

The Ceasefire Drafter's Handbook

An Introduction and Template for
Negotiators, Mediators, and Stakeholders



A project from
The Public International Law & Policy Group



PEACE NEGOTIATIONS
POST-CONFLICT CONSTITUTIONS
WAR CRIMES PROSECUTION

CEASEFIRE DRAFTER'S HANDBOOK

**An Introduction and Template for Negotiators,
Mediators, and Stakeholders**

Prepared by the

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CEASEFIRE DRAFTER'S HANDBOOK

Note for Users

The Public International Law & Policy Group's (PILPG) Ceasefire Drafter's Handbook is a guide intended to effectively supplement the activities of negotiators and drafters of ceasefire agreements. This Handbook draws from PILPG's experience in ceasefire negotiations, as well as state practice and comparative analysis of over 200 ceasefire agreements from Africa, Asia, Europe, the Middle East, and Latin America. As part of the ceasefires practice area, PILPG also provides negotiation simulations, strategic memoranda, training modules, and negotiation and drafting assistance to *pro bono* clients. For more information about PILPG's ceasefires work, please visit www.pilpg.org.

This Handbook includes an Introduction to Ceasefires and an Annotated Ceasefire Template. The Introduction to Ceasefires provides information on the core elements of ceasefires, the effects of asymmetry on ceasefire agreements, the role of third parties, and the legality of ceasefire agreements. The Annotated Ceasefire Template describes core provisions and provides sample language for drafters to incorporate into ceasefire agreements. Although each template section offers drafters a guiding framework, it may be necessary to reshape the provisions to address the nuances of each situation.

This Handbook's comparative provisions and sample language are included to provide options from existing ceasefires to assist the drafter. A full-text database of all the agreements cited in the footnotes can be found on PILPG's ceasefire database at www.pilpg.org/ceasefire-database/.

There are three Annexes to the handbook. Annex A provides a map of geographic ceasefire elements, Annex B provides a sample chart of assembly areas, and Annex C provides a sample timeline of implementation activities.

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INTRODUCTION TO CEASEFIRES

A ceasefire is an agreement that provides for the cessation of hostilities between parties engaged in armed conflict. Ceasefires have been used to pause a conflict, allowing the parties to negotiate a broader peace agreement. Ceasefires are often the first step towards a restoration of trust between the parties.¹ While there are many factors that contribute to permanent peace, a well-drafted ceasefire agreement can play a critical role in establishing a durable cessation of conflict.²

Core Elements of a Ceasefire

Several core elements emerge from a comparative analysis of ceasefires. These elements include provisions for (1) a cessation of hostilities, (2) the separation of forces, and (3) the verification, supervision, and monitoring of the agreement. The cessation of hostilities prevents the parties from engaging in hostile acts, which can include both military acts, such as firing on another party, and non-military acts, such as propaganda. The separation of forces is the process by which the parties will withdraw from contact and position themselves to prevent a return to conflict. Verification, supervision, and monitoring are measures to create accountability and ensure the proper implementation of the agreement.

Ceasefire Core Elements

- Cessation of Hostilities
 - Separation of Forces
 - Monitoring & Supervision
-

Parties to a ceasefire may wish to incorporate additional provisions to tailor the agreement to their specific conflict. Further, some ceasefire agreements aim to establish a framework for the peace process, whereas others simply limit the content of the agreement to the provisions necessary to end immediate hostilities.

Effective ceasefire agreements do the following: (1) establish tactical, geographical, and political obstacles that deter the parties from returning to conflict;³ (2) clearly indicate the rights and obligations of the parties, and minimize

¹ Maj. Vaughn A. Aary, *Concluding Hostilities: Humanitarian Provisions in Ceasefire Agreements*, 148 *MILITARY LAW REVIEW* 186, 190 (1995), available at http://www.loc.gov/tr/frd/Military_Law/Military_Law_Review/pdf-files/277871~1.pdf.

² See Virginia Fortna *PEACE TIME: CEASEFIRE AGREEMENTS AND THE DURABILITY OF PEACE* 210 (2004).

³ Virginia Page Fortna, *Scraps of Paper: Agreements and the Durability of Peace*, 57 *INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION* 337, 338 (2003), available at <http://www.columbia.edu/~vpf4/scraps%20IO%20offprint.pdf>.

uncertainty through communication and information sharing;⁴ (3) create a sense of formal legal obligation;⁵ and (4) engage the international community to significantly increase legitimacy and the costs of violating the agreement.⁶

Since World War II, the line between ceasefires and peace agreements has begun to blur.⁷ Many modern ceasefires do not precede a more comprehensive peace agreement. As a result, some negotiating parties have included ceasefire obligations that extend beyond the common core elements.⁸ In recent ceasefires, parties have included political obligations or complex military arrangements out of a concern that a broader agreement may never be negotiated.⁹ The inclusion of too many issues, however, could threaten the ability of the parties to achieve a swift cessation to on-going hostilities.¹⁰ Parties may create a clear commitment to promptly negotiate a later agreement to avoid forcing premature issues into a ceasefire.

Evolution of Ceasefires:

Modern ceasefires tend to include political obligations more traditionally reserved for comprehensive peace agreements.

Ceasefire durability depends on many factors. Such factors include whether one of the parties has achieved a decisive military advantage; the nature and political context of the conflict; whether all potential stakeholders are included in negotiations; and the general good faith and commitment of the parties to the peace process.¹¹

⁴ Antonia Potter, *Ceasefire Monitoring & Verification*, CENTRE FOR HUMANITARIAN DIALOGUE 6 (2004); Christine Bell, *Peace Agreements: Their Nature and Legal Status*, 100 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 373, 395 (2006), available at http://en.iwpeace.com/uploads/PEACE_AGREEMENTS_1251.pdf.

⁵ Christine Bell, *Peace Agreements: Their Nature and Legal Status*, 100 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 373, 385 (2006).

⁶ Suzanne Werner and Amy Yuen, *Making and Keeping Peace*, 59 INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 261, 269 (2005), available at <http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=buh&AN=17123229&site=ehost-live&scope=site>; see also Virginia Page Fortna, *Scraps of Paper: Agreements and the Durability of Peace*, 57 INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 337, 342-43 (2003).

⁷ Andrej Lang, "Modus Operandi" and the ICJ's Appraisal of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement in the *Armed Activities Case: The Role of Peace Agreements in International Conflict Resolution*, 40 INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLITICS 107, 114 (2008), available at <http://www.iilj.org/courses/documents/JILP40SI.Lang.pdf>.

⁸ Maj. Vaughn A. Aary, *Concluding Hostilities: Humanitarian Provisions in Ceasefire Agreements*, 148 MILITARY LAW REVIEW 186, 190 (1995).

⁹ Maj. Vaughn A. Aary, *Concluding Hostilities: Humanitarian Provisions in Ceasefire Agreements*, 148 MILITARY LAW REVIEW 186, 190 (1995).

¹⁰ Major Vaughn Ary, *Concluding Hostilities: Humanitarian Provisions in Cease-fire Agreements*, 148 MILITARY LAW REVIEW 186, 194, 273 (1995).

¹¹ See Virginia Page Fortna, *Scraps of Paper: Agreements and the Durability of Peace*, 57 INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 337, 351 (2003). See also Suzanne Werner and Amy Yuen, *Making and Keeping Peace*, 59 INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 261, 262-272 (2005).

Asymmetries in Ceasefire Negotiation and Drafting

Negotiators and drafters should be prepared to encounter asymmetries in the ceasefire process. In the context of ceasefires, “asymmetry” refers to inequality between the parties’ rights and obligations.¹² Asymmetries reflect power imbalances between the parties. For instance, a state is usually in a more powerful military and political position than a non-state group. As a result, ceasefire obligations are often imbalanced because they are negotiated between parties with unequal bargaining power.

Depending on the nature of the conflict, bargaining power is determined by military advantage, economic resources, or territorial control, among other factors. Generally, the party with the greater military advantage has the greater bargaining power. The disadvantaged party has less to gain from resumed hostilities, and will therefore make more concessions to keep the advantaged party at the negotiating table.¹³ The party with the military advantage may be willing to walk away from negotiations and resume fighting at a lower cost than the disadvantaged party.

In El Salvador, several armed groups cooperated to form the Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN) and launched a joint offensive against the government.¹⁴ Due to the FMLN’s military coalition, the government realized that it could no longer win the war outright, and acquiesced to ceasefire negotiations.¹⁵ The FMLN, therefore, entered into ceasefire negotiations with bargaining leverage because of its military advantage.¹⁶

¹² Liz Philipson, *Engaging Armed Groups: The Challenge of Asymmetries*, 16 ACCORD 68, 68 (2005), available at http://www.c-r.org/sites/c-r.org/files/accord16_16Engagingarmedgroups_2005_ENG_0.pdf.

¹³ Louis Kriesberg, *Changing Conflicts Asymmetries Constructively*, 2 DYNAMICS OF ASYMMETRIC CONFLICT 4, 4-5 (2009), available at <http://www.maxwell.syr.edu/uploadedFiles/parcc/Publications/2009%20Changing%20Conflict%20Asymmetries%20Constructively.pdf>.

¹⁴ Alberto Martin Alvarez, *From Revolutionary War to Democratic Revolution: The Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMNL) in El Salvador*, BERGHOF CONFLICT RESEARCH, 21 (2010), available at http://www.berghof-conflictresearch.org/documents/publications/transitions9_elsalvador.pdf; Luc Chounet Cambas, *Negotiating Ceasefires: Dilemmas and Options for Mediators*, CENTRE FOR HUMANITARIAN DIALOGUE 21, 24 (Mar. 2011).

¹⁵ Alberto Martin Alvarez, *From Revolutionary War to Democratic Revolution: The Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMNL) in El Salvador*, BERGHOF CONFLICT RESEARCH, 21 (2010); Luc Chounet Cambas, *Negotiating Ceasefires: Dilemmas and Options for Mediators*, CENTRE FOR HUMANITARIAN DIALOGUE 21, 24 (Mar. 2011).

¹⁶ Alberto Martin Alvarez, *From Revolutionary War to Democratic Revolution: The Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMNL) in El Salvador*, BERGHOF CONFLICT RESEARCH, 21 (2010); Luc Chounet Cambas, *Negotiating Ceasefires: Dilemmas and Options for Mediators*, CENTRE FOR HUMANITARIAN DIALOGUE 21, 24 (Mar. 2011).

The presence of international support for one of the parties can also contribute to bargaining power, and even compensate for military disadvantage. For instance, in the 1949 Israeli-Egyptian conflict, Israel's military advantage was neutralized by British threats to intervene on behalf of Egypt.¹⁷ The United States also pressured Israel to concede to certain Egyptian demands.¹⁸ Consequently, a ceasefire that may have otherwise been dictated by one party contained concessions on both sides. This demonstrates the impact of international support on bargaining power in ceasefire negotiations.

Ceasefire agreements often allocate rights and responsibilities unequally between the parties. This may result from the status of the conflict at the time of the ceasefire, unequal bargaining power, or other innate differences between the parties. In particular, ceasefires between state and non-state parties often contain asymmetrical obligations.

States have sovereignty under international law, which gives them the right to use force in maintaining security and asserting authority over their territory. In conflicts between a state and a non-state party, the state party will almost always retain their sovereign right to provide security and, thus, will not be required to disarm or take measures to diminish that right.

For instance, after the Israeli invasion of southern Lebanon in 2006, the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 1701, which served as a template for the ceasefire between the parties.¹⁹ The resolution required Hezbollah, the non-state armed group, to disarm while allowing Israel to retain their armaments and ability to protect their sovereignty.²⁰ Likewise, the Gulu Ceasefire agreement between the Ugandan government and the insurgent Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) almost entirely consists of obligations to be fulfilled by the LRA, a non-state armed group.²¹

¹⁷ Saadia Touval, *The Impact of Multiple Asymmetries on Arab-Israeli Negotiations*, in POWER AND NEGOTIATION 155, 161 (William Zartman and Jeffrey Z. Rubin, eds., 2000).

¹⁸ Saadia Touval, *The Impact of Multiple Asymmetries on Arab-Israeli Negotiations*, in POWER AND NEGOTIATION 155, 161 (William Zartman and Jeffrey Z. Rubin, eds., 2000).

¹⁹ Jeremy M. Sharp, *Lebanon: the Israel-Hamas-Hezbollah Conflict*, Congressional Research Service (Sep. 2006), available at <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RL33566.pdf>.

²⁰ Security Council Resolution 1701, para. 10, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1701 (Aug. 11, 2006).

²¹ *The Gulu Ceasefire Agreement* (Uganda, 1994), available at <http://publicinternationallawandpolicygroup.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/10/The-Gulu-Ceasefire-1994.pdf>.

There are exceptions to state/non-state asymmetry trend. For instance, the 1994 ceasefire between Azerbaijan, Armenia, and the non-state army of Nagorno Karabakh imposed identical provisions on all parties.²²

Ceasefire negotiators and drafters are encouraged to plan for asymmetry in ceasefire negotiation. Non-state parties can expect that a state party may demand commitments that will not be reciprocated. Thus, they may wish to take strategic measures to leverage any additional bargaining power, such as international support or military/political coalitions, before entering into a ceasefire agreement.

The Role of Third Parties in Ceasefires

A third party is a foreign state, non-governmental organization (NGO), international organization, or other entity that becomes involved in a conflict to assist one or more of the parties.²³ Ceasefire processes commonly involve a third party at some stage. The presence of a third party greatly increases the political costs of undermining the peace process.²⁴ Especially in a conflict between a state and a non-state actor, the presence of third parties can increase the degree of perceived obligation in the parties by offering various incentives or sanctions linked to compliance. Stakeholders should remember that third party engagement depends on the diplomatic interests of the third party, and they will likely work to promote those interests.²⁵

Several problems often serve as obstacles to ceasefire negotiations absent third party involvement. The parties may find it difficult to commit to an agreement without assurances that it will be enforced.²⁶ Information gaps and communication difficulties can complicate negotiating positions.²⁷ Additionally, the parties may still feel that they can best achieve their political goals through

²² *Ceasefire Agreement Signed in Bishkek* (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Army of Nagorno Karabakh, 1994), available at <http://publicinternationalallawandpolicygroup.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/10/Ceasefire-Agreement-Signed-in-Bishkek-1994.pdf>.

²³ CONFLICT RESEARCH CONSORTIUM, *Third Party Intervention* (1998), available at <http://www.colorado.edu/conflict/peace/treatment/3ptyint.htm>.

²⁴ Virginia Page Fortna, PEACE TIME: CEASE-FIRE AGREEMENTS AND THE DURABILITY OF PEACE, 28 (2004).

²⁵ Patrick M. Regan, *Conditions of Successful Third-Party Intervention in Intrastate Conflicts*, 40 THE JOURNAL OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION 336, 339 (1996).

²⁶ Caroline Hartzell, Matthew Hoddie, *Institutionalizing Peace: Power Sharing and Post-Civil War Conflict Management*, 47 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE 318 (2003).

²⁷ Michaela Mattes, Burcu Savun, *Information, Agreement Design, and the Durability of Civil War Settlements*, 54 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE 511 (2010).

armed conflict, rather than negotiation.²⁸ Third parties may provide a neutral space for negotiations, facilitate communication, and promote peaceful negotiation.²⁹

During negotiations, third parties can play important roles as facilitators, mediators, and witnesses. Their presence can be helpful in changing the perceptions and the behavior of the parties.³⁰ The role of third parties can change throughout the course of a negotiation, and they can fill multiple roles simultaneously. States and international organizations may use various incentives, sanctions, and even threats to persuade parties to take certain positions in negotiations. These measures can work to change the balance of interests between the parties, inserting new motivations for agreeing to a particular settlement.³¹ Sanctions and incentives can also be used after the signing of an agreement to compel compliance with a ceasefire.

