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PROSPECTS FOR DEMOCRACY IN YUGOSLAVIA

THURSDAY, JULY 29, 1999

U.S. SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPEAN AFFAIRS,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN Relations,
Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 3:23 p.m. in room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Gordon Smith (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Present: Senators Smith and Biden.

Senator Smith. Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. I apologize for our late beginning, but we are voting a lot today.

But we convene this Subcommittee on European Affairs to discuss the prospects for democracy in Yugoslavia and what the United States can do to assist those in Serbia who seek to oust the dictatorial regime of Slobodan Milosevic. Our first panel consists of Ambassador Robert Gelbard, Special Representative of the President and the Secretary of State for implementation of the Dayton Peace Accords, and Ambassador James Pardew, Deputy Special Advisor to the President and the Secretary of State for Kosovo and Dayton Implementation.

After we hear from administration representatives, the subcommittee will welcome Ms. Sonja Biserko—I apologize if my pronunciation is incorrect—chairperson of the Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia; Mr. James Hooper, executive director of the Balkan Action Council; Father Irinej Dobrijevic, executive director of the Office of External Affairs of the Serbian Orthodox Church here in the United States; Mr. John Fox, director of the Washington office at the Open Society Institute.

This hearing, by the way, will be the first in a series by this subcommittee on United States policy in the Balkans. This afternoon we are going to focus specifically on what is happening in Serbia right now, as opposition parties are rallying their supporters to take to the streets against Milosevic, as army reservists are launching protests after their return from Kosovo, as the Serbian Orthodox Church has at least spoken out in favor of replacing the regime for the good of the Serbian people.

In the fall, we will examine the course of political and diplomatic events that led to the NATO bombing in Kosovo, as well as the lessons the United States and our NATO allies can learn from the manner in which the war was waged. This has enormous implications for NATO and its future.
In addition, I am pleased that Senator Rod Grams will convene a hearing in September to look into the response of UNHCR to the Kosovo Albanian refugee crisis. I agree with Senator Grams that assessing the performance, both positive and negative, of UNHCR can be useful if and when we are faced with another refugee explosion in the future.

I appreciate the willingness of all our witnesses today to appear before the subcommittee, to share their thoughts and expertise on the prospects of democracy in Yugoslavia. We have an opportunity in Yugoslavia that we must not let pass. Milosevic has been weakened by the Serbian defeat in Kosovo and I feel that for the first time many average citizens of Yugoslavia have finally decided that they have had enough as well of his policies of repression and destruction.

He is now vulnerable. But as we all know, he has managed to be in vulnerable positions before, always managing to outmaneuver his opponents. He seems to be able to divide and conquer that way. Now that he has been indicted by the War Crimes Tribunal, I can only imagine that his desperation to hang onto power has intensified. Since the end of the war in Kosovo, opposition leaders in Serbia have launched demonstrations throughout the country, but thus far they have been unable to coordinate their message or their actions to reach out to a broader segment of the population. If these opposition forces have any hope of ousting Mr. Milosevic, it seems obvious to me that they must put aside personal differences and political ambition and, for the sake of their country, work together.

Ambassador Gelbard, I know that you have been working very hard on this issue, and I hope that in your comments you can offer me and other members who will join us some hope that we are moving in the right direction.

Furthermore, there are several other actors in this process: Montenegrin President Milo Djukanovic, the Serbian Orthodox Church, the student movement, which was so active in the 1996-97 demonstrations, and organizations like the independent media and trade unions. I am interested in exploring what role they can play in bringing about democratic change for Serbia.

I note that just yesterday the Foreign Relations Committee approved the Serbian Democratization Act, legislation that was introduced by Senator Helms in March, that I co-sponsored along with 11 other Senators. Specifically, the legislation authorizes $100 million in democratic assistance to Serbia over the course of the next 2 years. This is critically important. We must help those who are trying to establish democracy in their country.

I am pleased that the administration agrees with this approach and I understand that tomorrow in Sarajevo the President will announce that the United States will dedicate $10 million for this purpose. I encourage the administration to quickly identify appropriate organizations in Serbia so that this money can begin to have an effect as soon as possible. Milosevic must get this message: His days in power are over.

I believe we will soon be joined by Senator Biden and other members, but without delay we will turn to you, Ambassador Gelbard, and we welcome you and look forward to your remarks.
STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT S. GELBARD, SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE PRESIDENT AND THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DAYTON PEACE ACCORDS

Ambassador GELBARD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you particularly for giving me the opportunity once again to appear before the committee to discuss the status of our efforts on democratization in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

With your permission, sir, I would like to enter the full text of my statement for the record.

Senator SMITH. Without objection, we will receive that.

Ambassador GELBARD. This hearing comes at a moment of particular importance for the future of Yugoslavia and for the entire southeast European region. The success of the NATO air campaign, the deployment of KFOR, and the establishment of the U.N. civil administration in Kosovo have left President Slobodan Milosevic weakened and his policies discredited domestically as well as internationally.

Milosevic, as you said, Mr. Chairman, is now an international pariah and an indicted war criminal. While he and his regime remain in power in Belgrade, Serbia and the FRY cannot take their place among the community of nations, nor can they join the process of Euro-Atlantic integration, symbolized tomorrow by the Stability Pact Summit in Sarajevo.

Our policy with regard to Serbia has been very clearly articulated by President Clinton: As long as the Milosevic regime is in place, the United States will provide no reconstruction assistance to Serbia and we will continue our policy of overall isolation. Although we continue to provide the people of Serbia with humanitarian assistance through international organizations, like UNHCR, we cannot allow Milosevic or his political cronies to benefit from our aid. Helping to rebuild Serbia's roads and bridges would funnel money directly into the pockets of Milosevic and his friends, prolonging the current regime and denying Serbia any hope of a brighter future.

We must keep Milosevic isolated. Our European allies agree fully with this approach. We are working closely with them to coordinate our activities on Serbia and to deter any attempt at weakening the existing sanctions regime against the FRY.

Another key aspect of our policy on Serbia is to support the forces of democratic change that exist within Serbian society. Serbia's citizens have spontaneously demonstrated their disgust for Milosevic and their hunger for democratic government by gathering in the streets of cities throughout the country for the last several weeks. Opposition parties, taking advantage of the popular sentiment against Milosevic, have organized their own rallies and are beginning to mobilize for a larger effort in the fall. Serbia's independent media are also attempting to struggle out from under the weight of a draconian and repressive media law.

These are all very positive signs and we want to nurture them. At the same time, however, I do not want to overemphasize the possibility that the Milosevic regime will fall soon. Milosevic continues to hold the main levers of power in his hands, most importantly the army, the police, and the state-owned media. Over-
coming these obstacles would be difficult even for a united opposition in Serbia, but, sadly, the Serbian opposition remains far from united.

In all our dealings with Serbian opposition leaders—and I am in regular contact with every segment of the democratic opposition—we have urged them to overcome the politics of ego and to work together instead for the common good of Serbia and their people. I have repeatedly told opposition leaders—and I want to emphasize here—that the United States and the international community more broadly cannot do their job for them.

Change in Serbia must come from within, not from the outside, which means from us. We can buttress the opposition’s efforts. We can provide training and technical assistance to opposition parties. We can even provide equipment, and we can help widen the reach of the independent media. But we cannot win the hearts and minds of the Serbian people.

That can only happen if the opposition unites around a strong platform for positive change, a platform that must emphasize the destructive nature of Milosevic’s policies and presents a viable democratic alternative.

It is not for us to pick a single winner out of the opposition pack. It is for them to combine their different strengths in service for the greater goal.

Having said that, I would like to outline for you where we are focusing our efforts and in what ways we are promoting democratization in the FRY. Regardless of whether Milosevic stays or goes in the very short term, our support for democratic forces is an investment in Serbia’s and Yugoslavia’s future.

I should note, in fact, that we are not beginning from ground zero by any means here. In the 2 years leading up to the Kosovo crisis we spent $16.5 million on programs in support of Serbian democratization. The beginning of the conflict in Kosovo and the subsequent closure of our embassy in Belgrade by necessity cut short some of our programs, but we are now revitalizing our democracy support as quickly as possible.

I would divide the U.S. Government’s efforts on Serbia democratization into five categories: First, as I noted at the beginning, we are making sure that Milosevic remains completely isolated. This involves not just our sanctions policy, which means three levels of sanctions, starting with the outer wall, the Kosovo-related sanctions starting a year and a half ago, and then the wartime sanctions including the fuel embargo, but also the visa ban, which has had a demonstrably negative effect on members of the Milosevic regime psychologically and in real terms, and of course The Hague Tribunal indictments.

Second, we are beginning to assist a wide array of democratic groups, including NGO’s, political parties, independent media, youth organizations, and independent labor unions, as you mentioned, Mr. Chairman.

Third, we are consulting closely with European allies in order to coordinate our activities both on Kosovo and on Serbia democratization generally.
Fourth, we are encouraging the active engagement of regional countries in southeast Europe and particularly the neighbors, to harness their expertise with democratization and transition.

Fifth, we are providing strong support for the reform government in the FRY Republic Montenegro.

I would like to discuss briefly some of these tracks in greater detail. As I mentioned, over the past 2 years U.S. agencies such as AID, as well as NGO's such as the National Democratic Institute, the International Republic Institute, and the National Endowment for Democracy, have spent $16.5 million on projects aimed at the development of democratic governance and civil society in the FRY.

The situation this year was complicated by the outbreak of the conflict in Kosovo, but we still have money available in the pipeline for immediate use on Serbian democratization projects and we are using it right now. I am working closely with the National Endowment family, including IRI and NDI, to explore the best ways to help the Serbian opposition and, crucially, to encourage all opposition groups to work together.

The consensus among the experts is that opposition parties will be best served if we provide them with technical assistance and first class political advice, the kind that may seem commonplace to us but represents a whole different way of thinking to them.

Political parties are not the sole outlets for opposition in Serbia. Youth and student organizations, as well as independent labor unions, were very active in the 1996-97 demonstrations in Serbia and will undoubtedly be important sources of mobilization in the future. The AFL-CIO's Solidarity Center has done good work with independent unions in Serbia and, with our support, is now readying a new program for interaction.

On a larger economic scale, the Center for International Private Enterprise is preparing a program aimed at business leaders and independent economists in Serbia. Such economists, particularly those grouped under the G-17 in Belgrade, are widely respected and influential in Serbian society.

In short, by working with these groups we want to show the people of Serbia that our policy is not aimed against them, but against their leadership.

With regard to independent media, we are moving on two fronts. First, in order to increase the amount of objective news coverage reaching the Serbian population, we are nearing completion of what we call the “ring around Serbia,” a network of transmitters that permits us to broadcast Voice of America, Radio Free Europe, and other international news programs on FM frequencies throughout the country. RFE has now increased its Serbian language broadcasting to 13½ hours daily.

Perhaps even more important, however, we want to strengthen Serbia’s own independent media. Serbs, like Americans, prefer to get their news from their own sources in their own context. To this end, AID together with other international donors is reviewing a proposal by ANEM, the independent electronic media network in Serbia, that would assist individual television and radio stations, as well as create new links among them. Other programs to train journalists, support local print publications, and utilize Internet connections are also under consideration.
Overall, Mr. Chairman, I would add, as you know, that the administration does support the Serbian Democratization Act sponsored by Senator Helms and you, Mr. Chairman, and 11 others.

The second aspect of U.S. policy on Serbia that I would like to highlight is our cooperation with the Europeans. The NATO alliance proved its strength during the Kosovo air campaign and that solidarity has continued to be the rule, not the exception, in the post-conflict period. There are regular consultations between Secretary Albright and her European colleagues on issues related to both Kosovo and Serbia, as well as periodic meetings at the expert level.

The Western Europeans support our basic approach on Serbia and agree that isolating Milosevic must be the cornerstone of our strategy. We have pushed back on some efforts to lift selectively the oil embargo and provide fuel to opposition-controlled municipalities in Serbia, not because we object to helping opposition-run municipalities, but because oil is a fungible commodity and its distribution in Serbia would inevitably benefit Milosevic’s regime.

The Europeans, like us, are seeking the best ways to promote democracy in Serbia. They are eager to coordinate their democratization projects, as well as to ensure that we are all sending the same message of unity to the Serbian opposition.

The third pillar of our policy is the effort to engage the countries of southeast Europe in the Serbia democratization process. Leaders of these countries will meet together with Euro-Atlantic leaders tomorrow in Sarajevo under the rubric of the new Stability Pact for the region. At that meeting, participants will reaffirm their commitment to democratic development and express their regret that the FRY cannot take its rightful place at the summit because of the Milosevic regime.

We believe the countries of central and southeast Europe, with their vast experience in the transition to democratic and market-oriented societies, have a great deal to offer the people of the FRY. We are encouraging NGO’s and governments in the region to create links to democratic voices in Serbia and to share the benefits of the wisdom they have gained over the past decade.

Finally, in addition to our efforts to work with regional partners, we assign special importance to our cooperation with and support for the Government of Montenegro. This morning I noticed an editorial in the Wall Street Journal accusing the United States of neglecting Montenegro, which I find astonishing in its absolute incorrectness and the fact that it is totally wrong. We were not consulted on that editorial, of course.

The fact is that over 2 years ago we recognized that Milo Djukanovic had the potential to become an effective counterweight to Milosevic and his authoritarian policies. I began meeting with Djukanovic regularly even before he became the President of Montenegro a year and a half ago. I was with him during his inauguration when we felt that a strong international presence, a public presence, would deter a Milosevic-inspired coup. The U.S. provided $20 million in budgetary support over the last several months, when no other country stepped in to fill the gap, and we are prepared to do more.

We established a joint economic working group to discuss ways of modernizing the Montenegrin economy. We allowed Montene-
grin-owned ships to enter U.S. ports during the conflict and we pro-
vided a blanket waiver from Montenegro from FRY-related san-
tions from the very beginning as a way of stimulating their econ-
omy.

Djukanovic has managed to craft a multi-ethnic democratic coali-
tion government that focused on political and economic reform and
integration with the European mainstream. He and his government
have consistently demonstrated courage and determination in im-
plementing reform and in resisting Belgrade's attempts to strip
Montenegro of its constitutional powers. As a result, we have
steadily increased our support for Montenegro, providing financial
and technical assistance as well as humanitarian assistance of
many millions of dollars through UNHCR.

Because the Government of Montenegro represents the most
credible and powerful opposition force in the FRY today, we believe
that President Djukanovic and Montenegro can play a constructive
role in promoting democratic change in Serbia, too. While it is too
small to change Serbia directly, it can serve as a guiding light for
the Serbian opposition.

What Montenegro needs now is support from their European
neighbors in concrete terms, and particularly the same kind of
sanctions waivers that we have provided all along. We have urged
the Europeans to take a more forward-leaning approach to Monte-
negro and come through in concrete terms.

Mr. Chairman, it is clear that we have not reached the point
where we can say that Serbia is irreversibly on the road to democ-

cracy. Our efforts now, however, can do two things. In the short
term, we can help the indigenous Serbian opposition to focus their
energies and more effectively articulate their anger and frustration
of the Serbian public. In the longer term, we can cultivate and
strengthen these forces that will carry the democracy banner as
long as Milosevic remains in power.

Both of these are important goals. U.S. leadership in this endeav-
or is critical and your support is essential. As I said, the proposed
Serbian Democratization Act, which would authorize $100 million
over 2 years for democratization projects, is an excellent example
of the convergence of administration and congressional perspectives
on the Serbia democracy issue.

We look forward to working together with Congress to bring de-
mocracy to Serbia and the entire Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and
restore real stability to the region.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Gelbard follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR ROBERT S. GELBARD

Thank you for giving me the opportunity once again to appear before the com-
mittee to discuss the status of our efforts on democratization in the Federal Repub-
lic of Yugoslavia. This hearing comes at a moment of particular importance for
Yugoslavia and for the entire Southeast Europe region. The success of the NATO
air campaign, the deployment of KFOR, and the establishment of the UN civil ad-
ministration in Kosovo have left FRY President Milosevic weakened and his policies
discredited domestically. Milosevic is now an international pariah and an indicted
war criminal. While he and his regime remain in power in Belgrade, Serbia and the
FRY cannot take their place among the community of nations, nor can they join the
process of Euro-Atlantic integration symbolized this week by the Stability Pact sum-
mit in Sarajevo.
Our policy with regard to Serbia has been very clearly articulated by President Clinton. As long as the Milosevic regime is in place, the United States will provide no reconstruction assistance to Serbia. Although we continue to provide the people of Serbia with humanitarian assistance through international organizations like UNHCR, we cannot allow Milosevic or his political cronies to benefit from our aid. Helping to rebuild Serbia’s roads and bridges would funnel money directly into the pockets of Milosevic and his friends, prolonging the current regime and denying Serbia any hope of a brighter future. We must keep Milosevic isolated. Our European allies agree fully with this approach. We are working closely with them to coordinate our activities on Serbia and to deter any attempt at weakening the existing sanctions regime against the FRY.

Another key aspect of our policy on Serbia is to support the forces of democratic change that exist within Serbian society. Serbia’s citizens have spontaneously demonstrated their disgust for Milosevic and their hunger for democratic government by gathering in the streets of cities throughout the country for the last several weeks. Opposition parties, taking advantage of the popular sentiment against Milosevic, have organized their own rallies and are beginning to mobilize for a larger effort in the fall. Serbia’s independent media are also attempting to struggle out from under the weight of a draconian and repressive media law. These are all very positive signs and we want to nurture them.

At the same time, however, I do not want to overemphasize the possibility that the Milosevic regime will fall anytime soon. Milosevic continues to hold the main levers of power in his hands, most importantly the army, the police, and the state-owned media. Overcoming these obstacles would be difficult even for a united opposition in Serbia, and—sadly—the Serbian opposition remains far from united.

In all of our dealings with Serbian opposition leaders (and I am in regular contact with every segment of the democratic opposition) we have urged them to overcome the politics of ego and work together for the common good of Serbia. I have told opposition leaders—and I want to emphasize here—that the United States, and the international community more broadly, cannot do their job for them. Change in Serbia must come from within, not from the outside. We can buttress the opposition’s efforts, provide training and technical assistance to opposition parties, and help widen the reach of the independent media, but we cannot win the hearts and minds of the Serbian people. That can only happen if the opposition unites around a strong platform for change, a platform that emphasizes the destructive nature of Milosevic’s policies and presents a viable democratic alternative. It is not for us to pick a single winner out of the opposition pack; it is for them to combine their different strengths in service of a greater goal.

Having said that, I would like to outline for you where we are focusing our efforts and in what ways we are promoting democratization in the FRY. Regardless of whether Milosevic stays or goes in the short term, our support for democratic forces is an investment in Serbia’s future.

I should note, in fact, that we are not beginning from ground zero by any means. In the two years leading up to the Kosovo crisis, we spent 16.5 million dollars on programs in support of Serbia democratization. The beginning of the conflict in Kosovo and the subsequent closure of our embassy in Belgrade by necessity cut short some of these programs, but we are now revitalizing our democracy support as quickly as possible.

I would divide the U.S. government’s efforts on Serbia democratization into five categories:

- **first**, as I noted at the beginning, we are making sure that Milosevic remains completely isolated. This involves not just our sanctions policy but the visa ban—which has had a demonstrably negative impact on members of the Milosevic regime—and ICTY indictments;
- **second**, we are planning to assist a wide array of democratic groups, including NGOs, political parties, independent media, youth organizations and independent labor unions;
- **third**, we are consulting closely with European allies in order to coordinate our activities both on Kosovo and on Serbia democratization generally;
- **fourth**, we are encouraging the active engagement of regional countries in Southeast Europe to harness their expertise with democratization and transition;
- and **fifth**, we are providing strong support for the reformist government in the FRY republic of Montenegro.
I would like to discuss some of these tracks in greater detail.

ASSISTANCE TO DEMOCRATIC GROUPS

As I mentioned, over the past two years, U.S. government agencies such as USAID—as well as NGOs like NDI, IRI and the NED—have spent 16.5 million dollars on projects aimed at the development of democratic governance and civil society in the FRY. The situation this year was complicated by the outbreak of the conflict in Kosovo, but we still have money available in the pipeline for immediate use on Serbian democratization projects.

We are moving forward swiftly on a whole range of such projects. I am working closely with the NED family, including IRI and NDI, to explore the best ways to help the Serbian opposition and—crucially—to encourage all opposition groups to work together. The consensus among the experts is that opposition parties will be best served if we provide them with technical assistance and first-class political advice, the kind that may seem commonplace to us but represents a whole different way of thinking to them.

Political parties are not the sole outlets for opposition in Serbia. Youth and student organizations, as well as independent labor unions, were very active in the 1996-97 demonstrations in Serbia and will undoubtedly be important sources of mobilization in the future. The AFL-CIO “Solidarity Center” has done good work with independent unions in Serbia and, with our support, is now readying a new program for the region. On a larger economic scale, the Center for International Enterprise is prepared to develop a program aimed at business leaders and independent economists in Serbia. Such economists, particularly those grouped under the G-17 in Belgrade, are widely respected and influential in Serbian society. In short, by working with these groups, we want to show the people of Serbia that our policy is not aimed against them, but against their leadership.

