GOD AND CREATION.

BY

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NO serious fear is felt that any competent critic will impute
to this work an intent to introduce innovation into the
established and truthful thought of mankind.

A belief that was held during a period of four thousand
years by many of the best minds that have ever existed on
earth cannot be justly accused of being an attempted innovation.

Neither is any apprehension felt that sound and unprejudiced
believers in Christianity, who will carefully read the work, will
attribute to it any departure from the very highest standard of
belief in the plenary inspiration of the Holy Scriptures.

To those whose consciences will permit them to condemn
what they have never read, or do not understand, no appeal is
made herein. They will not be the judges upon whose decision
the fate of this work will depend.

The teachings concerning the verities of being, and concern-
ing the deep questions relating to God and man—Creator and
creature—which are herein presented, are all founded on the
dual basis of revealed truth from God and common sense in
man. No system of belief can be honestly and savingly adopted
by man which has not both of these foundations.

What the teachings are which are herein upheld can, of
course, be ascertained only by a careful reading and study of
the work itself. It will suffice to say here, by way of preface
and anticipation, that the system of belief set forth herein is
not Zoroastrism, nor Manichæism, nor any form of belief in
Ormuzd and Ahriman—the good and evil principles—whether taken literally or metaphorically. Neither is it Platonism, nor Neo-Platonism, nor any revived form of Gnosticism or Paulicianism.

The system presented is claimed to be solidly founded on Revelation in her soundest exegesis, and on common sense or reason in her highest intuitions and development. It presents the only basis on which revealed truth and science can be at peace with each other, and on which the infinite attributes of God can be reconciled with the conceded facts of the universe.

Nothing herein will be found in conflict with the universally expressed consensus of the Christian Church. The dictum that God created all things out of nothing in the space of six days (meaning days of twenty-four hours each) is herein shown never to have made its appearance on the surface of any authoritative Christian Creed or Confession of Faith until more than fifteen hundred years after the birth of Christ. It is an isolated statement, one clause of which has been long since abandoned as unfounded in truth. The abandonment of the other clause is only a question of time. It is demonstrated herein that this isolated statement, so far from being essential to the maintenance of the grand Pauline system of religious belief, in fact, destroys the symmetry of that system, and, when pushed with logical accuracy to its own necessary results, inevitably tends to rend asunder and overturn that system. Therefore that isolated dictum is the word of error from fallible man, and not the word of truth from the Omniscient God.

The work now offered to the reading and reflecting people of Christendom is the product of the thoughts and studies of a number of years, but its actual composition has been only recently completed.

In its preparation, although, on its human side, the modest and reasonable postulate, "some being exists now," with which
it opens, is the foundation for all the subsequent structure, yet no attempt has been made to ignore, or to treat in a sceptical spirit, the great masses of facts and knowledge in philosophy, science and religion which the studious workers of the world have gradually accumulated. Free resort has been made to the depositaries of these facts and this knowledge, so far as they were accessible; especially to the rich treasures in encyclopedic learning which the present age has so copiously outpoured. But whenever the question presented—whether of fact, of morals, or of religion—has seemed to be still an open question, the best light attainable has been sought for its elucidation. This has led to the original evidences whenever they could be reached; and in seeking them, and afterwards presenting and weighing them for use, constant aid has been found in the principles of the enlightened science of human jurisprudence.

No attempt has been herein made to disturb the demonstrated and established philosophy recognized by the common sense of man in all ages, and simply formulated by Kant and Hamilton, that a science of Ontology in its full meaning is impossible to man; in other words, that, though we know that spirit is, and that matter is, we do not know, and probably never will know, what is the essence either of spirit or of matter. A knowledge of actual being is, and must ever be, the prerogative of God only. Man knows being only by its manifestations and phenomena. The recent attempts of a certain school of philosophy (of which President James McCosh, of Princeton, and Professor Henry Calderwood, of Edinburgh, may be considered the leading exponents,) to disturb this truth, and to maintain the notion that we know spirit and matter in their actual essence, and not merely in their manifestations and phenomena, do not commend themselves to sound thought. This notion has probably been strengthened by the mistaken idea that only by maintaining it can the agnosticism and the
theory of "the unknowable Infinite," taught by Herbert Spencer and his adherents, be overthrown. Error can never be finally overthrown by error; truth only can vanquish it. God can never be known in His mysterious and inscrutable essence. But, for the salvation and happiness of His creature, man, He is fully and perfectly known in His manifestations, His providences, His works, His word, His institutions, and especially in His Son, who is God manifest in the flesh.

That Christianity, though assuredly divine, is not, as presented in creeds and from pulpits, making on masses of thinking men and women the wide and deep impression she ought to make, is a truth admitted by none more readily than by her own accredited ministers of every name. How far the causes of this failure, and the remedies for it, are truthfully indicated in this work, the author will not be so presumptuous as to declare. But it is not presumption to express the hope that what is herein written may aid in promoting saving faith in the Son of God.

BRAEHEAD, NEAR FREDERICKSBURG, VA.,
March 10th, 1883.
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A few errors have unfortunately escaped correction in the following pages, but as none of them are important, or tend to mislead as to the meaning intended, no formal list of "errata," beyond the following, is deemed necessary: "Wharton" for "Warton," p. 41, note 1; "gourmond" for "gourmand," p. 52, line 8; "Giordano, Bruno Galileo" for "Giordano Bruno, Galileo," p. 56, line 10; "sixteen" for "six," p. 88, line 15; "distinctive" for "destructive," p. 162, line 10; "initials" for "italics," p. 167, note 1; "acquiesces" for "acquiesce," p. 207, line 4; "Rev." for "See," p. 262, note 1; "therefore" for "theretofore," p. 444, line 1; "requires" for "require," p. 409, line 30; "definite" for "definit." p. 504, line 5.
GOD AND CREATION.

CHAPTER I.

ETERNAL BEING NECESSARY.

Some being exists now. We do not say some thing, because man, who is soul as well as body, does not call himself a thing. He claims to be a person. But he knows that he exists. To deny his own existence would be an act of madness, of which no known examples are extant. Lunatics sometimes believe themselves to be emperors, or magicians, or deities; but even lunatics never deny their own existence. To doubt seriously of its own being is what mind cannot do. “If any one pretends to be so skeptical as to deny his own existence (for really to doubt of it is manifestly impossible), let him for me enjoy his beloved happiness of being nothing until hunger, or some other pain, convince him of the contrary.” “He that can doubt whether he be any thing or no, I speak not to, no more than I would argue with pure nothing, or endeavor to convince nonentity that it were something.”

If, therefore, anything can be known, the being who thinks knows that he exists. Descartes was right in his basis principle,

1 Locke; Essay on the Human Understanding, Book IV., Chapter 10, Section 2. The order of the two sentences is transposed merely to make the logical sequence clearer. John Locke was wrong in the foundation of his mental philosophy; but in his great essay he has given to the world a large amount of the soundest thinking.
"Cogito, ergo sum," ("I think, therefore, I am.") This is not a syllogism, but an axiom, or self-evident truth, as clear as the axioms of mathematics, that "things, equal to the same thing, are equal to one another," and "the whole is greater than its part."

For years after Descartes wrote, opponents of his system were in the habit of attacking it as founded on an inconsequent syllogism, without major or minor premise. But the common sense of mankind has vindicated him, and his monument at Tours, recently erected, bears his favorite axiom.¹

Man therefore knows that he exists. He knows also that an outer world exists, which is not himself. His senses give him an immediate knowledge of the existence of the earth on which he treads, the food that he eats, the water that he drinks, the air he breathes, the fire that warms him when cold, or scorches and consumes him if he come in contact with it. His eyes see the sun and moon and starry heavens, the forest, fields, rivers, hills, mountains; his ears hear the cataract and the thunder; his smell perceives the perfume of flowers and fruits, and recoils from the odors of decomposition; his taste appreciates the pleasant contact of savors from food "convenient for him," and rejects the unpalatable; his feeling informs him of a surrounding material world—sometimes soft and

¹ Descartes' body was removed in 1819 from the Court of the Louvre in Paris to St. Germain's Des Pres, between Montfaucon and Mabillon. Gustavus III. built a monument to his memory at Stockholm, and a statue, representing him, has been erected at Tours, with the inscription, "Je pense, donc je suis." Encyc. Brit., new edit., art. Descartes, VII., 120. The great Immanuel Kant was one of the questioners of the soundness in logic of Descartes' dictum, but none can question its intuitive truth. See Criticism of the Critical Philosophy, by President McCo, Princeton Review, November, 1878, p. 909 Henry Longueville Mansel, in his "Limits of Religious Thought," note xxv., Lec. III., Amer. Edit., 1870, p. 288, gives full explanation and authority sustaining Descartes' "Cogito ergo sum." Mansel's soundness may be questioned, but not his erudition.
soothing, often hard, wounding, and impenetrable. Common sense tells him that an outer world of matter exists as certainly as he exists himself.

Men, in their senses, have never doubted the existence of the external world; yet it is equally true that, for hundreds of years, during the prevalence of the sensualistic philosophy, the men who claimed, "par excellence," the name of philosophers, taught principles which, if logically carried out, denied to man any knowledge of external objects. This false philosophy taught that when a man looked at a tree within easy view, he did not see the tree itself, but only an image impressed on his own retina; thus the mind had no knowledge of the object itself, but knew only its image, conveying through the brain an idea to the mind, which it connected with the outer object, and called "a tree." And as the image was certainly not the object, and the mind had no means of knowing that it even resembled it, actual knowledge of the external world was impossible. David Hume, the sceptic, took this prevalent philosophy, which Hobbes, Locke, Helvetius, Hartley, Condillac, Collins, Berkeley, in short, all the men of his own and the immediately preceding age who claimed to be teachers, had advocated, and, following it out with inexorable logic, demonstrated from it that man had no reason to believe the existence of anything outside of his own mind.¹

But a false system of so called philosophers did not in the slightest degree shake the common sense belief of mankind. The millions of men who are sometimes called "the vulgar," and whose belief was, in the language of the learned, "the vulgar belief," went on obstinately believing in the existence of the outer world, and believing that when they saw a tree, they

saw the tree itself, and not its image, and that, seeing it, they knew it was a tree.¹

Bishop Berkeley and Arthur Collier, both clergymen, having in good faith adopted the system taught by their predecessors, carried it to its legitimate results, and arrived at the conclusion that there was really no external world—that the earth, trees, rivers, mountains, plains, nay, even cities, containing palaces and houses built by men, were not real substances, but only ideas in our minds, and that we had no evidence that any substance existed except mind.² To such absurdities may learned men come when they cease to be governed by common sense. Berkeley, indeed, went so far as to contend that all men were idealists; that mankind generally did not believe in an actual external world, but only in the ideas arising in their own minds, which he insisted had no real resemblance to the supposed objects that produced them. But Arthur Collier was more consistent. He was compelled by overwhelming facts to admit that mankind generally believed in the reality of the external objects which they saw, and heard, and felt, and tasted, and smelled. But he declared this to be a "vulgar error," and

¹ The unlearned man says: "I perceive the external object, and I perceive it to exist. Nothing can be more absurd than to doubt it." "The vulgar undoubtedly believe that it is the external object which we immediately perceive, and not a representative image of it only. It is for this reason that they look upon it as perfect lunacy to call in question the existence of external objects." Reid, quoted by Sir Wm. Hamilton, "Philosophy of Perception," p. 281. And Reid, admitting that all the philosophers, ancient and modern, up to that time were on the other side, says, that to his great humiliation he feels compelled to have himself "classed with the vulgar." Ibid., 282. Happily, Reid's philosophy of "immediate knowledge of external objects obtained in perception" has finally demolished the false system preceding it. Mankind at large, being governed by common sense, never had any doubt on the subject.

² Berkeley's Prin. of Human Knowledge, and Collier's Clavis Universalis. These works were entirely independent, and nearly cotemporary. Hamilton's Philos. of Perception, 288.
contemptuously rejected all appeal to the common assent and belief of mankind. A great metaphysician has well remarked that, however absolute an idealist Berkeley or Collier might be in his study, he became a realist as soon as he stepped out into the world. The first stone wall he encountered would convert him.

It may, therefore, be held as certain, that for thousands of years the millions of mankind have known two facts: first, that they exist themselves; second, that an external world exists also. If these are not facts, no facts exist in the universe; if we do not know these things, we have no knowledge of any thing; knowledge becomes impossible.

Therefore we know that mind exists, and we know that matter exists. Our knowledge of each is immediate and intuitive. We are conscious of the thinking principle within us, and each individual of the human family has the same consciousness as to himself; that is, as to the existence of his own mind. In like manner, we have immediate cognizance of something, not ourselves, which we call matter.

This knowledge of the existence of mind and matter, to which the common sense of all mankind has led them, has been very appropriately called "the system of natural dualism."