In addition to playing a direct role in negotiations, and using persuasive mechanisms to bring parties to agreement, third parties may assist in the implementation of ceasefires. They often contribute peacekeeping forces, monitor and verify ceasefire compliance, and provide training and logistical support in the implementation phase.

The Legality of Ceasefire Obligations

Ceasefires are often not legally binding documents. Their success depends on the willingness of the parties to abide by their agreement. However, if the parties have a perception of a legal obligation, they will be more likely to implement the ceasefire.³² There are several factors that contribute to the legality of ceasefire obligations: (1) whether the ceasefire constitutes a treaty; (2) whether the parties sign the agreement as a formal written document; (3) whether the agreement is precisely drafted with clear rights and responsibilities; and (4) whether a third party has the power to interpret, or even enforce, the agreement.³³

²⁸ Luc Chounet-Cambas, *Negotiating Ceasefires: Dilemmas & Options for Mediators*, CENTRE FOR HUMANITARIAN DIALOGUE 14 (March 2011), available at http://www.hdcentre.org/files/HDC_MPS3_EN_web_0.pdf.

²⁹ Jacob Bercovitch, *Introduction: Putting Mediation in Context*, in *STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL MEDIATION* 16, 3-24 (Jacob Bercovitch, ed., 2002).

³⁰ Jacob Bercovitch, *Introduction: Putting Mediation in Context*, in *STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL MEDIATION* 7, 3-24 (Jacob Bercovitch, ed., 2002).

³¹ Sarah Bolger, et al., *International Peace Mediators and Codes of Conduct: An Analysis*, JOURNAL OF HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE, 7 (Aug. 2010), available at <http://sites.tufts.edu/jha/archives/756>.

³² Christine Bell, *Peace Agreements: Their Nature and Legal Status*, 100 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 373, 385 (2006).

³³ Christine Bell, *Peace Agreements: Their Nature and Legal Status*, 100 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 373, 385 (2006).

A treaty is an agreement concluded between states in written form and governed by international law.³⁴ A written ceasefire agreement between two states does constitute a treaty, and is thus binding under international law. However, the vast majority of ceasefires in the last 70 years have not been concluded between states, but between a state and non-state actors. Therefore, most ceasefires are not treaties under international law. Non-state actors, such as armed groups engaged in conflict, may still enter into legally binding agreements with states and non-state groups by, for instance, including a third state party as a guarantor or using a Security Council Resolution.³⁵ Regardless of whether the ceasefire is a treaty, the realities of international law and armed conflict make it particularly difficult to compel unwilling parties to implement any agreement.

The use of a formal written document, signed by the parties and witnesses, can increase the political costs of non-compliance. It is more difficult for a party to justify their own ceasefire violations if there is evidence in writing that they agreed to refrain from committing specific acts. Ceasefire drafters may thus follow the traditional form and structure of a treaty, even if there are non-state parties, to reinforce the agreement's importance and the intention of the parties to be bound. Following a formal structure in a public document bestows legitimacy in non-state parties and wagers the reputation of state parties on compliance.³⁶

The precision and clarity of the formal written document also contributes to the perception of a legal commitment among the parties. If the ceasefire establishes specific rights and obligations between the parties, it will be easier for the parties to both comply with the agreement and determine when it has been violated. Clear activities for the parties, timelines, geographic markers, and reporting requirements decrease the likelihood of a mistake in implementation. By contrast, vague commitments to end hostilities do not oblige the parties to fulfill tangible military requirements, such as withdrawing from contact, assembling forces, and disarming. A lack of precision allows parties to sign the agreement and continue their military *status quo*.³⁷

³⁴ Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 2(1)(a), May 29, 1986, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331; 8 I.L.M. 679 (1969), available at http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/1_1_1969.pdf.

³⁵ Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 3, May 29, 1986, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331; 8 I.L.M. 679 (1969). See also Christine Bell, *Peace Agreements: Their Nature and Legal Status*, 100 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 373, 381 (2006).

³⁶ Christine Bell, *Peace Agreements: Their Nature and Legal Status*, 100 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 373, 386-390 (2006).

³⁷ Christine Bell, *Peace Agreements: Their Nature and Legal Status*, 100 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 373, 395-400 (2006).

Finally, the empowerment of a third party to monitor and verify the agreement will create a sense of legal obligation in the parties. The presence of a third party in ceasefire negotiation, drafting, and implementation increases the political costs of undermining the peace process because of any incentives or sanctions linked to compliance established by the third party.³⁸

A well-drafted ceasefire agreement can fulfill the above factors to increase the likelihood of compliance. While there are many external factors beyond the written agreement that contribute to the durability of peace, ceasefire parties should not miss the opportunity to create a strong sense of legal obligation through a structured, precise document that includes the participation of third parties.

³⁸ Virginia Page Fortna, PEACE TIME: CEASE-FIRE AGREEMENTS AND THE DURABILITY OF PEACE, 28 (2004).

ANNOTATED CEASEFIRE TEMPLATE

The Annotated Ceasefire Template describes core provisions and provides sample language options for drafters to incorporate into ceasefire agreements. These provisions include: Preamble; Definitions; Entry into Force; Cessation of Hostilities; Separation of Forces; Monitoring and Implementation Commissions; Peacekeeping Forces; DDR and SSR; Humanitarian Provisions; Commitments to Engage in Peace Negotiations; Communication of the Agreement; Expiration and Renewal; and External Support.

In some cases, the drafter may select sample language from a variety of options. In these instances, the sample language is identified as “Option One” and “Option Two.”

Terms [**bracketed in bold**] indicate that the drafter may choose among several options. Terms [***bracketed in bold and italicized***] indicate that the drafter must insert conflict-specific information.

For example, the following sample language appears in the template:

#. This Ceasefire Agreement shall enter into force on [XX:XX] hours on [*designate date*]. [**This date may be postponed, if necessary, for at most [[X] days] by the agreement of the parties**].

Thus, following the text indicators as explained above, drafters might use this sample provision to draft the following provision:

#. This Ceasefire Agreement shall enter into force on 06:00 hours on July 2, 2012. This date may be postponed, if necessary, for at most 30 days by the agreement of the parties.

The purpose of the Handbook’s comparative provisions and sample language is to provide a guiding framework for drafters. Indeed, because every conflict situation is unique, the drafter may make adjustments to the text to enhance the ceasefire agreement’s relevance and applicability to particular contexts.

I. Preamble

Preambles to ceasefire agreements can provide language addressing the parties' object, purpose, and expressions of good faith in agreeing to a ceasefire. While not all ceasefires are treaties, the law of treaty interpretation provides helpful guidance on the role of preambles. Under international treaty law, agreements must be interpreted according to the ordinary meaning of the terms within them. A preamble assists in determining the meaning of the agreement's terms in light of the object and purpose of the agreement.³⁹

Preambles do not carry the same weight as the ceasefire's provisions. Most experts agree that preambles are "non-operative" text, that is, they do not contain any specific rights and obligations.⁴⁰ However, under treaty law, agreements must be interpreted as a whole, which prevents the operative provisions from being interpreted in contradiction to the principles in the preamble.⁴¹ In ceasefire agreements, preambles can refer to previous agreements, acknowledge human rights norms, and provide guiding principles related to the peace process.

Ceasefire preambles often refer to past agreements or negotiations between the parties. These references can demonstrate the parties' recognition of past commitments and can give context to the present agreement. Ceasefire preambles may also recognize obligations under international humanitarian or human rights law by reference to customary or conventional international law. These provisions set the ceasefire within the interpretive context of respect for human rights and international law. The preamble may also offer guiding principles to demonstrate the parties' determination to resolve the root causes of the conflict and to ameliorate violence, insecurity, and political instability within the state. These guiding principles often promote a commitment to the peace process and adherence to a certain set of political values. Parties may draft any additional preamble language that provides context and assistance in interpreting the operative provisions of the agreement. The sample language below represents common preamble statements.

³⁹ Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31(1)-(2), May 29, 1986, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331; 8 I.L.M. 679 (1969).

⁴⁰ International Center for Trade and Sustainable Development, RESOURCE BOOK ON TRIPS AND DEVELOPMENT: AN AUTHORITATIVE AND PRACTICAL GUIDE TO THE TRIPS AGREEMENT 2 (2005), available at http://www.iprsonline.org/unctadictsd/docs/RB_%20part1.1_corrected_update.pdf.

⁴¹ See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 44, May 29, 1986, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331; 8 I.L.M. 679 (1969).

Sample Language: Preamble

WE, the Parties to this Agreement, [*include the parties to the agreement*]:

CONFIRMING the commitment to respect and implement [*designate previous agreement*]/[*the agreements and protocols concluded for the purposes of ending the conflict*];⁴²

COGNIZANT of the need to create a conducive environment for the successful completion of the peace talks;⁴³

DETERMINED to actively promote peace throughout [*designate territory*];⁴⁴

DETERMINED to prevent a renewal of hostilities that may harm the peace process;

REJECTING the use of violence in achieving political goals;⁴⁵

COMMITTED to promoting full respect for human rights and humanitarian law,⁴⁶

Hereby agree to be bound by the provisions of the following Ceasefire Agreement:

⁴² *Global Ceasefire Agreement Between Burundi and the CNDD-FDD* Preamble (Burundi, 2003), available at <http://publicinternationalallawandpolicygroup.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/10/Global-Ceasefire-Agreement-Between-Burundi-and-the-CNDD-FDD-2003.pdf>.

⁴³ *LRA – Government Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities* Preamble (Uganda, 2006), available at <http://publicinternationalallawandpolicygroup.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/10/Agreement-on-Cessation-of-Hostilities-between-Uganda-and-LRA-2006.pdf>.

⁴⁴ *General Armistice Agreement Between the Government of Israel and the Kingdom of Jordan* art. 1 (Israel and Jordan, 1992), available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/arm02.asp; *The Lomé Agreement* Preamble (Sierra Leone, 1999), available at <http://publicinternationalallawandpolicygroup.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/10/The-Lome-Agreement-1999.pdf>.

⁴⁵ *Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities Between the Government of Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia and the Government of the State of Eritrea* Preamble (Ethiopia and Eritrea, 2000), available at <http://publicinternationalallawandpolicygroup.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/10/Agreement-on-Cessation-of-Hostilities-Between-the-Government-of-the-Federal-Democratic-Republic-of-Ethiopia-nad-the-Governmnet-of-the-State-of-Eritrea-2000.pdf>.

⁴⁶ *The Lomé Agreement* Preamble (Sierra Leone, 1992).

II. Definitions

Successful ceasefire agreements ensure that the parties have the same understanding of the agreement's terms.⁴⁷ One way to promote consistent interpretation of a ceasefire agreement is to include provisions defining key terms. Parties should define several types of terms, including terms, which, if misinterpreted, have potential to undermine the ceasefire agreement, terms that lend themselves to being inherently imprecise, and terms that may be ambiguous when translated between two parties who do not share the same language. Agreements may also designate an official language for interpretation of the agreement, even if it is drafted and made available in multiple languages. The parties may also define any other terms critical to the agreement's implementation.

Sample Language: Definitions

#. This Agreement **[is drawn up in [*designate language(s)*]/[will be translated into [*insert language(s)*]]**. The [*designate language*] text shall take precedence.⁴⁸

#. The following definitions shall serve as interpretation principles under the present Agreement:

- (1) Armed Groups – [*designate definition*]
- (2) Assembly Areas – [*designate definition*]
- (3) Entry into Force – [*designate definition*]
- (4) Forces – [*designate definition*]
- (5) Heavy Military Equipment - [*designate definition*]
- (6) Parties – [*designate definition*]
- (7) Peace Agreement – [*designate definition*]
- (8) Propaganda – [*designate definition*]
- (9) Terrorism – [*designate definition*]
- (10) Weapons – [*designate definition*]

⁴⁷ Virginia Fortna, PEACE TIME: CEASEFIRE AGREEMENTS AND THE DURABILITY OF PEACE 210 (2004).

⁴⁸ *Comprehensive Ceasefire Agreement Between The Government of the Republic of Burundi and the Palipehutu* art. VI (Burundi, 2006), available at <http://publicinternationallawandpolicygroup.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/10/Comprehensive-Ceasefire-Agreement-Between-the-Government-of-the-Republic-of-Burundi-and-the-Palipehutu-FNL-2006.pdf>; *Comprehensive Ceasefire Agreement* art. 5(3) (Kenya, 2005), available at <http://publicinternationallawandpolicygroup.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/10/CPA.pdf>.

⁴⁸ Nicholas Haysom and Julian Hottinger, *Do's and Don'ts of Sustainable Ceasefire Agreements*, PEACE APPEAL FOUNDATION 2 (2004).

III. Entry into Force

“Entry into force” provisions establish a specific time or date when the rights and obligations under the ceasefire agreement become binding on the parties. They may also establish an explicit commitment by the parties to respect the rights and obligations under the agreement.

Timing

Most ceasefire agreements have immediate effect, becoming enforceable upon signature. Some agreements create a period before the ceasefire becomes binding. In these cases, the entry into force provision explicitly sets a date and time, or establishes a set number of hours or days, before the agreement enters into force. Parties may establish this period to allow time to disseminate orders to their respective forces, to redeploy forces as required under the agreement, or to allow ceasefire monitors and peacekeepers to deploy. Comparative practice on pre-commencement periods shows a range between twenty-four hours to several months after signing. Some ceasefires enter into force upon the occurrence of a condition, such as when monitors are in place and fully operational. In deciding on timing, parties must balance the interests of a speedy cessation of hostilities and the establishment of the agreed mechanisms to properly implement the ceasefire.

Sample Language Option 1: Upon Signature

#. This Ceasefire Agreement shall enter into force, and the Parties shall immediately cease hostilities, starting from the signature of this formal document.⁴⁹

Sample Language Option 2: At a Specific Time or Date

#. This Ceasefire Agreement shall enter into force at [XX:XX] hours on [*designate date*]. [This date may be postponed, if necessary, for at most [X] days by the agreement of the Parties].⁵⁰

⁴⁹ *Global Ceasefire Agreement between Burundi and the CNDD-FDD* art. 7 (Burundi, 2003); *Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities Between the Government of Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia and the Government of the State of Eritrea* art. 1 (Ethiopia and Eritrea, 2000).

⁵⁰ *The Uribe Accords* art. 1 (Colombia, 1984), available at <http://publicinternationalallawandpolicygroup.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/10/The-Uribe-Accords-1984.pdf>; *Ceasefire Agreement in Guinea-Bissau* art. 3 (Guinea-Bissau, 1998), available at <http://publicinternationalallawandpolicygroup.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/10/Ceasefire-Agreement-in-Guinea-Bissau-1998.pdf>; *Lincoln Agreement on Peace, Security and Development on Bougainville* art. 3(1) (Papua New Guinea, 1998), available at <http://publicinternationalallawandpolicygroup.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/10/Lincoln-Agreement-on-Peace-Security-and-Development-of-Bougainville-1998.pdf>.

