9, 242a10, 264b7, 267a11–b1, *Stat.* 265b5, 268c5; cf. *Soph.* 240c9. For Sokrates cf. e.g. above, p. 209.

[47] E.g. *Soph.* 227d2, 234e6, 237b6, 238e6–7, 243d6, 260b5, *Stat.* 258e11, 261a7, 271c8, 277c5, 277e2, 280b6, 292b1.

[48] E.g. *Soph.* 224e5; cf. e.g. *Stat.* 271c3, 292c8, 293a2, 304e12.

[49] *Soph.* 235bc; cf. *Stat.* 286d8. For the personification of the argument cf. e.g. *Soph.* 227abc, 237ab, 238b5, 242a2, 257a10, *Stat.* 264b9, 265a1, 292d9–10, and above, p. 124 n. 73. For its necessity see e.g. *Soph.* 242b8, 255d7, 256d11, 257a3, 258a8, 259b1, 260a2, c9, 263c2, *Stat.* 261a4, 263b9–10, 284b7, 292d2, 304e12, 306a5. These two dialogues also include literally dozens of gerundives expressing an impersonal necessity.

[50] *Soph.* 218b, *Stat.* 257c; cf. also *Tht.* 147d and above, pp. 261–2.

equals (above, p. 284). In contrast to the individuality of Theaitetos in his eponymous dialogue, *Sophist* and *Statesman* provide no details about the interlocutors' personalities, appearance, social status or activities that might serve to differentiate them. Nor is there any mention of individuating family ties or other distinctive features to locate them more precisely in their cultural milieu. The two boys are represented, for philosophical purposes, as functionally interchangeable. In *Sophist*, Theaitetos assures the visitor that young Sokrates can take over his role if necessary (218b), and this is exactly what happens in *Statesman*.

In his eponymous dialogue, Theaitetos is portrayed as unique not only among those present, but among Athenians generally, and – we may add – among Platonic interlocutors. He is marked from the outset as exceptional by the extraordinary combination of vigor and "gentleness" that links him so closely with *Republic's* young guardians (above, p. 256). In *Sophist*, he retains both these aspects of his character, but vigor now takes a definite back seat to "gentleness," in the form of almost total acquiescence to the dominant character. When the visitor suggests pursuing a certain topic, adding, "if it makes no difference to you," Theaitetos replies, in essence, that the visitor may decide what his, Theaitetos', opinion is: "I'm at your disposal, however you want me. Looking at how the argument will proceed best, go that way yourself and lead me along that path."[51] When invited to make his own division, he endeavors to "cut" things the visitor's way (*Soph.* 227d2). And when the visitor fails to speak successfully about being, Theaitetos declines to try where the visitor has failed (*Soph.* 239bc). As Seth Benardete puts it, he "accepts the stranger's experience as authoritative for his own."[52] At one point the visitor even tells Theaitetos what he, Theaitetos, means, and the boy does not understand him (*Soph.* 261de, 262b).[53] We never do find out what Theaitetos thought that Theaitetos meant. He seems to abrogate personal independence entirely, evidently understanding that his job is to agree, that compliance is intrinsic to his role.

In *Theaetetus* the accommodating "gentleness" of Theaitetos was contrasted with the philosophical resistance of others: the reluctant Theodoros, the scolding "Protagoras," and the contemptuous students who abandon Sokrates' midwifery (*Tht.* 150e). In *Sophist* and *Statesman*, however, recalcitrant interlocutors are mentioned only as the kind of

[51] *Soph.* 237b; cf. e.g. 242b. The translation of the first clause (τὸ μὲν ἐμὸν ὅπῃ βούλει τίθεσο) is from Benardete 1984: II.

[52] 1984: II.117.

[53] For Plato's awareness that one may not understand one's own meaning cf. *Charm.* 162b

person with whom the visitor refuses to converse (*Soph.* 217d). Moreover Theaitetos is no longer alone in his compliance. Sokrates declares that everyone present will heed the visitor "gently," using a word that previously picked out Theaitetos for special praise (*Soph.* 217d; cf. *Tht.* 144a4). His claim is borne out when young Sokrates, assuming Theaitetos' role, shows a similar acquiescence (cf. e.g. *Stat.* 261d11, 277e). The overwhelming general impression conveyed by both boys is that of an extreme and pervasive passivity. With a single modest exception (discussed below), substantive objections are perceived and voiced not by the interlocutors but by the visitor himself (e.g. *Stat.* 267cd, 277a), or projected onto imaginary spokesmen, leaving the harmony of the participants and the passivity of the interlocutors unruffled.[54] This compliance is linked to the youthfulness of the respondents, which, as in *Theaetetus*, receives considerable emphasis.[55] Both boys show the limitations of their youth and inexperience: they often fail to follow the argument, sometimes make mistakes,[56] and are unwilling to answer tough questions.[57] But their "gentleness" also illustrates the potential benefits of youth. They are malleable, quick to learn, and open to guidance. They display an appropriately "Socratic" awareness of their own ignorance and a concomitant desire to learn. They are modest about their own abilities,[58] and admit to their *aporia*, ignorance, and failure to understand.[59]

Though "gentleness" is uppermost in their characters, both youths also show a certain amount of vigor. As with Polemarchos, this mostly takes the form of enthusiasm for the visitor's arguments. Each youth in turn shows confidence, stamina, and persistence through a long and complex discussion. The eagerness of both is also shown by their close attention to each step of the argument, sometimes indicated by interruption.[60] In contrast to *Theaetetus*, there is no direct reference to the physical courage or military exploits of any of the dramatis personae, but their intellectual courage is suggested through pervasive use of imagery from such activities as hunting, wrestling and military combat (below, p. 346). Theaitetos is confident from the outset of *Sophist*, and displays dialectical courage in his unwillingness to "soften" and give up, his refusal

[54] E.g. *Soph.* 243d–244c, 246e–248d. In contrast to "Protagoras" in *Tht.*, these imaginary opponents do not remonstrate against the treatment meted out to them.

[55] E.g. *Soph.* 217d, 232e, 234e, 239b, *Stat.* 257c, 268e, 280e7.

[56] E.g. *Soph.* 239d–240a, *Stat.* 262a.

[57] *Soph.* 239bc, *Stat.* 272b.

[58] E.g. *Soph.* 234e, 237c, 239c, *Stat.* 258c.

[59] *Soph.* 222d, 226e, 228a, 231bc, 233e, 237c6, 249e, 250e, 260b, 262a, 265b, *Stat.* 280b, 284b, 296a, 297c, 306a.

[60] *Soph.* 263e10, *Stat.* 277e5; cf. *Stat.* 266de.

to "shrink" from attacking Parmenides, and his eagerness to make an assertion "most fearlessly."[61] Young Sokrates is more strongly marked as intellectually spirited, receiving high praise from the visitor for his courage and enthusiasm.[62] He also voices the only substantive objection to come from either youth, when he resists the idea of rulers being unconstrained by the rule of law (*Stat.* 293e). His willingness to abandon that resistance shows that he also has the kind of courage necessary for elenctic scrutiny, which requires one at times to abandon one's most closely-held beliefs. Both boys thus display the combination of vigor and gentleness that earlier marked Theaitetos as unique, though the vigor is less in evidence – especially in Theaitetos himself.

The two youths also share, to a limited extent, the "kinship" with Sokrates that earlier marked Theaitetos as exceptional. The physical likeness between Sokrates and Theaitetos is again acknowledged, but it is now matched by a "kinship" between the two Sokrateses on account of their names.[63] Plato indirectly reinforces our sense of the latter "kinship," through the somewhat disconcerting device (at least for readers familiar with other dialogues) of having the visitor address young Sokrates simply as "Sokrates."[64] The older Sokrates invokes these multiple "kinships" as a reason for all of them to take their turn in discussion, so as to get to know each other better (*Stat.* 258a). The "kinship" of philosophy now unites all of the participants, while simultaneously linking them to the larger questions of likeness and difference that pervade these dialogues.[65] There is thus a shift away from *Theaetetus'* focus on the uniqueness of the quasi-familial bond between Theaitetos and Sokrates. This is indicated dramatically by these dialogues' lack of comment on the peculiar physical appearance that symbolized that special affinity.[66] From these two works in isolation, we would have no idea how any of the characters actually looks.

Nor does either youth show the special philosophical aptitude that Theaitetos' physical resemblance to Sokrates in *Theaetetus* betokened. Instead, both are portrayed as similarly promising. In *Theaetetus* Sokrates praised Theaitetos' nature (*phusis*) as exceptional; the visitor now pays

[61] *Soph.* 241c, 242a, 256d7; cf. Dalfen 1989: 101–3; Howland 1998: 212–13.
[62] *Stat.* 262a; cf. 263c5, 263d, 264b9, 277e1; Miller 1980: 24–6, 111–2.
[63] *Stat.* 257c–258a; cf. e.g. Miller 1980: 6–7.
[64] For this reason I prefer not to capitalize the first word of "young Sokrates." The potential for confusion is established at the outset when the visitor says, "Sokrates, do you hear what Sokrates says?" (*Stat.* 258a7; cf. Miller 1980: 14–15). Brandwood 1976 lists another twenty-five occurrences of the vocative.
[65] Compare the use of an abstract, faux-heroic "genealogy" to identify the sophist (*Soph.* 268cd).
[66] The single reference to their likeness includes no specifics (*Stat.* 257d).

tribute to the *phusis* of each boy in turn.[67] In *Theaetetus*, they both participated in their joint mathematical discovery, but Theaitetos took center stage as the star mathematician; in the latter pair of dialogues, by contrast, both have been prepared by their mathematical training for the method of division.[68] Both also show good understanding of a complex and challenging argument.[69] And both make the occasional contribution of a very limited kind.[70] Yet neither of them displays the special intellectual affinity with Sokrates that made Theaitetos both unique (qua Socratic respondent) and generic (qua aspiring philosopher). In particular, neither of them gives any hint of the kind of constructive philosophical imagination suggested by Theaitetos' mathematical example and his introduction of the "dream" theory in *Theaetetus*. To be sure, both youths display many aspects of a "Socratic" philosophical character. Both, for example, have good – though not perfect – memories.[71] Both realize the fundamental importance of consistency as the linchpin of rational argument.[72] And neither of them worries about precise terminology.[73] But there is nothing here to mark these traits as particularly Socratic, as opposed to generally desirable. Indeed, the boys share most of them with the visitor as well (below, p. 379).

The two youths are thus represented as a closely similar pair, jointly displaying most of the qualities that made Theaitetos an ideal respondent in the first of the three dialogues, but without his special tokens of uniqueness. The *vast* majority of the youths' responses render them virtually indistinguishable, and their likeness is further enhanced by the intellectual chasm dividing them from the visitor. But this does not rule out subtle differences of emphasis between the two boys' temperaments. Close scrutiny of their responses suggests that Theaitetos is somewhat more acquiescent than young Sokrates, more modest, and more aware of his own ignorance and *aporia*. He also seems more easily discouraged.[74] Young Sokrates, by contrast, shows more courage, spirit and resistance.

Most scholars who have observed this difference view Theaitetos as excessively gentle and young Sokrates as over-bold, forshadowing the

[67] *Tht.* 142c, *Soph.* 265de, *Stat.* 262c.

[68] Cf. *Soph.* 266a, *Stat.* 264e12, 266ab, 284e; Miller 1980: 68–9; Dorter 1994: 208–9. For the mathematical example in *Tht.* as a precursor of division see Friedländer 1964–9: III.243–4.

[69] *Soph.* 221d, 227c, 228e, 243d, 266d, 268c, *Stat.* 265d, 266b, 271c, 288a11, d1.

[70] *Soph.* 229d, 239d, 252d, 257d, *Stat.* 262a, 290a, 292e, 299e.

[71] *Soph.* 231d (with Dorter 1994: 125), 241b, 250a, d, 265b, *Stat.* 268e, 275d, 293a, 306d.

[72] *Soph.* 224e, 248d, *Stat.* 292cd, 295b.

[73] *Soph.* 220d, *Stat.* 261e.

[74] *Soph.* 245e, 261ab. My other generalizations regarding the differences between the two boys are based on the evidence for their characters marshaled earlier.

two imperfect character types discussed at the end of *Statesman*. But it is more plausible, in my view, to regard Theaitetos as an ideal towards which young Sokrates approaches, only to fall short.[75] The glowing praise heaped on Theaitetos in the first work of the triad has already set him up as an ideal and established in principle his potential for creative thinking; and Sokrates' explicit desire to see young Sokrates "tested" the same way suggests that Theaitetos is the standard by which his friend is to be measured (*Stat.* 258a). Certainly, young Sokrates bears a closer resemblance to the "courageous" character in *Statesman* (306e), while Theaitetos' character shows more of the "softness," "smoothness," and "slowness" of the restrained character (*Stat.* 307a). But the "smooth flow" of Theaitetos' character, as described in his eponymous dialogue (*Tht.* 144b), also resembles the "smoothness" of the finished fabric of *Statesman's* ideal state (310e11), where these contrasting characteristics have been successfully interwoven. The need to exercise one of these sets of qualities more than the other will vary according to circumstances. If Theaitetos is more "gentle" here than in his eponymous dialogue, it is in part because the visitor's method is one to which a vigorous or creative response is inappropriate. The pliant Theaitetos shows his ability to adapt to and learn from various pedagogical modes. This does not rule out the possibility of appropriate future self-assertion, and indeed, the visitor fosters this. Though he is generally encouraging towards both boys, he most repeatedly and emphatically encourages Theaitetos,[76] who shows no inappropriate manifestations of "spirit" still needing to be restrained.

Theaitetos' superiority to young Sokrates is corroborated by a diffident streak in the visitor's own persona: he must be urged to speak (*Soph.* 217bc), and like Theaitetos (as opposed to young Sokrates) he is often "encouraged" – never restrained – by his interlocutors (below, p. 346). Such intellectual modesty is also, of course, a Socratic trait. If Theaitetos seems excessively timid and confused, we should note that much of his uncertainty surrounds the discussion of non-being, which reduces the visitor himself to emphatic expressions of *aporia*.[77] Indeed, his willingness to take Theaitetos through such a "dangerous" argument at all could be construed as a token of confidence in the boy's natural abilities, character and education (*Soph.* 242b).[78] In *Theaetetus* the prospect of critiquing

[75] Cf. Lane 1998: 34. On Theaitetos' philosophical promise in this dialogue and his relationship to the visitor see Szlezák 1997.

[76] *Soph.* 223a8, 224c5, 227c10–d1, 233d6–7, 239b7–8, 240a6, 261bc, 264b11.

[77] Below, n.270. The visitor also endorses as "reasonable" Theaitetos' own *aporia* (*Soph.* 231c).

[78] Note in this connection that the visitor has talked with Theaitetos previously (*Soph.* 218a).

Parmenides – for which Theaitetos was eager – was posited by Sokrates as a mighty task. In *Sophist*, however, the boy is permitted to collaborate with the visitor in this enterprise, learning thereby to engage actively and critically with his own intellectual "grandfather" (cf. above, pp. 282–3). All this suggests that philosophical diffidence is at worst a lesser evil than over-confidence.

The subtle differences between the two boys may be further understood by considering the three dialogues as a dramatic sequence. As we have seen, *Theaetetus* is a monumental representation of the elenctic Socratic at work enhancing the interlocutor's awareness of his own ignorance. By discrediting Theaitetos' positive but mistaken ideas, Sokrates claims to have made him less troublesome and "tamer" for the future, since he now realizes in a self-restrained way (*sōphronōs*) the limits of his own knowledge (*Tht.* 210c) – and this despite the fact that he shows not a trace of "wildness" in that dialogue. This new Theaitetos, still "tamer" than before, is precisely what we encounter in *Sophist.* Purged of false ideas about knowledge, he is no longer "pregnant" with any ideas of his own, but has become an empty vessel waiting to be filled.[79] By this standard, his uncertainty and diffidence in *Sophist* are not defects, but signs of the elenctic Sokrates' educational success. As a result, Theaitetos is now "gentle" enough to be exposed to positive teaching from a source outside himself, teaching that he may eventually make his own.[80]

Young Sokrates likewise expresses few substantive opinions of any kind. He is unable, for example, to "recall" what "the many" think about the rule of law (*Stat.* 296a), despite the fact that this is a linchpin of his own conventional political morality. Similarly, when asked to compare the golden age with the age of Zeus, he produces none of several obvious available answers. Instead of offering a conventional understanding of the myth (the golden age was happier), or the aristocratic response of a Glaukon or Adeimantos (above, p. 203), or a Socratic preference for the life of philosophy (endorsed by the visitor), he is neither willing nor able to reply at all (*Stat.* 272bc). He thus seems to have no defined views on *the* fundamental question of ancient ethics – the true nature of human happiness. His political outlook is also vague.[81] Yet he does have a greater residue of conventional opinion than Theaitetos. His "courageous" but mistaken division is based on a highly conventional distinction between

[79] Cf. Berger 1982: 401.

[80] Cf. *Soph.* 265de. The model of education suggested here, and its relationship to Socratic pedagogy, will be discussed further below.

[81] Cf. Gill 1995: 292–3.

humans and wild animals, which the visitor likens to the views of the many and proceeds to discredit (*Stat.* 262a, d).[82] And as we have seen, he balks when the visitor proposes abandoning the rule of law (*Stat.* 293e).

Unlike his "fellow-gymnast," however, young Sokrates has not yet been exposed to the elenctic Sokrates' methods, which, if successful, would have emptied him more completely of conventional ideas and rendered him equally "gentle" and "restrained." The visitor discourages both boys from over-confidence, but especially young Sokrates, who is cautioned, among other things, not to "hurry" the *logos* (*Stat.* 262ab).[83] And he himself deals in elenctic fashion with young Sokrates' concern about the rule of law.[84] He begins by eliciting the boy's opinion. This takes a certain amount of effort, since young Sokrates is at first more than happy to dispense with the rule of law for the ideal ruler (*Stat.* 293a–d). But the visitor keeps pushing – rather like Sokrates the midwife bringing a "baby" to birth before testing it – until he obtains the desired response, spelling out the potentially tyrannical implications of the idea until young Sokrates voices his discomfort (*Stat.* 293cde).[85] When he does finally object, the visitor says he was "just about to ask" whether young Sokrates really agreed with all the details (*Stat.* 293e–294a). Only when the visitor has succeeded in eliciting a definite view does he proceed to "go through" the matter, until his respondent agrees that "it is impossible to contradict" his conclusion (*Stat.* 297b4). Young Sokrates is thus "purged," in quasi-elenctic fashion, of a residual opinion that was interfering with his receptiveness to new ideas. The visitor is instrumental in curbing his excessive vigor – or placing it in the service of novel ways of thinking – and bringing him closer to the ideal of the youthful interlocutor, as embodied in his friend Theaitetos.

Despite this difference of emphasis between the two youths, however, there is a clear general movement in the interlocutors of the triad, as with the dominant speakers, away from uniqueness and towards the generic. This effect is sharpened by the contrast between these respondents and the varied interlocutors of *Theaetetus*. Theodoros no longer plays a substantive role, and even "Protagoras" is replaced by the generic figure of the nameless imaginary sophist. There is an obvious parallel here with the shift in *Republic* towards similar and compliant rather than

[82] Cf. Sokrates' praise in *Tht.* for Theaitetos' "noble" answer, which he then proceeds to refute (*Tht.* 151e).

[83] Cf. 263ab, d, 264ab, *Soph.* 236d5–7, 238a1, and Howland 1998: 234, 244–50.

[84] Cf. Gill 1995: 293.

[85] Cf. Miller 1980: 89–91. For the association with tyranny see Skemp 1952: 47.

dissimilar and hostile interlocutors. *Theaetetus* is something like *Republic* Book 1, in that it uses sharply characterized dramatis personae to explore problems surrounding the individuality of the elenctic Sokrates. *Sophist* and *Statesman* resemble the remainder of *Republic*, in that they shift towards more generic philosophical types in both the dominant speaker and his respondents, in tandem with a more authoritarian philosophical and pedagogical method. The pattern is more marked, however, in the triad. The hierarchical method is more overt in *Sophist* and *Statesman* than in *Republic* 2–10, the main speaker more dogmatic, the respondents more docile, and all the speakers more bland and generic in character. And, of course, Sokrates himself has not simply become less individual, but been replaced in his dominant role by a bland and generalized philosophical figure.

If we compare Theaitetos and young Sokrates in these two dialogues with Glaukon and Adeimantos, the most important difference to emerge is their greater youth, with a correspondingly weaker degree of "moulding" by the corrupting culture of Athens. Accordingly, they also lack the dramatic vividness with which Glaukon and Adeimantos are endowed by their long speeches in *Republic* Book 2 – speeches embedding them securely in Athenian cultural life. Glaukon and Adeimantos arrive at Polemarchos' house with certain "right opinions," but also with a conventional aristocratic education and a set of elite male Athenian prejudices, which enable them to defend with vigor the vulgar view that justice does not pay, and color many of their subsequent responses. Nor is either of them personally exposed to elenctic testing within *Republic* or any other conversation that we know of. Theaitetos and young Sokrates, by contrast, have an innocence that goes hand in hand not only with their youth but with their relatively colorless characterization. Theaitetos' purity in particular is signaled by his utter ineptitude as a devil's advocate – a task at which he is even less successful in *Sophist* than *Theaetetus* (below, p. 348). He not only starts out with a modicum of right opinion, but has been successfully "cleansed," in the preceding dialogue, of any residual trace of false opinion (as represented by Protagoras), making him utterly docile and receptive to the visitor's teaching. As we have seen, young Sokrates undergoes a parallel process in *Statesman*.

In *Republic*, the newly homogeneous model for the philosophy student reached its apogee in the guardians of the ideal state, who carried the desirable qualities of the dramatis personae to an idealized conclusion (above, p. 246). In *Statesman* too Plato examines the character of the ideal citizen in a way that invites us to assess the dramatis personae by

a standard internal to the dialogue. The visitor reiterates the difficulty of blending the apparently opposed qualities of boldness and gentleness, which are presented, this time, as conflicting natural dispositions towards courage and moderation (*Stat.* 306a–311 c).[86] These dispositions are the statesman's raw material, just as the physical world is raw material for the process of division itself.[87] The statesman will choose the best of each group and improve them as much as possible by tempering their native dispositions. The complete elimination of such tendencies is impossible, even in principle: the two sets of natures as groups will be "at war forever" (*Stat.* 308b3). Even the improved characters will continue, for the most part, to tend one way or the other, like the weaver's warp and weft (*Stat.* 309b). For this reason they must complement each other on committees (*Stat.* 311 ab).[88] But this still leaves open the possibility of a true philosophical virtue based on knowledge. In *Republic*, such virtue can only be achieved by the rare few who begin with both natural tendencies and then receive the proper training. In the visitor's ideal state too, a few people will balance both tendencies well enough to qualify them to hold office individually, at least when properly educated (*Stat.* 311 a). It is presumably from their ranks that the ideal ruler himself will emerge – if he ever does – since he is able to make the right judgment in every situation, and must therefore, a fortiori, have a harmonious soul.

As we have seen, both Theaitetos and young Sokrates enjoy this desirable combination of bold and gentle tendencies, though the latter leans slightly in the direction of courage. They thus retain the potential to develop both dispositions in such a way as to grow into candidates for high office, and perhaps even statesmanship. These dialogues do not revoke the strong hints at the opening of *Theaetetus* that Theaitetos is a potential philosopher-ruler, even though the emphasis, the context, and the political structure in *Statesman* have all changed. In fact, *Republic* continues to be evoked by the visitor's repeated, slightly peculiar, reference to the ideal statesman as a "king" (*basileus*).[89] If youths of this kind are to live up to their potential, however, they must continue to receive the proper

[86] This passage has been seen as a significant departure from views on the unity of the virtues expressed elsewhere in Plato, notably by Sokrates. But if the visitor saw the virtues proper as irreducibly incompatible, he could not speak e.g. of a "courageous soul" needing to be "tamed" by true opinions (*Stat.* 309de). See further e.g. Miller 1980: 107–8; Dorter 1994: 224–7; Rowe 1995b: 239–40.

[87] *Stat.* 308c. Gold-refining is used as an analogy for division (*Stat.* 303de; cf. also 288de).

[88] This is a very small step towards a higher valuation of *poikilia* among human character types than we have seen elsewhere in Plato (cf. Lane 1998: 183).

[89] Peculiar because this word is not usually honorific in Athenian cultural terms. But it *is* used for the philosopher-rulers of *Rep.* (cf. Annas and Waterfield 1995: 5 n.).

education. Accordingly, the visitor performs, in the course of the dialogue itself, the educator's work of refining the two kinds of character (*Stat.* 308d). He does this, as we have seen, by encouraging a proper balance in each.

The visitor also encourages a blend of spirit and restraint by modeling such a character in himself. He is intellectually "gentle" – generous, self-deprecating, friendly, accommodating[90] – and simultaneously "courageous," enthusiastic and persistent.[91] In him, however, these qualities stand in a rather different relationship than they do in the two boys. In marked contrast to the interlocutors' passivity, restraint, and alternation of activity with rest, he displays a seemingly unlimited intellectual vigor. Despite his modesty he is dominant and assertive, and shows no sign of flagging over the length of two extended conversations. He is even afraid of seeming philosophically "frenzied" (*manikos*, 242a) – the state to which "courageous" dispositions will revert if unchecked (*Stat.* 310d9). This dominance enhances our sense of the interlocutors' inadequacy, thus calling into question their potential for active, creative philosophizing. Yet the differences between the visitor on the one hand, and his interlocutors on the other, befit their relative ages and complementary roles in the conversation. The roles of leader and follower require (or are required by) the differential dominance, or exercise, of the two complementary aspects of the ideal philosophical character. All three of the principal dramatis personae blend and manifest the two sides of the ideal character in a manner appropriate to their role at this particular stage of their intellectual development.

This miniature "community" of young and old, active and passive, assertive and compliant, models in its discourse the "weaving" of the ideal state. The group as a whole represents the like-minded friendliness of philosophical community.[92] But in the substance of the conversation, the interlocutors take turns supplying the softer weft, while the visitor embodies the firm threads of the warp, to which the weft must be accommodated.[93] On the level of literary craftsmanship, then, Plato not only homogenizes his characters, as the visitor does his respondents, but weaves them together, as the statesman does his people, into a strong yet

[90] E.g. *Soph.* 217ab, de, 239b, 242ab, 293e–294a, *Stat.* 297cd, 306a, de.

[91] E.g. *Soph.* 232b, 242a, 261bc, *Stat.* 257c, 304a.

[92] The only mildly combative relationship is the jocular but loaded one between Sokrates and Theodoros (*Stat.* 257b), which echoes their relationship in *Tht.* (above, p. 278).

[93] *Stat.* 282e; cf. *Laws* 734d–735a. On the complementarity of warp and weft see Scheid and Svenbro 1996: 13, 29.

pliant fabric of characters in dialogue.[94] This analogy brings out once again the superiority of the more compliant Theaitetos as an interlocutor in these particular circumstances, in so far as the qualities of the weft are called for by his role. In these conversations, the strength and vigor of the warp are exemplified exclusively by the visitor. But Theaitetos and his companion are still young, and may in the future, after achieving due docility, be stimulated – like the young guardians – to play a more forceful role.

THE VISITOR'S PEDAGOGY

The visitor's relationship to his interlocutors parallels in certain respects that of the constructive Sokrates. As with *Republic* 2–10, and in contrast to the elenctic dialogues (including *Theaetetus*), the discussion in *Sophist* and *Statesman* is not *about* the interlocutor's views, but about those of the dominant character. Instead of beginning by eliciting the interlocutor's own definition, the visitor explicitly leads first Theaitetos and then young Sokrates to various definitions which he then invites them to affirm.[95] But the differences from *Republic* 2–10 are also significant. In *Republic*, Sokrates' ideas are evidently being developed as he goes along, with the stimulation, criticism and support of his interlocutors. The visitor's basic views, by contrast, have been acquired before the dialogue opens. When Theodoros implies that he has an established set of ideas to impart, he does not deny it (*Soph.* 217b). He often speaks as if he knows what he is looking for, or where the argument is heading, rather than in an exploratory fashion.[96] Imagery of leading and following reinforces this sense that he knows the way ahead.[97] From the outset he leads strongly and assertively (*Soph.* 219a, *Stat.* 258b). He is concerned "to make clear" (δηλῶσαι) or "demonstrate" (ἐνδείξασθαι) his thoughts.[98] And his conclusions are voiced at

[94] Weaving is a traditional Greek image for language (see e.g. Bergren 1983), and used by the visitor as such (*Soph.* 262cd). For other suggestions about how weaving may function as a model for the dialogue as a whole see Klein 1977: 163–72; Miller 1980: 60–62; Gill 1995: 305 n. 62; Arends 1993: 154, 178–9.

[95] See *Soph.* 223ab, 224cd, 225e–226a, 268bcd, *Stat.* 276e–277a, 305e.

[96] E.g. *Soph.* 262e–263a, *Stat.* 265b, 267d, 282e1–2, 289c, 295b7–10, 304a, 306d10–11. Cf. Rowe 1996: 174–5.

[97] E.g. *Stat.* 292b1; see further below, p. 371.

[98] *Soph.* 267d, *Stat.* 306d. Cf. δηλῶσαι etc. at *Soph.* 226c1, 227b5, *Stat.* 262c5, 265d2, 266b9, e8, 277bc, 285e2, 287a3, 304a7; ἔνδειξις etc. at *Soph.* 217c4, *Stat.* 275b2, 285e–286a, 297c8, 306a5, d10, 308d9; ἀπόδειξις etc. at *Soph.* 256c1, 258cd, 261b2, *Stat.* 269c2, 273e5, 277b7; cf. 277a2, 284d2–3, 302e5.

the end of each dialogue with finality and confidence (*Soph.* 268cd; *Stat.* 311bc).

The visitor's confident, expository manner accords with all three of his main methods: division, which analyzes and articulates a pre-existing concept, *paradeigma* or "example," which depends on a teacher's prior ability to pick out an appropriate model, and the extended discourse of myth. Nevertheless, he chooses to carry out his exposition, like Sokrates in *Republic*, by means of question and answer. At the beginning of *Sophist* he distinguishes three modes of discourse – genuine conversation, continuous monologue, and exposition in the form of question and answer (πρὸς ἕτερον) – and chooses the last (217c–218a).[99] He evidently wishes to employ a method similar to Aristotle's "didascalic" dialectic, in which the questioner knows the right answer in advance, and leads the answerer to see the truth. On this model, as Aristotle puts it, "the learner must believe [the teacher]."[100] The teacher, on the other hand, though not interested in the interlocutor's views as such, is obliged by his choice of question and answer form to accommodate the other person's limitations. A "gentle" and compliant respondent is therefore even more crucial to the visitor than to the constructive Sokrates, if his expository purpose is not to be derailed. And unlike Sokrates, he makes this requirement explicit, stipulating that he will only converse with someone who will reply "without making trouble, and compliantly" – or more literally, "painlessly and obeying the rein" (ἀλύπως τε καὶ εὐηνίως, *Soph.* 217d).

In so far as the visitor has a pre-established expository agenda, there is little room for even the most talented respondent to contribute independently to the formation of his ideas.[101] Moreover division as a method leaves little room for creative or idiosyncratic contributions from the interlocutor. The same is true of example.[102] Accordingly, Theaitetos and young Sokrates, though close cousins of Glaukon and Adeimantos, are even more bland and compliant. Their lack of initiative is disturbing in its own way. But it is less problematic dramatically than the docility of Glaukon and Adeimantos in *Republic*, where Sokrates' extraordinary originality makes Glaukon and Adeimantos' lack of positive initiative so painfully obvious. This is in part because Theaitetos and young Sokrates are younger, but the problem is further eased by the fact that the visitor's method, which they are only just learning, leaves them little scope for the exercise of independent thought.

99 For the implications of πρός cf. 217d2, 218a1, a7.
100 *Soph. El.* 165a37–b9; cf. M. Frede 1992: 208–9; Blank 1993: 429–30.
101 Cf. Rowe 1996: 155.
102 Cf. R. Robinson 1953: 213–4; Miller 1980: 59–60.

The assembled company thus provides the visitor with interlocutors whose personal qualities contribute to his expository purpose and suit his intellectual methods. They are also, of course, provided for him by the author. Like the ideal statesman himself, Plato evidently sees no purpose, in these two dialogues, in "weaving together" people with bad dispositions, aiming instead at homogeneity and pliability.[103] We may compare the visitor's disdain for his imaginary opponents, in whom he takes no interest for their own sake, and whom he has no compunction in "improving," on the grounds that "what is agreed by better people is more valid than what is agreed by worse" (*Soph.* 246d). He is not even interested in listening to critics of his own methods (*Stat.* 287a). There is a contrast here not only with the elenctic Sokrates' refutation of people, as opposed to ideas, and insistence that agreement between the two discussants is all that matters, but with the concerns aired in *Theaetetus* about learning from others in their absence and giving them a fair hearing. Since the visitor does not care about his imaginary opponents as persons, and is not specially interested in doing them justice, he is free to "improve" them in a fashion that makes them easily refutable on his terms.

The visitor thus does quite overtly what Plato, and Sokrates as narrator, do tacitly elsewhere: he defeats an opponent by saddling him with ideas that he might plausibly be expected to reject.[104] He "improves" such people by making them part of his own intellectual and moral community, and thus open to refutation on the terms by which that community has been defined. Similarly, since Plato is not interested here in dramatizing resistance to the dominant character, he is free to "improve" his dramatis personae so that they do not create difficulties for the visitor's expository argument. In this respect, as in others, the visitor's explicitness provides a comment on Plato's methods as well as his own. By refusing to converse unless the interlocutor is compliant, and "improving" his imaginary opponents, he indicates, albeit indirectly, that there is no point for present purposes in dramatizing a conversation with a recalcitrant interlocutor. This amounts to a defense in principle of what many have seen as literary deterioration in these dialogues. Like the visitor, Plato has his reasons for preferring an interlocutor of a certain kind.

The combination of an overtly expository method with an explicitly compliant interlocutor might seem to imply, as many have thought, that the question and answer form of these two dialogues is pro forma and

[103] *Stat.* 309e; cf. 308e–309a.
[104] See *Soph.* 246c–247e with Dorter 1994: 142–3; for Sokrates cf. e.g. *Rep.* 353e, *Tht.* 166b.

philosophically redundant.[105] The difference between continuous discourse and question and answer seems to have been reduced entirely to a matter of the principal speaker's convenience (*Soph.* 217d). We may wonder, then, why Plato makes the visitor choose question and answer at all. One reason might be that it serves to ground the universal, systematic sweep of his discourse in the specifics of Greek life and linguistic usage, by winning the agreement of a second speaker to each step. The visitor's method is rooted in the language and unreflective concepts of ordinary people, including the present company, but adjusts them in order to correct the "delusions of the given."[106] The presence of a second speaker enables Plato to heighten the idiosyncrasy of this reconfiguration of ordinary experience by contrasting it with the point of view of an innocent native speaker, and at the same time to represent it as acceptable to such a person. The interlocutor's acquiescence suggests that his understanding of his own experiences is being successfully remapped in such a way as to mould his outlook to the visitor's. The interlocutor thus not only validates but embodies the visitor's restructuring of conventional categories.

Clearly, however, the most important purpose for using question and answer form in these dialogues is to dramatize a particular mode of philosophical education. Like Sokrates, the visitor attaches enormous importance to his pedagogical role, which, unlike the Sokrates of *Theaetetus*, he assumes quite overtly.[107] His preference for an expository account suggests that he favors a hierarchical, authoritarian pedagogy. There are also signs that this is how he learned from his own teachers. Theodoros' remark that he has "heard" about these matters, and not "forgotten," suggests that he exemplifies the ability to learn by remembering the exposition of others (*Soph.* 217b).[108] Chief among his teachers was Parmenides, whose method Sokrates suggests as a possible model (*Soph.* 217c). There is a clear allusion here to Sokrates' conversation with Parmenides in *Parmenides*, where the older philosopher's method is much like that of the visitor here: expository and didactic, though in question-and-answer form, with a preference for a youthful interlocutor who will not give trouble.[109] Similarly, within *Sophist* itself, "father" Parmenides

[105] For a cautious updating of this standard view see Rowe 1996.

[106] The phrase is Lane's (1998: 76); cf. also Gill 1995: 304–5.

[107] The angler example, the analysis of non-being, the methodological digression on division, and the paradigm of *paradeigma* are all explicitly pedagogical in intent (*Soph.* 218cde, 242b, *Stat.* 262c, 277d; cf. also *Stat.* 285cd).

[108] Cf. Howland 1998: 173–4; Gonzalez 2000: 163.

[109] *Parm.* 137bc; cf. e.g. 133a–137b; but the parallel with the portion of *Parm.* where Parmenides talks to young Aristotle is much closer.

is represented as a firmly authoritarian teacher.[110] The visitor acknowledges the influence of this model, speaking respectfully both of Parmenides and of other "ancient" authorities. It seems that, having been a subordinate student in a hierarchical mode of teaching, he is now taking his turn as teacher in a similarly authoritarian mode. There is an obvious contrast here with the elenctic Sokrates whom he replaces. Yet the visitor's avowedly authoritarian pedagogy also unmasks the covert authority of Sokrates qua "father" in *Theaetetus* (above, pp. 272–4).

The visitor's pedagogical paternalism is underwritten by the large age gap that separates him from his youthful interlocutors (cf. *Stat.* 268e). In *Theaetetus*, this kind of age difference was used to establish and justify a hierarchical, paternal mode of pedagogy within an elenctic framework. But that dialogue also used imagery of age and physical fitness in complex ways, to challenge as well as to endorse the conventional association of age with wisdom (above, pp. 279–80). In *Sophist* and *Statesman*, by contrast, this kind of imagery is used unambiguously to reinforce traditional cultural and intellectual hierarchies. There is no sign that either Theaitetos or young Sokrates might transcend conventional categorization as Theaitetos does in his eponymous dialogue. The visitor does once praise the keen intellectual sight of the young (*Soph.* 232e), but this is clearly ironic.[111] Similarly, when the visitor says Theaitetos should be vigorous and noble because of his youth, the boy's refusal to comply sheds an ironic light on this apparent praise (*Soph.* 239bc).

Elsewhere, Theaitetos deprecates his own youth,[112] and the visitor speaks contemptuously of the young.[113] Youth is also strongly associated with the negative figure of the sophist. Not only is he is able to dupe the young on account of their inexperience,[114] but he himself is referred to as a youth (νεανίας), which suggests a correlation between his faults and those of the young whom he misleads (*Soph.* 239d5; cf. 259d). And there is a distinct difference in tone between Sokrates' assumption that Theaitetos' youthful talent equips him to address the most challenging questions, and the visitor's acceptance of the deficiencies of youth as something to be rectified by all those present.[115] The focus has shifted away from optimism about the boy's future "racing" prospects (*Tht.* 148c) to his need for rest (*Stat.* 257c). All this suggests that if the young make

[110] Cf. *Soph.* 237a, 258cd. There is no acknowledgment that in their original context his arguments were purveyed by a goddess. This is typical of ancient critical practice (above, p. 94).

[111] It is not borne out in its context, and is contradicted more generally by the inability of the young to see through the sophist's deceptive images (*Soph.* 234bcd; cf. *Gorg.* 461cd, *Laws* 715de).

[112] *Soph.* 234e, 265d. [113] *Soph.* 251bc; cf. also 242a.

[114] *Soph.* 233bc, 234b–e; cf. *Tht.* 162d. [115] *Tht.* 148c, *Soph.* 234e–235a.

the most appropriate respondents – as Sokrates seems to suggest (*Soph.* 217d) – it is because they have the most to learn.[116] Accordingly, the sense of hierarchy is even stronger here than in *Republic*, as befits not only the larger age gap between the dominant speaker and his interlocutors, but this increased emphasis on the deficiencies of youth. If the young are as limited in their understanding as *Sophist* and *Statesman* suggest, only a youth who is willing to accept his elders' authority makes any sense at all as an interlocutor.

Advanced age, on the other hand, is no longer presented as a handicap or even a mixed blessing, but clearly validated as authoritative.[117] This is for the most traditional of reasons: the old have the wisdom of experience. The value of age and experience is a subtly pervasive theme of these two dialogues. Thus one way the sophist dupes his victims is by denying the relevance to argument of the physical phenomena perceived by experience (*Soph.* 239e–240a). Merely verbal contradictions are the "babyish" (νεογενής) offspring of someone with only recent experience of reality.[118] It is age and experience that enable a person to suspect his own ignorance, and to understand that the sophist has misled him.[119] The conversation of *Sophist* is directed towards leading Theaitetos as far as he can go without such experience (παθήματα) of his own, but the implication is that he will not reach full understanding until he is older (*Soph.* 234e). In *Statesman* too, the visitor expects young Sokrates to increase in wisdom (*phronēsis*) with age (*Stat.* 261e), and his myth is informed by the strange experiences of our early ancestors and the cosmos itself.[120] The people of the golden age, on the other hand, undergo a reversal of aging and thus of experience, which renders them infantile and without memory,[121] and consequently incapable of philosophy or true happiness.[122] Even in the age of Zeus, early human beings are lazy and stupid, suggesting that the race as a whole may be evolving with experience (*Soph.* 267d). The laws of the second-best state are derived partly from experience (*Stat.* 300b), and the longevity even of an imperfect state inspires a grudging respect (*Stat.* 302a).

[116] Sokrates gives no specific reason for recommending a youthful interlocutor (contrast *Parm.* 137bc).

[117] On the preference for the old in the late dialogues generally see Rudberg 1928: 28–9.

[118] *Soph.* 259d7. On νεογενής see Campbell 1867: 1.166 and cf. *Stat.* 270e6, 273e10.

[119] *Soph.* 234de, 243b; cf. 268a.

[120] Note the abundance of words denoting experience (πάθος, πάθημα, πάσχω) in the myth (e.g. 269b6, 9, 270b3, d2, 270e10–271a1, 273d1, 274a1).

[121] *Stat.* 270d–271a, 271e–272a.

[122] For the absence of philosophy from the golden age see Scodel 1987: 81 n. 9; Griswold 1989: 151; Nightingale 1996: 84; McCabe 1997: 105–9; Howland 1998: 263–4.