With regard to independent media in Serbia, we are moving on two fronts. First, in order to increase the amount of objective news coverage reaching the Serbian population, we are nearing completion of the “Ring Around Serbia,” a network of transmitters that will permit us to broadcast VOA, RFE and other international news programs on FM frequencies throughout the country. RFE has now increased its Serbian-language broadcasting to 13½ hours daily. Perhaps even more important, however, we want to strengthen Serbia’s own independent media. Serbs, like Americans, prefer to get their news from their own sources, in their own context. To this end, USAID, together with other international donors, is reviewing a proposal by ANEM (the independent electronic media network in Serbia) that would assist individual television and radio stations as well as create new links among them. Other programs to train journalists, support local print publications, and utilize Internet connections are also under consideration.

WORKING WITH ALLIES

The second aspect of U.S. policy on Serbia that I would like to highlight is our cooperation with the Europeans. The NATO alliance proved its strength during the Kosovo air campaign, and that solidarity has continued to be the rule, not the exception, in the post-conflict period. There are regular consultations between Secretary Albright and her European colleagues on issues related to both Kosovo and Serbia, as well as periodic meetings at the expert level.

The Europeans support our basic approach on Serbia and agree that isolating Milosevic must be the cornerstone of our strategy. We have pushed back on some European efforts to selectively lift the oil embargo and provide fuel to opposition-controlled municipalities in Serbia—not because we object to helping opposition-run municipalities but because oil is a fungible commodity and its distribution in Serbia would inevitably benefit Milosevic’s regime. The Europeans, like us, are seeking the best ways to promote democracy in Serbia. They are eager to coordinate their democratization projects as well as to ensure that we are all sending the same message of unity to the Serbian opposition.

WORKING WITH THE REGION

The third pillar of our Serbia policy is the effort to engage the countries of Southeast Europe in the Serbia democratization process. Leaders of SE European countries will meet together with Euro-Atlantic leaders tomorrow in Sarajevo under the rubric of the new Stability Pact for the region. At that meeting, participants will reaffirm their commitment to democratic development and express their regret that the FRY cannot take its rightful place at the summit because of the undemocratic nature of the Milosevic regime. We believe that the countries of central and southeast Europe, with their vast experience in the transition to democratic and market-
oriented societies, have a great deal to offer the people of the FRY. We are encouraging NGOs and governments in the region to create links to democratic voices in Serbia and to share the benefits of the wisdom they have gained over the past decade.

MONTENEGRO

Finally, in addition to our efforts to work with regional partners, we assign special importance to our cooperation with and support for Montenegro. This morning I noticed an editorial in the Wall Street Journal accusing the U.S. of neglecting Montenegro, which I regard as both factually incorrect and fundamentally wrong. The fact is that over two years ago we recognized that Milo Djukanovic had the potential to become an effective counterweight to Milosevic and his authoritarian policies. I began meeting with Djukanovic regularly even before he became the President of Montenegro; I was with him during his inauguration when we felt that a strong international presence would deter a Milosevic-inspired coup; the U.S. provided 20 million dollars in budgetary support when no other country stepped in to fill the gap; we established a joint economic working group to discuss ways of modernizing the Montenegrin economy; we allowed Montenegrin-owned ships to enter U.S. ports; and we provided a blanket waiver for Montenegro from FRY-related sanctions from the very beginning.

Djukanovic managed to craft a multi-ethnic, democratic coalition government that focused on political and economic reform and integration with the European mainstream. Djukanovic and his government have consistently demonstrated courage and determination in implementing reforms and in resisting Belgrade's attempts to strip Montenegro of its constitutional powers. As a result, we have steadily increased our support for Montenegro, providing financial and technical assistance as well as humanitarian assistance worth millions through UNHCR.

Because the government of Montenegro represents the most credible and powerful opposition force in the FRY today, we believe that Montenegro can play a constructive role in promoting democratic change in Serbia. While Montenegro is too small to change Serbia directly, it can serve as a guiding light for the Serbian opposition. What Montenegro needs now is support from their European neighbors in concrete terms, and in particular the same kind of sanctions waiver that we provided all along. We have urged the Europeans to take a more forward-leaning approach to Montenegro.

CONCLUSION

It is clear we have not yet reached the point where we can say that Serbia is irreversibly on the road to democracy. Our efforts now, however, can do two things. In the short term, we can help the indigenous Serbian opposition to focus its energies and more effectively articulate the anger and frustration of the Serbian public. In the longer term, we can cultivate and strengthen those forces that will carry the democracy banner as long as Milosevic remains in power. Both of these are important goals. U.S. leadership in this endeavor will be critical, and your support will be essential. The proposed Helms Democracy Act, which would authorize 100 million dollars over two years for democratization projects, is a good example of the convergence of Administration and Congressional perspectives on the Serbia democracy issue. We look forward to working together with Congress to bring democracy to Serbia and restore real stability to the region.

Senator SMITH. Thank you very much, Ambassador Gelbard.

Before we turn to you, Ambassador Pardew, we are pleased to be joined by my colleague Senator Biden. We would love to hear your comments.

Senator BIDEN. I would ask unanimous consent that my statement be placed in the record.

Senator SMITH. Without objection.

Senator BIDEN. Then I will be commenting.

Senator SMITH. All right.

Senator BIDEN. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for holding this important hearing. I can think of no subject that is more timely than the prospects for democracy in Yugoslavia.

I believe this Committee is doing a real service to the American people through the detailed analysis the expert witnesses and Senators will offer.

It is easy to fall into the trap of personalizing politics—of tracing every development to an individual and minimizing, or ignoring, larger societal factors.

But there is no denying that for more than a decade Slobodan Milosevic has exercised a dominant influence on the destiny of Serbia, and of Yugoslavia.

There is no doubt that Serbian nationalism is one of the strongest and deepest in Europe.

It is also true that since the founding of the first Yugoslav state—the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes—in 1918, there have been bitter antagonisms and quarrels among the various peoples in Yugoslavia.

But, Mr. Chairman, it is also true that a far-sighted statesman, concerned with the well-being of his country rather than his own personal agenda, could have steered a positive course of economic and political reform.

Instead, Milosevic turned to demagogy, playing on ethnic fears and discontent, and tapping into Serbian ultra-nationalism in order to climb to power in Serbia.

Then, once firmly established as the unchallenged boss of Serbia, he cynically provoked successive crises in Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Kosovo in order to hold onto power by distracting public attention from his corrupt mismanagement of the Serbian economy and state.

What have been the results of Milosevic's brutal policies?

The grim human legacy is hundreds of thousands of dead Croats, Bosniaks, Serbs, Albanians, and others.

In political terms, instead of the "Greater Serbia" that Milosevic tried to create, centuries of Serbian culture in the Krajina have been eradicated, the cradle of Serbian civilization in Kosovo is in grave danger, and Serbian-ruled territory threatens to be reduced to the borders of last century's Pashalik of Belgrade.

As a result of Milosevic's latest ill-fated adventure in Kosovo, much of Serbia's infrastructure now lies in twisted ruins.

Serbian citizens are already chopping wood in preparation for what promises to be a cruel, unheated winter.

Mr. Chairman, I do not believe for a minute that the majority of Serbs, if they had been given the facts, would have voted for a policy of ethnic cleansing in Kosovo.

The brave mayor of the Serbian town of Cacak recently accused Milosevic of having shamed Serbia's name before the entire world. Leaders of the Serbian Orthodox Church have voiced similar sentiments.

Considering all these developments, one would think that the time was ripe for getting rid of Milosevic.

It may well be. The problem, of course, is that the opposition forces appear to remain as fragmented as they proved to be in the spring of 1997.

I will leave it to our expert witnesses to pursue this topic in detail. I hope I am not unduly pessimistic about the chances of the various opposition groups' uniting. Yesterday this Committee passed the "Serbia Democracy Act of 1999," which, among other measures, authorizes one hundred million dollars in assistance over the next two years to promote democracy and civil society in Serbia and to help the reformist government of Montenegro.

Tomorrow the leaders of the United States, of Western European countries, and of all the countries of the Balkans except Milosevic will meet in Sarajevo to discuss a Southeast Europe Stability Pact, which is supposed to provide a regional framework for economic reconstruction.

But, I submit, the sine qua non for regional development in the Balkans is a democratic government in Belgrade that is tolerant of, and willing to cooperate with, its neighbors.

That, of course, can only happen if Slobodan Milosevic leaves the scene. At long last the West has come to the conclusion that instead of being part of the solution to the Yugoslav Problem, Milosevic is that problem. Our governments have been slow learners, but I suppose "better late than never."

Mr. Chairman, again I thank you for holding this hearing. I look forward to hearing the testimonies of our two panels of witnesses and to having the opportunity to ask them questions.
STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES W. PARDEW, JR., DEPUTY SPECIAL ADVISOR TO THE PRESIDENT AND THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR KOSOVO AND DAYTON IMPLEMENTATION

Ambassador PARDEW. Mr. Chairman, I too have a brief statement that I would like to submit for the record.

Senator SMITH. We would be pleased to receive that.

Ambassador PARDEW. I am grateful for this opportunity to discuss with you today our efforts to promote democracy in Kosovo. The movement toward democracy is key to promoting U.S. interests of regional stability in southeastern Europe.

Secretary Albright was in Kosovo today meeting with representatives of the international community and the people of Kosovo to promote our objectives. Tomorrow she will join President Clinton and more than three dozen other world leaders at the Stability Pact Summit in Sarajevo to emphasize our interest in a stable, prosperous, and democratic southeastern Europe.

Democracy in Kosovo must be built from the ground up. It must rise literally from the ashes of a savage campaign of destruction and murder waged by Milosevic's forces. And it must rely ultimately on the Kosovar Albanian population, which has been prohibited for more than a decade from participating in the existing structures of government, structures that were themselves undemocratic.

But we cannot forget that in the time since Belgrade revoked Kosovo’s autonomy Kosovar Albanians built and managed their own shadow government institutions. Despite the horrors of recent conflict, therefore, a basis for self-government already exists, but it must be revived, guided, and allowed to move toward true multi-ethnic democracy.

Our immediate steps in meeting this challenge have been achieved. First, Serb forces responsible for carrying out the systematic campaign of atrocities and ethnic cleansing in Kosovo have been driven from the province by NATO’s successful air campaign. Second, more than 700,000 of approximately 800,000 refugees driven out of Kosovo by Milosevic have been able to return more rapidly than anyone imagined and have begun to rebuild their lives.

Third, the international security force and civil administration called for in U.N. Security Council Resolution 1244 under NATO and the United Nations are being established.

KFOR currently has about 35,600 troops from 20 nations, including 5,600 U.S. forces, in Kosovo. KFOR is rapidly establishing the secure environment necessary for political and economic development in the province in the future.

The U.N. mission in Kosovo, or UNMIK, is making steady progress in deploying civil administrators, civilian police, and judicial authorities to the field under difficult circumstances. UNMIK has a powerful mandate, one sufficient to create the foundation for a democratic society. Nevertheless, there is still a long way to go, and we are urging the U.N. and contributing countries to deploy their resources and personnel to Kosovo as quickly as possible.

About 700 international staff are already on the ground, including more than 160 civilian police. Approximately 50 Kosovar judges, prosecutors, and defense attorneys have already been ap-
pointed, and civilian personnel continue to move in to fill positions within the U.N. administration.

Last Sunday, UNMIK issued its regulation No. 1, which specifies that all legislative and executive authority in Kosovo is vested in UNMIK, and it lays out how that authority is to be exercised.

For our part, we are moving to place American officials in leadership positions within UNMIK and to commit personnel and resources to the programs that would be crucial to future democracy in Kosovo. An experienced American diplomat, Jock Covey, is in Kosovo as the principal deputy to the U.N. Secretary General’s Special Representative Bernard Kouchner. We have placed Americans in a number of other key UNMIK positions. Further, if the Congress approves we intend to open a U.S. office in Pristina that enables us to engage directly with the international agencies, Kosovar leaders and citizens.

The effort to promote democracy in Kosovo has several components. The most urgent item on UNMIK’s agenda is the establishment of a civilian police force that will assume responsibility for law and order. The U.N. intends to deploy 3,100 international civil police in Kosovo, the largest international civilian police operation in which the U.S. has participated. The UNMIK civilian police will be armed and will have arrest authority. The U.S. has committed 450 of those civilian police.

As these police deploy, the OSCE will begin to train the Kosovar police of about 3,000, which will eventually take over responsibility for civilian policing. The U.S. is playing a leading role in this effort as well. An American has been appointed to head the police training academy. Nearly 6,000 applications have already been received from the Kosovar public for membership in this police force. The site for the police academy has been identified and the first class should begin training next month.

No less important than police in the long run is the prompt establishment of a judicial system and a human rights monitoring regime. The U.S. is working closely with the U.N. and OSCE to develop a comprehensive coordinated approach to implementing a justice system that operates under UNMIK authority, but that is staffed by Kosovar judges and attorneys.

In order to avoid a cycle of revenge and to foster an atmosphere of reconciliation, the U.S. has nominated 21 qualified human rights monitors as part of the OSCE contingent of more than 100 who will monitor and protect human rights of all Kosovars, whatever their ethnicity or religion.

We pushed hard and successfully for the creation of a human rights ombudsperson in Kosovo, and we intend to provide manpower and resources to support that office. In addition, we have pledged $9 million for the ICTY to ensure that the work of the War Crimes Tribunal in Kosovo can be carried forward.

Further down the road, democratization in Kosovo will require an active, pluralistic political life, free and fair elections, and self-government. We have no intention of seeing one single-party system replace another. In that regard, UNMIK is establishing local and national councils which are intended to guarantee the broadest possible citizen participation in the process of creating self-government in Kosovo.
Though Serbs and Albanians have at one time or another boycott the work of these councils, they remain essential to building the conditions in which democracy can take root. In her meeting today in Kosovo, Secretary Albright has emphasized to both Albanians and Serbs the need to participate fully and to make these councils work.

We are also working with the United Nations, the OSCE, and other international organizations to foster political party development and support training programs for civil administrators. Our goal is to hold local and Kosovo-wide elections as soon as possible.

The fostering of independent and responsible media is another indispensable part of building democracy and civil society in Kosovo. In addition to our continuing assistance to indigenous media there, I am pleased to note that an American, Doug Davidson, has been named to be head of OSCE’s Division of Media Affairs, which will have the responsibility for promoting the development of responsible independent media in Kosovo.

The most urgent task is to get Radio-TV Pristina operating, not as the mouthpiece of one party and one ethnic group, but as an independent, nonpartisan voice of all the people of Kosovo. Radio Pristina was on the air yesterday afternoon for the first time since the beginning of the NATO air campaign, broadcasting news and features in both Albanian and Serbian.

The commitments that I have just listed are essential to the creation of a peaceful democratic Kosovo, which is a critical element of U.S. interests in Europe. In the end, however, the establishment of democracy will depend on the people of Kosovo themselves.

Our overall objective is to see Kosovo, a democratic Serbia, and the whole of southeastern Europe as an integral part of an undivided, democratic and peaceful Europe. For we have learned from the history of this century that without stability in southeastern Europe the continent as a whole will not be peaceful. And we have learned from the history of the last 10 years that without peace, a democratic peace, in Kosovo there can be no stability in southeastern Europe.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Pardew follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR JAMES W. PARDEW, J.R.

I am grateful for the opportunity to discuss with you today our efforts to promote democracy in Kosovo. Movement toward democracy is key to promoting the U.S. interest of regional stability in southeastern Europe. Secretary Albright is in Kosovo today meeting with representatives of the international community and the people of Kosovo to promote our objectives. Tomorrow she will join President Clinton and more than three dozen other world leaders at the Stability Pact summit in Sarajevo to emphasize our interest in a stable, prosperous, and democratic southeastern Europe.

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Our immediate steps in meeting this challenge have been achieved. First, the Serb forces responsible for carrying out a systematic campaign of atrocities and ethnic cleansing in Kosovo have been driven from the province by NATO’s successful air campaign. Second, more than 700,000 out of the approximately 800,000 refugees driven out of Kosovo by Milosevic have been able to return more rapidly than anyone imagined, and have begun to rebuild their lives. Third, the international security force and civil administration called for in UNSC resolution 1244, under NATO and the UN, are being established.

KFOR currently has about 35,500 troops from twenty one nations, including 5,596 U.S. forces, in Kosovo. KFOR is rapidly establishing the secure environment necessary for political and economic development in the province.

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About 700 international staff are already on the ground, including more than 160 civilian police; approximately 50 judges, prosecutors and defense attorneys have already been appointed; and civilian personnel continue to move in and fill positions within the UN administration. Last Sunday, UNMIK issued its regulation number one, which specifies that all legislative and executive authority in Kosovo is vested in UNMIK, and lays out how that authority will be exercised.

For our part, we are moving to place American officials in leadership positions within UNMIK and to commit personnel and resources to the programs that will be crucial for the future of democracy in Kosovo. An experienced American diplomat, Jock Covey, is in Kosovo as the principal deputy to the UN Secretary General’s Special Representative Bernard Kouchner; we have placed Americans in a number of other key UNMIK positions; further, if the Congress approves, we intend to open a U.S. office in Pristina that enables us to engage directly with international agencies, Kosovar leaders and citizens.

There are four pillars to UNMIK’s operations in Kosovo. One is humanitarian, under the UNHCR, which is up and running, providing urgent humanitarian assistance to refugees and IDPs. Then there is reconstruction, to be led by the European Union, which held its first donors conference yesterday in Brussels. A third pillar is interim civil administration. And last, but certainly not least, is institution building.

The effort to promote democracy in Kosovo has several components. The most urgent item on UNMIK’s agenda is the establishment of a civilian police force that will assume the responsibility for law and order. The UN intends to deploy 3,100 international civilian police in Kosovo—the largest international civilian police operation in which the U.S. has ever participated. The UNMIK civilian police will be armed and will have arrest authority. The U.S. has committed to provide 450 of those police.

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Senator Smith. Thank you, Ambassador Pardew.

Ambassador Gelbard, I wonder if Balkan ghosts are so alive even in Serbia that these opposition forces can actually unite to extricate Mr. Milosevic. What are the odds? I mean, do you see it happening?

There is a number of parties here, Mr. Draskovic and Mr. Djindjic. Can they put aside personal ambition for national good in this effort?

Ambassador Gelbard. Well, first, Mr. Chairman, one thing I have learned after a number of years working in the Balkans is that I do not give odds. I like to be pleasantly surprised if that should happen.

The biggest obstacle right now, as I said, has been the fractiousness of some elements of the opposition and the possibility that they may not have learned from the mistakes they committed in the past, where they allowed their egos, personal differences, and perhaps even some ideological differences to get in the way from achieving the ultimate goal that they all say they desire.

As you know, Mr. Chairman, and as Senator Biden knows very well, the Zajedno group blew their opportunity during the winter of 1996-97 when they had victory in their hands. A principal reason for that was indeed personality differences between Draskovic and Djindjic. Over the last year and a half, some elements of the opposition appear to have learned from this. Several coalition groups have developed in a very positive way, including the Alliance for Change, the Alliance for Democratic Political Parties, and others, and their message appears to be a constructive one, a forward-looking one about the future that could be that of Serbia and the FRY.

Our message to the opposition has been that this time they need to learn from the mistakes of the past, because they have such an
extraordinary opportunity now, and they need to find a way, if they
cannot construct a single opposition front, then at least to develop
a loose coalition that follows the same line and to avoid undercut-
ting each other.

There have been a number of non-aggression pacts signed among
opposition groups and parties so far. That is a positive sign, and
we think it is critical that they continue to move forward on this
kind of code of conduct, as well as similar platforms in their dem-
onstrations as they move forward.

Senator Smith. As you look into the future and you think of
Montenegro and what they are doing, is Montenegro something of
a model for how Kosovo could develop? Is Montenegro likely to go
independent as well?

Ambassador Gelbard. Well, first, we have, as I said in my writ-
ten testimony, continued to point to the government, the ruling
party, the ruling coalition in Montenegro, as the right kind of ex-
ample for Serbia, in the sense that they have developed a multi-
ethnic democratic coalition, which incidentally includes Serbs,
Montenegrins, Albanians, Bosniacs, lots of others.

In that sense, we would hope that the Serbian political parties
and NGO’s, labor unions and the like, could learn from this. It is
very interesting for me that Serb opposition leaders really look up
to President Djukanovic, not just because he is six five, but because
he is somebody who clearly has demonstrated a willingness and an
ability to construct a democratic coalition that functions and that
pursues free market economic policies.

So we certainly hope that, whether it is the people of Serbia and
their leadership, their political parties, or in Kosovo, that this can
be a kind of example. At the same time, our preference, of course,
strong preference, as I repeatedly told President Djukanovic, is for
Montenegro to remain an integral part of the FRY.

Senator Smith. Is that likely, or what do you expect will happen?