#. The Parties agree to maintain the current cessation of hostilities between ***[explicitly name the parties]***.⁵¹

Sample Language Option 3: X Hours/Days after Signature

#. This Ceasefire Agreement shall enter into force ***[within [X] [hours]/[days]]*** after the signing of this Agreement.⁵² ***[This date may be postponed, if necessary, for at most [X] days by the agreement of the parties].***

#. The Parties agree to maintain the current cessation of hostilities between ***[explicitly name the parties] [until that time]***.⁵³

Sample Language Option 4: Upon the Occurrence of an Event

#. This ceasefire shall enter into force at ***[XX:XX]*** hours on the date on which ***[the [Peacekeeping Force]/[Ceasefire Commission]/[Monitoring Group] shall be in place with full capacity]/[designate event]***. This must be completed no later than ***[X]*** days after the signing of this Agreement.⁵⁴

#. The ***[Peacekeeping Force]/[Ceasefire Commission]/[Monitoring Group]/[designate party or body]*** shall notify the Parties of ***[its establishment and deployment]/[designate event]*** so that the date of entry into force may be set.⁵⁵

#. The Parties agree to maintain the current cessation of hostilities between ***[explicitly name the parties] [until the date of entry into force]***.⁵⁶

⁵¹ *Agreement on the Definitive Ceasefire* art. 3 (Guatemala, 1996), available at <http://publicinternationallawandpolicygroup.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/10/Agreement-on-the-Definitive-Ceasefire-1996.pdf>.

⁵² *Comprehensive Ceasefire Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Burundi and the Palipehutu – FNL* art. I(2) (Burundi, 2006); *Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement* art. I(2)(c) (Democratic Republic of Congo, 1999), available at <http://publicinternationallawandpolicygroup.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/10/The-Lusaka-Ceasefire-Agreement-1999.pdf>; *Humanitarian Cease Fire Agreement on the Conflict in Darfur* art. 2 (Sudan, 2004), available at http://www.usip.org/files/file/resources/collections/peace_agreements/sudan_ceasefire_04082004.pdf.

⁵³ *Agreement on the Definitive Ceasefire* art. 3 (Guatemala, 1996).

⁵⁴ *Agreement on the Definitive Ceasefire* art. 2 (Guatemala, 1996).

⁵⁵ *Agreement on the Definitive Ceasefire* art. 4 (Guatemala, 1996).

⁵⁶ *Agreement on the Definitive Ceasefire* art. 3 (Guatemala, 1996).

Effect of Entry into Force

Some agreements describe the effect of the entry into force on the parties. These provisions include a commitment by the parties to strictly observe the rights and obligations under the agreement as well as to cooperate with the groups tasked with implementing and monitoring the agreement. These provisions serve as an explicit statement of consent to be bound by the terms of the agreement, which creates a sense of legal obligation between the parties. The legal status, or perceived legal status, of a ceasefire agreement can support its durability.⁵⁷ In particular, parties are more likely to respect the obligations contained in the agreement when they believe it is legally binding.⁵⁸

Sample Language: Effect of Entry into Force

#. Entry into force of this Agreement entails strict observance of the commitments assumed by the Parties **[as well as the decisions made by bodies designated under this agreement as having the authority to verify, monitor, or otherwise implement the ceasefire]**.⁵⁹

IV. Cessation of Hostilities

Cessation of hostilities provisions are perhaps the most crucial element of a ceasefire agreement. These provisions establish the scope of the ceasefire and enumerate which acts the parties are prohibited from performing. A cessation of hostilities can create a secure environment for dialogue between conflicting parties and provide a period of calm that allows the parties to negotiate issues that cannot be addressed during active hostilities.⁶⁰

Cessation of hostilities provisions may include a statement confirming party control over forces; the identification of the geographic scope of the ceasefire agreement; and the enumeration of prohibited acts constituting a violation of the agreement. The types of activities prohibited by a ceasefire agreement vary

⁵⁷ Christine Bell, *Peace Agreements: Their Nature and Legal Status*, 100 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 373, 386-87 (2006).

⁵⁸ Christine Bell, *Peace Agreements: Their Nature and Legal Status*, 100 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 373, 386-87 (2006).

⁵⁹ *Peace Accords for Angola* art. II(1) (Angola, 1991), available at <http://publicinternationalallawandpolicygroup.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/10/Peace-Accords-for-Angola-Bicesse-Accords-1991.pdf>.

⁶⁰ M. Shane Smith, *Ceasefire*, BEYOND INTRACTABILITY (Guy Burgess and Heidi Burgess, eds., 2003), available at <http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/cease-fire/>.

depending upon the types of activities that have been employed by parties to the conflict, and upon the degree of asymmetry between the forces involved.

Geographic Scope of the Ceasefire

Some ceasefire agreements designate an area where the ceasefire will be respected.⁶¹ The geographic scope is most often the entire state or states where the conflict exists. Occasionally, agreements will designate an intrastate region for the ceasefire area. Provisions describing the geographic scope of the ceasefire may prevent misunderstandings as to who must comply with the agreement.⁶²

Sample Language: Geographic Scope

#. The Parties shall observe the ceasefire throughout [*designate area*].⁶³

Control Over Forces

Some ceasefire agreements include a provision confirming the parties' control over their respective forces and their commitment to control these forces in compliance with the agreement. These provisions function to prevent the parties from denying liability under the ceasefire in cases of breach. Depending on the nature of the conflict, provisions establishing party control will either explicitly name specific forces or include a general commitment to ensure the parties' forces will comply with the agreement. General commitment language is typically confined to conflicts where there is a prevalence of irregular militia groups without a traditional military command structure. These less-specific provisions leave room for the potential denial of control over forces in the event of a breach.

⁶¹ Luc Chounet-Cambas, *Negotiating Ceasefires: Dilemmas and Options for Mediators*, CENTER FOR HUMANITARIAN DIALOGUE, 12 (March 2011).

⁶² Luc Chounet-Cambas, *Negotiating Ceasefires: Dilemmas and Options for Mediators*, CENTER FOR HUMANITARIAN DIALOGUE, 12 (March 2011).

⁶³ *Ceasefire Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Cote d'Ivoire, the Mouvement Populaire Ivoirien du Grant Ouest and the Mouvement pour la Justice et la Paix* art. 2 (Cote d'Ivoire, 2003), available at <http://publicinternationallawandpolicygroup.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/10/Ceasefire-Agreement-Between-the-Government-of-the-Republic-of-Cote-dIvoire-the-Mouvement-Populaire-ivoirien-du-Grand-Ouest-and-the-mouvement-pour-la-Justice-et-la-Paix-2003.pdf>; *Ceasefire Agreement for Bosnia and Herzegovina* art. 3 (Bosnia and Herzegovina, 1995), available at <http://www.un.org/documents/ga/docs/50/plenary/a50-718.htm>; *The Nuba Mountains Cease-Fire Agreement* art. II(1),(4) (Sudan, 2002), available at <http://publicinternationallawandpolicygroup.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/10/Nuba-Mountains-Cease-Fire-Agreement-2002.pdf>.

Therefore, these provisions should be as specific as possible given the conflict context.⁶⁴

Sample Language Option 1: Control over Specific Forces

#. **[Party A, Party B, and Party C]** guarantee they are in full control of **[Force A, Force B, Force C]**, respectively, and will exercise control over them in furtherance of this Agreement.⁶⁵

Sample Language Option 2: Control over General Armed Groups

#. The Parties shall ensure that all armed groups **[under their control] [within the conflict area]** comply with this Agreement.⁶⁶

#. The Parties commit to control those groups that **[do not share their objectives but]** claim to be part of their forces.⁶⁷

Prohibited Acts

Prohibited acts are the specific actions that the parties may not perform during the ceasefire. A review of comparative state practice indicates that these provisions vary in their level of detail. Some ceasefire agreements have broad prohibited acts, simply forbidding the parties from engaging in hostilities or using military force. Many ceasefires, however, provide a detailed list to dispel any confusion in implementation. Along with prohibitions against the direct use of force between the parties, ceasefire agreements often create prohibitions that limit the ability of the parties to use the ceasefire to prepare for renewed fighting. Such measures include prohibitions against fortification of arms and equipment, recruitment, promulgation of hostile propaganda, obstruction of humanitarian assistance, and the laying of mines. In addition, prohibited acts provisions may function to prohibit human rights violations and to protect vulnerable populations, such as women and children. The following list of prohibited acts contains

⁶⁴ Nicholas Haysom and Julian Hottinger, *Do's and Don'ts of Sustainable Ceasefire Agreements*, PEACE APPEAL FOUNDATION 5.

⁶⁵ *Cessation of Hostilities Framework Between the Government of the Republic of Indonesia and the Free Aceh Movement* art. 2(a) (Indonesia, 2002), available at <http://publicinternationalawandpolicygroup.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/10/Cessation-of-Hostilities-Between-Government-of-the-REpublic-of-Indonesia-and-the-Free-Aceh-Movement-2002.pdf>.

⁶⁶ *Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement on the Conflict in Darfur* art. 6 (Sudan, 2004).

⁶⁷ *Cessation of Hostilities Framework Between the Government of the Republic of Indonesia and the Free Aceh Movement* art. 2(a) (Indonesia, 2002).

suggestions based on common ceasefire provisions. Parties are encouraged to include any additional prohibitions against actions that would threaten the peace process.

Sample Language: Prohibited Acts

#. The following acts shall constitute a violation of this Agreement:

- (1) Military or hostile attacks against the forces, positions, or property of another party;⁶⁸
- (2) Acquiring, fortifying, or distributing arms, ammunition, or other war equipment;⁶⁹
- (3) Attempts to occupy or occupying new ground locations or offensive positions;⁷⁰
- (4) Unauthorized movement or redeployment of forces or resources;⁷¹
- (5) Recruitment, drafting, or mobilization of soldiers⁷² **[, including boys and girls under 18 years]**;⁷³
- (6) Harassment, attacks, hostage taking or unlawful arrest of civilians **[and humanitarian personnel]** or the seizure of private properties;⁷⁴
- (7) Restriction or obstruction of the movement of **[all people and goods]/[specify groups or goods]**;⁷⁵

⁶⁸ *Ceasefire Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Cote d'Ivoire, the MPIGO, and the MJP* art. 8 (Cote d'Ivoire, 2003); *Jordanian-Israeli General Armistice Agreement* art. III(2) (Israel and Jordan, 1949); *Abuja Ceasefire Agreement Between the Government of Sierra Leone and the RUF* art. 9(ii) (Sierra Leone, 2000), available at <http://www.sierra-leone.org/ceasefire1100.html>.

⁶⁹ *Ceasefire Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Cote d'Ivoire, the MPIGO, and the MJP* art. 8 (Cote d'Ivoire, 2003); *Agreement on Ceasefire and Cessation of Hostilities Between the Government of the Republic of Liberia and LURD and MODEL* art. 9(e) (Liberia, 2003), available at <http://publicinternationallawandpolicygroup.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/10/Annex-1-Agreement-on-Ceasefire-and-Cessation-of-Hostilities-Between-the-Government-of-the-Republic-of-Liberia-and-Liberians-United-for-Reconciliation-and-Democracy-and-the-Movement-for-Democracy-in-Liberia-2003.pdf>; *Lincoln Agreement on Peace, Security and Development on Bougainville* art. 3(4) (Papua New Guinea, 1998); *Humanitarian Cease Fire Agreement on the Conflict in Darfur* art. 2 (Sudan, 2004).

⁷⁰ *Agreement on Ceasefire and Cessation of Hostilities Between the Government of the Republic of Liberia and LURD and MODEL* art. 9(d) (Liberia, 2003); *Darfur Peace Agreement* art. 226(k) (Sudan, 2006), available at <http://publicinternationallawandpolicygroup.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/10/Darfur-Peace-Agreement-2006.pdf>.

⁷¹ *The Lomé Agreement* annex II art. 1(b), (d) (Sierra Leone, 1999); *Humanitarian Cease Fire Agreement on the Conflict in Darfur* art. 2 (Sudan, 2004).

⁷² *Agreement on Ceasefire and Cessation of Hostilities Between the Government of the Republic of Liberia and LURD and MODEL* art. 9(i) (Liberia, 2003); *Comprehensive Peace Accord* art. 5(1)(2) (Nepal, 2006), available at <http://publicinternationallawandpolicygroup.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/10/Comprehensive-Peace-Accord-2006.pdf>; *Humanitarian Cease Fire Agreement on the Conflict in Darfur* art. 2 (Sudan, 2004).

⁷³ *Agreement on a Permanent Ceasefire and Security Arrangements Implementation Modalities During the Pre-Interim and Interim Periods* art. 10(1)(9) (Sudan, 2004), available at <http://publicinternationallawandpolicygroup.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/10/SPLA-During-the-Pre-Interim-and-Interim-Periods.pdf>; *Darfur Peace Agreement* art. 226(m) (Sudan, 2006).

⁷⁴ *Agreement on Ceasefire and Cessation of Hostilities Between the Government of the Republic of Liberia and LURD and MODEL* art. 9(c) (Liberia, 2003); *Comprehensive Peace Accord* art. 5(1)(1)(c)-(g) (Nepal, 2006).

- (8) Laying of mines or incendiary devices and interfering with the clearing of such devices;⁷⁶
- (9) The use of **[hostile] propaganda [including defamatory, untruthful or derogatory statements][both within and outside the country];**⁷⁷
- (10) Establishing sanctions, blockades, or checkpoints;⁷⁸
- (11) Espionage, spying, or sabotage;⁷⁹
- (12) Sexual violence;⁸⁰
- (13) Torture;⁸¹
- (14) Terrorism;⁸²
- (15) **[Designate prohibited act].**

V. Separation of Forces

Most ceasefires separate forces to prevent the potential for renewed military action and to dissipate tension between the warring parties.⁸³ Separation of forces provisions typically describe the location, time, and method through which the combating forces must move in order to avoid contact. Separating forces also

⁷⁵ *Humanitarian Cease Fire Agreement on the Conflict in Darfur* art. 2 (Sudan, 2004); *Agreement on Principles of a Peaceful Settlement of the Armed Conflict in the Transnistrian Region of the Republic of Moldova* art. 5(1) (Moldova and Russia, 1992), available at <http://publicinternationallawandpolicygroup.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/10/Agreement-on-Principles-of-a-Peaceful-Settlement-of-the-Armed-Conflict-in-the-Transnistrian-Region-of-the-Republic-of-Moldova-1992.pdf>; *Comprehensive Peace Accord* art. 5(2)(12) (Nepal, 2006).

⁷⁶ *Agreement on Ceasefire and Cessation of Hostilities Between the Government of the Republic of Liberia and LURD and MODEL* art. 9(a) (Liberia, 2003); *Abuja Ceasefire Agreement Between the Government of Sierra Leone and the RUF* art. 9(iii) (Sierra Leone, 2000); *Humanitarian Cease Fire Agreement on the Conflict in Darfur* art. 2 (Sudan, 2004).

⁷⁷ *Agreement on Ceasefire and Cessation of Hostilities Between the Government of the Republic of Liberia and LURD and MODEL* art. 9(g) (Liberia, 2003); *Agreement on the Definitive Ceasefire* art. 7 (Guatemala, 1996); *LRA – Government Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities* art. 2 (Uganda, 2006).

⁷⁸ *Agreement on Principles of a Peaceful Settlement of the Armed Conflict in the Transnistrian Region of the Republic of Moldova* art. 5(1) (Moldova and Russia, 1992); *Implementing Guidelines on the Security Aspect of the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement of Peace of 2001* art. II(3)(1)(3) (Philippines, 2001), available at <http://publicinternationallawandpolicygroup.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/10/Implementing-guidelines-on-the-security-aspect-of-the-GRP-MILF-Tripoli-Agreement-of-Peace-of-2001-2001.pdf>.

⁷⁹ *Comprehensive Peace Accord* art. 5(1)(1)(i), (j) (Nepal, 2006); *Agreement on a Ceasefire Between the Government of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka and the LTTE* art. 1.2(a) (Sri Lanka, 2002), available at <http://publicinternationallawandpolicygroup.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/10/Agreement-on-a-ceasefire-between-the-Government-of-the-Democratic-Socialist-Republic-of-Sri-Lanka-and-the-Liberation-Tigers-of-Tamil-Eelam-2002.pdf>; *Humanitarian Cease Fire Agreement on the Conflict in Darfur* art. 2 (Sudan, 2004).