But just as laws based on experience are inadequate without abstract knowledge, so our immediate experience of the world requires proper understanding if it is to be properly used.[123] It is lack of experience in *logoi* as well as life that makes the young such easy dupes for the sophist (cf. *Rep.* 487bc).[124] And it is by acquiring such experience, like children learning their letters (cf. *Stat.* 277e), that they will mature in their understanding. The visitor indicates this ironically, when Theaitetos makes an inappropriate response, by replying, "You have obviously never seen a sophist" (*Soph.* 239e), suggesting that Theaitetos suffers from a lack of experience of the real world. The boy presumably has "seen" sophists, just as he has met many materialists (*Soph.* 246b), and knows the work of Parmenides (*Soph.* 258d4), but the visitor's remark suggests he lacks the maturity to "see" them philosophically. This exemplifes the ubiquitous use of the language of vision as an image for intellectual insight, which suggests a close relationship between sensory and philosophical perception (see further below, pp. 370–71). It is complemented by the language of hearing, which links the two kinds of experience even more closely: with oral teaching, one "hears" philosophically precisely by "hearing" physically.[125]

It is the visitor's age and experience, both worldly and philosophical, that give him his superior power to follow the *logos*, and hence the authority to command a follower. He is an old man now, but as a boy he learned, like Sokrates, from the aged Parmenides.[126] Since then he has progressed philosophically towards a comparable maturity and authority of his own.[127] Accordingly, the importance of experience informs his intellectual and pedagogical outlook. In contrast to the Sokrates of *Theaetetus*, ever seeking out new talent (143de), the visitor's judgment of Theaitetos as an acceptable interlocutor is based in part on his prior experience of talking with the boy (*Soph.* 218a). It is because of his experience with the "friends of the Forms" that he, unlike Theaitetos, is able to "hear" their reply (*Soph.* 248b). In the sensory realm, his use of division both depends on, and displays, a remarkable array of technical

[123] Thus the supreme sophist is "most experienced" in his craft (*Stat.* 291c), but this is denigrated as mere τριβή (*Soph.* 254a). Cf. Lane 1998: 201.

[124] The visitor gets some of his own information from hearsay (e.g. *Stat.* 290e). Young Sokrates is assumed to have heard of the more exotic elements of the visitor's data, even though he has never experienced them himself (*Stat.* 264bc; cf. also 303e6). For hearsay as a source cf. also *Soph.* 220b5–6, e1, 225d12, 226d10–11, 232c3, 266b10, *Stat.* 288c6, 269a6, 306c1, 309a4.

[125] Cf. *Soph.* 237c2, *Stat.* 258a3–6, 269c4, 272b, 283b8, 284de, 293e8–9.

[126] *Soph.* 237a, *Parm.* 127bc; cf. *Tht.* 183e, *Soph.* 217c.

[127] Cf. *Soph.* 243b and note the juxtaposition παῖ παισίν at *Soph.* 237a5.

knowledge, showing him to be a man with minute experience of observing the world that he "weaves" together.[128] Unlike the poetic and sophistic "weavers" of words, he knows how to *use* this experience as raw material for philosophy, in a way that complements the abstract otherworldliness of his *ēthos* qua god-like philosopher. The value he attaches to experience connects his interest in organizing the material world with his authoritarian pedagogy, since it enables the former and justifies the latter.

The dramatic structure of these two works, in which the interlocutor's role is confined almost entirely to passive compliance, conveys the large gulf in experience, as well as skill, that separates the visitor from his followers. This situation is meekly accepted by the interlocutors, especially the compliant Theaitetos. In one revealing passage, when Theaitetos accepts an unconventional view strictly on the visitor's authority (βλέπων εἰς σέ), the visitor accepts his acquiescence, claiming that it would take too long to argue the issue further, and that in any case Theaitetos' nature is such that he will eventually reach the same view for himself (*Soph.* 265de).[129] This passage indicates an attitude towards pedagogical authority very different from that expressed in the midwifery of *Theaetetus*. On the latter model, despite Sokrates' role as leader, Theaitetos' youthful promise played a vital role, and he was even represented as intuitively anticipating Sokrates' own views (*Tht.* 185e, 201cd). In *Sophist*, by contrast, he is led or even "dragged" by the visitor's argument (265e2).[130] Whereas in *Theaetetus* Sokrates warmly welcomed his independence of mind (185e), here it is his *lack* of independence that is praised. What he will come to see is what the visitor is now telling him, rather than something that grew initially from within himself. In *Theaetetus*' terms, the visitor is his impregnator rather than his midwife. The passage replaces Socratic midwifery with a slightly uneasy balance between passivity and autonomy, similar to the goal of the education of *Republic's* guardians (above, pp. 214–16). Like the young guardians of *Republic*, and his earlier self in *Theaetetus*, Theaitetos is not distressed by being "dragged" intellectually. Rather, this is supposed to result in his embracing voluntarily what he is now taught, since he is "naturally" drawn to the idea in question (that of divine craftsmanship) (265de).

[128] We need not assume, of course, that the visitor has personally practised all these activities, but simply that he has learned of them by observation and/or hearsay in the course of a long life.

[129] McPherran makes the intriguing suggestion that the visitor's "godlike" nature is actually *visible* in his face (1993b: 121). But the idiom in question (βλέπω εἰς) is usually metaphorical.

[130] For the violent connotations of "dragging" cf. 246a9, c10, 259c2, *Stat.* 289b7, and above, p. 124.

The pedagogical tone of these two dialogues is, then, predominantly authoritarian. Yet the visitor's choice of question and answer makes his method authoritarian in a very different *way* from a continuous discourse, which is necessarily unresponsive to the specific needs of the listener. He uses the dialogic form to ensure, as far as possible, that the student understands and agrees with each step, attempting to forestall the rote agreement without full understanding that is one of the dangers of an authoritarian pedagogy combined with an overly compliant interlocutor.[131] He explains things that his interlocutors do not understand, corrects them when they make mistakes, and fosters desirable qualities of character.[132] He also criticizes those philosophical "Muses" who do not ensure that "the many" – like the present company – can follow what they say (*Soph.* 243a).[133]

Question and answer form of any kind places the learner in a less passive role than more traditional monologic modes of pedagogy. The interlocutor may alter the course of the exposition through his responses, and that course is necessarily adapted to his skills and capacities. Accordingly, the visitor avowedly adjusts his explanations to the present circumstances (*Stat.* 262c), which presumably include the limitations of the interlocutor.[134] Later he explains that the pedagogical use of images is relative to the skills of the inquirer as well as the nature of the object.[135] This kind of adaptation is most apparent in *Statesman*, where the interlocutor, young Sokrates, poses more of an obstacle to the visitor's expository project. At times the latter indicates that he "must" proceed in a certain way because of his respondent's eagerness or failure of understanding (*Stat.* 277e, 280b7). Young Sokrates' attempt at division instigates an excursus on method (*Stat.* 261e–262b); his concern about the rule of law initiates an extensive discussion; his failure to understand about mimesis likewise occasions a fuller exposition (*Stat.* 297c). The interlocutors thus do influence the path of the conversation, especially by controlling how much explanation is provided at various points. By such means they give the various parts of the discourse their "natural" or "proper" length, whose criterion is the education of the interlocutor.[136] But there is no sign that they significantly affect the substance of the picture of the world conveyed through the visitor's discourse.

[131] *Soph.* 236d, *Stat.* 258d, 293e–294a, 304c. These efforts are not, of course, always successful (cf. *Stat.* 297c).

[132] *Soph.* 260b, 262a–263e, *Stat.* 262c, 267d, and above, pp. 330–33.

[133] For the authoritarian connotations of the Muses see above, p. 39.

[134] So Dorter 1994: 236. [135] *Stat.* 277c, 285e–286a; cf. Lane 1998: 73.

[136] *Stat.* 286d–287a; see further below, pp. 368–70.

Despite this clearly established hierarchy, the visitor's pedagogy also has a collaborative coloring. He places strong emphasis on the joint nature of the inquiry and the interlocutor's full participation.[137] Even expository assertions are made in a way that suggests both participants will learn from the process (e.g. *Stat.* 267d4–5). Collaborative and didactic language are often combined in the same speech (e.g. *Stat.* 261a7–8, 283e). The hierarchical model of leading and following is complemented by the collaborative metaphor of joint travel, and agonistic imagery (combat, wrestling, hunting) is used primarily to present the participants as comrades. This is particularly the case in *Sophist*, where the visitor and Theaitetos are repeatedly represented as allies against the sophist and his ilk.[138] This egalitarian coloring is supported by various dramatic details. The visitor encourages his young interlocutors, but is also encouraged by them.[139] The boys praise him in the same terms that he uses for them,[140] and address him in the imperative, as he does them. Theaitetos speaks as if the visitor were giving him orders, but the visitor speaks the same way about the more assertive young Sokrates, and urges the docile Theaitetos to "give orders" to their imaginary opponents.[141] More subtly, both parties speak in ways that blur the line between their status positions within the hierarchy. Like Sokrates, the visitor repeatedly uses the first person plural for both sides of the process of question and answer, especially for speaking and cognitive processes, including mistakes.[142] His respondents do likewise.[143]

The opening example of the angler well exemplifies this marriage of hierarchy with collaboration. The goal is the collaborative one of harmonizing the private conceptions to which each participant gives the "name" of "sophist." To do this they must reach agreement through *logoi*, so that both of them share the same concept; and that is exactly what happens.[144] But given the visitor's assertive pedagogical role, and his control over the resulting definition, the process is clearly designed to bring Theaitetos round to his way of thinking, rather than vice versa.

[137] *Soph.* 218bcd, 246d, 250a, *Stat.* 258bcd, 260b, 277a, 304c. In *Soph.* 218b7–c1 note especially the dative participles, agreeing with Theaitetos. The sense in which the late dialogues generally present us with a shared search is discussed by Gill 1996b.

[138] E.g. *Soph.* 226a, 231c, e, 235abc, 236d, 239c, 241b–242b, 254a, 256d, 260a, 261abc; cf. also *Stat.* 258c, 268a1, 275d. On the pervasiveness of hunting/travel imagery see Skemp 1952: 121 n. 3. For the interplay between hunting and fighting see Notomi 1999: 163–6.

[139] E.g. *Soph.* 238a4, 242b, *Stat.* 277e1; cf. also *Stat.* 257b8–9.

[140] E.g. καλῶς/κάλλιστα ("finely") are used at *Soph.* 219a3, 227c10, 247e7, 251a4, e7, 254b7, 261c5, 265d5, *Stat.* 261e5, 264a4, b6, 267a1, 269c3, 271c8, 275a11, 279c6, 282a5, 286b2, 287b3, 288e8, 293a2, d3, 294e4, 301a5, 304d10.

[141] *Soph.* 226c12, 246e2, *Stat.* 261e7–8, 263a, 265b3–4.

[142] E.g. *Soph.* 223e, *Stat.* 264ab, 274e–275a, 283d11–12, 294a.

[143] E.g. *Soph.* 257d6, *Stat.* 262c8–9.

[144] *Soph.* 218bc, 221ab; cf. 242bc.

And so it goes throughout both dialogues. What the participants "agree" to are without exception the visitor's ideas.[145] The visitor almost always receives the answer he wants, which is usually clear from the form of the question, even when he is most insistent on the interlocutor's autonomy (*Soph.* 222b; cf. *Stat.* 266de). Any reservations or "wrong" answers are quickly resolved in his favor.[146] This pattern combines the visitor's obvious dominance with an appearance of participation and commitment from the interlocutor.

There is a certain tension between these two aspects of the visitor's pedagogy. Among other things, his dominance raises questions about the sincerity of the avowed doubt and uncertainty that contribute to his collaborative persona.[147] At times he speaks as if he does not know where the discussion is heading, but the reader may well suspect otherwise.[148] This is analogous to feelings provoked in many readers (and interlocutors) by Plato's Sokrates, whose uncertainties are often interpreted as a mask hiding his own (or Plato's) positive educational agenda (cf. above, p. 184). But there is a crucial difference here between the visitor and Sokrates. In the visitor's case we know, *because we have been told*, that he views the conversation primarily as an exposition of what he has learned from others in the past. This makes it clear that his inclusive language is indeed a pedagogical mannerism, designed to encourage the student by conveying a sense of solidarity between them, and to foster the follower's sense of progress by equating it with the leader's own journey along the same path. This is not disingenuousness or even irony. It simply allows the visitor to speak as if he and his young interlocutor were progressing as equals in a collaborative enterprise, even if he is not himself learning anything new. And of course, there is a sense in which he and the interlocutor *are* engaged in a collaborative enterprise – the instruction of the latter. Once again, we see the visitor making explicit certain methods and behaviors that may be suspected in some avatars of Sokrates.

ASSAULTING THE FATHER

I have been emphasizing the authoritarian aspects of the visitor's persona, in contrast to Sokrates' avowed desire to learn from others through

[145] E.g. *Soph.* 253b10, 254b8, 256a11, 260ab, 264d10; *Stat.* 300e4, 304b8.

[146] E.g. *Soph.* 228e, *Stat.* 290a. Contrast the thoroughness with which Theaitetos' erroneous ideas are examined in *Tht.*

[147] E.g. *Soph.* 236cd, 239c, 242bc, 244a, 249e, *Stat.* 267cd, 275d, 276c, 291bc.

[148] E.g. he introduces the paradigm of weaving as if it were a novel one that had just occurred to him (*Stat.* 279ab; cf. Rowe 1995 ad loc.). But Plato, if not the visitor himself, has clearly prepared us for it much earlier (cf. *Soph.* 226b, 240c, 242d, 262cd, *Stat.* 267b).

conversation. Yet it is important not to posit too sharp a dichotomy between expository leading and learning for oneself.[149] The fact that the visitor's collaborative language is pedagogical does not mean his exploratory tone is necessarily disingenuous. Though he obviously has little to learn from Theaitetos or young Sokrates, we should not rule out the possibility that he is reaching new insights as he guides his interlocutors over initially familiar ground. His expository method does not preclude interpretation and adaptation of what he has heard from others, or the addition of new thinking of his own. This is particularly clear from his discussion of non-being in *Sophist.* There is no reason to doubt him when he states that he has never followed this line of inquiry before, clearly signaling that at least this part of his discourse is genuinely exploratory (*Soph.* 242ab). A further implication is that the expressions of *aporia* clustered around the question of non-being should be construed as sincere.[150] This part of the dialogue is, of course, the most intellectually challenging, and in many ways the most philosophically significant. It also the part that most clearly defines the visitor's own innovative intellectual position in relation to his educational influences.

It may be significant that this portion of *Sophist* involves particularly extensive use of imaginary interlocutors. Despite Theaitetos' formal involvement, the visitor takes virtually all the substantive roles in the imagined conversations, ventriloquating the voices of Theaitetos, himself, and a range of imaginary opponents. The resultant shifting and confusion in the voices of questioner and answerer leads to a circus of role-playing by the visitor.[151] Theaitetos often fails to speak for their imaginary opponents adequately or at all, beyond affirming the visitor's propositions on their behalf.[152] As both he and the visitor acknowledge, he is practically worthless as a devil's advocate.[153] One effect of this ventriloquation and appropriation of other voices is to suggest that in this portion of the dialogue, where the visitor acknowledges that he is working out something new, he is essentially talking to himself. If so, then his words are an outer expression of the inner dialogue that constitutes thought.[154] The role of dialogue in philosophical inquiry seems to have been transposed entirely

[149] Cf. Rowe 1996: 178; Lane 1998: 68. [150] See esp. *Soph.* 238d–239b and cf. below, n. 270.

[151] Interestingly, there is some confusion about the proper attribution of speakers at *Soph.* 248d and 251e (Campbell 1867: I. 128, 139). The lack of quotation marks in ancient manuscripts would engender still greater confusion in the ancient reader.

[152] Cf. e.g. *Soph.* 237c, 247e, 251e. [153] *Soph.* 248b, 251e. The only exception is at 247bc.

[154] Cf. Szlezák 1999: 100–102. Like Sokrates in *Tht.* (189e–190a, 206cd) the visitor defines thought as an interior conversation, and *logos* as its vocal expression (*Soph.* 263de; cf. 230a5, 231d1, 264ab). Compare also the pluralists who carry their opponent within themselves (*Soph.* 252c).

from the interpersonal realm to the interior of the individual soul. Given that the visitor distinguishes between monologue and dialogue only pedagogically, it makes sense that he should not genuinely engage with other people's ideas except in his imagination. But if thought is a conversation in the soul, and *logos* its verbal expression, then the *process* of thinking can only be articulated by a single person as a dialogue between imaginary speakers. Since the visitor shows no interest in actually convincing his opponents of their errors or addressing them on their own terms, the purpose of his imaginary conversation is not so much to represent the ideas of others in their own right as to provide an external expression of his own thinking. This is only possible for one who has heard – and understood – enough voices to make the process fruitful (contrast *Tht.* 148e). It is the visitor's experience of both life and *logoi* that enables him to "talk to himself" in a way that constitutes creative thought (cf. *Soph.* 248b).

The visitor uses this creative mode of discourse to challenge the ideas of earlier authorities, most importantly, "father" Parmenides, whom he "assaults" (241d, 242a) and "disobeys" (258c). In so doing, he also inverts the pedagogical hierarchy by "going on ahead" and "demonstrating" to Parmenides things that go beyond what he would have permitted (*Soph.* 258c). In his willingness to refute his teacher in this fashion, he echoes the elenctic Sokrates' critical attitude towards tradition, his refusal to accept human authority without question, and his subordination of personal ties to the search for an impersonal truth.[155] He thereby exemplifies a model of philosophical heroism that incorporates not only the subtlety of an Odysseus and the integrity of an Achilles, but a faith in intellectual inquiry, and resistance to the father, that may be construed as Oedipal. His strong respect for pedagogical authority is thus tempered by an element of creativity growing out of a critique of such authority. He values "hearing" ideas from other people – specifically one's elders – and transmitting them in an expository fashion. Yet he does not reproduce mechanically what he has learned. He adapts and extends it, with serious and explicit criticisms of his predecessors, to present an innovative account of the topic of inquiry. The different voices he has "heard" are incorporated into an internal dialogue that is his own. Learning from others and thinking for himself, respect and innovation, are inextricably intertwined. This is especially clear from the way the discussion of nonbeing, his major independent contribution, plays a crucial role in the

[155] The visitor's preferred verb is ἐλέγχειν, the verbal equivalent of *elenchus* (*Soph.* 241e1, 242a8, 242b1–5, 259c9).

final definition of the sophist – the original topic that was to be clarified by explaining what people believe back in Elea.

As we would expect from his strong authoritarianism, the visitor's approach towards "attacking" his "father" is a very cautious one. He is slow to discount the authority of his elders, treats his "father" with great respect, and only criticizes him now that he himself is old and experienced, after much reluctance over a period of many years. He also incorporates him into the final picture that results from his critique (*Soph.* 241 d). Despite the "assault," his wording does not imply that he is actually committing parricide. The "father" is thus accorded much greater weight than he was on *Theaetetus'* model of midwifery, where he was elided – at least overtly – from the reproductive and educational process (above, p. 294). Respect for the father is the foundation for the Oedipal assault that allows the son to attain manhood, and assume, in his turn, the mantle of patriarch.

This pattern of strong authoritarianism tempered by the opportunity to critique that authority under limited conditions recurs in other aspects of these two dialogues. To begin with, the visitor's authoritative relationship to his young interlocutors positions him in turn as their "father." If they are to follow in his footsteps, they too may be licensed to take an independent stand and criticize or "assault" him under certain circumstances. This expectation is confirmed, to a modest extent, by signs that the visitor encourages an element of autonomy, especially in Theaitetos. Thus he gives the boy the option of suggesting an alternative method, urges him to answer however he likes, and invites him to attempt a solution where he himself has failed.[156] He treats neither interlocutor as an entirely passive learner, but urges them to try division for themselves,[157] and emphasizes the value of dialectical practice (*Soph.* 218cd). He aims at increasing their skill for the future and rendering them more "dialectical" and more "inventive" (εὑρετικός) at "demonstration" (δήλωσις) of the truth.[158] His digression on due measure is also prompted by thoughts of the future.[159] But this fostering of independence in his interlocutors, like his own assault on "father" Parmenides, is strictly circumscribed. He never encourages the boys to challenge his own authority or produce an individual and creative discourse like his myth. He offers them tools for their future self-education, but does not

[156] *Soph.* 218d, 222b, 239b. [157] E.g. *Soph.* 227cd, 265e–266a, *Stat.* 261a.
[158] *Stat.* 285d, 286a, 287a. On εὑρετικός see above, p. 215. [159] *Stat.* 283b; cf. also 284d, 286c.

license them to attack their "father" any time soon. Indeed, such a licence would undermine its own purpose by providing paternal authorization for critique of the father.

It is ironic, but hardly accidental, that this concern for the interlocutors' autonomy accompanies the elimination of almost all independence from their dramatic personae. This is not – as we might suppose – because such interlocutors have an especially acute need to develop some autonomy, but the opposite: their eventual autonomy may one day be possible in part *because of* the compliance that contributes to the excellence of their present character. Thus the visitor expresses confidence in the autonomous future progress of Theaitetos' nature, not *in spite of* his present docility, but *because* he is *not* one of those who may change their mind about what he, the visitor, has taught him (*Soph.* 265de; contrast *Stat.* 283b). Similarly, he urges young Sokrates to "keep safe" his present attitude in order to become "richer in wisdom in old age" (*Stat.* 261e). As Miller puts it, he "falls back on his external authority to give young Sokrates advice which, once accepted and applied, will liberate the latter from his very need for that authority."[160] It seems, then, that they are on their way to future independence – when they eventually acquire enough age and experience – precisely because of their present deference. If they are ever ready for full autonomy, they will, presumably, be licensed to depart from the visitor's point of view. For now, however, they must abide by his rules, until they have gained the intellectual maturity to transcend them. Their autonomy is only a remote possibility, for a future time when age, natural gifts, experience, and education have all been developed sufficiently and in the right way. The repeated emphasis on their youth, together with the large gap in skill and experience that divides them from the visitor, constantly remind us how far away this moment lies.

The combination of authoritarianism with a limited element of autonomy is also mirrored in *Statesman's* political discussion, much as *Republic*'s move towards a different form of pedagogy reflects the authoritarianism internal to the ideal state. Just as the visitor's authority over his young interlocutors is grounded in his vastly superior expertise, so too the expertise of the ideal ruler, modeled on that of the doctor, is used to underwrite an authoritarian politics.[161] In so far as the visitor represents the "godlike" philosopher, the enormous gulf between him and his interlocutors parallels the gulf between ordinary states and that ruled by

[160] Miller 1980: 72 and further 116–18.

[161] *Stat.* 293bcd, 295cd, 296bc; cf. 297e–299c; contrast *Laws* 720a–e, 857cde.

the expert statesman, which is as far from the others as god from humankind (*Stat.* 303b). Like the visitor's authority over his interlocutors, the authority of the ideal ruler – if he ever appeared – would be warmly embraced (*Stat.* 301d). The task of this statesman, qua educator, is to unite his people with the "divine" bond of right opinion (*Stat.* 309cd), as the visitor does for Theaitetos and young Sokrates.[162] But despite his absolute authority, he also fosters a limited independence in the citizens by educating them in good judgment and assigning them to the committees that perform some of the work of government.[163] He thus embodies the same combination of strong authoritarianism and eventual autonomy, based on proper nature and training, that we have seen in the visitor's pedagogy.

Like the doctor of his analogy or the ideal ruler, the visitor will (presumably) leave town, leaving behind him the "rules" of division as reminders of his directions (cf. *Stat.* 295c).[164] Like law, division is a "safe method of dealing with things in the aggregate."[165] Such methods are needed in any human community, because a comprehensive paternalism, which would require the ruler to stay beside each person constantly directing them, is impossible. Or rather, it is only possible for god, who is not circumscribed by place and time, and who rules paternalistically in the golden age. The human ruler, even in his ideal form, must rely on laws to some extent, since he cannot oversee every detail of individual lives (*Stat.* 294d–295b; cf. 305b5). These laws take the form of "memoranda," which he is free to override at will.[166] But in inferior states, law provides a repository of accumulated experience that should never be violated (*Stat.* 300bc; cf. *Laws* 715cd). For only strict adherence to law shows due respect for the fact that no one should change the laws except the true statesman.[167] Like the citizens of these second-best states, the visitor's interlocutors should for the present pay close heed to the rule of "law," in the form of his methodological prescriptions.

162 Cf. *Stat.* 277a, 278d; Miller 1980: 109.

163 *Stat.* 311ab; cf. Rowe 1995b on 311a4–b4; Lane 1998: 177–8.

164 Skemp reminds us that philosophers traveled to supply states with laws (1952: 209), and Miller suggests Plato was thinking of his own impending death (1980: 116–17).

165 Scodel 1987: 157.

166 Cf. Lane 1998: 152–5. These rules are not, of course, written down. But as Lane emphasizes, the visitor's primary contrast is not between oral and written laws, but between knowledge and tradition.

167 Lane 1998: 157–9. This prescription evokes the tradition that Solon and Lycurgus intended their laws to remain unaltered even if people were dissatisfied, and left their respective cities in order to avoid pressures to change them (Nagy 1985: 31–2; cf. also Skemp 1952: 199).

But the irreducible plurality of human affairs makes all general rules inadequate.[168] The rigid rule of law is therefore deleterious, despite the fact that there is no better alternative in the absence of the ideal ruler. Similarly, the visitor makes apparent the limitations of his method of division, viewed as a rigid set of rules. His use of the method depends not on strict adherence to such rules, but on his own good judgment.[169] Like the ideal ruler who overrides the laws, he sees fit to adjust his methodological guidelines in light of the *logos* and the needs of the individual student, for example by emphasizing "bifurcatory" or "organic" principles of division as the situation requires.[170] As with the rule of law, some people are entitled to political and intellectual autonomy, but only a select, highly qualified few, such as the "godlike" visitor himself. If such an extraordinary ruler is even a remote possibility, however, there must be some way of encouraging him to arise, since he does not do so "by nature," like a queen bee (*Stat.* 302de). If we feed the political model back into the pedagogical, we will see that a small door is left open for the nurturance of such a ruler in the visitor's treatment of his young interlocutors. The likelihood of this person's arising corresponds to the degree of permissible independence in Theaitetos and young Sokrates – small, and consigned to the distant future.

The combination of authoritarian paternalism with an element of autonomy in the ruled is sanctioned on yet another level by the visitor's myth. The tension and complementarity between divine control and human self-assertion, expository paternalism and critical reflection, are inscribed within the universe itself. In the golden age, human beings are entirely passive, like flocks of sheep governed by their divine herdsman, and fed by an autonomously fertile earth (272a). In our own age, however, god the "father," the demiurge, has provided teaching (διδαχή) to his creation, and "the necessary teaching and education" to accompany the crafts.[171] This divine "teaching" of craft-skills is presumably authoritarian and expository, on the paternal model.[172] But since our world is characterized by forgetfulness, it is remembered only in traces. How are these traces to be recovered? I suggest that they are embodied in the laws and "paternal" traditions, both of the ideal ruler and of the

[168] *Stat.* 294bc; cf. 273d, *Laws* 875d. [169] Cf. Campbell 1867: I. xii–xiii and below, pp. 358–9.

[170] Cf. Miller 1980: 74–81. [171] *Stat.* 273b, 274c7; cf. *Tim.* 42e.

[172] "Presumably" not only because the demiurge is identified as our "father," but because the authoritarian model is strongly associated both with divine gifts to mortals and with craft-teaching (cf. Burford 1972: 82–91, 119–23).

inferior states. The emphatically repeated word πάτριος ("paternal" or "handed down from our fathers") is an awkward one in context.[173] But it resonates with the paternal role of the demiurge, whose dispensation is remembered and passed down to us by our earliest ancestors as the myth of the golden age (*Stat.* 271abc). We must do our best to abide by the traces of this "teaching" by respecting the "memory" enshrined in whatever laws we have, even though it will be successfully embodied only in the laws of the true statesman.

At the same time, however, the age of Zeus is characterized by autonomy, of ourselves as of the cosmos as a whole.[174] This is, paradoxically, part of what is "commanded" by god to his creation (274a). The need for such autonomy derives from the same flux and unpredictability, the tendency towards *aporia* and "unlikeness," that make rigid laws disastrous (*Stat.* 273d; cf. 274c5). For this reason the divine rulers of the universe have given us tools to make human life livable, including fire, the crafts and agriculture (*Stat.* 274cd). However paternalistic the instruction that comes with these tools may be, they are left in our hands to be used on our own initiative. Without a god to stand by our elbows with paternal instruction, we must, while doing our best to remember the truths of divine authority, at the same time think for ourselves. These tools allow us to reproduce on a human level the creative activity of the divine "craftsman." Our age is also characterized by memory (albeit of an imperfect kind), which makes possible both social and political structures (*Stat.* 271e–272a) and, of course, philosophy. The myth thus encodes in the present human condition several traits basic to the visitor's own philosophical practice: the proper use of memory, respect for tradition and authority, and an element of creativity and autonomy for those who have mastered the rules that they have been given. The homology between microcosm and macrocosm is sustained by the way living creatures strive to resemble the cosmos itself.[175] In doing so, the autonomous humans of the age of Zeus employ structural or "second-order" mimesis, since they do not do exactly what the cosmos does, but rather imitate its autonomy

[173] It occurs at *Stat.* 295a6, 296c8, 298e1, 299d1, 301a4; cf. 290e7. Rowe notes the oddity of ascribing "ancestral" legislation to the ruler (1995b on 295a5–7). The laws of the inferior states are based on experience, refined by advice and persuasion (*Stat.* 300b; cf. 301e). They must therefore be the result of a process over time. But this is hard to square with the fact that in the second-best group of states the laws are never changed. On this problem see esp. Michelini 2000b.

[174] *Stat.* 273a, 274a,d; cf. Nightingale 1996: 85; Lane 1998: 108–11.

[175] *Stat.* 273e–274a, 274d.

by taking responsibility for themselves: "to imitate self-rule means to rule oneself, not to be ruled by that which one imitates."[176]

Yet the same mode of imitation drastically restricts human autonomy when imperfect states "imitate" the ideal.[177] The inferior ruler who attempts to "imitate" the ideal statesman by overthrowing the laws is inappropriately mimicking the most superficially obvious aspects of the statesman's behavior (*Stat.* 300de; cf. 303c). Like the sophist, with his outward appearance of wisdom and virtue, he is an illusionistic "first-order" imitator, one who tries to impersonate the true ruler by presenting himself as something he is not. The second-best ruler, by contrast, does not imitate the ideal ruler's *behavior*. Nevertheless, the state over which he presides is, paradoxically, a better "imitation" of the ideal in so far as it is based on the same underlying principle, namely the principle that only the true statesman should change the law (*Stat.* 300e–301 a).[178] Similarly, the kind of intellectual autonomy displayed by the visitor is not something to be imitated superficially by a Theaitetos or a young Sokrates. Rather, appropriate "imitation" means respecting fundamental principles, including the principle that their own intellectual autonomy should be strictly limited (at least for the present). Just as only the true statesman is entitled to overrule the laws, so only the true philosopher is entitled to full intellectual independence.

As we have seen, the visitor displays such independence in his treatment of his "father" Parmenides. It is also exemplified in his ability to "remember" his myth by reconstructing it from what "we have heard" (*Stat.* 269a8), that is, from the traces that remain in popular memory. The fact that these current myths are merely dim fragments is a sign of our "forgetfulness" – the forgetfulness of god that characterizes the age of Zeus because of its bodily nature (*Stat.* 273bc).[179] But we do retain sufficient memory to philosophize, however inadequately. It is memory that makes possible not only the retention but the critique of what we have heard, just as the visitor both retains and critiques the ideas of Parmenides. Young Sokrates is one of those who have "heard" and "remembers" the familiar myths (*Stat.* 268e10). But his memory is a partial and a static one. The visitor's memory works rather differently. He claims

[176] Lane 1998: 109. [177] *Stat.* 293e, 294e, 297bc, 300e–301 a.

[178] This is Lane's interpretation (1998: 156–8), which builds on Rowe's account of the value of law in *Stat.* (1995b: 15–18, 1996).

[179] On memory in *Stat.* see Miller 1980: 48–53; Ferrari 1995: 393–6; McCabe 1997: 107; Howland 1998: 260–61.

that his myth really occurred, i.e. that it is history.[180] Yet he also says "no one has ever spoken" it before (*Stat.* 269b), and offers no explanation for his own access to it. This signals that the myth should be conceived of as his own contribution, like the discussion of non-being in *Sophist.* Apparently, he transcends the limitations that keep most of us (such as young Sokrates) from a full understanding of the mythic past. Characteristically, he not only uses and incorporates the views and tales that serve as traces of this past, but draws attention to the fact that he is doing so.[181] The myth may therefore plausibly be construed as a creative act of memory, using the traces that have survived in the form of popular mythology.[182] The visitor's process of generating the myth thus enshrines the autonomy characteristic of the age of Zeus as presented within that myth.[183] In his own larger picture of the world, such autonomy is strictly prohibited to anyone but the true statesman. But the visitor permits it to himself, licensing himself to "create" his own cosmic order, like the demiurge himself, in the medium of *logoi.*

The visitor is thus a quasi-symbolic figure, a god-like philosopher comparable to the ruler of the "godlike" state and even to the demiurge himself. Unlike the demiurge, however, the visitor remains human; and unlike the ideal statesman whom he posits, he is dramatically present. The statesman, like the ideal philosophers of *Republic* and *Theaetetus*, is neither presently instantiated nor dramatically represented. This enables the visitor and/or Plato to evade the problem of whether such a person could ever actually exist.[184] Clearly this is supposed to be possible in principle. But as the visitor emphasizes, a ruler must be like his subjects in nature – i.e. he must be human (*Stat.* 274e–275c). Yet if he is really human in nature, and lives, as we do, under the reign of Zeus, he must share in the forgetfulness and error of the human race. It is hard to see how any such person could fully embody the comprehensive good judgment exercised by the truly knowledgeable statesman. The visitor himself is the ideal ruler's closest equivalent, but since he *is* dramatically represented, he can only be "godlike" as far as this is possible for an

[180] *Stat.* 268e8–10, 269b, 271b2–4. For interpretation of 268e see Rowe 1995b ad loc. Cf. Sokrates' insistence on the "truth" of the myth of *Gorg.* (523a, 524ab, 527a; cf. also *Tim.* 21d). On the visitor's historical sense see Mishima 1995: 312; Rowe 1995b on 272d3–5; Lane 1998: 149–50, 199–200. It does not follow, of course, that the myth should be interpreted as serious history or cosmology.

[181] Other Platonic myths also adapt a wide range of sources (see e.g. Dodds 1959: 372–6), but the visitor's is exceptional for its *explicit* incorporation of several well-known tales (cf. Hemmenway 1994: 259).

[182] Cf. *Phdr.* 250c7; Miller 1980: 76.

[183] Lane 1998: 113–14.

[184] On this problem see most recently Samaras 1996; Michelini 2000b.

embodied human being. Like the statesman, the human philosopher must resemble his students in his essential humanity, which includes being subject to error and confusion. The appearance of an ideal statesman is evidently as improbable as the emergence of the ideal philosopher with whom he is effectively identified.

This leaves us with a conundrum in trying to understand the Eleatic visitor as a character. Despite his blandness and abstraction, he necessarily retains, as we have seen, the limitations of embodied human identity. To argue that his "godlike" character removes him from such limitations would be untrue to the text, and in any case provides no real solution (cf. above, p. 218). He therefore illustrates the inadequacy of a strictly authoritarian paternalism, since in society, as in philosophy, it is bound to lead to error. On his own account of politics one should, in the absence of perfect leadership, obey traditional rules absolutely strictly rather than allow oneself to be influenced by seemingly authoritative innovators. If the same thing applies to philosophy, then the visitor's own imperfect leadership cannot be taken as a licence to attack such philosophical authorities as "father" Parmenides, or such traditional "rules" as the rule of law and the superiority of Greeks over barbarians. But if the visitor's entitlement to intellectual leadership is undercut by his own imperfections as a leader, then so is his assertion that in the absence of perfect leadership traditional laws should always be strictly obeyed. Like the authoritarian structures of *Republic*, the visitor's authoritarianism is challenged by the imperfections and uncertainty of its own spokesman. This constitutes a warning not to treat the "godlike" visitor with the authority due only to the ideal ruler or to god, and leaves open a window, for readers who may be more experienced, more independent-minded, better educated, and/or more intellectually gifted than Theaitetos or young Sokrates, to critique the visitor's political model on its own terms. By continuing to use dramatic form, even with such blandly presented characters, Plato thus provides us with clues as to how we may exercise the element of autonomy deemed permissible even under the visitor's own program.

A PLACE FOR EVERYTHING, AND EVERYTHING IN ITS PLACE

From his "godlike" (but human) perspective, the visitor generates a world-picture structured by certain values. His distinctive method of division provides a conceptual and methodological structure for a systematic and hierarchical inventory of human activities (cf. *Soph.*

235c6–7).[185] He uses this method to locate human beings within a web of relationships not only to each other, but to the cosmos, the elements, and all that lies between, especially other animals and the materials of human craftsmanship.[186] In so doing, he constructs a more or less coherent world picture within a particular conceptual and epistemological framework, in a kind of mapping of reality.[187] This picture is reinforced by the imagery of travel (the covering of territory), hunting and weaving of nets, which may be seen "as images of general tactics of location and classification in fields."[188]

But "mapping" implies a process that is provisional and relative to circumstances. As Dorter puts it, "there can be no definitive conceptual map of reality."[189] To be sure, the visitor seeks out "natural" or organic divisions.[190] Yet many such choices remain available, allowing for more than one way of classifying the same object.[191] The method is thus a provisional one, and adaptable to various purposes (cf. *Stat.* 289b, 302e), which may result in different divisions.[192] We can construct or reconstruct our world by mapping and remapping it in different ways, as the visitor's abundant neologisms attest. This active role in generating our own conceptual universe is indicated obliquely by a telling mannerism: the visitor often speaks of various theorists actively "constructing" their worlds: they "set the whole in motion" or "make it stand still as one," or alternately "combine" and "divide" all things.[193] The method of example complements this picture by positing craftsmanship as a conceptual tool for comprehending the world. Large-scale structures, including the state and the cosmos itself, are to be understood through the craft-models of the weaver and the divine demiurge respectively.

The humor, inconsistency, provisionality, back-tracking, confusion and arbitrariness with which the visitor employs his method suggest an awareness in himself – and Plato – of the dangers of trying to construct a world through *logoi* in this fashion. We are limited by human ignorance, which

[185] The value of division in general, and the visitor's uses of it in particular, has been much debated. For further discussion see esp. Miller 1980; Rosen 1983, 1995; Scodel 1987; Dorter 1994; Lane 1998.

[186] For division as a tool for understanding the cosmos cf. also *Phileb.* 23c4.

[187] Cf. Skemp 1952: 74.

[188] Brumbaugh 1952: 323; cf. *Soph.* 235b.

[189] 1994: 214; cf. 224; Lane 1998: 35–9, 42–3.

[190] *Stat.* 259d, 265b9, 287c; cf. *Phdr.* 265e.

[191] Cf. Campbell 1867: I. xiii; Hitchcock 1987: 127–8.

[192] Thus *Stat.* starts out from a different primary division than *Soph.*, with no indication that this invalidates the latter (*Stat.* 258b). The "two paths" in *Stat.* are also quite different from each other (cf. *Stat.* 265a, 267a).

[193] *Soph.* 252ab; cf. e.g. *Soph.* 246a, 260a2–3, *Stat.* 262de, 266e, 284a. This kind of language recalls the creation of a pictorial world on the shield of Achilles (above, p. 303); it is also common in Lucretius (e.g. 3.628).

causes a sense of *atopia*: a sense that things are "out of place."[194] The image of displacement is especially appropriate to the method of division, with its topographical view of the conceptual world, and simultaneously suggests reasons why a full and complete mapping is impossible for anyone subject to ignorance – i.e. any human being. Moreover the visitor is using division in part pedagogically, and it may be plausibly argued that one part of this purpose is to show the method's own limitations. But none of this invalidates the method as such.[195] Rather it emphasizes that the practitioner's degree of insight is one of the factors involved in generating such a picture of the world, for better or worse.

This insight includes a certain hierarchy of values. It is often said that division ignores questions of value. This is because the visitor declares that it "honors" all crafts equally, and no activity is too humble for the present discussion – not even louse-catching.[196] But since "sophist," "philosopher," and "statesman" are all heavily laden concepts, even to inquire about them is to ask a question about values, as Sokrates makes plain in the introductory conversation of *Statesman* (257b). Distinctions of value cannot be *discovered* by division. But a prior understanding of such distinctions – like the ability to see other kinds of "natural" or relevant difference – underwrites its successful practice. Later, the visitor will provide an overarching cosmic and ethical framework for his practice of division by means of the myth.[197] But the values in question are presupposed from the outset. Thus the visitor deems his preliminary example, the angler, to be intrinsically inferior (*phaulos*) and unworthy of serious attention.[198] Similarly, in *Statesman* he asserts that no one would inquire into a paltry thing like weaving for its own sake (285d).

Within this presupposed evaluative framework, everything has its place; even the most contemptible activities may have a kind of philosophical value.[199] This does not mean that louse-catching *per se* is as valuable as, for example, philosophy or statesmanship. But louse-catching and similar activities do have a different kind of value, a value relative to the circumstances. They are valuable *for the purpose of* gaining understanding,

[194] *Stat.* 291ab; cf. e.g. *Soph.* 239c1, *Stat.* 277d6, 298e4, and above, pp. 73–4.

[195] The visitor's other modes of discourse in *Stat.*, in particular myth and *paradeigma*, supplement the method of division rather than invalidating it. He never abandons division, and returns to it at the end of *Stat.* (cf. 268de).

[196] *Soph.* 227ab; cf. *Stat.* 266de, 285d, 286ab. This aspect of division has been much discussed (see esp. Dorter 1984, 1987: 111–17; Scodel 1987: 23, 92; Howland 1998: 200).

[197] Cf. Skemp 1952: 52–3; Dorter 1994: 194–5.

[198] *Soph.* 218e; cf. 226d, 227d–228e, 267c.

[199] It is worth noting in this regard that the verb διαιρεῖν ("divide") can be implicitly ethical in the sense of "discriminate" or "judge correctly" (cf. *Stat.* 305c3 and Parker 1983: 18–19).

and *in this respect*, and *in so far as* they resemble other things.[200] Similarly the craft of weaving, though contemptible in itself, has great value as a model or *paradeigma* (*Stat.* 285d).[201] Indeed, it is precisely the intrinsic triviality of such matters that makes them philosophically useful, as "practice" material, or models to help us understand the "greatest" things (τὰ μέγιστα).[202] Thus the angler helps us understand the method of division itself, and weaving the nature of good government. By providing methodological explanations of both division and example,[203] the visitor also provides a methodological justification for the (Socratic) practice of using examples drawn from the lowliest crafts.