1 "The motto of his work, from Malebranche, is the watch-word of his philosophy. Vulgi assensus et approbatio circa materiam difficilem, est certum argumentum falsitatis istius opinionis cui assentitur." Hamilton's Philos. of Percep., 298.


3 It had been indicated and explained by Dr. Thomas Reid, but was finally established by Sir William Hamilton, in his treatise on "The Philosophy of Common Sense," in which he has poured out a flood of mingled reasoning and erudition, that has swept away for ever the follies of the past philosophy. See the treatise passim and p. 84. It is singular that the late Dr. Charles Hodge, of Princeton, eminent alike in talent, learning, and piety, while testifying to the "invaluable service to
It is so-called because it recognizes an immediate knowledge of two substances as existing.

Since, therefore, it is certain that some being exists now, it is equally certain that some being has existed from eternity. This follows, of necessity, from the relation of cause and effect, of antecedent and consequent. *Ex nihilo nihil fit,* (from nothing nothing comes.) This is an axiom, the truth of which is seen at once by every man. It has been acknowledged as self-evident in all ages, and by all men. If anything exists at this moment, then something existed the moment before this, and something the moment before that; and thus we are led, by the necessary law of thinking, to the conclusion that something has existed from eternity.

We are thus conducted, by infallible steps, up to Eternal Being.

What is that which has existed from eternity? This is the question of questions. It interests every man; nor can any man, however indifferent and apathetic he may be, however immersed in the affairs of brief human life, escape the sweep of this enquiry; for we are all deeply conscious of dependence, and of limitation. We live, and know that we shall die; but what we shall meet in eternity must depend on the eternal.

the cause of truth” rendered by Hamilton in this treatise, says it is “perhaps infelicitously” called the “Philosophy of Common Sense.” Hodge’s Systematic Theology, Vol. 1., pp. 360, 361. This title is peculiarly appropriate, and therefore “felicitous,” because it designates a work which literally searches the wisdom of all ages, and finds in them proofs of the intuitive powers properly employed by the “common sense” of mankind.

1 Lucretius, in opening his system of philosophy, thus sets forth this axiom: “Nullam rem e nullo gigni divinitus uquam.” But as this expression denies even that Divine power has generated something from nothing, he immediately afterwards reaffirms his meaning in general form: “Quas ob res ubi viderimus ut posse creari de nihilo, tum quod sequimur jam rectius ade perspicuus, et unde quem res quisque creari.” Lucretius, De Rerum Natura, Edit. Lipsiae, 1., 150. But this Roman
THREE SYSTEMS.

There are only three systems of belief which common sense, in its higher development, can recognize as possible or reasonable on this subject. Modifications and varied forms, under these three systems, may be proposed; but they will be found, on analysis, to fall under one or another of the three. These systems are:

1st, That the Being from Eternity is solely matter.
This is the belief known as Materialism.

2nd, That the Eternal Being is solely spirit, or mind.
This is the belief frequently, but not universally, taught in the prevailing systems of Christian theology. How far it is founded on either revealed or intuitive knowledge, is a question which will be freely discussed in this work.

3rd, That the Eternal Being consists in God, the Eternal Spirit, or Mind, immanent in and working upon eternal matter, and bringing out from it, in time, the best results that perfect wisdom, benevolence, and power can produce.
This is the belief sometimes designated as the dualism of the universe. It is, in this work, held to be well founded in reason and revelation—consistent with all that we know, either of spirit or matter, consonant to our highest views of the character and works of God, and explanatory, at least to an extent suited to our present ignorance and limitations, of the

poet did not originate the common sense truth, that "nothing comes from nothing." His predecessors in materialism, Democritus and Epicurus, had founded on it; and no man, whether philosopher or peasant, had ever believed that the universe of mind and matter came from nothing. Sir Wm. Hamilton quotes as above, from Lucretius, and also a passage from the Roman satirist Persius:

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    o o o o o o Gigni
De nihil nihilo, in nihilum nil posse reverti,
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and declares this physical axiom to be "recalled to harmony with revealed truth," by his doctrine of the conditioned. "Philosophy of the Conditioned," Amer. Edit., edited by Wight, p. 494.
darkest and most awful problems which have tortured the human mind since man has existed on the earth. It is the purpose of this work to illustrate and maintain it.

To do so, it will be necessary to consider and discuss each of the three systems above named in their natural order.
CHAPTER II.

ETERNAL BEING NOT MERELY MATTER.

MATERIALISM is a system never believed in by the great mass of mankind. The reason is obvious. The same common sense which has enabled man to know by intuitive and immediate knowledge, that two substances, mind and matter, exist in the universe, forbids him to believe that one of them, and that the lower, has originated the other, which is not only higher in its functions, but substantially different.

Let us suppose, for a time, the thoughts of any individual man, of the first ages, to have been turned upon the universe. Let him be without any special revelation of its origin. He is thrown simply upon his own native powers. He is standing in front of a great rock, which is shadowing him, "in a dry and thirsty land." He is conscious of a something within him which thinks; something that reasons, and desires, and wills. Whether he has learned to call it his mind or soul matters not. He cannot doubt its existence, and he has associated with hundreds of other men who have shown themselves equally cognizant of their own spiritual nature; but he feels a full assurance that the rock before him is a something different from this thinking essence within him. Does the rock think? He is certain it does not. It has never conversed with him; never uttered a word, or made a sign to him, by which he might know that a mind within it answered to his mind. Yet it is a something indubitably; for he sees it with his eyes, and when he comes near and lays his hand on it, it is
hard to his touch. He knows that he cannot pass through it; though, if he wills so to do, he may possibly climb over it. He knows, too, that it does not move out of his way, however much he may desire to advance. But he stoops and picks up a small fragment of the rock which has fallen; and this he is able, at his will, to move, and to cast to a distance from him. Thus he learns the properties of this substance—matter. He may not yet have in his language words to designate these properties, but he knows of their existence.¹

First, he knows they are not the properties of thinking, reasoning, desiring, willing. This rock, therefore, is not mind. Then he knows they are the properties of extension or figure, of impenetrability or solidity, and of inertia. None of these properties can he, by any experience or reason, attribute to his own mind. Therefore his conclusion is fixed and final, that mind is not matter, and that matter is not mind.

When this man of the primary ages, and of philosophic cast of thought, comes to contemplate the universe, and to reflect on its origin, he concludes without difficulty that some being has existed from eternity. He rejects, instantly and absolutely, the idea that something has come from nothing. It is impossible for him to believe that. And, if not equally impossible, it is equally irrational and absurd, to believe that the rock has produced the mind; that a substance, which has nothing but extension, impenetrability, and inertia, is capable of bringing out from its own being a substance which has thought, reason, affections, and will.

John Locke has, with clearness and strength, presented this

¹ Sir Wm. Hamilton makes a more complex classification of the sensible properties of matter than other psychologists, but he gives good reasons. He classes them as 1st, Primary or Objective; 2nd, Secundo Primary or Subjective-Objective; 3rd, Secondary or Subjective. "Philosophy of Perception," 352.
argument.¹ "I appeal to every man's own thoughts, whether he cannot as easily conceive matter to be produced by nothing, as thought to be produced by pure matter, when before there was no such thing, or an intelligent being existing? Divide matter into as minute parts as you will (which we are apt to imagine a sort of spiritualizing, or making a thinking thing of it); vary the figure and motion of it as much as you please: a globe, cube, cone, prism, cylinder, &c., whose diameters are about one-hundred-thousandth part of a gry; it will operate no otherwise upon other bodies of proportionable bulk, than those of an inch or foot diameter; and you may as rationally expect to produce sense, thought, and knowledge, by putting together in a certain figure and motion, gross particles of matter, as by those that are the very minutest that do any where exist. They knock, impel, and resist one another, just as the greater do, and that is all they can do. So that, if we will suppose nothing first, or eternal, matter can never begin to be; if we suppose bare matter without motion, eternal motion can never begin to be; if we suppose only matter and motion first, or eternal, thought can never begin to be."

This lucid reasoning of a great mind is nothing more nor less than the plain expression of a process through which millions of minds have gone in reflecting on this subject. Mankind at large cannot be brought to believe that mere particles of matter, however minute in size, symmetrical or otherwise in figure, ethereal in nature, and rapid in motion, can ever, merely by their own action, evolve anything approaching to, or even slightly, resembling the phenomena of thought. There is a wide and deep chasm here that has never been bridged.

Hence, it is a truth of history that no nation, no people,

¹ Locke's Essay on the Human Understanding, Book IV., Chap. 10th, Sec. 10, p. 411.
have ever adopted materialism as their ultimate, philosophical, or social system of belief.

The earliest records and inscriptions of Babylonia and Assyria give a distinct view of a spiritual essence, as, at least, one of the factors in the making up of the universe. These ancient nations occupied the region between the great rivers Euphrates and Tigris, from which, according to the best lights we now have, the human family has emerged, and has spread itself over the earth. That these peoples were of high antiquity is undeniable. We need not, indeed, believe all that Berosus would teach on that subject. He asserts that, before the deluge, ten kings held successive dominion over this region, whose united reigns covered a period of one hundred and twenty saroi, or four hundred and thirty-two thousand years! And that, after Siruthrus (who was identical with Noah), eight dynasties continued for about thirty-five thousand years!

This chronology is, of course, unreliable and false; but the antiquity of the Accad races, inhabiting Mesopotamia, is beyond serious question.

Assyria had little native literature, but Babylonia produced very early a race of scholars, who have composed and preserved a number of compositions; chiefly hymns, expressing

1 Berosus, known as Manetho in the Babylonian records, was priest of Bel, and flourished in the age of Alexander's conquests. He copied out and preserved much curious learning of his day, but all of his works have perished, except a few remains gathered by Eusebius, and which have been published in Gey's Ancient Fragments. The learned Frenchman, Haret, has thrown much light on the subject in his "Memoire sur la date des Ecrits qui portent les noms de Beros et de Manethon." Dr. Wm. B. Carpenter, in his excellent work on "Mental Physiology," has some comments, as ingenious as true, on the tendency to exaggeration in numbers displayed by eastern nations. Am. Edit., pp. 230, 231. As to Manetho, see Samuel B. Schaff's "Foundations of History," Fourth edit., N. Y., 1865, p. 132. He gives the era of the Egyptian priest and historian, as B. C. 150.
the best thoughts of her best minds on the great problems of
the universe. Two thousand years before the Christian era
this country had two universities, those of Erech and Bors-
sippa, which were renowned even down to the classic age of
Greece. The immense library at Sargon contained thousands
of the books of that age, written on tablets of clay, and care-
fully preserved and classified.¹

Hymns to Deity, or in His honor, have been the form in
which much of the very earliest thought of the world has ex-
pressed itself as to eternal being. These Babylonian hymns,
or such fragments of them as remain, have forms notable for
regularity, and indicative of the parallelism which afterwards
characterized Hebrew poetry. Learned observers have even
gone so far as to assert that “the parallelism of Hebrew and
Assyrian poetry seems to have been borrowed from the Acca-
dians.”²

Now, these ancient hymns of Babylonia distinctly recognize
the eternal Being as a person, a spiritual and intelligent Father
and Protector. Materialism acknowledges no such being.
These hymns address him thus: “May God, my creator, take
nine hands! Guide thou the breath of my mouth! As for
Thee, thy word in heaven is declared; the spirits of earth kiss
the ground before Thee!”

These ancient books also give the clearest evidence that the
existence of spirit or mind, as eternal Being, was the prevalent
belief of the people. It is true, they recognized evil spirits
as part of hostile nature, with whom they were to contend;
and consequently their books set forth, in strange distinctness,
magic formulae, and charms intended to counteract the efforts
of sorcery and demonical possession.³

³ Ibid., p. 191.
ETERNAL BEING NOT MERELY MATTER.

This recognition of spirit, though encumbered with much superstition flowing from their material life, proves clearly that these people of the hoary age of the world never adopted the idea of a purely material Being from eternity. Common sense worked out for them a different solution.

The Chinese are another very ancient people. Indeed, if their own chronological claims could be admitted, Babylon and Assyria would be mere babes in age when compared with them. Chinese writers claim that a period of two millions two hundred and sixty-seven thousand years elapsed between the “time when the powers of heaven and earth united to produce man in the possession of the soil of China, and the time of Confucius.”\(^1\) To fill out this fabulous period, they invented dynasties of immense duration and “endless genealogies,” which have no more basis in truth than the “tales of the genii.” Yet the claim itself to this great antiquity is one of the evidences that this people is very old. And such is the best modern opinion.

The literature of the Chinese is frightfully voluminous; so enormous and unwieldy, in fact, that until Confucius arose and labored, collected and wrote, the books of his country were a chaos. This truly great and good man is supposed to have lived between the years 550 and 478 B. C. He wrote much himself, but his most valuable literary labor was in collecting, revising, and republishing a number of poems far more ancient than his own times, which he has given to the world under the title of “Shi King.”\(^2\)

This collection contains hymns, of which the most recent have been ascertained to date from 585 B. C., and the oldest are supposed to be twelve hundred years earlier. Confucius him-

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\(^2\) Article, “Confucius.” Encyc. Britan., Vol. VI., 258, 263. Prof. Legge is the author of this learned article. He has given in rythmic
self was wont to say, that he who was not acquainted with the
"Shi," was not fit to be conversed with, and that the study of
it would produce a mind without a single depraved thought.