Ambassador Gelbard. President Djukanovic is looking for a fair-
er deal under the constitution that exists. The constitution itself is
not bad; it has been the way Milosevic has twisted it over the last
7 or 8 years. Djukanovic is now looking for more autonomy under
this constitution as a way of keeping Montenegro inside of Yugo-
slavia, and we do not disagree with that.

We want to continue to see Montenegro as part of Yugoslavia
and we feel that a country made up of equal republics is a reason-
able and decent way to go.

Senator Smith. Ambassador Pardew, without a democratic
change in Belgrade, though, is it realistic for Kosovo to be a truly
autonomous province in Serbia?

Ambassador Pardew. In the long run we must have a democratic
change in Belgrade. We are going to do everything that we possibly
can to create the institutions of democracy in Kosovo, without re-
gard to what happens in Belgrade.

But you are right, there are limits to how far you can go with
the current regime in Belgrade. So I agree with you.

Senator Smith. Senator Biden.

Senator Biden. Gentlemen, they are both good statements, I be-
lieve. There is so much to ask. Let me start by picking up where
the chairman left off. Montenegro has basically issued an ulti-
matum to Serbia, which says: We want greater autonomy, we want to be able to conduct relations with other countries without Belgrade's interference. They set a deadline for that to occur. They are going to hold a referendum. That has been pushed back, as I understand it, until September.

I do not know where that goes. If Milosevic accedes to that, he demonstrates he has even less power than he is trying to portray. And if he does not, there is nothing he can do to stop what Montenegro is going to do.

Would you comment on that, Ambassador Gelbard?

Ambassador GELBARD. First, under the constitution of the FRY, the Federal constitution, and under Montenegro's constitution they do have certain rights which go further than we would normally expect part of a sovereign state to have. For example, they do have legitimately their own foreign minister and ability to conduct some foreign policy functions constitutionally.

They also have the right to have a referendum on independence under their constitution. My sense is that right now the vote would not go in favor of independence. But what is very clear, Senator, is that Milosevic has been the one who has pushed the Montenegrin people in this direction over the course of the last 2 years.

As I mentioned in my testimony, Milosevic and his puppet, the former president of Montenegro, Momir Buleidovic, tried to overthrow Djukanovic before he was inaugurated as President on June 15, 1998. They also increased the size of the army, the VJ, in Montenegro during the conflict in Kosovo from 9,500, which is its usual size, up to 40,000 by adding on reservists and some other regular army personnel.

There was a very delicate dance that took place there between the VJ and the police, which come under the Montenegrin Government. I think Milosevic knew that if the army tried to overthrow Djukanovic there was likely to be civil war. The army was likely to fracture and the police are quite strong.

Nonetheless, the Montenegrin Government is showing prudence in how it is trying to proceed. Djukanovic by his own public statements has said that he does not want independence. What he wants is equal opportunity inside of the FRY.

Senator BIDEN. But he has threatened a referendum, has he not?

Ambassador GELBARD. He has threatened a referendum, which, as I said, is legitimate under their constitution. So I would not want to give you a hypothetical answer about where this is going, but Djukanovic is trying to keep his coalition together. He is trying to cope with a significantly increased percentage of the population who are now tremendously frustrated by Milosevic's boycotts and blockades against the Montenegrin people. I think President Djukanovic deserves a great deal of credit for trying to walk a very delicate line right now even as he is trying to stay inside Yugoslavia.

Senator BIDEN. That's a great non-answer, and I appreciate it very much. Since I am not a diplomat most people forget what I have to say anyway.

Ambassador GELBARD. I never do, Senator.

Senator BIDEN. Djukanovic is looking to cut himself a deal so he gets a major piece of the reconstruction that is going to go on in
the Balkans. Serbia cannot block access now. Boycotts are not going to matter.

I wonder how this is playing in Belgrade. Who is more afraid of a referendum; Serbia or Djukanovic? But you have answered as you probably should.

Ambassador Pardew, we talk about supporting a free and open media. How do we do that?

Ambassador Pardew. We work primarily through nongovernmental organizations. We have established, as Ambassador Gelbard mentioned, ring around Serbia, which is using international broadcasts, but we are offering that to independent voices in Serbia. We are using international facilities and making them available to independent groups.

Senator Biden. Let me put it another way. We can make facilities available. Are we prepared to shut down facilities that spew propaganda?

Ambassador Pardew. We have, Senator.

Senator Smith. We have. This is the long haul.

Ambassador Pardew. During the war, during the conflict in Kosovo, we and our allies——

Senator Biden. No, I know that. I am asking, I want to know from now.

Ambassador Gelbard. Well, as far as I am aware, Serb television is still being cut off the EUTELSAT facilities, and we have made sure that whenever they made an attempt—and there was a brief moment when they got back on another satellite—we shut them off those.

What we are really trying to do, the use of the international facilities that Ambassador Pardew referred to, particularly RFE, RL, and the ring around Serbia, is a temporary measure. What we are trying to do over the long term is support an alternative indigenous voice for the Serbian people through mechanisms such as ANEM, the network of independent radio and television.

We have funds available that we were just about to deliver when the conflict broke out and Milosevic switched them off. But we have funds available that we are on the verge of providing to them again so that independent television and radio can be augmented throughout Serbia. We are supporting Montenegrin television and radio so that they can be another voice for the Serb opposition and the Serb people, as well as for the Montenegrin people. And we are looking at other means to really augment the capability or startup again the capability of free Serbian voices inside of Serbia.

Ambassador Pardew. Can I add to that, Senator?

Senator Biden. Yes.

Ambassador Pardew. The international community is promoting the printing of newspapers, previously printed in Kosovo, in Macedonia. Those papers are distributed in Kosovo free of charge. You will hear later from John Fox of the Soros Foundation. They have been instrumental in putting funding into independent radio in Kosovo. We encourage that.

The former Serbian radio and TV in Pristina has been taken over by the international community and we have denied access to one group to insure no single group dominates broadcasting. We do not
want a single voice in Kosovo, and we will ensure that there are multiple voices to be heard.

So there are a range of programs ongoing in Kosovo, as Bob mentioned.

Senator Biden. What can we do inside Serbia? For example, doesn't Draskovic continue to deny access to Studio B?

Ambassador Gelbard. No, he has actually given access to Studio B—excuse me, given access of Studio B to Radio B-92. My understanding is that Radio B-92, one of the independent voices, has just re-opened as Radio B-2-92.

We want Draskovic to open up Studio B to the rest of the opposition and that is a message that he will be getting from us in the next few days.

Senator Biden. The last question, if I may, Mr. Chairman.

Senator Smith. Sure.

Senator Biden. We all say, myself included, that ultimately there is no long-term integration of the Balkans into an undivided Europe until Milosevic goes. I wonder whether we are saying that too much these days, myself included. Let me be more precise.

As long as there is success in Sarajevo, the commitments are real, the civilian police force is put in place, the media is not dominated, the reconstruction of Kosovo and Macedonia and Montenegro and the surrounding areas really begins in earnest, with the European community taking the lead, I do not know what Serbia can do under Milosevic's leadership that can affect whether or not we succeed in that part.

In other words, I agree that until the Serbian people have come to terms with their leadership and what was done you cannot have a solution here. I do not however know what Milosevic and an antagonistic Serbia can do to affect about 500 things we have got to do in the meantime to begin to put together economically and politically a larger plan for the Balkans.

Am I missing something here?

Ambassador Gelbard. Senator, I believe that Milosevic has an infinite capability for creating damage. Even while he had so many problems at home, he tried to overthrow the Dodec government, the moderate Bosnian Serb Government in Republika Srpska. We were able to stymie that and Dodec and his government emerged strong after the conflict.

Senator Biden. But what about his ability to provide force to back up any effort to provide assistance?

Ambassador Gelbard. He still has the capability of providing force, not in Bosnia, but in Montenegro. And in his own perverse way——

Senator Biden. How can he do that? Be specific?

Ambassador Gelbard. Through the army.

Senator Biden. If in fact that occurs, I cannot imagine that the international community and KFOR will not come down on that effort like a gosh-darn mountainside being blown up. I do not understand that. Is there any doubt on the part of the alliance that if there is use of military force, of the VJ, in Montenegro that we will not use all force available to us to take them out?

Senator Smith. Or are you telling us that we will not?
Ambassador Gelbard. I am not certain that that is something which is in—that is not necessarily in NATO's agreed NATO action at this point or when the current mandate terminates.

What I worry about is that Milosevic survives by creating trouble. He is in the worst trouble he has ever been. He is in a corner. The economy has collapsed totally. Real wages were at the same level as the early 1950's before the conflict and right now they have virtually no reserves left. But this is why it is imperative to see a change in the regime, to have democratic government arrive in Belgrade as a way of having the region whole. That is why we consider that to be an imperative in our foreign policy.

Senator Biden. As you know, there has been no one you have known in Congress to be more supportive of arriving at that conclusion than I. But I like to think of myself as a realist. The idea that we are going to produce a democratic government in Serbia between now and the end of the year is about as likely as this podium getting up and walking to the back of the room.

What I want to sort of disabuse everybody of here is a new State Department-arrived at notion that through State Department speak we are going to arrive at something that is not possible. The most likely way to catch Milosevic is by literally going in, getting him and dragging him to The Hague. If we had a brain in our collective heads, that is what we would do.

But we are not going to do that because our European friends lack the will, and we will lack the willingness to push that initiative forcefully.

So I just hope we make it clear that the idea that he may be alive and well in Serbia does not impede us from pursuing all our other objectives in the meantime. If they want to wither on the vine and die, so be it.

Which takes me to a question relating to, humanitarian financial assistance. We are not providing financial assistance or reconstruction aid, but rather humanitarian assistance. I think that is a very fine line to draw. We should be very aware that his ability to create mischief and gain credibility will relate to how tightly we monitor that.

How do we prevent Milosevic from claiming credit for Western assistance to Serbia, particularly when the media is still not a free media? I am not asking you to respond because it is unfair. If you would like to, I welcome it. But I think this is not over until he is gone. But we cannot assume as long as he is gone we can hedge our assessment of what we are able to do outside of Serbia.

Senator Smith. I would like to follow onto what Senator Biden is saying here. One of the reasons that I voted to support President Clinton and the allies in this action in Kosovo was my belief that if Milosevic could work this kind of mischief we would be pinned down in Bosnia for a long, long, long time, and that by defanging his military we could go home earlier.

Is that a naive belief on my part?

Ambassador Gelbard. Well, first to answer Senator Biden's question—

Senator Smith. And by the way, I think he is going to commit mischief if we are saying that we are not willing to do anything.

Ambassador Gelbard. First to answer Senator Biden, though.
Senator, I agree with you. That is why we are continuing to push ahead on all other initiatives and we are working with the Europeans on the Stability Pact, which is a regional effort, a regional approach regarding democracy, security, and economic development. That is what we feel it has to be, a regional focus on every place.

The line, the fine line you ask about, I agree with you again. That is why, again, we are not trying to play games on the issue of assistance. We are saying humanitarian assistance means food and medicine. We have looked at other types of possible assistance, but we feel, as I said in my statement, that it is imperative to maintain the isolation with the three layers of sanctions: the outer wall, the Kosovo-related sanctions, and the wartime sanctions.

President Clinton and the administration, the entire administration, feel very strongly that we should be maintaining all these sanctions as a way of maintaining this type of isolation because, you are right, it would be very easy to begin to blur the line. I know, as you know, Senator, there are countries out there that are interested in moving over different lines over time.

Senator Biden. I am worried about us setting the bar so high that we build in failure if a year from now there is not democracy in Serbia after we keep talking about democratic forces. There are not any democratic forces in Serbia now. Draskovic is not a democracy.

I think we should be honest about this. There is a big difference between clearing the bridge debris out of the Danube so our allies can use it, and building the new bridge. I will clear it. I will do everything in my power to make sure there is not a cent that can be spent to build it.

I think they have to come to the realization of what they have enabled Milosevic to do. Until there are democratic forces there, I do not know who to give the $100 million we voted for to. I know what I would like to give it to.

But we Americans tend to think, whether it was Ronald Reagan in Latin America or ourselves in the Balkans, that there is some Jeffersonian democrat waiting to spring up somewhere to lead a democratic revival.

There aren't any democrats in Serbia that I have found, nor any democratic leadership that has any realistic possibility of moving.

It is a little bit like when the Secretary got mad at me when I said months ago to stop talking about Rambouillet, and how we want to bring them back to the table. We do not want to bring them back. We want to beat them until they stop. That is what we want, and that is the only thing that has worked.

We are in effect saying that we are not going to succeed until we have a democratic Serbia. That is ultimate success. But I am afraid that if after 4 months, we do not have democracy, people will say we should not be spending all this money.

Ambassador Gelbard. Well, in fact I said in my statement that in the short term it is hard to imagine that it will be able to achieve a democratic solution in Serbia. That is why we have to be prepared to support democratic forces. And there are democratic forces.

Senator Biden. There isn't much democratic leadership.
Ambassador Gelbard. Tomorrow a representative of the democratic opposition, Dragoslav Avramovic, will be in Sarajevo for the summit. This is a man who is a very high common denominator. He is part of the Alliance for Change.

Vuk Draskovic is a really flawed individual.

Senator Biden. He is the Rasputin of the 21st century, or about to be. We are not quite there yet.

Ambassador Gelbard. I will tell him you said that.

Senator Biden. I told him that.

Ambassador Gelbard. We still hope that he can be part of the solution here.

Senator Biden. I hope so, too.

Ambassador Gelbard. He is going to take work.

Mr. Chairman——

Senator Biden. He is going to take a lot of work. That is a very high maintenance fellow.

Ambassador Gelbard. I know. believe me, I know.

Mr. Chairman, regarding the question, the Republika Srpska has emerged coming out of the conflict, if anything, with significantly strengthened moderate leadership. The Dodec government is stronger than they were at the beginning of the year. They are stronger than they were after the elections in September.

When I last met with Prime Minister Dodec about a month ago, he was much more comfortable, much more confident about his ability to govern. We are seeing that the extremes, what were weakened after the September national elections, are becoming weaker still. High Representative Carlos Westendorf, whose last day is tomorrow, banished President Poplashin, the leader of the Radical Party, from his position and it is now very clear that his Radical Party is weaker than ever, as is Karadzic’s SDS.

We see prospects for the moderates better than ever and, while there is still a ways to go, the prospects look much better.

Senator Smith. Thank you.

Ambassador Pardey. If I could just comment on the democracy issue. We do not have any illusions about who we are dealing with here, but I do think democracy is an aspiration of many of the Serb people. In that regard, I do not think we ought to stop talking publicly about it, Senator. I think we ought to continue to discuss it as an issue.

Senator Biden. I am not saying we should not talk about it. I am suggesting we talk about it realistically. It is amazing what can happen when you eliminate the extremes.

The single best thing that ever happened to Republika Srpska was when we defeated Milosevic. There isn’t any alternative left. That is the reason why it happened. It had nothing to do with elections. It had to do with the fact that Westendorf had the right idea, and that there isn’t an alternative. Belgrade is no beacon, no help, no place to go. So there is no alternative.

It is amazing what a salutary impact that has upon extremes in countries. That is why my dream is to visit Milosevic in prison. I mean that sincerely. If you put Milosevic in prison, things in the region will change drastically.
If you said to me you can leave him where he is or give him a plane ticket to take off like the former leader of Uganda, Idi Amin. I would say no, leave him there until we get him. Put him in jail. Short of that, I do not know how we get to that point. And by the way, I often wonder. Karadzic is part of the SDS. The only misnomer in that, they should have dropped the "D". I mean, these guys are bad guys, bad guys. They are no good.

Senator Smith. When Senator Biden makes that visit to that prison, I want to be your junior companion.

Gentlemen, thank you very much for your testimony. We appreciate it.

Senator Biden. Thanks.

Senator Smith. We will call now our second panel. That panel will consist of Sonja Biserko, Father Irinej, and John Fox, and Jim Hooper.

We are pleased to be joined by Senator Santorum. Senator, if you have any opening statement we welcome that.

Senator Santorum. Just here to listen to witnesses, and I appreciate the opportunity to be here and participate.

Senator Smith. Terrific.

Ms. Biserko, why do we not begin with you, and we will just move this way across the dais.

STATEMENT OF SONJA BISERKO, CHAIRPERSON, INTERNATIONAL HELSINKI COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS IN SERBIA

Ms. Biserko. Distinguished Senators, ladies and gentlemen——

Senator Smith. You can pull the microphone real close to you.

Ms. Biserko. I am honored to be with you today. I thank you very much for your invitation to participate in this important hearing.

In my remarks I will concentrate on three aspects of the current situation: developments in the aftermath of the NATO military campaign, the current political landscape in Serbia, and possible options of further developments.

Developments in Serbia in the aftermath of the NATO campaign. The NATO military campaign has changed the course of events in Yugoslavia. It seems to have put an end to the Serbian regime's adventure. The NATO action has also galvanized the overall internal dynamics in Serbia. What we now witness in Serbia is the release of accumulated frustration, anger, and confusion.

This is especially true of provincial regions, which have suffered greatest misery and the greatest mobilization during the recent Serbian operation in Kosovo. Belgrade itself is at this moment politically the most conservative and centralist oriented.

However, we have to be aware that the frustration, anger, and confusion have not yet led to the political awakening of the Serbian population and its political and intellectual elite. The major reason behind this situation is almost total identification of the population and its elite with the Greater Serbia Project. Unfortunately, the Serbian imperial aspirations to dominate the Balkans, although militarily defeated, have not yet been mentally rejected. The people in general still experience the military defeat as "the moral defeat of NATO, the European Union, and the United States," the inter-
national protectorate over Kosovo as a foreign occupation and not as a result of the failed and aggressive policies of Belgrade.

The official media has developed the notion, widely accepted, that NATO member countries are morally obliged to reconstruct Serbia. This also explains the recent refusal of Milosevic to allow transitting of the Danube unless all eight bridges be reconstructed.

There is no room yet, therefore, for factual and objective analysis of the recent past and of the responsibility in general for the suffering caused to the neighboring countries and to the Serbian people itself. The long-term policy of aggression, compounded by isolation and the effect of bombing campaign, have led to state of anarchy and dysfunction of the entire political, judicial and moral system. Serbia lives in a limbo which can easily be manipulated with opening space for different scenarios for the future.

Political landscape and its protagonists. In such circumstances, major protagonists on the political scene are: still Milosevic himself; his ruling party, Socialist Party; and his wife's party; two pro-Milosevic opposition parties, Radicals led by Seselj and SPO, led by Vuk Draskovic; other opposition parties organized in different coalitions; the military; the Serbian Orthodox Church; and the intellectual elite, mostly represented in the Serbian Academy.

Milosevic's maneuvering space has been greatly reduced, especially after the indictment by The Hague War Crimes Tribunal and his total international isolation. Being thus straightjacketed, Milosevic is still capable in his lust for power and desperation to pull down Serbia into even deeper repression and violence.

In that respect it is most important to get the situation in Kosovo under full control as soon as possible, as well as foreclose any possibilities of suppressing Montenegro's careful moving away from the retrograde Belgrade politics. NATO's warnings to Belgrade to keep its hands off Montenegro are of utmost importance.

One cannot exclude that Milosevic still counts on the Russian card, which provides Russia with a very strong foothold in the Balkans and an important leverage in its political bargaining with the West. As for the others, Seselj or the like, time may come if Serbia becomes more radicalized, which has to be prevented. Draskovic is once again unpredictable and unreliable. In his inconsistency, he best reflects the fluidity of the situation by still balancing between sides.

The opposition, mainly the recently formed Coalition for Change, steps up demonstrations and rallies around Serbia with the aim to provoke a general rebellion. It calls for a change of the regime, the removal of Milosevic, and early elections. Up to this moment they have not taken any stand on the causes of Serbia's downfall, concentrating on putting all the blame on Milosevic alone. They have not articulated any alternative vision for the future, nor have they recognized their accountability regarding the past.

The highest military has sided with Milosevic, but that reserve forces have protested, demanding to be paid. There are no firm indications, but there are speculations that the younger officers may be restless and perhaps attracted to more radical changes.

The Serbian Orthodox Church, which had an important role in creating Serbian project, has stepped up its anti-Milosevic activities and is developing into an even more important political player. For
the first time in 10 years of destruction and horrific atrocities, the church has for the first time stated that a major sin has been committed in our name against Kosovars.

The Serbian elite, or most of it, had a very important role in the process of organizing the Serbian project, but is still very unwilling to come up with its own accountability. Coming mostly from the rural background, it remains committed to egalitarianism and monism. Market and rule of law is aligned to them.

Possible future options. Notwithstanding the fact that the situation in Serbia is not evolving faster and more positively, as many would want and expect, the current discontent is bound to further ferment. The direction in which this energy is channeled will depend on the interrelationship and dynamics between different protagonists. The process will be slow and there should be no exaggerated expectations in this regard.

The removal of Milosevic could come only from the inside, riding and pushed by the wave of popular discontent. In that sense, we may not speak about the following possible scenarios.

First, I would say the most positive one is the establishment of a transition government that would be composed of technocrats. This government would prepare the grounds for democratic elections in 1 or 2 years time. There should be no illusions about the ideological or political profile of such government.