The visitor's "mapping" of the world is one way in which he tries to mediate the tensions between universal and particular, likeness and difference, which complicate epistemology, politics and metaphysics. In contrast to other dialogues, however, the tensions explored on the discursive level are no longer embodied in the dramatis personae carrying out those explorations. In *Sophist* and *Statesman* – as opposed to *Theaetetus* – the dramatic liveliness of rich and detailed personalities gives way to predominantly intellectual characterization, whereby the interest of the characters is strictly proportionate to their philosophical contributions. The dominant speaker, his interlocutors, and even Sokrates are bereft of the engaging variety that we find elsewhere in Plato's dramatis personae, whether in the form of variation among a range of characters in one work, or variation and complexity within individual characters. Shape-shifting, polytropism, and *atopia* are instead attributed to the figures under discussion, most notably the kaleidoscopic sophist, with his numerous definitions or disguises, and the "weird" (*atopos*) polytropic mob of false politicians (*Stat.* 291ab). The multiplicity of the world, whether material or human, has been abstracted from the mise en scène and incorporated exclusively into the subject of inquiry. For example, in contrast to *Theaetetus*, the question of mental and physical beauty and ugliness is now analyzed without any reference to the personal qualities of the participants (*Soph.* 228d–229a). The preoccupation of the discourse with the specificity of the human world accompanies a decline in the particularity of the characters themselves.

[200] τοῦ κτήσασθαι ἕνεκα νοῦν . . . πρός τοῦτο . . . κατὰ τὴν ὁμοιότητα (*Soph.* 227ab).

[201] This contempt for weaving accords with its strong association with women (above, p. 141). Thus at *Phd.* 87bc the male weaver is a mere "human being" (ἄνθρωπος) as opposed to a real "man" (ἀνήρ). This ambivalence towards his own models is typical of Plato (see Scheid and Svenbro 1996: 23–4).

[202] *Soph.* 218cd, *Stat.* 278e, 285d–286a, 302b1. On the identity of τὰ μέγιστα see Owen 1973: 358; Rowe 1995b on *Stat.* 285e4.

[203] For the former see e.g. *Stat.* 285ab; for the latter *Stat.* 277a–278e, 285d–286a.

This is the same kind of shift, in both characterization and discursive content, that we saw in *Republic* (above, pp. 227–8). In the triad, however, it is taken still further, in a way that is justified in part by the visitor's principal method. As a mode of analysis more than discovery, division invites the dominant speaker to generate a rich and detailed picture of the world. Multiplicity therefore remains a quality of his intellectual character, in so far as it is a salient feature of his discourse. The minutiae of the world have become part of his conceptual universe. This exemplifies a larger pattern in Plato generally, whereby the most rich, diverse and "real" characters and dramatic scenery often set the stage for the most idealizing theories (*Symposium*, *Phaedo*, *Phaedrus*, *Republic*), while dialogues more concerned discursively with the minutiae of the "real" world employ characters that are more sketchy and abstract (cf. above, p. 74). This reaches an extreme in *Timaeus* and *Laws*, with their lack of individual characterization and their obsessive attention to the details of the material world and the organization of human life respectively.

From within his hierarchy of values, the visitor uses the method of division to construct a picture of the world, in a particular interpretation, from a particular perspective, and for a particular purpose. In keeping with his status as an iconic outsider, this world is neither culturally nor geographically parochial, embracing such matters as fish in the Nile, the Persian king's ponds, and geese and cranes in Thessaly (*Stat.* 264c). He does not hesitate to criticize the local (παρ᾽ ἡμῖν) Eleans (*Soph.* 242d), and when Theaitetos speaks of what is said by "us" Athenians (δι᾽ ἡμῶν), the visitor expands his remark to "nearly all Greeks" (*Soph.* 229d). He can compare Egyptian religious and political practices with those of Greek states, of which Athens (παρ᾽ ὑμῖν) furnishes one example (*Stat.* 290e5–6).[204] When he discusses methods of athletic coaching, Athens is again just one city among others (καὶ παρ᾽ ὑμῖν) (*Stat.* 294d). And as Lane points out, his treatment of autochthony in the myth is subversive of Athenian patriotic ideology.[205]

A famous passage shows the visitor's large geographical and cultural perspective most clearly, when he criticizes the distinction between Greek and "barbarian," made by "most people here [in Greece]," as an inappropriate juncture for division (*Stat.* 262cde).[206] The levelling effect of this critique is enhanced by his substitution of Lydians and

[204] Egypt is a potent symbol of the Other in Greek culture generally and Plato in particular (see e.g. Blondell et al. 1999: 22–3).

[205] Lane 1998: 106.

[206] On this passage see further Miller 1980: 22–4; Skemp 1952: 131–2; H. Joly 1992: 84–9; Dorter 1994: 188–9.

Phrygians – groups despised by Athenians – for Greeks generally, thus belittling the Greeks collectively for their limited perspective.[207] This is, by Greek standards, a rare and remarkable expression of inclusiveness, as may be seen by contrast not only with young Sokrates' unreflective Hellenocentrism (*Stat.* 292e), but with the way even Sokrates, in *Republic*, distinguishes between the "natural" enmity of Greeks towards barbarians, and "unnatural" strife among Greeks (470bc).

The visitor's world-view transcends other cultural divisions as well, including class and gender. Nothing is said explicitly about his own social status. His class background, like that of the philosopher of the digression, is unmarked. But he is situated in the wealthy leisured classes by his occupation (or lack thereof), his liberty to travel, and his philosophical education. His language sometimes betrays an elitist and even aristocratic outlook.[208] Yet the activities he analyzes have a democratic sweep embracing all social strata: men and women, freeborn and slaves, democrats, aristocrats, and the Great King of Persia. Female and servile activities are grouped with male in a classification that cuts across gender and class lines: straining, sifting, winnowing, separating, carding, spinning, combing (*Soph.* 226b).[209] This passage also marks the first appearance in these two dialogues of the craft of weaving – *the* paradigmatic female activity in ancient Greek gender ideology.[210] The visitor's use of weaving as a controlling image both draws on and appropriates the realm of female experience, suggesting that the world-view constructed through division is not limited by the gender of the constructor. Rather it incorporates all the adult elements of the Greek household: men, women and slaves.[211]

This inclusiveness is appropriate to the method of division, in which even the lowest aspects of the world may have a valuable place. But in the visitor's conceptual universe, the "feminine" activity of weaving is not an afterthought or even a complement to the masculine. It is, rather, the structural principle that informs that universe. It is a model not only for the work of the statesman but for the method of division itself, to which its intricacy, specificity, and wealth of technical detail are well suited.[212] By providing material for an exercise of division, and at the same time

[207] Cf. Campbell 1867: II.20; Scodel 1987: 56. [208] E.g. *Stat.* 289d–290a, 293a, 297bc.

[209] Cf. also the bread-makers of *Stat.* 267e, who, as Skemp points out, would include women (1952: 142).

[210] See above, p. 141; on this aspect of *Stat.* see Lane 1998: 164–73.

[211] Cf. Arist. *Pol.* 1252a24–b15. In the visitor's golden age, by contrast, there is no place (or no need) for the female, since there is no sexual reproduction or social structure (*Stat.* 271e–272a).

[212] Cf. *Soph.* 268c6, *Stat.* 267b, 280e–281a, 282bcd; Owen 1973: 359–60; Dorter 1994: 238; Rosen 1995: 114. On weaving as a model for politics see Scheid and Svenbro 1996: ch. 1.

a model for it, weaving exemplifies two different kinds of philosophical *use* of the material world – two different ways of employing that world to structure and organize our experience. It also serves as a model for pedagogy, for articulate language and hence philosophy in general, for this pair of dialogues in particular, and for reality itself.[213] As a model for both division and statesmanship it further "weaves together" the visitor's two primary analytical methods (division and example).[214] And as an image, weaving has mythical associations which give it both cosmic and political overtones.[215]

When this model is applied to statesmanship, the raw material that is shaped and structured through the craftsman's activity is men themselves, who are "woven" together by the statesman. Similarly, male characters and discourse are interwoven by the composer of philosophical dialogues, Plato. In these cases, a "feminine" principle appears to impose "form" on a "masculine" matter, in vivid contrast to Aristotle's famous procreative doctrine. As elsewhere in Plato, however, this use of the feminine has the effect of eliding real women from the world it is used to construct. The "material" of the state is presumptively masculine (as in Athenian public life), and the characters of Plato's dialogue are exclusively male. The visitor avoids specifying a human subject for the practices of weaving, and on the rare occasions when he does so, that subject is male, despite the limited participation of men in weaving in Plato's own world.[216] Elsewhere, the craft (*technē*) of weaving itself serves as the subject.[217] Analogously, the activities of ruling are attributed not to the statesman himself, but to the craft of ruling per se (*politikē technē*, 311bc; cf. 308d–309b). These abstract terms suggest an erasure or transcendence of human individuality, including gender. But as feminine abstractions wielded by men, they imply the control and appropriation of the human female.[218] In constructing his world-picture, the visitor thus does not escape his own subject-position as a male member of the

[213] *Soph.* 240c; cf. 242d8; Friedländer 1964–9: III.290–91; above, pp. 336–7.
[214] For the interconnections between the two see Lane 1998.
[215] See Friedländer 1964–9: III.290–91; Scheid and Svenbro 1996.
[216] Tellingly, Plato himself provides most of the "evidence" for male weavers in Athens (above, p. 141 n. 143). The only gendered human subjects in this portion of *Stat.* are the masculine fuller (reflecting the fact that men did this particular job), the male weaver incorporated into the same sentence (*Stat.* 281a), and the back-reference to this passage at *Stat.* 289c7. The association of weaving with women is never mentioned (contrast the fact of Diotima's femaleness in *Symp.*, and Sokrates' play with gender at *Tht.* 150b, 210cd).
[217] E.g. *Stat.* 308d–309b, 311bc.
[218] This is most striking with unexpected gendered terms like "mistress" (δεσπότις, 305a) and "maid-servant" (ὑπηρέτις, 305c), which could be used for actual women.

profoundly patriarchal culture that produced both himself and his author. Yet his reconsideration of standard class and gender boundaries remains provocative.

Still more remarkable is the challenge he issues to the anthropocentrism so characteristic of ancient Greek attitudes.[219] It is true, of course, that virtually all his examples relate other creatures or substances to human life. His primary models – mapping, weaving, kinship – are all phenomena of human culture. And it is another such phenomenon – literacy – that provides him with a paradigm for the understanding of "the long and complex syllables of real things."[220] The myth similarly focuses on human beings by providing an all-embracing picture relating them to gods, animals, and the cosmic order (or disorder). Indeed, the visitor explicitly observes that it would take too long to go through all the animals in detail, but human beings are more to the point (*Stat.* 274b). At first sight this seems overtly anthropocentric, and it certainly implies that relevance to human beings is an appropriate criterion for determining the shape and size of the present discourse. But the inquiry is, after all, a search for a human type. And even so, the visitor expresses himself here in a way that "takes care not automatically to privilege human beings over animals."[221] Moreover there are hints elsewhere that the proper application of division transcends humanity, at least in principle. The example of the "intelligent" crane (*Stat.* 263de) implies that humans should strive to free themselves from anthropocentrism.[222] And the visitor corrects young Sokrates when he rushes the process of division because of a focus on the human (*Stat.* 262d). He speaks of cattle in remarkably humanizing terms, and even imagines animals doing philosophy (*Stat.* 268ab, 272bc). Such a whimsical and even comic straining towards a nonhuman perspective seems appropriate to the "godlike" visitor (cf. above, pp. 323–4). At the same time, his discourse as a whole remains informed by his human status, which directs it towards human concerns and activities.

These concerns include philosophical, discursive and educational practices, all of which are subsumed under the umbrella of division (see especially *Soph.* 227d–234e). The intellectual activities embraced by the visitor's analysis include arguing, education, imitation in words, and the separation of similars and dissimiliars (i.e. division itself). It also subsumes

[219] For its pervasiveness in Greek thinking see Renehan 1981.
[220] *Stat.* 278d, trans. Waterfield in Annas and Waterfield 1995. Language is also structurally linked to division by the model of writing as a kind of synthesis and diaeresis (Steiner 1994: 116–22).
[221] Rowe 1995b ad loc. [222] Cf. Miller 1980: 25.

many of the activities used as images for philosophical inquiry – travel, combat, conquest, gymnastics, wrestling, hunting – thus further inviting us to locate the participants' own activities in their proper place in the world the visitor constructs. The picture is further complicated by the way he exemplifies in his own behavior the value of a wide range of intellectual practices. The mapping of such activities provides a way for the visitor to critique other thinkers and simultaneously incorporate them into his own world view. Thus he is critical yet respectful of both Eleaticism and the "friends of the Forms," and appropriates the claim of the "witty fellows" that everything is measurable.[223] He even endorses certain aspects of the sophist, for example by remaining open to a pair of discursive options often associated with sophistry,[224] and approving the Socratic demand by the "sophist" for a single defining factor (*Soph.* 240a). He treats the arguments of the imaginary sophist, like the "friends of the Forms," with respect, implying that they all abide by the same criteria of reason and consistency as himself or any other rational person.[225] Just as the ideal ruler incorporates a transformed rhetoric into his state (*Stat.* 304cd), so the visitor incorporates aspects of sophistry under his intellectual umbrella. He ends up addressing collectively all those who have spoken about being (*Soph.* 251 cd), implying that the argument transcends their various positions, since all belong to the same community of discourse.

A WORD IS WORTH A THOUSAND PICTURES

I have spoken of the visitor's world-view as a "picture." The verbal representation he provides us with is a kind of "imitation" of the conceptual world that it simultaneously fabricates. It is also, of course, an "imitation" by Plato both of that world and of its fabricator. Examining the visitor's discourse as a form of mimesis will aid in understanding some structural aspects of this pair of dialogues, and at the same time shed further light on aspects of the visitor's (and Plato's) pedagogy.

[223] *Soph.* 242d, 248abc, *Stat.* 284e–285a. Like other collective groups the visitor critiques, these "witty fellows" (κομψοί) are hard to identify precisely (see Rowe 1995b ad loc. and cf. below, p. 384).

[224] *Soph.* 217cd; cf. *Tht.* 167d, *Soph.* 225b, 268b, and above, p. 99.

[225] Cf. *Soph.* 240c, 241a, 248d. Contrast the contempt with which Sokrates in *Tht.* treats the "Heracliteans," who are incapable of such discourse (180c–183b; cf. also *Soph.* 249b). In *Soph.* and *Stat.* the only persons who do not belong to this community are the materialists, who must be "improved" (*Soph.* 246cd; cf. above, p. 339), but this is because they are coarse, not intrinsically irrational (cf. Campbell 1867: I.120).

In earlier chapters, we saw how the dramatic strategies of particular dialogues interacted with their discursive treatment of mimesis. Mimesis is also an explicit concern of *Sophist* and *Statesman* (in contrast to *Theaetetus*). As we have already seen, *Statesman* is concerned with "imitation" on a cosmic level. The visitor is also concerned in both dialogues with artistic mimesis, especially in his portrayal of the sophist as an illusionistic "conjurer" who deceives his public.[226] We are therefore entitled to inquire into the relationship between this thematic thread and the dialogues' own status as dramatically constructed works of mimetic art.

Though neither of these works is overtly concerned with dramatic imitation as such, both presuppose a theatrical model of mimesis in ways that imply a concern about its effects on others. Thus in *Statesman*, the spurious or sophistic politician appears in theatrical guise, as one of a "chorus" of lions, centaurs or satyrs, performing a "drama."[227] And in *Sophist*, one subdivision of illusionistic imitation is the impersonation of another human being with one's own body and voice, i.e. acting (267abc). The visitor relates this mode of imitation to the dramatis personae themselves by making Theaitetos serve as his example. The same passage also raises questions of ethical formation and the influence of imitations on the consumer, since the imitators in question are attempting to take on the appearance of virtue in order to deceive others. As the visitor put it earlier, the sophist exerts a dangerous educational influence in so far as he is an "unhealthy" image (*phantasma*) of the wise and virtuous man.[228] The visitor is greatly concerned with the ability of the student – specifically, with Theaitetos' ability – to form accurate judgments regarding such images (*Soph.* 234b–e).

In contrast to the dialogues we have examined so far, however, the negative concept of a *phantasma* or deceptive image is explicitly distinguished, in *Sophist*, from a superior form of likeness, which the visitor calls an *eikōn*. An *eikōn* preserves the proportions (including depth) and proper colors of the original.[229] A *phantasma,* by contrast, adjusts the original

[226] See *Soph.* 234a–236e, 240e, 241b, 267a–268d, *Stat.* 291abc, 303cd; Hirsch 1995; Notomi 1999: 124–33, 279–88.

[227] *Stat.* 291abc, 303cd. Drama is further evoked in *Stat.* by references to mimesis through μουσική, which incorporates poetry and dance as well as music and thus embraces theater (*Stat.* 288c, 306cd; cf. 304a, 307ab, 309d3).

[228] *Soph.* 232a; cf. 216cd, 233bc, 265a8, 268e.

[229] Davis argues that Plato's seeming preference for an art that is epistemologically rather than phenomenologically accurate may have been derived from a knowledge of Egyptian art (1979; cf. also H. Joly 1992: 97–109). Another way to put this would be to say that the visitor seeks an art that adopts the view from nowhere.

to the perspective of the viewer (specifically, to the distance between viewer and object), thus producing a false appearance of beauty and reality.[230] The latter is characteristic of the deceptive, imitative sophist. Since the sophist's primary medium for self-presentation is language, the visitor's distinction implies that proper proportions and "coloring" determine whether a discourse, as well as a statue, is to count as an *eikōn* or a *phantasma*, and this will be corroborated in *Statesman*, as we shall see. Even if the distinction ultimately collapses,[231] it remains a significant attempt to identify a beneficial form of mimesis, in contrast to the illusionistic "imitation" with which Plato is usually most preoccupied. As such it is relevant to Plato's own mimetic practice, in so far as it this is – presumably – intended to be beneficial.

The visitor's concern about proportion and veracity in imaging recurs in *Statesman* in a way that clarifies this relevance. After producing his first set of divisions, the visitor says their picture of the statesman is not complete, but needs further elaboration: some material needs to be stripped away, but first more bulk must be added in the form of the myth.[232] After finishing the myth, he will go on to speak of it as a "sketch" of the ideal king, one that might be thought ill-proportioned out of haste and excess bulk, or deemed a mere outline, which lacks the proper colors to give it "distinctness" (ἐνάργεια);[233] the medium by which this "sketch" or "sculpture" is generated is, of course, language (*logoi*), a medium that the visitor declares superior to the visual arts for "showing" any creature.[234]

Logoi may be used to portray a "creature" such as the statesman in at least three ways: the statesman may be dramatized, described, or

[230] *Soph.* 235d–236c. The distinction recurs at 260c, 266e; cf. also *Laws* 667d–669b. For the importance of perspective, especially the viewer's distance from the object, in judging visual phenomena cf. *Rep.* 368d, 602c, *Tht.* 208e, *Phileb.* 38cd, *Laws* 663bc. But strictly speaking, the technique referred to in *Soph.* deals not with "perspective" but with "optical proportions" (Keuls 1978: 111–5).

[231] Cf. Rosen 1983: 170–74, 191–2; Polanksy 1992: 175; Dorter 1994: 137–40.

[232] *Stat.* 268cde. For the verb ἀπεργάζομαι (268c7), standardly used for the completion of a work of art, cf. 257a4, 267d1.

[233] The adjective ἐναργής is often used for intellectual clarity (e.g. *Soph.* 242b10, 250c10, 261c7, *Stat.* 263a3, b3, 275b4), sometimes with explicit reference to intellectual perspective and imaging (e.g. *Soph.* 234d5, 254a1, *Stat.* 286a2, 291c6).

[234] *Stat.* 277abc; cf. 268c6–7, 275c1, 285d–286a. On the shift from three-dimensional to two-dimensional mimesis at 277abc cf. Benardete 1963: 203–5; Skemp 1952: 158; Scodel 1987: 99–100; Rowe 1995a: 19 n. 42. The perspectival account in *Soph.* applies to both painting and sculpture, with color playing a role parallel to proportion in producing the realism of the *eikōn* (*Soph.* 235e1). The absence of color from the two-dimensional "sketch" is thus a distortion parallel to the excessive bulk of the statue, both of which make it, at first glance, less "realistic."

analyzed.[235] The visitor is talking about the last of these, as his own language makes clear. The *logoi* in question are to be *followed* (*Stat.* 277c5). That is to say, they are arguments, as opposed to the kind of words that might be used to "paint" a descriptive portrait, or the illusionistic dramatic verbal mimesis of the sophist. The myth exemplifies this use of *logoi* to produce an "image" analytically, since it neither dramatizes or describes the statesman, but "portrays" him only in the sense that it contributes to an analytical understanding of the concept he instantiates. The use of arguments, then, is itself a form of image-making or "showing." This is confirmed later, when the visitor implies that dialectic, including his own discourse, is a way of "showing" the invisible through *logoi* (*Stat.* 286a; cf. also 306d11). Moreover it is the *only* way of "showing" the "most beautiful and greatest" things, which are incorporeal (*Stat.* 285e–286a).

Since it forms part of an analytic account – as opposed to a dramatization – the visitor's myth is evidently not a *phantasma*, "proportioned" and "colored" in such a way as to produce an illusion of realism. (It does not attempt to "deceive" us into thinking we have really seen or met the statesman.) The visitor's own dissatisfaction might suggest that it is not a successful *eikōn* either, since it is apparently deficient in both "color" and proportions. But though the visitor briefly *entertains* the idea that the myth is ill-proportioned, he does not commit himself to this judgment. And later he repudiates it by defending the length of his own discourse after all. The criterion for proper length, he tells us, is "appropriateness" (τὸ πρέπον) (*Stat.* 286cd). Elsewhere, he uses this word to mean relevant, "fitting," or appropriate to a purpose (*Stat.* 286cd). He also employs the cognate verb πρέπει for the appropriateness of a particular mode of explanation, for example, for the choice of *logoi* over visual images in the right circumstances (*Stat.* 277c4); for the use of the myth to "show forth" the king (*Stat.* 269c1–2); and to criticize the assumption that the figure of the king required a "great" paradigm (*Stat.* 277b4). In employing this notion to defend the length of his myth, he explains that the primary criterion for appropriateness is not pleasure (except incidentally), or speed of results (which is secondary), but "respect" (τιμᾶν) for the participants' competence; whether long or short, a discourse is to be judged by its educational value, a criterion that justifies any length, no matter what critics may say (*Stat.* 286d–287a).

Τὸ πρέπον has many synonyms denoting various kinds of appropriateness or relevance (cf. *Stat.* 284e). One of these is προσῆκον ("belonging"),

[235] For the problematic nature of images constructed in the medium of *logoi* cf. Derrida 1981: 136–43; Sallis 1996: 481.

used by the visitor in *Sophist* to denote the proper coloring of an *eikōn*, as opposed to a *phantasma* (*Soph.* 235e1). In *Statesman*, he uses the same word to justify spending more time on human beings than other animals (274b5). In other words, he uses it, like τὸ πρέπον, for the appropriate size of a discourse or its parts. It is used again like this to introduce the excursus on due measure, in which the discussion of τὸ πρέπον itself occurs (*Stat.* 283b8). [236] Like the myth, this digression might look like an unsightly lump on the statue of the visitor's *logos*. But he trims it to the appropriate length for present purposes, so that the present account is rendered "sufficiently and beautifully" (*Stat.* 284d). The digression on proper length thus turns out be self-justifying, via the notion of τὸ πρέπον that it expounds.[237] Accordingly, it ends self-referentially with the remark, "that's enough about that, if you agree" (*Stat.* 287ab). Since the criterion of appropriateness is the education of the interlocutor, when young Sokrates indicates that he has understood, the digression on digression has achieved its proper length.[238] Similarly the digression on inferior forms of government is introduced as a digression (πάρεργον) from the present task, a "deluge" that has flooded over them, but one that is justified by its larger relevance to human life (*Stat.* 302bc). Digressions, like divisions, and like various modes of discourse and pedagogy, are justifiable in relation to a purpose.

All this implies that although the myth may seem to the naive (young?) reader or listener to be ill-proportioned, with excessive bulk in the wrong places, as the visitor at first feared, it is in fact the proper length, like a large painting that refuses to compensate for perspective, and therefore looks ill-proportioned to the naive viewer. This means it is a more accurate representation of its subject than the distorted and superficially more "beautiful" *logoi* produced by the sophists. Like the ill-proportioned facial features of Sokrates and Theaitetos, which betoken a more profound beauty (above, p. 261), it is more closely related to the truth than are more conventionally and superficially beautiful discourses. The criterion for "proper" size is not the illusionistic plausibility of the sophist, whose discourse generates the appearance of "life," and presumably employs

[236] For προσῆκον as a criterion for the length of a conversation cf. *Phileb.* 36d. The word is also used e.g. for "proper" naming in division (*Soph.* 223a10, 226e6, *Stat.* 288a1), for what "befits" the statesman (*Stat.* 260a4, 275b4, 276b5, 309d2) and for the statesman's application of the treatment appropriate to each individual (Stat. 294d12, 295a2, b2).

[237] Note also the emphasis on the *purpose* of both the myth (*Stat.* 272d, 273e, 274b, e, 275b) and the discursus on measure (286bc), which determines their length.

[238] As Benardete points out, this means that others than the interlocutor may legitimately find parts of the discourse tedious from the point of view of their own needs (1963: 207).

the criterion of pleasure that the visitor eschews as accidental.[239] What seems inept by such conventional criteria is in fact, in the visitor's view, intrinsic to an accurate representation of the truth in the interests of pedagogy.

The visitor's concern to justify the size and proportions of his discourse in *Statesman* is also relevant to *Sophist*. He explicitly applies his criteria for proper length not only to the myth and the discussion of weaving in *Statesman*, but to the lengthiness (μακρολογία) of *Sophist's* digression on non-being (*Stat.* 286b). The excursus on proper length thus applies to all kinds of extended discourse, not just long speeches like those of the myth, but dialectical analysis through question and answer (as in the discussion of non-being), and the extensive use of example or imagery (the weaving paradigm). All these, then, should be as long as pedagogically necessary. On the other hand, brevity is also approved where pedagogically appropriate (*Stat.* 286e). Small elements as well as large have their appropriate size by the criterion of τὸ πρέπον. This is shown by the visitor in practice. For example, in *Sophist* he decides not to develop a long argument, on the grounds that Theaitetos has the "nature" to grasp it for himself in the future, and in *Statesman*, he explicitly limits the present account of measure (*Soph.* 265de, *Stat.* 284cd). Every aspect of his discourse is thus to be understood as appropriate in its own context. This is reinforced by the familiar view that any discourse should be viewed as an "organic" whole, where each part is its proper or "natural" size, every detail accurate and appropriate, which is evoked both by the analogy with a statue or picture and by the principle that division seeks "natural" joints like those on a body.[240] The visitor's concern with appropriateness to function and context complements his construction of a "map" of the world in which everything has its proper place, including various discursive and pedagogical modes, which are to be adapted to the needs of the particular occasion.

The influence of perspective on mimesis also ties in with the importance in these dialogues of experience, and of properly interpreting the material world, to which visual perception provides our primary mode of access. The homology between visual and intellectual perspective offers a model for intellectual insight and the ways in which it can be distorted and corrected. Accurate perception of the world gives us a

[239] *Soph.* 233d–234c; cf. *Stat.* 286d, 288c.

[240] Cf. above, p. 4. The most common word for statue or picture (ζῷον, *Stat.* 277bc) literally means "animal." As Miller points out, the model for the cosmic totality is also implicitly organic (1980: 76–7), which complements the idea of division as a "cutting" along natural joints.

sound foundation for conceptual analysis (cf. e.g. *Stat.* 290a4). By the same token, experience of the world furnishes a way of correcting faults of intellectual perspective by getting "closer" (*Soph.* 234d). This is conveyed through imagery of division as a mode of seeing, intertwined with the pervasive images of travel, hunting, leading and following. Seeing is a traditional and commonplace image, here as in Greek texts generally, for intellectual discovery of various kinds.[241] But it applies in a special way to the method of division. Division is a kind of "cleaning," which makes an object "conspicuous" (κατάδηλος) by clearing away the clutter of other similar things, so that we can "see clearly" what we are looking for.[242] This process reaches a climax in the final "discovery" of the statesman, when the use of division allows the participants to remove the excess bulk that has obscured the outlines of their "royal portrait" (σχῆμα βασιλικόν, *Stat.* 268c). Like gold-refining, division strips away the extraneous until we can "see" the statesman by himself, "naked" and isolated.[243] It thus enables us to dispel the blurred vision or "dizziness" of intellectual confusion.

Division is also a journey, one that brings us progressively closer to our quarry, until it can be "caught" and we can "see" it more easily.[244] This integration of traveling and visual imagery suggests that the "cleaning" process of division is also a correcting of perspective, one that undercuts the sophist's illusionism by leading the student close enough to enjoy a clear and undistorted view of the object sought (cf. *Soph.* 234e). Since any object is harder to see from far away, the most obvious way to gain a clear view is the same as the simplest way of altering one's perspective, i.e. by moving closer. This is the perspectival model presupposed by the visitor, who speaks of what he can see "at least from here" (ὥς ἐνθένδε ἰδεῖν), and wishes to clarify the issue by getting "nearer" (*Stat.* 289d). He aims to offer his interlocutors a close-up view of the sophist and statesman, as located in their proper places within the picture of the world that he develops through division. The closer one stands to such an image, the more clearly one can see it. At the same time, the closer one stands to any accurately proportioned, large-scale image, the more distorted it will be by one's perspective. The visitor declines to adjust such distortions in his picture, thereby presenting us with images that are strange-looking in their "colors" and "proportions."

[241] E.g. *Stat.* 275b4, 294b8, 297d3–4, 302b7.
[242] *Soph.* 226b–227c, *Stat.* 268c, 287b, 291abc, 292d.
[243] *Stat.* 303d–304a; cf. *Gorg.* 523cde, 524d, *Rep.* 361c, 611b–612a.
[244] Cf. *Stat.* 289d, 290c, d, 307c7.

There is a problem with approaching reality by means of large models, since a close approach alters our perception of the shape and proportions of the object portrayed. Standing close to such an image makes it appear distorted (*if* it is accurate), and thus conveys a misleading picture of reality. Large-scale images are therefore precisely the ones distorted by "sophistic" artists in the interests of verisimilitude (*Soph.* 235–236a). But the visitor's other principal method, example, suggests an awareness of this problem and also a possible solution. Like division and myth, his *paradeigma* of weaving is part of the representation of statesmanship through *logoi* (*Stat.* 277d). Like his other methods, it is neither dramatic or descriptive. It gives us a clearer "view" of the object sought, but it does so through conceptual analysis rather than illusionistic mimesis, by providing a model or conceptual image of the invisible.[245] The method of example, like division and myth, is thus another tool for verbal imaging. And like these other methods, it is informed by questions about the nature and size of images and their educational value. Its value derives in part from the fact that we experience a confusing, "dream-like" state when looking at large objects directly – presumably because their size makes them hard to grasp. It is therefore larger items that require a *paradeigma*.[246] A benefit of the method of example, it seems, is that it allows us to avoid the distortions of perspective that result from examining important matters through large-scale images. Instead it enables us to elucidate the structure of the large object by discovering it in a smaller one. This provides a further methodological justification for the practice of using "trivial" material for examples. Since they are more easily grasped, as a small image is more easily seen, these examples may assist us precisely by their "small" or unassuming nature (cf. *Stat.* 286a8–b1).

The visitor thus employs analytical *logoi* of various kinds to represent his conceptual world, in contrast to the dramatic illusionism of the sophist. Like him, the sophist embraces the whole world in his accounts. Like division, the sophist's art of debate embraces the divine, the human, earthly and celestial phenomena, laws and politics, and the crafts; in short, his "capacity" (*dunamis*) embraces all things.[247] In a way, then, he may be said to "make" all things – humans, animals, trees, earth, sea, sky, and gods – by means of imitation through *logoi* (*Soph.* 233d–234c). He thus resembles the imitative poet of the *Republic*, who reproduces everything,

[245] See Dorter 1987: 121; Lane 1998: 70–75; Rowe 1995b: 210–11.

[246] *Stat.* 277d; cf. 278e, 285e–286a; Arist. *Poet.* 1450b34–1451a6.

[247] *Soph.* 232cde, 233b; cf. *Euthyd.* 271c, *Gorg.* 456ab, *Prot.* 316a; and the multiplicity of Ion (cf. *Ion* 541e) and Hippias (above, pp. 140–43).

as if in a mirror.[248] This generates a superficial resemblance between the visitor and the sophist as "creators" of parallel universes. But there are two key differences. One is the hierarchical, structured organization of the visitor's world, which distinguishes it from the sophist/artist's uncritical reflection of everything around him. The other is the fact that the sophist's images aim to delude their audience through the kind of illusionism that adjusts for perspective.[249] The visitor's world-picture, by contrast, elucidates the relationships among concepts, using a set of analytical tools that he also makes available to others. This fosters in the consumer an active rather than a passive understanding of his world. The resulting "map" is explicitly alien from the obvious, i.e. it provides not a deceptively realistic picture adapted to a conventional human point of view, but a "true" structural account designed to lead us beyond that perspective. Illusionism promotes slavish imitation, but analysis leads to thought and understanding of basic principles and relationships. The visitor's methods thus encourage an appreciation of structural mimesis, and resistance to the mindless imitation of sophistic illusionism.

The visitor's implicit defence of non-illusionistic or "unrealistic" images, whether visual or verbal, has far-reaching implications for our reading of Plato. His argument can be used to justify his own distortions of perspective as "more truthful" than the superficially more "lifelike" productions of the sophists. For instance, he employs satirically distorted images to illuminate his political argument. The doctor and helmsman are said to be "necessary" images (*eikones*) of the statesman, used to construct a fictitious "sketch" for the participants to "look at."[250] But the satire in which they feature is a bizarre distortion of Athenian democracy and the rule of law. Young Sokrates calls it "weird" or "out of place" (*atopos*, *Stat.* 298e4). It is indeed "out of place," or distorted, to his conventional Athenian eyes. But the visitor has already explained that such sensations result from the observer's ignorance (*Stat.* 291b). From his own more "knowledgeable" perspective, the strict rule of law will prove to be the best political scenario available in the absence of the ideal ruler. The implication is that human life, at least as organized at present, just is absurd to the philosopher, who sees things accurately from his privileged point of view (cf. *Soph.* 236b). The visitor succeeds in bringing young Sokrates to this point of view, thus "leading" him to a more truthful "perspective" (cf. *Soph.* 234e). Conversely, in *Sophist* Theaitetos declares

[248] *Rep.* 596cde; cf. *Rep.* 397e–398a, 598d, *Euthyd.* 293e–296e, *Ion* 539e.
[249] *Soph.* 234bc, 235d–236c. [250] κατίδωμεν γὰρ δή τι σχῆμα . . . πλασάμενοι (*Stat.* 297e).

the visitor's satirical picture of their self-contradictory opponents to be "like them and true" (*Soph.* 252d1). This suggests that he is adjusting his perspective so that he can identify the truth in a superficially distorted but essentially accurate picture.

It follows that if we, like Theaitetos and young Sokrates, are able to view the visitor's discourse from a "beautiful perspective" (*Soph.* 236b), we will realize that its apparent distortions of size or appearance are what make it, in reality, an accurate representation from the point of view of "appropriateness" (τὸ πρέπον). To acquire such a perspective requires the wisdom of age, experience, and education, which will enable us to stand "closer," in a place from which any actual distortions (like those of the sophists) will be more evident. It is useful here to remember the theatrical model that lies behind so much Platonic thinking on mimesis. The theater is a place where the distance of spectator from performer requires distorted images in the form of bold masks, costumes and gestures, which are used by playwrights to "deceive" the audience.[251] From close up, the lack of realism in these conventions becomes obvious. In analogous fashion, the experienced philosophical observer, like the visitor, can perceive on close inspection (σκοπούμενος) that the sophistic impersonators are nothing but a crowd of lascivious satyrs (*Stat.* 291abc). Since these are "hard to separate" from the true statesman (*Stat.* 291c), their "appearance" as satyrs and so on must refer not to their external appearance – they do not literally wear comic masks – but to their inner nature, to the fraudulent "actor" behind the delusive "mask" of wisdom. The visitor's representation of such persons as vulgar satyrs is therefore more "truthful" than their superficial appearance as "beautiful" human beings. They are the inverse of Sokrates and Theaitetos, who appear satyr-like on the outside, but are truly wise and beautiful within.

The discussion of due measure, with its reflexive relevance to the dramatized conversation, invites us to re-examine the internal proportions of Plato's discourse as well as the visitor's. These two dialogues are commonly seen – and not without reason – as "undramatic," austere, "unrealistic," and "artificial," as opposed to "natural."[252] By defending apparently extraneous bulk as "appropriate," *Statesman* is, as Lane engagingly puts it, "making a virtue, and an issue, of its own tedium."[253] This

[251] In the Theater of Dionysos at Athens, even the front row of the audience was some seventy feet away from the stage building (though not from the *orchēstra*). For the idea that the playwright "deceives" the audience cf. esp. Gorg. DK 82 B23.

[252] Cf. Benardete 1963: 193; Rowe 1996: 154–5.

[253] Lane 1995: 290.

impression of Platonic self-awareness regarding the dialogue's compositional "flaws" is reinforced by the fact that both these works, though comparatively unpolished in their form, are more explicitly *composed* than many others, with frequent signposting of their own structural elements.[254] Plato thus challenges us to address the construction of his own dialogues, with an eye to the appropriateness of all their elements, large and small.[255] This challenge extends to the exiguous opening frame and the paucity of "dramatic" elements.

The structure and style (or "proportions" and "coloring") of these dialogues are vindicated by the distinction between two kinds of mimesis, suggesting that a large-scale image that represents the truth accurately will indeed appear "unrealistic" to its viewers, in comparison with a distorted image that is adapted to their point of view. It is not surprising that most readers find the representation of the philosopher and his students, in the form of the Eleatic visitor and his dutiful interlocutors, less compelling than the vividly realized dramatis personae of many other dialogues. The "god-like" visitor and his bland companions do not wear the phantasmal disguise of "realistic" human personality. But the account of mimesis in *Sophist* suggests that the images on offer here are in fact more "truthful" than such appealing figures, if only we can view them from the proper perspective. The dramatic austerity of these dialogues is thus intrinsic to their representation of an "unrealistic" Platonic "reality." Their lack of "realism" makes them more truthful, because less superficially "beautiful" and deceptive, than the kind of dramatic verisimilitude practised not only by the sophists but by Plato himself in other dialogues.

It is therefore at first sight surprising that in these two works Plato should choose to employ direct dramatic form – the form critiqued by Sokrates in *Republic* as most "mimetic," and consequently most illusionistic and dangerous. The choice is not a casual one, since it is clearly marked in the prologue of *Theaetetus*, with its self-conscious awareness of the difference between direct and reported dialogue. Reported form, as used in *Republic* and elsewhere, is arguably part of a Platonic strategy for distancing his own work from the negative effects of direct mimesis (above, pp. 90–91). The dramatic framing, detailed characterization, scene-setting, and reportage made possible by indirect form are

[254] Campbell 1867: I. xxiii.

[255] Cf. Hoffmann 1993. We must distinguish here between the proper proportions of the picture of the statesman, which gradually evolves throughout the work, to be completed only at the end (*Stat.* 311 c9–10), and the proper proportions of the dialogue itself, in which each part must be of the correct size to do its own work.

all ways of trying to defuse the dangerous effects of identifying with Plato's characters in an unhealthy fashion. Why, then, does Plato choose to employ direct imitation in *Sophist* and *Statesman*, where the dangers of illusionistic imitation are still at issue?

One might approach this issue by arguing that in *Sophist* and *Statesman* the elimination of complex and inferior characters, in favor of the generic, idealized models of the philosopher and his students, makes it "safe" to employ direct dialogue form, since these characters do not pose a mimetic threat. In *Republic's* terms, as we saw, imitation of an appropriate model is not damaging to the philosophically minded because it is an imitation of the self to which they aspire (above, pp. 236–8). If all the characters are appropriate philosophical models, there is no need to prevent the reader from sympathizing or identifying with any one of them. In effect, there is nothing for a narrator to do.[256] Accordingly, the conversation of *Sophist* and *Statesman* has been stripped of the connective tissue of narrative that mediates our response to the more dangerous characters of the reported dialogues.

This also makes sense in *Sophist's* own terms, since direct dramatic form provides a *more* accurate, less distorted representation of a conversation, an *eikōn* as opposed to a *phantasma*.[257] The narrative strategies employed in reported dialogues like *Republic* not only control our responses to the characters, but also make Plato's writing more "realistic" and "beautiful," since they facilitate the production of a more fully colored and richer picture of human interaction. Such features are redundant, however, and indeed positively misleading, in works that eschew a conventional "realism" to represent philosophical discussion as transcending idiosyncratic particulars of personality and place. Like the visitor searching for the "naked" statesman (*Stat.* 304a), these works represent the philosopher in his bare essentials, stripped of superficial and misleading accretions. It is not coincidental, then, that in these dialogues Plato eschews the superficial verisimilitude of his more colorful dialogues in favor of a dramatic austerity and unrealistic "realism" that are faithful to the visitor's own account of truthful mimesis. This stripping away of interpretive coloring goes hand in hand with the "return" to direct dramatic form.

[256] The contrast between *Soph./Stat.* and *Tht.* is instructive in this respect. Despite the absence of a formal narrator for the latter dialogue, Plato allows Sokrates to ventriloquate his primary opponent, Protagoras, and control him with an editorial "narrative" commentary. Sokrates also uses his dominant role to color the recalcitrant Theodoros. Plato thus smuggles in some of the spin provided by the kind of formal narrator that he has "officially" eliminated.

[257] Cf. Burger 1997: 125–6.

As we have seen, the visitor's dry, analytical style and method may be understood in part as a device to urge his interlocutors in the direction of structural imitation, in contrast to the seductive superficiality of the sophist. Similarly, the dramatic austerity and lack of "realism" of these two dialogues may help to nudge Plato's readers towards structural imitation of their dramatis personae, as opposed to superficial mimicry. All the characters represented in these works retain the fundamental qualities of the virtuous philosophical *ēthos* that we too will need if we are to be entrusted with intellectual independence. But by paring away the accretions of individuality and extraneous (non-philosophical) emotional involvements, Plato encourages us not simply to identify with these fundamental character traits, but also to use them as a platform for the perception and scrutiny of philosophical principles, rather than being seduced into the rote imitation of external particulars.