These writings make abundant references to the eternal
Being, and show forth "an exulting, awful recognition of Him
as the almighty personal Ruler who orders the course of na-
ture and providence." No materialism appears in their senti-
ments. A spiritual Being endued with mind and will is as-
sumed as the eternal.

The "Shi King" poems and writings give the earliest
thoughts of this ancient people on the being of the universe.
And such thoughts continued to govern them; for, though
Confucius himself used more general terms, and spoke of
"Heaven" as the governing power above us; yet, he never in-
timated a doubt as to the spiritual and intellectual origin from
which the souls of the world had sprung.

This elevated system of belief governed China, and still pre-
vails among the best millions of her people. But the tendency
to something lower, which man derives from his material na-
ture, was felt by the masses. Sixty-five years before Christ, 
Buddhism was introduced into China from the south, where it
had been the prevailing belief for several centuries. Its origin
and nature will presently be considered.

form, from the Chinese original, the estimate in which nearly every man,
woman and child of that nation hold their greatest teacher:

Confucius! Confucius! how great was Confucius!
Before him there was no Confucius;
Since him there has been no other;
Confucius, Confucius, how great was Confucius!

1 Idem, 263.

2 Having no revealed knowledge of God and His government, it was
not unwise in Confucius to seek to perfect a system of worldly wisdom
for China. How wonderfully he succeeded, has been shown in letters on
his life and character, lately published, from the pen of Rev. H. C. Du
Bose, American Missionary at Soochow, China.
India is among the most ancient settlements of the world. Her earliest belief was in Brahma, as the Divine cause and essence of the universe, Siva, the destroyer, and Vishnu, the preserver, who has undergone nine avatars, or incarnations, and awaits a tenth, which is yet to come.¹

The teachings of this faith are embodied in the Vedas, which are vast collections of hymns, and other poems and writings in the Sanscrit language. In this mass of early thought, the Puranas are held to be specially old and hoary in their origin, as they derive their title from Pura, ancient. These writings comprise the whole body of Brahminic theology, treating of the creation, destruction, and renovation of the worlds, visible and invisible.² The people to whom this religion and literature are traced are the Aryans,³ of the Caucasian race, and speaking the Sanscrit language, who came from the regions about the sources of the Oxus river, and settled in the valleys of the Ganges and Jumna, between the Himalaya, and the Vindhya mountains.⁴

Though the Puranas “overflow with a chaotic and gigantic mythology, and exhibit a medley of contending sects,” yet they attribute to the eternal Being a spiritual origin. The ancient faith of India may be thus expressed: “The world is in the power of the Devas (Gods), and the Devas are in the power of mantras and brahmanas (prayers), and these are in the power of the Brahmins.”⁵

In this confession of faith, the power of prayer is recognized as above all others. And this is always in its essence a spiritual or mental power; for it is dependent for its expres-

³ From Arya, excellent and housekeeper.
⁴ Same article, Vol. III., p. 616.
sion on "the word," which is language, and is not only the sign of thought, but cannot exist without thought.

And in declaring the origin of Brahma, the recognition of the spiritual element was perfectly distinct. "The imperceptible sleeping universe was rendered perceptible by the Lord, with the five elements, and with other principles, in purest splendor, so that Prakriti (or Nature) was developed by Him who is perceivable only by the mind, and who decreed the emanation of creatures and sent forth the water, placing in it the germ. Out of this came an egg, shining like gold; out of this egg was born God, in the form of Brahma." ¹

But as ages passed away, the active Hindu mind, working upon the enormous mythology developed in the Puranas, constructed idols, the most hideous known on earth, and exacted penances and sacrifices for sin which outraged human nature. The religion of Brahma needed reformation; and a reformer came.

About the year 480 B. C. was born the Prince Gautama, the eldest son of the Raja, or the chief of the great Aryan tribe which held the region already mentioned. His place of birth was about fifty miles south of the Himalaya mountains, and sixty miles north of the present city of Benares.²

He was, from his childhood, thoughtful and devoted to study. The horrors which the religion of Brahma had developed deeply affected his spirit; and he sought, by meditation, fasting, and prayer, to think out and formulate a system of belief and practice which should rescue the masses of his countrymen from the dark abyss of idolatry into which they had fallen. In due time, and while yet a young man, he announced himself as "the Buddha;" that is, the enlightened, the intellectual. He made no pretension to be divine, but

¹ Translation from the Puranas; art. Brahma, New Am. Cyc., III., 617.
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claimed the authority of one divinely instructed. And such was the influence of his teachings, that before his death all that part of India in which he had lived had accepted Buddhism in the place of Brahminism, and after his death his faith spread to neighboring nations, until a large part of the people of India, Siam, Ceylon and Burma, were professed believers in that form of his system known as "Southern Buddhism;" and millions in China, Nepal, Thibet, and Japan, had embraced "Northern Buddhism." 1 It is estimated now that four hundred and fifty millions of the human family profess this system. 2

As Buddhism was a reaction from the chaotic mythology of Brahminism, its author sought to steer his system clear of the rocks and torrents on which the ancient faith was tossed. Hence, it does not attempt to solve the problem of the ultimate origin of the Cosmos. But it takes as its own ultimate ground the existence of the material world, and of conscious beings living in it. 3 Therefore it does not deny the facts of spiritual action, and never attributes the origin of the universe to a material cause.

Its central thought is subjective asceticism, the restraint of the emotions and passions, the self-denying control of appetite, and thus the progress of the soul to happiness, or nothingness, which will at least end misery. And it is not to be denied that "Buddhism carried the elements of Indian civilization to many a savage tribe, broke up many a cruel custom, and became a blessing to the greater part of Asia." 4

To suppose that a system really so benignant had adopted the soul-deadening tenets of materialism, would be unjust to its princely founder and his followers. It has, indeed, been stated

2 Max Müller, "Chips from a German Workshop," p. 214.
that this religion "ignores the existence of God, and denies the existence of the soul!"¹ But such is not the view of competent students of its literature. Gautama himself did not avow a belief in God; for he sought to reform the faith of Brahma, in which grotesque and horrible gods were already too abundant. But his followers uniformly denied that he meant Atheism by his system. They fully acknowledged the existence and providence of Devas, or Gods.²

Buddhism, it is true, knows of no creation in the sense of creating something out of nothing. Its doctrine is: "The worlds are from the not-beginning, in a continual revolution of arising and of perishing." It taught a proper humility as to human wisdom: "It is not within the domain of the intellect to know whence all entities come, or whither they go. Four things are immeasurable, viz.: The science of Buddha (intelligence); the number of breathing beings; the number of worlds, and the way of the Devas, or Gods." It acknowledged "Gods of limited light, of illimited light, of pure light, and the place of naught, the place of no-thought, and of not-no-thought."³ Assuredly such a belief was far from denying the eternity of a thinking being.

It taught that "living beings are not products of nature," taking nature in the sense of the material universe. "Only

¹ Article, Buddhism, Encyc. Britan., New Edit., Vol. IV., p. 434. The author of this article is said to be T. W. Rhys Davids, Esq. It is learned and able, but, seemingly at least, imbued with the spirit of the school of modern materialists, represented by Huxley, Tyndall and Herbert Spencer. I do not class Darwin among them; because, however fully and ingeniously he may teach "evolution," he has not proclaimed himself an unbeliever in a Great Spiritual First Cause.


³ Ibid.
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because the entities have sinned, or become material, matter exists. The universe is the result of the morality of breathing beings; and destiny is the product of their merit and guilt." It sought for its followers the annihilation of all causes of pain and evil, by pointing out to them its "eight paths," which were right view, right sense, right speech, right action, right position, right energy, right memory, and right meditation. It taught a metempsychosis, but it was not a transfer from one body to another, but a metamorphosis of the soul, which it illustrated by one lamp lighted from another; "the lamps differ, but the second receives its light from the first; so is it also in regard to souls." And thus through the paths, the soul was to ascend either into perfect happiness or perfect freedom from pain and anxiety, "by passing out of the Sansara into the Nirvana." What is the real essence of the Nirvana has been a subject of fruitful discussion among the different philosophic schools of Buddhists. To Theists it means the highest enfranchisement of the soul from evil and death; to Atheists, the absorption of the individual soul in Ténω.1

Thus it appears that Buddhism recognizes the spiritual as the eternal, and never taught that the universe had a material origin.

Persia contains another very ancient people. Her great philosopher was Zoroaster; but whether he lived six thousand years before the age of Plato, or only five hundred years before the Trojan war (both of which antiquities are assigned to him by Greek writers), is a point of chronology for the determination of which very meagre material exists.2 The opinion best sus-

1 New Am. Cyclop., Vol. III., pp. 66, 67. Dr. John William Draper, in his thoughtful and suggestive "History of the Conflict between Religion and Science," considers, with evident favor, the doctrine of "emanation and absorption" in reference to the human soul, and treats Nirvana as the final state of union of the soul with the universal intellect. Sixth Edit., 1875, pp. 122, 140.

tained is that he lived in the sixth century B.C. But whatever was his era, it is certain that he represented the widest philosophy and the most popular belief of Persia, a belief which has come down from a time not many hundred years below the deluge to the present age, in which the Guebres and the Parsees still hold the identical faith which Zoroaster, a Bactrian by birth, formulated for the Persian people.  

It is also certain that this faith was not materialism. It was the reverse. It recognized the spiritual as the Eternal. It has been a common belief that Zoroaster held to the eternal existence of two spirits—Ormuzd, the good, Ahriman, the evil, spirit—and that the ceaseless conflict between these two caused the phenomena of nature and of human life. But this is an imperfect and unjust view of his philosophy as taught by himself, and as still existing. He believed in the eternal essence of one incomprehensible Being, or spirit, called Zeruane Ake-ren or the Eternal One. From this Being emanated primeval light, and from this was born Ormuzd, who was the good, and was recognized as “the one God, omnipotent, invisible, without form, the Creator, Ruler and Preserver of the universe, and the final Judge of all.” The undoubted existence of evil, physical

1 New Am. Cyclop., Art. above, and Guebres, Vol. VIII., p. 546. In his work entitied "The Magic of the Middle Ages," lately translated from the Swedish, and published in New York, Victor Rydberg seeks to maintain that the dualism taught by Zoroaster, with its Ormuzd and Ahriman, its good and evil principles, was adopted by the Jews during their Babylonish captivity, and brought back by them to Palestine and the shores of the Mediterranean, when Cyrus released them. Rydberg says: "The 'Adversary,' (Satan), who sometimes appears in the most recent portions of the Old Testament, written under Persian influence, and plays a continually widening role in the Rabbinical literature, is the Judaized Ahriman." N. Y. Edit., 1879, Henry Holt & Co., p. 35. But it is certain that Satan appears in the Book of Job, which, so far from being one of "the most recent portions of the Old Testament," is the oldest book of the inspired canon, and, according to the best light now attainable, is far older than the age of Zoroaster himself.
and moral, drove Zoroaster to the belief in another spiritual being, Ahriman, a younger brother of Ormuzd, who, being jealous of him, rebelled, and for his crime was shut up by the \textit{Eternal One} for three thousand years in utter darkness. On his release he created a number of bad spirits to oppose the good spirits created by Ormuzd, and when the latter made an egg containing good genii, Ahriman produced another egg full of evil demons, and broke the two eggs together, so good and evil became mixed in the new creation.\footnote{\textit{New Am. Cyclop., Art. Zoroaster, Vol. XVI., p. 655; Art. Guebres, 546; Art. Ormuzd, Vol. XII., 580; Art. Demon, Vol. VI., 367, 369. That the doctrine of an eternal evil principle is not materialism, appears from the fact that the sage and God-fearing Plutarch was a holder of that doctrine. Dr. Ralph Cudworth demonstrates this. \textquoteleft\textquoteleft Intellec. Syst. of the Universe," Edit. 1820, Vol. I., pp. 443, 455; especially on page 443. Plutarch applies to this evil principle the words, \textit{γαρ άποικος και κακοπνεον}, an irrational and evil-doing spirit or demon.}

With such a faith held from the earliest ages even to the present time, it will hardly be contended that the people of Persia have ever held a materialistic system.