⁸⁰ *Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement* art. I(3)(c) (Democratic Republic of Congo, 1999).

⁸¹ *Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement* art. I(3)(c) (Democratic Republic of Congo, 1999).

⁸² *Agreement on a Temporary Cease-fire and the Cessation of Other Hostile Acts on the Tajik-Afghan Border and within the Country for the Duration of the Talks* art. 2(b) (Tajikistan, 1994), available at <http://www.incore.ulst.ac.uk/services/cds/agreements/pdf/taj12.pdf>.

⁸³ Virginia Page Fortna, *Scraps of Paper: Agreements and the Durability of Peace*, 57 INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 337, 345 (2003).

requires controlled zones of separation to further prevent contact between the parties.⁸⁴ Agreements may also include a reporting requirement so the parties and the monitors are aware of the size, locations, and capabilities of their forces. Some ceasefires include requirements for disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) processes to begin in conjunction with the separation of forces.

Reporting Requirements

Ceasefire agreements may contain provisions that require the parties to report the number, composition, and location of their forces. This requirement assists peacekeepers, monitors, and commissioners to make appropriate plans for ceasefire implementation and to discern whether the parties are abiding by the agreement.

Sample Language: Reporting Requirements

#. Within [X] days of the entry into force of this Agreement, **[the Parties]/[designate party]** shall provide the **[Monitoring Group]/[Ceasefire Commission]/[Peacekeeping Force]** with updated, reliable, and verifiable information concerning the number, location, organization, and composition of:⁸⁵

- (1) Forces, including troop names and identification information;
- (2) Armaments, in storage and in possession;
- (3) Equipment;
- (4) Explosives and Mines.

#. The Parties agree to report any additional information required by the **[Ceasefire Commission]/[Peacekeeping Force]/[Monitoring Group]**.⁸⁶

Method of Separation

The method of separation used in a ceasefire depends on the nature of the conflict and the situation in the field. *In situ* ceasefires call for parties to remain in their respective positions or assume non-offensive postures. Ceasefire lines create a geographic line dividing the parties' forces. Assembly areas are used to concentrate parties' forces in particular areas. Total withdrawal requires one or more of the parties to completely leave a region or state. Some of these methods

⁸⁴ UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE, *Cessation of Large Scale Violence*, in GUIDING PRINCIPLES FOR STABILIZATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 6.5.3 (2009), available at <http://www.usip.org/guiding-principles-stabilization-and-reconstruction-the-web-version/safe-and-secure-environment/nece>.

⁸⁵ *Lusaka Protocol* annex 3, art. II(3) (Angola, 1994); *Agreement on the Definitive Ceasefire* art. 15 (Guatemala, 1996).

⁸⁶ *Agreement on the Definitive Ceasefire* art. 16 (Guatemala, 1996).

require time for their implementation. Thus, many agreements will include phases or steps in which these activities must take place. Additionally, the same ceasefire may utilize multiple methods of separation.

For each of the following methods of separation, precision in the geographic area identified is important to avoid ambiguity and disagreement. Therefore, ceasefire drafters are encouraged to ensure that the parties are in agreement on the specific geographic markers affecting the agreement.⁸⁷ In particular, drafters may include detailed maps to enhance clarity.⁸⁸

In Situ Ceasefire

In situ ceasefires require combatants to remain in their respective positions when the ceasefire enters into force. *In situ*, or “in place”, provisions allow parties to begin implementation of the ceasefire immediately, as opposed to ceasefire lines or assembly points, where forces need time to relocate. *In situ* ceasefires, however, are difficult to monitor and leave the forces vulnerable to attack and contact with their adversaries.⁸⁹ In cases where the parties are in close proximity, the *in situ* provisions may include a requirement to disengage and assume defensive positions.

Ceasefire agreements may combine *in situ* separation with other methods of separation. Agreements using this approach include an initial *in situ* ceasefire, followed by a different form of separation. This combination functions to maintain the cessation of hostilities while allowing for observers, peacekeepers, and humanitarian aid to flow into the conflict area before the forces engage in more complicated movement. Implementation of these steps can also serve as a confidence-building measure for the parties as they implement the ceasefire.

Sample Language: *In Situ* Ceasefire

#. The Parties agree to freeze their respective military positions held at the time of the **[signing]/[entry into force]** of this Agreement.⁹⁰

⁸⁷ Luc Chounet-Cambas, *Negotiating Ceasefires: Dilemmas and Options for Mediators*, CENTER FOR HUMANITARIAN DIALOGUE, 12 (March 2011).

⁸⁸ Nicholas Haysom and Julian Hottinger, *Do's and Don'ts of Sustainable Ceasefire Agreements*, 3 (2004).

⁸⁹ Nat Coletta, *Mediating Ceasefires and Cessation of Hostilities Agreements in the Framework of Peace Processes*, in PEACEMAKING: FROM PRACTICE TO THEORY 135, 140 (Susan Allen Nan and Zachariah Cherian Mampilly, eds., 2011), available at <http://www.google.com/books?id=Hx0p4RCdD4wC>.

⁹⁰ *Ceasefire Agreement in Guinea-Bissau* art. 1(b) (Guinea-Bissau, 1998); *Agreement on Ceasefire in Sierra Leone* art. 2 (Sierra Leone, 1999).

#. Where the forces are in direct contact, the Parties shall disengage their forces. The forces of both sides will stop firing and position themselves in a defensive posture.⁹¹

#. Parties' forces shall maintain a distance of [X] meters between them.⁹²

#. This process shall be [Coordinated/Monitored] by the [Peacekeeping Force]/[Monitoring Group]/[Ceasefire Commission].

Total Withdrawal

Some ceasefire agreements require one or more parties to completely leave a state or region. Total withdrawal is particularly common where foreign forces are present or where the conflict is concentrated in a specific region within a state. These provisions often do not require the demarcation of any lines because they use existing state or regional boundaries.

Sample Language Option 1: Total Withdrawal of Foreign Forces

#. [All foreign forces]/[All forces from [designate state]] shall permanently withdraw from the national territory of [designate state] [within [X] days of the entry into force of this Agreement].⁹³

#. This process shall be [Coordinated/Monitored] by the [Peacekeeping Force]/[Monitoring Group]/[Ceasefire Commission].

Sample Language Option 2: Total Withdrawal of Forces from Region

#. [Designate party] shall withdraw from [designate region] [within [X] days of the entry into force of this Agreement].⁹⁴

#. This process shall be [Coordinated/Monitored] by the [Peacekeeping Force]/[Monitoring Group]/[Ceasefire Commission].

⁹¹ Lusaka Protocol Annex 3, art. 3, phase 1, step 4 (Angola, 1994).

⁹² Agreement on a Ceasefire Between the Government of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam art. 1.4 (Sri Lanka, 2002).

⁹³ The Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement art. III(12) (Democratic Republic of Congo, 1999).

⁹⁴ Lincoln Agreement on Peace, Security and Development on Bougainville art. 4 (Papua New Guinea, 1998).

Ceasefire Line

Ceasefire lines establish a physical division between the parties and require the parties to withdraw and remain on opposite sides of it.⁹⁵ These lines may be referred to as a “separation line”, “demarcation line”, “line of control”, or “line of contact”. Agreements often create a controlled buffer zone around the ceasefire line, with special rules governing the right to move within the buffer zone. Effective agreements also include detailed maps with markers to establish the line.⁹⁶

Sample Language: Ceasefire Line

#. The Parties accept the Ceasefire Line as a distinct demarcation between the opposing forces. **[The precise Ceasefire Line is indicated [using geographic coordinates] on the map[s] included as Annex [A] to this agreement].**⁹⁷

#. The Parties shall withdraw all forces behind the designated Buffer Zone, which shall extend for a distance of [X] kilometers on either side of the Ceasefire Line. This withdrawal shall be completed within [X] days of the entry into force of this Agreement.⁹⁸

Assembly Areas

Assembly areas, sometimes referred to as “cantonments”, are agreed upon locations where forces must convene to separate the forces and prepare for further instructions.⁹⁹ In conflicts where total withdrawal or ceasefire lines are not ideal, parties may agree to place their forces into separate assembly areas. Ceasefire agreements requiring assembly areas often create asymmetrical obligations on the parties. One of the parties, often the government party, may not be required to assemble their forces into assembly areas. This asymmetry may also be present where a non-state party has agreed to disarm, demobilize, and reintegrate their forces back into society.

⁹⁵ See U.S. Department of Defense, *Joint Publication 1-02: Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms* (March 2012), available at http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp1_02.pdf.

⁹⁶ Virginia Page Fortna, *Scraps of Paper: Agreements and the Durability of Peace*, 57 INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 337, 362 (2003).

⁹⁷ *General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia & Herzegovina: Annex 1A: Agreement on the Military Aspects of the Peace Settlement* art. IV(2)(b)-(c) (Bosnia and Herzegovina, 1995).

⁹⁸ *General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia & Herzegovina: Annex 1A: Agreement on the Military Aspects of the Peace Settlement* art. IV(2)(b)-(c) (Bosnia and Herzegovina, 1995).

⁹⁹ See U.S. Department of Defense, *Joint Publication 1-02: Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms* (March 2012).

Assembly areas allow monitors and ceasefire commissions to function more efficiently, while protecting both the forces encamped and the forces outside. Assembly areas can be useful troop concentration points for disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) and security sector reform (SSR) activities.

Special consideration must be made for vulnerable groups, such as women and children, encamped within assembly areas. Women and children who travel with armed forces or are combatants themselves often have different needs, which should be addressed in assembly areas.¹⁰⁰ For instance, international standards call for separate facilities for women and children within these sites.¹⁰¹

Sample Language: Assembly Areas

#. All forces of [*designate party*] shall be assembled in [*designate assembly area*]/[**the assembly areas specified in Annex B**] to await further instruction. The assembly area[s] shall be situated away from major population centers.¹⁰²
[**Assembly areas are indicated [using geographic coordinates] on the map[s] included as Annex A to this agreement**].

#. The Parties shall respect the buffer zone extending for a distance of [X] kilometers around the assembly area[s].¹⁰³

#. [**The Parties'**]/[*designate party's*] forces shall be assembled in the designated assembly area[s] within [X] days of the entry into force of this agreement.¹⁰⁴

#. [**The Parties'**]/[*designate party's*] forces are guaranteed safe passage to reach the assembly areas.¹⁰⁵

#. This process shall be [**coordinated/monitored**] by the [**Peacekeeping Force**]/[**Monitoring Group**]/[**Ceasefire Commission**].

¹⁰⁰ United Nations, *Children in DDR*, in INTEGRATED DISARMAMENT, DEMOBILIZATION AND REINTEGRATION STANDARDS, 5(30)(6)(2) (August 2006), available at http://www.unddr.org/iddrs/05/download/IDDRS_530.pdf.

¹⁰¹ United Nations, *Children in DDR*, in INTEGRATED DISARMAMENT, DEMOBILIZATION AND REINTEGRATION STANDARDS, 5(30)(6)(2) (August 2006).

¹⁰² *Peace Accords for Angola Annex I*, art. C(1) (Angola, 1991).

¹⁰³ *Agreement on a Permanent Ceasefire* art. 3.1-2 (Uganda, 2008).

¹⁰⁴ *Peace Accords for Angola Annex I*, art. C(1) (Angola, 1991).

¹⁰⁵ *LRA – Government Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities* art. 5 (Uganda, 2006).

#. The **[Peacekeeping Force]/[Ceasefire Commission]** will provide adequate food, supplies, security, services and logistical support to the assembly areas.

#. The **[Peacekeeping Force]/[Ceasefire Commission]** shall ensure that separate accommodations are made for women and children in assembly areas, including specific health services, including reproductive health services, and separate hygiene facilities.¹⁰⁶

Activities and Restrictions in Assembly Areas

Ceasefire agreements can create restrictions and allow certain activities within the assembly areas. Restrictions are most commonly designed to prevent renewed conflict or movement outside the assembly area. The allowed activities often include measures to assist the ceasefire process and protect the health and well being of those within the encampment.

Sample Language: Activities and Restrictions in Assembly Areas

#. Assembled forces shall not leave the assembly areas without the consent and verification of **[Peacekeeping Force]/[Monitoring Group]/[Ceasefire Commission]**. Assembled forces may leave assembly points only if they are unarmed and accompanied by verification representatives, in the cases provided for in the following subparagraphs:

- (1) Medical treatment;
- (2) To hand over or identify clandestine stores of arms, munitions and equipment located anywhere;
- (3) To point out areas where there are minefields.¹⁰⁷

#. Assembled forces may engage in the following activities while in the assembly areas:

- (1) Resupply of food, water, and essential supplies;
- (2) Material maintenance and repair;
- (3) Improvements to infrastructure;
- (4) Deactivation of mines within assembly area;
- (5) Cultural and recreational activities.¹⁰⁸

#. Assembled forces may not engage in **[political]/[military training]** activities.¹⁰⁹

¹⁰⁶ United Nations, *Children in DDR*, in INTEGRATED DISARMAMENT, DEMOBILIZATION AND REINTEGRATION STANDARDS, 5(30)(6)(2) (August, 2006).

¹⁰⁷ *Agreement on the Definitive Ceasefire* art. 21 (Guatemala, 1996).

¹⁰⁸ *Peace Accords for Angola* Appendix 4, art. 3(c) (Angola, 1991).

Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration in Assembly Areas

Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) is the process of disarming combatants and transforming them into civilians.¹¹⁰ The assembly areas used in a ceasefire may serve a second purpose under future DDR arrangements. DDR processes often use assembly areas to localize and control activities. Without specific provisions for broader DDR, related activities in the ceasefire assembly areas will be limited until a further agreement is reached. Ceasefires that do contemplate DDR may mention that these processes will take place within assembly areas.

Sample Language: DDR Activities in Assembly Areas

#. [*Designate party's*] military structures will end at the designated Assembly Areas. All [*designate party*] forces will engage in complete and total disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) into civil and political life.¹¹¹

#. In preparation of detailed agreements and arrangements for disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration, the parties will take measures necessary to adhere to gender and child specific standards for DDR assembly areas.¹¹²

Zones of Separation

Ceasefire agreements often create neutral geographic zones that serve to separate the forces in conjunction with the above methods of separation. These zones may be created in relation to the specific method of separation used, for instance, around ceasefire lines and assembly points. Agreements may also provide for the parties or a third party to create visible markers and signs to show where the zone of separation begins. These zones are called by many different names and may serve several different functions. A few categories have emerged in ceasefire practice, including zones that exclude the parties from entering (buffer zones), zones that apply restrictions on the parties within them (restricted zones), and zones that require permission and coordination from the peacekeeping body or commission (coordination zones). These zones can be used in combination.

¹⁰⁹ *Peace Accords for Angola* Appendix 4, art. 3(d) (Angola, 1991).

¹¹⁰ Kimberly Mahling Clark, *The Demobilization and Reintegration of Soldiers: Perspectives from USAID*, 42 AFRICA TODAY 49, 50 (1995), available at <http://www.jstor.org/stable/4187030>.

¹¹¹ *Agreement on the Definitive Ceasefire* art. 27 (Guatemala, 1996).

¹¹² *Agreement on a Permanent Ceasefire* art. 3.3 (Uganda, 2008).