If we imitate the visitor in this structural fashion, we will not try to do exactly what he does (such as the exercise of autonomy, creativity, and dominance); instead we will internalize his principles, including the principle that full autonomy is only appropriate in strictly limited circumstances. In so doing, we are also acting as his students, Theaitetos and young Sokrates, are expected to do. Conversely, structural imitation of the interlocutors allows us to follow them in respecting the visitor's principles, including his authority, while also "imitating" them in exercising the limited element of autonomy that is appropriate to them at this stage, namely their efforts to be good dialectical respondents (above, pp. 350–51). This kind of imitation encourages us to do our best to make our own responses, rather than accepting theirs uncritically.

This freedom is also implicit in the written nature of the text, which is so strongly marked in the prologue. Although as readers we are required, like the visitor's young interlocutors, to "follow" in linear fashion if we are to grasp the work as a whole, we are also free to turn aside from this path, to backtrack or reject the visitor's leadership if we wish to make detours or digressions of our own. This places us in a different position not only from the docile respondents who serve the visitor's purposes, but also from the silent internal audience, who cannot revisit the text. As long as we follow the interlocutors in internalizing the visitor's principles, however, this autonomy will remain rooted in a proper understanding of the limited circumstances in which it is appropriate. It follows that if we are ever fully ready for such autonomy, we will be free to use the tools of critical analysis provided by the visitor to depart from his point of view, and even, paradoxically, from his principles, just as the ideal ruler is free to change the rules that he himself has made.

THE VISITOR AND SOKRATES

The replacement of Sokrates with the Eleatic visitor as the dominant character of these two dialogues poses an obvious challenge to Socratic uniqueness. Any Socratic substitute will compromise that uniqueness if he resembles him too closely. If, on the other hand, the substitute is significantly different from Sokrates, this would suggest that despite Sokrates' uniqueness, others may also be capable of playing a dominant philosophical role, which would compromise Socratic uniqueness in a different way.

I shall argue that *Sophist* and *Statesman* walk a line between these two options: the visitor is both importantly similar to and at the same time significantly different from the Sokrates of other Platonic dialogues, and more specifically, from the elenctic Sokrates of *Theaetetus* whom he replaces. Along with the latter's snub nose, bulging eyes, and specific historical, geographical, and cultural context, the visitor loses such intellectual peculiarities as Sokrates' evasiveness, irony, and interest in particular persons. At the same time he develops and organizes other central features of Sokrates' earlier avatars. In this respect he is the opposite of the Socratic wannabes we have met elsewhere, whose imitations of Sokrates focus on external particulars, rather than philosophical essentials. He thus endorses, but takes much further, the adjustments to the elenctic Sokrates' character that were adumbrated in *Theaetetus*. He also appropriates certain aspects of the constructive Sokrates, while repudiating others. In doing so he repositions various aspects of Plato's various Sokrateses in a larger methodological picture where both their strengths and their limitations can be recognized. Sokrates is put in his place qua individual, historically determined human being, but reinstated in a manner that transcends such particularity.

The visitor's nameless, "godlike" status and lack of individual character form a sharp contrast with the highly particularized Sokrates of *Theaetetus*, with his peculiar method of "midwifery," his "weird" (*atopos*) effect on others (*Tht.* 149a), his social embeddedness and strong sense of Athenian identity. Indeed, the strangest thing about the visitor, as a character, is his lack of strangeness – the paucity of idiosyncratic defining human features. His *atopia* is confined to the content of his thought. Whereas Sokrates' uniqueness is symbolized by his peculiar physical appearance, the visitor has no appearance at all. At the same time, the two characters are linked by a shared resemblance to the philosopher of the digression. This helps to clarify the ways in which the visitor is not

simply a departure from the Sokrates of *Theaetetus*, but a development of certain aspects of his character. For example, the wandering that distinguishes the visitor from the Sokrates rooted in Athens simultaneously links him to the Sokrates who transcends Athenian particularity, the Sokrates whose ideas have as much meaning in Megara as in Athens. The visitor is at home – pedagogically and intellectually – wherever he happens to be, precisely *because* he is not "at home" in any normal sense. Like Sokrates, he transcends geographical parochialism; but he does so without Sokrates' paradoxical embeddedness in the culture of a particular time and place. The visitor's resemblances to Sokrates thus endorse the latter's abstract, superhuman qualities – his "godlike" aspects.

The visitor's more specific character traits – such as they are – also overlap with those of Sokrates, especially the benign Sokrates of *Theaetetus*. The incorporation of these Socratic qualities into the visitor's character suggests that the selected traits are deemed appropriate to the philosopher per se. As we have already seen, the visitor, like Sokrates, is philosophically "gentle." He is friendly, cooperative, benevolent, accommodating, and hesitates at the magnitude of his task, sometimes even with a touch of irony.[258] Like Sokrates, he is also "courageous," daring even to "attack" the awe-inspiring Parmenides. Like Sokrates his tone is collaborative, and he adapts to the needs of his interlocutors. And like Sokrates, he has a sense of "serious play." Although he disapproves of some kinds of playfulness, he also dislikes inappropriate seriousness, and prescribes educational play for children.[259] His own discourse is larded with playful touches, from the "amusement" of the myth (*Stat.* 268de) to many humorous uses of division.[260] Yet he lacks, for the most part, the elenctic Sokrates' characteristic irony at the expense of himself and other individuals.[261] Nor does he share Sokrates' penchant for friendly banter, which was on display in *Theaetetus*, and even appears in *Sophist* and *Statesman* (e.g. *Stat.* 257ab). His humor, in contrast to that of Sokrates, is impersonal in its targets, suggesting "fun made of humanity as such."[262]

The visitor's intellectual profile, as well as his larger character, has many points of contact with Sokrates in *Theaetetus*. He articulates the

[258] *Soph.* 262e4; cf. *Tht.* 145d6.

[259] Cf. *Soph.* 234ab, 235a, 237bc, 242c, 259c, *Stat.* 288c, 308d.

[260] Cf. e.g. *Stat.* 266ab (with Skemp 1952: 139), and *Stat.* 266c, which recalls the critique of Protagoras in *Tht.* (Campbell 1867: II. 33).

[261] There are a few hints of irony (cf. *Soph.* 232e with Campbell 1867: I. 67; 239b; 239e with Rosen 1983: 188; 244a). But it is worth comparing e.g. *Soph.* 243a with the obvious irony of *Tht.* 152c, 181b, and 210c, which express much the same sentiments (cf. also *Laws* 886c).

[262] Skemp 1952: 67.

issue that faces him as a "what is x?" question,[263] pursues it by trying to find a definition based on a single common factor, and responds to a list of examples from the interlocutor by emphasizing the need for such a factor.[264] He values intellectual consistency,[265] but takes a relaxed attitude towards terminology.[266] He is respectful yet critical of his predecessors. He has a good (though imperfect) memory, and repeatedly invokes its importance.[267] He is aware both of his own ignorance,[268] and of the limitations of his methods.[269] He retains a marked sense of *aporia*, even positioning himself, in Socratic fashion, as one who aspires to learn from the wisdom of others – though without a trace of irony (*Soph.* 244a). Last but not least, he induces *aporia* in others through the strangeness of his discourse.[270]

The visitor also shares many interests, ideas, and attitudes with Sokrates outside this triad of dialogues.[271] His three main methods – division, myth, and example – all have Socratic associations. In the case of myth and example the connections are obvious.[272] Division is on the face of it less Socratic, but it is praised and even practised by the constructive Sokrates in *Phaedrus* (263b, 265c–266c). It also has elenctic antecedents, as the visitor acknowledges by linking the two methods as forms of separation or "cleansing."[273] He also echoes the language of elenchus,[274] acknowledges its value for "cleansing the soul," and critiques young Sokrates in elenctic fashion.[275] He even seems to have benefited personally from some such "cleansing" in the past, when his own youthful confidence was replaced by *aporia* (*Soph.* 243b). As we have seen, division also continues Socratic concerns by offering a way of using the data of the human and material world. The visitor even incorporates into his analysis two of the most distinctive Socratic images from *Theaetetus*, namely midwifery and match-making (*Stat.* 268a).

Thematic concerns that the visitor shares with Sokrates include issues surrounding education, politics, sophistry, and philosophy. He displays a

263 *Soph.* 217b3, 218c1, c6–7.
264 *Soph.* 232a, 240a; cf. *Tht.* 146cd.
265 *Soph.* 236e, 238d, 241e, *Stat.* 281d, 292cd, 305a; cf. *Soph.* 230b, 283b.
266 *Soph.* 225c, 226d, 267d, *Stat.* 260e, 261e, 275d, 302d; cf. *Tht.* 166b, 177de, 184c.
267 E.g. *Soph.* 231de, 264c, 265b, 266d, *Stat.* 268e, 284c, 285c, 286bcd, 293a, 294d, 300c, 306d. For Sokrates' memory cf. *Stat.* 257b.
268 E.g. *Soph.* 249e, *Stat.* 291b.
269 *Soph.* 254c; cf. 231a; Nails 1995: 226–8.
270 Above, p. 328; cf. *Tht.* 149a. For the visitor's own *aporia* see *Soph.* 236e, 238a, 239c, 241b, 243b, 245de, 249d, 250e, 264c; cf. also *Soph.* 217a5–6.
271 Cf. Campbell 1867: I. 2–3.
272 On *paradeigma* as an elaboration of Socratic practice see Lane 1998: 18–20 and passim. Myth is of course a staple of the constructive Sokrates.
273 *Soph.* 226b–230e; see Sayre 1969: 223–38; Guthrie 1978: 130–36; M. Morgan 1993: 94–5.
274 Cf. e.g. *Soph.* 241e, 242b; Howland 1998: 213.
275 *Soph.* 227c–231b and above, p. 333.

Socratic intellectual and political elitism,[276] views the gods as good and benevolent rulers of the universe, eschews stories of divine strife,[277] and even voices the notorious Socratic view that no one does wrong intentionally (*Soph.* 228c; cf. 230a). He is greatly preoccupied with crafts, and their value as a model for understanding, using such Socratic examples as medicine, weaving, athletic training and helmsmanship.[278] Even his remarkable view that the second-best state is based on the strict rule of law has its antecedents in the Sokrates of *Crito*.[279] The appropriation of the female through the model of weaving provides a further intriguing parallel, recalling as it does both the Socratic midwifery of *Theaetetus* and the female reproductive imagery that Sokrates ascribes to Diotima in *Symposium*.[280] Like midwifery and childbearing in those dialogues, the female activity of weaving is much more than a metaphor in the visitor's account, though as we have seen, it is less explicitly gendered than the female imagery used by Sokrates.

The way in which the visitor addresses other characters also resembles Sokrates, as distinct from other named characters in Plato, in an intriguing way. Eleanor Dickey has shown that both he and the nameless Athenian visitor in *Laws* use forms of address very much as Plato's Sokrates does.[281] The exceptionally abundant use of friendship terms is not a feature of all Plato's dominant characters, since it does not apply to Parmenides, a named individual who serves as the dominant character in his eponymous dialogue. Indeed, Dickey thinks it may have been a mannerism of the historical Sokrates.[282] The nameless visitor's resemblance to Sokrates in this respect not only reinforces the hypothesis of his fictionality, but strengthens the suggestion that Plato has created or adopted certain Socratic traits and developed them into attributes of the philosopher per se. At first blush, a speaker's preferred forms of address may seem philosophically insignificant. But in fact, Sokrates' particular way of addressing others emphasizes two key aspects of his persona, both strongly marked in *Theaetetus*: his friendliness and his dominance in argument. It therefore makes sense that this feature of Socratic language,

[276] *Stat.* 292e–293a, 297b, 300e.
[277] *Stat.* 271de, 273b–e; cf. *Tht.* 151cd; Howland 1998: 258–9.
[278] Note particularly that the division leading to the Socratic "noble sophist" begins from humble domestic activities (*Soph.* 226b).
[279] Even in *Crito* Sokrates does not exclude the possibility that the true statesman (who does not exist) might be justified in breaking the law (Weiss 1995: 214–15; cf. also Howland 1998: 324 n. 1). See further below, p. 384.
[280] On the latter, see esp. Halperin 1990: ch. 6.
[281] Dickey 1996: 111–19; see further above, p. 121.
[282] Dickey 1996: 126, 133.

though at first sight idiosyncratic, should be retained as an attribute of the philosopher per se, and should accompany other, more obviously generalizable "Socratic" aspects of the visitor.

The most important resemblance between Sokrates and the visitor is closely linked to this dominance. That is their shared philosophical creativity. The use of myth as a complement to discursive argument in *Statesman* recalls the mythic creativity often displayed by Plato's Sokrates in his constructive persona. Even in *Theaetetus*, with its elenctic structure, Sokrates displays a vivid philosophical imagination, both in his long speeches (the midwife speech, the defence of Protagoras, the digression), and in his striking use of imagery. The Eleatic visitor likewise displays an exuberant imagination in the range of his examples and images. Moreover his preference for mundane examples evokes Sokrates as he is characterized throughout the Platonic corpus. Yet there are significant differences in the way the visitor exercises this intellectual imagination. Both he and Sokrates differ markedly, on the one hand, from Protagoras and the Heracliteans in *Theaetetus*, who do not organize or discriminate among sensory appearances at all, and on the other, from the sophist in *Sophist*, who laughs at talk of physical phenomena and is preoccupied only with *logoi*.[283] But the visitor goes far beyond Sokrates in the degree to which he explicitly organizes his observations into a structured vision of the world. And in contrast to Sokrates' striking but ad hoc craft-images and other exempla, he subsumes such examples into a comprehensive hierarchical scheme, which articulates our place in the world through the systematic interrelationship of innumerable crafts.[284]

Furthermore, this view of the world is set out unapologetically for our assessment. Unlike Sokrates in *Theaetetus*, the visitor does not deny his role as the source of the arguments in the present discussion.[285] And unlike Sokrates in, for example, *Symposium* or *Phaedo*, he reproduces the discourse he has "heard" as his own, and in his own voice. Though he comes closer in this respect to the constructive Sokrates of *Republic*, the visitor is much more dogmatic and paternalistic even than that Sokrates. In line with this acknowledgement of his expository purpose, he consistently speaks for himself, takes full responsibility for his own ideas, and does

[283] *Soph.* 239e–240a. For the Heracliteans see above, pp. 267–8.

[284] Contrast, for example, his use of herdsmanship as a model for statesmanship and the cosmic order with Sokrates' use of it at *Gorg.* 516a–e.

[285] A small, but telling, indicator of the contrast is his use of the phrase κατὰ τὸν ἐμὸν λόγον (*Soph.* 226c5), or κατὰ τὸν αὑτὸν λόγον (*Stat.* 303e7), in contrast to the elenctic Sokrates' habitual κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον (see above, p. 138 n. 135, and cf. *Tht.* 164d8–10).

not hesitate to assert definite opinions. In contrast to Sokrates, he does not deprecate his own use of long speeches or hedge his positive exposition with disclaimers and reluctance.[286] Instead, he acknowledges and defends his choice of an expository mode of discourse. Even though his account takes place by means of question and answer, he suggests that it will be analogous to an exposition or *epideixis* (217e).[287] It is true that he evokes Sokrates in his initial embarrassment at providing this kind of discourse (*Soph.* 217d), and later suggests that his myth is disproportionately long (*Stat.* 277ab). But unlike Sokrates, he ends up defending both these practices in principle: the expository mode is necessary for the material in question (*Soph.* 217e), and length per se is unobjectionable (*Stat.* 286b–287a). Qua Sokrates-substitute, then, the visitor serves to unmask certain aspects of the allegedly "infertile" Sokrates of *Theaetetus*, and indeed of Plato himself, by representing a method implicitly present (though officially denied) in Plato's use of dramatic form elsewhere. His expository mode of discourse conveys a critique not only of the negativity of the elenctic Sokrates, but of the sleight of hand with which Plato so often allows Sokrates to evade that negativity.[288]

A further difference lies in the visitor's mode of inquiry. Although, as we have seen, all his methods have links to Plato's Sokrates, he develops some of them far beyond Sokrates, and takes a broader view of the various methods and their distinctive contributions, placing particular emphasis on the appropriateness of different methods in different circumstances. In contrast to Sokrates he posits the method of question and answer as one mode of discourse among several, each of which may be used in appropriate circumstances (*Soph.* 217cde), and favors long or short discourses depending on the context (*Stat.* 286b–287a). When necessary, he also expresses his own thoughts by articulating an internal dialogue (above, pp. 348–9).

The subsuming of these views and methods into a larger picture posits "Sokrates" as something to investigate rather than to accept uncritically. But potential criticisms are couched in such a way as to detach them from Sokrates personally. For example, the visitor revisits the well-known issue of the unity of the virtues, but without identifying it as a peculiarly

[286] Only occasionally does he use qualifying phrases like, "at least in my opinion" (e.g. *Stat.* 272c8–d1, 277a5, 291c9).

[287] On *epideixis* and its associations with extensive discourse and the sophists cf. *Soph.* 224b and cf. above, p. 128.

[288] This in turn implies the possibility of criticizing Plato's own studied anonymity as an evasion of responsibility (cf. above, p. 41).

Socratic concern.[289] Similarly, the "friends of the Forms" against whom he argues (*Soph.* 248a) obviously include the Sokrates of *Phaedo* and *Republic*; yet Sokrates is not mentioned, and the "friends of the Forms" may not be confined to him.[290] The visitor's political views likewise respond to those of both the elenctic Sokrates and the constructive Sokrates of *Republic*, but it is debatable whether they constitute an expansion, a critique, or both.[291] Perhaps most significantly, the visitor discusses the educational method he calls elenchus in a way that clearly evokes Plato's Sokrates, but does not tie the method exclusively to him. He does this in *Sophist's* famous account of a "noble" kind of sophistry (*Soph.* 231b), which brings out some of the elenctic Sokrates' limitations. But the visitor does not speak in the personally judging, "refutative" (*elenktikos*) fashion that Sokrates feared at the outset (*Soph.* 216b), serving as a rather more tactful, constructive kind of critic. He makes no mention of the risk of arousing hostility that is inherent in the method of this "sophist," emphasizing instead the enjoyment of the bystanders and the educational effectiveness of the method (*Soph.* 230c) – neither of which is unproblematically true of the elenctic Sokrates as represented by Plato.[292] He also says that elenchus makes its victim "harsh to himself" and "mild towards others," and is secure in its results – a description less evocative of Plato's representations of Socratic practice than of the admonition delivered to Sokrates by "Protagoras" in *Theaetetus* (*Tht.* 167e–168c). He will go on to speak witheringly of the practice of inducing merely verbal contradictions, declaring that this is no true refutation (*Soph.* 259cd); yet this echoes the experience of many Socratic victims as portrayed by Plato.

In many ways this "noble" sophist bears a closer resemblance to the sanitized elenctic Sokrates of *Theaetetus* than to the less ambiguously elenctic figure of some other dialogues. But his most notable divergence from the elenctic Sokrates is unparalleled in *Theaetetus* as well. On the visitor's account, the preliminary "cleansing" of elenchus is to be followed by the provision of positive teaching (*Soph.* 230cd). His analysis thus

[289] It is not in fact possible to identify it clearly as Socratic (see Rowe 1995b: 239–40 and cf. Kahn 1996: 13–14; Irwin 1998: 37–47).

[290] Attempts to pin them down more specifically are inconclusive (cf. Campbell 1867: I. 125–6; Diès 1955: 293–7; Dorter 1994: 146–7; L. Brown 1998: 194–5).

[291] For two different views on this issue see Weiss 1995; Narcy 1995.

[292] Cf. above, pp. 126–7. For the enjoyment of the bystanders see esp. *Ap.* 33b (in this respect I stress the word "unproblematically"). Kerferd 1954 argues that the sophist of noble lineage alludes to actual sophists (cf. also Bluck 1975: 40–46). Though his overall argument is not convincing (see Trevaskis 1955) it does draw attention to the looseness of fit between the visitor's description and Plato's elenctic Sokrates.

acknowledges the inadequacy of elenctic scrutiny per se for discovering substantive ideas. It must be supplemented by positive teaching, to be discovered and communicated by a different method. This is demonstrated dramatically by the visitor's own treatment of his young interlocutors. Once again, the triad makes more explicit, and more marked, a shift that we have already observed in the *Republic*. But whereas the critique of the elenctic Sokrates in *Republic* 2–10 was implicit in Sokrates' own change of methods, in *Sophist* it is voiced openly by the visitor. Moreover the criticisms of Sokrates that were veiled and distorted by being placed in the mouth of Thrasymachos (in *Republic*) and "Protagoras" (in *Theaetetus*), both of whom were manipulated and discredited by their narrators, give way to more overt and honest criticism in the mouth of a respected speaker. Yet there is no ad hominem attack. The combination of clear allusions to the elenctic Sokrates with elements detaching those allusions from his specific representations in Plato generates an indeterminacy that enables the visitor's critique (and appreciation) of elenctic methods to incorporate Sokrates without being confined to him.

This view of elenchus validates the visitor's own attitude towards teaching, which, as we have seen, combines question and answer form with a strong element of the kind of paternalistic authority that he explicitly contrasts with elenchus (*Soph.* 229e–230a). His pedagogical outlook, like his mode of inquiry, has a broader reach than any of the other models he mentions: the strict authoritarianism of "father" Parmenides, the negativity of elenchus, and the philosophical "Muses"' with their disdain for their followers (*Soph.* 243a). Nor does he claim that his is the only legitimate method, asserting rather, in *Sophist*, that everyone present will participate in educating Theaitetos, each presumably in his own fashion (*Soph.* 234e). The educational strategies represented by this company – as illustrated in *Theaetetus* – include the didacticism of Theodoros, Socratic midwifery, and young Sokrates' role as Theaitetos' peer in mutual inquiry. The visitor's account of elenchus thus values it highly, but at the same time incorporates it into a larger range of methodological and pedagogical possibilities, as just one of many methods each of which may have its proper place.

In doing this he also, notoriously, challenges us to examine the ways in which Sokrates may be similar to, or different from, a sophist. For the sophist, in at least one of his manifestations, has turned out to *be* the elenctic Sokrates, or someone remarkably like him. There are other reminders of this Sokrates during the search for the sophist. We hear, for example, of a kind of speaker who annoys his hearers with his "prattling"

(*adoleschia*), makes no money by it, and neglects his household affairs (*Soph.* 225d; cf. *Stat.* 299b).[293] Like Sokrates, the sophist is preoccupied with *logoi*, and seeks the common factor in a series of examples.[294] And then there is the close relative of the sophist whose experience with arguments makes him suspect his own ignorance, and who is called dissembling or ironic.[295] These family relationships between Sokrates and various sophistic figures further complicate the initial problem of distinguishing the sophist from the philosopher.

Once again, the visitor presents us with a larger picture in which various elements each have their place, but can be adapted, replaced or revised according to circumstances. Such an outlook is appropriate to a world-view structured by division, which both incorporates and revises the concepts it encounters. Similarly, the visitor's methodological range incorporates and approximates the views of others, but adapts them in light of his own experience and integrates them into the map of the world that he has generated. He embodies both a more inclusive view of philosophical method and pedagogy, and a more general model of the philosopher than Sokrates, who is thereby simultaneously incorporated and put in his place. The visitor thus becomes a vehicle for Plato's resistance to his own intellectual "father." Like him, however, Plato continues to take his "father" very seriously and incorporate him into the discourse without killing him. He weaves elements of the views and methods of the various Sokrateses, along with others, into a larger scheme in which each such element takes its place, to be used as the situation demands. Plato thereby invites us not so much to criticize or reject Sokrates in himself, as to situate his various attributes among a range of ideas and methods that are more or less valuable depending on the context and circumstances.

SILENCING SOKRATES

I close this chapter – and this book – with some final reflections on the dethroning of Sokrates, which not only is *the* central dramatic issue of *Theaetetus*, *Sophist* and *Statesman*, but has larger significance for Plato's oeuvre as a whole. Sokrates' drastically reduced role in *Sophist* and *Statesman* suggests that Plato is shifting his gaze away from the life and death of the man with whom so many of his works seem preoccupied to the point of

[293] On this passage see esp. Gonzalez 1998: 285 n. 5; Taylor 2001.
[294] *Soph.* 239e–240a; cf. Campbell 1867: i. ad loc.
[295] *Soph.* 268a; cf. *Tht.* 172c and Dorter 1994: 168–9; Notomi 1999: 288–92.

obsession. To be sure, Socratic concerns remain vitally important, but the context in which Plato now locates them is no longer dominated by Sokrates' personal story. The King Archon before whom Sokrates was arraigned the previous day (*Tht.* 210d) has become merely a curious feature of the Athenian constitution (*Stat.* 294d). And Sokrates himself has become one influence among many, one, to be sure, whose activities have special value, but who is at the same time open both to criticism and to repositioning in a larger intellectual and political framework. Philosophy is now greater than Sokrates. For the dramatic strategy by which Plato suggests this, we may compare the treatment of Klytemnestra in Aeschylus' *Oresteia*. After dominating *Agamemnon*, she reappears in the subsequent plays of the trilogy in increasingly attenuated form. But the issues she embodies – issues surrounding gender, reproduction, and power – remain central to the very end of the trilogy. Analogously, in *Sophist* and *Statesman* the person of Sokrates is no longer the locus of Platonic anxiety, but the larger issues he embodies live on to be explored by others.

It is no coincidence that these dialogues, which demote Sokrates to a supporting role, and in which he and his methods are reassessed and even criticized by another dominant philosophical character, make no explicit mention of his trial and death. Their intellectual reappraisal of Sokrates makes it all the more important for Plato to distance the matters under discussion from these events, in order not to seem to be endorsing them. This provides him with one very obvious reason for replacing Sokrates with the Eleatic visitor. Besides, it would be difficult for Plato to convey a dispassionate critique of the elenctic Sokrates or his methods in a dialogue dominated by Sokrates. Overt dramatic references to his trial and death would exacerbate this difficulty, by forcing Plato into a defensive posture on his teacher's behalf. Any critique of the elenctic Sokrates in the dialogues he dominates must therefore be voiced by a subordinate character, or conveyed obliquely through dramatic structure, as we have seen in both *Republic* and *Theaetetus*. By cancelling this dominance, and avoiding the specifics of his trial and death, Plato frees himself from the emotional charge surrounding those events, enabling him to locate it, however distressing it was to those intimately involved, as just one of the many evils in the world.

I differ here from the many critics who have seen the dramatic date of *Sophist* and *Statesman* as the key to their interpretation. If, as they argue, the death of Sokrates is of overwhelming importance for understanding these dialogues, the lack of any reference to that event can only be construed

as weak dramaturgy on Plato's part.[296] Yet to assert that these dialogues lack explicit dramatic reference to the trial and death of Sokrates is not to deny that they touch on important related issues – such as the difficulty of distinguishing the sophist from the philosopher – or even that they allude to the trial less directly. Each of the two dialogues contains one particularly striking and substantial instance of such indirect reference. In both cases, however, these allusions serve to locate Sokrates within a larger philosophical and political context. In *Sophist*, this passage is the famous discussion of the "noble" sophist, which, as we have seen, alludes to Plato's elenctic Sokrates, but does so without referring directly to him, and in a sanitized fashion (above, pp. 384–5). The combination of clear allusion to the elenctic Sokrates with elements detaching that allusion from his specific representations in Plato generates an indeterminacy that enables the visitor's critique of the elenctic method to incorporate Sokrates without being confined to him.

In *Statesman*, there is an unmistakable allusion to Sokrates' trial and death in the visitor's satire of democracy. In this imaginary scenario, anyone who defies the law by seeking the truth and being clever or pursuing wisdom (σοφιζόμενος) should be called an inquirer into lofty matters and a prattling sophist (μετεωρολόγον, ἀδολέσχην τινὰ σοφιστήν), and should be indicted and executed for corrupting the young and encouraging law-breaking and independence (or "self-rule"), since no one should be wiser than the law (*Stat.* 299bc). Again, the allusion to the charges against Sokrates is clear, its precise import and tone less so. The satire presents democracy as one of the second-best states, in which the law is always obeyed. As such, it does not precisely correspond to Sokrates' Athens, which was a corrupt democracy – according to the visitor's taxonomy of constitutions – since it changed its laws and did not always abide by them.[297] On the other hand, Sokrates' trial and death did proceed in accordance with the law (cf. *Crito* 50c, 54bc). Presumably, then, they would have occurred even in a law-abiding democracy. Whether or not Athens is categorized as law-abiding, however, it is certainly prone

[296] E.g. when Sallis says this is "what is most important to recall" at *Sophist* 254b (1996: 510), we may legitimately ask why, in that case, Plato does nothing at that moment to make us recall it (contrast e.g. *Phd.* 63b and even *Phileb.* 52e).

[297] The visitor even rejects the Athenian democratic maxim "persuade or obey" (*Stat.* 296a–e; cf. *Crito* 51e–52a and Rowe 1995b on *Stat.* 296a7). As Lane points out, Athens had no law against inquiry of the kind that the visitor satirizes (1998: 154). But in *Ap.* Sokrates refuses to obey a hypothetical order to cease and desist from philosophy, defending his refusal with an appeal to the superior authority of god (29cd). This might be construed as a claim to be wiser than the established laws.

to the many evils from which all the inferior kinds of state suffer, the law-abiding and law-breaking alike (*Stat.* 301e–302a). The death of Sokrates is presumably one such evil.

This has some disconcerting implications. The visitor declares that democracy, compared to other forms of government, is intrinsically weak and unable to do anything "great" (μέγα) *for good or for evil* (*Stat.* 303ab). This rather startlingly suggests that, from the visitor's perspective, Sokrates' upcoming death will not be a *major* evil – in contrast, one may suppose, to the mass-murders perpetrated by the Thirty Tyrants in Plato's youth.[298] It also implies that his philosophical achievement, made possible by the democracy in which he throve, was not a *great* good. The visitor, qua dramatic character, is unaware (presumably) that Sokrates is about to be tried for his life. But he does know and evidently respect the living Sokrates. Sokrates himself, of course, does not believe his own death is a great evil, since the many are incapable of doing the greatest evil or good, or even harming a good man.[299] But the goods and evils he has in mind are independent of any form of government. And Plato expends great energy elsewhere to convince us that his death is indeed a great evil for others, if not for himself, and to redeem that death by immortalizing him in the dialogues. In his oeuvre as a whole, Plato certainly succeeds in turning the life and death of Sokrates into "great" goods. In these two works, however, he seems to be challenging Sokrates' survivors to leave him behind, by adopting his own perspective regarding the insignificance of his death.

This should not be taken to imply either that the visitor speaks directly for Plato, or that his judgment is infallible (cf. above, p. 326). The point is rather that Plato is now using a dominant (and therefore privileged) character to *entertain* the idea that the death of an individual – even such a remarkable one as Sokrates – may be a price worth paying for living in one kind of state rather than another. To put it another way, he is showing us the price of sacrificing the individuality embodied so remarkably in his own portrait of Sokrates. If it seems incredible that he should treat Sokrates like this, we must remember that it is, in a sense, the logical culmination of a vital strand in Sokrates' own outlook – the insignificance of the material and the personal. And other aspects of the dialogues have shown us additional reasons for deprivileging Sokrates,

[298] The Thirty killed some fifteen hundred Athenians (P. Krentz 1982: 79; Munn 2000: 231). For the contrast between great (public) and small (private) achievements cf. *Rep.* 497a, *Stat.* 273c, Isoc. *Antid.* 84–5; Ober 1998: 237.

[299] *Crito* 44d, 48ab, *Ap.* 30cd

at least in his elenctic avatar. Plato's elenctic Sokrates nearly always fails to convert his interlocutors to his way of thinking and living. The same Sokrates, as represented in *Theaetetus*, is unable to generate positive ideas even when presented with a "perfect" interlocutor. Moreover, any good this Sokrates accomplishes is on a small scale, by the very nature of his method. His attention is directed more or less effectively to just one person at a time, in contrast to the large-scale work of the ideal ruler, or indeed the large-scale aims of Plato qua writer, political theorist, and founder of the Academy.[300] The visitor's taxonomy of human political life thus decenters Sokrates' life as well as his death. It would be tasteless, to say the least, to convey this within a dramatic framework of overt references to the circumstances of his trial and execution.

The constructive Sokrates is also subject to Plato's implicit critique, in so far as he lurks behind the elenctic Sokrates of *Theaetetus*, avoiding responsibility for his own ideas. Elsewhere, however, Sokrates in his constructive persona is allowed to voice positive theories, some of which carry large political implications, as in *Republic*. Why then does Plato not allow him to continue as the dominant character in *Sophist* and *Statesman* too? I suggest that the marginalization of Sokrates in these dialogues conveys, at least in part, the idea that Sokrates is no longer enough. By this I do not merely mean that Plato has given up on the possibility of adapting Sokrates to his changing purposes, that there are limits to his plasticity.[301] His Sokrates proves so adaptable elsewhere that we cannot say he deems it inappropriate to Sokrates to voice positive views, discuss a wide range of material, or employ a range of philosophical and pedagogical methods.[302] Nor is he simply taking leave of the "historical" Sokrates.

Rather the point concerns uniqueness per se. For Plato to re-employ "Sokrates" yet again as his principal speaker would continue to suggest – regardless of how he was characterized – that he, and only he, is an adequate spokesman for philosophy. The very name "Sokrates" is inseparable from the unique image of the snub-nosed, bare-foot Athenian

[300] Cf. Rowe 1984: 27–8; Nehamas 1986: 315–16. Some have seen Sokrates himself as standing for the true statesman in *Stat.*, as at *Gorg.* 521d (e.g. Rowe 1995b: 10, 179, 229). But this is difficult to square with the individuality of Sokrates' methods (cf. *Stat.* 295ab), his denials of knowledge, and the visitor's claim that the true statesman would be welcomed if he appeared (*Stat.* 301d). Cf. also Solana Dueso 1993.

[301] This argument is made in detail by Long 1998 (cf. also Stenzel 1940: 3–4). But in my view it does not escape circularity.

[302] Cf. D. Frede 1996: 215–16. For other suggestions as to why Sokrates is demoted see Ryle 1966: 28–32; Scodel 1987: 15–16; Wengert 1988: 9; Rosen 1995: 100; Miller 1980: 8–10; Cherubin 1993: 234; Friedländer 1964–9: I.134–6.

gadfly, created in large measure by Plato himself. Even the blandest avatar of this particular character cannot serve as a vehicle to transcend his own uniqueness, since he carries with him the baggage of his other selves. The Sokrates of *Philebus* for example, must carry this Socratic burden. If Plato wants to escape this difficulty, and express a more generous – and ultimately more optimistic – view of the philosophic nature, he must escape the tyranny of his own creation. And this can only be done by silencing Sokrates. The nameless visitor provides his creator with a clean slate, a philosopher whose views may be assessed exclusively on their intellectual merits. What matters about him is not just his differences from Sokrates, but the fact that he is *not* Sokrates.

Sokrates' silence takes on added significance in the light of the theme of philosophical paternity. By focusing on this central, "heroic" figure in so many dialogues, Plato undertook the task of immortalizing him – a task in which he was supremely successful. Why, then, did he choose in these (putatively late) dialogues to silence the very figure that he had gone to so much trouble to create? I suggest that having immortalized his Sokrates, Plato needed to free both himself and philosophy from that figure's overwhelming influence, to silence him if he was to make heard any other voice. Only by displacing Sokrates could he offer a model of the philosopher that might transcend the individual. Only then could philosophy itself transcend the particular circumstances in which Sokrates lived and died. A struggle for such transcendence emerges over and over again in Plato's Socratic works (above all in *Symposium*, his most comprehensive attempt to marry Socratic uniqueness to philosophical abstraction). But all these dialogues end up corroborating Sokrates' uniqueness. It was only by "suppressing the irrepressible Sokrates" that Plato could provide for the future of philosophy in the lives of other concrete historically bound persons, by offering a more generic, and thus more available model for their emulation.[303] By replacing Sokrates, he frees his reader from the impossible task of aspiring to *be* Sokrates.

The displacement of Sokrates enables Plato to suggest that the successful practice of philosophy transcends any one model – a transcendence we have already seen embodied in the visitor. Its significance thus extends beyond the elenctic Sokrates, or his specific representation in *Theaetetus*, to his role in the entire Platonic corpus. I would develop this point by arguing that Plato's Sokrateses collectively represent his continuing effort to grapple with the problems surrounding human individuality and its

[303] The quoted phrase is from Plass 1964: 254; cf. also Grene 1950: 109–10; Rankin 1993: 52.

transcendence. As a result, Sokrates is not just a specific unique individual, but comes to *stand for* such individuality, both personally and philosophically. He literally *embodies* individuality in mind, physique, personality, mode of inquiry and pedagogy. To displace him is therefore to reject the centrality of human idiosyncrasy to a proper understanding of the world, and to assert the value of a generic philosophical ideal that is not bound up with Socratic uniqueness but may be instantiated by various persons, such as the anonymous visitor.

This becomes still clearer if we look at the range of dominant speakers in the late dialogues as a group, including the Athenian visitor in *Laws*, the barely characterized participants of *Timaeus* and *Critias*, and the lightly characterized Sokrates of *Philebus*. In the context of these late dialogues viewed collectively, Sokrates has become just one of many dominant speakers. Plato did not (presumably) plan these dialogues as a coherent group. But the same overall pattern is exemplified internally within *Timaeus* and *Critias*, a closely linked pair of dialogues that feature two main speakers with the promise of a third, while also retrospectively endorsing the Socratic discourse of *Republic*. This move towards a range of dominant figures, with little to choose between them in character, is an expression of anti-individualism, and as such militates against the seductive particularity of dialogue form.

But if Sokrates is philosophically and dramatically unnecessary, and in some ways even a liability, why does Plato retain him at all in these two dialogues, even in such a minor role? Again, viewing the triad as a dramatic sequence helps to clarify the issue. As we have already seen, Plato dates these dialogues close to Sokrates' trial and death, while shifting the dramatic focus away from those events over the course of the triad. Similarly, the continuing presence of Sokrates, while providing a formal link to *Theaetetus*, at the same time marks a transition, obliquely acknowledging that this particular man, this particular life and death, are being transcended. (We may compare the continuing presence of Thrasymachos in *Republic* 2–10.) That is not enough, however, to explain the particular form that Sokrates' exiguous presence takes in both these dialogues: a brief introductory speaking part, followed by extensive, unbroken silence. This silence is marked in a peculiar, indirect way in *Sophist*, through the visitor's repeated addresses to young Sokrates as simply "Sokrates," which keep nudging us into awareness of the older Sokrates' silent presence (above, p. 329). His role has become comparable to that of the bystanders so often present in the dialogues he himself dominates.

Many scholars have read significance into this silence, often seeing it as tacitly critical of the visitor.[304] They sometimes bolster such interpretations by providing us with cues for imagining Sokrates' reactions to the visitor's discourse.[305] Particularly revealing is the theatrical language used by critics like Miller, who speaks of "the deeper project – represented on stage by the elder Sokrates."[306] In a staged drama, a silent figure may indeed make an important visual and dramatic impact. For example, Kassandra in Aeschlyus' *Agamemnon* is present for some three hundred lines of the play before breaking her silence with enormous dramatic power. Unlike Kassandra, however, Sokrates does not speak again, in either *Sophist* or *Statesman*, after the opening conversation. More importantly, we do not, in fact, "see" him.[307] To interpolate stage directions, where Plato gives us none, is to commit the "documentary fallacy," that is, to provide characters with attributes and behaviors for which there is no textual evidence.[308]

What, then, is the meaning of this extended silence? Silence can mean many different things, depending on the context. But unlike other Platonic moments when Sokrates' silence is marked as significant,[309] no one within these dialogues draws attention to it, any more than to the silence of Theodoros or other bystanders. In ancient Greek terms, such an unmarked silence from a free adult male in the presence of friends is most plausibly understood as conveying respect, acquiescence or assent. This is especially true in the Athenian democratic culture of free speech (*parrhēsia*), which means so much to Plato's Sokrates (above, p. 75). An unmarked silence is therefore most plausibly interpreted as acquiescent or respectful. This also accords with the general picture of Sokrates in other dialogues, who customarily speaks up if he disagrees, and expects others to do the same (cf. above, p. 123). At the very least, then, some clear indicator would be required if Plato intended us to view Sokrates' silence as either hostile to or critical of the visitor.

Without such textual signposts from Plato or his characters, we can only interpret a silence in relation to any words or deeds that precede or follow it.[310] In this case, Sokrates' silences are preceded, in the larger context of the triad, by his own loquacity in *Theaetetus*. And his remarks

[304] E.g. Friedländer 1964–9: III.304–5; cf. Scodel 1987: 33; Gonzalez 2000: 168. For other interpretatons see Eades 1996.

[305] E.g. Narcy 1995: 232; Klein 1977: 22; Tejera 1978: 99, 1997: 71.

[306] Miller 1980: 106; cf. e.g. Sallis 1996: 456.

[307] Unless, that is, the dialogues were originally "staged," with different people taking each part – an interpretation that would require considerable defense (cf. above, pp. 22–5).

[308] See Waldock 1951: ch. 2 and cf. Gould 1978: 43–4.

[309] E.g. *Lys.* 211 a, *Phd.* 84c, *HMin.* 363a.

[310] Cf. Poyatos 1981; Lateiner 1995: 195, 201.

at the opening of *Statesman* may be understood as a response to the conversation of *Sophist*, to which he attended without speaking. But within each of the latter two dialogues, his silence is preceded by only a few words and deeds on his part, and followed by none. All these contextual markers, such as they are, signify a friendly, positive attitude. Sokrates' initial enthusiasm for the visitor is maintained at the beginning of *Statesman* and never withdrawn (*Soph.* 216a, *Stat.* 257a). And the general atmosphere of the opening exchanges is one of a cordial mutual respect.[311] It is evidently out of respect for Sokrates that the visitor is willing to provide a discourse that he earlier withheld; for his part, Sokrates politely asks the visitor for his views (*Soph.* 217a–d). This request superficially resembles his opening gambit in many elenctic encounters; but he listens to both the resulting discourses without challenging them or questioning the speaker's wisdom.