Second, social misery may lead to further radicalization of the situation, to calls for law and order, which may prompt the military to support some sort of dictatorship. The legal framework has already been prepared, including the abolishment of university autonomy and restrictions on the media.

Third, the worst scenario is more violence and some sort of a civil war, which many people are now calling for.

What can the international community do to help bring about a peaceful and democratic change in Serbia? It is important not to totally isolate Serbia, but to develop a coherent strategy of support for democracy-building based on reality and a realistic assessment of the situation and of its protagonists.

This assessment should guide the international community in its support for independent media, for social awareness-raising, for the development of the civil society, and ultimately for the emergence of a new democratic political core within a firm framework of standards, rules, and accountability, some sort of civil protectorate.

The continuous and more intense work of The Hague War Crimes Tribunal and the insistent pressure and monitoring of the refugee return in all the successor states of the former Yugoslavia remain the cornerstones of this strategy and prerequisites of returning the region to normalcy and its integration into the European mainstream.

Distinguished Senators, ladies and gentlemen, I thank you for your attention.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Biserko follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SONJA BISERKO

SERBIA IN THE AFTERMATH OF KOSOVO CRISIS

1. In recent weeks Serbia has been in a turmoil. Political scene is in disarray and as the situation country-wide is volatile it is not easy to predict the future course
of events. All options are possible, including the worst one, namely massive outburst of wrath and violence. What we are in fact witnessing, following the heroic resistance of our army against the state-of-the-art technical-technological aggression, is “testing the waters” between the regime and opposition. The regime is widely promoting “the post-war reconstruction,” while both sides are trying to consolidate their positions in the wake of defeat. In short, NATO military campaign has galvanized the internal dynamics but has also brought to surface the overall confusion and the contamination of the entire population.

2. By careful analysis of the public discourse it is difficult to expect immediate sobering up. Most of the population has been identified with the Serbian project. Additionally, with the totalitarian mindset it is difficult to create space for analysis not only of the recent history but also the meaning of Yugoslavia as the common state. The Serbian illusion that Yugoslavia is only enlarged Serbia and their lamenting that everything that has been “lost” and that the “loss will be difficult to compensate” clearly illustrates that Yugoslavia has not been seen as the project of other nations. Serbs have never acknowledged their expectations and urge to be equal.

3. Opposition is stepping up demonstrations and rallies Serbia-wide and endeavors to provoke general “rebellion,” all the while voicing demands for the unseating of the regime and calling for snap elections. Opposition parties are currently exploiting enormous popular discontent and counting on a large scale protests, alike the 1996–97 unrest. But other demands, indispensable for inclusion in the reconstruction program, failed to be voiced. Likewise there is no recognition of massive atrocities in Kosovo. Opposition is still split, and there is a palpable tension between its Belgrade seats and local committees. Belgrade-based centralism and absolute dictatorship of opposition leaders often generate discord at the local level, which are apt to show a much higher degree of flexibility. The ongoing power-struggle did not crystallize new programme. The same old methods are still in practice (populism). The new radicalization is also possible calling for the “social minimum.” Most of the population has not been seriously working for last ten years.

Recently launched initiative, namely citizens signing up a petition for Milosevic’s resignation, although unlikely to produce that result in the short run, is nonetheless an important, fear-liberating action for people at large.

4. As the situation in Serbia is not transparent, but rather fluid and open-ended, it is not possible to predict any definite outcome. It seems that Vuk Draskovic’s inconsistency best reflects that fluidity. This most charismatic leader, and self-styled “international king of streets” has recently stated that “he is giving another chance to Milosevic.” The future course of events will be most likely decided by the very Milosevic. His perception of his own standing will play a crucial role in future developments. It seems that he is weighing up the general situation, feeling the pulse of people and waiting for the unfolding of the Kosovo operation. He still has instruments to destabilize the Kosovo operation, either through the Russians, or through his loyalists who have stayed out in Kosovo.

5. Exodus of Serbs from Kosovo, after the entry of international troops, and simultaneous return of Albanian refugees and the KLA units, have become chips in the game between the regime and opposition. While the regime insists on the Serbian refugees return, irrespective of the current situation in Kosovo, opposition mentions their safety solely for self-promotional purposes, and makes no effort to assist them. The Serbian Orthodox Church has organized itself and remained the only Serbian institution in Kosovo to fill the security vacuum under the newly-emerged circumstances. The Orthodox Church, which has stepped up its anti-Milosevic activities, is turning into an important player in the political developments. After a recent session of its Synod the SOC addressed its believers by stating that “in our name a major sin was committed against Kosovars.” After the Kosovo defeat the SOC quickly responded to the new situation. Its priests (especially Father Sava from Decani) who had stayed in Kosovo during the air campaign now play a double role, namely they take both physical and spiritual care of the Serbs remaining in Kosovo. Due to the police and army departure “the SOC had to take on the role which it once had under the Turkish occupation.”

According to Father Sava from Decani Monastery (NTV Studio B, 7 J uly) approximately 80,000 Serbs have left Kosovo. The High Commissioner for Refugees Bratislava Morina said (Politika, 6 J uly) that 8,000 have returned to Kosovo. The government is making an effort to push back as many as possible Kosovo refugees. Pensioners cannot obtain their pensions outside Kosovo, the same applies to car owners who are entitled to petrol coupons. Kosovo school children are not allowed to register in for the coming school year outside Kosovo.

Though situation in Kosovo is getting under the international control Serbs are still on their way out. The local leader from the Serbian Resistance Movement
Dusan Ristic said that apart from the “Albanian terrorists, the Belgrade regime is also responsible for the massive exodus of Serbs.” Many Serbs from Kosovo (namely Istok, Babusa and Prizren) according to their testimonies have been pushed out by the Serbian police. Dusko Ristic is also blaming the Serbian leadership from Kosovo (SPS, JUL, SRS) for leaving without protecting people they have left behind. It is evident that Serbia cannot cope with additional refugees and is therefore trying to keep them away. Additionally their anger can be crucial in generating the discontent. It should, however, also be kept in mind that Belgrade may still expect to get away with partitioning. Kosovska Mitrovica may serve as an example.

6. The Army is another dynamic factor in the Serbian scene at the moment. The Army has profiled itself in the first weeks of military campaign as a patriotic Army after the years of being humiliated. The last defeat is attributed to Milosevic and, of recent, to Russians whom they blame for “betrayal.” So far the Army anger is generated for months. Having in mind the military tradition in the Serbian society they might play more substantial role in months to come once it becomes clear which line is prevailing.

7. Developments in Montenegro after President Djukanovic’s letter on the need to re-define relationship between the two federal units clearly indicate that Montenegro is setting the stage for more independent status and forging closer links with Europe. However growing speculation that the Yugoslav army might attack Montenegro should not be wholly discarded. Milosevic’s hesitancy to move more resolutely against Djukanovic, “who is trying to backstab Serbia at the most critical moment” indicates the weakness of the Serbian regime. In that sense the NATO’s warnings to the regime to keep its hands off Montenegro obviously play a decisive role. But, the Russians might also spring some surprises, as both for them and Serbia, Montenegro is much more important than Kosovo. The first meeting between the Serbian and Montenegrin ruling coalitions has been more a testing on both sides than serious talks. It is worth mentioning that Bogoljub Karic in an interview to the daily paper Vijesti (17 July) said: “If there is no substantial agreement between Montenegro and Serbia then there is no reason for them to leave. Then we have to see how Germany and Austria are cooperating for years and recently Chech Republic and Slovakia.” The similar statement was made by former president Lilic few days earlier.

8. In the meantime the Serbian Academy has also discussed concerning the “tragic status of the Serbian people.” It is highlighted that “in the momentous changes which happened in the world in the last decade, the Serbian nation suffered great losses, and has the worst status today, for the politically lost wars were waged for the liberation and unification of the Serbian people. The state which we in vain considered our homeland, was broken up.” Some members of the Academy also voiced that demand for Milosevic’s removal because “if he stays Serbia will be the only ghetto-state in Europe and the only state to remain outside the European Union.” But voices of dissent were also heard: “We cannot back the NATO-pursued anti-Milosevic policy. The ouster of Milosevic and his regime are our internal matter, hence the Academy cannot act as an authority above the people.” Unfortunately the Serbian Academy did not muster up enough intellectual courage to assume responsibility for the creation of Milosevic’s regime program. On the contrary it denied the importance of the Memorandum as a blueprint for the regime’s ideological program. Moreover the Academy stated that “the Memorandum had an essentially filo-Yugoslav and anti-Titoist character, amply indicating the weak and ruinous state of the 1974 Constitution.”

9. It is manifest in Serbia that the populace is aware of the need for change. But there is also a massive perception that the unseating of only one man will not resolve the issue of a viable political alternative. The Serbian Academy which essentially has been backing Milosevic all the time and has never denounced its Project states that “the present-day political scene is dominated by parties and politicians with backward ideologies of civil wars, as such defeated by the overall progress of the world.” It goes on to say that “those ideologies, self-styled ‘left’ and ‘right’ are morally compromised, historically conservative and bereft of personal authority.”

10. A genuine democratic and reform potential—imprisoned in the political dinosaur called the Serbian Socialist Party—and in some parts of the Yugoslav Army is yet to be brought to light. If that potential emerged, then its coupling with the massive rallies could represent the most painless way to transition, alike the one in Republika Srpska or Montenegro. The recent information on Arkan’s offer to the Tribunal, if true, is the first signal of the inside differentiation.

11. One of the external elements that may influence the internal dynamics could be the role of Russians in the whole process. It is perilous for the future of Serbia to turn to the Russians, as the last refuge, while such a move would provide the latter with an opportunity to easily recover their role of “the leading power.” By ex-
tension the Russians are very adroit in exploiting their role in the Balkans: they
get their dividends for such engagement by the West. Hence the Russians take on
a double role, the one of instigator, and one of the peacemaker. For Milosevic the
Russians represent the only point of support, although they publicly denounce him.
But were they to get involved in Serbian developments, like they did in the past,
in some East European countries, it could possibly lead to Milosevic stepping down.
But the question is whether the Russians are currently more interested in their
competition with the NSTO or in the fate of the people led astray. Were they to “as-
sist” in Milosevic stepping down, it would perhaps constitute their first good-will to-
wards the Serbian people.

12. Massive popular discontent for the time being has not found its expression in
an articulated political vision of Serbia. The political elite is still neither ready nor
able to assume responsibility. That leaves room for the “wounded beast,” namely
Milosevic’s regime to engage in the ultimate act of brinkmanship by dragging quick-
ly Serbia into total disaster. International community’s attempts to “lure” by various
promises the Serbian opposition to Europe might be futile. The fact is that all the
neighboring countries are under some kind of protectorate of international commu-
nity. Only Serbia is under constant pressure, but even that measure proved to be
of a limited effect. Corruption and lack of scruples of the Belgrade regime seem to
be its enormous advantage over the Western democracies, and desperation and fa-
talism its most powerful weapon in defying the West.

13. However, differentiation process has started. For example Kosovo Serbs have
genuine feeling of recent events in Kosovo but also for the whole last decade. There
are ample testimonies illustrating that but that is only one fragment. Obviously
there is not only one answer to the current situation. “Sickness of the society” is
problems and therefore needs a long term cure. The society needs help in under-
standing what has happened. Serbia has in the meantime cut off all the relations
with the world and has become an autistic society without real insight in the Euro-
pean mainstream trends. Stereotype thinking is still prevailing (for example Ger-
many is still seen as the old Second World enemy, conspiracy theories are answer
to all our troubles—Kouchner is seen as a Serb-hater etc.).

14. The present political and intellectual elite is completely drained, a new one
has yet to be articulated. The liberal elite which has been marginalized needs sup-
port and comeback in order to create space for analysis and new modern vision of
Serbia. The ongoing outside pressure, especially from the neighbouring countries,
has an enormous impact on the fermentation of the ongoing process. The Stability
Pact, if seriously applied, will have crucial role in modernizing and Europenizing of
Serbia.

Senator SMITH. Thank you very much, Ms. Biserko.

Mr. Fox.

STATEMENT OF JOHN FOX, DIRECTOR, WASHINGTON OFFICE,
OPEN SOCIETY INSTITUTE, WASHINGTON, DC

Mr. FOX. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senators.

I would first like to thank the committee on behalf of the non-
governmental community and for many in the region for the forth-
right and bipartisan approach that you have taken over the years
on Balkans issues and particularly for the strong support that you
have given to democratization in Yugoslavia and the neighboring
countries.

Slobodan Milosevic is not only the first sitting head of state to
be indicted as a war criminal by the United Nations. He is also by
several years the dean of all the leaders in Europe and Eurasia.
Now that NATO has 100,000 troops deployed in the Balkans, and
less than 4 years after Mr. Milosevic was an honored American
guest and guarantor of the Dayton Peace Agreement, it is a prin-
ciple aim of U.S. and European policy to see him removed from
power.

After 10 years of resolutely refusing engagement with democratic
forces in Serbia, the West is urgently reaching out to democrats,
pseudo-democrats, and even compromised nationalists to hasten
Mr. Milosevic's departure. In other words, the U.S. and Europe are just starting out on a road we should have taken a decade ago when Washington was leading the way in supporting democratic forces throughout Central and Eastern Europe.

Why did America not seriously engage with embryonic democratic forces in the former Yugoslavia much earlier, at low cost? The lost list of policy misjudgments and missed opportunities is rooted in the dominant view toward southeastern Europe throughout much of this decade, that the West has no real interest in the Balkans, which is a condemned region of murderous ethnic zombies that must somehow be walled off from civilized Europe.

Only with the war in Kosovo has the international community abandoned the blood-soaked myth of post-Yugoslav exceptionalism, the notion that modern European standards could not apply among feuding Balkan tribes, a view that fit nicely with the ideology and practice of the region's war criminals.

I think it is fair to say that if the United States and its allies had treated the Rumanian or the Bulgarian or Slovak opposition the way we have treated the Serbian opposition, that is if they had been left in a cave of isolation after 1989 without political or material support or international partners, governing multi-ethnic coalitions would not now be driving those democracies on a Euro-Atlantic track to full integration in Western institutions. Without the sustained commitment of the U.S. and nongovernmental organizations to indigenous democratic forces, destabilizing nationalism and anti-reform politics would today be much stronger in those and many other countries in the transition region.

Whereas the practitioners of ethnic terror and repression were given free reign in Serbia, Croatia, and much of Bosnia, in the rest of Central and Eastern Europe the tested and true conditionality of free and fair elections, human rights, rule of law, market reform, and good neighbor policies were helping to lay the foundation, the strong foundation for the widening zone of democratic stability that we see today.

Last September a leading Serbian democratic activist listed five major weaknesses of the democratic opportunity: one, lack of unity and a mentality of defeat; two, fear of regime's repression; three, lack of funding for regular activities; four, belief that Milosevic enjoys the support of the West; five, lack of an effective Western strategy in support of a democratic Serbia.

At the same time, the same weaknesses plagued the Croatian opposition, which had been left for years in its particular cave of isolation and nationalist temptation while Washington supported the Tudjman regime and traded favors on Bosnia. Following the decisive U.S. policy shift to support Croatia's democratic forces last year, most of this list of weaknesses no longer apply and the prospects for a democratic transition in Croatia at the next elections are increasingly promising. A nonviolent democratic transition in Croatia would be a vital contribution to democratizing Serbia, as the Tudjman and Milosevic regimes not only have maintained a condominium of interests in Bosnia, but have politically reinforced one another's domestic anti-democratic policies.

The same pattern could hold true in Serbia and, while there is urgency to this challenge, there are not necessarily the shortcuts
that truly energized Western governments would like to find. The strong political will in Washington and in European capitals in support of a democratic Serbia has yet to be accompanied by the flow of material support that was essential to nearly every successful democratic coalition that has overcome an authoritarian regime in the past 20 years, whether in Eastern Europe, Latin America, Asia, or Africa.

Of the widely advertised millions of dollars in U.S. democratic assistance for Serbia over the past 2 years, only a limited stream has actually reached indigenous groups in Serbia, and that has gone for civil society and media, not for political coalitions. So we must go beyond the technical assistance advice that Ambassador Gelbard was describing. He explicitly did not talk about material assistance, which has been vital to every democratic coalition from Bulgaria to Poland and Slovakia in the region.

The absence of international engagement with the democratic forces has had the added effect of increasing the large and unsustainable political burden carried by a relatively few Belgrade-based civil society and independent media organizations in recent years. Because the West's decade of on again, off again partnership with the Milosevic regime stirred the deepest doubts among the Serbian people and elites about what America and Europe truly wanted to see in Serbia, American and European policy today must not only be unified, but crystal clear.

Support should be given to the unified democratic coalition Alliance for Change, to groups willing to cooperate with it, and, as in earlier cases from Poland to Slovakia, individual leaders who fail to cooperate with the coalition should not be supported. Political and material support should go to organizations, not personalities.

American and European officials should also respect one rule in their public and backgrounded statements, which are read microscopically in the region: Do not criticize publicly the coalition or individual actors within it. U.S. senior officials in particular fell into this counterproductive habit around the time of the Zajedno demonstrations in 1997 and it still has not stopped. Those messages need to be delivered privately if this is really ever going to be a partnership.

The West has successfully delivered its message about the linkage of Serbia's future acceptance in the international community to the departure of the Milosevic regime. More needs to be done, however, to deliver the affirmative message that sanctions lifting and economic and political benefits will be conditioned, as they were throughout Eastern Europe, on democratic governance, market reform, respect for human rights, in other words on implementation of the coherent program that the democratic coalition must develop and take to the Serbian people in order to prevail.

There is, of course, a particular affliction that much of the Serbian opposition as well as the civil society has suffered from, an intolerant, often hard line and even racist nationalism. Following the war in Kosovo and the war crimes committed on a mass scale by thousands of Serb forces, there is substantial denial at both the popular and elite level about these crimes. There is a poll, recent poll, showing that two-thirds of the Serbian people do not believe the atrocities took place.
There is instead in many quarters a deepening sense of victimization of the Serbian people. Much as many in Serbia and in the West would like to move pragmatically past the moral issue of individual and political responsibility for war crimes, the culture of victimization in Serbia creates a practical problem for the opposition. Any successor Belgrade government will have to face up to how to treat the indicted and harbored war criminals and will not be able to lead Serbia into Europe without de-Nazifying the elites.

Just as the indictment of Milosevic hastened the end of the Kosovo war by demonstrating to the Serbian people beyond a doubt that the West was finished dancing with this dictator, so a meaningful de-Nazification campaign will speed Serbia’s reforms and integration into the international system.

Balkan war criminals and their mafias have proved to be deadliest enemies of reform and where left in place they have managed to keep most of the former Yugoslavia out of Europe. Strong linkage between cooperation with The Hague Tribunal and international concessions to Serbia must be at the core of the West’s policy for a sustainable democratic transition to occur.

I conclude with some specific recommendations that could accelerate democratization in Serbia and promote stability in the region. The European Union-U.S. visa blacklist of 300-plus key officials and regime supporters is proving remarkably effective and should be expanded, and I think a corresponding honors list of civil society and democratic leaders could be created who get multi-entry visas and are invited precisely to the events that the Serbian officials are excluded from. This should be a major, intensive exchange and targeted travel opportunities reaching out into sectors and parts of the country in Serbia that we have not reached. We have tended to rely more on a Belgrade-centered civil society set. We need to go well beyond that into the professions, local government officials, and so forth.

The OSCE should assure that the expelled Serb citizens from Croatia that are now living outside the country vote in the next Croatian elections and that the ethnic Croat citizens of Bosnia do not vote. Humanitarian assistance I think could be given on a trial basis through nongovernmental local opposition channels, but if that does not work it should be halted.

We could also support leading nongovernmental organizations from the transition countries in Central Europe to work in Serbia. The arrest of Karadzic and friends, indicted friends, would certainly still send a powerful message and effect inside Serbia. I think the tribunal should be given the additional resources and management to prepare hundreds of indictments of high level, mid-level Serb and many Croat officials, security figures, and so forth. I think that would have a very salutary effect on their transitions.

So with a strong and enduring U.S.-led commitment on democratization in Serbia and Croatia, the withdrawal date of NATO forces from the region should be advanced somewhat, as should the integration of Europe and the Atlantic community as a whole, following indeed the same pattern that America promoted in postwar Western Europe and post-cold war Central Europe. There really is no third way to this objective, I think.

Thank you.
Senator SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Fox.
Father, we invite your testimony.

STATEMENT OF FATHER IRINEJ DOBRIJEVIC, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, SERBIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH, BROADVIEW HEIGHTS, OH

Father DOBRIJEVIC. Thank you kindly, honorable chairman. I would beg the indulgence of the chair to enter the full text of this speech into the record.

Senator SMITH. Without objection.

Father DOBRIJEVIC. My approach will essentially be theoretical and practical, as an investigation of a wide variety of proposed solutions in light of the contribution of the church.