Buffer Zone

A zone that excludes the parties from entering its defined area is the most common zone of separation used in ceasefire agreements. These zones are an effective way to prevent contact between the parties.¹¹³ Ceasefire agreements may refer to them as “buffer zones”, “demilitarized zones”, “security zones”, or “peace zones”, among other names. The U.S. Department of Defense defines a buffer zone as, “a defined area controlled by a peace operations force from which disputing or belligerent forces have been excluded.”¹¹⁴ Similarly, the United Nations defines a demilitarized zone as, “an area between . . . the parties, into which they have agreed not to deploy military forces and which may be placed under control of a neutral force.”¹¹⁵ The most common buffer zones exclude all party forces and may also exclude civilians.

Sample Language: Buffer Zone

#. A Buffer Zone shall extend a distance of [X] kilometers [on either side of the Ceasefire Line]/[from the perimeters of the Assembly Area(s)]/[from [designate area]].¹¹⁶

#. No [person, military or civilian]/[member of [designate force]] shall be permitted to enter the Buffer Zone except [Ceasefire Commission]/[Peacekeeping Force]/[humanitarian assistance] and persons specifically authorized by [Ceasefire Commission]/[Peacekeeping Force].¹¹⁷

#. The Parties shall not execute any hostile act within, from, or against the Buffer Zone.¹¹⁸

#. [The precise area of the Buffer Zone is indicated [using geographic coordinates] on the map[s] included as Annex A to this agreement].¹¹⁹

¹¹³ Virginia Page Fortna, *Scraps of Paper: Agreements and the Durability of Peace*, 57 INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 337, 366 (2003).

¹¹⁴ United States Marine Corps, FM 101-5-1 OPERATIONAL TERMS AND GRAPHICS, ch. 1, p 22 (1997), available at http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/service_pubs/101_5_1.pdf.

¹¹⁵ United Nations, *UN Peacemaker: Glossary: Demilitarized Zone* (2006), available at <http://peacemaker.unlb.org/glossary.php?f=D&d=232#d232>.

¹¹⁶ See *General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia & Herzegovina: Annex IA: Agreement on the Military Aspects of the Peace Settlement* art. IV(2)(c) (Bosnia and Herzegovina, 1995); *Agreement on a Permanent Ceasefire* arts. 1, 3.2 (Uganda, 2008).

¹¹⁷ *Korean War Armistice Agreement* art. I(9) (Korea, United Nations, 1953).

¹¹⁸ *Korean War Armistice Agreement* art. I(6) (Korea, United Nations, 1953).

¹¹⁹ *General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia & Herzegovina: Annex IA: Agreement on the Military Aspects of the Peace Settlement* art. IV(2)(b)-(c) (Bosnia and Herzegovina, 1995).

#. The Buffer Zone shall be **[Demarcated/Administered/Monitored]** by the **[Monitoring Group]/[Ceasefire Commission]/[Peacekeeping Force]**.

Restricted Zones

Some ceasefire agreements create additional zones, which may extend beyond buffer zones. These zones can be used for restricting certain activity, while not excluding the forces altogether. Restricted zones are often named for the type of activity they are restricting, such as a “restricted weapons zone” or a “restricted air zone”. The inclusion of restricted zones provides for more security and control within the ceasefire area.

Sample Language: Restricted Weapons Zone

#. A Restricted Weapons Zone shall extend a distance of **[X]** kilometers **[from the perimeters of the Buffer Zone]/[from *designate area*]**.

#. There shall be no **[heavy military equipment]/[*designate weapon class*]** in the Restricted Weapons Zone. Such equipment includes:¹²⁰

- (1) Artillery and mortars of a caliber exceeding **[X]** millimeters;
- (2) Tanks;
- (3) Armored Vehicles;
- (4) Surface-to-Air Missiles;
- (5) **[*designate weapons or vehicles*]**.

#. The Parties shall withdraw **[heavy military equipment]/[*designate weapon class*]** from the Restricted Weapons Zone within **[X]** days of the entry into force of this Agreement.¹²¹

#. **[Heavy military equipment]/[*designate weapon class*]** shall be stored in **[*designate area*]** and shall be **[monitored]/[demarcated]** by the **[Monitoring Group]/[Ceasefire Commission]/[Peacekeeping Force]**.¹²²

#. The precise Restricted Weapons Zone is indicated **[using geographic coordinates]** on the map[s] included as Annex A to this Agreement.

¹²⁰ *Agreement on a Ceasefire and Separation of Forces* art. 2(a) (Georgia, 1994).

¹²¹ *Agreement on a Ceasefire and Separation of Forces* art. 2(c) (Georgia, 1994).

¹²² *Agreement on a Ceasefire and Separation of Forces* art. 2(c) (Georgia, 1994).

Sample Language: Restricted Air Zone

- #. A Restricted Air Zone shall extend a distance of [X] kilometers [from the perimeters of the Buffer Zone]/[from *designate area*].
- #. There shall be no [air traffic]/[military air traffic]/[non-military air traffic performing military missions] unless there is a [disaster]/[public emergency] warranting such traffic.¹²³
- #. The [Peacekeeping Force]/[Ceasefire Commission]/*designate party* will control and coordinate the use of air space over the Restricted Air Zone.¹²⁴
- #. Any [military] flights must be authorized with advance notification to [Monitoring Group]/[Ceasefire Commission]/[Peacekeeping Force].¹²⁵
- #. All early warning, air defense, or fire control radars shall be shut down within [X] hours of the entry into force and shall remain inactive unless authorized by [Peacekeeping Force]/[Ceasefire Commission]/*designate party*.¹²⁶
- #. The precise Restricted Air Zone is indicated [using geographic coordinates] on the map[s] included as Annex [A] to this agreement.

Coordination Zones

Parties may also decide to create coordination zones, within which movement by the parties' forces must be coordinated with the peacekeeping force or ceasefire commission. These provisions provide another level of control and security within the ceasefire area.

Sample Language: Coordination Zones

- #. A Coordination Zone shall extend a distance of [X] kilometers [from the perimeters of the Buffer Zone]/[from *designate areas*].¹²⁷

¹²³ *Agreement on the Definitive Ceasefire* art. 23(a) (Guatemala, 1996).

¹²⁴ *Military Technical Agreement between the International Security Force ("KFOR") and the Governments of Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Serbia* art. 2(3)(c) (1999).

¹²⁵ *Agreement on the Definitive Ceasefire* art. 23(b) (Guatemala, 1996).

¹²⁶ *General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia & Herzegovina: Annex IA: Agreement on the Military Aspects of the Peace Settlement* art. VI (Bosnia and Herzegovina, 1995).

¹²⁷ *Agreement on the Definitive Ceasefire* art. 13 (Guatemala, 1996).

#. Movement by **[the Parties']**/*[designate party's]* forces must be coordinated in advance with the **[Monitoring Group]**/**[Ceasefire Commission]**/**[Peacekeeping Force]**.¹²⁸

VI. Monitoring/Implementation Commission

Many ceasefire agreements create a commission or similar entity to monitor, verify, and/or promote implementation of the agreement. Monitoring refers to the gathering and documentation of information on activities related to ceasefire implementation.¹²⁹ Verification is the use of information gathered through monitoring to make a determination on whether the parties are in compliance with the agreement.¹³⁰ Promoting implementation refers to providing assistance, logistical support, and expertise to assist the parties in fulfilling their duties under the ceasefire.

Ceasefire agreements may include provisions that identify the type of monitoring or implementation entity that will be used as well as set forth its mandate, authority, and composition. A survey of state practice indicates that clarity and detail on the mandate of the monitoring body or ceasefire commission reduces uncertainty and may thus avoid a return to conflict.¹³¹

Depending on their role, function, and composition, monitoring/implementation entities are referred to as “ceasefire”, “monitoring”, “verification”, “implementation”, “joint”, or “international” commissions. Some ceasefire agreements establish one entity responsible for both monitoring and assisting with implementation. Other agreements create one entity for monitoring/verification duties and another entity for supporting implementation. Creating separate entities may avoid confusion about the prioritization of roles. In general, monitoring and implementation commissions provide accountability and support the successful implementation of ceasefire agreements.¹³²

Type and Structure

Monitoring and implementation commissions can take several forms: (1) internal commissions, (2) international commissions, and (3) joint commissions.

¹²⁸ *Agreement on the Definitive Ceasefire* art. 23 (Guatemala, 1996).

¹²⁹ Jane Boulden, *The Verification and Monitoring of Peace Accords*, 45 (2000).

¹³⁰ Jane Boulden, *The Verification and Monitoring of Peace Accords*, 45 (2000).

¹³¹ Antonia Potter, *Ceasefire Monitoring & Verification*. CENTRE FOR HUMANITARIAN DIALOGUE 5 (Jun. 10-11, 2004).

¹³² Virginia Fortna *PEACE TIME: CEASEFIRE AGREEMENTS AND THE DURABILITY OF PEACE* (2004).

Monitoring and implementation mechanisms in more recent ceasefire agreements reflect increased involvement by international actors and organizations.¹³³ Generally, international and joint monitoring and implementation mechanisms are most effective in fulfilling their mandates given the influence of impartial third parties.¹³⁴

International Commission

International commissions consist exclusively of individuals from the United Nations, international organizations, regional bodies, or non-governmental organizations (NGOs). They do not include members from any of the conflict parties. Typically, international commissions are solely tasked with monitoring and verifying the ceasefire. In several agreements, international commissions were tasked with monitoring and verifying the ceasefire, while a separate commission (either joint or internal) handled ceasefire logistics and implementation support.¹³⁵ If an international actor has not previously agreed to provide monitors and support, the ceasefire agreement may explicitly request such assistance.

Sample Language Option 1: International Commission

#. A [**Monitoring Group**]/[**Ceasefire Commission**] from [**the United Nations**]/[*designate organization*]/[*designate state*] shall [**be requested to**] [**monitor**]/[**verify**]/[**assist with**] the implementation of the Agreement.¹³⁶

Joint Commission

Joint commissions are composed of both the parties and third-party actors from international organizations or neutral states. The third-party often sits as the chairman of these commissions to serve as a tiebreaker on decisions or a mediator in case of a dispute.

¹³³ Antonia Potter, *Ceasefire Monitoring & Verification*. CENTRE FOR HUMANITARIAN DIALOGUE 2 (Jun. 10-11, 2004).

¹³⁴ Antonia Potter, *Ceasefire Monitoring & Verification*. CENTRE FOR HUMANITARIAN DIALOGUE 2 (Jun. 10-11, 2004).

¹³⁵ See *Agreement on the Definitive Ceasefire* arts. 6, 29 (Guatemala, 1996); *Framework Agreement on the Peaceful Settlement of the Territorial Dispute Between the Republic of Chad and the Great Socialist People's Libya Arab Jamahiriya* arts. 5, 6 (Chad and Libya, 1989).

¹³⁶ *Framework Agreement on the Peaceful Settlement of the Territorial Dispute Between the Republic of Chad and the Great Socialist People's Libya Arab Jamahiriya* art. 6 (Chad and Libya, 1989); *Agreement on the Definitive Ceasefire* arts. 2, 6 (Guatemala, 1996).

Sample Language Option 2: Joint Commission

#. A Joint **[Monitoring Group]/[Ceasefire Commission]** consisting of representatives from **[designate parties]** and **[designate international organization]/[designate state]** will **[monitor]/[verify]/[assist with]** the implementation of the agreement. **[A neutral chairman appointed by [designate international organization] in consultation with the parties shall preside over the monitoring committee].**¹³⁷

Internal Commission

Internal commissions include only the parties to the conflict. Ceasefire agreements may establish internal commissions to manage the implementation, while a separate external group provides monitoring and verification. Occasionally ceasefire parties agree to monitor and implement the agreement without organized international involvement. This may not be an effective approach, because the absence of third parties can increase the likelihood of a return to conflict, rather than the use of the commission, to address violations.¹³⁸

Sample Language Option 3: Internal Commission

#. A **[Monitoring Group]/[Ceasefire Commission]** composed of representatives from the parties shall be established to **[monitor]/[manage]** the implementation of the agreement.¹³⁹

Mandate

At a minimum, ceasefire commissions oversee the monitoring of the ceasefire agreement. However, most ceasefire agreements include additional responsibilities for the commissions. Tasks may include managing assembly areas, providing assistance to troops, facilitating prisoner exchanges, and implementation of other confidence building measures. Commissions may also have the authority to interpret the agreement and resolve disputes. Empowering a ceasefire commission with dispute resolution authority may increase the chances of the

¹³⁷ *Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement* annex A, art. 7(2) (Democratic Republic of Congo, 1999); *Humanitarian Cease Fire Agreement on the Conflict in Darfur* art. 3 (Sudan, 2004).

¹³⁸ Antonia Potter, *Ceasefire Monitoring & Verification*. CENTRE FOR HUMANITARIAN DIALOGUE 2 (June 10-11, 2004).

¹³⁹ See *Gulu Ceasefire Agreement* Appendix A (Uganda, 1994); *Framework Agreement on the Peaceful Settlement of the Territorial Dispute Between the Republic of Chad and the Great Socialist People's Libya Arab Jamahiriya* art. 5 (Chad and Libya, 1989).

ceasefire's success by ameliorating disagreements before they cause a return to conflict.¹⁴⁰

When developing a mandate, the parties are encouraged to remain mindful of the commission's capacity and resources. Too many responsibilities may result in ineffective implementation. The following language provides common duties included in ceasefire commission mandates. For those ceasefires that create a separate monitoring group, its mandate is usually limited to monitoring and verifying the agreement.

Sample Language: Commission Mandate

#. The mandate of the **[Monitoring Group]/[Ceasefire Commission]** shall include:

- (1) **[Monitoring]/[verifying]/[overseeing]/[supervising]** the implementation of this agreement;¹⁴¹
- (2) Updating **[designate organization]** on the process of ceasefire implementation;¹⁴²
- (3) **[Facilitating]/[monitoring]** the movement of troops **[and assembly areas]** to ensure compliance with the ceasefire agreement;¹⁴³
- (4) **[Facilitating]/[monitoring]** the delivery of basic assistance and supplies to **[designate party or group]**;¹⁴⁴
- (5) **[Facilitating]/[monitoring]** the **[return/exchange]** of prisoners as agreed upon by the Parties;¹⁴⁵
- (6) Resolving disputes among the parties about the implementation or interpretation of the agreement;¹⁴⁶
- (7) Settling through negotiations any violations of the agreement;¹⁴⁷
- (8) **[Other tasks agreed upon by the parties].**

¹⁴⁰ Virginia Page Fortna, *Scraps of Paper: Agreements and the Durability of Peace*, 57 INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 337, 362 (2003).

¹⁴¹ *Agreement on a Permanent Ceasefire and Security Arrangements Implementation Modalities* art. 14.5.1 (Sudan 2004).

¹⁴² *Agreement on a Permanent Ceasefire and Security Arrangements Implementation Modalities* art. 14.5.4 (Sudan 2004).

¹⁴³ *Agreement on a Permanent Ceasefire* art. 4.12(a)-(b) (Uganda, 2008); *Agreement on a Ceasefire and Separation of Forces* para. 2(d) (Georgia, 1994).

¹⁴⁴ *Agreement on a Permanent Ceasefire* art. 4.12(f) (Uganda, 2008).

¹⁴⁵ Secretary-General, *Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation Concerning Western Sahara*, para. 20, delivered to the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/21360 (Jun. 18, 1990), available at http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/21360.

¹⁴⁶ *Agreement on a Permanent Ceasefire* art. 4.12(c) (Uganda, 2008).

¹⁴⁷ *Korean War Armistice Agreement* art. II(B)(24) (Korea, 1953).