Besides this general friendliness, there are some slight but clear signs of Socratic approval for the visitor's enterprise. Sokrates himself offers the visitor an "unsocratic" choice of methods (*Soph.* 217c) – in contrast to his practice elsewhere – and does so without prejudice.[312] When the visitor chooses expository discourse, Sokrates offers no objection, but rather seems to endorse the choice by offering as a model his own conversation with Parmenides (*Soph.* 217c). He also endorses proleptically the critique of Parmenides (*Tht.* 183e–184a), and even the method of division (*Soph.* 217a). At the opening of *Statesman*, his desire to hear young Sokrates tested (*Stat.* 258a) tells us not only that he is still searching for talented young men (cf. *Tht.* 143de), but that he regards the visitor's methods as a useful means for discovering them. And he unites himself symbolically with the compliant young interlocutors by adding young Sokrates to his philosophical "family."[313] All this suggests that Sokrates' silence should be understood as a friendly endorsement, not necessarily of every detail of the visitor's discourse, but of his overall project.

Plato's Sokrates often "tames" other speakers by silencing them, whether they like it or not (above, pp. 122–4). I suggest that in *Sophist* and *Statesman* Plato has analogously "tamed" his Sokrates, and that this is what the latter's silent supporting role betokens. That is, Sokrates is retained in order to show his tacit approval of the visitor and what he stands for, including Plato's decision to broaden the range of dominant speakers beyond Sokrates himself. It thus gives a Socratic endorsement

[311] Cf. Miller 1980: 1–2; cf. also Szlezák 1997: 81–4; contra e.g. Scodel 1987: 19–22, 44 n. 38; Gonzalez 2000.

[312] Contrast *Prot.* 334c–338e and cf. above, p. 116.

[313] *Stat.* 258a; cf. Rowe 1995b ad loc.

to a move away from Socratic dominance: through this Sokrates' complicity, all previous Sokrateses are co-opted. Just as the visitor has the courage to "assault" his "father" Parmenides, Plato "assaults" his own father-figure, not just on an intellectual level, by critiquing and incorporating his ideas, but on a dramatic level, by reducing him to a walk-on part. This accords with a thread we have observed running through these works: in Platonic terms, to respect one's intellectual father one must displace him. In a further twist of irony, this means that Plato himself is most "Socratic" – the truest avatar and offspring of his own Sokrates – when he is most willing to adopt a critical stance towards this figure and his methods. It is by their willingness to critique Sokrates that both the visitor and Plato paradoxically prove themselves his true intellectual "children."[314]

Paradoxically, this makes these "undramatic" late dialogues, with their minimal characterization, more philosophically optimistic than many more richly characterized dialogues where Sokrates remains firmly in control. For they demonstrate that there is still life after Sokrates. At the same time, the continuing presence of any Sokrates, no matter how anemic, indicates that he is not to be understood as superseded. As a friendly, approving listener, he embodies and implicitly endorses the qualities of the compliant, attentive interlocutor. Yet as we have seen, the visitor's intellectual regime treats such respectful acquiescence as a prelude to autonomy. And Sokrates' interest in assessing the caliber of young Sokrates shows that qua listener he reserves the right to an actively critical role. He says himself that he will question the boy some other time (*Stat.* 258a). By allowing us a range of philosophical choices the visitor frees us from Sokrates, as Plato has freed himself. But he also frees us to take on aspects of that Sokrates if the situation requires it, as the visitor himself does in certain circumstances. Sokrates lives on, but embedded in a larger picture.

Sokrates is also reinstated in another more subtle way. For if we emulate the core of philosophically desirable qualities embodied in the visitor, we will be "imitating" Sokrates himself, to the extent that those qualities were abstracted from his earlier avatars. We may imitate him selectively (as the visitor does, thanks to Plato), without trying to be exactly like him. By losing Sokrates' particular identity, the visitor encourages us to imitate philosophical essentials, as opposed to superficial idiosyncrasies. This means that there may also be life after Sokrates for Sokrates. But

[314] Cf. Howland 1998: 213–14.

the Socratic spirit can only live on in persons whose intellectual independence frees them from attempting, or achieving, a more superficial resemblance to Sokrates the individual.[315]

Plato thus uses these two dialogues in part to put the idiosyncratic Sokrates of his other dialogues squarely in his place. Yet that same Sokrates ends up getting the last laugh. Not only do the "Socratic" dialogues continue to receive the most attention – especially in classrooms where "Western Civilization" is purveyed – but Sokrates continues to overshadow scholarly interpretation even of these two dialogues in which he plays virtually no role.[316] The reader's knowledge of Sokrates, derived predominantly from Plato himself, provides a backdrop against which even the most two-dimensional "Sokrates" takes on individuality, depth and substance. This is, in part, a result of Plato's decision to *write* Sokrates, thus releasing his creation from authorial control. The tyranny exerted by this cumulative Sokrates is manifest in the interpretive literature on *Sophist* and *Statesman*. Most commentators who make these dialogues revolve around the trial and death of Sokrates are primarily concerned with Sokrates as he appears in *other* dialogues. It is this that allows them to read large symbolic meanings into his silent and barely characterized presence in *Sophist* and *Statesman*. This critical focus may be in part a reaction of desperation to the fact that there is so little to be said about the visitor, a rush to fill the vacuum of his namelessness. But whatever its cause, to continue to insist on Sokrates' overwhelming personal importance, in defiance of the dramatic evidence, is to refuse Plato the licence to declare independence from his philosophic father.

[315] This is the central argument of Nehamas 1998. But the qualities he views as essentially Socratic are very different from those embodied in the visitor.

[316] In *Laws* he plays no role at all, yet Aristotle notoriously speaks as if he did (*Pol.* 1265a11).

Bibliography

Adam, J. (ed.) (1963) *The Republic of Plato* (2nd edn.; 1st edn. 1902)

Adkins, A. W. H. (1960) *Merit and Responsibility: A Study in Greek Values* (Oxford)

Ahl, F. (1984) "The art of safe criticism in Greece and Rome," *American Journal of Philology* 105: 174–208

(1991) *Sophocles' Oedipus: Evidence and Self-Conviction* (Ithaca, NY)

Ahrends, J. F. M. (1988) *Die Einheit des Polis. Eine Studien über Platons Staat. Mnemosyne* Supp. 106

Albinus, L. (1998) "The *katabasis* of Er. Plato's use of myths, exemplified by the myth of Er," in *Essays on Plato's Republic*, ed. E. N. Ostenfeld (Aarhus) 91–105

Alford, R. D. (1987) *Naming and Identity: A Cross-Cultural Study of Personal Naming Practices* (New Haven)

Allen, D. (2000) "Envisaging the body of the condemned: the power of Platonic symbols," *Classical Philology* 95: 133–50

Altieri, C. (1990) "Plato's performative sublime," in *Canons and Consequences* (Evanston, IL) 163–88

Amory, F. (1984) "Socrates: the legend," *Classica et Medievialia* 35: 19–56

Annas, J. (1977) "Plato and Aristotle on friendship and altruism," *Mind* 86: 532–54

(1981) *An Introduction to Plato's Republic* (Oxford)

(1982) "Plato's myths of judgement," *Phronesis* 27: 119–43

(1999) *Platonic Ethics, Old and New* (Ithaca, NY)

Annas, J. and R. Waterfield (1995) *Plato: Statesman* (Cambridge)

Apelt, O. (1912) *Platonische Aufsätze* (Leipzig and Berlin)

Arends, J. F. M. (1993) "Survival, war and unity of the polis in Plato's *Statesman*," *Polis* 12: 154–87

Arieti, J. A. (1991) *Interpreting Plato: The Dialogues as Drama* (Savage, MD)

(1995) "How to read a Platonic dialogue," in Gonzalez 1995a: 119–32

Asmis, E. (1992) "Plato on poetic creativity," in R. Kraut (ed.) *The Cambridge Companion to Plato* (Cambridge) 338–64

Ausland, H. W. (1997) "On reading Plato mimetically," *American Journal of Philology* 118: 371–416

(2000) "Who speaks for whom in the *Timaeus-Critias*?" in Press 2000a: 183–98

Austin, J. L. (1962) *How to Do Things with Words* (Cambridge, MA)

Bacon, H. (1959) "Socrates crowned," *Virginia Quarterly Review* 35: 415–30

Bakhtin, M. (1984) *Problems of Dostoevsky's Poetics*, ed. and trans. C. Emerson (Minneapolis)
Balaudé, J.-F. (1997a) "La Finalité de l'elenchos d'après les premiers dialogues de Platon," in Giannantoni and Narcy 1997: 235–58
(1997b) "Que veut montrer Socrate dans l'*Hippias mineur*?" in Giannantoni and Narcy 1997: 259–77
Baltes, M. (1993) "Plato's school, the Academy," *Hermathena* 155: 5–26
Barabas, M. (1986) "The strangeness of Socrates," *Philosophical Investigations* 9: 89–110
Barber, B. R. (1996) "Misreading democracy: Peter Euben and the *Gorgias*," in Ober and Hedrick 1996: 361–75
Barker, A. (1976) "The digression in the 'Theaetetus'," *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 14: 457–62
Barker, A. and M. Warner (eds. and introd.) (1992) *The Language of the Cave* (Edmonton)
Beckerman, B. (1970) *Dynamics of Drama: Theory and Method of Analysis* (New York 1970; reprinted New York 1979)
Belfiore, E. (1980) "*Elenchus*, *epode*, and magic: Socrates as Silenus," *Phoenix* 34: 128–37
(1984) "A theory of imitation in Plato's *Republic*," *Transactions of the American Philological Association* 114: 121–46
Benardete, S. (1963) "Eidos and diaeresis in Plato's Statesman," *Philologus* 107: 193–226
(1984) *The Being of the Beautiful*. Part I: *Plato's Theaetetus*, Part II: *Plato's Sophist*, Part III: *Plato's Statesman* (Chicago)
(1989) *Socrates' Second Sailing: On Plato's Republic* (Chicago)
Benitez, E. (1992) "Argument, rhetoric and philosophic method: Plato's *Protagoras*," *Philosophy and Rhetoric* 25: 222–52
(1996) "Characterization and interpretation: the importance of drama in Plato's *Sophist*," *Literature and Aesthetics* 6: 27–39
Benitez, E. and L. Guimaraes (1993) "Philosophy as performed in Plato's *Theaetetus*," *Review of Metaphysics* 47: 297–328
Benson, H. H. (1987) "The problem of the elenchus reconsidered," *Ancient Philosophy* 7: 67–85
(1990) "The priority of definition and the Socratic elenchus," *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy* 8: 19–65
Berg, G. O. (1904) *Metaphor and Comparison in the Dialogues of Plato* (Berlin)
Berger, H. (1982) "Plato's flying philosopher," *Philosophical Forum* 13/14: 385–407
(1984) "Facing sophists: Socrates' charismatic bondage in *Protagoras*," *Representations* 5: 66–91
Bergren, A. (1983) "Language and the female in early Greek thought," *Arethusa* 16: 69–95
Bergson, H. (1914) *Laughter: An Essay on the Meaning of the Comic*, trans. C. Brereton and F. Rothwell (New York)
Beversluis, J. (2000) *Cross-Examining Socrates: A Defense of the Interlocutors in Plato's Early Dialogues* (Cambridge)

Beye, C. R. (1987) *Ancient Greek Literature and Society* (2nd edn. Ithaca, NY)
Blair, E. D. (1996) "Women: the unrecognized teachers of the Platonic Socrates," *Ancient Philosophy* 16: 330–50
Blank, D. L. (1985) "Socrates versus sophists on payment for teaching," *Classical Antiquity* 4: 1–49
(1993) "The arousal of emotion in Plato's dialogues," *Classical Quarterly* 2: 428–39
Blondell, R. (formerly M. W. Blundell) (1998) "Reproducing Socrates: dramatic form and pedagogy in the *Theaetetus*," *Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy* 14: 213–38
(2000) "Letting Plato speak for himself," in Press 2000a: 127–46
Blondell, R., B. Zweig, N. S. Rabinowitz and M.-K. Gamel (1999) *Women on the Edge: Four Plays by Euripides* (New York)
Bloom, A. (1968) *The Republic of Plato*, translated, with notes and an interpretive essay (New York)
Bluck, R. S. (1975) *Plato's Sophist* (Manchester)
Blundell, M. W. (1987) "The moral character of Odysseus in *Philoctetes*," *Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies* 28: 307–29
(1988) "The *phusis* of Neoptolemus in Sophocles' *Philoctetes*," *Greece and Rome* 35: 137–48; reprinted in *Greece and Rome Studies II: Greek Tragedy*, ed. I. McAuslan and P. Walcot (Oxford 1993), 104–115
(1989) *Helping Friends and Harming Enemies: A Study in Sophocles and Greek Ethics* (Cambridge)
(1990) "Parental nature and Stoic οἰκείωσις," *Ancient Philosophy* 10: 221–42
(1992a) "*Ethos* and *dianoia* reconsidered," in *Essays in Aristotle's Poetics*, ed. A. O. Rorty (Princeton) 155–75
(1992b) "Character and meaning in Plato's *Hippias Minor*," in *Methods of Interpreting Plato and his Dialogues*, ed. J. C. Klagge and N. D. Smith, *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy* supp. vol. (1992) 131–72
(1992c) "Commentary on Reeve," *Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy* 8 (1992) 115–32
(1993a) "Self-censorship in Plato's *Republic*," in Irwin and Nussbaum 1993: 17–36
(1993b) "The ideal of the *polis* in *Oedipus at Colonus*," in *Tragedy, Comedy and the Polis: Papers from the Greek Drama Conference, Nottingham, 18–20 July 1990*, ed. A. H. Sommerstein, S. Halliwell, J. Henderson and B. Zimmermann (Bari) 287–306
Blyth, D. J. (1995) "Polemarchus in Plato's *Republic*," *Prudentia* 26: 53–82
Bobonich, C. (1995) "The virtues of ordinary people in Plato's *Statesman*," in Rowe 1995a: 313–29
Booth, W. (1961) *The Rhetoric of Fiction* (Chicago)
Borges, J. L. (1970) "Pierre Menard, author of the *Quixote*," in *Labyrinths: Selected Stories and Other Writings*, ed. D. A. Yates and J. E. Irby (Harmondsworth) 62–71
Bostock, D. (1988) *Plato's Theaetetus* (Oxford)

Boud, T. W. (1994) "Where Ion stood, what Ion sang," *Harvard Studies in Classical Philology* 96: 109–21
Bourdieu, P. (1990) *The Logic of Practice*, trans. R. Nice (Stanford, CA)
Bowra, C. M. (1944) *Sophoclean Tragedy* (Oxford)
Brandwood, L. (1976) *A Word Index to Plato* (Leeds)
Branham, R. B. (1989) *Unruly Eloquence: Lucian and the Comedy of Traditions* (Cambridge, MA)
Brann, E. (1967) "The music of the *Republic*," *Agon* 1: 1–117
Brennan, T. (1987) "Plato's *Lesser Hippias*: a translation and critical discussion," B.A. thesis, Reed College
Brickhouse, T. C. and N. D. Smith (1984) "Vlastos on the elenchus," *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy* 2: 185–96
(1989) *Socrates on Trial* (Princeton)
(1991) "Socrates' elenctic mission," *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy* 11: 131–59
(1992) "Socrates' elenctic psychology," *Synthese* 92: 63–82
(1994) *Plato's Socrates* (Oxford)
Brisson, L. (1995) "Interprétation du mythe du *Politique*," in Rowe 1995a: 349–63
(1998) *Plato the Myth Maker*, trans. G. Naddaf (Chicago)
Brock, R. (1990) "Plato and comedy," in *Owls to Athens*, ed. E. M. Craik (Oxford) 39–49
Brown, L. (1998) "Innovation and continuity: the battle of gods and giants, *Sophist* 245–249," in Gentzler 1998: 181–207
Brown, M. (1969) "*Theaetetus*: knowledge as continued learning," *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 7: 359–79.
Brown, W. (1988) "'Supposing truth were a woman . . .' Plato's subversion of masculine discourse," *Political Theory* 16: 594–616
Brumbaugh, R. S. (1952) "Plato studies as contemporary philosophy," *Review of Metaphysics* 6: 315–24
(1954) *Plato's Mathematical Imagination* (Bloomington)
(1967) "A new interpretation of Plato's *Republic*," *Journal of Philosophy* 64: 661–70
(1976) "Plato's relation to the arts and crafts," in *Facets of Plato's Philosophy*, ed. W. H. Werkmeister = *Phronesis* Supp. 2 (Assen) 40–52
(1983) "Diction and dialectic: the language of Plato's stranger from Elea," in K. Robb (ed.) *Language and Thought in Early Greek Philosophy* (La Salle, IL) 66–76
Brumbaugh, R. S. and N. M. Lawrence (1972) *Philosophical Themes in Modern Education* (Boston)
Bruns, I. (1896) *Das literarische Porträt der Griechen* (Berlin; reprinted Darmstadt 1961)
Burford, A. (1972) *Craftsmen in Greek and Roman Society* (London)
Burger, R. (1997) "Plato's non-Socratic narrations of Socratic conversations," in Hart and Tejera 1997: 121–42
Burke, S. (1996) "The textual estate: Plato and the ethics of signature," *History of the Human Sciences* 9: 59–72

Burnet, J. (ed.) (1911) *Plato's Phaedo* (Oxford)
(ed.) (1924) *Plato: Euthyphro, Apology of Socrates, Crito* (Oxford)
Burnett, A. P. (1983) *Three Archaic Poets: Archilochus, Alcaeus, Sappho* (Cambridge, MA)
Burnyeat, M. F. (1970) "The material and sources of Plato's dream," *Phronesis* 15: 101–22
(1976) "Protagoras and self-refutation in Plato's *Theaetetus*," *Philosophical Review* 85: 172–95
(1977a) "Socratic midwifery, Platonic inspiration," *Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies* 24 (1977) 7–17
(1977b) "Examples in epistemology: Socrates, Theaetetus and G. E. Moore," *Philosophy* 52 (1977) 381–98
(1978) "The philosophical sense of Theaetetus' mathematics," *Isis* 69: 489–513
(1985) "Sphinx without a secret," *New York Review of Books*, 30 May 1985: 3–36
(1990) "Introduction" to Levett 1990
(forthcoming) "Plato," *Proceedings of the British Academy*
Caizzi, F. D. (1966) *Antisthenis Fragmenta* (Milan)
Calame, C. (1995) *The Craft of Poetic Speech in Ancient Greece*, trans. J. Orion (Ithaca, NY)
Calderini, A. (1906) "Intorno ad Ulisse e Achille in Platone," *Reconditi Istituto Lombardo* 39: 1003–10
Callahan, J. F. (1977) "Dialectic, myth and history in the philosophy of Plato," in *Interpretations of Plato*, ed. Helen F. North (Leiden) 64–85
Calogero, G. (ed.) (1948) *L'Ippia Minore* (Florence)
Campbell, L. (ed.) (1867) *The Sophistes and Politicus of Plato*. 2 vols. (Oxford; reprinted Salem, NH 1988)
(1883) *The Theaetetus of Plato* (2nd edn. Oxford; reprinted New York 1980)
Carlson, M. (1990) *Theatre Semiotics: Signs of Life* (Bloomington and Indianapolis)
Carnes, J. (1997) "This myth which is not one: construction of discourse in Plato's *Symposium*," in *Rethinking Sexuality: Foucault and Classical Antiquity*, ed. D. H. J. Larmour, P. A. Miller, and C. Platter (Princeton) 104–21
Carone, G. R. (1993) "Cosmic and human drama in Plato's *Statesman*: on cosmos, god and microcosm in the myth," *Polis* 12: 99–121
Carter, L. B. (1986) *The Quiet Athenian* (Oxford)
Cascardi, A. J. (ed.) (1987) *Literature and the Question of Philosophy* (Baltimore)
Cavarero, A. (1995) *In Spite of Plato: A Feminist Rewriting of Ancient Philosophy*, trans. S. Anderlini-D'Onofrio and Á. O'Healy (New York)
Charles, L. H. (1951) "Drama in first-naming ceremonies," *Journal of American Folklore* 64: 11–35
Cherubin, R. (1993) "What is Eleatic about the Eleatic stranger?" in Press 1993a: 215–36
Childs, W. A. P. (1994) "Platon, les images et l'art grec du IVe siècle avant J.-C." *Revue Archéologique* 1: 33–56

Chroust, A.-H. (1977) *Socrates, Man and Myth: The Two Socratic Apologies of Xenophon* (London)
Clay, D. (1972) "Socrates' mulishness and heroism," *Phronesis* 17: 53–60
(1975) "The tragic and comic poet of the *Symposium,*" *Arion* 2: 238–61
(1988a) "Gaps in the universe of the Platonic dialogues," *Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy* 3: 131–57
(1988b) "Reading the *Republic*," in Griswold 1988a: 19–33
(1992) "Plato's first words," *Yale Classical Studies* 29: 113–29
(1994) "The origins of the Socratic dialogue," in Vander Waerdt 1994: 23–47
(1998) "The theory of the literary persona in antiquity," *Materiali e discussioni per l'analisi dei testi classici* 40: 9–40
(2000) *Platonic Questions: Dialogues with the Silent Philosopher* (University Park, PA)
Cobb, W. (1992) "Plato's *Theages,*" *Ancient Philosophy* 12: 267–84
Cohen, S. M. and D. Keyt (1992) "Analysing Plato's arguments: Plato and Platonism," in Klagge and Smith 1992: 173–200
Cole, T. (1991) *The Origins of Rhetoric in Ancient Greece* (Baltimore)
Comotti, G. (1989) *Music in Greek and Roman Culture*, trans. R. V. Munson (Baltimore)
Connor, W. R. (1971) *The New Politicians of Fifth-Century Athens* (Princeton)
Cook, A. (1995) *The Stance of Plato* (Lanham MD)
Cooke, E. F. (1999) "The moral and intellectual development of the philosopher in Plato's *Republic,*" *Ancient Philosophy* 19: 37–44
Cooper, J. M. (1980) "Aristotle on friendship," in *Essays on Aristotle's Ethics*, ed. A. O. Rorty (Berkeley and Los Angeles) 301–40
(1997) "Introduction," to Cooper and Hutchinson 1997: vii–xxvi
Cooper, J. M. and D. S. Hutchinson (eds.) (1997) *Plato: Complete Works* (Indianapolis)
Cordero, N.-L. (1991) "L'Invention de l'école éléatique: Platon, *Sophiste*, 244d," in Narcy (ed.) 1991: 91–124
Corlett, J. A. (1997) "Interpreting Plato's dialogues," *Classical Quarterly* 47: 423–37
Cornford, F. M. (1935) *Plato's Theory of Knowledge* (London)
(trans.) (1941) *The Republic of Plato* (Oxford)
(1987) "Plato's *Euthyphro* or how to read a Socratic dialogue," in *Selected Papers* of F. M. Cornford, ed. A. C. Bowen (New York) 221–38
Corrigan, K. (1997) "The comic-serious figure in Plato's middle dialogues: the Symposium as philosophical art," in *Laughter Down the Centuries,* vol. III, ed. S. Jäkel, A. Timonen and V.-M. Rissanen (Turku) 55–64
Cosgriff, L. S. (1994) "The *ethopoiia* of Plato's *Republic*," Ph.D. diss. University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill
Coulter, J. A. (1976) *The Literary Microcosm: Theories of Interpretation of the Later Neoplatonists* (Leiden)
Coventry, L. (1990) "The role of the interlocutor in Plato's dialogues: theory and practice," in Pelling 1990: 174–96
Cropsey, J. (1995) *Plato's World: Man's Place in the Cosmos* (Chicago)
Csapo, E. and W. J. Slater. (1995) *The Context of Ancient Drama* (Ann Arbor)

Dahrendorf, R. (1968) "In praise of Thrasymachus," in *Essays in the Theory of Society* (Stanford, CA) 129–30

Dalfen, J. (1974) "Die philosophische Aussage der künstlerischen Gestaltung platonischer Dialoge," in *Gegenwart der Antike*, ed. F. Hörmann (Munich) 5–21

(1989) "Platonische Intermezzi – Diskurse über Kommunikation," *Grazer Beiträge* 16: 71–123

Danto, A. C. (1987) "Philosophy as/and/of literature," in Cascardi 1987: 1–23

David, E. (1989) "Laughter in Spartan society," in *Classical Sparta: Techniques behind her Success*, ed. Anton Powell (Norman, OK) 1–25

Davidson, D. (1985) "Plato's philosopher," *London Review of Books* 1 August 1985: 15–17

Davis, W. M. (1979) "Plato on Egyptian art," *Journal of Egyptian Archeology* 66: 121–7

Denniston, J. D. (1954) *The Greek Particles* (2nd edn. Oxford)

Derrida, J. (1981) "Plato's pharmacy," in *Dissemination*, trans. B. Johnson (Chicago)

(1987) *The Post Card: From Socrates to Freud and Beyond*, trans. A. Bass (Chicago)

Desjardins, R. (1988) "Why dialogues? Plato's serious play," in Griswold 1988a: 110–25

(1990) *The Rational Enterprise: Logos in Plato's Theaetetus* (Albany, NY)

Detienne, M. (1962) *Homère, Hésiode et Pythagore* (Brussels)

(1996) *The Masters of Truth in Archaic Greece*, trans. J. Lloyd (New York)

de Vries, G. J. (1935) "Apollodore dans le "Banquet" de Platon," *Revue des études grecques* 48: 65–9

(1984) "Platonic dialogues performed?" *Mnemosyne* 37: 143–5

Dewald, C. (1999) "The figured stage: focalizing the initial narratives of Herodotus and Thucydides," in Falkner et al. 1999: 229–61

Dickey, E. (1996) *Greek Forms of Address* (Oxford)

Diès, A. (1947) Introduction to Émile Chambry (ed.), *Platon: Oeuvres Complètes*, tome VI, *La République: Livres I–III* (Paris)

(ed.) (1955) *Platon: Oeuvres Complètes*, tome VIII, *Le Sophiste* (Paris)

Dillon, J. (1992) "Plato and the Golden Age," *Hermathena* 153: 21–36

Dobson, W. (trans.) (1836) *Schleiermacher's Introductions to the Dialogues of Plato* (Cambridge; reprinted NY 1973)

Dodds, E. R. (1951) *The Greeks and the Irrational* (Berkeley and Los Angeles)

(ed.) (1959) *Plato: Gorgias* (Oxford)

(ed.) (1960) *Euripides: Bacchae* (2nd edn. Oxford)

(1973) *The Ancient Concept of Progress* (Oxford)

Donohue, B. (1997) "The dramatic significance of Cephalus in Plato's *Republic*," *Teaching Philosophy* 20: 239–49

Dörrie, H. and M. Baltes (1987) *Der Platonismus in Antike*, vol. I (Stuttgart)

(1990) *Der Platonismus in Antike*, vol. II (Stuttgart)

Dorter, K. (1974) "Socrates' refutation of Thrasymachus and treatment of virtue," *Philosophy and Rhetoric* 7: 25–46

(1987) "Justice and method in the *Statesman*," in Panagiotou 1987: 105–22
(1994) *Form and Good in Plato's Eleatic Dialogues* (Berkeley and Los Angeles)
Dover, K. J. (1967) "Portrait masks in Aristophanes," in Κωμωιδοτραγήματα (Amsterdam) 16–28
(ed.) (1968a) *Aristophanes: Clouds* (Oxford)
(1968b) *Lysias and the Corpus Lysiacum* (Berkeley and Los Angeles)
(1974) *Greek Popular Morality in the Time of Plato and Aristotle* (Oxford)
(ed.) (1980) *Plato: Symposium* (Cambridge)
(1988) "The freedom of the intellectual in Greek society," in *The Greeks and Their Legacy*, Oxford: 135–58 (reprinted from *Talanta* 7 [1975]24–54)
(1989) *Greek Homosexuality* (revised edn, Cambridge, MA)
(ed.) (1993) *Aristophanes: Frogs* (Oxford)
duBois, P. (1985) "Phallocentrism and its subversion in Plato's *Phaedrus*," *Arethusa* 18: 91–103
(1988) *Sowing the Body: Psychoanalysis and Ancient Representations of Women* (Chicago)
(1991) *Torture and Truth* (New York)
(1995) *Sappho is Burning* (Chicago)
Dunbar, N. (ed.) (1995) *Aristophanes: Birds* (Oxford)
Dyer, L. (1901) "Plato as a playwright," *Harvard Studies in Classical Philology* 12: 165–80
Eades, T. (1996) "Plato, rhetoric, and silence," *Philosophy and Rhetoric* 29: 244–58
Eckstein, J. (1968) *The Platonic Method: An Interpretation of the Dramatic-Philosophic Aspects of the Meno* (New York)
Edelstein, L. (1962) "Platonic anonymity," *American Journal of Philology* 83: 1–22
Egermann, F. (1952) *Vom attischen Menschenbild* (Munich; reprinted NY 1979)
Ehrenberg, V. (1947) "Polypragmosyne: a study in Greek politics," *Journal of Hellenic Studies* 67: 46–67
Eide, T. (1996) "On Socrates' ἀτοπία," *Symbolae Osloenses* 71: 59–67
Eisner, R. (1982) "Socrates as hero," *Philosophy and Literature* 6: 106–18
Elam, K. (1980) *The Semiotics of Theatre and Drama* (London and New York)
Emerson, R. W. (1850) *Representative Men*, cited from P. Schirmeister (ed.) (New York: 1995)
Erler, M. (1987) *Der Sinn der Aporien in den Dialogen Platons* (Berlin)
Euben, J. P. (1996) "Reading democracy: 'Socratic' dialogues and the political education of democratic citizens," in Ober and Hedrick 1996: 327–59
Evans, E. C. (1969) *Physiognomics in the Ancient World* (Philadelphia)
Falkner, T. M. (1995) *The Poetics of Old Age in Greek Epic, Lyric and Tragedy* (Norman, OK)
Falkner, T. M., N. Felson, and D. Konstan (eds.) (1999) *Contextualizing Classics: Ideology, Performance, Dialogue: Essays in Honor of John J. Peradotto* (Lanham, MD)
Farness, J. (1991) *Missing Socrates: Problems of Plato's Writing* (University Park, PA)
Ferrari, G. R. F. (1987) *Listening to the Cicadas: A Study of Plato's Phaedrus* (Cambridge)
(1989) "Plato and poetry," in *The Cambridge History of Literary Criticism* vol. 1, ed. G. A. Kennedy (Cambridge) 92–148

(1995) "Myth and conservatism in Plato's *Statesman*," in Rowe 1995a: 389–97
Field, G. C. (1930) *Plato and his Contemporaries* (London)
Finley, J. H. (1978) *Homer's Odyssey* (Cambridge, MA)
Fish, S. (1980) *Is There a Text in this Class? The Authority of Interpretive Communities* (Cambridge, MA)
FitzPatrick, P. J. (1992) "The legacy of Socrates," in Gower and Stokes 1992: 153–208
Flashar, H. (1958) *Der Dialog Ion als Zeugnis platonischer Philosophie* (Berlin)
Ford, A. (1994) "Protagoras' head: interpreting philosophical fragments in *Theaetetus*," *American Journal of Philology* 115: 199–218
(1997) "The inland ship: problems in the performance and reception of Homeric epic," in *Written Voices, Spoken Signs*, ed. E. Bakker and A. Kahane (Cambridge, MA) 83–109
Foucault, M. (1984) "What is an author?" in *The Foucault Reader*, ed. Paul Rabinow (New York) 101–20
Frame, D. (1978) *The Myth of Return in Early Greek Epic* (New Haven)
Frede, D. (1996) "The hedonist's conversion: the role of Socrates in the *Philebus*," in Gill and McCabe 1996: 213–48
Frede, M. (1992) "Plato's arguments and the dialogue form," in Klagge and Smith 1992: 201–19
(1996) "The literary form of the *Sophist*," in Gill and McCabe 1996: 135–51
Freeman, K. (1966) *The Pre-Socratic Philosophers* (3rd edn. Cambridge, MA)
Freis, R. (ed.) (1969) *The Progress of Plato's Progress, Arion* supp. 2
Frère, J. (1995) *Temps, désir et vouloir en Grèce ancienne* (Paris)
Freydberg, B. (1997) *The Play of the Platonic Dialogues* (New York)
Friedländer, P. (1964–1969) *Plato*, trans. H. Meyerhoff, vol. I (2nd edn. Princeton 1969); vol. II (Princeton 1964); vol. III (Princeton 1969)
Frischer, B. (1982) *The Sculpted Word: Epicureanism and Philosophical Recruitment in Ancient Greece* (Berkeley and Los Angeles)
Gadamer, H.-G. (1980) *Dialogue and Dialectic: Eight Hermeneutical Studies on Plato*, trans. P. C. Smith (New Haven)
(1991) *Plato's Dialectical Ethics: Phenomenological Interpretations Relating to the Philebus*, trans. R. M. Wallace (New Haven)
Gaiser, K. (1984) *Platone come Scrittore Filosofico: Saggi sull' Ermeneutica dei Dialoghi Platonici* (Naples)
Gallop, D. (1971) "Dreaming and waking in Plato," in *Essays in Greek Philosophy*, ed. J. P. Anton and G. L. Kustas (Albany, NY) 187–201
Garland, R. (1990) *The Greek Way of Life: From Conception to Old Age* (Ithaca, NY)
Gellrich, M. (1994) "Socratic magic: enchantment, irony and persuasion in Plato's Dialogues," *Classical World* 87: 275–307
Genette, G. (1982) *Figures of Literary Discourse*, trans. A. Sheridan (New York)
Gentili, B. (1988) *Poetry and its Public in Ancient Greece: From Homer to the Fifth Century*, trans. A. T. Cole (Baltimore)
Gentzler, J. (ed.) (1998) *Method in Ancient Philosophy* (Oxford)
Gera, D. L. (1996) "Porters, *paidagogoi*, jailers, and attendants: some slaves in Plato," *Scripta Classica Israelica* 15: 90–101

Gerson, L. P. (1992) "The ignorance of Socrates," *Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association* 66: 123–35

(2000) "Plato absconditus," in Press 2000a: 201–10

Giannantoni, G. (1957) "Il primo libro della *Republica* di Platone," *Rivista Critica di Storia della Filosofia* 12: 123–45

Giannantoni, G. and M. Narcy (eds.) (1997) *Lezioni Socratiche* (Naples)

Gigon, O. (1947) *Sokrates: Sein Bild in Dichtung und Geschichte* (Bern)

Gilead, A. (1994) *The Platonic Odyssey: A Philosophical-Literary Inquiry into the Phaedo* (Amsterdam)

Gill, C. (1985) "Plato and the education of character," *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie* 67: 1–26

(1990) "The character-personality distinction," in Pelling (ed.) 1990: 1–31

(1992) "Dogmatic dialogue in *Phaedrus* 276–7?" in L. Rossetti (ed.) *Understanding the Phaedrus*, *International Plato Studies* 1: 156–72

(1993) "Platonic dialectic and the truth-status of the unwritten doctrines," *Méthexis* 6: 55–72

(1995) "Rethinking constitutionalism in *Statesman* 291–303," in Rowe 1995a: 292–305

(1996a) *Personality in Greek Epic, Tragedy and Philosophy: The Self in Dialogue* (Oxford)

(1996b) "Afterword: dialectic and the dialogue form in late Plato," in Gill and McCabe 1996: 283–311

Gill, C. and M. M. McCabe. (eds.) (1996) *Form and Argument in Late Plato* (Oxford)

Girard, R. (1965) *Deceit, Desire, and the Novel: Self and Other in Literary Structure*, trans. Y. Freccero (Baltimore, MD)

Gleason, M. W. (1990) "The semiotics of gender: physiognomy and self-fashioning in the second century CE," in D. M. Halperin, J. J. Winkler and F. I. Zeitlin (eds.) *Before Sexuality* (Princeton) 389–415

Goffman, E. (1959) *The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life* (New York)

Goheen, R. F. (1951) *The Imagery of Sophocles' Antigone* (Princeton)

Golden, M. (1990) *Children and Childhood in Classical Athens* (Baltimore)

Goldschmidt, V. (1970) *Questions platoniciennes* (Paris)

Gomperz, T. (1905) *Greek Thinkers*, vol. II, trans. G. G. Berry (New York)

Gonzalez, F. J. (ed.) (1995a) *The Third Way: New Directions in Platonic Studies* (Lanham, MD)

(1995b) "A short history of Platonic interpretation and the 'Third Way'," in Gonzalez 1995a: 1–22

(1995c) "Self-knowledge, practical knowledge, and insight: Plato's dialectic and the dialogue form'," in Gonzalez 1995a: 155–87

(1998) *Dialectic and Dialogue: Plato's Practice of Philosophical Inquiry* (Evanston, IL)

(2000) "The Eleatic stranger: his master's voice?" in Press 2000a: 161–81

Gordon, J. (1996) "Dialectic, dialogue, and transformation of the self," *Philosophy and Rhetoric* 29: 259–78

(1999) *Turning toward Philosophy: Literary Device and Dramatic Structure in Plato's Dialogues* (University Park, PA)

Gould, J. (1955) *The Development of Plato's Ethics* (Cambridge)
(1978) "Dramatic character and 'human intelligibility' in Greek tragedy," *Proceedings of the Cambridge Philological Society* 24: 43–67
(1992) "Plato in performance," in Barker and Warner 1992: 13–25
Gouldner, A. W. (1965) *Enter Plato: Classical Greece and the Origins of Social Theory* (New York)
Gower, B. S. and M. C. Stokes (eds.) (1992) *Socratic Questions: New Essays on the Philosophy of Socrates and its Significance* (London)
Graham, D. W. (1997) "What Socrates knew," in McPherran 1997: 25–36
Greenberg, N. A. (1965) "Socrates' choice in the *Crito,*" *Harvard Studies in Classical Philology* 70: 45–82
Greene, W. C. (1918) "Plato's view of poetry," *Harvard Studies in Classical Philology* 29: 1–75
Grene, D. (1950) *Greek Political Theory: The Image of Man from Thucydides to Plato* (Chicago)
Griffith, M. (1990) "Contest and contradiction in early Greek poetry," in *Cabinet of the Muses*, ed. M. Griffith and D. J. Mastronarde (Atlanta): 185–207
Griffith, R. D. (1996) *The Theatre of Apollo: Divine Justice and Sophocles' Oedipus the King* (Montreal and Kingston)
Griswold, C. L. (1986) *Self-Knowledge in Plato's Phaedrus* (New Haven, PA)
(ed.) (1988a) *Platonic Writings/Platonic Readings* (New York)
(1988b) "Plato's metaphilosophy: why Plato wrote dialogues," in Griswold 1988a: 143–67
(1989) "Politikē epistēmē in Plato's *Statesman*," in *Essays in Ancient Greek Philosophy* III ed. J. P. Anton and A. Preus (Albany, NY) 141–67
(1990) "Unifying Plato: Charles Kahn on Platonic *prolepsis*," *Ancient Philosophy* 10: 243–62
(1999a) "Relying on your own voice: an unsettled rivalry of moral ideals in Plato's *Protagoras*," *Review of Metaphysics* 53 (1999) 283–307
(1999b) "*E pluribus unum*? On the Platonic 'corpus'," *Ancient Philosophy* 19: 361–97
Grote, G. (1888) *Plato and the Other Companions of Sokrates*, vols. I–IV (2nd edn. London)
Grube, G. M. A. (1933) "The structural unity of the *Protagoras*," *Classical Quarterly* 27: 203–7
Gulley, N. (1968) *The Philosophy of Socrates* (London)
Guthrie, W. K. C. (1969) *A History of Greek Philosophy*, vol. III (Cambridge)
(1975) *A History of Greek Philosophy*, vol. IV (Cambridge)
(1978) *A History of Greek Philosophy*, vol. V (Cambridge)
Haden, J. (1997) "On the *Hippias Minor*: Achilles, Odysseus, Socrates," in Hart and Tejera 1997: 143–67
Hadot, P. (1995) *Qu'est-ce que la philosophie antique?* (Paris)
Hall, E. (1995) "Lawcourt dramas: the power of performance in Greek forensic oratory," *Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies* 40: 39–58

Halliwell, S. (1984) "Plato and Aristotle on the denial of tragedy," *Proceedings of the Cambridge Philological Society* 30: 49–71
(1986) *Aristotle's Poetics* (Chapel Hill, NC)
(1990) "Traditional Greek conceptions of character," in Pelling 1990: 32–59
(1992) "Plato and the psychology of drama," in B. Zimmermann (ed.) *Antike Dramentheorien und ihre Rezeption* (Stuttgart) 55–73
(1997) "The *Republic's* two critiques of poetry (Book II 376c-III 398b, Book X 595a–608b)," in O. Höffe (ed.) *Platon, Politeia* (Berlin) 313–32
(2000) "The subjection of muthos to logos: Plato's citations of the poets," *Classical Quarterly* 50: 94–112
Halperin, D. M. (1985) "Platonic *eros* and what men call love," *Ancient Philosophy* 5: 161–204
(1986) "Plato and erotic reciprocity," *Classical Antiquity* 5: 60–80
(1990) *One Hundred Years of Homosexuality* (New York)
(1992) "Plato and the erotics of narrativity," in Klagge and Smith 1992: 93–129
Harding, D. W. (1962) "Psychological processes in the reading of fiction," *British Journal of Aesthetics* 2: 133–47
Haring, E. S. (1982) "The *Theaetetus* ends well," *Review of Metaphysics* 35: 509–28
Harris, W. V. (1989) *Ancient Literacy* (Cambridge, MA)
Harrison, A. R. W. (1968) *The Law of Athens,* vol. I, *The Family and Property* (Oxford)
(1971) *The Law of Athens,* vol. II, *Procedure* (Oxford)
Harrison, E. L. (1967) "Plato's manipulation of Thrasymachus," *Phoenix* 21: 27–39
Harrison, J. C. (1978) "Plato's prologue: *Theaetetus* 142a–143e," *Tulane Studies in Philosophy* 27: 103–23
Hart, R. E. and V. Tejera (eds.) (1997) *Plato's Dialogues: The Dialogical Approach* (Lewiston, NY)
Haslam, M. W. (1972) "Plato, Sophron and the dramatic dialogue," *Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies* 19: 17–38
(1976) "A note on Plato's unfinished dialogues," *American Journal of Philology* 97: 336–9
Havelock, E. A. (1963) *Preface to Plato* (Cambridge, MA)
Hawtrey, R. S. W. (1981) *Commentary on Plato's Euthydemus* (Philadelphia)
Heath, M. (1987) *The Poetics of Greek Tragedy* (London)
(1989) *Unity in Greek Poetics* (Oxford)
Heiden, B. (1991) "Shifting contexts in the *Iliad*," *Eranos* 89: 1–12
Hemmenway, S. R. (1990) "Philosophical apology in the *Theaetetus,*" *Interpretation* 17: 324–46
(1994) "Pedagogy in the myth of Plato's *Statesman*: body and soul in relation to philosophy and politics," *History of Philosophy Quarterly* 11: 253–68
Henderson, J. (1991) "Women and the Athenian dramatic festivals," *Transactions of the American Philological Association* 121: 133–47
Henderson, T. Y. (1970) "In defense of Thrasymachus," *American Philosophical Quarterly* 7: 218–28