As to Greece, and her descendant, scholar and imitator in religion, literature and philosophy, and her final conqueror in arms, ancient Rome, it will not be seriously argued by any well-informed student that they held the doctrine that the universe came from a source purely material. It is true that a vast majority of their most thoughtful men believed that matter is eternal—that it has existed and will exist for ever.\footnote{Such was Aristotle's belief, and he studied not only metaphysics, but natural philosophy, with far more attention than any other ancient thinker. Phys. VIII. 1, Prof. Butler's Lectures on the History of Ancient Philosophy, Vol. II., p. 185, &c., and Dean Mansel's "Limits of Religious Thought," p. 281; see also J. Anthony Froude's "Science and Theology, Ancient and Modern," Internat. Review, May. 1878, p. 298; and Dr. N. L. Rice's "Lecture on the Moral Effects of Christianity," University of Virginia Lect., pp. 584, 589. This learned divine expressly admits that the ancient philosophers held to "the eternity of matter and mind," (p.}
they also held with equal tenacity that mind is eternal, and that from this source alone come all the marvellous adjustments of the cosmos, as well as the gigantic intellectual works of gods and men.

The Stoics were far in advance of all the other classic schools of philosophy, both in their moral teachings and in their intellectual expanse.¹ They needed only the humanizing and softening influence of the Divine Teacher to make them worthy of a place among the benefactors of mankind.

They assuredly taught that the eternal Being, whether one God or many, was intellectual and spiritual in elemental essence, and that He not only formed the world and all it contained, but ruled over it, and over all the affairs of mankind, by providential interference and direction.²

589). Plato believed and taught this doctrine. Froude, it is true, in the article above cited, says: "Plato taught a pure theism," p. 298. And from the context it seems evident that by a pure theism, Mr. Froude meant that Plato taught that eternal Being is pure spirit only. But this is an error. Plato's exuberant imagination led him into metaphors and forms of speech which obscured his meaning by their very brilliancy; but several passages from the "Timaeus" and the "Sophist" distinctly indicate that he held the general belief of his day. M. Guizot, who was not less learned in Greek literature than Mr. Froude, and who had specially studied Plato's writings with a view to ascertain the sense in which he used the word "λόγος," says: "According to Plato, God and matter existed from all eternity." Note to Gibbon's Decline and Fall, Vol. II., p. 301; Harpers' Milman, Edit. 1850. The learned Milman quotes this note with approbation, p. 302.

¹ This is abundantly proved by the learned Dr. John Leland in his "Advantage and Necessity of the Christian Revelation."

² Cicero has left us a treatise, "De Natura Deorum," which, although it has suffered some losses, and perhaps was never finished as he designed, is a very interesting and valuable record of the real thoughts of Greek and Roman philosophers on the nature of the gods. It is in the form of a conversation or series of extended addresses between Velleius, an epicurean, Balbus, a stoic, and Aurelius Cotta, a disciple of the Greek academy. The stoic argues, with clearness and force, for the intelligent and providential nature of the eternal Being. In fact, he presents the teleological
And although the other schools of Greek philosophy were inferior to the Stoics in moral and social science, yet, with one exception, they all believed and taught that eternal being necessarily involved a spiritual entity. For mind was in the world, and was the controlling power of the universe. The one exception was the Epicurean school, of which we shall presently write.

It may, perhaps, be said that the students and philosophers of Greece and Rome were far in advance of the common people,—the millions constituting the "vulgus," and that we have no reason to believe that these advanced teachings, concerning the spiritual essence of the great First Cause, were adopted or shared by the lower minds who made up the larger part of the people. But the more thoroughly we enter into the spirit of mythologic belief, which was the faith of the multitude, the more apparent does it become that an original spiritual idea of Deity entered into and permeated the faiths of the millions. They believed in many Gods because this spiritual power was manifested in many ways, useful, beneficial and agreeable, or else hurtful and terrible to them, and therefore adapted to inspire gratitude and love, or reverence and fear. Hence, they worshipped not only the memory of the heroes among men, who had lived and wrought so nobly that they became gods and demigods, but natural objects—the sun, the moon, the stars, the

view with a fulness little inferior to that of modern and Christian theologians. It is worthy of note that, though in deference to the common faith of his country he uses the plural in speaking of the Divine manifestations, yet he denounces, in terms of mingled severity and contempt, the vulgar belief in the lusts, weaknesses, maladies, iracondules and wars of the gods, and declares a pure theism in these words: "Sei tamen, his fabulis spretis ac repudiatis, Deus pertinens per naturam cujusque rei, per terras Ceres, per maria Neptunus. alii per alia poterant intelligi, qui qualesque sint, quo que eos nomine consuetudo nuncupaverit, hos deos et venerari et tolerare debemus."—Cicero, De Natura Deorum, Edit. Lipsiae, 1877, p. 63.
earth itself,—all of which were believed to be endowed with a subtle life and intelligence, coming from the Eternal Spirit. Even the learned among the Stoics taught that the world was God.¹

And thus the teeming minds of the people of antiquity framed their myths into a mythology—a science of the mythical. To suppose that man, with his native spiritual endowments, is really capable of worshipping a stock or a stone is irrational. He cannot adore the merely material; he must see in it, by the light of his soul or the teachings of his fathers, a Spirit—a power beyond the material, and claiming his reverence and love or fear, by intelligence, mind, will; otherwise he finds no Deity. Without this spiritual possession the loftiest palace is but dead marble; with it, the smallest plant or flower may be a god.

The lore of ancient Egypt abounded in this spiritual faith. Without this key we can never unlock the mysteries of her mythology. That a people descended from the bright-minded Aryan race, and admirable in their architecture, their monumental literature, and their mental insight, should yet worship the ox, the ape, the crocodile—"four-footed beasts and creeping things"—even the leeks and onions in their gardens, seems an inconsistency beyond belief, until we view them as looking beyond the mere physical or animal object, and adoring the invisible Spirit who possessed them and infused into them His own divine energy. They believed that this Spirit was eternal, believed in the continued existence of the human spirit after death, inculcated a faith in future rewards and punishments,

¹ Balbus quotes the words of Zeno: "Quod ratione utitur, id melius est quam id, quod ratione non utitur. Nihil autem mundo melius; ratione igitur mundus utitur." He adds: "Similiter effici potest sapientem esse mundum, similiter beatum, similiter eternum. Omnia enim hae meliora sunt quam ea, quae sunt his carentia, nec mundo quidquam melius; ex quo efficitur, esse Mundum Deum."—Cicero, De Natura Deorum, Lib. Edit. p. 48.
and believed that the good dwelt with the gods in bliss, while the wicked were consigned to fiery torments amid perpetual darkness.¹

The real meanings of their mythologic gods prove their faith in the Eternal as spirit as well as matter. Equal to Osiris and Isis was the god Thoth, who represented pure reason or intellect. Maut represented the material principle; Phrah, the chemical power of the sun; Seb, the earth, the father of the gods; Nepte, the sky, wife of Seb; Moni, the sunlight; Atmon, the darkness. And it was only because certain animals were supposed to be specially endowed by the spirit of a divinity, whereby they were made useful or formidable, that they became objects of worship.²

The Greeks drew much of their learning from Egypt, and improved on it by the exercise of their own versatile and etherial genius. And Rome readily recognized and adopted the divinities of all nations—even the Jehovah of the Jews, so long as she did not comprehend His exclusive claims. But throughout all the beautiful mythology of the ancient classic period, we discern the same fact that we have noted in Egypt—the worshippers never adored matter, whether living or dead. They attributed to every object which became exceptionally useful or delightful or terrible to them a living spirit, derived from the Eternal One. "Rivers, fountains, grottos, forests, mountains, rain, storm, the ocean, fire, thunder, clouds, and the heavenly bodies, were all clothed with living attributes, and every description of nature was a myth. Every natural change was a sign of the hostile or peaceful, happy or ill-omened coincidence of certain divinities."³

³ New Am. Cyclop., Article Mythology, Vol. XII., p. 78, 79. This
And thus a spirit, the very reverse of the material, dwelt in their religion. The Muses and Graces inspired poetry and beauty; the Dryads and Hamadryads dwelt in the forests, and lived in the very life of the trees; Eolus bound the winds in caves, or sent them forth on their mission; Pan and the Fauna ruled the fields; the Nymphs invisibly presided in mounts and fountains; Eos opened the gates of the skies to Apollo; Iris, the messenger of Jove, made the rainbow her highway. Reason, thought, intelligence pervaded all.

The same principle has informed the primitive and continued beliefs of all nations in all ages, whether instructed by the Hebrew and Christian revelations, or left to the guidance of intuition, tradition and experience.

The *Shamanism*, which constituted the earliest religious belief of the Accad races in Babylonia and Assyria, is in substance the same belief held by the Siberian and Samoyed tribes at the present day. "Each object had its spirit, good or bad, and the power of controlling these spirits was in the hands of the priests. The world swarmed with these spirits, especially with the demons, and there was scarcely an action which did not risk demoniacal possession. Diseases were regarded as caused in the same way."

The Northmen believed, and the most ignorant Laps still believe, in a Spirit who has existed from eternity. The Aztecs of Mexico, and native Peruvians of South America, all held

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the same faith. The Indians of North America all believe in "the Great Spirit," "the Father of Spirits," who will finally admit all who are worthy to the happy hunting grounds. The poet has but uttered a truth of reason and nature in the words:

"The soul, uneasy and confined from home,
Rests and expatiates on a life to come.
Lo! the poor Indian, whose untutor’d mind
Sees God in clouds, or hears Him in the wind,
His soul proud science never taught to stray
Far as the solar walk or milky way:
Yet simple nature to his hope has given
Behind the cloud-topped hill an humbler heaven." 1

As to the Semitic and Christian nations, it need hardly be said that their belief in an Eternal Spirit has always been fixed. Even Renan, the ingenious but deluding rationalist, expressly admits that the Semitic races have never had a mythology. From the beginning they have not varied from the conception of the government of the universe as an absolute monarchy, and have seen in the development of things only the inflexible accomplishment of the will of a Supreme Being. 2 And the Christian faith has ever been that God is a Spirit, and that God created the heavens and the earth.

Thus all history, all the facts of the past and present which

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1 Pope's Essay on Man, Epis. I, lines 97-105. Dr. Tylor calls this passage "Pope's now hackneyed lines," but admits that they express a real motive, and that the poor Indians expect the spirits of their dogs to guide the spirits of their children.—Prim. Cult. I. 472. See New Am. Cyclop., Art. Mythology, VII., p. 81. The testimony of Alexander Von Humboldt is explicit on this point: "We find, even among the most savage nations (as my own travels enable me to attest), a certain vague, terror-stricken sense of the all-powerful unity of natural forces, and of the existence of an invisible spiritual essence manifested in these forces, whether in unfolding the flowers and maturing the fruit of the nutrient tree, in upheaving the soil of the forest, or in rending the clouds with the might of the storm." Cosmos, Introd. Amer. Edit., 1850, Vol. I., pp. 36, 37.

can be held to be established by adequate evidence, lead to the conclusion that mankind in general have never believed in a system of materialism. Common sense has rejected it.

It is true that in our age an elaborate effort has been made to break the force of the universal concurrence of the human family in the belief that there is a something called Spirit, which differs radically from the material body, or the material earth, mountains, hills, plains and rivers among which mankind have lived. A learned and ingenious English scholar, Dr. Edward B. Tylor, has given to the world two thoughtful and labored works, one entitled "Researches into the Early History of Mankind," the other, "Primitive Culture."

In the latter of these works especially, he has sought to establish two theories, which are closely related to each other, and neither of which can pass for established truth without the most emphatic challenge from the common sense of man, enlightened by all pertinent facts thus far ascertained. We propose briefly to state and comment on these theories.

1. He seeks to establish the belief that civilized man, everywhere in our world, has been developed by stages of progress from savagery, which he maintains to have been the primitive condition of all mankind.

2. He seeks to prove that the universal belief among all nations in the existence of what is called spirit, mind or soul, has been developed from the rude faiths of savage peoples or tribes in the lower stages of progress, and that these faiths do not really attribute an immaterial essence to spirit, but a shadowy, phantom-like entity of matter. Hence the conclusion is suggested, that although savage nations are all deeply imbued with a belief in "animism," yet when tested by their own notions on the subject, this belief resolves itself into "materialism."

These carefully prepared volumes on "Primitive Culture"
have been admired for their research and erudition, and have
given added impetus to the materialistic tendencies of our age.¹

Yet, when all the statements in these volumes which can be
held as representative of actual facts, and all the studied reflections
applied to them, have been carefully pondered, they will
be found confirmatory of the belief that men everywhere, in
all ages and in all conditions of progress, have recognized in
the universe two essentially differing entities—matter and spirit.

1. The theory of the progress of the human race from a
state of universal savagery to their present advanced civiliza-
tion, is repudiated by the soundest thinkers and students who
have considered the subject.

The great German historian, Niebuhr, who has dug as deeply
into the regions penetrated by the roots of human history as
any earnest worker ever did, distinctly denies the truth of any
such theory. He holds “that all savages are the degenerate
remnants of more civilized races, which had been overpowered
by enemies and driven to take refuge in the woods, there to
wander, seeking a precarious existence, till they had forgotten
most of the arts of settled life, and sunk into a wild state.”
He holds also, “that no single example can be brought forward
of an actually savage people having independently become
civilized.”² To these views agree perfectly the conclusions of
Archbishop Whately, who, in his able lecture on the “Origin
of Civilization,” has stated as a stubborn fact that “no authen-
ticated instance can be produced of savages that ever did
emerge, unaided, from that state.”