Honorable Senator Gordon Smith, Honorable Senator Biden, and Honorable Senator Santorum, ladies and gentlemen: It is indeed my distinct honor and privilege to be able to address this august body on behalf of the recently created Office of External Affairs of the Serbian Orthodox Church. Kindly permit me to begin by congratulating and profoundly thanking the Honorable Senator Jesse Helms, Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, and his distinguished colleagues, among them our honorable chairman, for unanimously passing a bill introduced by the Honorable Chairman Helms allocating $100 million for promoting democracy in Serbia and Montenegro.

Without the aid of critically needed funding, the process of democratization would have been seriously hampered in a nation where it is estimated that $30 billion are needed over a decade for recovery. Poor economic conditions tend to encourage political radicalism and provide a strong impetus for localism as a phenomenon, with its attempts to resolve economic problems through jobs, taxes to central government and contracts to relatively small communities.

A lesson taken from the Iraqi people clearly indicates that they have little or no incentive to drive out Saddam Hussein as long as they are kept in poverty. In today's Yugoslavia, socioenvironmental concerns such as increased radiation levels and mounting toxicity, combined with disastrously low levels of social security, rampant unemployment, and a high refugee population will continue to destabilize the regions by producing a new outpouring of economic immigrants. Without extensive foreign economic assistance, it is highly improbable that Yugoslavia will be able to recover socially, politically, or even culturally.

The Standing Conference of Canonical Orthodox Bishops in the Americas in a recent statement noted: "The large-scale violence and atrocities in Kosovo, as well as the bombing of Yugoslavia, have come to an end. Many Albanian refugees and expellees are returning to Kosovo. Many Serbs are now fleeing. While war appears to have ended in Kosovo, the peace has not been won. What lies ahead is the painful and difficult work of conflict resolution and reconciliation, rebuilding and reconstruction in Kosovo, in Yugoslavia as a whole, and in the whole of southeastern Europe. The religious communities of that region must take a full and active part in the work of building a peaceful and just present and future for all the peoples of that region."
National self-determination and regional integration, two often incompatible trends, are intrinsically tied to the building of an internationally acceptable, modern civil society. Peace and stability can be fostered only through functional and secure social, economic, and political institutions. Yet the reconstruction of Kosovo is currently being espoused without extending the same to all Yugoslavia unless the Serbian people overthrow the Milosevic government, while only limited and extended conditions are placed upon the full disarmament of the Kosovo Liberation Army, the KLA.

This contradictory measure undermines reasonable integration policies by replacing one repressive system with another. The result is evidenced through bitter retaliation by Kosovar Albanians as the KLA gains in latitude and the relentless persecution of the diminished number of Kosovo Serbs and other ethnic minorities. With such solutions in place, there can be no victors, only victims.

Should not there be a moral imperative for the NATO Pact countries to offer reconstruction to Yugoslavia, as was offered to Germany through the Marshall Plan? Deputy Finance Minister Nikos Chrisodoulatis told BBC television that Greece favored unconditional reconstruction aid for Yugoslavia: “If countries are given the chance to build their future, then democracy will consolidate and totalitarian regimes will leave more easily.”

As violence is thoroughly incapable of establishing a just and enduring peace, so also isolationist policies cannot promote a healthy foundation for the building of a stable civil society.

The first step, therefore, is to recognize that the Western notion of civil society is culturally specific as the result of certain social and historical conditions. Merely exporting or imposing Western forms of civil society onto southeastern Europe, without cultural substance and understanding, is meaningless.

An essential and perhaps more productive approach to the region would be based on comprehension of how indigenous forms of social and political association and considerations of Western notions of civil society might accommodate local environments, rather than replace them. Given this historical and cultural context, the Serbian Orthodox Church offers unique recourse to the issue of civil society and democratic change as a meridian between East and West.

Whenever governments and elements of civil society are at odds with each other, religious leadership retains the unique ability to set the foundation for solid regional cooperation with other faith communities, nongovernmental organizations, and ultimately extending itself to the international community. Therefore, in order for peace and stability to effectively take root in Kosovo, throughout southeastern Europe and into the world, the voice of religious leadership can no longer be ignored.

The faith communities must be an integral part of and an equal partner in the peace process, promoting true reconciliation, equitable reconstruction, and advocating democracy in order to secure the present and ensure the future of Kosovo through valid national self-determination and proper regional integration.

The Serbian Orthodox Church under the leadership of Patriarch Pavle in general and in Kosovo under Bishop Artemije has attempted to promote peace. As a source of moral authority, the
church represents the preeminent voice of its people, offering regional stability and continuity. Therefore, as the only institution trusted by the people, the church serves to inform the inner psyche of its faithful and transcends the narrow constraints of self-serving nationalism.

In calling upon “the Federal president and his government to resign in the name of the people and for the salvation of the people,” the Holy Synod of Bishops of the Serbian Orthodox Church clearly and courageously paved the way for a government that would be acceptable to those at home and abroad.

Often, in areas of conflict resolution, nongovernmental organizations and private volunteer organizations have made recourse to the local church, through whom access has been gained to designated officials of independent-minded principalities and other positive opposition forces. For the sake of context and historical affirmation, religious leaders, such as Archbishop Makarios, who was elected in 1960 as the first President of an independent Cyprus, and Archbishop Desmond Tutu, who continues to offer a cathartic mechanism in opposition to apartheid, serve to affirm the essential role of the church in transitional stability in order to rebuild fragmented societies rising out from under oppressive regimes.

Pragmatically, the church, especially in view of a weakened and fragmented opposition, can serve as a neutral and fair monitoring system, providing a sound and secure basis for a national referendum and registration of voters, while averting the dangers of a potential civil conflict. Given the international proportions of the Serbian Orthodox Church, this privilege could be either contained to those citizens residing within Serbia and Montenegro proper or duly extended to those living in the diaspora.

One such referendum model might be charged with the task of allowing citizens the choice of voting for a republic or a constitutional monarchy. The latter maintains a distinct historical precedent in Serbia, which at the turn of the century, while fostering a strong liberal intellectual tradition, enjoyed having freely elected exiled King Peter I as its monarch. Today Spain stands to underscore the positive role of King Juan Carlos in rebuilding a prosperous nation from a dictatorship to a constitutional monarchy.

With the serious lack of stability in Kosovo, one possible option might be a bicameral system of governance similar to that of the Government of the United States. One house would be established proportionate to its population and maintain autonomy. In order to assure a true multi-ethnic state, preventing secession and fragmentation while securing regional stability, another house would maintain equal representation from all ethnic groups.

It would then follow that from this house the chief executive would be appointed, at least provisionally. The assent of both houses would be required to effect legislation. This approach attempts to reconcile Western concepts of civil society with the local environment.

The American governmental model is one that could be readily applied to Serbia and Montenegro, that is to say Yugoslavia. However, given its current political, economic, and ecological difficulties in the aftermath of a decade of violence, Serbia and Montenegro is most likely in need of an apolitical transitional government.
The concept of a technocratic government or government of experts has been espoused by groups such as the Council for Democratic Changes in Serbia, which advocates a system of a cabinet of experts, proportionate to the distribution of the Serbian population, two-thirds from Serbia and one-third from the diaspora.

A group of Serbian and Montenegrin economists known as Group 17 have come up with a plan, the Pact on Stability in Serbia. G17 made the call for a government of “national salvation,” which is to say the salvation of the people, not only in answer to this problem, but directly in response to the call of the Serbian Orthodox Church for Milosevic’s resignation.

Such a transitional government of experts would give itself, depending on the plan, from 1 to 3 to 5 years to effect economic reform, revamp the constitution, call for free elections, and promote free media, while paving the way for Belgrade’s eventual accession to the Pact on Stability for southeastern Europe, through which the West anticipated bringing peace, development, and a free market economy to this troubled region.

One precise mechanism for a potential handover is being worked out by G17 in association with the Independent Society of Judges of Serbia. Timing is of the essence in all matters concerned.

 Properly supported, the Serbian Orthodox Church could fully assume its rightful role in society, a privilege denied it for the past 50 years. And to end once again with a quote from the Standing Conference of Canonical Orthodox Bishops here in the Americas: “If peace is to be won for all of southeastern Europe, it is particularly important that the Orthodox Churches of the region assume an active and constructive regional role in spiritual renewal, economic reconstruction, and humanitarian responsibility. It is critically important that the Serbian Orthodox Church be given a quick and strong affirmation as a key participant in the process of regional reconstruction and that this involvement of the Church of Serbia be understood as an important starting point for the civil and democratic renewal of Yugoslavia.”

I thank you kindly for your indulgence.

[The prepared statement of Father Dobrijevic follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF REV. IRINEJ DOBRIJEVIC

It is indeed my distinct honor and privilege to be able to address this august body on behalf of the recently-created Office of External Affairs of the Serbian Orthodox Church.

Kindly permit me to begin by congratulating and profoundly thanking the Honorable Senator Jesse Helms, Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, and his distinguished colleagues for unanimously passing a bill, introduced by the Honorable Chairman Helms, allocating $100 million for promoting Democracy in Serbia and Montenegro. Without the aid of critically needed funding, the process of democratization would have been seriously hampered in a nation where it is estimated that $30 billion are needed over a decade for recovery.

Poor economic conditions tend to encourage political radicalism and provide a strong impetus for "localism" as a phenomenon, with its attempts to resolve economic problems through jobs, taxes to central government and contracts through relatively small communities. A lesson taken from the Iraqi people clearly indicates that they have little or no incentive to drive out Saddam Husseïn as long as they are kept in poverty. In today's Yugoslavia, socio-environmental concerns, such as increased radiation levels and mounting toxicity, combined with disastrously low levels of social security, rampant unemployment and a high refugee population will continue to destabilize the region by producing a new outpouring of economic immi-
grants. Without extensive foreign economic assistance, it is highly improbable that Yugoslavia will be able to recover socially, politically or even culturally.

The Standing Conference of Canonical Orthodox Bishops in the Americas in a recent statement, noted: “The large-scale violence and atrocities in Kosovo as well as the bombing of Yugoslavia have come to an end. Many Albanian refugees and expellees are returning to Kosovo. Many Serbs are now fleeing.”

“While war appears to have ended in Kosovo, the peace has not been won. What lies ahead is the painful and difficult work of conflict-resolution and reconciliation, rebuilding and reconstruction in Kosovo, in Yugoslavia as a whole, and in the whole of Southeastern Europe. The religious communities of that region must take a full and active part in the work of building a peaceful and just present and future for all the peoples of the region.”

National self-determination and regional integration, to often incompatible trends, are intrinsically tied to the building of an internationally acceptable, modern civil society. Peace and stability can be fostered only through functional and secure social, economic and political institutions. Yet, the reconstruction of Kosovo is currently being espoused, without extending the same to all of Yugoslavia—unless the Serbian people overthrow the Milosevic government—while only limited and extended conditions are placed upon the full disarmament of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA). This contradictory measure undermines reasonable integration policies by replacing one repressive system with another. The result is evidenced through bitter retaliation by Kosovar Albanians as the KLA gains in latitude and the relentless persecution of the diminished number of Kosovo Serbs continues. With such solutions in place, there can be no victors, only victims.

Should not there be a moral imperative for NATO Pact countries to offer reconstruction to Yugoslavia as was offered to Germany through the Marshall Plan? Deputy Finance Minister Nikos Chrisoudoulakis told BBC Television that Greece favored unconditional reconstruction aid for Yugoslavia. “If countries are given the chance to build their future, then democracy will consolidate and totalitarian regimes will leave more easily.” As violence is thoroughly incapable of establishing a just and enduring peace, so also isolationist policies cannot promote a healthy foundation for the building of a stable civil society.

The first step, therefore, is to recognize that the “western” notion of civil society is culturally specific as the result of certain social and historical conditions. By merely exporting or imposing western forms of civil society onto Southeastern Europe, without cultural substance and understanding, is meaningless. An essential and perhaps more productive approach to the region would be based on comprehension of indigenous forms of social and political association, and on considerations of how western notions of civil society might accommodate local environments, rather than replace them. Given this historical and cultural context, the Serbian Orthodox Church offers unique recourse to the issue of civil society and democratic change as a meridian between East and West.

Whenever governments and elements of civil society are at odds with each other, religious leadership retains the unique ability to set the foundation for solid regional cooperation with other faith communities, non-governmental organizations and ultimately, extending itself to the international community. Therefore, in order for peace and stability to effectively take root in Kosovo, throughout Southeastern Europe and into the world, the voice of religious leadership can no longer be ignored.

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1 According to Miadjan Dinkic, author of the bestseller. The Economics of Destruction and a coordinator of Group 17: “Leaving Serbia isolated is a grave error which will sooner or later provoke a new war disaster . . . I strongly believe that this was one of the main reasons for the violent disintegration of the former Yugoslavia . . .” Dinkic continues by arguing that nobody will be willing to invest in a country void of a functional infrastructure. “Taking this into consideration, once the economic interest prevail over an irrational war logic, all problems will be easily resolved.” 21 May 1999, http://www.g17.org.yu.

2 As radical post-authoritarian political groups emerge, differences from other similar groups as well as the outgoing regime are stressed. The moderate Kosovar Albanian political leader who should have emerged under normal circumstances was Ibrahim Rugova. However, it was inevitable that the radical and violent KLA would win, not only because of the policies of Milosevic, but also because of the process of political organization in a weak and atomized society.

3 According to ecclesiastical sources (27 July 1999, http://www.decani.yunet.com/destruction.html), during the month and one half NATO/JUN sponsored “peace,” 130,000 Serbs have become refugees or internally displaced persons, which represents 9% of the pre-war Serbian population of Kosovo; 150 Serbs have been killed; 200 kidnapped and 40 churches (of the 1,657 sacred shrines in Kosovo) have been damaged or destroyed in what now appears to be a systematic eradication of the Serbian religious and cultural heritage.

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5 11 June 1999.
The faith communities must be an integral part of and an equal partner in the peace process, promoting true reconciliation, equitable reconstruction and advocating democracy in order to secure the present and insure the future of Kosovo through valid national self-determination and proper regional integration.6

The Serbian Orthodox Church under the leadership of Patriarch Pavle in general and in Kosovo under Bishop Artemije, has attempted to promote peace. As a source of moral authority, the Church represents the pre-eminent voice of its people offering regional stability and continuity. Therefore, as the only “institution” trusted by the people, the Church serves to inform the inner psyche of its faithful and transcends the narrow constraints of self-serving nationalism. In calling upon “the Federal President and his government to resign in the name of the people and for the salvation of the people,”7 the Holy Synod of Bishops of the Serbian Orthodox Church clearly and courageously paved the way for a government that would be acceptable to those at home and abroad.

Often, in areas of conflict resolution, non-governmental organizations (NGO’s) and private volunteer organizations (PVO’s) have made recourse to the local Church through whom access has been gained to designated officials of independent-minded principalities and other positive opposition forces. For the sake of context and history, religious leaders, such as Archbishop Makarios, who was elected in 1960 as the first president of an independent Cyprus, and Archbishop Desmond Tutu, who continues to offer a cathartic mechanism in opposition to apartheid, serve to affirm the essential role of the Church in transitional stability in order to rebuild fragmented societies rising out from under oppressive regimes.

Pragmatically, the Church—especially in view of a weakened and fragmented opposition—can serve as a neutral and fair monitoring system, providing a sound and secure basis for a national referendum and registration of voters, while averting the danger of potential civil conflict. Given the international proportions of the Serbian Orthodox Church, this privilege could be either contained to those citizens residing within Serbia and Montenegro proper or duly extended to those living in the Diaspora.

One such referendum model might be charged with the task of allowing citizens the choice of voting for a republic or a constitutional monarchy. The latter maintains a distinct historical precedent in Serbia, which at the turn of the century, while fostering a strong liberal intellectual tradition, enjoyed having freely elected exiled King Peter I (1903-1921) as its Monarch. Today, Spain stands to underscore the positive role of King Juan Carlos in rebuilding a prosperous nation from a dictatorship to a constitutional monarchy.

With the serious lack of stability in Kosovo, one possible option might be a bi-cameral system of governance, similar to that of the government of the United States. One house would be established, proportionate to its population and maintain autonomy. In order to assure a true multi-ethnic state, preventing secession and fragmentation while securing regional stability, another house would maintain equal representation from all ethnic groups. It would then follow that from this house the chief executive would be appointed, at least provisionally. The ascent of both houses would be required to effect legislation. This approach attempts to reconcile present concepts of civil society within the local environment.

The American governmental model is one that could be readily applied to Serbia and Montenegro, i.e., Yugoslavia. However, given its current political, economic and ecological difficulties in the aftermath of a decade of violence, Serbia and Montenegro is most likely in need of an a-political, transitional government. The concept of a “technocratic” government or government of experts has been espoused by groups such as the Council for Democratic Changes in Serbia, which advocates a system of cabinet of experts, proportionate to the distribution of the Serbian population, two thirds from Serbia and one third from the Diaspora. A group of Serbian and Montenegrin economists, Group 17 (G17), have come up with a plan—the “Pact on Stability in Serbia.”8 G17 made the call for a government of “national salvation,”

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6 A resounding example of the same may be witnessed in the unwavering position of the monastic communities of Kosovo. On 26 July 1999, a meeting of Kosovar Albanian representatives with His Holiness Patriarch Pavle of the Serbian Orthodox Church was held in Pristina. The Albanian delegates expressed their trust in the Serbian Orthodox Church as the only constructive Serbian factor in establishing peace in Kosovo and Metohija, and as the only institution which nurtures friendly relations with the Albanians.

7 15 June 1999. Previously, the Church requested the resignation of the Milosevic regime in favor of a government of national salvation during the student demonstrations in the winter of 1996-1997.

i.e., “salvation of the people,” not only in answer to this problem, but directly in response to the call of the Serbian Orthodox Church for the Milosevic's resignation. Such a transitional government of experts would give itself, depending on the plan from one, to three to five years to effect economic reform, revamp the constitution, call for free elections, and promote free media, while paving the way for Belgrade’s eventual accession to the Pact on Stability for Southeastern Europe, through which the West anticipated bringing peace, development and a free market economy to this troubled region. One precise mechanism for a potential hand over is being worked out by G17 in association with the Independent Society of Judges of Serbia. Timing is of the essence in all matters concerned.

Properly supported, the Church could fully assume its rightful role in society, a privilege denied it for the past 50 years. “If peace is to be won for all of southeastern Europe, it is particularly important that the Orthodox Churches of the region assume an active and constructive regional role in spiritual renewal, economic reconstruction, and humanitarian responsibility. It is critically important that the Serbian Orthodox Church be given quick and strong affirmation as a key participant in the process of regional reconstruction and that this involvement of the Church of Serbia be understood as an important starting point for the civil and democratic renewal of Yugoslavia.”

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Senator Biden [presiding]. Thank you very much, Father. We appreciate it.

Mr. Hooper.

STATEMENT OF JAMES R. HOOPER, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, BALKAN ACTION COUNCIL, WASHINGTON, DC

Mr. Hooper. Thank you. I request the committee’s approval to enter the text of my statement into the record.

Senator Biden. Without objection, it will be placed in the record.

Mr. Hooper. I was elated that Senator Smith decided to hold this hearing. I think it could not be more timely. The topic is very important. There has been a good turnout. I hope that you are in the process of turning the interested members of this committee into an informal caucus for the continuing support of Serbian democratization. I think they need it and they could certainly benefit from it.

Senator Biden, I am very pleased to see you here. I know you have spent more time meeting with members of the democratic opposition than perhaps anyone except for Ambassador Gelbard, perhaps even more than Ambassador Gelbard.

I know Senator Lugar is not here, but he continues to be very interested in the issue, his writings and public statements.

I want to make the point that Serbian democracy is not just another important Washington issue or one aspect of a complex Balkan tapestry or whatever, but it is the issue regarding the future stability of the Balkans, the viability of the NATO alliance, and the leadership of the United States in post-cold war Europe.

Until there is a stable democratic government in Belgrade, American troops and those of the allies will have to remain stationed in Kosovo, Bosnia, Macedonia, and perhaps elsewhere in the region if additional crises and threats arise. Serbian dictator Slobodan Milosevic will continue to generate these new crises, perhaps in Montenegro or Macedonia or with his own remaining minorities in Serbia, all the while seeking to manipulate Russia’s fragile democracy toward distracting confrontations with the West. Each crisis
will revive questions about the credibility of American leadership and the alliance that surfaced in Kosovo and Bosnia.

I believe the committee understands that and applaud its decision to approve the Serbian Democracy Act that was discussed earlier. Ambassador Gelbard understands this also. He has done more than almost any other U.S. Government official to nurture support for the Serbian democratization movement. I hope that his well-deserved appointment to the embassy in Jakarta will not lead to any decompression in Washington’s efforts to effectively promote democratization in Serbia.

A more ominous source of concern, however, is the decision by the Secretary of Defense and the White House to relieve NATO Supreme Commander Gen. Wesley Clark of his command prior to conclusion of his first term. Not only did General Clark do more than virtually anyone else in this administration to win the war over Kosovo and provide security for Montenegro, but he also has come to understand the dynamics, intricacies, and nuances of the interrelated set of problems in the Balkans better than any other senior U.S. military officer.