Henry, M. M. (1995) *Prisoner of History: Aspasia of Miletus and her Biographical Tradition* (New York)
Herington, J. (1985) *Poetry into Drama: Early Tragedy and the Greek Poetic Tradition* (Berkeley and Los Angeles)
Hermann, F. G. (1995) "Wrestling metaphors in Plato's 'Theaetetus'," *Nikephoros* 8: 77–109
Hershbell, J. P. (1995) "Reflections on the orality and literacy of Plato's dialogues," in Gonzalez 1995a: 25–39
Hirsch, U. (1995) "Μιμεῖσθαι und verwandte Ausdrücke in Platons *Politikos*," in Rowe 1995a: 184–9
Hirst, M. E. (1940) "The choice of Odysseus (Plato *Republic* 620C–D)," *Classical Philology* 35, 67–8
Hirzel, R. (1895) *Der Dialog: Ein literarhistorischer Versuch* vol. 1 (Leipzig; reprinted Hildesheim 1963)
(1914) *Die Person: Begriff und Name Derselben im Altertum* (Munich; reprinted New York 1976)
(1918) *Der Name: Ein Beitrag zur seiner Geschichte im Altertum und besonders bei den Grechen* (Leipzig)
Hitchcock, D. L. (1987) "Professor Dorter on justice and method in the *Statesman*," in Panagiotou 1987: 123–31
Hobbs, A. (2000) *Plato and the Hero: Courage, Manliness and the Impersonal Good* (Cambridge)
Hoerber, R. G. (1962) "Plato's *Lesser Hippias*," *Phronesis* 7: 121–31
Hoffmann, M. (1993) "The 'realization of the due-measure' as structural principle in Plato's *Statesman*," *Polis* 12: 77–98
Hornblower, S. (1987) *Thucydides* (Baltimore)
Hose, M. (1998) "Fragment und Kontext," in Jens Holzhausen (ed.) Ψυχή - *Seele-Anima* (Stuttgart-Leipzig) 89–112
Howes, G. E. (1895) "Homeric quotations in Plato and Aristotle," *Harvard Studies in Classical Philology* 6: 153–237
Howland, J. (1991) "Re-reading Plato: the problem of Platonic chronology reconsidered," *Phoenix* 45: 189–214
(1993) *The Republic: The Odyssey of Philosophy* (New York)
(1998) *The Paradox of Political Philosophy: Socrates' Philosophic Trial* (Lanham, MD)
Hurwit, J. M. (1999) *The Athenian Acropolis* (Cambridge)
Hyland, D. (1968) "Why Plato wrote dialogues," *Philosophy and Rhetoric* 1: 38–50
(1995) *Finitude and Transcendence in the Platonic Dialogues* (Albany, NY)
Inwood, B. (1987) "Professor Stokes on Adeimantus in the *Republic*," in Panagiotou (ed.) 1987: 97–103
Irwin, T. H. (1977) *Plato's Moral Theory: The Early and Middle Dialogues* (Oxford)
(1986) "Coercion and objectivity in Plato's dialectic," *Revue internationale de philosophie* 156–7: 49–74
(1988) "Socrates and the tragic hero," in *Language and the Tragic Hero*, ed. P. Pucci (Atlanta) 55–83

(1992) "Plato: the intellectual background," in Kraut (ed.) *The Cambridge Companion to Plato* (Cambridge) 51–89
(1993) "Say what you believe," in Irwin and Nussbaum 1993: 1–16
(1995) *Plato's Ethics* (Oxford)
(1996) "Art and philosophy in Plato's dialogues," *Phronesis* 41 (1996) 335–50
(1998) "Common sense and Socratic method," in Gentzler 1998: 29–66
Irwin, T. and M. C. Nussbaum (eds.) (1993) *Virtue, Love, and Form: Essays in Memory of Gregory Vlastos* = *Apeiron* 26 (Edmonton)
Jaeger, W. (1945) *Paideia*, vol. I; 2nd edn. trans. G. Highet (Oxford)
(1948) *Aristotle: Fundamentals of the History of his Development*, 2nd edn. trans. R. Robinson (Oxford)
Janaway, C. (1995) *Images of Excellence: Plato's Critique of the Arts* (Oxford)
Jaspers, K. (1962) *Socrates, Buddha, Confucius, Jesus: The Paradigmatic Individuals*, trans. R. Manheim (San Diego).
Jatakari, T. (1990) "Der jüngerer Sokrates," *Arctos* 24: 19–45
Jauss, H. R. (1974) "Levels of identification of hero and audience," *New Literary History* 5: 283–317
Johnson, D. M. (1999) "God as the true self: Plato's *Alcibiades I*," *Ancient Philosophy* 19: 1–19
Johnson, W. A. (1998) "Dramatic frame and philosophic idea in Plato," *American Journal of Philology* 119: 577–98
Joly, H. (1992) *Études platoniciennes: la question des étrangers* (Paris)
Joly, R. (1994) "Les Origines de l' ὁμοίωσις θεῷ," in *Glane de Philosophie Antique: Scripta Minora* (Brussels) 7–14
Jowett, B. and L. Campbell (eds.) (1894) *Plato's Republic* (Oxford)
Judovitz, D. (1987) "Philosophy and poetry: the difference between them in Plato and Descartes," in Cascardi 1987: 23–51
Kahn, C. H. (1976) "Plato on the unity of the virtues," in *Facets of Plato's Philosophy*, ed. W. H. Werkmeister = *Phronesis* Supp. 2 (Assen) 21–39
(1983) "Drama and dialectic in Plato's *Gorgias*," *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy* 1: 75–121
(1992) "Vlastos's Socrates," *Phronesis* 37: 233–58
(1993) "Proleptic composition in the *Republic*," *Classical Quarterly* 43: 131–42
(1995) "The place of the *Statesman* in Plato's later work," in Rowe 1995a: 49–60
(1996) *Plato and the Socratic Dialogue: The Philosophical Use of a Literary Form* (Cambridge)
Kakridis, J. T. (1948) "The part of Cephalus in Plato's *Republic*," *Eranos* 46: 35–41
Kaufmann, W. (ed. and trans.) (1954) *The Portable Nietzsche* (New York)
Kennedy, G. (1957) "The ancient dispute over rhetoric in Homer," *American Journal of Philology* 78: 23–35
Kenny, A. J. P. (1973) "Mental Health in Plato's *Republic*," in *The Anatomy of the Soul* (Oxford) 1–27
Kerferd, G. B. (1954) "Plato's noble art of sophistry," *Classical Quarterly* 4: 84–90
(1981) *The Sophistic Movement* (Cambridge)

Kesner, L. (1995) "Likeness of no one: (re)presenting the first emperor's army," *Art Bulletin* 77: 115–32
Keuls, E. C. (1978) *Plato and Greek Painting* (Leiden)
Kidd, I. (1992) "Socratic questions," in Gower and Stokes 1992: 82–92
Kierkegaard, S. (1966) *The Concept of Irony*, trans. L. M. Capel (London)
King, K. C. (1987) *Achilles: Paradigms of the War Hero from Homer to the Middle Ages* (Berkeley and Los Angeles)
Kirby, J. (1991) "Mimesis and diegesis: foundations of aesthetic theory in Plato and Aristotle," *Helios* 18: 113–28; reprinted in B. Allert (ed.) *Languages of Visuality: Crossings Between Science, Art, Politics, and Literature* (Detroit 1996) 29–45
Kirk, G. S. (1962) *The Songs of Homer* (Cambridge)
Kitto, H. D. F. (1966) *Poiesis: Structure and Thought* (Berkeley and Los Angeles)
Klagge, J. and N. D. Smith (eds.) (1992) *Methods of Interpreting Plato and his Dialogues, Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy* supp. vol.
Klein, J. (1965) *A Commentary on Plato's Meno* (Chapel Hill)
(1977) *Plato's Trilogy: Theaetetus, the Sophist, and the Statesman* (Chicago)
Kleingünther, A. (1933) Πρῶτος Εὑρετής, *Philologus* Supp. 26 (Leipzig)
Klonoski, R. (1993) "The preservation of Homeric tradition: re-performance in the *Republic* and *Odyssey*," *Clio* 22: 251–71
Klosko, G. (1983) "Criteria of fallacy and sophistry for use in the analysis of Platonic dialogues," *Classical Quarterly* 33: 363–74
Knox, B. M. W. (1957) *Oedipus at Thebes* (New Haven)
(1964) *The Heroic Temper* (Berkeley and Los Angeles)
(1968) "Silent reading in antiquity," *Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies* 9: 421–35
Kosman, L. A. (1992a) "Silence and imitation in the Platonic dialogues," in Klagge and Smith 1992: 73–92
(1992b) "Acting: *Drama* as the *mimēsis* of *praxis*," in *Essays in Aristotle's Poetics*, ed. A. O. Rorty (Princeton) 51–72
Koyré, A. (1945) *Discovering Plato*, trans. L. C. Rosenfield (New York).
Kraut, R. (1983) "Comments on Vlastos," *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy* 1: 59–70
(1984) *Socrates and the State* (Princeton)
(1988) "Reply to Clifford Orwin," in Griswold 1988a: 177–82
(1992)"Introduction to the study of Plato," in R. Kraut (ed.) *The Cambridge Companion to Plato* (Cambridge) 1–50
Krell, D. F. (1972) "Socrates' body," *Southern Journal of Philosophy* 10: 443–51
Krentz, A. A. (1983) "Dramatic form and philosophical content in Plato's dialogues," *Philosophy and Literature* 7: 32–47
Krentz, P. (1982) *The Thirty at Athens* (Ithaca, NY)
Kuhn, H. (1941) "The true tragedy," (1) *Harvard Studies in Classical Philology* 52: 1–40
(1942) "The true tragedy," (2) *Harvard Studies in Classical Philology* 53 (1942) 37–88
Kupperman, J. J. (1991) *Character* (Oxford)

Labarbe, J. (1949) *L'Homère de Platon* (Liège)
Laird, A. (1999) *Powers of Expression, Expressions of Power: Speech Presentation and Latin Literature* (Oxford)
Lamberton, R. "The Neo-Platonists and the spiritualization of Homer," in R. Lamberton and J. J. Keaney (eds.) Homer's Ancient Readers (Princeton) 115–33
Lampert, L. and C. Planeaux (1998) "Who's who in Plato's *Timaeus-Critias* and why," *Review of Metaphysics* 52: 87–125
Lane, M. S. (1995) "A new angle on utopia: the political theory of the *Statesman*," in Rowe 1995a: 276–91
(1998) *Method and Politics in Plato's Statesman* (Cambridge)
(2001) *Plato's Progeny: How Plato and Socrates Still Captivate the Modern Mind* (London)
Lang, B. (1973) "Presentation and representation in Plato's dialogues," *Philosophical Forum* 4: 224–40
Lanni, A. M. (1997) "Spectator sport or serious politics? οἱ περιεστηκότες and the Athenian lawcourts," *Journal of Hellenic Studies* 117: 183–9
Lateiner, D. (1995) *Sardonic Smile: Nonverbal Behavior in Homeric Epic* (Ann Arbor)
(1998) "Blushes and pallor in ancient fictions," *Helios* 25: 163–89
Lee, E. N. (1973) "'Hoist with his own petard': ironic and comic elements in Plato's critique of Protagoras (*Tht.* 161–171)," in E. N. Lee, A. P. D. Mourelatos, and R. M. Rorty (eds.) *Exegesis and Argument* = *Phronesis* Supp.1 (Assen) 225–61
(unpublished) "Understanding Plato's *Theaetetus*," paper presented at conference on Methodological Approaches to Plato and his Dialogues in Blacksburg, VA, March 1988
Lefkowitz, M. R. (1981) *The Lives of the Greek Poets* (Baltimore)
Lentricchia, F. and T. McLaughlin (1995) *Critical Terms for Literary Study*, 2nd edn. (Chicago)
Lesher, J. H. (1984) "Parmenides' critique of thinking," *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy* 2: 1–30
Lesky, A. (1983) *Greek Tragic Poetry*, trans. M. Dillon (New Haven)
Levett, M. J. (trans., revised by M. Burnyeat) (1990) *The Theaetetus of Plato* (Indianapolis)
Levi, A. W. (1976) "Philosophy as literature: the dialogue," *Philosophy and Rhetoric* 9: 1–20
Livingstone, R. W. (ed.) (1938) *Portrait of Socrates* (Oxford)
Lloyd, G. E. R. (1966) *Polarity and Analogy: Two Types of Argumentation in Early Greek Thought* (Cambridge)
(1987) *The Revolutions of Wisdom: Studies in the Claims and Practice of Ancient Greek Science* (Berkeley and Los Angeles)
Lodge, D. (1987) "After Bakhtin," in *The Linguistics of Writing*, ed. N. Fabb, D. Attridge, A. Durant and C. MacCabe (New York) 89–102
Long, A. A. (1998) "Plato's apologies and Socrates in the *Theaetetus*," in Genztler 1998: 113–36
Longo, O. (1990) "The theater of the *polis*," in Winkler and Zeitlin 1990: 12–19

Loraux, N. (1973) "'Marathon' ou l'histoire idéologique," *Revue des études anciennes* 75: 13–42
(1993) *The Children of Athena: Athenian Ideas about Citizenship and the Division between the Sexes*, trans. C. Levine (Princeton)
(1995) *The Experiences of Teiresias: The Feminine and the Greek Man*, trans. P. Wissing (Princeton)
Louis, P. (1945) *Les Métaphores de Platon* (Paris)
Lovibond, S. (1991) "Plato's theory of mind," in S. Everson (ed.) *Psychology* (Cambridge) 35–55
Lycos, K. (1987) *Plato on Justice and Power: Reading Book I of Plato's Republic* (Albany)
Lyons, D. (1997) *Gender and Immortality: Heroines in Ancient Greek Myth and Cult* (Princeton)
McAvoy, M. (1996) "The profession of ignorance, with constant reference to Socrates," *Prudentia* 28: 16–34
(1999) *The Profession of Ignorance: with Constant Reference to Socrates* (Lanham, MD)
McCabe, M. M. (1994) "Form, forms, and reform," *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy* 12: 219–26
(1997) "Chaos and control: reading Plato's *Politicus*," *Phronesis* 42: 94–117
McDonald, J. M. S. (1931) *Character-Portraiture in Epicharmus, Sophron and Plato* (Sewanee, TN)
MacDowell, D. M. (1978) *The Law in Classical Athens* (Ithaca, NY)
Machle, E. (1984) "A plea for Euthyphro," in B. Lang, G. Sacksteder and G. Stahl (eds.) *The Philosopher in the Community: Essays in Honor of Bertram Morris* (Lanham, MD): 37–47
Mackenzie, M. M. (1988) "The virtues of Socratic ignorance," *Classical Quarterly* 38: 331–50
McKeon, R. (1990) "Dialogue and controversy in philosophy," in Maranhão 1990: 25–46
McPherran, M. L. (1986) "Socrates and the duty to philosophize," *Southern Journal of Philosophy* 24: 541–60
(1990) "Kahn on the pre-middle Platonic dialogues," *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy* 8: 211–36
(1993a) "Knowing the *Theaetetus*," *Phronesis* 38: 321–36
(1993b) "Commentary on Morgan," *Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy* 9: 112–29
(ed.) (1997) *Wisdom, Ignorance and Virtue: New Essays in Socratic Studies = Apeiron* 30 (Edmonton)
(unpublished) "Does piety pay?" (paper presented at the Arizona Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy in February 1998)
Mader, M. (1977) *Das Problem des Lachens und der Komödie bei Platon* (Stuttgart)
Madhu, R. C. (1999) "Plato's Homer," *Ancient Philosophy* 19: 87–95
Makowski, F. (1994) "Où est Socrate? L'Aporie de l'atopicité chez Platon," *Revue de Philosophie Ancienne* 12: 131–52
Mansfield, J. (1990) *Studies in the Historiography of Greek Philosophy* (Assen)
Maranhão, T. (ed.) (1990) *The Interpretation of Dialogue* (Chicago)

Marcel, R. (1951) "'Saint' Socrate patron de l'humanisme," *Revue internationale de philosophie* 5: 135–43
Marrou, H. I. (1956) *A History of Education in Antiquity*, trans. G. Lamb (New York)
Martin, R. (1998) "The seven sages as performers of wisdom," in *Cultural Poetics in Archaic Greece: Cult, Performance, Politics*, ed. C. Dougherty and L. Kurke (Oxford) 108–28
Mecke, J. (1990) "Dialogue in narration (the narrative principle)," in Maranhão 1990: 195–215
Merlan, P. (1947) "Form and content in Plato's philosophy," *Journal of the History of Ideas* 8: 406–30
Michelini, A. N. (1998) "Πολλὴ ἀγροικία: rudeness and irony in Plato's *Gorgias*," *Classical Philology* 93: 50–59
(2000a) "Socrates plays the buffoon," *American Journal of Philology* 121: 509–35
(2000b) "The search for the king: reflexive irony in Plato's *Politicus*," *Classical Antiquity* 19: 180–204
Miller, M. H. (1980) *The Philosopher in Plato's Statesman* (The Hague)
(1985) "Platonic provocations: reflections on the soul and the good in the *Republic*," in *Platonic Investigations*, ed. D. J. O'Meara (Washington, DC) 163–93
(1986) *Plato's Parmenides: The Conversion of the Soul* (Princeton)
(1987) "Commentary on Clay," *Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy* 3: 158–64
(1992) "Unity and *logos*: a reading of *Theaetetus* 201c–210a," *Ancient Philosophy* 12: 87–111
(1996) "'The arguments I seem to hear': argument and irony in the *Crito*," *Phronesis* 41: 121–37
(1999) "Platonic mimesis," in Falkner et al. 1999: 253–66
Mishima, T. (1995) "Courage and moderation in the *Statesman*," in Rowe 1995a: 306–12
Mittelstrass, J. (1988) "On Socratic dialogue," in Griswold 1988a: 126–42
Momigliano, A. (1993) *The Development of Greek Biography* (expanded edn. Cambridge, MA)
Monoson, S. S. (2000) *Plato's Democratic Entanglements: Athenian Politics and the Practice of Philosophy* (Princeton)
Moors, K. F. (1978) "Plato's use of dialogue," *Classical World* 72: 77–93
Moravcsik, J. M. E. (1983) "Plato and Pericles on freedom and politics," *Canadian Journal of Philosophy* Supp. 11: 1–17
Moravcsik, J. and P. Temko (eds.) (1982) *Plato on Beauty, Wisdom and the Arts* (Totowa, NJ)
Moreau, J. (1939) *La Construction de l'Idéalisme Platonicien* (Paris)
Morgan, M. (1990) "Plato, inquiry, and painting," *Apeiron* 23: 121–45
(1993) "Philosophy in Plato's *Sophist*," *Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy* 9: 83–111
Morgan, T. (1998) *Literate Education in the Hellenistic and Roman Worlds* (Cambridge)
Morrow, G. R. (1960) *Plato's Cretan City: A Historical Interpretation of the Laws* (Princeton)

(1970) "Plato and the mathematicians: an interpretation of Socrates' dream in the *Theaetetus* (201e–206c)," *Philosophical Review* 79: 309–33

Most, G. W. (1994) "Simonides' ode to Scopas in contexts," in I. J. F. De Jong and J. P. Sullivan (eds.) *Modern Critical Theory and Classical Literature* (Leiden) 127–52

Muecke, F. (1982) "A portrait of the artist as a young woman," *Classical Quarterly* 32: 41–55

Mulhern, J. J. (1968) "*Tropos* and *polytropia* in Plato's *Hippias Minor*," *Phoenix* 22: 283–8

(2000) "Interpreting the Platonic dialogues: What can one say?" in Press 2000: 221–34

Müller, G. (1979) "Platonische Freiwilligkeit im *Hippias Elatton*," *Würzburger Jahrbücher für die Altertumswissenschaft* 5: 61–79

Munn, M. (2000) *The School of History: Athens in the Age of Socrates* (Berkeley and Los Angeles)

Murdoch, I. (1978) "Philosophy and literature," in B. Magee (ed.), *Men of Ideas* (New York) 262–84

Murley, C. (1954) "Techniques of modern fiction in Plato," *Classical Journal* 50: 281–7

Murphy, N. R. (1951) *The Interpretation of Plato's Republic* (Oxford)

Murray, P. (ed.) (1996) *Plato on Poetry* (Cambridge)

Nagel, T. (1986) *The View from Nowhere* (Oxford)

Nagy, G. (1979) *The Best of the Achaians: Concepts of the Hero in Archaic Greek Poetry* (Baltimore)

(1985) "Theognis and Megara: a poet's vision of his city," *Theognis of Megara: Poetry and the Polis*, ed. T. J. Figueira and G. Nagy (Baltimore, MD) 22–81

(1996) *Poetry as Performance: Homer and Beyond* (Cambridge)

(1999) "Homer and Plato at the Panathenaia: synchronic and diachronic perspectives," in Falkner et al. 1999: 123–50

Nails, D. (1992) "Platonic chronology reconsidered," *Bryn Mawr Classical Review* 3: 314–27

(1993) "Problems with Vlastos' Platonic developmentalism," *Ancient Philosophy* 13: 273–91

(1994) "Plato's 'middle' cluster," *Phoenix* 48: 62–7

(1995) *Agora, Academy, and the Conduct of Philosophy* (Dordrecht)

(1998) "The dramatic date of Plato's *Republic*," *Classical Journal* 93: 383–96

(2000) "Mouthpiece schmouthpiece," in Press 2000a: 15–26

(forthcoming) *The People of Plato*

Narcy, M. (1991) (ed.) *Études sur le Sophiste de Platon* (Naples)

(1995) "La Critique de Socrate par l'étranger dans le *Politique*," in Rowe 1995a: 227–35

Nehamas, A. (1982) "Plato on imitation and poetry in *Republic* 10," in Moravcsik and Temko 1982: 47–78

(1985) "Meno's paradox and Socrates as a teacher," *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy* 3: 1–30; reprinted in Nehamas 1999: 3–26

(1986) "Socratic intellectualism," *Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy* 2: 275–316; reprinted in Nehamas 1999: 27–58
(1987) "Writer, text, work, author," in Cascardi 1987: 265–91
(1988) "Plato and the mass media," *Monist* 71: 214–34; cited from Nehamas 1999: 279–99
(1990) "Eristic, antilogic, sophistic, dialectic: Plato's demarcation of philosophy from sophistry," *History of Philosophy Quarterly* 7: 3–16; cited from Nehamas 1999: 108–22
(1992a) "Voices of silence: on Gregory Vlastos' Socrates," *Arion* 2: 157–86; reprinted in Nehamas 1999: 83–107
(1992b) "What did Socrates teach and to whom did he teach it?" *Review of Metaphysics* 46: 279–306; reprinted in Nehamas 1999: 59–82
(1998) *The Art of Living: Socratic Reflections from Plato to Foucault* (Berkeley and Los Angeles)
(1999) *Virtues of Authenticity: Essays on Plato and Aristotle* (Princeton)
Nettleship, R. L. (1901) *Lectures on the Republic of Plato* (2nd edn. London)
Newton-De Molina, D. (ed.) (1976) *On Literary Intention* (Edinburgh)
Niehues-Pröbsting, H. (1982) "Die 'Episode' im 'Theaitetos': Verschärfung der Begriffe von Rhetorik und Philosophie," *Archiv für Begriffsgeschichte* 26: 7–24
Nightingale, A. W. (1993) "Writing/reading a sacred text: a literary interpretation of Plato's *Laws*," *Classical Philology* 88: 279–300
(1995) *Genres in Dialogue: Plato and the Construct of Philosophy* (Cambridge)
(1996) "Plato on the origins of evil: the *Statesman* myth reconsidered," *Ancient Philosophy* 16 (1996) 65–91
North, H. F. (1966) *Sophrosyne: Self-Knowledge and Self-Restraint in Greek Literature* (Ithaca, NY)
(1979) *From Myth to Icon: Reflections of Greek Ethical Doctrine in Literature and Art* (Ithaca, NY)
(1991) "Combing and curling: *orator summus Plato*," *Illinois Classical Studies* 16: 201–19
Notomi, N. (1999) *The Unity of Plato's Sophist: Between the Sophist and the Philosopher* (Cambridge)
Notopoulos, J. A. (1938) "Mnemosyne in oral literature," *Transactions of the American Philological Association* 69: 465–93
Nozick, R. (1981) *Philosophical Explanations* (Cambridge, MA)
Nussbaum, M. C. (1980) "Aristophanes and Socrates on learning practical wisdom," *Yale Classical Studies* 26: 43–97
(1986) *The Fragility of Goodness: Luck and Ethics in Greek Tragedy and Philosophy* (Cambridge)
(1994) *The Therapy of Desire: Theory and Practice in Hellenistic Ethics* (Princeton)
Ober, J. (1989) *Mass and Elite in Democratic Athens: Rhetoric, Ideology, and the Power of the People* (Princeton)
(1998) *Political Dissent in Democratic Athens: Intellectual Critics of Popular Rule* (Princeton)

(2000) "Living freely as a slave of the law: notes on why Socrates lives in Athens," in *Polis and Politics* ed. P. Flensted-Jensen, T. H. Neilsen and L. Rubinstein (Copenhagen) 541–52
(unpublished) "Performing Socrates"
Ober, J. and C. Hedrick (eds.) (1996) *Demokratia* (Princeton)
O'Brien, M. J. (1967) *The Socratic Paradoxes and the Greek Mind* (Chapel Hill)
Ogilvy, J. A. (1971) "Socratic method, Platonic method, and authority," *Educational Theory* 21: 3–16
Ohmann, R. (1973) "Literature as act," in S. Chatman (ed.) *Approaches to Poetics* (New York) 81–107
Okin, S. M. (1977) "Philosopher queens and private wives: Plato on women and the family," *Philosophy and Public Affairs* 6: 345–69
Ophir, A. (1991) *Plato's Invisible Cities: Discourse and Power in the Republic* (London)
Osborne, M. J. (1982) *Naturalization in Athens*, vol. II (Brussels)
Ostenfeld, E. (2000) "Who speaks for Plato? Everyone!" in Press 2000a: 211–19
Owen, G. E. L. (1973) "Plato on the undepictable," in *Exegesis and Argument*, ed. E. N. Lee, A. P. D. Mourelatos, and R. M. Rorty = *Phronesis* Supp. I (Assen) 324–48; reprinted in *Logic, Science and Dialectic* (Ithaca, NY 1986) 138–47
Page, C. (1990) "The unjust treatment of Polemarchus," *History of Philosophy Quarterly* 7: 243–67
Panagiotou, S. (ed.) (1987) *Justice, Law and Method in Plato and Aristotle* (Edmonton)
Papademetriou, J.-Th. A. (1997) *Aesop as an Archetypal Hero* (Athens)
Parker, R. (1983) *Miasma: Pollution and Purification in Early Greek Religion* (Oxford)
Parry, H. (1992) *Thelxis: Magic and Imagination in Greek Myth and Poetry* (Lanham, MD)
Passmore, J. (1970) *The Perfectibility of Man* (London)
Patterson, R. (1982) "The Platonic art of comedy and tragedy," *Philosophy and Literature* 6: 76–93
(1985) *Image and Reality in Plato's Metaphysics* (Indianapolis)
(1987) "Plato on philosophic character," *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 25: 325–50
(1997) "*Philosophos agonistes*: imagery and moral psychology in Plato's *Republic*," *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 35: 327–54
Patzer, H. (1965) "Die philosophische Bedeutung der Sokratesgestalt in den platonischen Dialogen," in *Parousia*, ed. K. Flasch (Frankfurt) 21–43
Pearson, L. (1954) "Real and conventional personalities in Greek history," *Journal of the History of Ideas* 15: 136–45
Pelliccia, H. (1995) *Mind, Body, and Speech in Homer and Pindar, Hypomnemata* 107 (Göttingen)
Pelling, C. B. R. (ed.) (1990) *Characterization and Individuality in Greek Literature* (Oxford)
Penner, T. (1973) "Socrates on virtue and motivation," in *Exegesis and Argument*, ed. E. N. Lee, A. P. D. Mourelatos, and R. M. Rorty = *Phronesis* Supp. I (Assen) 133–51

(1992) "Socrates and the early dialogues," in R. Kraut (ed.) *The Cambridge Companion to Plato* (Cambridge) 121–69

Penwill, J. L. (1978) "Men in love: aspects of Plato's Symposium," *Ramus* 7: 143–75

Peradotto, J. (1990) *Man in the Middle Voice: Name and Narration in the Odyssey* (Princeton)

Perlman, S. (1964) "Quotations from poetry in Attic orators of the fourth century B. C." *American Journal of Philology* 85: 155–72

Pfeiffer, R. (1968) *History of Classical Scholarship* (Oxford)

Phillips, J. (1987) "Plato's use of Homer in the *Hippias Minor*," *Favonius* 1: 21–30

Pickard-Cambridge, A. W. (1988) *The Dramatic Festivals of Athens* (2nd. edn. revised by J. Gould and D. M. Lewis, Oxford)

Plass, P. (1964) "Philosophic anonymity and irony in the Platonic dialogues," *American Journal of Philology* 85: 254–78

Plochmann, G. K. (1954) "Socrates, the stranger from Elea, and some others," *Classical Philology* 49: 223–31

(1971) "Supporting themes in the *Symposium*," in *Essays in Ancient Greek Philosophy*, ed. J. P. Anton and G. L. Kustas (Albany, NY) 328–44

(1973) *Plato* (New York)

Pohlenz, M. (1913) *Aus Platos Werdezeit* (Berlin)

Polansky, R. M. (1992) *Philosophy and Knowledge: A Commentary on Plato's Theaetetus* (Lewisburg)

Pollitt, J. J. (1972) *Art and Experience in Classical Greece* (Cambridge)

(1974) *The Ancient View of Greek Art: Criticism, History, and Terminology* (New Haven, CT)

Poster, C. (1998) "The idea(s) of order of Platonic dialogues and their hermeneutic consequences," *Phoenix* 52: 282–98

Poyatos, F. (1981) "Silence and stillness: toward a new status of non-activity," *Kodikas / Code* 3: 3–26

Pratt, L. H. (1993) *Lying and Poetry from Homer to Pindar: Falsehood and Deception in Archaic Greek Poetics* (Ann Arbor)

Press, G. A. (ed.) (1993a) *Plato's Dialogues: New Studies and Interpretations* (Lanham, MD)

(1993b) "Principles of dramatic and non-dogmatic Plato interpretation," in Press 1993a: 107–27

(1995) "Plato's dialogues as enactments," in Gonzalez 1995a: 133–52

(1996a) "The state of the question in the study of Plato," *Southern Journal of Philosophy* 34: 507–32

(1996b) "Continuities and innovations in the history of *Republic* interpretation," *International Studies in Philosophy* 28: 61–78

(1997) "The dialogical mode in modern Plato studies," in Hart and Tejera 1997: 1–28

(ed.) (2000a) *Who Speaks for Plato? Studies in Platonic Anonymity* (Lanham, MD)

(2000b) "The logic of attributing characters' views to Plato," in Press 2000a: 27–38

Price, A. W. (1989) *Love and Friendship in Plato and Aristotle* (Oxford)

Priestley, J. (1803) *Socrates and Jesus Compared* (London)
Prior, W. J. (1997) "Why did Plato write Socratic dialogues?" in McPherran 1997: 109–23
Quincey, J. H. (1981) "Another purpose for Plato, 'Republic' I," *Hermes* 109: 300–15
Rabel, R. J. (1997) *Plot and Point of View in the Iliad* (Ann Arbor)
Randall, J. H. (1970) *Plato: Dramatist of the Life of Reason* (New York)
Rankin, H. D. (1964) *Plato and the Individual* (New York)
(1965) "Παράδειγμα and realizability in Plato's *Republic*," *Eranos* 63: 120–33
(1983) *Sophists, Socrates and Cynics* (Beckenham, Kent)
(1993) "Socrates, Plato and fiction," *Scholia* 2: 45–55
Raphael, D. D. (1960) *The Paradox of Tragedy* (Bloomington)
(1983) "Can literature be moral philosophy?" *New Literary History* 15: 1–12
Rappe, S. L. (1995) "Socrates and self-knowledge," *Apeiron* 28: 1–24
Rauhut, N. C. (1997) "In search of Thrasymachus: the role of Thrasymachus in the ethical argument of Plato's 'Republic'," (Ph.D. diss. University of Washington)
Reden, S. von and S. Goldhill (1999) "Plato and the performance of dialogue," in *Performance Culture and Athenian Democracy*, ed. S. Goldhill and R. Osborne (Cambridge) 257–89
Reeve, C. D. C. (1988) *Philosopher-Kings: The Argument of Plato's Republic* (Princeton)
Renehan, R. (1981) "The Greek anthropocentric view of man," *Harvard Studies in Classical Philology* 85: 239–59
Rice, D. H. (1998) *A Guide to Plato's Republic* (New York)
Richardson, N. (1993) *The Iliad: A Commentary,* vol. VI: Books 21–24 (Cambridge)
Riffaterre, M. (1983) *Text Production*, trans. T. Lyons (New York)
Riginos, A. S. (1976) *Platonica: The Anecdotes Concerning the Life and Writings of Plato* (Leiden)
Ritter, C. (1933) *The Essence of Plato's Philosophy*, trans. A. Alles (London)
Robb, K. (1993) "*Asebeia* and *sunousia*. The issues behind the indictment of Socrates," in Press 1993a: 77–106
(1994) *Literacy and Paideia in Ancient Greece* (Oxford)
(1997) "Orality, literacy and the dialogue form," in Hart and Tejera 1997: 29–64
Robinson, R. (1942) "Plato's consciousness of fallacy," *Mind* 51: 97–114; reprinted in *Essays in Greek Philosophy* (Oxford 1969) 16–38
(1953) *Plato's Earlier Dialectic* (2nd edn., Oxford)
Robinson, T. M. (1995) "Methodology in the reading of the *Timaeus* and *Politicus*," in Gonzalez 1995a: 111–18
Rocco, C. (1997) *Tragedy and Enlightenment: Athenian Political Thought and the Dilemmas of Modernity* (Berkeley and Los Angeles)
Romilly, J. de (1963) *Thucydides and Athenian imperialism*, trans. P. Thody (Oxford)
(1975) *Magic and Rhetoric in Ancient Greece* (Cambridge, MA)
Roochnik, D. (1988) "The tragic philosopher: a critique of Martha Nussbaum," *Ancient Philosopy* 8: 285–95

(1990) *The Tragedy of Reason: Towards a Platonic Conception of Logos* (New York and London)
(1995) "Socrates' rhetorical attack on rhetoric," in Gonzalez 1995a: 81–94
Rorty, A. O. (1973) "A speculative note on some dramatic elements in the *Theaetetus*," *Phronesis* 18: 227–38
(1976) "A literary postscript: characters, persons, selves, individuals," in *The Identities of Persons*, ed. A. O. Rorty (Berkeley and Los Angeles) 301–23
Rorty, R., J. B. Schneewind and Q. Skinner (eds.) (1984) *Philosophy in History* (Cambridge)
Rose, P. W. (1992) *Sons of the Gods, Children of Earth: Ideology and Literary Form in Ancient Greece* (Ithaca, NY)
Rosen, S. (1979) "Plato's myth of the reversed cosmos," *Review of Metaphysics* 33: 59–85
(1983) *Plato's Sophist: The Drama of Original and Image* (New Haven, CT)
(1990) "The golden apple," *Arion* 1: 187–207
(1995) *Plato's Statesman: The Web of Politics* (New Haven, CT)
Rosenstock, B. (1983) "Rereading the *Republic*," *Arethusa* 16: 219–46
Rossetti, L. (1993) "Where philosophy and literature merge in the Platonic dialogues," *Argumentation* 6: 433–43
(1997) "Arguing and suggesting within a Platonic dialogue: towards a typology," in Hart and Tejera 1997: 215–45
Rouveret, A. (1989) *Histoire et imaginaire de la peinture ancienne* (Rome)
Rowe, C. J. (1984) *Plato* (Brighton)
(1987) "Platonic irony," *Nova Tellus* 5: 83–101
(ed.) (1995a) *Reading the Statesman*, *International Plato Studies* 4 (Sankt Augustin)
(1995b) (trans. and comm.) *Plato: Statesman* (Warminster)
(1996) "The *Politicus*: structure and form," in Gill and McCabe 1996: 153–78
(1997) "The good, the reasonable and the laughable in Plato's *Republic*," in *Laughter Down the Centuries*, vol. III, ed. S. Jäkel, A. Timonen and V.-M. Rissanen (Turku) 45–54
(2001a) "Socrates and his twin in Plato's *Symposium*," *Omnibus* 41: 30–32
(2001b) "Socrates and the *Lysis*," paper presented at the Sixth Annual Arizona Conference in Ancient Philosophy, Tucson
Rubino, C. A. (1991) "The least deceptive mirror of the mind: truth and reality in the Homeric poems," *St. John's Review* 41: 61–73
(unpublished) "The thinker as hero"
Rudberg, G. (1928) "Zur Personenzeichnung Platons," *Symbolae Osloenses* 6: 17–32
Rue, R. (1993) "The philosopher in flight: the digression (172c–177c) in Plato's *Theaetetus*," *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy* 11: 71–100
Russell, B. (1945) *A History of Western Philosophy* (New York)
Russell, D. A. (1979) "*De Imitatione*," in D. West and T. Woodman (eds.) *Creative Imitation and Latin Literature* (Cambridge) 1–16
(1981) *Criticism in Antiquity* (London)
(1990) "*Ēthos* in oratory and rhetoric," in Pelling 1990: 197–212

Russo, J. (1974) "The inner man in Archilochus and the *Odyssey*," *Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies* 15: 139–52

(1997) "Prose genres for the performance of traditional wisdom in ancient Greece," in *Poet, Public, and Performance in Ancient Greece*, ed. L. Edmunds and R. W. Wallace (Baltimore, MD) 49–64

Russo, J., M. Fernandez-Galiano and A. Heubeck (1992) *A Commentary on Homer's Odyssey*, vol. III (Oxford)

Rusten, J. S. (ed.) (1989) *Thucydides: The Peloponnesian War Book II* (Cambridge)

Rutherford, R. B. (1995) *The Art of Plato: Ten Essays in Platonic Interpretation* (Cambridge, MA)

Ryle, G. (1966) *Plato's Progress* (Cambridge)

Sachs, E. (1914) *De Theaeteto Mathematico Atheniensi* (Berlin)

Sallis, J. (1996) *Being and Logos: Reading the Platonic Dialogues* (3rd edn. Bloomington)

Samaras, T. (1996) "When did Plato abandon the hope that ideal rulers might appear among human beings?" *History of Political Thought* 17: 109–13

Santas, G. X. (1979) *Socrates: Philosophy in Plato's Early Dialogues* (London)

Saxonhouse, A. W. (1978) "Comedy in Callipolis: animal imagery in the *Republic*," *American Political Science Review* 72: 888–901

Sayre, K. M. (1969) *Plato's Analytical Method* (Chicago)

(1983) *Plato's Late Ontology: A Riddle Resolved* (Princeton)

(1992) "A maieutic view of five late dialogues," in Klagge and Smith 1992: 221–43

(1995) *Plato's Literary Garden: How to Read a Platonic Dialogue* (Notre Dame, IN)

Schaerer, R. (1941) "Le Méchanisme de l'ironie dans ses rapports avec la dialectique," *Revue de métaphysique et de morale* 48: 181–209

(1969) *La Question platonicienne* (2nd edn. Neuchâtel)

Scheid, J. and J. Svenbro (1996) *The Craft of Zeus: Myths of Weaving and Fabric*, trans. C. Volk (Cambridge, MA)

Schmiel, R. (1983/4) "Wily Achilles," *Classical Outlook* 61: 41–3

Schneidewin, W. (1931) *Platons zweiter Hippiasdialog* (Paderborn)

Schofield, M. (1993) "Plato on the economy," in *The Ancient Greek City-State*, ed. M. H. Hansen (Copenhagen) 183–96

Scodel, H. (1987) *Diaeresis and Myth in Plato's Statesman* (Göttingen)

Scolnicov, S. (1988) *Plato's Metaphysics of Education* (New York)

Scott, D. (1999) "Platonic pessimism and moral education," *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy* 17: 15–36

Scott, G. A. (2000) *Plato's Socrates as Educator* (Albany, NY)

(ed.) (2002) *Does Socrates Have a Method? Rethinking the Elenchus in Plato's Dialogues and Beyond* (University Park, PA)

Searle, J. R. (1969) *Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language* (Cambridge)

Sedley, D. (1995) "The dramatis personae of Plato's *Phaedo*," *Proceedings of the British Academy* 85: 3–26

(1996) "Three Platonist interpretations of the *Theaetetus*," in Gill and McCabe 1996: 79–103

Seeskin, K. (1987) *Dialogue and Discovery: A Study in Socratic Method* (Albany, NY)

Segal, C. P. (1962) "Gorgias and the psychology of the *logos*," *Harvard Studies in Classical Philology* 66: 99–155

(1978) "'The myth was saved': reflections of Homer and the mythology of Plato's *Republic*," *Hermes* 106: 315–36

(1987) "Writer as hero: the heroic ethos in Longinus, *On The Sublime*," in *Stemmata*, ed. J. Servais, T. Hackens and B. Servais (Brussels and Liège) 207–19

(1994) "Classical criticism and the canon, or why read the ancient critics?" in *Reading World Literature: Theory, History, Practice*, ed. Sarah Lawall (Austin, TX) 87–112

(1996) "Catharsis, audience and closure in Greek tragedy," in Silk 1996: 149–72

Sesonske, A. (1961) "Plato's apology: *Republic I*," *Phronesis* 6: 29–36; reprinted in *Plato's Republic: Interpretation and Criticism* (Belmont, CA 1966) 40–47

(1969) "Ryle on the Republic," in Freis 1969: 63–71

Shankman, S. (1994) "Plato and postmodernism," in S. Shankman (ed.) *Plato and Postmodernism* (Glenside, PA) 3–28

Shapiro, H. A. (1998) "Hipparchos and the rhapsodes," in *Cultural Poetics in Archaic Greece: Cult, Performance, Politics*, ed. C. Dougherty and L. Kurke (Oxford) 92–107

Sharples, R. W. (ed.) (1985) *Plato: Meno* (Warminster)

Sicking, C. M. J. (1963) "Organische Komposition und Verwandtes," *Mnemosyne* 16: 225–42