The learned author of “Primitive Culture,” after quoting these

¹ Professor Alexander Bain, of Aberdeen, finds them specially accept-
able, and adopts many of their teachings. “Mind and Body,” pp. 140–144;
II., pp. 55–57. It concludes with a paragraph of strongly implied censure

² Niebuhr, Romische Geschichte, Part I., p. 88, cited by Dr. Tylor him-
words, does not deny their truth, but seeks to neutralize their effect by asking the "counter-question whether we find one recorded instance of a civilized people falling independently into a savage state?" He intimates that no such case can be found. Had he been more familiar with the facts in American social life, he would have known that in several instances very large numbers of negroes, formerly held as slaves, have been emancipated by the philanthropy (whether true or false, it would be impertinent to enquire) of their owners, and have been provided with lands, agricultural implements, and needed supplies for launching a colony, and in every such case, where the environing conditions of prejudice or aversion were such as to leave the colony substantially to its own unaided efforts, the result has been that, in less than a century, these negroes, from a state of comparative civilization and intelligence, have degenerated to a state exhibiting every material trait of savage life. And it is a well known fact that, since the general emancipation of the four millions of negro slaves in the cotton-growing States of America, which was occasioned by the late war, many in thickly populated negro districts, when left for a few years to their own devices, have relapsed, from habits at least nominally civilized and Christian, into the idolatry and fetishism practised by the savage native African tribes. Similar facts can doubtless be ascertained by proper research, all tending powerfully to overturn the theory of progress, and to establish that of degeneracy in reference to civilized and savage peoples.

And all geologic exhumations and researches have resulted in bringing to light in the regions of the earth which were first peopled by Adam's race, viz.: Assyria, Babylon, and Egypt, distinct evidences of high primitive civilization, such as remnants of beautiful architecture and imposing statuary, elaborate relics in iron and bronze, tempered swords, fine helmets, shields,

1 "Primitive Culture," Vol. I., pp. 41, 42.
and breastplates; while in distant parts of the earth, similar ex- 
humations have brought to light only stone implements, arrow-
points, spear-heads, and other evidences of savage life.\(^1\) The 
tendency of such facts cannot be mistaken, and is confirmed by 
the admissions of Doctor Tylor himself, who tells us that "the 
Algonquin Indians look back to old days as to a golden age, 
when life was better than now, when they had better laws and 
leaders, and manners less rude." And the rude Kamchadal de-
clares that the world is growing worse and worse, that men are 
becoming fewer and viler, and food scarcer.\(^2\) These are the 
dim and traditionary memories of the better civilization from 
which they have degenerated.

As to the second theory, the student who desires to pass, 
with calm and discerning spirit, through the immense array of 
evidences, more or less questionable, presented by Doctor Tylor, 
under the heads of "Mythology" and "Animism," must take 
with him a key to unlock myths and beliefs which, without it, 
would mislead him. That key is furnished by the learned 
writer himself, though it may well be doubted how far such was 
his intention.

In reviewing the mythologies of rude peoples, he furnishes 
abundant evidence of the fact so much insisted on in the pre-
ceding part of this work, viz.: that neither cultured nor savage 
idolaters ever worship the material object itself, but invariably 
personify it by attributing to it spirit, mind, soul, life; in short, 
a personal spiritual immunence capable of exercising thought, 
will, and affections. Now, the very recognition of material 
objects as persons—not things, but persons—exercising thought 
and will, is proof positive that the distinction between matter 
and mind is known to the savage—that he is not a materialist.

\(^1\) "Epoch of the Mammoth," by Southall, pp. 316, 317; George Raw-

Thus the learned author says: "First and foremost among the causes which transfigure into myths the facts of daily experience is the belief in the animation of all nature, rising at its highest pitch to personification. This—no occasional or hypothetical action of the mind—is inextricably bound in with that primitive mental state where man recognizes in every detail of his world the operation of personal life and will." Hence he proves, by almost numberless evidences, that among the lower tribes of man, sun, moon, stars, trees, rivers, winds, clouds, become personal, animate creatures, and that these notions rest upon a broad philosophy of nature, early and crude indeed, but thoughtful, consistent and quite really and seriously meant.

Furthermore, this diligent writer has presented in these volumes cumulative proofs of the fact that man is "a religious animal;" and he distinctly admits that the true significance of this fact consists in the belief in spiritual being everywhere found among men. He criticizes with grave severity the attempts of some writers who have asserted the entire absence of "religious phenomena among some savage people." He says of such assertion: "The case is in some degree similar to that of the tribes asserted to exist without language, or without the use of fire; nothing in the nature of things seems to forbid the possibility of such existence, but, as a matter of fact, the tribes are not found." According to the testimony arrayed by him, the lowest of all the peoples of the earth have been found with religious beliefs, viz.: ideas of spiritual being above them. By the concurring testimony of a crowd of observers, it is known that the natives of Australia were, at their discovery, and have since remained, a race with minds saturated with the most vivid

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belief in souls, demons and deities. All the tribes of the old world and of America, even down to the Digger Indians, have been found with such ideas; so that Doctor Tylor sums up with the simple claim that "a minimum definition of religion is the belief in spiritual beings,"¹ and that all tribes, however savage, have this. And every language that has ever existed, or now exists on earth, has words to express the idea of spirit.

Now, these facts furnish the key of which we have spoken. They prove that man, even in his lowest estate, and when furthest removed from the lights of civilization, has yet that substratum of common sense left which enables him to recognize the radical difference between matter and spirit—between body and mind. He knows the difference between his own body and the spirit that animates it. When the body of a companion savage is dead, he perceives that it is lifeless and motionless and inert, but he believes that the spirit is not dead, but gone. And when he looks at a tree, or even a rocky mountain, he perceives with his senses its matter, but with his spirit he personifies it, attributes to it an animating, personal spirit, who has intelligence and will. The savage does not practise abstract reasoning about his own spirit or the spirits of material objects—the sun, moon and stars, the rainbow, cloud, thunderstorm—or the Great Spirit who animates all. He does not know or seek to find out what are the peculiar properties of matter, and what the peculiar properties of spirit; all such thoughts belong to a higher stage of civilization. But the savage knows that matter is not spirit; that his body is not his soul; that the senseless stone on which he sits to rest when tired cannot of itself think, or feel, or will. Therefore, if he prizes it specially because it is useful to him, he personifies it; he attributes to it a spirit, having intelligence, affection and will, like his own soul.

DOCTOR TYLOR'S EVIDENCES.

Proofs of this are found in hundreds of the beliefs, traditions and savage usages so industriously collected and so adroitly presented by Doctor Tylor. His own words, introducing his doctrines of "Animism," are: "Spiritual beings are held to affect or control the events of the material world, and man's life here and hereafter; and, it being considered that they hold intercourse with men, and receive pleasure or displeasure from human actions, the belief in their existence leads naturally, and it might almost be said inevitably, to active reverence and propitiation."\(^1\)

Hence we have his account of numerous evidences of a faith in spiritual transmissions among savages. The Nutka Indians accounted for the existence of a distant tribe, speaking the same language as themselves, by declaring them to be the spirits of their dead. "It is mostly ancestral or kindred souls that are thought to enter into children, and this kind of transmigration is, therefore, from the savage point of view, a highly philosophical theory, accounting, as it does so well, for the general resemblance between parents and children, and even for the more special phenomena of atavism."

The Ahts, of Vancouver's Island, say that in old times men existed in the forms of birds, beasts, and fishes, or these had the spirits of the Indians in their bodies. In another savage district of northwest America, we find Indians believing that the spirits of their dead enter into bears; and travellers learned of an Indian, who begged the life of an old wrinkle-faced grizzly she-bear, because he thought she was the receptacle of his grandmother's spirit.

But however extravagant the superstitions thus entertained may be, they all find their solution in the fixed belief of the savage, that the spirit is not the body, but a something which

\(^1\) "Primitive Culture," Vol. I., pp. 427, 428.
animates and informs the body, and makes both together a person.¹ This belief is the very reverse of materialism.

It is very true, and willingly admitted, that when savages have been, by questions and persuasion, induced to give some account of their religious ideas, and to describe, as well as they could, the souls or spirits which they attribute to themselves and to their dead, and to all material objects that can, in their opinions, do them good or harm, they invariably attribute to them material shapes and natures, though they also attribute to them personal traits, which belong only to spirits, such as reason, knowledge and will. The explanation of this fact is obvious, and it is somewhat surprising that an observer so acute and philosophic as the learned author of "Primitive Culture," in dwelling so largely on the fact, should not also have admitted and given some reasonable space to this explanation.

He does indeed once make the important admission that "even with much time and care and knowledge of language, it is not always easy to elicit from savages the details of their theology. They try to hide from the prying and contemptuous foreigner their worship of gods who seem to shrink, like their worshippers, before the white man and his mightier Deity."² And he follows these remarks by a number of experiences of missionaries and travellers, illustrating their truth.

The reason why savage tribes have often shown themselves unwilling to expound their own religious ideas, and describe what they mean by either the Great Spirit who rules in all, or the lesser spirits who animate particular bodies or material objects, is because they find themselves unable to do so. They are unable to express in language even their own intuitions and emotions on the subject of spirit. Deep in their innermost souls they know and feel that spirit is not matter, that mind is

¹ "Primitive Culture," Vol. II., pp. 8, 6, 7, 9, 25, 66, 86, &c.
not body; but when they come to the task of expressing in words what they know and feel, they find that their language has no such words beyond the simple words—spirit, soul, ghost—which the ineradicable thought of all men has quickly introduced into all languages.

Savage languages deal not in words adequate to convey ideas of the distinguishing properties of matter, such as extension, impenetrability, inertia; or of the distinguishing properties of spirit, such as reason, memory, will, affection. The words of savage languages are seldom written, generally only vocal sounds, and originally signs adopted impromptu, under the pressure of material wants, and taken from material objects. How inadequate so rude a vehicle is for conveying thought at all, except in its initial forms, and how incompetent for expressing abstract properties and qualities, needs no demonstration. Hence, when the savage, bewildered, hesitating, and often reluctant, is at last induced, by questions, to attempt to convey his ideas of spirit or soul, it is unavoidable that he shall describe it in the only forms his language furnishes, that is, in forms expressing ethereal shapes, vapors, clouds, phantoms, winds—anything that is most removed, in his experience, from the grosser bodies around him. But in addition to this material shape, he also invariably gives to spirit or soul, no matter what may be its receptacle, the idea of personality, that is, intelligence, memory, affection and will. Now, these are properties which even Professor Bain emphatically denies to matter. Therefore, upon the repeated admissions of Doctor Tylor, it appears that savages themselves have in their own souls the true properties of the spiritual and the immaterial, however the rude poverty of their languages may confine them to descriptions savoring of the palpable and the material.

The key thus furnished not only opens all the mystery of savage "animism," but answers another purpose; it will throw
open to our use a casket containing a healthful elixir, which
will eliminate from the volumes on "Primitive Culture" the
subtle poison, materialism, and leave only the vast and valuable
depository of facts which the zeal and industry of the dis-
tinguished author has collected.

He has thrown much light on dawning culture in many tribes
of savages, but he has wholly failed to prove that mankind be-
lieve in materialism.

Two questions then naturally arise: Has such a system ever
been held? and if it has, by what course of reasoning have its
advocates sought to maintain it? We must consider these
questions.

The first must be answered in the affirmative. Materialism
as a system has been held and taught as truth in several eras
of the world's history; but its advocates, though learned and
acute in mind, have never been numerous. They have never
represented the thinking of mankind; nor have they ever been
able to influence that thinking to a wide extent. Intuitive con-
viction has been against them. Common sense is their cease-
less opponent. Yet, in both ancient and modern times, they
have claimed the protection of science, and have so dexterously
and ingeniously presented their belief as to challenge attention.

Some modern materialists claim that the Jewish sect known
as the Sadducees had adopted their faith; and that as this sect
arose in the full light of the Hebrew revelation, it furnishes
proof that the Holy Scriptures were not intended to teach
science, and are not opposed to any system which science can
erect.