General Clark in my view is paying the price for shaping the victory and getting NATO’s action right. Despite all the predictions made at the time, his bombing of Serbia’s infrastructure and the military defeat he imposed on Serbian forces set the stage for the rebirth of the Serbian democratization movement.

The decision to replace him might well be construed by Mr. Milosevic as a repudiation of the tough administration policy toward the regime and will undoubtedly embolden Milosevic and the Belgrade hardliners. General Clark’s Serbian counterpart, General Dragoljub Ojdanic, received a promotion and a medal for his services.

It is now more essential than ever, therefore, that the United States undertake to provide the hope and the help that Serbian opposition democrats require to implant democracy there. They now believe that they can win and they have demonstrated a greater degree of unity and purpose than at any time since the Belgrade street demonstrations of 1996 and 1997 and a broader countrywide support for that effort. They must carry the heaviest burdens of the democratization struggle, but they will not prevail without the support of the Western democracies.

As in Poland during the 1980’s and Portugal and Spain during the 1970’s, U.S.-led Western assistance can be critical to the outcome of uneven contests between oppressive regimes and popular movements. Serbia, however, does present a different problem from other Communist-era transitions. Decisions made in Moscow will not be made crucial in removing Milosevic. He has exploited, but never depended upon, Russian support to survive. He thrives, not on imported political ideologies backed by foreign military power, but on home-grown extreme nationalism, an extension of 19th century Serbian nationalism and 14th century myths.

Removing Milosevic is the first step toward ending the manipulation of potent ultranationalist and ultraracist ideas by Serbian leaders. The second step is the establishment of stable democratic structures and institutions of civil society strong enough to tape
this nationalism so that NATO need not contain it externally military force.

The Alliance for Change and other political movements offer the best hope for achieving democratic change. It does no disservice to their cause to note that some of the political parties and leaders who make up the alliance have made mistakes of judgment. Lec Waleca and Mario Soares made their share of political errors, too. It is only in retrospect that victory appears to have been certain.

Let us keep in mind that Solidarity had Ronald Reagan and Lane Kirkland, to name two, in their corner and Portugal was blessed with Frank Carlucci as the activist U.S. Ambassador leading an activist embassy staff.

I am convinced that Serbian democrats have learned from their mistakes. Support throughout Serbia for the democratic opposition has yet to crest. Serbs are also showing renewed interest in free labor unions and other components of civil society. We have only to wait for September and October to see what the Serbian student organizations will contribute to the cause.

Milosevic appears to take the opposition movement seriously as he plays for time, hoping to exhaust the energies of his opponents, wait for the opportune moment to co-opt them, and resume playing political footsie with Western governments. He has drawn the upper echelons of the military into a tight embrace, with his indicted chief of staff, military chief of staff, projecting the military's backing for his regime as support for legitimate elected constitutional authority. He hopes to keep the lower ranks, the reservists who have taken to the streets to demand back pay for their service in Kosovo, passive into next year by offering payments spread over 6 months.

He has placed major obstacles in the way of humanitarian organizations that seek to provide assistance to the Serbian people through democratically elected city councils in some towns. The Goebbels-like state-controlled media blankets the country with daily installments of “the big lie,” and the democratically elected Government in Montenegro, a key bastion of support for Serbian democratic forces, remains under threat from Belgrade.

What can the United States do to provide hope and help to these democratic forces? First, unlike long periods during the fighting in Bosnia and until the bombing began in Kosovo, when many in the Congress, the NGO community, the media, and the American public were at loggerheads with what they perceived as administration inactivism on the Serbian democratic front, if not outright support for Milosevic, the administration's commitment to the replacement of Milosevic by the democracy opposition offers significant opportunities for cooperation. We should all recognize this and find ways to work together. That is the goal of the newly formed Serbia Democracy Coalition, a grouping of key NGO's.

Second, differentiate between the complicity of many Serbs in ethnic cleansing, most recently in Bosnia, and the efforts of Serbian democrats who want to end it. Do not let the Serbian people off the hook in their denial, but recognize that democratization offers them the best means of coming to terms with the policies that Milosevic has perpetrated in their name.
In practice, this will require that the Serbian people accept that they live in a multi-ethnic state with significant numbers of ethnic Albanians, Hungarians, Muslims, Roma, and other minorities residing as citizens in Serbia proper. It also means coming to terms with the likely permanent loss of Kosovo.

Third, surround Serbia with functioning, secure democracies. The democratically elected Montenegrin Government requires a NATO security guarantee to ensure that it can withstand persistent Belgrade destabilization, whether it chooses to remain in the federation with Serbia or declare its independence.

In Kosovo, the United States should press for a rolling electoral process that begins with some municipal elections later this year and moves quickly to parliamentary elections by spring.

Croatian parliamentary elections that must be held by January promise serious democratization, as democratic forces there seem primed to win if it is a free and fair campaign.

Senator Biden. That is right.

Mr. Hooper. In Bosnia the United States has made a potentially crippling mistake by scheduling a reduction of SFOR troop strength by nearly 50 percent. If anything, SFOR needs to be increased in order to take the risks necessary to return ethnically cleaned refugees to homes in areas where they are in the minority, which will pave the way for a resumption of democratization efforts.

Indicted war criminal Radovan Karadzic must also be arrested. These two actions will signal to Milosevic that NATO is taking Bosnia off the table and increase domestic pressure against him.

Fourth, support the Alliance for Change and other democratic parties and movements working in parallel with the Alliance to Establish Democratic Government in Serbia. The Alliance needs money—relatively small amounts of a few hundred thousand dollars can make an enormous difference—and training supplied, in the words of the Italian Prime Minister, discretely but not clandestinely. Our political party institutes, working through the NED, can best provide this, but it must be done quickly.

There is far too much talk of assistance and far too little delivery. Days have become weeks, which can easily turn into months as AID and the Congress seek a level of comfort on disbursement procedures.

I really want to underline the importance of getting funding to the Alliance for these demonstrations. There could be more demonstrations today, tomorrow, next week. All it takes is—there is a lot of money back here, relative to the prevailing situation, in Washington. The funds we are talking about are invisible, they are negligible, they are nothing. In Serbia they can have an enormous impact.

The money is here, the Alliance and other political groupings are out there that are prepared to use it, and a way has to be found quickly to move that there, for computers, for vehicles, for posters, for long distance phone calls within the country, for fax machines, for gasoline. It is these kinds of things that we are talking about, and it does not cost that much.

Fifth, engage the municipalities that are governed by democratically elected councils. American humanitarian organizations could try to run projects with some of them. If the regime refused to co-
operate, the democratic opposition could turn the issue against Milosevic. American cities could establish sister city programs with counterparts in Serbia. We might even consider a small pilot program funded at $1 million or so for reconstruction efforts in a few of these municipalities if we were confident that the United Nations or others would not seize this as a precedent to advance much larger reconstruction efforts that would benefit the regime.

Sixth, persuade the AFL-CIO to make a commitment to significantly expand its support for Serbia's courageous democratic labor movement, modeled on the AFL's assistance to the Polish Solidarity movement during the 1980's. The AFL-CIO could even work with Serbian unions in partnership with Solidarity.

This would involve programmatic increases of several hundred thousand dollars, not tens of millions of dollars. Once again, by prevailing standards the funding required is incredibly modest.

Seventh, American religious groups should engage actively with members of the Serbian Orthodox Church, which has provided intermittent support for the democratic movement, to encourage the Serbian Orthodox Church to provide more sustained backing for democratization.

In conclusion, it is important to understand that the democratic movement in Serbia is still growing, drawing in more supporters, and soon perhaps producing new leaders. Democratization has yet to reach critical mass. This may happen faster than many people think if the West rolls up its sleeves and provides resources needed to reach their goal.

The price of failure will be high—the indefinite stationing of American and allied troops in the region and more crises that raise all the familiar dilemmas, policy dilemmas, for American administrations of sitting on the sidelines while Milosevic continues to destabilize the region or shouldering the risks of military and political action to stop him.

Thank you very much.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Hooper follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JAMES R. HOOPER

PROVIDING HOPE AND HELP FOR SERBIAN DEMOCRATIZATION

I want to thank the Committee and Senator Gordon Smith for holding these hearings and inviting me to participate. Serbian democracy is not just another important Washington issue or one aspect of a complex Balkan tapestry. It is the issue regarding the future stability of the Balkans, viability of the NATO alliance, and leadership of the United States in post-Cold War Europe.

Until there is a stable democratic government in Belgrade, American troops and those of the allies will have to remain stationed in Kosovo, Bosnia, Macedonia and perhaps elsewhere in the region if additional threats arise. Serbian dictator Slobodan Milosevic will continue to generate new crises, perhaps in Montenegro or Macedonia or with his remaining minorities, all the while seeking to manipulate Russia's fragile democracy toward distracting confrontations with the West. Each crisis will revive questions about the credibility of American leadership and the alliance that surfaced in Kosovo and Bosnia.

I believe the Senate understands that, and applaud its decision—undertaken with the leadership of members of this Committee—to send to the House of Representatives the Serbian Democracy Act. Once signed into law, it will encourage the Serbian people to anticipate a post-Milosevic era in which Serbia is no longer governed by indicted war criminals but by democratically elected officials not in the thrall of the virulent ultranationalism that has become pervasive under Milosevic.

Ambassador Gelbard understands this also, and has done more than almost any other United States government official to nurture support for the Serbian democra-
tization movement. I hope that his well-deserved appointment to the embassy in Jakarta will not lead to any decompression of Washington's efforts to effectively promote democratization in Serbia.

A more ominous source of concern is the decision by the Secretary of Defense and the White House to relieve NATO Supreme Commander General Wesley Clark of his command prior to the conclusion of his first term. Not only did Gen. Clark do more than virtually anyone else in this Administration to win the war over Kosovo, but he also has come to understand the dynamics, intricacies and nuances of the interrelated set of crises in the Balkans better than any other U.S. military officer. General Clark is paying the price for shaping the victory and getting NATO's action right. Despite all the predictions made at the time, his bombing of Serbia's infrastructure and the military defeat of Serbian forces were the cause of the rebirth of the Serbian democratic movement. The decision to replace him might well be construed by Milosevic as a repudiation of the tough American policy toward the regime and will undoubtedly embolden Milosevic and the Belgrade hardliners. Clark's Serbian counterpart, General Dragoljub Ojdanic, received a promotion and a medal for his services. It is now more essential than ever that the United States undertake to provide the hope and the help that Serbian opposition democrats require to implant democracy there. They now believe that they can win and have demonstrated a greater degree of unity and purpose than at any time since the Belgrade street demonstrations of 1996–1997. They must carry the heaviest burdens of the democratization struggle, but they will not prevail without the support of the Western democracies. As in Poland during the 1980s and Portugal and Spain during the 1970s, U.S.-led Western assistance can be critical to the outcome of uneven contests between oppressive regimes and popular movements.

Serbia, however, does present a different problem from other communist-era transitions. Decisions made in Moscow will not be crucial in removing Milosevic. He has exploited but never depended upon Russian support to survive. He thrives, not on imported political ideologies backed by foreign military power, but on homegrown extreme nationalism, an extension of nineteenth century Serbian nationalism and fourteenth century myths.

Removing Milosevic is the first step toward ending the manipulation of potent ultranationalist and ultraracist ideas by Serbian leaders. The second step is the establishment of stable democratic structures and institutions of civil society strong enough to tame this nationalism so that NATO need not contain it externally by military force.

The Alliance for Change and other movements offer the best hope for achieving democratic change. It does no disservice to their cause to note that some of the political parties and leaders who make up the Alliance have made mistakes of judgment. Lech Walesa and Mario Soares made their share of political errors too. It is only in retrospect that victory appears to have been certain. Let us keep in mind that Solidarity had Ronald Reagan and Lane Kirkland in its corner, and Portugal was blessed with Frank Carlucci as the U.S. ambassador leading an activist embassy staff.

I am convinced that Serbian democrats have learned from their mistakes. Support throughout Serbia for the democratic opposition has yet to crest. Serbs are also showing renewed interest in free labor unions and other components of civil society. We have only to wait for September and October to see what Serbian student organizations can contribute to the cause.

Milosevic appears to take the opposition movement seriously as he plays for time, hoping to exhaust the energies of his opponents, wait for the opportune moment to co-opt them, and resume playing political footsie with Western governments. He has drawn the upper echelons of the military into a tight embrace, with his indicted chief of staff projecting the military's backing for his regime as support for legitimate elected constitutional authority. He hopes to keep lower ranks of reservists who have taken to the streets to demand back pay for their service in Kosovo passive into next year by offering payments spread over six months. He has placed major obstacles in the way of humanitarian organizations that seek to provide assistance to the Serbian people through democratically elected city councils in some towns. The Goebbels-like state-controlled media blankets the country with daily installments of The Big Lie. And the democratically elected government of Montenegro, a key bastion of support for Serbian democratic forces, remains under threat from Belgrade. What can the United States do to provide hope and help to these democratic forces?

1. First, unlike long periods during the fighting in Bosnia and until the bombing began in Kosovo, when many in the Congress, NGO community, media and the American public were at loggerheads with what they perceived as Administration inactivism on the Serbian democratic front, if not outright support for Milosevic, the
Administration’s commitment to the replacement of Milosevic by the democratic opposition offers significant opportunities for cooperation. We should all recognize this and find ways to work together. That is the goal of the newly-formed Serbia Democracy Coalition, a grouping of key NGOs.

2. Differentiate between the complicity of many Serbs in “ethnic cleansing,” most recently in Kosovo, and the efforts of Serbian democrats who want to end it. Don’t let the Serbian people off the hook in their denial, but recognize that democratization offers them the best means of coming to terms with the policies that Milosevic has perpetrated in their name. In practice, this will require that the Serbian people accept that they live in a multiethnic state, with significant numbers of ethnic Albanians, Hungarians, Muslims, Roma and other minorities residing as citizens in Serbia proper. It also means coming to terms with the likely permanent loss of Kosovo.

3. Surround Serbia with functioning, secure democracies. The democratically elected Montenegrin government requires a NATO security guarantee to ensure that it can withstand persistent Belgrade destabilization, whether it chooses to remain in the Federation with Serbia or declare its independence. In Kosovo, the United States should press for a rolling electoral process that begins with some municipal elections later this year and moves quickly to parliamentary elections by spring. Croatian parliamentary elections that must be held by January promise serious democratization, as democratic forces there seem primed to win if the campaign is free and fair. In Bosnia, the United States has made a potentially crippling mistake by scheduling a reduction of SFOR troop strength by nearly 50 percent. If anything, SFOR needs to be increased and ordered to take the risks necessary to return “ethnically cleansed” refugees to homes in areas where they are in the minority, which will pave the way for a resumption of democratization efforts. Indicted war criminal Radovan Karadzic must also be arrested. These two actions will signal Milosevic that NATO is taking Bosnia “off the table” and could increase domestic pressure against him.

4. Support the Alliance for Change and other democratic parties and movements working in parallel with the Alliance to establish democratic government in Serbia. The Alliance needs money—relatively small amounts of a few hundred thousand dollars can make an enormous difference—and training supplied, in the words of the Italian prime minister, discreetly but not clandestinely. Our political party institutes working through the NED can best provide this, but it must be done quickly. There is far too much talk of assistance and far too little delivery; days have become weeks which can easily turn into months as AID and the Congress seek a level of comfort on disbursement procedures.

5. Engage the municipalities that are governed by democratically elected councils. American humanitarian organizations could try to run projects with some of them; if the regime refused to cooperate, the democratic opposition could turn the issue against Milosevic. American cities could establish sister city programs with counterparts in Serbia. We might even consider a small pilot program funded at one million dollars for reconstruction efforts in a few of these municipalities if we were confident that the U.N. would not seize this as a precedent to advance much larger reconstruction efforts that would benefit the regime.

6. Persuade the AFL-CIO to make a commitment to significantly expanded support for Serbia’s courageous democratic labor movement, modeled on their assistance to Polish Solidarity during the 1980s. The AFL-CIO could even work with Serbian unions in partnership with Solidarity. This would involve programmatic increases of several hundred thousand dollars, not tens of millions. Once again, by prevailing standards, the funding required is incredibly modest.

7. American religious groups should engage actively with members of the Serbian Orthodox Church, which has provided intermittent support for the democratic movement, to encourage more sustained backing of democratization.

In conclusion, it is important to understand that the democratic movement in Serbia is still growing, drawing in more supporters and soon perhaps producing new leaders. Democratization has yet to reach critical mass. This may happen faster than many people think, if the West rolls up its sleeves and provides resources needed to reach their goal. The price of failure will be high: the indefinite stationing of American and allied troops in the region and more crises that raise all the familiar dilemmas of sitting on the sidelines while Milosevic continues to destabilize the region or shouldering the risks of military and political involvement in stopping him.

Senator BIDEN. Thank you very much, Mr. Hooper. We have been joined by two of my colleagues who are not members of this committee, but I am anxious to give them an oppor-
tunity to ask questions. The distinguished Senators from Pennsyl-
vania and Ohio are here. I will begin, and I will not take the full 10 minutes and then yield to my colleagues and come back for additional questions. Let me start by saying, Ms. Biserko, I want to publicly acknowledge, and I hope it does not hurt you, how courageous you have been. I think that the service that you have provided for the world here has been significant. Although I found your statement pessimistic, I must admit I share your degree of pessimism about what is likely to happen in the near term absent some serious turn-around. I will have some questions, but I just want to acknowledge how much I appreciate your being here.

Also, Messrs. Fox and Hooper, as they say, you were there before it was fashionable to be in the Balkans. You underestimate the impact you have had on the thinking of a lot of people here in this town, and I compliment you for the honorable way in which you voiced your disagreement to policies when you were in the administration. I mean that sincerely.

Father, it is an honor to have you here. I am of the view that the Serbian Orthodox Church has the potential to play an incredibly positive role if it so chooses and if given the opportunity. I do not suggest it has the same influence as the Roman Catholic Church had in Poland, but it does have an exceptional capacity to impact events. I would like to begin by making a statement relative to something you said, Father, and then invite your response if you would like. I can understand your frustration and, although you did not display any, possible anger at what you probably perceive to be a double standard in rebuilding Kosovo and not Serbia. You compared it to what we did in Germany.

I would like to suggest to you that there was a fundamentally different situation in Germany. We occupied all of Germany. We took over the institutions. We initiated the Marshall Plan when there were four sectors in Germany, controlled by the victors. There was a Konrad Adenauer. I do not see one arising at this moment in Serbia. There were other significant democratic leaders, and the condition upon which the Marshall Plan went forward was absolute evidence of democratization, not a promise of democratization, but absolute evidence of democratization.

So I would respectfully suggest that, although I do not rule out the possibility and hopefully, if things move properly, the probability of the West uniting with other donor nations to rebuild Serbia, I do respectfully suggest that what Mr. Fox has said was already under way. The de-Nazification of Germany, the forceful requirement that the Germans recognize Wagner was not a politician, that heroic notions of German ultranationalism were mistaken, and the other requirements that the German people had to come to terms after watching the Nuremberg trials.

So I do not expect you are suggesting that we should do any of those things in Serbia, that is either occupy Serbia, or have show trials in the literal sense like the trials that took place in Nuremberg. Nor are you suggesting that there is a Konrad Adenauer or others like him present.
I believe your commitment to democratization. I believe that is what the church wants. I am trying to figure out how can you use the potentially significant influence of the church to promote that. Let me end by being very specific. When the recent protests, which have not reached the level of the protests that took place after Milosevic negated the municipal elections several years ago, were taking place, the leader of the opposition said that, he hoped in 10 days all of the bells in Serbia would ring in unison as a sign to Milosevic that there was unity on the issue that he should leave.

To the best of my knowledge, not a single Serbian Orthodox Church bell rang. Is there a reason for that?

Father Dobrijevic. I thank you for your kind observations, and if you will permit me respectfully to respond. My remarks were predicated in great part on my personal experience living in Yugoslavia during the academic year of 1996 and 1997. I was there at the invitation of His Holiness Patriarch Pavle to teach at the Graduate School of Theology in Belgrade, and that entire academic year was thoroughly destroyed because of the good work and the good intentions of the students demonstrating on the streets of Belgrade, trying to usher in democracy and reform.

It was precisely at that time when there was a throng of students, of mainstream intellectuals and the church present together on the streets, trying to somehow topple the Milosevic government and at best perhaps gain the attention of the West in joining them in their efforts. They feel completely demoralized and they feel that they have been clearly let down in the course of their actions.

I think this is why today we are witnessing demonstrations only peripherally. There are no demonstrations in Belgrade. They are everywhere save Belgrade and very limited in Novi Sad. I believe that this is one of the keys. They feel that they have been let down.

And, with all due respect, not only that I subscribe to this mindset, but I do state it for the record, that the Serbian people as a whole do feel that the NATO forces during the course of their campaign and now with their presence are an occupying force. One must come to terms with this mentality in order to help break it down if it is not so.

Senator Biden. I think in truth we are right now. There is an occupying force.

Father Dobrijevic. So that must be stated, I think, for the record. With this in mind, having watched these people and having seen them, having been there during the course of the bombing and seeing this blank, lifeless look on the people on the streets of the city, in the institutions, everywhere you go, I feel very strongly committed to the fact that if they are not given adequate and proper economic support they will never be able to usher in democracy. This is why I entered my remarks as I did.