Sider, D. (1976) "The structure of Plato Republic VI," *Rivista di Studi Classici* 24: 336–48

Siewert, P. (1977) "The ephebic oath in fifth-century Athens," *Journal of Hellenic Studies* 97: 102–11

Silk, M. S. (ed.) (1996) *Tragedy and the Tragic* (Oxford)

Sinaiko, H. L. (1965) *Love, Knowledge, and Discourse in Plato: Dialogue and Dialectic in Phaedrus, Republic, Parmenides* (Chicago)

Skemp, J. B. (1952) *Plato: The Statesman* (2nd edn. New York; reprinted Bristol 1987)

Slings, S. R. (1999) *Plato: Clitophon* (Cambridge)

Smith, N. D. (1999a) "How the prisoners in Plato's cave are 'like us'," *Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy* 13: 187–204

(1999b) "Images, education and paradox in Plato's *Republic*," *Apeiron* 32: 125–41

Smith, P. C. (1995) "Plato's methods of argument in the *Phaedo*," in Gonzalez 1995a: 95–107

Solana Dueso, J. (1993) "*Statesman* (299b–d) and the condemnation of Socrates," *Polis* 12: 52–63

Sparshott, F. E. (1957) "Plato and Thrasymachus," *University of Toronto Quarterly* 27: 54–61

(1966) "Socrates and Thrasymachus," *Monist* 50: 421–59

Sprague, R. K. (1962) *Plato's Use of Fallacy* (London)

(1967) "Logic and literary form in Plato," *The Personalist* 48: 560–72

(1984) "Plato and children's games," in *Greek Poetry and Philosophy*, ed. D. E. Gerber (Chico, CA) 275–84

Stanford, W. B. (1963) *The Ulysses Theme* (2nd edn. Oxford)

(1983) *Greek Tragedy and the Emotions: An Introductory Study* (London)

Stehle, E. (1997) *Performance and Gender in Ancient Greece: Nondramatic Poetry in its Setting* (Princeton)

Steiner, D. T. (1994) *The Tyrant's Writ: Myths and Images of Writing in Ancient Greece* (Princeton)

(1996) "For love of a statue: a reading of Plato's Symposium 215a–b," *Ramus* 25: 89–111

Stenzel, J. (1940) *Plato's Method of Dialectic*, trans. D. J. Allan (Oxford)

Stokes, M. C. (1986) *Plato's Socratic Conversations: Drama and Dialectic in Three Dialogues* (London)

(1987) "Adeimantus in the *Republic*," in Panagiotou 1987: 67–96

(1992a) "Plato and the sightlovers of the *Republic*," in Barker and Warner 1992: 103–32

(1992b) "Socrates' mission," in Gower and Stokes 1992: 26–81

Stove, D. (1991) *The Plato Cult and Other Philosophical Follies* (Oxford)

Strauss, B. S. (1993) *Fathers and Sons in Athens* (Princeton)

Strauss, L. (1946) "On a new interpretation of Plato's political philosophy," *Social Research* 13: 326–67

(1964) *The City and Man* (Chicago)

Sulzberger, M. (1926) "Ὄνομα ἐπώνυμον: Les Noms propres chez Homère et dans la mythologie grecque," *Revue des études grecques* 39: 381–447

Szlezák, T. A. (1997) "Theaitetos und der Gast aus Elea. Zur philosophischen Kommunikation in Platons *Sophistes*," *Beiträge zur antiken Philosophie*, ed. H.-C. Günther and A. Rengakos (Stuttgart) 81–101

(1999) *Reading Plato* (London and New York)

Tait, M. D. C. (1949) "Spirit, gentleness and the philosophic nature in the *Republic*," *Transactions of the American Philological Association* 80: 203–11

Tannen, D. (1988) "The commingling of orality and literacy in giving a paper at a scholarly conference," *American Speech* 63: 34–43

(1989) *Talking Voices: Repetition, Dialogue and Imagery in Conversational Discourse* (Cambridge)

Tarrant, D. (1928) *The Hippias Major Attributed to Plato* (Cambridge)

(1946) "Imagery in Plato's *Republic*," *Classical Quarterly* 40: 27–34

(1948) "Style and thought in Plato's dialogues," *Classical Quarterly* 42: 28–34

(1951) "Plato's use of quotations and other illustrative material," *Classical Quarterly* 45: 59–67

(1955a) "Plato's use of extended *oratio obliqua*," *Classical Quarterly* 5 (NS): 222–4

(1955b) "Plato as dramatist," *Journal of Hellenic Studies* 75: 82–9

(1958) "The touch of Socrates," *Classical Quarterly* 8: 95–8

Tarrant, H. (1988) "Midwifery and the *Clouds*," *Classical Quarterly* 38: 116–22

(1996) "Plato, prejudice, and the mature-age student in antiquity," in E. Benitez (ed.) *Dialogues with Plato* = *Apeiron* 29 (Edmonton) 105–20

(2000) "Where Plato speaks: reflections on an ancient debate," in Press 2000a: 67–80
Taylor, A. E. (1960) *Plato: The Man and his Work* (7th edn. London)
Taylor, C. C. W. (1998) *Socrates* (Oxford)
(2001) "Socrates the sophist," paper presented at the Sixth Annual Arizona Conference in Ancient Philosophy, Tucson
Taylor, Charles (1989) *Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity* (Cambridge, MA)
Tecuşan, M. (1990) "*Logos sympotikos*: patterns of the irrational in philosophical drinking: Plato outside the *Symposium*," in *Sympotica*, ed. O. Murray (Oxford)
(1992) "Speaking about the unspeakable," in Barker and Warner 1992: 69–87
Tejera, V. (1978) "Plato's *Politikos*: an Eleatic sophist on politics," *Philosophy and Social Criticism* 5: 85–104 and 107–25
(1984) *Plato's Dialogues One by One: A Structural Interpretation* (New York)
(1993) "The Hellenistic obliteration of Plato's dialogism," in Press 1993a: 129–44
(1997) "The son of Apollo explicated: Plato's wit, his irony, and dialogism," in Hart and Tejera 1997: 65–86
Teloh, H. (1986) *Socratic Education in Plato's Early Dialogues* (Notre Dame, IN)
Thalmann, W. G. (1984) *Conventions of Form and Thought in Early Greek Epic Poetry* (Baltimore)
Thayer, H. S. (1993) "Meaning and dramatic interpretation," in Press 1993a: 47–59
(1997) "Plato's style: temporal, dramatic and semantic levels in the dialogues," in Hart and Tejera 1997: 87–120
Thesleff, H. (1967) *Studies in the Styles of Plato* (Helsinki)
(1982) *Studies in Platonic Chronology* (Helsinki)
(1990) "Theaitetos and Theodoros," *Arctos* 24: 147–59
(1993) "Looking for clues. An interpretation of some literary aspects of Plato's 'two-level' model," in Press 1993a: 17–45
Thimme, O. (1935) Φύσις Τρόπος Ἦθος (diss. Göttingen)
Thomas, R. (1992) *Literacy and Orality in Ancient Greece* (Cambridge)
Thompson, W. H. (ed.) (1868) *The Phaedrus of Plato* (London)
Tigerstedt, E. N. (1977) *Interpreting Plato* (Stockholm)
Todd, S. C. (1993) *The Shape of Athenian Law* (Oxford)
Tomin, J. (1987) "Socratic midwifery," *Classical Quarterly* 37: 97–102
Tompkins, D. P. (1993) "Archidamus and the question of characterization in Thucydides," in *Nomodeiktes*, ed. R. Rosen and J. Farrell (Ann Arbor) 99–111
Too, Y. L. (1995) *The Rhetoric of Identity in Isocrates* (Cambridge)
(1998) *The Idea of Ancient Literary Criticism* (Oxford)
Trevaskis, J. R. (1955) "The sophistry of noble lineage," *Phronesis* 1: 36–49
Tschemplik, A. (1993) "Framing the question of knowledge: beginning Plato's *Theaetetus*," in Press 1993a: 169–78
Tuozzo, T. M. (unpublished) "Cephalus and Polemarchus on justice and the human good."
Turner, E. G. (1952) *Athenian Books in the Fifth and Fourth Centuries BC* (London)

Turner, J. S. (1993) "᾿Ατοπία in Plato's *Gorgias*," *International Studies in Philosophy* 25: 69–77
Untersteiner, M. (1954) *The Sophists*, trans. K. Freeman (New York)
Usher, S. (1965) "Individual characterization in Lysias," *Eranos* 63: 99–119
Vancamp, B. (ed.) (1996) *Platon: Hippias Major – Hippias Minor* (Stuttgart)
Vander Waerdt, P. A. (ed.) (1994) *The Socratic Movement* (Ithaca, NY)
Verdenius, W. J. (1970) "Homer, the educator of the Greeks," *Mededelingen der Koninklijke Nederlandse Akademie van Wetenschappen* 33.5: 205–31
Vermeule, E. (1979) *Aspects of Death in Early Greek Art and Poetry* (Berkeley and Los Angeles)
Vernant, J.-P. (1989) "Dim body, dazzling body," in *Fragments for a History of the Human Body*, ed. M. Feher (New York) 19–47; reprinted as "Mortals and immortals: the body of the divine," in Vernant 1991 ch. 1.
(1991) *Mortals and Immortals*, ed. F. I. Zeitlin (Princeton)
Versényi, L. (1963) *Socratic Humanism* (New Haven, CT)
Vicaire, P. (1960) *Platon. Critique littéraire* (Paris)
Vidal-Naquet, P. (1978) "Plato's myth of the Statesman: the ambiguities of the Golden Age and of history," *Journal of Hellenic Studies* 98: 132–41
Villela-Petit, M. (1991) "La question de l'image artistique dans le *Sophiste*," in Narcy (ed.) 1991: 53–90
Vlastos, G. (1956) "Introduction" to *Plato: Protagoras*, trans. M. Ostwald (New York)
(1971) "The paradox of Socrates," in *The Philosophy of Socrates*, ed. G. Vlastos (Garden City, NY; reprinted Notre Dame, IN 1980) 1–21
(1983a) "The Socratic elenchus," *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy* 1: 27–58; reprinted in Vlastos 1994: 1–37
(1983b) "The historical Socrates and the Athenian democracy," *Political Theory* 11: 495–516
(1985) "Socrates' disavowal of knowledge," *Philosophical Quarterly* 35: 1–31; reprinted in Vlastos 1994: 39–66
(1987) "Socratic irony," *Classical Quarterly* 37: 79–96; reprinted in Vlastos 1991: ch. 1
(1991) *Socrates: Ironist and Moral Philosopher* (Ithaca, NY)
(1994) *Socratic Studies* (Cambridge)
Voegelin, E. (1957) *Order and History III: Plato and Aristotle* (Baton Rouge, LA)
Waldock, A. J. A. (1951) *Sophocles the Dramatist* (Cambridge)
Wallace, R. (1997) "Poet, Public, and 'Theatocracy': audience performance in classical Athens," in *Poet, Public, and Performance in Ancient Greece*, ed. L. Edmunds and R. W. Wallace (Baltimore, MD) 97–111
Walsh, G. B. (1984) *The Varieties of Enchantment: Early Greek Views of the Nature and Function of Poetry* (Chapel Hill)
Wardy, R. (1996) *The Birth of Rhetoric: Gorgias, Plato and their Successors* (New York)
Waterfield, R. (trans.) (1987a) *Plato: Theaetetus* (Harmondsworth)
(1987b) *Hippias Minor*: translation, introduction and notes, in *Plato: Early Socratic Dialogues*, ed. T. J. Saunders (Harmondsworth)
Waugh, J. (1995) "Neither published nor perished," in Gonzalez 1995a: 61–77

(2000) "Socrates and the character of Platonic dialogue," in Press 2000a: 39–52
Waymack, M. H. (1985) "The *Theaetetus* 172c–177c: a reading of the philosopher in court," *Southern Journal of Philosophy* 23: 481–9
Weiss, R. (1981) "῾Ο ἀγαθός as ὁ δυνατός in the *Hippias Minor*," *Classical Quarterly* 31: 287–304
(1995) "Statesman as ἐπιστήμων: caretaker, physician, and weaver," in Rowe 1995a: 213–22
(1998) *Socrates Dissatisfied* (Oxford)
Welliver, W. (1977) *Character, Plot and Thought in Plato's Timaeus-Critias* (Leiden)
Wengert, R. G. (1988) "The paradox of the midwife," *History of Philosophy Quarterly* 5: 3–10
West, E. J. M. (1993) "An ironic dilemma, or incompatible interpretations of *Euthyphro* 5a–b," in Press 1993a: 147–67
(1995) "Plato's audiences, or how Plato replies to the fifth-century intellectual mistrust of letters," in Gonzalez 1995a: 41–60
(2000) "Why doesn't Plato speak?" in Press 2000a: 99–111
West M. L. (ed.) (1978) *Hesiod: Works and Days* (Oxford)
Westerink, L. G. (ed. and comm.) (1956) *Olympiodorus: Commentary on the First Alcibiades of Plato* (Amsterdam)
(ed.) (1962) *Anonymous Prolegomena to Platonic Philosophy* (Amsterdam)
White, S. A. (1994) "Callimachus on Plato and Cleombrotus," *Transactions of the American Philological Association* 124: 135–61
(1995) "Thrasymachus the diplomat," *Classical Philology* 90: 307–27
(2000) "Socrates at Colonus: a hero for the Academy," in *Reason and Religion in Socratic Philosophy*, ed. N. D. Smith and P. Woodruff (Oxford) 151–75
Whitehead, A. N. (1978) *Process and Reality: An Essay in Cosmology*, ed. D. R. Griffin and D. W. Sherburne (New York)
Whitehead, D. (1977) *The Ideology of the Athenian Metic* (Cambridge)
Wilamowitz, U. von. (1948) *Platon: sein Leben und seine Werke*. Nach der 3. vom Verfasser herausgegebenen Aufl., durchgesehen von Bruno Snell. (Berlin)
Wiles, D. (1991) *The Masks of Menander: Sign and Meaning in Greek and Roman Performance* (Cambridge)
(1997) *Tragedy in Athens: Performance Space and Theatrical Meaning* (Cambridge)
Williams, B. (1993) *Shame and Necessity* (Berkeley and Los Angeles)
Wilson, J. R. S. (1995) "Thrasymachus and the *thumos*: a further case of prolepsis in *Republic* I," *Classical Quarterly* 45: 58–67
Wilson, P. J. (1996) "Tragic rhetoric: the use of tragedy and the tragic in the fourth century," in Silk 1996: 310–31
Winkler, J. J. (1990a) "Laying down the law: the oversight of men's sexual behavior in classical Athens," in D. M. Halperin, J. J. Winkler and F. I. Zeitlin (eds.) *Before Sexuality* (Princeton) 171–209
(1990b) "The Ephebes' Song: *Tragōidia* and *Polis*," in Winkler and Zeitlin 1990: 20–62
Winkler, J. J. and F. I. Zeitlin (eds.) (1990) *Nothing to Do with Dionysos?* (Princeton)

Wolff, E. (1929) *Platos Apologie* (Berlin)
Wolff, F. (1997) "Être disciple de Socrate," in Giannantoni and Narcy 1997: 29–79
Wolfsdorf, D. (1998) "The historical reader of Plato's *Protagoras*," *Classical Quarterly* 48: 126–34
Wolz, H. G. (1963) "Philosophy as drama: an approach to Plato's dialogues," *IPQ* 3: 236–70
Wood, J. (1999) "The lion king," *New York Times Book Review* July 11: 15–16
Wood, N. and E. M. Wood. (1986) "Socrates and democracy: a reply to Gregory Vlastos," *Political Theory* 14: 55–82
Woodruff, P. (1982) *Plato: Hippias Major* (Oxford)
(1988) "Reply to Ronald Polansky," in Griswold 1988a: 210–14
Woolf, R. (1997) "The self in Plato's *Ion*," *Apeiron* 30: 189–210
Woozley, A. D. (1979) *Law and Obedience: The Arguments of Plato's Crito* (London)
Yates, F. A. (1966) *The Art of Memory* (London)
Yates, V. L. (1998) "Madman, sophist, and imitator: Plato's strategies for representing the poet" (Ph.D. diss. Princeton)
Yong, P. (1996) "Intellectualism and moral habituation in Plato's earlier dialogues," in E. Benitez (ed.) *Dialogues with Plato = Apeiron* 29 (Edmonton) 49–61
Young, C. M. (1994) "Plato and computer dating," *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy* 12: 227–50
Zanker, P. (1995) *The Mask of Socrates: The Image of the Intellectual in Antiquity* (Berkeley and Los Angeles)
Zeitlin, F. (1996) "Playing the other: theater, theatricality, and the feminine in Greek drama," in *Playing the Other: Gender and Society in Classical Greek Literature* (Chicago) 341–74
Zembaty, J. (1989) "Socrates' perplexity in Plato's *Hippias Minor*," *Essays in Ancient Greek Philosophy* III, ed. J. P. Anton and A. Preus (New York) 51–69

General index

Academy, 25–6, 29, 40, 52 n., 71 n., 110, 390
Achilles, 82, 85, 275
 in Homer, 59, 61, 87, 230–31, 301, 303
 in Plato, 132–8, 144–9, 153, 154–62, 230–31, 235
acting
 as impersonation, 16, 23, 27, 236, 366, 374
 styles, Greek, 22–4, 26
Adeimantos, *see* Glaukon and Adeimantos
Aeschylus, 7, 32–4, 62, 240, 262, 301, 387
 in Aristophanes' *Frogs*, 104, 122
aesthetics, Greek, 2, 56–7, 60–61, 67, 225, 322
agonism (*see also* rivalry)
 in Greek culture, 40, 52, 87, 97–8, 121–2, 128–9, 132
 of Sokrates, 40, 88, 121–5, 144, 194–5, 209, 253
 of sophists, 98, 118, 122–3, 128–9, 144, 181–2, 194, 209
Alexander the Great, 82
Alcibiades I, 285
Alkibiades, 35, 57, 93, 109, 274
ancient critics on Plato, 6–7, 19, 29–31, 32, 34, 47, 67n.
anonymity (*see also* Eleatic visitor, namelessness of)
 of minor characters, 51–2, 68, 223, 319
 of Plato, 17–21, 38–9, 43–6
anthologies, ancient, 94, 145, 214
Apollo, 69, 86, 100, 109, 218, 267
Apollodoros, 108–9, 169, 312
Apology (Plato's), 7, 10, 37, 41, 50, 69, 86, 113
aporia
 induced/experienced by Sokrates, 42, 73, 86, 113, 117–18, 122, 145, 176, 182, 190, 192, 203, 251 n., 254
 not caused by Sokrates, 212, 216, 256–7, 263, 330, 348, 354, 380
appropriateness (*to prepon*), 350, 368–70, 374
Archilochus, 62, 72–3
Aristodemos, 86, 107–9, 312
Ariston, 190
Aristophanes (*see also* comedy, Greek)
 on literature and/or education, 55, 59–60, 83, 92, 95, 102, 104, 320
 on Sokrates, 69 n., 70, 94, 127
Aristotle, 38, 46–7, 99, 291, 338, 363
 as reader of Plato, 19, 137, 152
 on character (*ēthos*), 35, 53–6, 59, 60, 71
 on friendship, 284, 286, 288
 on mimesis, 16, 30, 62, 83
Aristotle of Thorae, 93, 179 n.
Artemis, 266–7
Athens/Athenians
 as location for philosophy, 166–8, 316–17, 319–20
 institutions/values of, 63–4, 66, 75–6, 97–8, 118–19, 123, 128, 132, 156–7, 171, 289, 294, 295, 297, 361–2, 393
 Plato and, 33, 66, 110
 Sokrates and, 69, 75–80, 86, 89, 127, 168, 218, 298–9, 301, 378–9, 387, 388–9
atopia, 73–4, 77, 112 n., 359, 360, 373, 378
audience
 critical capacity of, 89–90, 103–5
 Plato's, 25–9, 52, 91–2, 123, 156, 161–4, 180, 184, 192, 232, 242–3, 249–50, 310–13, 377, 396
 sophists', 122, 129, 131, 133, 149–50
 theatrical, 23, 31, 81, 89, 157
author
 absence of, 21, 101, 136, 305–10
 controlling function of, 5, 32, 43–7, 110–12,

164, 185, 196–7, 210, 232, 309, 317, 336–7, 339, 396
voice of, 16–21, 38–9, 42, 111
authoritarianism
educational, 39–41, 50–51, 95–6, 99, 214–17, 245, 334, 338
of non-Socratic characters, 181, 283, 337–47, 350, 357, 385
of Sokrates, 200–202, 223–4, 274, 283
Platonic, 42, 105
political, 219, 225, 351–5, 357
authority (*see also* author; authoritarianism; Sokrates, dominance of)
avoidance of, by Plato/Sokrates, 21, 39–44, 103, 111–12, 116–17, 201–2, 249–50, 274, 289, 382–3
of age, 95, 169, 278–80, 341–4, 349–50
resistance to
by non-Socratic characters, 153–4, 176–7, 206–8, 246, 249–50, 320, 332, 349–57, 379
by Plato, 386, 394–6
by Sokrates, 100, 108–9, 282–4

Bakhtin, 72
beauty/ugliness
as indication of character, 58–62
of Sokrates and/or Theaitetos, 70–74, 261, 271, 278, 292, 360, 369, 374
biography, Greek, 60
brothers, solidarity of, 205, 284
bystanders, 51–2, 67–8, 90, 123, 133, 167, 192, 315, 384, 392

canonization of Plato, 46–7
Castor and Pollux, 284
censorship, 55, 171, 228–45, 246
character, Greek conceptions of (*see also ēthos*), 53–62
characterization, techniques for
in Greek literature, 60–62, 301
in Plato, 53, 56–8, 63–6, 69, 85, 113–14, 140–41, 181–2, 196–9, 301–2
Charmantides, 167
Charmides, 35, 127
Charmides, 10, 93
chronology of Plato's works, 7, 11–14, 165, 251
Cicero, 46

clothing, *see* costume; physical appearance
comedy, Greek (*see also* Aristophanes), 14, 30, 31–4, 51, 59, 62, 71–2, 89–90, 91, 108
community, philosophical
as Socratic goal, 76, 79, 86, 120–22, 177, 293
modeled in the dialogues, 167–8, 202, 211, 285–7, 293, 329, 336, 339, 394
compliance (*see also* gentleness; imagery, painting/sculpting), 95, 178–9, 189, 204–5, 206, 210, 223–4, 259, 284, 327–8, 338, 344, 345, 351
consistency (*see also* words and deeds)
as Socratic value, 116, 117, 124, 125, 148–9, 251 n., 266–70
in non-Socratic characters, 129–31, 149–50, 153, 157, 159–60, 176, 177, 183, 263, 267–70, 324, 330, 380
context, neglect of, 93–5, 144–5, 160, 234–5, 240–41, 308
cooperation, 51, 120–21, 181, 193–6, 199–200, 202–9, 254–5, 264–5, 345–7, 379
cosmos, Plato's dialogues as, 6, 66
costume (*see also* appearance, physical), 22–3, 98, 99, 374
courage, *see* vigor/courage
crafts, 70, 76, 111 n., 140–43, 150–53, 225, 301–2, 343–4, 357–60, 381, 382
Cratylus, 7, 102, 237
Critias, see Timaeus-Critias
Crito, 7, 42, 69, 79, 381
Cropsey, Joseph, 7

daimonion, Sokrates', 69, 202, 218, 246
dates, dramatic, 6 n., 65, 167 n.
deception/falsehood, 61, 117, 135, 137–8, 146–9, 156, 162, 197, 366–7, 374
as Socratic trait, 75, 120, 148–9, 158–60, 184, 191
democracy (*see also* Athens/Athenians)
Plato's portrayal of, 156–7, 179, 225, 259, 373, 388–9
Demosthenes, 94
developmentalism, 11, 13, 111
devil's advocates
Glaukon and Adeimantos as, 190–93, 195, 208, 239
Theaitetos as, 334, 348
dialogue form, *see* dramatic form

dialogue, internal/external, 261–2, 264–5, 267–70, 285–6, 287–8, 291, 310–11, 348–50, 383
dianoia (intellect)
  as element of character, 55–8
  as separable from body, 290, 299, 323
Dickey, Eleanor, 121, 381
digression of *Theaetetus*, 273, 274, 278–9, 292, 303
  orator of, 253, 259, 286, 289, 295, 298, 300–301
  philosopher of, 110, 266–8, 289–91, 296–301, 309, 323–4, 378
digressions, defense of (in *Statesman*), 369, 370
discursive and dramatic levels, 2, 6, 29, 42–3, 49, 51, 84, 105
  of *Hippias Minor*, 115, 154–5, 164
  of *Republic*, 184, 196–9, 201, 206, 211–12, 216–17, 222–3, 226, 231–2, 228–50
  of *Sophist/Statesman*, 334–7, 351–6, 360–61, 363, 365–6, 374–6, 395
  of *Theaetetus*, 252, 260, 288–9, 304, 339
divinity
  association of philosophy with (*see also* likeness of philosopher to god), 219, 224, 226, 323–6, 351–2, 356–7
  association of Sokrates with (*see also* *daimonion*, Sokrates'), 87, 266–7, 273
  of Plato, 46, 190
division, method of, 13, 321, 322–3, 324, 338, 343–4, 352–3, 357–65, 371, 379, 380, 386
dizziness, 71 n., 117, 253, 371
Dodds, E. R., 19
dogmatism, *see* authority
drama
  defining features of, 16–17, 22, 25, 26–7, 48, 54
  Greek (*see also* comedy, Greek; mime; tragedy, Greek), 22, 26, 27, 35, 45, 52, 60, 374, 393
  Plato's dialogues and, 8–9, 27, 14–37, 38, 51–2, 56
dramatic form (*see also* discursive and dramatic levels; drama; reported vs. direct dramatic form), 1–3, 6, 15–19, 29, 56
  emotional power of, 46–8, 80–84, 90, 96, 103 n., 239, 242–3
  functions of, 37–52, 69, 103, 105, 111, 114, 162, 187–8, 222–3, 357, 383, 387
Eastwood, Clint, 322
education/pedagogy (*see also* imitation, role of in education)
  as function of Plato's dialogues, 7, 26–9, 41–2, 50–52, 99, 102–3, 162, 233–5
  Eleatic visitor's, 333, 336–47, 350–51, 359, 366, 368–70
  in ideal state of *Statesman*, 335, 352
  in Kallipolis, 101, 211, 213–16, 224–5, 228–45, 247–8
  Socratic, 42, 51, 77, 79, 88, 99–101, 106, 116–18, 126–7, 129, 223–4
    in *Hippias Minor*, 138–9, 146–7, 148, 161–2
    in *Republic*, 176–8, 183, 186, 187, 200–202, 216, 247–9
    in *Theaetetus* (*see also* imagery, midwife), 252–3, 272–4, 278, 281–2, 292, 296–7, 332, 344
  sophistic (*see also* Homer, sophists' use of), 96–9, 128–9, 151, 181, 189
  traditional Greek, 81–4, 94, 95–8, 128–9, 153–4, 161, 167, 169, 170–71, 175, 189, 197–8, 214, 312
    corrupting effects of, 83–4, 171, 213, 217–19, 220, 228–46, 256, 259–60, 334
Eleatic philosophy (*see also* Parmenides), 316, 319, 321, 365
Eleatic visitor (*see also* education/pedagogy, Eleatic visitor's), 315, 318–26, 336–57
  as ideal philosopher/statesman, 322–6, 336, 351–3, 355–7, 378–9, 381–2
  compared to Sokrates, 330, 333, 337–9, 343, 344, 346, 347, 349, 350, 360, 362, 378–86
  compared to the sophist, 373
  cosmopolitanism of, 319–20, 323–4, 361–2
  creativity of, 347–50, 354, 355–6, 357–65, 382
  dominance of, 336, 346–7
  fictionality of, 321–2, 381
  humor/irony of, 341, 358, 379, 380
  inclusiveness of, 357–65, 383–6, 388, 395
  memory of, 355–6, 380
  namelessness of, 318–19, 321–2
elenchus, *see* Sokrates, elenctic
elite attitudes, 44, 60, 141, 203, 212, 223, 289, 297–8, 334, 362
elitism, of Plato and his characters, 25, 28, 42, 66, 76, 78, 203, 297–8, 362, 380–81

embodiment (*see also* physical appearance; Sokrates, physicality of)
and dramatic form, 48–50, 54, 252, 271, 290–91, 324–6, 356–7
transcendence of, 290–303, 304–5, 320–26, 355–7, 363, 391–2
Empedocles, 39
emphasis (ancient literary term), 34, 322
Epicharmus, 14
epideixis (rhetorical display speech), 99, 128, 383
ēthos, 54–5, 58, 60, 62, 80, 84, 85, 102, 224
in Aristotle, 35, 53, 55
in music/visual arts, 56–7
Eudikos, 129, 132–3, 149–50
Eukleides and/or Terpsion (*see also Theaetetus*, opening of), 305–7, 312–13
Euripides, 9, 19, 27, 56, 82, 94
in Aristophanes' *Frogs*, 83, 92, 104, 122
Euthydemus, 106
Euthyphro, 32, 108 n., 126, 258
Euthyphro, 7, 10
example (*paradeigma*)
educational use of (*see also* imitation, role of in education), 81–2, 83, 95, 97, 154–62, 237, 291
method of (in *Statesman*), 338, 358, 360, 363, 372
Socrates as, 86, 88
fallacies, Sokrates' use of, 137–9, 146–7, 149, 178, 184
festivals, religious
as setting for performance, 22–3, 63–4, 97–8, 128–9
as setting for philosophy, 63–4, 79–80, 165, 168
Forms, Platonic, 201, 204, 213, 215, 217–19, 220, 225, 227, 243–4, 246, 248, 304
frame, dramatic (*see also* setting, dramatic), 47–8, 78–9, 85
Frede, Michael, 40
frenzy (*mania*)
erotic, 173, 229
philosophical, 324–5, 336
friendship (*philia*) (*see also* community, philosophical)
and enmity, 174, 177, 198, 205, 287
of equals/unequals, 284–7, 326–7
with oneself, 269, 287–8
generic, ideal character as, 60–62, 124–5, 220–28, 233, 236, 238, 242, 311, 318–34, 360–61, 375–7, 392
gentleness, *see* compliance; vigor/courage and gentleness
Glaukon (*see also* Glaukon and Adeimantos)
and erotic desire, 203, 212, 219
in Xenophon, 34
Glaukon and Adeimantos, 167, 190–93, 195, 196–214, 217–21, 223, 228, 232, 239–42, 246–50
compared to Theaitetos and/or young Sokrates, 256, 259, 332, 333–4, 338
differences between, 203, 204, 207, 210, 219–20, 241, 246
exceptional nature of, 190, 193, 218–19
Gorgias, 32, 97, 98, 99
Gorgias, 13, 27, 69, 78, 82
Grote, George, 39–40, 80–81
guardians (*see also* education/pedagogy in Kallipolis)
as heroes, 226, 304
character of, 188, 211, 213, 215, 224–5
Republic's dramatis personae compared to, 199, 211–14, 216–17, 219, 231–2, 233–4, 245–7
Gyges, 219, 239–40

Helen, 9, 61, 261, 282
Heracliteans (in *Theaetetus*), 265–9, 274, 276, 285, 287, 291, 300, 382
Herakles, 85, 159 n., 280
heroism, Greek attitudes towards, 31, 61, 68, 72–3, 87, 98, 104, 134, 156, 226, 231, 303, 325–6
hetairoi ("comrades"), 285, 286–7, 319, 321
Hippias, 68–9, 128–64, 176
Hippias Major, 129
Hippias Minor, 10, 21, 55, 105, 114–15, 128–64, 199
historians, Greek, 23, 31–2, 34, 65
history, Plato's use of (*see also* irony, historical), 6, 30–37, 321–2
Homer/epic
cultural importance of, 22–3, 31, 39, 81–2, 95–6, 97–8, 128–9, 132, 136
Plato's resemblance to, 17–18, 29–31, 44–5, 85, 112, 238–9, 302–3
Plato's use of, 14, 43, 154–62

Homer/epic (*cont.*)
Sokrates' use of, 137–8, 144–7
sophists' use of, 97, 98, 128–9, 132–6, 143
Howland, Jacob, 6
humor/satire (*see also* comedy; Sokrates as comic figure)
dangers of, 92, 234
of physical details, 61–2, 70–72, 91, 107–9, 141–2
Plato's use of, 32, 91–2, 136–7, 141–2, 163–4, 234, 373–4
social significance of, 91, 290

imagery
animal, 181, 191, 196, 324, 364, 366
combat/hunting/athletics, 64, 121–2, 177, 181, 253, 265, 278, 279–80, 328, 346, 358
dragging, 124, 182, 215–16, 253–4, 279, 295, 344
dream, 258, 264, 272, 291, 296, 372
erotic/reproductive (*see also* imagery, midwife; Socrates and *erōs*), 110–11, 213–14, 271–7, 278, 283, 381
feasting, 64, 80
flying, 290–91
leading/following, 200, 213, 274, 326, 337, 371
light/vision, 64, 201, 204, 216, 343, 370–72
magic, 96, 97, 106, 144, 155, 159, 191, 193
midwife, 70, 101, 255, 263–4, 266–7, 272–4, 288, 293–6, 301, 302, 308, 344, 380, 381
mirror, 261, 285–6, 288, 373
painting/sculpting, 61, 70, 95, 96, 99, 212, 214, 216, 225, 231–2, 237–8, 240, 367, 370, 371–2
taming, 118
travel, 64, 118, 148, 159, 214, 346, 358, 371
weaving, 143–4, 335, 336–7, 358, 360, 362–3, 381
imitation (*see also Republic*, mimesis in), 2–3, 16, 30, 57, 67
as self-fashioning (vs. illusionism), 236–8, 242, 243–4, 247, 284, 376
beneficial, 84, 85–6, 89–93, 101–12, 161–2, 236–8, 243–4, 365–77
dangers of, 82–5, 88, 92, 95, 104–5, 106, 164, 236, 283–4, 366–7, 375–6
of Sokrates, 86–8, 103–12, 127,164, 227, 250, 263, 283–4, 296–7, 304, 310–13, 378, 395–6
role of in education, 26–7, 29, 80–85, 88–112, 128, 147, 155–61, 228–45, 245–50, 265–6, 286, 310–13
structural (vs. slavish), 102–9, 161–2, 164, 237, 263, 266, 291–2, 300, 310–12, 354–5, 373, 376–7, 395–6
individuality (*see also* generic, ideal character as), 2–3, 49, 58, 60–63, 268, 289–90
of Plato's characters (*see also* Sokrates, individuality of), 62, 67–9, 141, 165, 185, 187–8, 220, 235, 360–61, 327
intention, importance of, 137–40, 146–9, 150–53
interlocutors, Socratic (range of), 118–19, 126, 165–6, 299
Ion, 99
Ion (Plato's), 10, 99
Isocrates, 37, 81, 112, 222
irony
historical/dramatic, 32–3, 93, 127, 179
Platonic, 21, 130
Socratic, 69, 75, 106, 119–20, 121, 125, 227, 255–6
in *Hippias Minor*, 131, 135, 142, 146, 163
in *Republic*, 170, 184, 187, 191, 202–3
in *Theaetetus*, 255, 265
in *Sophist/Statesman*, 323, 386
Isles of the Blessed, 304

Kallias, 307
Kallikles, 31, 71, 89, 123, 126
Kallipolis (*see also* education/pedagogy in Kallipolis; guardians), 173, 199, 206, 207, 211, 215
Kassandra, 393
Kephalos, 165–75, 187–9, 198, 207, 220–21, 228–30, 232, 234–5, 241, 245–7, 280
and erotic desire, 173, 229
and money, *see* money, Kephalos' family and
as potential tyrant, 229, 243
Klein, Jacob, 34
Kleitophon, 167, 199
Klytemnestra, 301, 387
Kritias, 35, 93, 127, 212

Laches, 10
Lane, Melissa, 102
laws, in *Statesman*, 352, 354, 357, 373, 381
Laws, 12, 82, 83, 84, 92, 361, 381, 392
Leontios, 62

letters, Platonic, 32, 38–9, 41, 259
likeness (*see also* Theaitetos, likeness of to Sokrates)
and learning (*see also* imitation, role of in education), 82–4, 95, 105, 265–8, 310–12
attraction exerted by, 82–4, 246–7, 265–8, 270, 284, 286
of philosopher to god, 226, 266–8, 270, 273, 286, 290–91, 292, 299, 323, 326
of sons to fathers, 81, 174–5, 177, 221, 275
"literature" vs. "philosophy", 1–2, 4–5, 37–8
logoi (words)
as medium for representation, 206, 231, 247–9, 323, 356, 367–8, 372
of Sokrates, 57–8, 70, 73, 106, 107, 263
logos (argument)
force of, 124, 154, 293, 326
impersonality of, 124, 186, 196, 265, 293, 326, 343
logos and *ergon*, *see* discursive vs. dramatic levels; word and deed
long speeches
authoritarianism of, 40–41, 50–51, 95, 97, 181
used by Socrates, 11, 42, 148, 227, 382
vs. dialectic, 99, 100, 116–17, 186–7, 193, 213, 338, 340, 345, 383
Lysias, 167, 179–80
Lysis, 32

megalopsuchia, 59, 60, 71, 108 n.
Megara, 301, 316–17, 379
Meletos, 62
memorization, 95, 99, 101, 128, 141–2, 146, 161, 312
Menexenus, 37, 77
Meno, 34, 126, 258
Meno, 10, 13, 75, 82, 100–101, 223–4, 272
Miller, Mitchell, 89, 90, 91, 103, 166, 351, 393
mime, 14, 22
mimetic pedagogy, *see* imitation, role of in education
money
bad character and, 176, 198, 212, 230–31
Kephalos' family and ,166–7, 171–3, 175, 179–80, 198, 229
Sokrates and, 76–7, 171–2, 261, 299
sophists and, 98, 128, 131, 204, 230
multiplicity (*see also* individuality; *poikilia*; versatility), 61–2, 111, 239, 247, 291–2, 360–61
Muses, 39, 312, 345, 385
myth
Greek uses of, 9, 31, 32, 33, 82, 96, 97
of Er, 43, 158, 173, 219, 227–8, 230, 242
of *Statesman*, 321, 323, 326, 332, 338, 342, 353–6, 359, 364, 367–9
Plato's dialogues as, 33–4

Nagel, Thomas, 290
names, significance of (*see also* anonymity), 63, 68, 261–2, 318–20, 392
narration, Plato's use of (*see also* reported vs. direct dramatic form), 3, 9, 43, 48, 180–81, 196–9, 213, 242–3, 375–6
nature (*phusis*), exceptional, dangers of, 109, 189, 212–13
negative characters, reactions to, 91–3, 105, 162–3, 235
Nehamas, Alexander, 92, 124
Neoptolemos, 97, 134, 275, 277, 280–81
Nestor, 95, 97, 133–4, 155, 169, 171
Nikeratos, 55, 167–8, 240
Nikias, 167

objectors, imaginary, 11, 195, 210, 241, 242, 265, 328, 348–9
Odysseus
in Homer, 72–3, 85, 123
in Plato, 132–8, 144–9, 150–51, 153, 154–62
in tragedy, 9, 277, 280–81
old age/old men, 77, 169–73, 279–80
and love of *logoi*, 77, 169–771, 279
wisdom of, 77, 95, 133, 169, 170, 280, 342–4, 351, 374
open-endedness of Plato's dialogues, 5–6, 47–8, 103, 313
opinion (*doxa*), 131–2, 202, 213–14, 217, 248
right (*orthē*), 177–8, 205–6, 212, 245–7, 249, 334
organic model of discourse, 4–6, 94–5, 370

paradeigma, see example
Parmenides, 39, 64, 266, 343, 381
as father figure, 276, 282–3, 320, 340–41, 343, 349–50, 379
Parmenides, 18, 20, 24, 77, 340, 381
parrhēsia (freedom of speech), 75, 123, 393

Peiraeus, 168, 169, 204
performance
in Greek culture, 22–3, 52, 63–4, 81, 82, 97
of Plato's dialogues, 23–8
sophistic, 23, 97, 128–9
personality (*see also* individuality), 54, 55, 58–9, 62
Phaedo, 7, 11, 18, 34, 65, 69, 74, 78–9, 86, 87–8
Phaedrus, 11, 21, 44, 74–5
Phaidros, 108 n.
Philebus, 12, 391, 392
philia, *see* friendship
physical appearance
as indication of character, 58–62, 70–74, 102, 107–9, 275
of Plato's non-Socratic characters, 62, 169, 198, 140–41, 182, 260–61, 275, 324, 378
of Sokrates, *see* Sokrates, physicality of
physiognomers, ancient, 71, 73
Pindar, 83, 238, 240
playfulness, 70, 72, 201, 202, 204, 279, 379
pleasure in discourse, 84, 96, 98, 106–7, 169
Plutarch, 24, 60
poikilia, 2, 61, 67, 143
Polemarchos, 68, 93, 165–8, 184, 187–9, 206, 207, 220–21, 228, 245–7
polutropia, *see* versatility
polymathy, *see* versatility
Prodikos, 62, 272
prosōpon (dramatis persona), 54–5
Protagoras, 21, 41, 97
in *Theaetetus*, 254–5, 272, 274, 278, 282–3, 285, 286–7, 291, 295, 307–9
Protagoras, 52, 55, 69
Pygmalion, 238
Pylades, 262
Python, Monty, 109

reader, *see* audience, Plato's
reading in the ancient world, 22–3, 24, 25–7, 32, 81, 305–6
reported vs. direct dramatic form (*see also* narration, Plato's use of), 17, 23–4, 43–4, 63, 90–91, 235–6, 238–42, 307, 313, 316–17, 375–6
Republic, 10, 11, 13, 18, 32–3, 48, 52, 64, 69, 101, 102, 165–250
compared to *Sophist/Statesman*, 333–5, 337–8, 361, 385
compared to *Theaetetus*, 256–9, 304–5, 308
mimesis in, 16–17, 20, 26, 61, 67, 82, 83–4, 90, 91, 92, 105, 228–45, 372–3, 375–6
responsibility, intellectual (*see also* authority), 21, 94, 191–2, 200, 382–3, 279, 280, 382–3
evasion of, by Plato/Sokrates, 21, 41–2, 163, 186–7, 191–2, 197, 249, 274, 382–3, 390
rhapsodes, 23, 26, 97–9, 101, 312
rhetoric/oratory (*see also epideixis*; long speeches; sophists), 35, 75, 81, 131, 197, 213
rivalry (*see also* agonism)
Plato's with poetry, 31, 44–5, 64, 84, 114–15, 154–62
Sokrates' with poets/sophists, 133, 136–7, 144–5, 148, 153, 154–62, 175, 192
Ryle, Gilbert, 16