But in fact the Sadducees were not materialists. They did
not, it is true, believe in angel or spirit, or the resurrection of
the dead. But the spirit which they rejected was only the
separate and individual spirit of man or angel. They believed
in the Great Spirit of the universe, who is from eternity; for
they upheld and believed the whole inspired Word—all the written Hebrew Scriptures. They rejected only the traditions of the Pharisees and doctors, and in this rejection Christ concurred with them.¹

In fact, the Sadducees, who never appear in history until the era of the Maccabean Jonathan, about 144 B.C., and who disappear, in like manner, a few years after the extinction of the Jewish state in Palestine, originated in a mere mistake of their founder. Sadok being taught by his master, Antigonus Socchaenus, that man ought to serve God disinterestedly, and not for fear of punishment or hope of reward, immediately instructed his brother-disciples that their rabbi taught that there was no heaven, no hell, no hereafter for man, and, consequently, no spirit, no resurrection. Thus the sect arose. Though they embraced some men of wealth, learning and influence, they were never numerous and never popular.² Certainly materialism can derive little support from their origin, doctrines, feebleness, history or final end.

The Greek materialism, founded by Democritus of Abdera, was undoubtedly a reaction against the superstition of their mythology; just as we have noted that Buddhism was a reaction

¹ Matt. xv. 1–9; Kitto’s note on Matt. xvi. 1, in Eng. Pictorial Bible, III., 40.

² Kitto’s note, above cited; Dr. Albert Barnes’ Notes on the Gospels, I., 51; especially note on Matt. iv. 7. Gossmann De Philosophia Sadducearum, from which the article Sadducees, New Am. Cyclop., XIV., 254, appears to be drawn. In this article a different origin from Sadok, or Tzadok, is suggested for the name Sadducee, but with small ground to support it. See translation into English of the Mishna, with the Commentaries of Maimonides, by the learned Professor Alexander Meyrowitz, of the University of Missouri, Southern Presbyterian Review, January, 1879, pp. 148, 149. In this the misunderstanding of the teachings of the Rabbi Antigonus of Socho, by Zadok and Boethos, is set forth: “They supposed the rabbi taught there is nothing to be expected in the future life,” p. 149.
from Brahminism. The philosopher of Abdera is believed, on the best evidence now attainable, to have been born 460 B.C., and to have reached the age of ninety-nine at the time of his death. Thrace, his native province, was the region of Greece in the north which swept around a part of the Black Sea. Its people were proverbial for stupidity, but Democritus, at least, was an exception. His father was immensely rich, and was rather Asiatic than Greek in his sympathies, in proof of which we have a tradition that he entertained Xerxes and the remnant of his army after the battle of Salamis.\(^1\) Democritus was an insatiable student; his wealth enabled him to travel extensively, and he visited not only all parts of Greece, but Asia, Egypt, and the Nile, in pursuit of knowledge.\(^2\)

When he lived, Athens had recognized the existence of some thirty thousand gods, and the number was increasing. Egypt had not so many, but those she had, put on her people a yoke of superstition more intolerable than the myths of Greece. Perverted religious sentiment has never failed to bring dreadful suffering to mankind. Human victims offered up in bloody sacrifice were, perhaps, not the greatest or most afflicting torments of idolatry. The ceaseless slavery of the soul to undefined fears, and the dread of the vengeance of the gods in this world and that to come, were evils not the less real because born of the spiritual nature of man.

The sacrifice of the lovely and innocent Iphigenia, daughter of Agamemnon, whose blood was shed upon the altar at Aulis,

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\(^1\) We are indebted to Valerius Maximus for preserving this tradition, Lib. VIII., Cap. VII., Exem. 4, cited by Pierre Bayle, Dict. Crit. et Hist., Tome II., p. 979, article Democritus. The original words are: "Divitiae tantae fuerunt, ut pater ejus Xerxis exercuiti epulum dare ex facili potuerit."

DEMOCRITUS.

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to propitiate the gods and obtain favorable winds for the Greek fleet, that was about to sail with their army to the siege of Troy, was a pathetic belief, which, whether fabulous or not, was thoroughly received by the people. Minds, philosophic and independent in their essence and culture, were ready to react against a faith that led to such deeds, and to denounce the religion which thus oppressed mankind like a demon stooping from the clouds.¹

Democritus was one of these minds. He was independent by fortune, habit, travel, culture, and native endowment. His temperament was so healthful and cheerful that he could not admit the solemn and gloomy into the circle of his associations.

¹ The admired passages from Lucretius, the disciple of Epicurus and Democritus, may well be repeated in confirmation:

"Quod, contra, saepius illa
Religio peperit scelerosa atque impia facta.
Aulide, quo pacto Triviai virginiis aram
Iphianassai turparunt sanguine faede
Ductores Danaum delecti prima virorum."—Lib. I., 83–86.

One of Racine's noblest and most affecting tragedies is founded on the incident, and is not the less pathetic because the poet found a substitute for Iphigenia. James Anthony Froude declares the whole description from Lucretius to contain "the most beautiful lines in Latin poetry," and that the object of the poet was to create, at once and indelibly, the impression he most desired to convey, of the horrors occasioned by religion and the dread of the unknown. "Science and Theology, Ancient and Modern," Internat. Review, May. 1878, p. 301.

The picture of superstition given by Lucretius is terrible in power:

"Humana ante oculos faede cum vita jaceret
In terris oppressa gravi sub religione
Quae caput a coeli regionibus ostendebat

Joseph Wharton, the great English scholar, has pointed out this passage as a complete refutation of a disparaging remark of Tully upon the genius of Lucretius.
Even those objects which other men were wont to regard with awe and horror—graveyards, ghosts, spectres—were subjects of some of his most sparkling wit. He was called "the laughing philosopher," as Heraclitus was "the weeping"; and if in modern times it is possible to find his anti-type, it is probable that no one can so nearly fill the rôle as the brilliant and witty French moqueur, Voltaire. Some of the favorite sayings attributed to Democritus were: "There is nothing true, and if there is, we do not know it." "We know nothing, not even if there is anything to know."\(^1\)

Yet this man has formulated, and pushed near to finality, the system of the universe known as materialism. Whether he originated it is doubtful. He had obtained access to every school of formal thought then in the world. Those who believe that his father entertained, on his estates in and near Abdera, the Persian King, Xerxes, and his shattered army, will not reject the added narrative that Xerxes left with his entertainer a number of the Persian wise men or magi, and that Democritus sat delightedly at their feet as a scholar.\(^2\) Afterwards he sought knowledge from the priests of Egypt and the mysteries of Osiris and Isis. He is said to have consulted the Chaldean astrologers, and to have penetrated even into India and Ethiopia, and conferred with the Gymnosophists.\(^3\) He visited Athens, and resided there many years; but finding little in her religion or philosophy to please him, he preserved a strict in-
cognito, and remained unknown up to the time of his return to Abdera.¹

In all these wanderings he found not his peculiar doctrine. He found, indeed, enough to induce him to reject mythology in all its forms, whether Oriental, Egyptian, or Greek, and to adopt a belief concerning the gods which banished them entirely from human affairs, and left mankind free from their dominion and their terrors. But he longed, farther, for a system of faith and philosophy which would enable him to dispense with the gods in constructing the universe. This he found in the "atomic system," the germs of which he certainly obtained from Leucippus, who lived cotemporary with him.

Whence did Leucippus obtain this system? The human mind has no creative power in the sense of producing something from nothing. It can only remodel and reconstruct forms of beauty or grandeur out of materials already existing. But this implies the power to construct a new system, because materials are always ample. Leucippus, therefore, may have been the originator of the doctrine of atoms; yet he had studied under the great stoic Zeno, and in the schools of the disciples of Pythagoras, from neither of which sources was it probable that he learned materialism.² Very ancient authority has attributed the invention of the atomic theory to a Phoenecian philosopher named Moschus, who lived before the siege of Troy!³ If so,

¹ "Athenis autem compluribus annis moratus, omnia temporum momeuta ad percipientiam et exercendam doctrinam conferens, ignotus illi urbi vixit."—Valer. Maximus, Lib. VIII., Cap. 7th.

² Lempriere Clas. Dict. Art. Leucippus; Art. Pythagoras, New Am. Cyclop., Vol. XIII., pp. 687–689. Lempriere states that Leucippus was of Abdera, but this is doubtful, as Elis and Miletus also claim his birth. We have very meagre details of his life.—Art. Lencip., New Am. Cyc., Vol. X., p. 479.

³ Strabo, who died A. D. 25, has preserved this statement, but he attributes it to Posidonius, in a form indicating some doubt of its truth:
it had met very little favor and made very little progress when it was extricated out of the dim clouds of tradition by Leucippus.

But however he obtained it, and by whomsoever invented, it is certain that Democritus promulgated it in a form so complete, symmetrical and fascinating, that it derived no signal improvement, though some additions, from the labors of his successors, Epicurus and Lucretius. Epicurus adopted it as the ground-work of his philosophy, which, under the title of Epicureanism, gained followers in Greece, the Orient, and Rome; and Lucretius, who lived more than two hundred years after Epicurus, and more than four hundred after Democritus, studied their system with enthusiastic devotion, and finally set it forth in a poem, which, though necessarily didactic, abounds in all the beauties and graces flowing from a cultivated fancy.¹

A cautious examination will show that this system of materialism, which “crosses the boundary of experimental evidence, and discerns in matter the promise and potency of all terrestrial life,” is the same system as taught by Democritus and his ancient followers that it is now, as taught in modern times by the German Häckel, and the Englishmen Huxley and Tyndall. The only differences are local and adventitious, not essential or

“Εἰ δὲ δὲι Ποσιδωνίων πιστεύσαι, καὶ το περὶ τῶν ατομῶν δόμα παλαιον εἰσὶν αὑτὸς Σίδνων Μοσχιν πρὸ τῶν τριῶν χιλιων γενομενος.”—Libr. XVI., p. 512. Posidonius was the tutor of Cicero, and it is possible the great orator and student may have derived from his teacher the evident dislike he cherished to Democritus, Epicurus, Lucretius,—in short, to all advocates of the atomic system. Sextus Empiricus has repeated the same statement given by Strabo, and in nearly the same form.—Adversus Mathematicos, p. 367. Bayle seems to doubt whether Posidonius ought to be believed in the matter.—Dict. Hist. et Crit., Art. Leucippe, II., 1899. As to Moschus and his claim to the paternity of the atomic theory, see Dr. Ralph Cudworth’s Intellec. System of the Universe, Edit. 1820, Vol. I., p. 90.

¹ This is the great poem “De Rerum Natura,” which will be read long after materialism has been so completely exploded that the very names of most of its teachers will be forgotten.
material. These differences arise from the more extended knowledge of the chemical composition and properties of matter, and of the mode of action of the forces which operate on matter, possessed in modern times than in the days of the Greek and Roman materialists. But all the essentials of the system, and all its numberless incongruities, self-contradictions, baseless hypotheses, and distinct violations of common sense, are held alike by the ancients and moderns. The lessons of two thousand years, with all the wonders of science which have illumined the last three hundred, have not advanced modern materialists one step beyond their old masters Moschus, Leucippus, Democritus, Epicurus, and Lucretius. It is the old falsehood recast. Like the Bourbons, the modern atheists have on this subject "forgotten nothing and learned nothing."

That this is a fact, evidence will presently be presented. If it be a fact, it is significant and important enough to justify some further reference to the life and peculiar traits of Democritus, who, with justice, is regarded by Professor John Tyndall as the founder of his cherished system.¹

He returned to Abdera so impoverished by the enormous expenses of his travels and researches that he was in danger of losing the privilege of being buried in the family tomb, under a law of his native province.² But he cheerfully called the magistrates and people together, and read to them one of his works, which, he assured them, he could never have composed but for his wanderings and expenses.³ They were so moved by

³ This was the "Μεγάς Διάνυσος," which Bayle says was "l' historie des Enfers"—the history of the infernal regions. No fragments of it remain.
its learning and eloquence that they voted him a present of five hundred talents, erected statues to him, and ordered that after his death the public should take care of his funeral. Nevertheless, it seems that his fellow citizens were by no means satisfied as to his sanity, for we learn that soon afterwards they sent him to Hippocrates to be treated for lunacy.\footnote{Art. Democritus, Encyc. Brit., Vol. VII., pp. 59, 60. This is a prevalent belief about Democritus; so much so that Pierre Bayle refers to it thus: "Personne presque n'a oûi parler de Democrite sans apprendre qu'Hippocrate fut appelé pour le guérir."—Dict. II., 981, note F. But the statement rests on the authority of Diogenes Laertius, who gives some letters, attributed to Hippocrates, which good critics believe to be spurious. The intercourse and friendship, however, between the philosopher and physician are well authenticated.} The skilful Greek physician thought him not insane, but excitable and eccentric, under the pressure of much learning, on all manner of subjects. He formed a friendship for him which continued during their joint lives.

It is certain that, if the materialism of Democritus is to be adopted, it must be on its own merits, and not from any presumptions of sound judgment and discreet thinking in its author. It would be hard to find among the ancient philosophers one who has left behind him a reputation for more folly—more extravagant and absurd claims and practices—more signal departures from common sense, than Democritus.