Senator Biden. I want to state for the record, I have a deep abiding faith that if the Serbian people, who have been denied the control of the media, had an honest, clear look at what Milosevic did in their name, they would be revolted by what has happened.

My avocation is theology. I happen to be fairly knowledgeable about the Serbian Orthodox Church. The only other thing I ever thought of doing was wearing a collar like you have, only a Roman one. And I find that you have been in a very, very delicate position,
not unlike the Roman Catholic Church was in Poland during the Communist period.

We all give the Roman Church a great deal of credit for what has happened in Poland, and they deserve it. But there were long periods where the ability to speak out and act on their right moral instincts, was either muffled or avoided.

The Serbian Orthodox Church has a phenomenal opportunity now. We would be forever in your debt if the kind of moral leadership it is capable of could be exerted now. I do not want to overstate what I think to be the responsibility of the church, nor do I want to overstate what I believe to be the capacity of the church, even if it does everything correctly. Nor do I want to suggest that there is a clear path as to how to do it.

I would suggest, Father, that there is a dramatic distinction between the Marshall Plan in Germany and the willingness to rebuild Serbia, absent some concrete movement, beyond humanitarian assistance.

But my time is up. I know it is not orthodox, no pun intended, to yield to non-committee members, but these two gentlemen have keen interest and are knowledgeable about this and I would like to give them an opportunity. I am going to come back then, if I may to ask you some specific questions. But I yield to my friend from Pennsylvania.

Senator Santorum. Thank you.

As the Senator from Delaware knows, this is an issue that is very important. We have a large constituency of Serbians, Croats, other people from the Balkans, in Pennsylvania, and I wanted to thank Father Dobrijevic for being here. I asked some people from the Serbian community in Pennsylvania, as did Senator Voinovich in Ohio, and all of them pointed to Father Dobrijevic as being a good spokesman for the Serbian community here in the United States. So I am glad that the chairman here was able to make provisions for you to be able to be here.

I wanted to follow up on your comments and then ask the other people on the panel to respond to them. You focused on the solution of having the Serbian Orthodox Church take a major role, a transitional role. None of the other speakers really—I mean, you talked about how we are going to support democracy, sort of—and I do not mean to be critical, but sort of traditional views, how we would do things here in the United States.

What I heard, from Father Dobrijevic was, this is not the United States, this is not Western culture as we know it, and we have got to do things differently in Serbia. The suggestion is that we need, an idea that I do not think we would have advocated, or at least I would not have even thought of, something that would be anathema here in the United States, the church actually taking a lead role, as you described it, a transitional governmental role, where you would have a technocracy or a bunch of technocrats and governmental officials who would try to transition into democracy.

A couple of questions. No. 1, Father, how does that happen? How do we go from where we are now, and what is the United States' role, if any, or NATO's role, if any, in accomplishing that, No. 1?

Then I would like from the panelists a response from you as to whether you think this is reasonable or unreasonable. You are
speaking on behalf of, at least from my understanding, a feeling that is held by many Serbians, not just the church, by many Serbians here in this country as really the only workable solution from their perspective of how this is accomplished.

I just found it interesting that you would mention it, but none of the experts that are observing the situation there have brought this to the table. I just want to understand why that is the case and why you are suggesting what you are.

Father D. OBRIJEVIC. Thank you, sir. I mentioned it very specifically because it is already taking place. It was not necessarily that I subscribed the church to play an interim governmental role, but to facilitate some sort of an interim governmental role, and therein lies the difference.

How this is taking place already can be seen in the fact that all of the opposition leaders are turning to the church in order to receive some sort of sanction for their work, for their attempts in revamping the government and the structure of the government in Yugoslavia. Not only is the opposition turning to the church, but it is the populace which turns to the church and even, as witnessed in my remarks, Group 17, which is a very prominent, an eminent group of economists from Serbia and from Montenegro. They are already turning to the church and they have initiated their reforms in response to the church.

So we see the key role that the church does play in Serbia is trying to usher in democracy. Part of the frustration of the church, and why I brought it out so strongly to the forefront, is that the church did try desperately to avert the entire conflict in Kosovo. Namely, Bishop Artemije, who is the Serbian Orthodox Bishop of Kosovo, had visited the United States no less than five times and had presented his point of view to various levels of the U.S. Government. He had also traveled to France and spoke in Paris. He spoke before the Parliament in England. He was in Bonn, he was at the Russian Duma, and so on, addressing the major governments of the world, trying to tell them of the impending dangers and what would happen, what disaster would unfold in Kosovo, if this were not averted.

But nobody heeded the moderate voice of religious leadership. Tragically coupled with this is the fact that in Vienna on March 18, under the aegis of the Appeal of Conscience Foundation headed by Rabbi Arthur Schneier of New York, a document was signed, a joint declaration by the Serbian Orthodox Church, the Roman Catholic Church, and the Muslim leadership of Kosovo, trying to come to some sort of consensus to stave off the impending war which everybody foresaw.

They stated at that time that they categorically reject any and all forms of violence and that they would want to bequeath to their future generations a legacy of Kosovo which they could all jointly take pride in. This is part of the growing frustration that this voice, this moderate voice of religious leadership, has not been heeded, and the results have been rather tragic.

It is for this reason that the people are naturally turning to the church. The Polish model is indicative of the same, I believe. So for those reasons I did bring forth the church in order to facilitate this interim government.
Mr. HOOPER. I would support a more active role by the church in supporting a democratization, a movement toward democratization. I think the key here is to sustain that support, to make sure that the church is committed, that it can provide a context, a backing, a sanction, as Father Dobrijevic said, a roof, whatever you want to call it. I think that would be very helpful. I hope that would be encouraged by American religious leaders, religious groups, Orthodox and non-Orthodox. I think there should be more support for that.

But the key is sustained support by the church for the democratization movement. I think that is what is important, so that they draw a line with Mr. Milosevic and that regime and then do not cross over that line themselves, that they stay on the democratic side of that line. I think it is very important that it be sustained.

Mr. Fox. Well, a couple of points. I think, as Senator Biden suggested with respect to the Polish church in its testing time, there are analogous divisions in the Orthodox Church. There is a more accommodationist wing. It is well represented, I would say, by the Belgrade representatives. So it is not a unified church on these issues. I think that is one of the reasons that the bells do not all ring.

So one could hope for the wing of the church that is represented here today prevailing in fact. I think one of the—and whatever can be done from the international community side I think should be done to assist that.

But I think one of the positive elements of the withdrawal of the Milosevic forces from Kosovo is that in fact Bishop Artemije now has a role that he did not have before and Father Sava has some movement and is being well respected by both the U.N. administration and, I must say, the Kosovo Albanian leadership. That is all to the good, and I know that is something that gives a lot of heart to the Albanian moderates, the Kosovo Albanian moderates, who are relying on that.

But I would have to also respectfully suggest that the church's primary impact we could hope would be on the Belgrade authorities, and so far that impact—

Senator BIDEN. Would be on the what? I am sorry?

Mr. Fox. On the Belgrade authorities, whether with respect to the violence in Kosovo or democratization. And that is much less apparent, that there is that impact.

Ms. Biserko. Well, being an insider, I have some difficulties with the role of the church in general, especially over the last 20 years, I would say. As you know, they had a very important role in mobilizing Serb nationalism and emotions over Serbian victimhood. Only 2 years ago, Patriarch Pavle has initiated a declaration on amnestying Karadzic, a declaration on genocide of Serbs, and these are I would say very important points in the church's recent history.

I would say this is a welcome change in Kosovo that came only once Kosovo is lost to Serbia. As you say, Father Artemije, accompanied with some other Serbian leaders from the region, has been visiting the United States and other European states, but only coming up with some sort of plan of cantonization, of course, which always hides behind the unitary concept.
Somehow I think that the Serbian church has always been very conservative. It is an unreformed church, you know, and not very modern, I am afraid. I think that if they could restore their moral leadership, which we have a vacuum now of, of moral system in general, and that would imply that they would denounce all the war crimes, not only in Kosovo, in Croatia, in Bosnia, all of the minorities, help refugees return and not merely gather them back home to improve our blood in Serbia and so on.

There are a lot of racist positions in church rhetoric over the last 10 years, and I would very much welcome their role because someone has to play a role. It cannot be a political role. They have been linked to this regime. They have been linked to the Communist regime. So their history is also very discredited, I would say. So in order to have this role we are talking about, I think they should do much more.

Senator Santorum. I would like to give Father Dobrijevic a chance to respond to what you have just heard. The fact that you are not a united church, the fact that there is not the speaking up within Belgrade to the authorities, and the comments that Ms. Biserko made, if you could respond to that. I know my time is up.

Senator Biden. No, go ahead.

Father Dobrijevic. I believe that the church not only has articulated its position against Milosevic, not only has it called for his resignation and the resignation of his entire government, but it has also condemned the ethnic cleansing that took place in Kosovo.

I as a personal translator for Patriarch Pavle when he had received many visiting foreign dignitaries, I know for a fact that he consistently condemned all of the violence which had taken place in Croatia, in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and throughout the entire former Yugoslavia. So his voice is a very consistent and staid voice. That is why he is highly respected as a moral leader and has the authority that he does enjoy within not only the Serbian church, but within all the Orthodox churches, and I would say within all the population of Yugoslavia.

So the church is not being inconsistent with itself. I think it is very consistent. Again, my emphasis was not in having the church play some sort of political role, but simply to facilitate change. It could be a facilitator for change, and I think that everybody is intuitively turning toward the church.

Senator Santorum. My time is up.

Senator Voinovich. I would first of all like to thank you, Mr. Chairman, for having this hearing and giving these witnesses an opportunity to share their observations.

Senator Biden. Thank you for coming.

Senator Voinovich. I think it is very timely.

I first of all would like to say that I have been involved indirectly and directly with what has been happening over in Serbia for the last couple of years. A group of Serbian Americans who represented the Serbian diaspora came to me and urged me to see if I could provide an opportunity for them to meet with our State Department officials to talk about some alternative to Slobodan Milosevic, who I have considered to be a war criminal for a long period of time, in fact on occasion I have been invited to Serbia and have
never gone because of the fact that he was the leader of the country.

Unfortunately for probably a couple of reasons, the response did not come from our State Department. I would probably attribute it to two things: one, that he was the President of the country and that meeting with some other group perhaps might have jeopardized the State Department's position in terms of Milosevic; and I would also like to think that maybe the reason is because they thought that they had a handle on Milosevic.

I kept reminding them that he was the problem and that as long as he was there what we would all like to see take place in Serbia was not going to take place.

I do not think that when the demonstrations took place that we really gave them much help, and they were on their own and they were demoralized. So there is not a great feeling there about help.

That is over now and the question is how do we go about engendering this and encouraging this alternative leadership that we need as quickly as possible. When I was in St. Petersburg, as I shared with you, Mr. Chairman, I worked to get a resolution passed—

Senator Santorum. He is not chairman yet. Let us not advance him too quickly.

Senator Biden. Acting minority chairman, who is the only member of the committee, which gives me some residual authority, but very little, very little.

Senator Voinovich. As far as I am concerned, you showed up today; you are the chairman.

Senator Biden. I like your attitude.

Senator Voinovich. But the fact is that as a result of the outpouring of concern from many nations in the Balkans about the humanitarian and infrastructure needs, a resolution was passed that basically urged the Stability Pact nations and the 54 nations represented at the OECD to encourage humanitarian and infrastructure projects in the region, including in Serbia, which impacted on the region.

The reason for it was that they were complaining, the Bulgarians, Rumanians, the Hungarians, that we did not really understand that what is happening over there has had a dramatic negative impact on their respective economies and they would like to get going now that the war is over.

So that resolution passed, and things that were talked about were things like cleaning up the Danube, perhaps rebuilding one or two bridges that are needed for travel through Serbia to move goods, and a few other things. In addition to that, there was also talk of humanitarian efforts to reach out to the Serbian people, understanding that in Serbia you have over 500,000 refugees and another probably 75,000 to 100,000 may be coming in now from Kosovo, and that if humanitarian help is not given that you are going to have some real tremendous humanitarian problems in Serbia. And some of the adjacent countries said: We are going to have an exodus of people out of Serbia who will become refugees in our countries because they are not going to be able to get the help in Serbia.
I would like to know from you, how do we best as a nation encourage, what things should we be doing now? We have Senator Helms' resolution, $100 million. We have Congressman Smith's SEED program of $35 million over in the House. What do you think we ought to be doing to move this anti-Milosevic or, let us put it in the positive, to bring democracy, democratization, to Serbia?

Maybe, Mr. Fox, would you like to start?

Mr. Fox. Yes. I think it is very important to recognize that, as frustrated and disappointed as I think all of us are who have been on this account now for however long it has been, there is one big difference between what has been done in all the countries I named and is now being done in Croatia just in the past year with an activist U.S. Ambassador and a complete change in policy toward the opposition there, which was regarded as weak, nationalist, divided, hopeless, all the same attributes—did not have quite the baggage that the Serbian opposition has, but quite a bit—

Senator Biden. A lot.

Mr. Fox. Not for want of trying in some cases.

One year ago, the policy changed, 1 year ago. Resources went in. NGO's were brought in. The IRI–NDI program was stepped up. Ambassador Montgomery has taken a very hands-on approach there, and much more active attention to the tribunal, a variety of aspects to this.

But it was good old-fashioned basic baseball democratization: campaign assistance; they have worked with that coalition, they are whipping them into shape; providing resources.

That has simply not been done in Serbia. It has never been done. It has to be stressed that as of today they have not seen resource one, material resource one from all of this.

Senator Biden. Will the Senator yield on that point? We can maybe do this in tandem here, because I will not take you off point. Croatia desperately wants economic integration in Europe. We have an ambassador in Zagreb. We have no ambassador in Serbia. Could we mechanically do what you suggested in Serbia? Could we send in NGO's? How would we get them in? Could we physically engage in the way we have in Croatia?

You are making a comparison which I think is legitimate, but mechanically is it a possibility?

Mr. Fox. I think it is a combination. Well, that is, I think the decision on whether and when the U.S. sends back representation should be heavily guided by this consideration, that if and when we do send a charge back in it ought to be for this purpose. I would argue that that is the one consideration that would argue for an earlier return.

But yes, you can do it. As I see it, this is a combination of Poland pre-1989 and Bulgaria early 90's and Slovakia over the last couple of years. You have it has been, I think, more and more accepted in the Serbian opposition that this coalition of coalitions approach that was tried in Slovakia, where they also had personality disorders in the opposition and the usual problems.

They overcame that and both the NGO's and the opposition disciplined themselves quite effectively with judicious outside assistance. In Bulgaria, something like a million dollars in material as-
istance went to the Union of Democratic Forces in 1990. They did not get the endless conferences and how-to and so forth. They got some of that. They got computers, faxes, vehicles, gasoline. That is what they got.

They have never gotten that in Serbia. It is what they are starved for right now, and those are the building blocks. That is how you develop a partnership with an opposition. I think, to be fair to them, they have never gotten it. It is an egregious situation, frankly, and it still has not been corrected as of this moment.

Senator BIDEN. Keep going, Senator.

Senator VOINOVICH. Father Dobrijevic.

Father DOBRIJEVIC. I would tend to agree with that. Part of the problem, as you have mentioned, is the vast amount of refugees who are now located in Serbia and the many more who are coming there. Another part of the problem is that there is a hidden statistic which often escapes the eye of those who come in to monitor refugees, and that is that approximately 97 percent of all of those refugees are privately housed. So with the crippling effects of sanctions on top of everything else that has taken place, you have not only a refugee crisis on your hands, but you have an entire population which is in crisis.

Having worked in the field of humanitarian aid since the beginning of the breakup of Yugoslavia, I understand how repatriation demands simple commodities such as computers and all the other things which were just mentioned. We see none of this pouring into Serbia. We see no incentive for the people.

On a practical level, the work ethic of the Serbian people in Yugoslavia has also been broken, because they often work and they never reap the benefits of their labors, they are never given wages for the jobs that they have. Many of those who are trying to earn a living in Yugoslavia are persons who have been internally displaced, not once, but now twice within a short span of 4 years, as many of my own family members have, first from the Krajina and now again from this situation in Kosovo.

So it is a violent cycle which somehow has to be broken.

Senator VOINOVICH. Father, one of the things that—and we talked about this. There is the opinion, and I have really talked to some people high up in our government about this, that if we do infrastructure say in Serbia or humanitarian aid, that that would be helpful to Milosevic and further solidify his position.

I would be interested, what reaction do you think it would have if some infrastructure or humanitarian, if there was a real outpouring, in terms of his—would he take advantage of that or do you think it would result in the opposite happening?

Father DOBRIJEVIC. Well, of course the pendulum could swing either way on that. He could simply take advantage, which he is already taking advantage, of the humanitarian aid commodities which are coming in. There is a problem now with the distribution of medicines, where that has been taken over by the Yugoslavia Government and the International Red Cross. So that there is always a chance for the abuse of any commodity whatsoever.

I would beg the issue that if you are already distributing humanitarian aid, however limited it may be, of what use is it for a hospital to receive medical commodities, to receive food and bedding
and so on, and not have electricity, not have running water? Some-
body who lives in Pancevo, for instance, who depends on crossing
the river every day in order to come into Belgrade to work, if he
cannot come in to work, if he has no means to transport himself,
he cannot earn a living. What are they to do?

This is part of breaking that vicious cycle, you see. So this is why
I see the need for economic assistance. Infrastructure is intrinsi-
cally tied to the question of humanitarian aid and the question of
rebuilding Serbia.

Senator VOINOVICH. Well, some people say, Father, that if you do
not give it and you do not do the infrastructure, that things are
going to get so bad and that will accelerate his demise.

Father DOBRIJEVIC. Quite the contrary, I would disagree. I think
it would so thoroughly demoralize the people that they would not
be able to rise up against him. You cannot starve someone into
submission.

Mr. FOX. We have an interesting case of this in the last couple
of weeks, and that is Mr. Canac, who is a leading figure in the coa-
lition, opposition coalition, based in Novi Sad has said: “Give me
a bridge and I will fight the regime.” The Austrians offered him a
bridge, a pontoon bridge for Novi Sad, and engineers to go with it,
and they were denied visas.

Senator BIDEN. Denied visas by whom?

Mr. FOX. Denied visas by Belgrade. They want the bridge going
through the Belgrade authorities. They demand that all of the city
to city assistance that the Germans and the British and others are
trying to provide, the Austrians, is not getting in. It is just a trick-

The opposition itself is saying, do not do it unless it goes through
our channels. That is the dilemma. I think this has to be tested
carefully. In fact, it might well be that the Orthodox Church, some
of the International Orthodox Christian charities and others can
play more of a role here on the humanitarian assistance. But it has
to be accountable, because I think those institutions themselves
would be damaged if it is not.

Senator BIDEN. You keep going.

Senator VOINOVICH. The one last question is the issue of who
could provide that, be the facilitator. My head says to me that if
the humanitarian aid was promised and there were some infra-
structure projects they were willing to go in, say that did not nec-
essarily benefit only Serbia but just say the region—let us talk
about cleaning up the river, for example—and it was done by a
neutral party, let us say the Orthodox Church, and that the condi-
tion was that for it to occur that it would have to be done through
that. Then if it was and it was offered and Milosevic came back
and said, oh no, we are not going to let you have this, we are not
going to let you have that, do you not think that if it was really
well understood what it was and that he was standing in the way
for it to happen, that that would be an added momentum to say
to the people, we have got to get rid of this man because without
it we are not going to get this help?

Mr. FOX. Well, I think that is certainly what I am saying, is test
it carefully step by step, and then if he tries to stop it blow the
whistle. But do not go ahead with it, certainly not when your
democratic partners are saying do not go ahead with it.

Senator Biden. Senator, I think you are on the mark here. You
and I have had private discussions about this. I do not think there
is any disagreement that, for example, the Senator and I have
about either Milosevic or about the need to help the Serbian peo-
ple. I do not think there is any disagreement, except on the details.

I wanted to ask Ms. Biserko here a question. Suppose we make
a decision that we are going to send in fax machines, what we call
in American politics walking around money, so that the opposition
actually had money on the ground to send out faxes, to distribute
literature, to do basic campaign things.

Do you think that Milosevic would allow fax machines to be sent
in to the opposition, or would we have to do them clandestinely?

Ms. Biserko. Well, it has happened so far.

Senator Biden. What has happened?

Ms. Biserko. I know people who have fax machines and com-
puters, some of us who have been supported from outside. So I
think that is not the major problem.

I think humanitarian aid you're referring to has always been dis-
seminated by the national Red Cross, by International Red Cross,
UNHCR, and it was always manipulated to some extent, because
it is not only refugees who need aid. It is now the whole country
is a social problem in one way or the other.

So it is either taken into official stores and then sold out, and
you always have some profiteers out of that. But I think inter-
national agencies so far, they always count on that to some per-
centage.