"say what you believe," *see* sincerity requirement
self-love, *see* friendship with oneself
Semonides, 62
setting, dramatic
functions of, 63–5, 361
of *Hippias Minor*, 128–9, 149
of *Republic*, 165–9
of *Sophist/Statesman*, 316–17
of *Theaetetus* (*see also Theaetetus*, opening of), 252, 257, 301, 316–17
Shakespeare, 18, 38
shame, 123–4, 131, 151, 182, 195, 255
silence
in Greek culture, 23, 40–41, 122–4, 262, 393
induced by Sokrates, 122–4, 126, 182–3, 191, 193, 195–6, 210, 280, 394
of Sokrates, 85, 123–4, 129, 391, 392–5
Simonides, 175, 176, 240
sincerity requirement, 116, 182–3, 185–6, 190, 251 n., 263, 287
slaves, 21, 24, 66, 68 n., 167, 223–4, 297–8, 305, 362
social status (*see also* elite attitudes)
as constructive of identity, 54, 58–60, 63, 223, 289–91, 295, 297–8

of characters in *Hippias Minor*, 128–30, 132–3, 149–50
of characters in *Republic*, 166–8, 182–3, 198, 203, 212
of characters in *Theaetetus*, 256, 277–8, 301, 320
of Eleatic visitor, 318–19, 362
of Plato's characters generally, 52, 66, 76–8, 118–19
of Sokrates, 76–7
Sokrates, Platonic (*see also* agonism of Sokrates; Athens, Sokrates and; education/pedagogy, Socratic; imitation of Sokrates; irony, Socratic; *logoi* of Sokrates; silence of Sokrates)
and *erōs*, 74, 79, 87, 107, 109, 261, 271, 273, 293, 294
as comic figure, 71–2, 77, 87, 108, 267, 299
as father-figure, 177, 272–7, 282–3, 285, 341
as hero, 73–4, 78, 85, 87, 88, 104, 112, 121–2, 127, 149, 158–61, 279–80
as ideal philosopher, 188, 266–7, 298–301
constructive, 11, 13, 123, 338, 378, 380, 390
in *Republic*, 165, 193–4, 199–211, 213–14, 217–19, 222, 227–8, 246–50, 251, 255, 265, 274, 337
cosmopolitanism of, 78–9, 168
creativity of, 11, 207, 210–11, 227–8, 247–8, 301–3, 382
deficiencies of, 13, 125–7, 162–4, 178–80, 183–7, 209–10, 221–4, 226–7, 252–4, 260, 286, 295, 384–5, 387, 389–90
dethroning of, in *Sophist/Statesman*, 315, 322, 360, 378, 383–96
dominance of, 42–3, 120–21, 179, 193, 194, 199–202, 209–10, 242–3, 322, 381–2, 387, 392, 396
effect of on others, 52, 56–7, 86, 106–7, 117, 125–6, 143, 149, 176, 180–84, 186–7, 191–3, 255
elenctic, 10, 12–14, 113–27, 129–54, 165–93, 196–7, 200–203, 209, 215, 221–4, 226–7, 251–6, 260, 274, 286, 295–6, 332–3, 378–80, 384–6
friendliness of, 121, 187, 194–5, 199, 227, 255, 381, 394
general figure of, 8–11, 51, 69–80, 299–300, 306–7, 378, 381–4, 389–92, 396
historicity of, 8–9, 11, 36–7, 79 n., 115, 127, 381
immortality of (*see also* Sokrates, reproduction of), 3, 85, 87–8, 110–11, 303–4, 389, 391
individuality of (*see also* Sokrates, uniqueness of), 2, 36–7, 42, 125, 202, 378–9, 389, 390–92, 396
later influence of, 10, 37, 46, 69, 74, 85, 112
memory of, 101, 263, 278, 306
paradoxical nature of, 69–80, 298–301
physicality of, 70–75, 107–9, 299–301, 329, 378
relationship of to Plato, 88, 110–11, 386, 395, 396
reproduction of, 86–8, 110–11, 124–5, 162, 261–3, 275–7, 303–13
resemblance of to sophist, 122–4, 384–6, 388
tragedy of, 85 n., 87–8, 262–3
transgressiveness of, 71, 73–4, 294
trial and/or death of, 6–7, 36–7, 65, 71, 79, 85, 86, 87–8, 127, 215, 218
relevance of to *Theaetetus*, 252, 261, 276, 298–9, 304–5
relevance of to *Sophist/Statesman*, 317, 386–90, 392
uniqueness of, 2, 69–75, 86–8, 127, 202, 210–11, 218, 228, 247, 262–3, 288–9, 303–4, 312, 318, 378, 390–92
Sokratikoi logoi, genre of, 32, 37
sophia (cleverness/wisdom) (*see also* old age/old men, wisdom of), 114, 117, 119, 134, 136, 137, 140–42, 144, 146, 157, 159, 186
Sophist/Statesman, 12, 314–96
links of to *Theaetetus*, 7–8, 13, 313, 314–17, 323–4, 392
literary merits of, 316, 374–5, 387–8
sophist, figure of (in *Sophist*), 324–5, 341–3, 355, 359, 360, 365–7, 372, 382, 384–6
"noble", 384–5, 388
sophists (*see also* names of individual sophists), 96–9, 101, 118–19, 128–9, 320
cosmopolitanism of, 98, 128, 141
links of to poetic tradition, 96–9, 128, 134, 136, 143, 197–8

sophists (*cont.*)
  Plato's treatment of, 32, 96–7, 98, 100, 106, 118–19, 122–3, 136–7, 255
Sophocles, 7–8, 9, 62, 301
  Philoctetes of, compared with *Theaetetus*, 275, 277, 280–81
soul, 124–5, 152, 266
  dialogue in (*see also* dialogue, internal/external), 268–70, 285
  independence of, from body, 74, 124, 264, 290, 299
Sparta/Spartans, 60, 122, 128
spirit, *see thumos*; vigor/courage
Statesman, *see Sophist/Statesman*
statesman, figure of (in *Statesman*), 324–5, 335–6, 351–4, 359
Stehle, Eva, 39
Strauss, Leo, 34
symposium, 22, 63, 289, 297, 299
Symposium (Plato's), 10, 11, 64, 65, 69, 77, 94, 101
  dramatic structure of, 20, 24, 42, 43, 48, 52
  erotic theory of, 74, 227, 271

Terpsion, *see* Eukleides and/or Terpsion
Theaetetus, 7–8, 13, 21, 40, 251–313, 326–32, 333, 339, 341, 378–9, 385
  opening of, 18, 20, 21, 24, 43–4, 48, 65, 281, 304–7, 311–13, 316–17
Theaitetos
  as ideal interlocutor, 256–60, 274, 296–7, 331–2
  compared to *Republic's* guardians, 256–9, 304, 327, 335, 344
  compared to young Sokrates, 330–33, 337
  creativity of, 258, 264
  exceptional *phusis* of, 256, 273, 274, 277, 329–30, 351
  historical figure of, 32–3, 251, 304, 305
  in *Sophist/Statesman*, 315, 318, 326–37, 341–4, 348, 350–51, 366, 373–4, 377
  in *Theaetetus*, 256–89, 294, 296, 300, 304–5, 310–11
  likeness of to Sokrates, 260–70, 275, 284–6, 288–9, 304, 310–11, 318, 329, 330
  mathematical skills of, 32–3, 257–8, 263, 305, 330
  memory of, 257, 263, 278, 281, 330
  uniqueness of, 258, 327, 330
Theodoros, 253, 254, 255, 256–7, 272, 277–81, 285, 286–7, 293, 306, 315, 320
Theognis, 59, 82
Theophrastus, 60, 62, 81
Thersites, 61–2, 181
thirty, age of, 213
Thrasymachos, 32, 68, 165–6, 167, 180–99, 206–7, 208–9, 212–13, 220–21, 228–35, 245–7
  "taming" of, 92–3, 193–6, 243
thumos, 182, 188
Timaeus-Critias, 12, 322, 361, 392
time, dramatic use of, 65–6, 80
tragedy, Greek (*see also* drama, Greek), 7–9, 15, 17, 30, 31, 33–4, 55, 56, 62, 82, 90, 301
treatise (vs. dialogue form), 38, 41, 49 n., 111
truth
  impersonality of, 46, 124, 163, 182, 186, 287, 295, 296, 308–9, 349
  Sokrates' quest for, 46, 114, 124, 159, 295
tyrant, figure of in Plato, 62, 82, 173, 176, 189, 330–31, 243
Tyrants, Thirty, 78, 93, 127, 166–8, 179–80, 389

ugliness, *see* beauty/ugliness

versatility (*see* also multiplicity; *poikilia*), 75, 133–5, 137, 140–43, 147, 155–7, 255, 277–8
vigor/courage
  and gentleness, 188–9, 204–6, 211, 219, 256–7, 327–8, 335–6, 379
  intellectual, 153, 169–70, 175–6, 177, 187, 188, 205, 206, 209, 249, 306, 328–9, 336, 379
  physical, 72, 169–70, 175–6, 190, 256, 261, 304, 328
Vlastos, Gregory, 254

Whitehead, Alfred North, 46
women
  attitudes towards, in Plato (*see also* imagery, erotic/reproductive; imagery,

midwife; imagery, weaving), 66, 76–7, 79, 128, 294–5, 298, 362–4
in the Academy, 52 n.
in Greek culture, 9 n., 62, 72, 76, 83, 123, 128 n., 141, 143 n., 294, 319, 363
words and deeds, 27, 49, 76, 85, 98,130–31, 244
writing
attitudes towards, in Plato, 25, 28, 44, 76, 101, 110, 305–10
Plato's works as, 25, 28, 44, 110–11, 250, 311–13, 377, 396
Xenophon, 22, 23, 55, 62, 127

young Sokrates, 261–2, 315, 326–37, 338, 341–2, 350–51, 355, 373, 377
compared with Theaitetos, 330–33
youth/young men, 77, 95, 119–20, 126, 255, 259–60, 271, 280–82, 328, 334, 341–2, 351

Zanker, Paul, 58–9
Zeus, 323
Zopyrus, 73

Index of passages cited

Aelian
VH
2.30 15 n., 30
Aeschylus
Libation Bearers
748–60 62
Seven Against Thebes
592–4 240
Anacreon
82 Gentili 59 n.
Anth. Pal.
9.188 46 n.
Antiphon
DK 87 B60 64 n.
Antisthenes
fr. 51 Caizzi 134 n., 135 n.
Archilochus
114 West 72 n.
196A West 62
Aristophanes
Birds
831 141 n.
1280–83 108 n.
1553–5 72 n.
Clouds
60–74 68 n.
412–17 94 n.
478–80 114 n.
500–505 108 n., 290 n.
834–7 108 n.
961–1023 60, 71
1079–82 81 n.
1321–33 320 n.
1353–79 175 n., 320
Frogs
57–72 107
710–14 196 n.
717–19 63 n.
948–52 111 n.
954–8 104
967 168 n.
1007–8 122
1010–11 83
1032–6 134 n.
1050–51 83, 92
1069–73 104
1174–5 140 n.
1491–2 72 n.
Lysistrata
529–38 141 n.
Thesmophoriazusae
146–71 102, 266 n.
Wasps
1016–22 21 n.
Aristotle
EE
1240a9–b38 284 n., 288 n.
EN
1096a16 287 n.
1098b7 64 n.
1105a17–b12 127 n.
1106b27–35 224 n.
1123a34–1125a17 59
1124b1–5 108 n.
1125a5–9 199 n.
1129a11–16 152 n.
1155a32–b8 265 n.
1157a3–8 271 n.
1159b2–3 284
1161a4–6 285 n.
1161b16–1162a15 285 n., 288
1166a1–b2 269 n., 288
1167b17–1168a27 121 n.

1168a28–1169b2 284 n., 288
Hist. An.
492a 71 n.
Met.
908a22–28 81 n.
1025a6–13 137, 152 n.
Poet.
1447b9–13 14 n.
1448a1–18 4 n., 16 n., 30, 53, 62
1452b30–1453a17 83 n.
1461a21–3 98 n.
1461b29–1462a4 23 n.
1462a14–18 81 n.
Pol.
1252a24–b15 362 n.
1253b27–33 319 n.
1264b27–7 12 n.
1265a11 396 n.
1340a28–b19 57 n.
Post. An.
97b18–21 71
Rhet.
1356a1–13 35
1400b19–21 68 n.
1403b22 23 n.
1416a28–34 94 n.
Soph. El.
165a37–b9 338 n.
183b6–184a8 99 n.
183b22–8 64 n.
Top.
117b10–14 132 n.
117b25 134 n.
[Aristotle]
Ath. Pol.
29.3 168 n.
34.3 168 n.
58 166 n.
MM
1213a10–26 286
Prob.
963b15 71 n.
Arrian
Epict. Diss.
5–8 58 n.
Athenaeus
9.381f–382a 24
11.505d 32
Augustine
Civ. Dei
18.18 94 n.

Cicero
Ad Att.
13.19.4 18 n.
4.16 46 n.
De Orat.
3.32 141 n.
Tusc.
1.39 46 n.

Demetrius
On Style
37 30 n.
288 34 n.
Demosthenes
19.246–50 94
Diogenes Laertius
1.34 298 n.
2.19 76 n.
2.21 117 n.
2.27 94 n.
2.31 76 n.
2.36 91
2.47 109 n.
2.105–6 76 n., 305 n.
2.108 305 n.
3.5 15
3.6 305 n.
3.7 64 n.
3.17 31 n.
3.26 45 n.
3.34 109 n.
3.35–7 12 n., 23 n., 32
3.46 52 n.
3.48 55 n.
3.50 24 n
3.52 19 n., 321 n.
3.56–62 15 n., 86 n.
4.32 25 n.
Dionysius of Halicarnassus
De Comp. Verb.
25 4 n.
Dissoi Logoi
2.17 141 n.

Empedocles
DK 31 B112.3–4 39, 266 n.

Eunapius
VS
502 72 n., 122 n.
504 72 n.
Euripides
Bacchae
266–327 56
367 68 n.
508 68 n.
Helen
262–6 59 n.
941–3 174 n.
1014–16 290 n.
Heraclidae
655–72 59 n.
Medea
214–18 123 n.
516–19 59 n.
920–21 174 n.
Orestes
917–22 72 n.
Phoenissae
390–92 123 n.
535–40 284 n.

Gorgias
DK 82 B8 98 n.
B23 374 n.
Helen
8–14 99

Heraclitus
DK 22 B30 142 n.
B35 142 n.
B40 140 n.
B124 142 n.
Herodotus
1.30 64, 71 n.
2.35.2 141 n.
6.21.2 89 n.
9.91 68 n.
Hesiod
Theog.
570–93 59 n.
WD
54–82 59 n.
185–8 320 n.
235 275 n.
287–92 64 n.
Hippias
DK 86 A13 156 n.
B6 145, 155 n.
B17 132 n.
Homer
Iliad
1.225 31 n.
2.212–19 61–2
2.478–9 61 n.
2.484–93 312 n.
3.195–8 73
3.202 157 n.
6.342 123 n.
6.476–81 174 n.
9.308–13 135 n.
9.323–7 301
9.443 98 n.
9.522–8 82 n.
11.543–73 78 n.
15.412 133 n.
18.105–6 134
18.394 266 n.
18.417–20 61 n.
18.425 266 n.
24.629–30 61 n.
Odyssey
1.1 133 n., 135 n.
3.122 157 n.
3.126–9 134 n.
3.126–224 155 n.
4.204–11 174 n.
3.28–261 155
8.22 266 n.
8.552 68 n.
10.330 133 n.
11.368 155 n.
11.563–4 123 n.
17.465 123
17.486 157 n.
17.518–21 155 n.
20.17–18 158 n.
23.156–63 73

Isocrates
Ad Nic.
40–41 94 n.
Antid.
84–5 389 n.
274 222

277 81
278 35 n.
Evag.
10–11 90 n.
75 57 n.

[Longinus]
9.3 82 n.
13.3–4 30 n., 31 n.
36.2 112 n.
44.2–5 60 n.
Lucretius
3.628 358 n.
Lysias
10.29 59 n.
12.4 166 n.
12.14 180
12.16–19 166 n.
12.20 167 n.

Olympiodorus
Comm. Alc.
2.76–9 15 n.
2.147–50 52 n.

Pausanias
22.8 76 n.
Philemon
fr. 93 Kassel–Austin 60 n.
Pindar
Ol.
1.28–9 61 n.
Pyth.
2.72 83
Plato
Alcibiades 1
132d–133b 285 n.
Apology
17c–18a 41, 299, 300
18bcd 94 n., 299 n.
19bcd 94 n., 299 n.
19e–20a 132, 136 n.
20e 41
21a 41
21b–23b 86, 100, 114, 139, 159, 186 n.
21e 253
23c 52, 86
24d–25a 82, 123
26a 147 n., 148 n.
27c10 123
28cd 158
29c–30b 75 n., 76, 100, 115, 139, 159, 388 n.
30cde 118, 389
31b 79, 86
32a–d 75, 78, 299, 300
32e–33b 80, 384 n.
34cd 79
35a 75, 299
37e–38a 80
38c–39d 85, 86, 170 n.
41bc 152 n., 159
41e–42a 79, 86
Charmides
153d 71 n.
154c–e 61 n., 71 n., 271 n.
154e–155a 127
161e–162b 141 n., 327 n.
175de 93
Cratylus
403d 84
422e–424a 102
432bc 237
Crito
44a–d 79, 158 n., 389 n.
46bcd 100, 117
47a–48b 78 n., 100, 152, 389 n.
49a–d 100 n.
50abc 86 n., 388
50d–51c 75, 79 n., 248 n.
51c–53e 69, 75 n., 123 n., 388 n.
54bc 388
Epistulae
314c 32
328b 259
338b 259
340c 218 n.
341a–e 38, 248 n.
Euthydemus
271bc 119 n., 122 n., 372 n.
272a–d 77 n., 122 n.
273e–274a 323 n.
274de 222 n.
282c 258 n.

Plato (*cont.*)
290bc 259 n.
290e 43 n.
300d 106
303e–304a 106
304bcd 98 n., 100
Euthyphro
2ab 62, 299
3cd 80, 125
11b–e 4 n., 70, 148 n.
12a 255 n.
36bc 108 n.
Gorgias
413c 126
447a 299
447d–448a 122 n.
452de 97
456ab 372 n.
456c–457c 140 n.
458d 126
461cd 341 n.
470c 77
471e–472b 76
473e–474a 78 n.
481bc 77, 123
481d–482d 82
482e 122
483e–484a 96
484cde 289 n.
485a–e 71 n.
486e–487e 189 n.
490e 114 n.
505e–506a 123 n.
510d–511a 82
513abc 84, 157 n., 237 n.
515b–517a 100 n., 123, 127, 382 n.
521d 69, 390 n.
524d–525a 62 n.
525c 92 n.
526c 158
527c 86
Hippias Major
281ab 128 n., 131, 136 b., 156 n.
282b 131
282d–e 98 n., 128 n.
283bc 119 n., 131 n.
284e 131 n.
285c–286b 128, 129, 131 n., 140 n., 142 n.
286a–287c 130 n., 132
290b 61 n.
291a 141 n.
291de 135 n.
292e 158 n.
295e–296a 140 n., 150 n.
301b 178 n.
304ab 130 n., 140 n., 178 n.
304de 87 n.
Hippias Minor
363ab 123 n., 129, 132, 133, 393 n.
363c–364a 98 n., 128 n., 129, 130, 131, 132, 140, 141 n., 143, 150, 157
364b–e 129, 130, 131, 132, 133, 134, 135
365bcd 21, 135, 136, 137, 138, 143
365e 137, 138, 153, 156
366ab 136, 137, 138, 140
366c–367d 135, 137, 139, 140, 146 n., 147
367d–368a 137, 139
368a–d 43 n., 97, 128 n., 130 n., 139, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 146, 156, 157
368e–369a 142, 155, 156
369bc 128 n., 139, 143, 144, 162, 178 n.
369de 136, 144
369e–370a 144
370a–371e 138, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 149 n., 153, 157
371e–372a 148, 149 n., 151
372a–d 136, 144, 148, 149 n., 159, 161
372e–373a 139, 141 n., 148, 149, 152, 154, 159, 161
373bc 131, 149, 150, 162
373c–375e 150, 151
374cd 152
375d 153, 154, 162
375e–376c 136, 151, 152, 153, 154, 159, 161, 162

Ion
530a–d 26, 97 n., 99, 141 n.
531a 140 n.
532d 23 n.
533c 97 n., 140 n.
533d–535e 23 n., 99, 215 n., 291 n., 312 n.
536a, d 23 n., 291 n.
540b 60 n., 99
541de 99, 157, 372 n.
542ab 218 n.
Laches
178a–180a 63 n.
180de 76 n.
183bcd 116
186a–187b 100 n.
189b 72 n.
200cd 76, 116
Laws
625bc 306 n.
655ab 57 n.
656b 84
663b6–7 71 n.
667d–669b 367 n.
715cde 341 n., 352
719c 60 n.
720a–e 351 n.
722d–723b 64 n.
728b 82, 83
731bcd 211 n.
734d–735a 336 n.
746c 200
747b 257 n.
751de 77 n.
811a 94 n.
815d–816d 82
816de 26 n., 59 n., 80 n., 92
838c 92
857cde 351 n.
875d 353 n.
886c 379 n.
887de 81 n., 82
892d–893e 199 n.
903bcd 4 n.
904de 82
904e–905a 83
964d–965b 4 n.
Lysis
210c 119 n.
211a 393 n.
223ab 77, 100 n.
Meno
70ab 227 n., 276
71ab 75
72a 255 n.
80abc 117 n., 122
81abc 148 n., 170 n.
82b 223
86b 118 n.
91b–96d 82, 96
100b 218 n.
Parmenides
126c–127a 312 n.
127bcd 77 n., 93, 343 n.
127e–136d 120 n.
130e 282 n.
136d–137a 77 n.
137bc 340 n., 342 n.
Phaedo
59bc 18, 78, 261 n., 305 n.
60a–61b 77 n., 79, 298 n., 299 n.
63b–e 80, 388 n.
64a 79
67c–68c 290 n.
77e–78a 79, 86, 248 n.
81e–82c 158
84c 393 n.
87bc 360 n.
88c 47 n.
91bc 46 n.
96a–99e 299 n.
102a–d 47 n., 70n
107ab 126 n.
114d 248 n.
117d 108 n.
118b 69
Phaedrus
229c–230a 75, 93, 161, 215 n.
230e 306
236b 380
242c 276 n.
245a 82 n.
246a 50 n.
249d–250c 290 n., 291 n., 356 n.
251a 61 n.

Plato (*cont.*)
251e 71 n.
252d–253c 61 n., 246 n., 286 n.
253de 71 n.
255d 286
258bcd 44 n., 45n.
261bc 134 n., 155 n.
265c–266c 323 n., 380
267b 128 n., 136 n.
272a 325 n.
273e 323 n.
275a–e 28, 44 n., 101, 110, 142 n., 236, 307 n.
278e–279b 276 n., 305 n.
279b 72 n.
Philebus
16cde 323 n.
23c4 358 n.
36d 369 n.
52e 388 n.
Protagoras
310c 68 n.
313c–314c 100 n.
314c–316a 96, 97, 129, 372 n.
316c–317a 97 n., 134 n.
319a1 140 n.
328a 276 n.
328d 97 n.
329b 44 n.
331c 126
333c 186 n.
334c–338e 101, 394 n.
335c–336b 114 n., 122 n., 123
338a 131 n.
339e 122 n., 124 n.
342de 122 n.
347a 145
347b–348a 21 n., 99 n., 237 n., 299 n.
350c 101 n.
354e–356c 186 n.
357e 148 n.
358a–359a 136 n.
361e 69
Republic
327abc 165, 167, 175, 219, 221, 222
328ab 64, 165, 167, 169, 175, 204 n., 219
328cde 167 n., 168, 169, 170, 171, 187, 229
329a–e 100 n., 170 n., 171, 172, 173, 187, 229
330abc 169, 171, 174, 187, 229
330d–331e 170, 171, 172, 173, 174, 175, 229, 280
331e–332a 174 n., 323 n.
332cde 174, 176, 177
333a12 176
333cde 174, 176
334a–e 176, 287
335cde 175, 176, 177, 187, 208
336a 176, 243
336bc 122, 179, 180, 181, 184
336de 179, 184, 187, 196
337a 125, 184, 191, 194, 202, 206
337cde 171, 184, 197, 204
338ab 171, 196, 197, 199, 205, 212
338d5 129
339a 183
339e 187
340abc 177, 179, 187, 204 n.
340e2 184
341abc 181 n., 184
342cd 43 n.
343a–344c 176 n., 181, 183, 230, 231 n.
344de 181, 183, 190, 191, 196
345ab 181, 182, 183
347a 205
347e–348b 181, 206
348e 245
349ab 186
350cd 43, 62, 182, 187, 215
351cd 181, 187
351e 181
352b 64
352d 191
353e 182, 186, 339 n.
354abc 64, 165, 182, 183, 185, 187, 193, 194, 197, 200

357abc 193, 204, 206
358a–d 172, 191, 192, 193, 197, 205, 206, 212
359d–360d 239, 240
360e–361d 4 n., 61 n., 225, 235 n., 240
362abc 176 n., 198, 240
362de 190, 191, 192, 202, 204, 205, 206, 219
362e–365a 240
363a–e 172, 229, 231, 240
364b 198, 230 n.
364cde 64 n., 240
365ab 214, 240, 241
365d–366b 230 n., 241
366c 194, 204
366d–367a 45, 69, 192, 212, 213, 215
367ab 190, 191, 241
367de 192, 205, 248
367e–368c 190, 192, 198 n., 200 n., 202, 205, 206, 213, 213, 218
369e–370c 141 n., 225
371cd 172
372a 204
372cd 203, 207, 212
374a 203
375a–376b 177 n., 188, 211 n., 214
376d 232
376d–398c 220
377abc 64 n., 217, 232, 259
378a–d 215, 217, 233 n.
378e–379a 231 n.
379a–380c 229, 230 n., 233 n.
380d 226
381de 229, 230 n., 235 n.
383a 217
383c 219, 226
386a–387c 84, 229, 230
387d–388d 84, 92, 157, 180, 215, 234
388e–389d 201, 234
389e 157, 231
390abc 229, 230 n.
390d–391a 173, 229, 229, 232 n., 235
391a–d 145, 157, 230, 231, 232 n., 235
391e 81 n., 232 n.
392ab 92, 230
392c–394c 16, 20, 23n, 236
392d 200, 202
393a 236
393c 18, 236
393d–394a 90
394c 238
394e–395c 236, 238
395c–398b 23 n., 83
395cde 92, 232, 233, 237
396a 239, 242 n.
396b–e 83, 92, 201 n., 216 n., 234, 236, 238, 243
397a–d 23 n., 83, 236
397e–398b 98 n., 157, 239, 242
398b–401d 57 n., 61
398e–399a 203 n., 217
399c–400d 90 n., 204 n., 217
400c–401d 81 n., 82 n., 214
402b–403c 71 n., 204 n., 211, 219, 229, 234
409a–d 83, 238 n.
410a 215
414abc 146 n., 209, 226, 232
415abc 45 n., 203 n., 232
416a–417a 172, 234
419a 203, 212
420cd 4 n., 61 n.
423d 4 n.
425bc 83 n.
426ab 203
427cde 176, 190 n., 201
429a 215 n.
430c 169
432bc 200
432de 201
435c 203
438a 210
439e–440a 62
440c 182 n.
443bcd 33, 204, 215
445c 224
449ab 221
449c–450a 193 n., 201

Plato (*cont.*)
450d 209
451b 204, 209
451c–e 214
452d 234 n.
453abc 210
454b 325 n.
455b7 215
459ab 203 n.
462a–d 4 n.
463c 199
464ab, d 4 n.
466a 61 n., 214
468c–469b 226, 304 n.
470bc 362
472b–473a 61 n., 212, 240, 292 n.
474a 205 n., 209
474bcd 200, 201, 204 n.
474b–476d 225
475a 201 n.
475c–476d 142 n., 204, 225, 247
484cd 212 n., 238
487a–e 178, 191, 204, 208, 343
489ab 200, 207, 208
489e 225
490a–d 184, 203, 229
491a–493a 218
492a–495b 189
492a–e 82, 96 n., 218
493a–d 130 n., 201, 216
494bcd 212, 216
495a–496a 60 n., 109
496a–497a 167 n., 202, 218, 289 n., 389 n.
497cd 212
498cd 194, 204, 207
499ab 200
499d–500e 195, 207
500bcd 81 n., 82, 91, 199, 216, 224, 238, 289 n., 323 n.
500c–501c 61 n., 212 n., 214, 225
501c–502a 195 n., 203
502b–e 200, 219
503bcd 211 n.
504a–e 200, 204, 211 n., 213, 234
506a–507a 192, 200, 202, 207, 213, 214, 219, 250
507d–508a 50 n., 81 n.
508c3 201
509c 202
509d–511e 204, 225 n., 257, 258
514ab 228 n., 242
515a 211
515cde 215, 216
517bcd 204, 205, 289 n.
518cd 196, 215
519c–521b 204 n., 215, 216, 289 n., 304
522a 215
523abc 201, 216
524ab 216
524de 216
526c–530c 216, 289 n.
527e–528c 33, 208, 257
528d 204, 220
530b 204
531a 204 n.
531d 207
532bcd 214, 216
533a 213, 246, 249
533bcd 216, 258
534b 204, 213
534e 259
535ab 71 n., 257
535cd 214, 257 n.
536b–537a 101, 170, 194 n., 215, 216 n., 259
537b–539d 105 n., 178, 192, 207, 212, 213, 215, 225, 237, 259 n.
540abc 61 n., 216, 225, 226, 238, 240, 304 n.
544b 176, 205
547b–580a 62
548de 205 n.
550c–555a 172
554cde 172
557bc 142 n., 247
558b 237 n.
559e 84
561a–e 142 n., 157, 179

562e–563a 166 n.
568ab 235 n.
572b 84, 173, 219
572d–575a 212
573a–d 173, 201, 204, 229, 230 n., 231
574a 231
574d–575a 173, 229
576e–577a 59 n., 102
578a 229
580b9 190 n.
588a–e 61 n., 228 n., 231
588e–590a 208
589cde 173
590c–591a 59 n., 166 n., 215, 225, 226
592a 33 n.
595a5 244 n.
595bc 46 n., 90, 201, 239
596a–e 204, 205 n., 373 n.
596e–598b 244
597a8–9 201
598b–e 236, 243
603c 16 n.
604e 157, 224
605a 157
605bcd 83, 84
606ab 84
606cd 84, 234
607ab 1, 243
607c–608b 106, 217, 246, 248 n.
612abc 219, 230, 240
613ab 226, 266 n.
614b 228 n.
616a 92 n.
619b–620d 157 n., 158, 173, 242 n.

Sophist
216a–d 272, 285 n., 314, 315, 319, 323, 324, 325, 384, 394
217a–d 315, 318, 321, 331, 337, 340, 394
217c–218b 262, 285 n., 315, 326 n., 327, 328, 331 n., 338, 340, 342, 343, 346 n., 365 n., 383, 394
218cde 340 n., 350, 359 n.
219a 337
220d 330 n.
222b 347
224b 383 n.
224e 330 n.
225b–d 365 n., 386
226bc 362, 381 n., 382 n.
227ab 359 n., 360 n.
227d–234e 327, 364
228c–229a 360, 381
229d–230d 100 n., 282 n., 361, 381, 384, 384, 385
231abc 325 n., 331 n., 384
232a 366 n.
232cde 319 n., 341, 372 n., 379 n.
233bc 341 n., 372 n.
233d–234e 341 n., 342 n., 366, 370 n., 371, 372, 373 n., 385
234e–235a 341 n., 342, 373
235b 326 n.
235c6–7 357–8
235d–236c 367 n., 367 n., 369, 372, 373, 374
236d 345 n.
237ab 327 n., 343 n.
238d–239c 327, 328 n., 341, 348 n., 359 n.
239d–240a 260 n., 341, 342, 343, 365, 382 n., 386 n.
240c 363 n.
241d 349, 350
242ab 325, 331, 340 n., 348, 349
242d 361, 365 n.
242e–243b 266 n., 336, 342 n., 343 n., 345, 379 n., 380, 385
243d–244c 328 n., 380
245e 330 n.
246a–d 266 n., 328 n., 339, 343, 365 n.
246e–248d 328 n., 330 n., 339 n.
247b 348 n.

Plato (*cont.*)
248abc 343, 348 n., 349, 365, 384
248d 348 n.
249b 365 n.
251bc 341 n., 365
251e 348 n.
252ab 324 n., 358 n.
252cd 21 n., 348 n., 374
253cde 267 n., 297 n., 323, 324 n.
254ab 324, 325 n., 343 n., 388 n.
258cd 343, 349
259cd 341, 342 n., 384
260b 345 n.
261ab 330 n.
261de 327, 330 n.
262a–263e 327, 328 n., 337, 345 n., 363 n., 379 n.
265de 330 n., 332 n., 341 n., 344, 351, 370
267a–d 342, 366
268a–d 329 n., 338, 365 n., 386 n.

Statesman
257a–258a 262, 272, 314, 315, 319, 326 n., 329, 331, 336 n., 341, 359, 379, 394, 395
258b 337, 358 n.
258d 345 n.
260c 325
261a 346
261d–262b 328, 329 n., 333, 342, 345, 351, 364
262c–263a 324 n., 330 n., 333, 340 n., 345, 361
263de 364
264bc 343 n., 361
265a 358 n.
266abc 379 n.
266de 347
267a 358 n.
267cde 328, 346, 362 n.
268ab 364, 380
268cde 341, 355, 356 n., 359 n., 367 n., 371, 379
269ab 355, 356
269cd 324, 368
270d–271c 342 n., 354, 356 n.
271d–272a 342 n., 353, 354, 362 n., 381 n.
272bc 328 n., 332, 364
272e 323 n.
273bc 292 n., 323 n., 353 n., 454, 355, 381 n., 389 n.
274ab 354, 364, 369
274cd 215 n., 353 n., 354
274e–275c 326 n., 356
277abc 4 n., 328, 345 n., 367 n., 368, 370 n., 383
277cde 328, 340 n., 343, 345, 359 n., 368, 372
278d 364 n.
279ab 347 n.
280b7 345
281a 363 n.
282e 336 n.
283b 351, 369
283e 346
284c–285a 365 n., 368, 369, 370
285d–286b 345 n., 359, 360, 368, 370, 372, 383
286c–287b 215 n., 339, 345 n., 368, 369, 370, 383
289bcd 358, 363 n., 371
290a4 371
290e 343 n., 361
291abc 133 n., 324 n., 359 n., 360, 366 n., 373, 374
292cd 330 n.
292e–293d 333, 381 n.
293e–294a 329, 333, 345 n.
294bc 353 n.
294d–295c 320, 330 n., 352, 354 n., 361, 387, 390 n.
296a–e 332, 388 n.

297bc 333, 345, 381 n.
297e 373 n.
298e4 359 n., 373
299bc 386, 388
300bc 342, 352, 354 n.
300d–301a 237, 355, 381 n.
301d–302a 352, 354 n., 389, 390 n.
302abc 342, 369
302de 353, 358
303a–304a 325, 335 n., 352, 355, 366 n., 371 n., 376, 382 n., 389
304c 345 n.
305abc 352, 359 n., 363 n.
306a–311b 211 n., 335
306e 331
307a 331
308b–309b 335, 336, 363
309cde 335 n., 339 n., 352
310de 331, 336
311abc 335, 338, 352 n., 363, 375 n.

Symposium
172c–173d 86, 107, 108, 109
174bc 235 n.
175ab 299 n.
175d 101
176e 64, 298 n., 299 n.
177e 72
179b 66
179e 158 n.
186e 134 n.
187a 94 n.
192a5 275 n.
198b–199a 124 n., 299 n.
203c–204a 74
205bc 143
206c 294 n.
208cd 158 n.
209a5 215 n.
209cd 45 n.
210bc 71 n., 259, 261
210de 106, 248 n.
211a 74
211c 225 n.
212c 43 n., 297 n.
215a–e 57, 70 n., 106, 267
216ab 57, 86, 106, 253
216d–217a 72 n., 73
218b 291 n.
219e 106
220c–221c 78 n., 94 n., 299 n.
222ab 107

Theaetetus
142bc 256, 261, 273 n., 276, 306, 330 n.
142de 252 n., 281, 304, 306
143a–e 20, 24, 44, 75 n., 260, 261, 274, 275, 277, 278, 289, 292, 293, 298, 306, 307, 316, 343, 394
144abc 211 n., 256, 257, 261, 263, 278, 288, 298, 315, 328, 331
144c–145b 256, 257, 260, 261, 275, 277, 279, 285, 288, 298, 301
145cd 257, 279, 280
146a–e 40, 255 n., 256, 258, 263. 278, 279, 283, 293, 299
146d–148b 258
147cde 256, 257, 261, 262, 272, 283 n.
148bc 256, 257, 258 n., 263, 281, 341
148de 256, 263, 272, 349
148e–151d 101, 306
149a 70, 275, 285, 288, 293, 378
149bc 266 n.
149d–150b 272, 273, 363 n.
150c–151a 76, 253, 264, 267, 271 n., 273, 281, 283, 327
151b 255, 272, 294
151cd 255, 263, 279, 295, 381 n.
151e–152c 97, 272, 283, 307, 333 n.
152cde 235 n., 255, 379 n.
153a 299
154cde 263, 267, 270 n.
155ab 70 n., 270, 277

Plato (*cont.*)

155c–156a 257, 259, 264, 266, 270 n., 306
156bc 265
157bcd 263, 267, 274, 296
160e–161a 256, 272, 273 n., 274, 279, 282 n., 287, 294, 296
161e 299
162a–e 253, 254 n., 255 n., 259, 278, 279, 280, 282 n., 307
162e–163a 263
163abc 255, 258
164cd 253, 382 n.
164e–165b 256, 278, 279, 287 n., 307, 308
166abc 259, 282 n., 307, 308, 309, 339 n.
166c–167d 21 n., 254 n., 365 n.
167d–168e 254, 259, 266, 273 n., 279, 281, 282 n., 286, 384
169a–d 77 n., 253, 257, 272 n., 278, 279, 280
170a–172b 95, 291
170abc 303, 308
170e 278
171cd 265 n., 282, 287, 307, 309
172b–173b 252 n., 253, 259, 281, 289, 290 n., 297 n., 298, 299, 300, 386 n.
173c–174a 199 n., 289, 290, 293, 298, 299, 300, 301
174b–175b 199 n., 253 n., 289, 290, 291, 298, 299
175cde 253, 297, 298, 299
176a–e 84, 266 n., 267, 273, 274, 279, 291, 292 n., 299, 300
177abc 253, 266, 268 n., 279, 282 n., 286, 291
178b 308
179a 282
179d–180c 265, 266, 267, 268, 269, 276 n., 285 n., 287, 294 n.
181ab 253, 255, 265, 278, 282, 286, 287, 299, 300, 379 n.
183c–184a 256, 261, 266, 272 n., 278, 280, 282, 283, 394
184bc 255, 261, 263, 264
184e 265 n.
185b–186b 267 n.
185c3 154 n.
185e 258, 261, 264, 269, 271, 344
186bcd 259, 263, 267, 281
187a–d 259, 263, 264, 269, 282, 296
188c–190e 251 n., 268
189cd 255, 282, 283
190a 269
191a 293
191d 256
192cd 256
194bc 261, 262
195c 269
196a 269 n.
196d–197a 253, 255, 265, 300
199a5 254 n.
199e 255, 258
201cd 258, 264, 272, 344
202cd 264 n., 265
205a 256
206d 268 n.
207de 258
208c 204 n., 258, 263
209bc 260
210bcd 8 n., 252 n., 255, 257, 260, 271, 272 n., 273, 282, 294, 313, 314, 317, 332, 363 n., 379 n., 387
235c1 40

Timaeus

25e 33 n.
30b–31b 4 n.
34b 266 n.
42e 353 n.

76e 4 n.
87e–88c 211 n.

[Plato]
Eryxias
399bc 35 n.
Theages
130de 106 n.

Plutarch
Alexander
1.2 60
1.3 57 n.
Moralia
26ab 80 n.
335b 57 n.
711bc 24
796de 80 n.
835bc 166 n.

Poetae Melici Graeci
889 59 n.

Proclus
in Alc.
18.19 64 n.
in Parm.
658–9 64 n.
in Rem.
i.118–19 30 n.
i.161 30 n.
i.163–70 30 n.

Prolegomena Philosophiae Platonicae
1.29–38 30
3.17–20 15 n.
4.25–6 52 n.
10–11 19 n.
14.3–8 55 n.
14.9–23 88 n.
15.7–13 47
15.20–29 88 n.
20 24 n.
24–6 15 n.

Quintilian
Inst. Orat.
10.1.81 30 n.

Semonides
7.71–82 Diehl 62

Sophocles
Ajax
430–33 68 n.
474–6 68 n.
545–51 174 n.
Antigone
223–36 62
641–44 174 n.
Philoctetes
94 135 n..
356–8 275 n.
1440–44 33 n.

Theognis
119–28 59 n.
213–8 61 n.
535–7 59
963–70 59 n.

Theophrastus
Char.
5.5 275 n.
27 77 n.

Thrasymachus
DK 85 B5–6 180 n.

Thucydides
1.144.4 171 n.
2.36.2–3 171 n.
2.40.2 76

Xenophon
Ap.
30 170 n.
Hell.
2.4.19 127
Hiero
2.2 176 n.
Mem.
1.2.3 86 n.
1.2.6 76 n.
1.2.33–7 213 n.
1.3.1 117 n.
1.6.14 23, 25 n., 94 n.
2.1.21–34 62, 64 n., 98 n.
3.5 34 n., 205 n.
3.10 57 n., 60 n., 78
3.11 77 n.

Xenophon (*cont.*)
4.1–3 114 n.
4.4.5 128 n.
4.4.6–7 61 n., 130 n., 132 n., 139 n., 155 n.
4.4.9 163 n.
4.4.19–20 147 n.
4.5.12 268 n.
4.6.15 155 n.

Symp.
2.19 70 n.
3.5–6 55, 98 n., 167 n.
4.1.14 130 n.
4.2.1 119 n.
4.2.10 98 n.
4.6–7 96, 127, 140 n.
4.62 142 n.
5.10 126 n.