He drank milk at the table of Hippocrates, and immediately afterwards declared that, by his recondite knowledge, he was able to tell that it was the milk of a black she-goat, who had never borne but one kid. He addressed a woman whom the physician had brought with him, as a girl, and the next day he addressed her as a wife, claiming abstruse skill in the detection of virginity and its contrary.\footnote{These statements are from Diog. Laert. Bayle does not believe that Democritus had any such power as he claimed, and adds, somewhat satirically: "Cette sagacité est odieuse à la moitié du genre humain."} He frequently practised magical
rites, and claimed magical results. He insisted that if a woman, in a certain condition of health, would walk, with naked feet and dishevelled hair, three times through every part of her house, all the caterpillars in the adjoining garden would die immediately. Also, that in order to obtain a confession of the truth from a woman, all that was necessary was to place over her heart while she was sleeping the tongue of a frog, provided it had been torn out from the mouth while the frog was living, and that no part of the animal's body was touched except the tongue, and that the frog was immediately put back into the water. He claimed that by mingling together the blood of certain birds, whose names and species he professed to know, a serpent would be generated which had a property so admirable that whoever ate the flesh of this serpent would be able to understand what birds said to each other in their mutual chirpings and warblings.¹

His habits of study were as eccentric as his beliefs and practices. He chose a chamber in a house situated in the centre of a huge garden; here he immured himself, and was so absorbed that he perceived nothing of what was going on outside, and heard neither the approach of footsteps nor the bellowing of the ox, nor the voice of his own father when he called him to assist at an impending sacrifice. He carried so far his love of solitude and study that he finally took up his abode in a sepulchre near the city. Here he studied and reflected and nursed the powers of his imagination. Some young men, wishing to affright him, dressed themselves like corpses, put on horrible masks, and came around him with a hundred leaps

¹ Pliny relates this: "Vel que Democritus tradit nominando aves quorum confuso sanguine serpens gignatur, quem quisquis edexit, intellecturus fit avium colloquia."—Lib. X., Cap. xlix. The vagaries of Democritus are very fully and impartially discussed by Bayle; Dict. Hist. et Crit., II., 979–982.
and bounds and threatening gestures; he did not deign to take
any notice of them, except to say, "Cease to make fools of
yourselfs!" while he continued calmly his writing.¹

He never married, and was wont to speak of marriage with
contempt—of its consummation as a disease similar to epilepsy,
and of its legitimate fruits as a result to be condemned, because
it was the springing of one human being out of another.² Yet
we have some strong testimony that his own life was far from
chaste and virtuous. It is true that respectable authorities have
attributed his long life to remarkable temperance and modera-
tion in his habits. But some time before his death his strange
departures from common sense had led him to an act which
may well be considered the culmination of his eccentricities—
he put out the sight of his own eyes by means of burning
glasses or mirrors held up before them.³ Some writers, in a
spirit of exalted charity, have attributed this act to his desire
to reflect more profoundly, undisturbed by the objective world.
But the Christian father, Tertullian, who lived only a few
centuries after Democritus, and who, being a convert from

¹ Lucian gives us this incident, Philopseude, Vol. II., 495, and adds his
own comment to show how fully Democritus was convinced that souls
were nothing after they had left bodies: "Ὦσε ἰδοὺ πετάναι χθες μεθέν
εἰσι τοῖς ψυχαῖς εἰς εὖ γενομένης τῶν σώματος."

² "Venerem damnavit Democritus ut in qua homo alius exsiliret ex
hominis."—Pliny, quoted by Balthus Bonifacius; Hist. Ludicra, Lib. XII.,
Cap. v., p. 517. The physician Galen has preserved the view as to
epilepsy.—Commentar., Lib. III, Epidemiorum Hippoc.

³ This fact, though almost incredible, seems as well authenticated as
any unusual event of that era. It is mentioned by Cicero, De Finibus,
Lib V., fol. 244; Aulus Gellius, Lib. XII., Cap. xvii. "Democritum
llumibus oculorum sua sponte se privasse"; Laberius, in a poem, from
which we give an extract:

"Democritus Abderites physicus philosophus
Occulos efferere ut posset splendore aereo;"

and Plutarch, De Curiositate, p. 521, C., who alone intimates doubts.
paganism, may well be supposed to have known the current domestic traditions of the times, asserts that the reason why Democritus put out his eyes was one not favorable to his character, habits and reputation for chastity. 1

After a very long life, this old materialist came at last to his dying bed. But as his sister was very anxious to take part in the festival of Ceres, and could not decently, or even lawfully, do so in case of his death; his affection for her induced him to postpone in her favor, for a few days, an event which is commonly regarded as not under the control of the dying person. He ordered hot bread to be brought to him every morning, and by its vivifying odor he maintained his vital powers for the three days during which the festival lasted. And that he finally terminated his life by suicide is expressly declared by his successor and admirer, Lucretius, who, perhaps in imitation of so august an example, perhaps in delirium, ended his own life in like manner. 2

Epicurus, the successor of Democritus in teaching materialism, was far more successful than his master in founding a philosophic school. He was born in Attica, but his father, Neocles, and his mother, Cherestrata, were sent by the Athenians to the island of Samos, where the boy passed his early years. 3 His mother filled a character never very respect-

1 Democritus excceando semet ipsum quod mulieres sine concupiscentia aspicere non posset, et doleret si non potitus, incontinentiam emendatione profiteatur."—Tertullian, in Apolog., Cap. xlvi.

2 "En faaver de sa soeur, il recula de quelques jours l' heure de la mort."—Bayle, II., 980. Lucretius gives testimony as to his death in the lines—

"Denique Democritum postquam matura vestutas
Admonuit memorem motus languescere mentis
Spoute sua leto caput obvius obtulet ipse."

—"De Rerum Natura," Lib. III., l. 1037.

3 Hence he is often represented as a native of Samos. The author of
able. She was often engaged as a "Saga," "Venefica," or witch, to visit deserted and haunted houses, and drive away evil beings by her charms and prayers, and we have ancient testimony that Epicurus frequently accompanied and aided her in this good work.¹

When eighteen years old he returned to Athens, and engaged in study. There first he became an admirer of Democritus. When twenty-three, he returned to his family, and after spending seven years in travel and study, he returned to Athens, rented a beautiful garden, and established a school, which soon became one of the most celebrated in Greece. He received as pupils and disciples, not only men, but women; and we have no reason to doubt the traditions which attribute to his followers the most enthusiastic attachment to their master.²

This devotion was not singular. The man who taught that "Εὐδαιμονια"—good living, comfortable and sufficient feeding, eating, drinking, clothing, with perfect tranquillity about past, present and future, made up the "sumnum bonum," was not apt to be long without followers in his mercurial age and nation. Epicurus has introduced a word into the English tongue which sufficiently designates his philosophy and its tendency, whatever apologies may be made for him. Ever since the days of the learned Frenchman, Gassendi, who adopted part of the philosophy of Epicurus, and wrote part of his history, it has been common to believe that he inculcated and


¹ Diog. Laertius in Epicuro, Lib. X., Num. 4; Bayle, II., 1074.
² The beautiful apostrophe of Lucretius will be readily recalled:

"E tenebris tantis tam clarum extollere lumen
Qui primus putuisti, in lustrans commoda vita
Te Sequor, O Grecia gentis decus, in que tuis nunc
Ficta pedum pono pressis vestigia signis."

lived a pure life, and that his followers imitated his example. But those who believe in the uniform energy of moral or im-

moral forces, and that like causes, acting under like circum-
stances, will produce like effects, find it hardly possible to
doubt that a philosophy which taught that, though there were
gods, they had nothing to do with men, and no interest in
human affairs; that man was made up entirely of matter; that
what he innocently called his soul was nothing but matter
more subtle and refined than other parts of his body; that at
death the man ceased for ever; that there was no hereafter—
no reward for the righteous or punishment for the wicked in a
future life—such a philosophy, if really adopted and acted on,
must, after a time, bring man into subjection to the lower
appetites and passions of his material nature.

And so it was with Epicurus and his disciples, even in his
life time. The ingenious glosses of Gassendi have not sufficed
to erase the distinct testimonies of antiquity on this subject.
Epicurus was considered and spoken of by his cotemporaries,
and by writers who lived a few centuries after him, as a glutton,
a drunkard, a sensualist, who indeed concealed his vices, but
could not entirely escape the eye of truth.¹

It is proved that his disciples—men and women—met
together in nocturnal assemblages, amid the dark shades of his
garden; and a deserter from the sect of the Epicureans after-
wards asserted that scenes of illicit pleasure were enacted there
which would rival the lewd mysteries of Egyptian worship.
The names of two courtesans, Leontium and Lania, have been
brought into the scenes. They professed to be disciples of
Epicurus, and doubtless their attendance at the night meetings
was assiduous. It is certain that Metrodorus, one of the
principal friends of Epicurus, had Leontium for his paramour;

¹ "On le fit passer pour un goinfré, pour un impudique, pour un

and the deserter above mentioned was Timocrates (brother of Metrodorus), who seems to have been driven by disgust from the brotherhood, and who revealed what he had seen and known. That he told the truth is rendered probable by the excessive bitterness and resentment with which Epicurus assailed him.¹

Moreover, it is asserted by very good authority that Timocrates revealed the personal habits of Epicurus as revolting in sensuality. He declared that he was a gourmand and inebriate, and that the excess of his gluttony caused him to vomit twice every day!² He finally died, from disorder of the bladder, when probably not more than sixty-one years of age.

Some two hundred years after him came his great disciple and admirer, Titus Lucretius Carus, without whose genius and labors materialism would hardly have survived the era of the Greek and Roman classics. Lucretius was of noble family, but whether of that of the knights Vespillo or Osella is not certain. According to the best authorities, he was twelve years younger than Cicero.³ He studied in Athens, embraced with ardor the

¹ “Epicure u' epargna pas ce deserteur de la secte; it ecrivit contre lui et le traita durement.”—Bayle Hist., II., 1079, note K. The original statements are given by Athenaeus, Lib. XIII., p. 589–593.

² This curious statement is circumstantially given by Diogenes Laertius, in “Epicuro,” Lib. X., Num. 6. The learned article “Epicurus and Lucretius,” in the Westminster Review for April, 1882, although tinged with the prevalent scepticism of that magazine, gives a just view of Epicurus as compared with Democritus and Lucretius, and places him far below either in native power. It says of him: “It seems to be forgotten that what was best in his physics he borrowed from others, and that what he added was of less than no value,” p. 148. This is a significant admission, for what Epicurus added to the atoms of Democritus was the doctrine of the “climamen,”—the slight inclination from the perpendicular,—which is at once the concession of supernatural and spiritual power.

³ Whether he was twelve years senior or junior to Cicero has been a subject of exhaustive discussion, in which Ensebius, Lambrinus, Gifanius, Daniel Pareus, M. Le Baron de Coutures, Pere Briet, and Pierre Bayle, all
philosophy of Epicurus, and on his return to Rome wrote his celebrated poem "De Rerum Natura." A learned man has declared that Lucretius "wrote Latin better than any other man ever did."

1 His life was not pure,—not free from the vicious indulgencies to which his system of belief inevitably led. ² His mistress, Lucilia, in an hour of jealousy, and with the hope of attaching him more strongly to her, administered to him a love philtre, the effect of which was so powerful that he became insane, and so continued, with frequent and long lucid intervals, during which the larger part of his poem is said to have been composed. He perished by his own hand in the forty-fourth year of his age. Cicero revised his work after his death, but judiciously confined himself to the correction of obvious clerical errors, leaving the philosophy and the sometimes quaint and designedly antiquated Latin to stand on their own merits.

Thus we have seen that materialism, as a system, existed in Greece and in Rome. It was taught in the school of Epicurus, cherished by his disciples, and commended to public favor by one of the most graceful and fascinating philosophical compositions ever produced by the human mind. Moreover, it commended itself to the young, the excitable, the men and women fond of pleasure, by discarding Divine authority and encouraging the doctrine which the sensual nature of man loves supremely—"eat, drink and be merry, for to-morrow ye die." But with all these advantages, it never made any progress with the multitudes; it made few converts, and lost more than it

bear their part. The reader who has time and taste for such questions may consult note (B.), Bayle, II., 1803, Art. Lucrece.


² Bayle attempts to defend the grossly immodest passages of the poem by insisting that Lucretius wrote as a scientific man, or a physicist, (Note G., Dict., II., 1805), but no well-balanced reader can doubt that the poet took pleasure in presenting these sensual images.
made. The thoughtful men, and the men who were governed by common sense, were all against it. Two hundred years after the birth of Christ, the sect of the materialists had practically disappeared from the earth: we search in vain for any evidences of their prevalent existence.