But I think in this whole discussion my feeling is that what we
lack is really, what do we do with the republican and federal ad-
ministrations, because these are the only people who are skillful in
doing something? We are now talking——

Senator Biden. The only people who what? I am sorry.

Ms. Biserko. Politically skillful.

Senator Biden. Politically skillful. I am sorry, I did not hear
what you said. I understand.

Ms. Biserko. Even including SDS people and the other minor
parties. So we are talking about the political opposition, which is
not yet politically articulate and does not have a structure, which
we are now through your help trying to build up. This is something
which is done by NDI and some others from the United States and
other countries. So they are just learning how to deal with that.

But people who are professional, highly professional in the ad-
ministration, which should also be looked at, because if you have
this critical mass being created in the streets of discontent of the
wider population, which is coming up anyway, it can be channeled
professionally also with these people, who will at one point detect
Milosevic because they will understand that things are going dif-
ferent parts.

So you have also to focus on these people as well, some of them.

Senator Biden. I apologize for not understanding: by "these peo-
ple" are you referring to people within the Milosevic regime now?

Ms. Biserko. Yes, yes, all the structures, in the parties, and in
his own circle.
Senator BIDEN. And you think it is possible to destabilize him by dealing with some of them? Is that what you are saying?

Ms. BISERKO. Well, that should be, I should say, done in shadow.

Senator BIDEN. Yes, I see.

Ms. BISERKO. Because this street sort of critical mass coming up, married with this internal sort of dynamics, can bring about the positive change.

Senator BIDEN. I wanted to ask you something—and please interrupt me, Senator—

Senator VOINOVICH. No, go ahead.

Senator BIDEN [continuing]. Because I would like this to be more of a conversation because I am learning something here.

There is a distinction some are making, I among them, between the command level of the VJ and the conscripts, and the reservists who were called up—the people who are protesting now within the military. In other words, those with the stars on their shoulders seem to be very loyal at this moment to Milosevic? For reasons that they may get tried next and indicted next, but they seem to be very loyal.

There is at the lower levels within the military some real discontent. Is the discontent because they are not getting paid?

Ms. BISERKO. Yes.

Senator BIDEN. Or is the discontent because they would like to get rid of Milosevic because they think he has done bad things for their country? In other words, do we have any hope in the military being any part of an ultimate opposition to Milosevic?

Ms. BISERKO. Well, talking about reservists, so far it is only discontent for not being paid, because otherwise they could have rebelled before the Kosovo operation and they did not. So this is now really, at this point it is not yet quality in this sense.

There are some voices from the military, like Perecic, who is probably also a war criminal, who said that the Yugoslavia army is now being used as a party cell of SDS. So he is obviously trying to call for non-party sort of engagement of the army, which it was always a party army throughout the last 50 years, not only now, and even during the Perecic time.

But this is a voice which at this point may indicate something, and they say that he is rather popular in the lower ranks in the army. So whether and how much they can deliver, this discontent will continue. It will buildup. It does not have any other message at this point.

To remove Milosevic is also something which is widely supported now. I would say at one point there is some sort of, to scapegoat Milosevic, make him responsible for everything, and amnesty all of us for any responsibility, and this is an oversimplification. He has to go, and I think that we all have to take up our own accountability for what has happened, because all these recruits could have stopped army operations last year.

Parents were coming to our office, we have dealt with them, and we tried to organize sort of protests in the streets, but we did not succeed. We had only five parents standing up. There was no mother movement until the moment that young people arrived in the coffins back home in Krusevac and other places.
Senator Biden. As we say unfortunately here, the body bags began to come home.

Ms. Bisero. Only then, once they suffered. The protests in Serbia proper especially came as a result of suffering, of misery and everything, because they were mostly hit down there. As you know, Serbia proper was a stronghold of the SDS and Milosevic. So now they hit the bottom and these young men who closed down these radio stations and called the people to come into streets did what they did.

But you know, this is quality which has to be worked on yet.

Senator Biden. That is not inconsistent with what Mr. Fox is saying, I do not think. There is an old expression: “better the devil you know than the one you do not.” Here it seems to be “the better the devil you do not know than the one you do know,” here. I thought your analogy in Croatia was an accurate one, in the sense that promoting opposition is kind of a nurturing process. Is that what you are saying?

Mr. Fox. Absolutely. I think we tend to forget, even those of us who have been involved on the front lines in various ways in government and out of government, these oppositions never start very well. Some of the ones that are now models of transition democracy were replete with very intolerant nationalists, people that did not want to allow any minority parties to register, et cetera, et cetera.

We had leverage on these oppositions because we were doing things for them and with them. We were giving them resources that they needed. We could help shape the moderates within the coalitions, but work with, whether it is IRI or NDI, the usual democracy groups, the Trade Union Institute. That was a vital partnership.

That has been lost, frankly, because we have had so many transitions now people have almost forgotten how to do it. Frankly, the assistance bureaucracy not only does not encourage it, it rather discourages it in the case of the democracy groups, which is why we are all arguing for the resources to go through the NED, by the way.

Senator Biden. Through the what?

Mr. Fox. The National Endowment for Democracy, rather than the Agency for International Development.

Senator Biden. That is the vehicle you believe—

Mr. Fox. Absolutely, it has to go through the NED, absolutely.

But let us take another case. Let us take Slovakia. Again, the shift on Slovakia, real attention to Slovakia, it was not there in 1994, it was not there in 1995. It really came when Secretary Albright assumed her present position, got some serious attention, and we had an ambassador who was very engaged and we had NGO’s that were very engaged. That was a couple of years in the making, and that was a lost case until policy changed.

Senator Biden. Well, I do not want to drag this out and I want the Senator to pursue any other area that he would like to pursue. But let me say that I do not think anyone disagrees that if we could get more NGO’s in; if we were able to get more direct access to individuals; if I could put it in the parlance of Federal relationships with States; if we could go straight to the mayors and not through the Governor, no offense, Governor, if we could go straight
to the county councils and not to the State legislature; if we could be in the position to go in like we did in other countries for a while in Poland, where we went straight to individuals and identified whether they were mayors or whether they were opposition leaders or whether they were local officials in small villages, and went in and assisted them; if we, the European community and ourselves, could get in to do that, then it seems to me over time it would work.

We were able to do that in Slovakia. We were able to do that in Croatia. I do not see the circumstance where Belgrade will allow essentially a mini-Peace Corps to all of a sudden invade Serbia. The evidence, I would argue, is the example you gave in, was it, west Novi Sad? I forgot the name of the leader.

Mr. Fox. Novi Sad.

Senator Biden. Where the Austrians said they would build Serbia a pontoon bridge, and Belgrade says, they don’t want a pontoon bridge. Yet Belgrade is saying they want to be able to cross the river. So I just wonder how we do that.

Do you understand what I am saying? If there is opposition, I do not think we should fail to try to do that. What is the alternative?

Let me say one last thing and then ask you to comment if you wish to any event. Father, it seems to me that the Senator from Ohio is correct. The church theoretically could be uniquely situated to dispense a lot of this humanitarian aid. I am not at all certain, because I think it is accurate what Ms. Biserko said. The leadership in Belgrade in the church, and I will not make apologies for them, has not been as forthcoming as the leadership in Kosovo has in terms of distancing themselves from the political leadership, either under the Communists or now.

I am not passing judgment. I am not sitting here saying you should have done the following. I am just stating what I think is historically factual. It has been very difficult because you may get shot or you may get put in prison.

I am convinced that if there was a mechanism able to be worked out where the Orthodox church was a vehicle for distribution of humanitarian aid, you would get overwhelming support in this place for that to happen.

Father Dobrijevic. May I respectfully note that the church has been a vehicle for the distribution of humanitarian aid. The church has its own department for humanitarian aid. It is called “Covekoljubije,” which means “Philanthropy,” and it is now presently revamped through the efforts of International Orthodox Christian Charities, IOCC. They are now working on the ground.

IOCC is the only organization which maintained an expatriate presence in Yugoslavia during the bombing campaign and is still there working. They have distributed a substantial amount of aid during that time. IOCC is sponsored by all of the Orthodox churches here in America and they interface directly with the Serbian Orthodox Church.

Senator Biden. I am aware of that, Father. What I am talking about is a much grander scale. What I am talking about is the potential for there to be hundreds of millions of dollars.

Senator Voinovich. The problem is that somebody has to put the package together.
Senator BIDEN. Yes.

Senator VOINOVICH. And it is like we are trying to figure out what to do, and as we are waltzing time is running out. I think that we need to say this is what we are willing to do and put it in a package and say this is a major commitment that we are willing to make, we are going to be willing to do it through, say, through the Serbian Orthodox Church or maybe particular projects in one area maybe through the local political officials, and just lay it out in a well understood program where people can comprehend this is really something spectacular, this is great, this will be great for our country.

But I think if we do little pieces here and pieces there, you really do not get the full impact of what it could mean for the people in Serbia. I think that that is what we should be encouraging the Stability Pact nations to be doing. I think that is what we have—we have allocated what, almost $900 million for humanitarian aid. We have got this money.

We need to just lay it out and say, here are the things that we are going to do, and put the package together. We need the leadership to do that.

Senator BIDEN. I think that is right. The only point I am trying to make is that the difference between Croatia and Tudjman, who may very well get indicted as a war criminal himself, and Serbia and Milosevic is that there is serious leverage in Croatia.

Croatia desperately wants to become part of the EU. It also wants to become a member of NATO. And that is real leverage. It wants to be part of the West. Milosevic does not want Serbia to go West, young man. He is not looking for it to go West. The leverage we have over Milosevic, short of arresting him, is minimal.

So I am not suggesting that we should not have scores of Western NGO's in Serbia. If tomorrow the West put together a package saying we are prepared to send 5,000 NGO's into Serbia and move them in the following circumstances to rebuild infrastructure and distribute humanitarian aid, I would say let us go to it. I cannot imagine Milosevic allowing that to happen.

But I understood your earlier point to be that we should put together a package that demonstrates to the Serbian people that we are prepared to rebuild their country; but only through the following mechanisms, not through Belgrade and the Milosevic government. If that is stopped, it is because Milosevic stopped it.

Is that kind of what you were saying?

Senator VOINOVICH. Yes, I think specifically that is what I am saying, unless there is some other way of getting it done.

Senator BIDEN. And by the way, I do not disagree with what the Senator says. You and I have been sort of talking our way through this on the floor, because I know of your extreme interest and you know of mine. You know it better than I do in terms of the impact on the Serbian people and the flowback from that over here.

But I think that is the key. How do we get that aid in and have it not be the existing Socialist Party and Milosevic that dispenses the aid and is able to claim credit. Milosevic will say that the West is morally corrupt, and that it will rebuild Serbia because it has demonstrated its moral corruptness.
As a new bridge goes across the Danube, he will stand there as he breaks a bottle of champagne over it and says: “This is evidence of the fact I was right. They have acknowledged their moral corruptness, they have come forward.” I do not know how you keep that from happening.

Mr. HOOPER. Senator, could I ask just to say a couple of things?

Senator BIDEN. Please.

Mr. HOOPER. First, if it is not out of place to suggest so, you have had so much experience with the Bosnia issue. You knew that one. You fought it for 3 years, 4 years. You really pressed this Kosovo issue hard. I think you understand the background on Serbian democratization.

If it is not—and I am not being coy. I really mean this. If you would be prepared to—you are asking all the right questions. Senator Voinovich is asking a lot of good questions. But if you would be prepared to go out yourself or go out with some of your colleagues to ask some of these questions and look into some of these, and then come back here and work the system back here in Washington——

Senator BIDEN. That is precisely what I am about to do as of September the 1st.

Mr. HOOPER. Second, I think—thank you very much. I congratulate you. I am glad you are doing that.

We may not—it may not be possible for NGO’s to go in, but it certainly is possible for Serbs to come out. That is one way. There are other Slavic neighbors who may be more amenable, who may be more acceptable, Bulgaria, Slovakia, so forth. There is Montenegro. There are lots of ways to do this.

In Poland, AFL-CIO got in printing presses during the 1980’s, the AFL-CIO. These things can be done.

Senator BIDEN. I could not agree with you more.

But I do not want anybody walking away with an absolute comparison of what happened in Slovakia or what happened in Bulgaria or what happened on Croatia to what is happening in Serbia.

Mr. HOOPER. But many of the same techniques——

Senator BIDEN. But the same techniques can work.

For me, I think all the points you mentioned have to occur. The best building block first and foremost is the stabilization of the democracies in the region.

If you told me I could only do one thing at a time, the first thing I would do would be to help Montenegro and Macedonia, work on Croatia, and deal with Hungary. You surround, not to isolate, but to embolden. You surround Serbia with functioning democratic neighbors who have benefited economically from the integration and the willingness of Europe to participate along with us.

I am not suggesting, Senator, you do not feed anybody in the meantime. I am not suggesting you let anarchy reign in Serbia in the meantime. We have got to arrange our priorities in a way that enables the very thing Mr. Fox is suggesting. That is, what is the best way, over the nearest timeframe, to establish a legitimate democratic opposition? It may find root in the military. It may find root in former socialists. It may take root in other places.

I think that is a difficult objective. I am not saying we should not do it, but the one thing I do not think we should do is allow for
the economic, humanitarian, and structural aid to Serbia to go through the pipeline of Belgrade, the Socialist Party, and Mr. Milosevic.

Senator VOINOVICH. Senator, I agree with you on that. But I will tell you this, that if you want to get this going you ought to support the people that are already there. When I met with Staiyonov in Bulgaria, he was saying: You have got to understand, we want to get rid of Milosevic, but you also have to understand that during this period of time our economy has been in lockjaw. We are a new democracy. We need to get going. We cannot get anybody to invest in this place. Do you not understand that we have got to go through Serbia if we are going to move goods?

When I was at the OSCE, the Hungarians saying to me: Do you not understand, the railroads are out, the bridges are out, the river cannot be used. The Ukrainians, you would think maybe they would not be interested, coming to me and saying: Do you not understand that this has had a billion dollars worth of negative impact on our economy?

I met with the Greek Ambassador, who said the same thing: We cannot bring our goods anywhere; we have got to take them across the Adriatic and take them over to Italy.

Senator BIDEN. One of the things that was said here earlier was that Milosevic has indicated that unless we rebuild the Danube as he wants it rebuilt, he is not going to let any ships go through the Danube from Hungary or anywhere else.

Now, whether that is true or not I do not know.

Ms. BISERKO. It is, it is in the New York Times today.

Senator VOINOVICH. Well, I read it in the paper. But I have got to say to you, if the President of the United States after Sarajevo and the Stability Pact nations said, we are going to get together as a humanitarian gesture and we are going to clean this river out, and we are just telling you, Mr. Milosevic, we are going to get it done----

Senator BIDEN. I am with you.

Senator VOINOVICH [continuing]. I think he is going to be in a pretty difficult position if he says, well, we are not going to let you do it unless you do it my way, because the people in those areas are going to say, I will be damned, we are going to get it done.

Senator BIDEN. I would agree with you that if we attempt to do it and make it clear if we cannot do it it is because he will not let us do it, that that is a helpful thing.

But anyway, we are keeping you all very, very late. Would any of you like to make any closing comment or ask us any questions? We will flip this around. I mean, seriously, is there anything you would like to add? You have been all very, very helpful.

Anybody have any closing comments?

Mr. HOOPER. Can I ask if you would be willing to look in, while you are here in Washington, to look into just the issue of the money that will go to the resources for the democracy parties? I know you have concerns about that.

Senator BIDEN. The answer is I personally, and I am sure the Senator already has, commit to you that I have started that. That is why the first question I asked was the mechanics, how do we do this. I am anxious to do it; the administration is anxious to do this.
This is not something there is any reluctance on the part of the administration.

I am anxious to do it and any suggestions you have would be appreciated.

Mr. HOOPER. Keep in touch with both IRI and NDI and check with them, because there really honestly is an awful lot of red tape. There is a blowtorch to get that money out there, but it is not happening because various—and I do not mean congressional procedures.

Senator BIDEN. No, I understand.

Mr. HOOPER. That is not a problem.

Senator BIDEN. I promise you that I will. If I can figure out what should be done to my satisfaction, I will. I have no reluctance to borrow a blowtorch, none.

Mr. FOX. I have just one final comment, in addition to thanking you very much for this hearing and for all the blowtorches that you bring to these issues. We admire what you do very much in our sector, believe me.

I do not want to rain on this humanitarian parade, but if you got $100 million in humanitarian assistance through non-State channels, I am not sure it would bring you democracy in Serbia, either. If you got the kinds of resources that we have referred to today direct, by a variety of channels, drawing on different examples from the past, and you start that in the present, and I mean this week, next week, and really that serious engagement that we have seen in every other successful democratic change, if it does not work it would be the first one that did not.

Ms. Biserko. I would like to thank you all for your time and dedication to help Serbian democracy. I just would like to make one more point clear: that Serbia maybe at this point, when the territorial issue is somehow closed down by having the protectorate in Kosovo, by having all these independent States around, and hopefully Montenegro out of it, that they will focus on what is Serbia.

I think the main Serbian problem for all these years has been that they have been focused, together with the opposition, on the—

Senator BIDEN. Good point.

Ms. Biserko. That is why it is important to keep Kosovo and Montenegro out of Serbia now. We have to acknowledge what we are, what is our territory. This was what was lacking all the time. Even last week Vuk Draskovic was saying those who are encouraging Montenegro to go are encouraging civil war. I mean, none of them are really clear on this position toward Montenegro.

This, I think the administration has to make a clear message to Belgrade that Montenegro is a serious issue, like Kosovo as well. Only in that case will we be able to focus on our own issues, on our own democracy agenda. Nobody has defined what is the democracy agenda of Serbia. It is not only the replacement of Milosevic.

I would also add one more thing, that Serbia is set up of different regions which have different historical backgrounds, which have different political cultures, like Vojvojina, which was part of Austro-Hungary, which was the third richest region in former Yugoslavia, that has different potential. Serbia proper is different.
I mean, it is more rural, it is more conservative. Now they have demonstrations. We do not know how it will end.

Belgrade, politically speaking, is the most conservative bastion. I would say, of this unitary centralized concept. You have to deal with people in Belgrade, and also pushing them to define the democracy agenda of Serbia. One thing is to get the removal of Milosevic, but they have to say what is the transition agenda really of Serbia.

Senator BIDEN. If I may be so bold, in 1993 in Belgrade I asked to meet with the opposition, the intellectual community, and the church as well. Fifty people showed up, all of whom professed to not be supporters of Milosevic, and talking about democracy. I am sure I did not get it all, but everyone I remember talking to talked about a greater Serbia. Everyone I remember talking to talked about a circumstance that did not bear a lot of relationship to reality, particularly the intellectual community, which surprised me.

I should have known. I should have known, but I did not.

The point I was trying to make at the outset here when I talked about the Republika Srpska, what you just said about Serbia having to come to grips with what is Serbia and who they are, is enhanced if the rest of the region becomes solidified, in the same way it would force the attention of the Republika Srpska.

Once the war occurred and NATO prevailed, the road became much smoother. The extremes began to diminish because there was no realistic possibility of realizing the dream of the Republika Srpska and their more radical factions to unite with a greater Serbia. There was not much benefit in uniting with it. It was a non-starter.

So I think the larger point you make about simultaneously making sure that we issue a clear declaration to Montenegro and how seriously we take it and the rest of the region is important. You have said more clearly what I was saying early on. I, for one, do not disagree with you, because I still think in the end that this is an incredibly rich culture. This is an incredibly capable people. It is almost the ultimate squandering of talent and culture, in my view. So I still have faith that if we provide the environment the right thing is going to be done.

Father, you want the closing word?

Father DOBRIJEVIC. Yes.

Senator BIDEN. You have benediction.

Father DOBRIJEVIC. In lieu of benediction, if you would kindly permit me to end with the issue of ringing of bells, inasmuch as you initiated your dialog with me on that subject.

Senator BIDEN. Please, be my guest.

Father DOBRIJEVIC. I would like to reiterate today what I said to President Clinton once in a meeting with him, that when all is said and done I think that the United States of America and all of the allies will once again see in Serbia one of its greatest and most tried and true allies in that region. We have a record of being allied with the United States, as you well know, during World War I, World War II, the posthumous awarding of the Award of Legion to General Draza Mihailovic. And I believe, if I am not mistaken, that Serbia alone has the distinction of having a U.S. President, Woodrow Wilson, asking for all church bells throughout America on
June 28, 1918, the day of the commemoration of Battle of Kosovo, to be rung at noon, noting the Serbs were fighting for the freedom of the world.

So I thank you for allowing the Serbian Church to come here and I thank you for allowing bells to be heard once again, as they rightly should be.

Senator BIDEN. Well, let us hope they are heard in both countries.

Senator, any comment, closing comment?

Senator VOINOVICH. Thank you very much for coming today.

Senator BIDEN. I want to thank you all. I can assure you that this will be not the last time we will ask you for your input, particularly Messrs. Fox and Hooper, who have been great for a long time here. I again thank you all for being here. As my mother would say, with the grace of God and the good will of the neighbors, we may be able to get something done here.

Thank you very much.

[Whereupon, at 6:34 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]