#. The Parties agree to cooperate with the **[Monitoring Group]/[Ceasefire Commission]**, to ensure the freedom of movement of the Commission, and to provide the Commission access to facilities as necessary so that it can safely and efficiently fulfill its responsibilities.¹⁴⁸

#. **[Monitoring Group]/[Ceasefire Commission]** shall be constituted and deployed within **[X]** days of the entry into force of this Agreement.

Subsidiary Structures

Some detailed agreements grant ceasefire commissions the authority to establish or control subsidiary structures, such as sub-commissions. Subsidiary structures may allow the primary ceasefire monitoring/implementation committee to fulfill its mandate more effectively and efficiently.

Sample Language: General Subsidiary Structures

#. The **[Monitoring Group]/[Ceasefire Commission]** **[may]/[shall]** establish subordinate **[commissions]/[units]** for the purpose of providing assistance in carrying out its functions.¹⁴⁹

Localized Units

Agreements may likewise grant ceasefire commissions the authority to establish or control localized units to assist with monitoring and implementation. These units usually serve as subsidiaries to the ceasefire commission and carry out the duties of the commission within a specific region.

Sample Language

#. Local **[Monitoring]/[Verification]/[Implementation]** Units **[shall]/[may]** be established at the **[local]/[provincial]/[district]/[regional]** level to **[monitor]/[verify]/[assist]** the implementation of this agreement, and report all violations to the **[Monitoring Group]/[Ceasefire Commission]**.¹⁵⁰

¹⁴⁸ *Declaration of Cessation of Hostilities* art. 5(e)-(f) (Sri Lanka, 1995).

¹⁴⁹ *General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia & Herzegovina: Annex IA: Agreement on the Military Aspects of the Peace Settlement* art. VIII (Bosnia and Herzegovina, 1995); *The N'Sele Ceasefire Agreement* art. III(4) (Rwanda, 1992), available at <http://publicinternationallawandpolicygroup.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/10/The-Nsele-Ceasefire-Agreement-1992.pdf>; *Peace Accords for Angola* art. III(3) (Angola, 1999).

¹⁵⁰ *Lomé Agreement* art. II(1) (Sierra Leone, 1999); *Agreement on a Ceasefire* art. 3(7) (Sri Lanka, 2002).

#. Local **[Monitoring]/[Verification]/[Implementation]** Units shall serve the **[Monitoring Group]/[Ceasefire Commission]** in an advisory capacity relating to the implementation of this Agreement in their respective **[localities]/[provinces]/[districts]/[regions]**, with a view to establishing a common understanding of such issues.¹⁵¹

#. Each Local **[Monitoring]/[Verification]/[Implementation]** Unit shall consist of **[X]** members, **[X]** appointed by *[designate party]* and **[X]** appointed by *[designate party]*. **[[Designate third-party] shall chair each unit]**.¹⁵²

VII. Peacekeeping Force

Peacekeepers act to stop and prevent violence, interfere with military contact between the ceasefire parties, and increase the economic, strategic, and political costs of returning to conflict.¹⁵³ Peacekeepers deployed into ceasefire areas often primarily work to establish and maintain the separation of forces. However, peacekeepers are a versatile resource and may be used for training, logistical support, DDR oversight, mine-clearing, crowd control, law enforcement, humanitarian aid delivery, and monitoring and verification, among many other potential roles.¹⁵⁴ Several issues regarding peacekeepers can create contention in ceasefire negotiations. States may see the presence of peacekeepers as an infringement on their sovereignty. The parties may disagree on the source and composition of the peacekeeping force. Further, they may also disagree on certain peacekeeping functions. To avoid the risk of derailing ceasefire negotiations, parties can commit to negotiating the use of peacekeepers at a later date.

Source and Composition

Ceasefire agreements may designate peacekeeping forces from the United Nations or other international and regional organizations. Ceasefire agreements referring to a peacekeeping force often include a provision expressing which organization will be responsible for providing peacekeepers. The United Nations is the most common, and perhaps the most successful, provider of peacekeepers.

¹⁵¹ *Agreement on a Ceasefire* art. 3(8) (Sri Lanka, 2002).

¹⁵² *Agreement on a Ceasefire* art. 3(7) (Sri Lanka, 2002).

¹⁵³ Muzaffer Ercan Yilmaz, *Resolving Internal Conflicts in the Post-Cold War Era: Is Peacekeeping Enough?*, 8 *Journal of Economic and Social Research* 27, 29 (2006), available at <http://www.fatih.edu.tr/~jesr/jesr.yilmaz.e.pdf>.

¹⁵⁴ Wibke Hansen, et al., *Hawks and Doves Peacekeeping and Conflict Resolution*, BERGHOF RESEARCH CENTER FOR CONSTRUCTIVE CONFLICT MANAGEMENT, 5 (Aug. 2004), available at http://www.berghof-handbook.net/documents/publications/hansen_etal_handbook.pdf.

The United Nations also often provides financial support for these missions.¹⁵⁵ Ceasefires can also use peacekeeping forces from regional organizations, such as the African Union (AU), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

Sample Language: Peacekeeping Composition and Deployment

#. **[The United Nations]/[designate organization/state]** shall be requested to constitute, facilitate, and deploy an appropriate Peacekeeping Force **[under the auspices of [the United Nations]/[designate organization/state]]** to ensure the implementation of this Agreement.¹⁵⁶

#. The size and the composition of the Peacekeeping Force shall be adapted to the mission assigned to it and shall be determined by the **[Secretary General]/[designate senior official]** of **[the United Nations]/[designate organization/state]** with the acceptance of the Parties.¹⁵⁷

#. The Peacekeeping Force shall be constituted and deployed within **[X]** days of the entry into force of this agreement.

Mandate

Ceasefire agreements containing peacekeeping provisions often task peacekeeping forces with similar responsibilities regardless of the composition of the force or the type of conflict. These responsibilities generally include: maintaining peace and security; monitoring and verifying the cessation of hostilities; guarding protected zones; assisting in withdrawal, disarmament, and redeployment of forces; assisting in humanitarian efforts; and, keeping the parties abreast of the peacekeeping force's operations. The responsibilities granted to a peacekeeping force should be conflict-specific and tailored to the goals of the ceasefire agreement.

Peacekeeping forces may be assigned certain duties that would also be appropriate for monitoring groups or ceasefire commissions. Ceasefire agreements

¹⁵⁵ Mark J. Mullenbach, *Deciding to Keep Peace: An Analysis of International Influences on the Establishment of Third-Party Peacekeeping Missions*, 49 INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY 529, 529 (2005).

¹⁵⁶ *The Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement* art. 11(a), Annex A, art 8.1 (Democratic Republic of Congo, 1999); *Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities Between the Government of Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia and the Government of the State of Eritrea* art. 2 (Ethiopia and Eritrea, 2000).

¹⁵⁷ *Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities Between the Government of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia and the Government of the State of Eritrea* art. 4 (Ethiopia and Eritrea, 2000).

that utilize both commissions and peacekeeping forces should be clear on the delegation of tasks between these respective entities. The 1999 Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement in the Democratic Republic of Congo provides an example of how an agreement may divide responsibility between a commission and a peacekeeping force.¹⁵⁸

Sample Language: Peacekeeping Mandate

#. The mandate of the [**The United Nations**]/[*designate organization/state*] Peacekeeping Force shall include:

- (1) Creating and promoting secure conditions for the continuation of the peace process;¹⁵⁹
- (2) Ensuring the observance of security commitments agreed by the Parties in this Agreement;¹⁶⁰
- (3) [**Delineation**]/[**demarcation**] of the [**Ceasefire Line**]/[**Buffer Zone(s)**]/[**Assembly Area(s)**]/[**Restricted Zone(s)**] established by this Agreement.¹⁶¹
- (4) [**Regularly patrolling**]/[**monitoring compliance**] inside and near the [**Ceasefire Line**]/[**Buffer Zone(s)**]/[**Assembly Area(s)**]/[**Restricted Zone(s)**].¹⁶²
- (5) [**Facilitating**]/[**monitoring**] the [**disengagement**]/[**movement**] of troops [**and assembly areas**] to ensure compliance with the ceasefire agreement;¹⁶³
- (6) [**Facilitating**]/[**monitoring**] the clearing of minefields and blockades or obstacles;¹⁶⁴
- (7) Collecting, accounting for, and securing weapons from [**the Parties**]/[**civilians**];¹⁶⁵
- (8) Preventing interference with the movement of civilian populations, refugees, and displaced persons.¹⁶⁶

¹⁵⁸ See *The Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement* annex A arts. 7-8 (Democratic Republic of Congo, 1999).

¹⁵⁹ *General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia & Herzegovina: Annex IA: Agreement on the Military Aspects of the Peace Settlement* art. VI (Bosnia and Herzegovina, 1995).

¹⁶⁰ *Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities Between the Government of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia and the Government of the State of Eritrea* art. 3(3) (Ethiopia and Eritrea, 2000).

¹⁶¹ *Agreement on a Ceasefire and Separation of Forces* art. 3 (Georgia, 1994).

¹⁶² *Agreement on a Ceasefire and Separation of Forces* art. 2(d) (Georgia, 1994).

¹⁶³ *The Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement* annex A art. 8.2.1(d) (Democratic Republic of Congo, 1999); *Agreement on a Ceasefire and Separation of Forces* art. 2(d) (Georgia, 1994).

¹⁶⁴ *General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia & Herzegovina: Annex IA: Agreement on the Military Aspects of the Peace Settlement* art. VI (Bosnia and Herzegovina, 1995).

¹⁶⁵ *The Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement* annex A art. 8.2.1(h) (Democratic Republic of Congo, 1999).

¹⁶⁶ *General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia & Herzegovina: Annex IA: Agreement on the Military Aspects of the Peace Settlement* art. VI (Bosnia and Herzegovina, 1995).

- (9) **[Monitoring]/[verifying]** and reporting on the compliance with this Agreement by all parties;¹⁶⁷
- (10) Contributing to confidence building measures among the parties **[and civilians]** by raising awareness and promoting the ceasefire agreement;¹⁶⁸
- (11) **[Facilitating]/[monitoring]** the delivery of humanitarian assistance and supplies;¹⁶⁹
- (12) **[Other tasks agreed upon by the parties].**

#. The Parties agree that the Peacekeeping Force shall have authority, without interference or permission of any party, to do all that is necessary and appropriate **[not including the use of force,]** to carry out the responsibilities listed above.¹⁷⁰

#. The Peacekeeping Force shall have complete and unimpeded freedom of movement by ground, air, and water throughout **[designate area].**¹⁷¹

Use of Force

Ceasefire agreements may enumerate and limit the authority of peacekeepers to use force. Most agreements only allow peacekeepers to use force in self-defense, in response to an attack or direct threat to their personal safety.¹⁷² Some agreements allow peacekeepers to use force when necessary to protect themselves *and* to fulfill their duties.¹⁷³ This broader authority may allow peacekeepers to use force to protect civilians or prevent a resurgence of hostilities. Use of force for these purposes is known as “peace enforcement.”¹⁷⁴ This practice can be problematic, especially where peacekeepers are engaged in the use of military force to *restore* ceasefire conditions between parties who do not necessarily

¹⁶⁷ *The Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement* annex A art. 8.2.1(b) (Democratic Republic of Congo, 1999).

¹⁶⁸ *Lincoln Agreement on Peace, Security and Development on Bougainville* arts. 6.2, 6.3 (Bougainville, 1998); *Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities Between the Government of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia and the Government of the State of Eritrea* art. 12 (Ethiopia and Eritrea, 2000).

¹⁶⁹ *The Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement* annex A art. 8.2.1(f) (Democratic Republic of Congo, 1999).

¹⁷⁰ *General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia & Herzegovina: Annex IA: Agreement on the Military Aspects of the Peace Settlement* art. VI (Bosnia and Herzegovina, 1995).

¹⁷¹ *General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia & Herzegovina: Annex IA: Agreement on the Military Aspects of the Peace Settlement* art. VI (Bosnia and Herzegovina, 1995).

¹⁷² Trevor Findlay, *The Use of Force in UN Peace Operations*, STOCKHOLM INTERNATIONAL PEACE RESEARCH INSTITUTE, 19 (2002), available at <http://books.sipri.org/files/books/SIPRI02Findlay.pdf>.

¹⁷³ United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, *United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines*, 19 (2008), available at http://pbpu.unlb.org/pbps/library/Capstone_Doctrine_ENG.pdf.

¹⁷⁴ George F. Oliver, *The Other Side of Peacekeeping: Peace Enforcement and Who Should Do It?*, in INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING: THE YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL PEACE OPERATIONS 99, 102 (Harvey Langholtz, et al., eds., 2002), available at <http://www.internationalpeacekeeping.org/pdf/04.pdf>.

consent, and who may have resumed hostilities.¹⁷⁵ The vast majority of ceasefire agreements do not specifically mention permissible justifications for using force. Clear drafting in limiting the permissible actions of peacekeepers may help prevent peacekeeping forces from overstepping their mandate.

Sample Language Option 1: Use of Force – Self Defense

#. The Peacekeeping Force may take necessary and appropriate measures [**in the event of an attack or direct threat against the Peacekeeping Force,**] for its safety and self-defense.¹⁷⁶

Sample Language Option 2: Use of Force – Self Defense and Fulfill Duties

#. The Peacekeeping Force shall have the authority, without interference or permission of any party, to take all necessary and appropriate measures [**including the use of military force,**] to carry out the responsibilities listed above.¹⁷⁷

VIII. Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration and Security Sector Reform

Disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) is the process of disarming combatants and transitioning them into civilian life.¹⁷⁸ Security sector reform (SSR) is the process through which states restructure the institutions that provide safety, security, and justice for citizens.¹⁷⁹ These two processes are often linked in post-conflict scenarios. Both have the end goal of creating a monopoly of force within state institutions, which creates an inherent tension for non-state

¹⁷⁵ George F. Oliver, *The Other Side of Peacekeeping: Peace Enforcement and Who Should Do It?*, in INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING: THE YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL PEACE OPERATIONS 99, 102 (Harvey Langholtz, et al., eds., 2002).

¹⁷⁶ *Agreement on a Ceasefire and Separation of Forces* art. 2(h) (Georgia, 1994).

¹⁷⁷ *General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia & Herzegovina: Annex IA: Agreement on the Military Aspects of the Peace Settlement* art. VI (Bosnia and Herzegovina, 1995); *Military Technical Agreement between the International Security Force (“KFOR”) and the Governments of Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Serbia* art. I(4)(b) (1999).

¹⁷⁸ Kimberly Mahling Clark, *The Demobilization and Reintegration of Soldiers: Perspectives from USAID*, 42 AFRICA TODAY 49, 50 (1995), available at <http://www.jstor.org/stable/4187030>.

¹⁷⁹ Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development, *OECD DAC Handbook on Security System Reform: Supporting Security and Justice*, 21 (2007), available at www.oecd.org/dataoecd/43/25/38406485.pdf.

parties.¹⁸⁰ These processes mark the end of a non-state parties ability to immediately resort to armed conflict as means of achieving political goals.

In cases where it is feasible for the parties, DDR and SSR commitments can serve as confidence-building measures in ceasefire agreements, exhibiting faith in the peace process.¹⁸¹ Reaching agreement on these issues is a difficult task. DDR and SSR provisions frequently create asymmetrical obligations, often requiring non-state parties to disarm and demobilize their forces, sometimes incorporating them into a developing state-controlled military. Without a broad peace agreement addressing the political causes of the conflict, non-state forces are unlikely to agree to any measures that take away their ability to resort to military force.¹⁸² To avoid the risk of DDR and SSR discussions derailing ceasefire negotiations, parties can commit to negotiating subsequent peace agreements and DDR/SSR-specific arrangements that will further address these elements.¹⁸³

Disarmament

Disarmament is the process of reducing or removing weapons held by a party's forces and the civilian population.¹⁸⁴ This process can be implemented during the separation of forces. As mentioned above, disarmament leaves the disarming party vulnerable to attack. Thus, disarmament provisions in ceasefires are usually seen in conflicts where there is a decisive military imbalance between the parties, or where considerable negotiations have already taken place.¹⁸⁵ Disarmament provisions can require the disarming party to relinquish their weapons at designated points and empower the peacekeeping force to facilitate the process.

¹⁸⁰ See Sean McFate, *The Link Between DDR and SSR in Conflict Affected Countries*, UNITED STATES INSTITUTE FOR PEACE 1-5 (May 2010), available at http://www.usip.org/files/resources/SR238McFate_DDR_SSR_Conflict.pdf.

¹⁸¹ Paul R. Williams and Matthew T. Simpson, *Drafting in Doha: An Assessment of the Darfur Peace Process and Ceasefire Agreements*, in MONOPOLY OF FORCE: THE NEXUS OF DDR AND SSR, 41 (Melanne Civic and Michael Miklaucic, eds., 2011), available at http://ccoportal.org/sites/ccoportal.org/files/monopoly-of-force_0.pdf.

¹⁸² Véronique Dudouet, *Non-State Armed Groups and the Politics of Postwar Security Governance*, in MONOPOLY OF FORCE: THE NEXUS OF DDR AND SSR, 3, 9 (Melanne Civic and Michael Miklaucic, eds., 2011).

¹⁸³ Luc Chounet-Cambas, *Negotiating Ceasefires: Dilemmas and Options for Mediators*, CENTER FOR HUMANITARIAN DIALOGUE, 13 (March 2011).

¹⁸⁴ United Nations, *OG 4.10: Disarmament*, in OPERATIONAL GUIDE TO THE IDDRS 121, 121 (2006), available at http://unddr.org/iddrs/og/OG_4_10.pdf.

¹⁸⁵ Maj. Vaughn A. Aary, *Concluding Hostilities: Humanitarian Provisions in Ceasefire Agreements*, 148 MILITARY LAW REVIEW 186, 194 (1995).

Sample Language: Disarmament

#. [Peacekeeping Force] shall disarm [*designate party*] forces and other armed residents, starting within [X] days of the entry into force of this Agreement.¹⁸⁶

#. Within [X] days of the entry into force of this Agreement, [*designate party*] will place their weapons, arms, and explosives at [*designate assembly point*]/[*designate arms collection area*].¹⁸⁷

#. This process shall be [Coordinated]/[Monitored] by the [Peacekeeping Force]/[Monitoring Group]/[Ceasefire Commission].

Demobilization and Reintegration

Most ceasefires create an initial environment for the peace process, but rarely establish a full demilitarization of the conflict.¹⁸⁸ Thus, few ceasefire agreements create comprehensive arrangements for DDR. DDR involves the partial or total dissolution of one of the parties' forces. If there is not sufficient confidence between the parties, they are less likely to commit to diminishing their military capacity through DDR in the context of a ceasefire.¹⁸⁹

If the parties are willing to contemplate DDR, ceasefire agreements can provide a helpful step to build confidence for future DDR arrangements.¹⁹⁰ Ceasefires including DDR can establish a clear commitment to engage in the process, acknowledging that it will result in the demobilization of the obliged parties' military. The parties may provide for the ceasefire commission or peacekeeping force to establish a mechanism for DDR, or they may commit to addressing DDR in subsequent agreements.

¹⁸⁶ *The Lomé Agreement* art. XVI(1) (Sierra Leone, 1999).

¹⁸⁷ *Cessation of Hostilities Framework Between the Government of the Republic of Indonesia and the Free Aceh Movement* art. 3(b)(vi) (Indonesia, 2002).

¹⁸⁸ Kelvin Ong, MANAGING FIGHTING FORCES: DDR IN THE PEACE PROCESS 11 (2012), available at http://www.usip.org/files/resources/PMT_ManagingFightingForces.pdf.

¹⁸⁹ Maj. Vaughn A. Aary, *Concluding Hostilities: Humanitarian Provisions in Ceasefire Agreements*, 148 MILITARY LAW REVIEW 186, 194 (1995); United Nations, UN Peacemaker: Glossary: Ceasefire (2012).

¹⁹⁰ Kelvin Ong, MANAGING FIGHTING FORCES: DDR IN THE PEACE PROCESS 47 (2012).

Sample Language: DDR

#. [**Designate party**] military structures will end at the designated Assembly Areas. All [**designate party**] forces will engage in complete and total disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) into civil and political life.¹⁹¹

#. The [**Parties**]/[**Ceasefire Commission**]/[**Peacekeeping Force**] [**with the assistance of the [United Nations]/[designate organization]**] shall establish a comprehensive mechanism for [**documenting**]/[**disarming**]/[**demobilizing**]/[**reintegrating**] the forces of [**designate party**] in accordance with international standards and respect for human rights.¹⁹²

Security Sector Reform

Post-conflict states often undergo security sector reform (SSR). The purpose of SSR is to create a monopoly of force in the state by reestablishing trust and legitimacy in state-run security institutions.¹⁹³ SSR is a complex process, especially in a post-conflict environment, which involves restructuring state institutions and welcoming aggrieved parties to participate their development.¹⁹⁴ SSR is an ongoing cooperative and collaborative process that cannot be arranged solely through a ceasefire negotiation. However, a ceasefire may include a commitment to engage in SSR, in consultation with all the parties, to establish an environment conducive to further arrangements.

SSR processes often provide for the integration of non-state party forces into the developing state-run military. This option may be expressly stated in the ceasefire to prepare the non-state forces for the decision to reintegrate into civilian life or into the state military.¹⁹⁵

¹⁹¹ *Agreement on the Definitive Ceasefire* art. 27 (Guatemala, 1996).

¹⁹² *Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement* annex A art 9(1) (DRC, 1999).

¹⁹³ Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development, *OECD DAC Handbook on Security System Reform: Supporting Security and Justice*, 22 (2007).

¹⁹⁴ Véronique Dudouet, *Non-State Armed Groups and the Politics of Postwar Security Governance*, in *MONOPOLY OF FORCE: THE NEXUS OF DDR AND SSR* 3, 18-21 (Melanne Civic and Michael Miklaucic, eds., 2011).

¹⁹⁵ See generally, Mark Knight, *Security Sector Reform: Post-Conflict Integration*, GLOBAL FACILITATION NETWORK FOR SECURITY SECTOR REFORM (Aug. 2009), available at http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/documents/GFNSSR_SSR_PostConflictIntegration.pdf.

Sample Language: SSR

#. Arrangements for the restructuring, composition, and training of a new [*designate state-run military*] will be negotiated by the Parties and carried out by [*designate parties*] with a view to creating a truly national armed force.¹⁹⁶

#. Forces of [*designate party*] may integrate into the new [*designate state-run military*] if they desire to do so and meet the criteria established by the [*designate state party*].¹⁹⁷

IX. Humanitarian Provisions

Several ceasefire agreements include humanitarian provisions, which function to protect human rights and build confidence in the peace process. These provisions create protections and arrangements for refugees, internally displaced persons, humanitarian workers, and prisoners detained as a result of the conflict. Ceasefire agreements may also include protections for the freedom of movement throughout the conflict area.

Return of Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons

International law creates and protects certain minimum rights for refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs).¹⁹⁸ The Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees defines refugees as people outside the country of their nationality, who cannot or will not avail themselves of the protection of that country as a result of a well-founded fear of persecution.¹⁹⁹ IDPs are defined as people who have been forced to flee or leave their homes or places of habitual residence to avoid the effects of armed conflict, violence, or human rights violations, but who have not crossed an internationally recognized state border.²⁰⁰ Most armed conflicts produce forcible displacement and, as a result, many ceasefire agreements include provisions for the return and proper treatment of refugees and IDPs. Provisions

¹⁹⁶ *The Lomé Agreement* art. XVII(1) (Sierra Leone, 1999); *Comprehensive Ceasefire Agreement Between The Government of the Republic of Burundi and the Palipehutu-FNL* annex III art 2(2)-(3) (Burundi, 2006).

¹⁹⁷ *The Lomé Agreement* art. XVII(2) (Sierra Leone, 1999); *Comprehensive Ceasefire Agreement Between The Government of the Republic of Burundi and the Palipehutu-FNL* annex III art 2(1) (Burundi, 2006).

¹⁹⁸ Maj. Vaughn A. Aary, *Concluding Hostilities: Humanitarian Provisions in Ceasefire Agreements*, 148 *MILITARY LAW REVIEW* 186, 194 (1995).

¹⁹⁹ Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, art. 1(a)(2), Apr. 22, 1954, 189 U.N.T.S. 150 (1954), available at <http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/refugees.htm>.

²⁰⁰ Representative of the Secretary-General, *Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement*, Annex, para. 2, delivered to the Commission on Human Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1998/53/Add.2 (Feb. 11, 1998), available at <http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/GuidingPrinciplesonInternalDisplacement.htm>.

providing for the return of refugees and IDPs may contribute to peace and confidence building processes. Under international law, refugees are protected against *refoulement*, or forced return to their country or region of origin.²⁰¹ Thus, the return process as set forth in the ceasefire agreement should be voluntary. International law does not require all of the same protections for IDPs; however, ceasefire drafters may nonetheless apply the same protection to IDPs to indicate compliance and respect for human rights within the context of the ceasefire.²⁰²

Sample Language: Return of Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons

#. [The Parties]/[*designate party*] shall provide security guarantees for the safe and unhindered return and resettlement of freely consenting refugees and internally displaced persons.²⁰³

#. This process shall be [Coordinated/Monitored] by the [Peacekeeping Force]/[Monitoring Force]/[Ceasefire Commission].

Cooperation with Humanitarian Agencies

Ceasefire agreements often create obligations in the parties to support, cooperate with, and provide security guarantees to humanitarian agencies. The protection of humanitarian personnel is a norm of customary international law, supported by hundreds of state practice examples.²⁰⁴ Supporting and cooperating with humanitarian personnel can function to promote human rights and build confidence in the peace process. Parties may also provide specific guarantees for the freedom of movement, including the creation of secure corridors, for humanitarian workers.

²⁰¹ Barry N. Stein, *Refugee Repatriation, Return, and Refoulement During Conflict*, UNITED STATES AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, 3 (Oct. 30-31, 1997), available at http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNACD092.pdf.

²⁰² International Council on Human Rights Policy, *Negotiating Justice? Human Rights and Peace Agreements*, 62 (2006), available at www.ichrp.org/files/reports/22/128_report_en.pdf.

²⁰³ *Peace Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of Niger and the Coordination of the Armed Resistance* art. 10 (Niger, 1994), available at <http://publicinternationalallawandpolicygroup.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/10/Ouagadougou-Accord-1994.pdf>; *Agreement on Ceasefire and Cessation of Hostilities Between the Government of the Republic of Liberia and LURD and MODEL* art. 5 (Liberia, 2003).

²⁰⁴ International Committee of the Red Cross, *Practice Relating to Rule 31: Humanitarian Relief Personnel*, in CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW DATABASE, Rule 31. (2012), available at http://www.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v2_rul_rule31.

Sample Language: Humanitarian Assistance

#. The Parties shall create conditions favorable to supplying emergency relief and provide security guarantees for safe, unhindered access by humanitarian agencies to vulnerable groups.²⁰⁵

#. The Parties shall secure and provide free passage and unimpeded access within [*designate area*] along [*designate road(s) or route(s)*] for humanitarian personnel.²⁰⁶

Prisoner Exchange

Several ceasefire agreements include provisions obligating the parties to release prisoners detained as a consequence of the conflict. These obligations serve to build confidence in the peace process. If the parties are dissatisfied with the treatment or arrangements for addressing prisoners, the broader peace process may be threatened.²⁰⁷ Information sharing on prisoners can precede their release to allow the monitoring and implementation bodies to verify and assist with compliance.

Sample Language: Prisoner Release

#. The Parties shall share provide the [**Peacekeeping Force**]/[**Monitoring Group**]/[**Ceasefire Commission**] with relevant information regarding all civilian and military prisoners who were detained or withheld as a consequence of the conflict within [**X**] days of the entry into force of this Agreement.²⁰⁸

#. The Parties shall release all civilian and military prisoners who were detained or withheld as a consequence of the conflict within [**X**] days of the entry into force of this Agreement.²⁰⁹

²⁰⁵ *Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement on the Conflict in Darfur* art. 8 (Sudan, 2004); *Agreement on Ceasefire and Cessation of Hostilities Between the Government of the Republic of Liberia and LURD and MODEL* art. 5 (Liberia, 2003).

²⁰⁶ *Ceasefire Agreement for Bosnia and Herzegovina* art. 7 (Bosnia and Herzegovina, 1995); *Agreement by the Government of the Philippines and MILF* art. 1 (Philippines, 1997).

²⁰⁷ Yaser Alashqar, *Political Prisoners in Peacemaking Processes: The Case of Northern Ireland*, GLENCREE CENTER FOR PEACE AND RECONCILIATION IN IRELAND 3 (Feb, 2012), available at http://www.glencree.ie/site/documents/Political_Prisoners_Peacemaking.pdf.

²⁰⁸ *Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement* annex A art. 3(1)-(2) (Democratic Republic of Congo, 1999).

²⁰⁹ *Peace Accords for Angola* art. II(3) (Angola, 1991); *Ceasefire Agreement for Bosnia and Herzegovina* art. 5 (Bosnia and Herzegovina, 1995); *Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement* annex A art. 3(1)-(2) (Democratic Republic of Congo, 1999); *Comprehensive Ceasefire Agreement Between The Government of the Republic of Burundi and the Palipehutu-FNL* annex II art. 3 (Burundi, 2006).

#. This process shall be **[Coordinated/Monitored]** by the **[Peacekeeping Force]/[Monitoring Group]/[Ceasefire Commission]**.

Freedom of Movement

Freedom of movement, both within a state and across borders, is codified as a fundamental human right in numerous international legal instruments.²¹⁰ As a result of armed conflict, freedom of movement is often restricted within the state in conflict. In ceasefires agreements freedom of movement provisions permit or restrict the movement of people and goods under the ceasefire agreement. These provisions may garner public support of the ceasefire by creating conditions for an influx of supplies and increasing security in travel.²¹¹ If the parties are unable to ensure unrestricted and safe movement, they may narrow the scope of the provision. For instance, the agreement may create specific protected routes, entry points and exit points for goods and people traveling within the conflict area.²¹² Additionally, agreements may specifically apply these provisions to certain groups, such as non-combatants, humanitarian workers, or displaced persons.

Sample Language Option 1: Unrestricted Freedom of Movement

#. The Parties shall guarantee the unhindered, free movement of **[all persons and goods]/[designate group, population, or goods]** throughout **[designate area]** in accordance with law.²¹³

Sample Language Option 2: Qualified Freedom of Movement

#. The Parties shall secure and provide free passage and unimpeded road access within **[designate area]** along **[designate road(s) or route(s)]** for **[all persons and goods]/[designate specific group, population, or goods]**.²¹⁴

²¹⁰Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art 13, G.A. res. 217A (III), U.N. Doc A/810 at 71 (1948); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 12, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966).

²¹¹ Antonia Potter, *Ceasefire Monitoring & Verification*, CENTRE FOR HUMANITARIAN DIALOGUE 8 (2004).

²¹² Nicholas Haysom and Julian Hottinger, *Do's and Don'ts of Sustainable Ceasefire Agreements*, PEACE APPEAL FOUNDATION 14 (2004).

²¹³ *Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement* art. 3(6) (Democratic Republic of Congo, 1999); *Lincoln Agreement* art 9(b) (Papua New Guinea, 1998).

²¹⁴ *Ceasefire Agreement for Bosnia and Herzegovina* art. 7 (Bosnia and Herzegovina, 1995); *Agreement by the Government of the Philippines and MILF* art. 1 (Philippines, 1997).

X. Commitments to Engage in Peace Negotiations

Most parties negotiate ceasefires as a first or early step toward a broader peace process.²¹⁵ Thus, the ceasefire agreement may include an affirmative obligation on the parties to negotiate political arrangements for peace. Such a commitment may list the issues to be addressed in the negotiation. These can include issues such as national reconciliation, social reforms, and DDR. The scope of issues for future negotiation is entirely dependent on the parties' ability to agree on them.²¹⁶ Ceasefire drafters should note that waiting too long to conclude a peace agreement that addresses the root causes of conflict or long-term solutions can put strain on the ceasefire and risk a return to violence. The language below and potential issues for negotiation highlight common themes left for broader peace agreements.

Sample Language: Peace Negotiations

#. The signing of this agreement shall be followed by the good faith engagement of the Parties to seek a comprehensive peace agreement.²¹⁷ **[These negotiations shall commence within [X] days after the entry into force of this agreement].**

Sample Language: Substantive Issues of Peace Negotiations

#. The peace agreement shall, amongst other issues, cover the following:²¹⁸

- (1) Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration;
- (2) Security Sector Reform;
- (3) Human Rights;
- (4) National Reconciliation;
- (5) Reconstruction and Rehabilitation;
- (6) Territorial Autonomy;
- (7) Social Reforms;
- (8) Economic Reforms;
- (9) Minority Rights;
- (10) Transitional Justice and Amnesty.

²¹⁵ Maj. Vaugh A. Aary, *Concluding Hostilities: Humanitarian Provisions in Ceasefire Agreements*, 148 MILITARY LAW REVIEW 186, 191 (1995); United Nations, UN Peacemaker: Glossary: Ceasefire (2012).

²¹⁶ Maj. Vaugh A. Aary, *Concluding Hostilities: Humanitarian Provisions in Ceasefire Agreements*, 148 MILITARY LAW REVIEW 186, 193 (1995); United Nations, UN Peacemaker: Glossary: Ceasefire (2012).

²¹⁷ *Agreement on Ceasefire in Sierra Leone* art. 3 (Sierra Leone, 1999).

²¹⁸ *Agreement on Ceasefire and Cessation of Hostilities Between the Government of the Republic of Liberia and LURD and MODEL* art. 8 (Liberia, 2003).

XI. Communication of the Agreement

Communication provisions aim to inform all interested groups, including the parties' forces, the general public, and the international community about the existence and substance of a ceasefire agreement. A failure to communicate the agreement can result in renewed fighting and the breakdown of trust between the parties.²¹⁹ Ceasefire agreements may thus provide for both specific communication to military forces as well as broader communication to the public and the international community.

Sample Language: Communication

#. Within [X] days of the entry into force of this Agreement, the Parties shall ensure that the terms of this Agreement, and [written] orders requiring compliance, are communicated to all of the Parties' respective forces.²²⁰

#. [The Parties]/[the Ceasefire Commission] shall communicate the ceasefire to the civilian population through print, radio, and all possible means of communication.²²¹ The Parties shall provide accurate information concerning the ceasefire to the media and shall not interfere with the dissemination of information.²²²

#. [The Parties]/[the Ceasefire Commission] shall give notice of this Agreement to the [United Nations]/[designate international/regional organization].²²³

XII. Expiration and Renewal of Agreement

Ceasefire agreements may include expiration provisions that create a specific end date for the ceasefire or a specific event triggering the termination of

²¹⁹ See Nicholas Haysom, Julian Hottinger, *Do's and Don'ts of Sustainable Ceasefire Agreements* PEACE APPEAL FOUNDATION 14 (2004).

²²⁰ *The Lome Agreement* art. 20 (Sierra Leone, 1999). See also *Ceasefire Agreement Between the Transitional Government of Burundi and the Conseil national pour la défense de la démocratie-Forces pour la défense de la démocratie* art. 1(1) (Burundi, 2002); *Agreement on a Permanent Ceasefire in Juba, Sudan, between Uganda and the LRA* art. 7(1) (Uganda, 2008).

²²¹ *The Nuba Mountains Cease-Fire Agreement* art. II(6) (Sudan, 2002); *Agreement on a Permanent Ceasefire in Juba, Sudan, between Uganda and the LRA* art. 7(2) (Uganda, 2008).

²²² *The Nuba Mountains Cease-Fire Agreement* art. III(9) (Sudan, 2002).

²²³ *Chad and Libyan Arab Jamahiriya: Framework Agreement on the Peaceful Settlement of the Territorial Dispute* art. 7 (Chad and Libya, 1989).

the ceasefire.²²⁴ Most ceasefire agreements do not have expiration provisions. Expiration provisions in ceasefire agreements may function to set a specific time frame in which parties may evaluate the prospects of broader negotiation. Expiration provisions may also apply pressure on the parties to come to agreement on larger issues beyond the ceasefire.²²⁵ These provisions may thus be used when the ceasefire is intended as an initial phase in a larger peace process. Additionally, expiration provisions may be coupled with renewal provisions, which allow a ceasefire to be extended upon specified action by the parties.²²⁶ Renewal provisions may serve several purposes. In particular they allow for protracted peace negotiations under less hostile conditions, provide time for the implementation of obligations, and permit humanitarian aid to reach those in need within the conflict area.²²⁷

Expiration Based on a Specific Date

Some ceasefire agreements contain provisions that establish specific expiration dates. The date-based expiration of a ceasefire agreement may provide pressure on the parties to pursue more comprehensive peace negotiations before the deadline, and may also remove the risk that parties are permanently locked into the terms of the agreement.

Sample Language: Expiration on a Specific Date

#. The parties shall remain bound by the terms and commitments of this Agreement **[for a period of [X] months]/[until *designate date*]**.²²⁸

Expiration Based on Specific Date or the Occurrence of a Condition

Some ceasefire agreements include both an expiration date and a condition upon which the ceasefire expires. This condition is often the negotiation of a more comprehensive peace agreement. The parties may use such a provision to create pressure or flexibility depending on how it is drafted. By using “no later than” language, the agreement will pressure the parties to take some action before the

²²⁴ Luc Chounet-Cambas, *Negotiating Ceasefires: Dilemmas and Options for Mediators*, CENTER FOR HUMANITARIAN DIALOGUE, 19 (March 2011).

²²⁵ Luc Chounet-Cambas, *Negotiating Ceasefires: Dilemmas and Options for Mediators*, CENTER FOR HUMANITARIAN DIALOGUE, 19 (March 2011).

²²⁶ See *Nuba Mountains Cease-Fire Agreement* art. III(11) (Sudan, 2002).

²²⁷ *GOS, SPLA Renew Ceasefire in Nuba Mountains*, SUDAN TRIBUNE, Jan. 20, 2004, available at <http://www.sudantribune.com/GOS-SPLA-renew-ceasefire-in-Nuba,1535>.

²²⁸ *Bogota Accord* preamble (Nicaragua, 1984), available at www.incore.ulst.ac.uk/cds/agreements/pdf/nic2.pdf.

expiration date to avoid expiration. By using “whichever is later” language, the parties are encouraged to begin broader negotiations, but are not pressured to complete a new agreement by the specific date. Instead, “whichever is later” language creates a ceasefire that lasts for at least the duration of the designated timeframe, but may extend until the condition is fulfilled.

Sample Language Option 1: Expiration Condition “No later than”

#. This Agreement shall remain in effect until **[peace negotiations are concluded]/[designate condition]**, and no later than **[X] days after the entry into force of this Agreement/[designate date]**.²²⁹

Sample Language Option 2: Expiration Condition “Whichever is later”

#. In order to allow for the negotiation and the commencement of the implementation of a peace agreement, this ceasefire will last for **[X] days after the entry into force of this Agreement or until [completion of peace negotiations and the drafting of a peace agreement]/[designate condition]**, whichever is later.²³⁰

Renewal

Parties can postpone the expiration of a ceasefire by providing for a renewal mechanism in the ceasefire agreement. Renewal mechanisms allow the parties to maintain ceasefire conditions if ongoing peace negotiations are taking longer than expected or if ceasefire conditions are suitable to the parties. Common renewal mechanisms require a party to notify the ceasefire commission and gain the consent of the other parties before the agreement can be renewed.

Sample Language: Renewal

#. The Parties may agree to renew this Agreement for an additional **[X] [month]/[day] period**.

#. **[Not later than X] days** before the expiration of the Agreement, either Party may notify the **[Ceasefire Commission]/[Peacekeeping Force]** that it is prepared to agree to such a renewal. If both Parties agree, the Agreement shall be extended

²²⁹ Memorandum of Understanding on Cessation of Hostilities Between the Government of the Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army art. 7 (Sudan, 2002), available at www.iss.co.za/AF/profiles/Sudan/hostil1002.pdf.

²³⁰ Ceasefire Agreement for Bosnia and Herzegovina art. 3 (Bosnia and Herzegovina, 1995).

for an additional [X] [months]/[days]. Thereafter, the Agreement may be further extended for additional periods by means of the same procedure.²³¹

XIII. External Support

Provisions that call for international external support of the ceasefire agreement may add legitimacy and certainty to an agreement. Such provisions are tailored to the characteristics of the conflict and the type of involvement external organizations or institutions are willing to provide or are already providing.

Sample Language: External Support

#. The Parties will inform [**the United Nations**]/[*designate international third party*], no later than the date of notification of their acceptance of the ceasefire agreement, as to which country or countries will be invited to render assistance in [*designate activity*].

#. The Parties call on the [**United Nations**]/[**international community**]/[*designate third party*] to help provide adequate resources for the implementation and follow-up of the ceasefire agreement. [**The Parties also agree to convene for an international conference aimed at addressing reconstruction and development within [X] months**].²³²

XIV. Signatures

All parties to the ceasefire agreement may provide written signatures from party representatives. Signatories must have the authority to conclude such agreements on behalf of the party. Military commanders, who will play a major role in implementing the agreement, may also provide their signatures. All third parties serving as witnesses or assisting in the implementation of the agreement can include their signature to increase the political costs of violating the ceasefire. The date and location of the agreement signing can also be included.

²³¹ *Nuba Mountains Cease-Fire Agreement* art. III(11) (Sudan, 2002).

²³² *Agreement Between the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia (TFG) and the Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia (ARS)* art. 11 (Somalia, 2008).

Sample Language: Signatures

Done at [*designate location of signing*] on [*designate date, month and year*]

For [*designate party A*]
[*name of signatory A1*]
[*name of signatory A2*]

For [*designate party B*]
[*name of signatory B1*]
[*name of signatory B2*]


For [*designate party C*]
[*name of signatory C1*]
[*name of signatory C2*]

For [*designate third party*]
[*name of third party signatory 1*]
[*name of third party signatory 2*]²³³

²³³ *Agreement on the Definitive Ceasefire* art. 3 (Guatemala, 1996).

**ANNEX A:
MAP OF [CEASEFIRE LINE] [BUFFER ZONES] [ASSEMBLY AREAS]**

This map represents one possible way the parties may delineate important geographic ceasefire obligations on a map.



**ANNEX B:
ASSEMBLY AREAS**

This chart allows the parties to designate assembly areas where one or more parties are required to assemble their forces.

Locality	[Party A]	[Party B]	[Party C]
[town/locality]	X		
[town/locality]	X		
[town/locality]		X	
[town/locality]		X	
[town/locality]			X
[town/locality]			X

**ANNEX C:
TIMELINE OF MAJOR CEASEFIRE ACTIVITIES**

This chart represents a timeline of ceasefire activities provided for in the Ceasefire Template. Drafters must alter this timeline to fit the activities and obligations created by their agreement.

<u>Activity</u>	<u>Timing</u>
Entry into force of the Agreement	D-Day
Parties give necessary orders to their respective forces in compliance with this Agreement	D-Day +/- [X] days
[Designate party] freezes military positions	D-Day +/- [X] days
Creation of Peacekeeping Force	D-Day +/- [X] days
Creation of [Monitoring Group]/[Ceasefire Commission]	D-Day +/- [X] days
Parties report on number, location and composition of forces	D-Day +/- [X] days
Parties report on civilian and military prisoners	D-Day +/- [X] days
Peacekeeping Force deploys	D-Day +/- [X] days
[Monitoring Group]/[Ceasefire Commission] deploys	D-Day +/- [X] days
[Peacekeeping Force]/[Ceasefire Commission] demarcates Ceasefire Line [and [Buffer]/[Restricted]/[Coordination] Zones]	D-Day +/- [X] days
[Peacekeeping Force]/[Ceasefire Commission] establishes assembly areas	D-Day +/- [X] days
[Designate party] deploys to assembly areas	D-Day +/- [X] days
The Parties withdraw to defensive positions beyond Buffer Zone	D-Day +/- [X] days
[Designate party] withdraws from [designate region/state]	D-Day +/- [X] days
[Designate party] withdraws [designate weapon class] from Restricted Weapons Zone	D-Day +/- [X] days
[Designate party] shuts down air defense systems	D-Day +/- [X] days
The Parties release civilian and military prisoners detained as a consequence of the conflict	D-Day +/- [X] days
Comprehensive peace negotiations begin	D-Day +/- [X] days
Expiration of Ceasefire Agreement	D-Day +/- [X] days

About the Public International Law & Policy Group

The Public International Law & Policy Group is a non-profit organization that operates as a global *pro bono* law firm to provide free legal assistance to states and governments involved in peace negotiations, advise states on drafting post-conflict constitutions, and assist in prosecuting war criminals. To facilitate the utilization of this legal assistance, PILPG also provides policy formulation advice and training on matters related to conflict resolution.

PILPG's primary practice areas are:

- **Peace Negotiations**
- **Post-Conflict Constitution Drafting**
- **War Crimes Prosecution**
- **Policy Planning**
- **Democracy and Governance**
- **Water Diplomacy**

To provide *pro bono* legal advice and policy formulation expertise, PILPG draws on the volunteer services of more than sixty former legal advisors and former Foreign Service officers from the US Department of State and other foreign ministries. PILPG also draws on *pro bono* assistance from major international law firms including Baker & McKenzie; Cleary, Gottlieb, Steen & Hamilton; Covington & Burling; Davis, Polk & Wardwell; Debevoise & Plimpton; DLA Piper/New Perimeter; Jones Day Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy; Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe; Shearman & Sterling; Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom; Sullivan & Cromwell; White & Case; and WilmerHale. Annually, PILPG is able to provide over \$15 million worth of *pro bono* international legal services.

Frequently, PILPG sends members in country to facilitate the provision of legal assistance; its members often serve on the delegations of its clients during peace negotiations. PILPG is based in Washington, D.C., with additional offices in New York and Amsterdam. PILPG has also operated field offices in Georgia, Iraq, Kenya, Kosovo, Nepal, Somaliland, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Tanzania, and Uganda, and maintains contacts in nearly two dozen key cities around the globe.

PILPG was founded in London in 1995 and moved to Washington, D.C. in 1996, where it operated under the auspices of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace for two years. In July 1999, the United Nations granted official Non-Governmental Organization status to PILPG.

In January 2005, a half-dozen of PILPG's *pro bono* clients nominated PILPG for the Nobel Peace Prize for "significantly contributing to the promotion of peace throughout the globe by providing crucial *pro bono* legal assistance to states and non-state entities involved in peace negotiations and in bringing war criminals to justice."