Professor Tyndall has told us that Lord Bacon considered Democritus to be a man of weightier metal than either Plato or Aristotle, though their philosophy “was noised and celebrated in the schools, amid the din and pomp of professors.” He adds that it was not Plato or Aristotle (meaning men who believed in the existence of mind or soul, who destroyed the atomic philosophy of which he founded his materialism), but Genseric and Attila, the barbarians. In answer, it would be but fair to ask the learned professor to explain to the world why the system, introduced by Democritus, illustrated by Epicurus, and glorified by Lucretius, made no progress whatever, but rather distinctly retrograded during the long period of four hundred and fifty-five years, from the death of Lucretius to the time of Attila, and five hundred and ten years from the same death to the time when Genseric sacked Rome. This period was long and brilliant, and if their system had been true, it assuredly would not have languished and died, leaving hardly a trace of its existence.

It is true the atomic theory of matter is something independent of and apart from materialism, and will properly enlist our thoughtful attention hereafter. But the very fact that it had been used as the foundation of a system which denied the existence of God, the soul, immortality, and future rewards and punishments, was not adapted to commend it to the favor of communities over which Christianity had, at least, a nominal sway.

It is quite certain that during the centuries between the

death of Lucretius and the fading away of epicureanism we find no traces of a materialistic philosophy, nor do we find any revival thereof, until we approach the borders of the age of Voltaire and the encyclopedists of France. During the darkness of the middle ages, people continued to believe in God and mind. The Arabs, in this time of gloom, were the only people who produced men deserving to be called scientific. They cultivated the art of healing and the “materia medica” used therein. There is truth in the remark of Tyndall that “when smitten with disease, the Christian peasant resorted to a shrine, the Moorish one to an instructed physician.”¹ Alhazen corrected Plato’s fallacy by proving that rays of light were not emitted by the eye. He, moreover, discovered refraction, by which we see the sun and moon after they have set; he showed that the atmosphere decreases in density as it increases in elevation, and actually estimated its height at fifty-eight and a half miles; he understood the principle of the centre of gravity, and considered gravity to be a force, long before Sir Isaac Newton lived, though Alhazen fell into the error of confining it to terrestrial regions, and of making it diminish simply as the distance increased. He had distinct ideas as to capillary attraction, improved the hydrometer, and determined the relative densities of bodies with an accuracy nearly approaching that of modern science.²

Yet, with all their wonderful advances in physical science during these ages, the Arabian philosophers continued to believe in spirit, and never approached a point at which they pro-

¹ Belfast Address, p. 47.
² Dr. Draper’s “Intellectual Development of Europe,” p. 359, cited in Prof. Tyndall’s Belfast Lecture, pp. 48, 49. In his “Conflict Between Religion and Science,” pp. 111, 112, 115, 117, 158, Dr. Draper gives other interesting statements of the progress in literature and science made by the Saracens after their capture of Alexandria, B. C. 638.
fessed to find in matter the "promise and potency" of all terrestrial life.

The persecuting spirit and intellectual slavery inculcated by the Roman Catholic Church, and by many narrow-minded Protestants, undoubtedly warped into birth the germs of modern materialism. Men, cultivated into independence, resent nothing more keenly than an attempt to repress thought and enquiry by dogmatic dictation. Hence, as physical science advanced, and as the brilliant light of successive discoveries by Copernicus, Giordano, Bruno Galileo, Kepler, Gassendi, and Newton successively swept away the false interpretations on which religious authorities had built their systems, it was according to weak human nature that men of science should push their theories to extreme results. Released from fear of rack and faggot, and exulting in an insight into the innermost nature and forces of matter, which no previous age had enjoyed, a few of the most acute and advanced minds of our age have bowed finally down and worshipped the material of the universe as their only God. Yet even these few differ among themselves, and find it hard to bring themselves to a conclusion against which the common sense of humanity revolts. Among the names of a century past and passing, which are commonly representative of materialism—Anarcharsis Cloots, Otto Berger; Haeckel, Vogt, Moleschott, Compte, Herbert Spencer, Huxley, Darwin, Tyndall, Alexander Bain—perhaps not one is that of a man who, "in hours of clearness and vigor," would exclude mind from the universe, or who, if he had ever conceived and given expression to such an opinion, would not find that "in the presence of stronger and healthier thought it dissolved and disappeared."

1 Dr. Wm. B. Carpenter, in his admirable chapter on "Mind and Will in Nature." XX. "Mental Physiology." Am. ed. p. 698, has some strong remarks enforcing this view.

* Certainly such is the experience of Prof. Tyndall, for his own words
Hence it is that, although in the full light of the nineteenth century, materialism has been awakened to a new life, and is openly professed and taught; yet its teachers are few and far between, and though they are listened to with respect and reverence when they give to the world their great treasures of actual knowledge, yet the moment they transcend the just limits of science, and deny mind to the universe, mankind turns away in disappointment and rebuke.¹

Thus one of the questions heretofore mentioned has been answered in the affirmative. Materialism as a system has been taught in the world, and is held and taught now. The other question remains to be considered, to-wit: Upon what facts and reasons do its advocates base their system? This question must be answered; for, however few in numbers these advocates may be, and however generally mankind may have rejected their system, yet, if it be true in fact and reason, it will finally prevail.

are above quoted, (Preface, dated September 15, 1874, to Belfast Address, p. 31). He had previously, in a lecture in Manchester, uttered a similar sentiment, to which the Bishop of Manchester alluded, somewhat loosely and inaccurately, in an article in the London Times, November 9th, 1874. This, as is usual in such cases, led the scientist to disclaim and explain, (Preface to last Eng. edition of Belfast Lecture, p. 8); but he has left the original preface of September 15, 1874, unaltered and unrevoked.

¹ The historian Froude has lately deserted his proper sphere, in which he had gained deserved reputation, and given to the reading world an article the conclusions of which are briefly summed up by him thus: “Materialism, all over Europe, stands frankly out, and is respectfully listened to when it affirms that the war is over, that the claims of revelation cannot be maintained, and that the existence of God and of a future state, the origin of man, the nature of conscience, and the meaning of the distinctions between good and evil, are all open questions.”—Internat. Review, May, 1878, p. 296. Mr. Froude is skilled in learning something of the past by sifting testimony, but he seems to have little sagacity in interpreting the present. Probably at no other time has Christendom contained so large a ratio of men and women who believe in a spiritual and personal God as now.
The man who believes in the existence of God, and believes that He has spoken to the world through the Hebrew and Christian Scriptures, is compelled at once and finally to reject materialism. The two faiths cannot stand together. The book known as "the Bible" teaches, not merely in its opening chapters, but in its whole texture and doctrine, that God is a Spirit, and that He created, upholds and directs the material universe.

But as materialism necessarily denies the existence of a Spiritual and Personal God, and asserts itself as a rival and conflicting system of faith, of course its advocates cannot be overthrown by appeal to the authority of Scripture. The believer in a written revelation cannot force the materialist to abide by the decision of a court in which that revelation is the final authority. The materialist may plead want of jurisdiction, and, in the present state of our enlightenment, his plea must be received. If met at all, he must be met on the ground of unrevealed knowledge.

But it is on this ground that the common sense of mankind meets him and overthrows him. He attempts to sustain a system which is not new in the world—which has been announced and rejected again and again during the past twenty-three centuries, which, in all its phases and through all the variations in form that its ingenious teachers have given it, has been substantially the same—no stronger and no more reasonable than when first introduced into the world, and which, under the light of the present, and with all the re-enforcement of its scientific advocates of this age, is really weaker in its hold on the common sense of mankind than it was as taught by its apostles in the dim ages of the past.

We have seen that Democritus of Abdera, if not its first teacher among the ancients, is yet at the head of the line in culture and thought, and is held in special reverence by Pro-
fessor Tyndall, who may be considered as ending the line in the present age.

We have seen something of the vagaries and eccentricities of Democritus; we must now look more closely at his philosophy.

He taught that the universe, embracing sun, moon, stars, heavens, earth, gods, men, and lower animals, was all made from matter which existed from eternity, but originally in the form of "atoms," or exceedingly minute particles, which are in ceaseless motion, and, by their movement and union through the course of countless ages, have gradually formed all existing things. He was, in truth, the father not only of materialism, but of pyrrhonism and universal scepticism. For he taught that the testimony of the senses could not be trusted, that truth was hidden at the bottom of a well, that nothing was real except atoms and void space, and that all else consisted but in opinion.¹

Having thus supposed the existence of these infinitely numerous and varied atoms of matter, Democritus supposed them to have been falling, from all eternity, through space, in lines directly downward. The question then inevitably forced itself on a mind as cultivated and acute as any mind of the ancient world, how have the earth and all it contains been made? In the absence of an intelligent and thinking Creator, how have these blind, insensate atoms been brought together so as to form the marvellous beings of the universe?

¹ Diog. Laert., Lib. IX., num. 44; Sext. Empiricus adv. Mathematicos, p. 163. "Il soutenait qu'il n'y avait rien de réel que les atomes et le vide, et que tout le reste ne consistoit qu'en opinion."—Bayle, Art. Democrite, Tom. II., Dict. 984. It is worthy of remark that Professor Tyndall, after ascribing this belief to Democritus as one of his fixed principles, says it is one of the "five propositions which are a fair general statement of the atomic philosophy as now held."—Address at Belfast, p. 36. Are all holders of the atomic theory atheists?
To this momentous question, which forces itself into every system of materialism and rends it asunder, Democritus found an answer, but it was a very different one from that attributed to him by his admiring disciple of modern times. Professor Tyndall has hazarded the assertion that "Democritus assumed that the larger atoms moved more rapidly than the smaller ones, which they, therefore, could overtake, and with which they could combine."¹ The accuracy of this assertion is open to most serious question.

It is said that Democritus left at his death seventy-two works from his pen, treating of many subjects, written in pure Ionic Greek, and abounding in poetic beauties, worthy, in fact, to be compared with the compositions of Plato.² A curious tradition has also come down to us from antiquity, that the God-fearing and spiritually-minded Plato, either from abhorrence of the doctrines of Democritus, or from the less worthy motive of jealousy, collected all of his works that he could obtain, and was about to burn them, when he was deterred by two Pythagorean philosophers, who assured him it would do no good, as other copies were in the hands of several persons.³ However this may be, it is certainly true that none of these numerous works have come down to us. Only a few fragments have been preserved in the writings of others, and these, with the

¹ Address at Belfast, Am. Edit., p. 83.
³ We are indebted to Diogenes Laertius for this fact, and he adds that it was a policy well understood, since it was to prevent people from perceiving that Plato, in his own writings, had contradicted "the most excellent of the philosophers." " Que Platon contredisoit le plus excellent des philosophes."—Bayle, Tom. II., Dict. Hist. et Crit., 984. It is certain that Plato felt strong aversion to Democritus, for he never mentions him or his writings, not even in the "Timæus," where he treats of world-making.
statements of his doctrines given to us in his Greek and Roman successors, furnish all we know of his teachings.

Among these remains, no such notion as that attributed to Democritus by the English scientist will be found announced with any distinctness. On the contrary, Cicero seems to deny it, by declaring that Epicurus invented the theory of a deflexion from the perpendicular by the atoms in their fall in order to avoid the operation of a fixed and inexorable fate, but that Democritus was more willing to accept the doctrine of necessity than to take away natural notions from individual bodies.¹

It is singular that a scientific observer, who not only expresses his own high esteem for the Greek materialist, but brings forward also the testimony of Bacon, and “the learned editor” Spedding,² in his favor, should have been willing, upon grounds surely very slender in history, to have ascribed to his favorite the notion before mentioned. For, supposing all atoms, from eternity, to be falling through empty space, or a perfect vacuum, it is difficult to conceive any reason in nature why a

¹ Cicero’s words are: “Sed Epicurus declinatione atomi vitari fati necessitatem putat: o o o Democritus auctor atomorum accepera maluit necessitate omnia fieri quia a corporibus individuis naturales motus avellere.—Cicero “De Fato,” p. 80.

² Prof. Tyndall’s Address at Belfast, Am. Edit., pp. 35, 51. Except, perhaps, in England, Lord Bacon’s reputation among men of philosophy and science has undergone a perceptible shrinkage within the past half century. Prof. John Wm. Draper, in his “Conflict between Religion and Science,” N. Y. Edit., 1876, p. 233, says, after speaking of Leonardo da Vinci: “To him, and not to Lord Bacon, must be attributed the renaissance of science. Bacon was not only ignorant of mathematics, but depreciated its application to physical inquiries. He contemptuously rejected the Copernican system, alleging absurd objections to it. While Galileo was on the brink of his great telescopic discoveries, Bacon was publishing doubts as to the utility of instruments in scientific investigations. To ascribe the inductive method to him is to ignore history. His fanciful philosophical suggestions have never been of the slightest practical use.”
larger atom should fall faster than a small one, inasmuch as each would tend \textit{downward} by its own nature, and neither would meet the slightest resistance.\textsuperscript{1} The "natural motions" of "individual bodies," of which Cicero wrote, were simply the motion downward attributed to his atoms by Democritus. But even supposing that some atoms moved downward faster than others, the consequence would never be the making of worlds, still less the making of living animals. For in this race, in eternal ages, and in void space, the fastest atoms would simply get the lead and keep it for ever, the next fastest would follow in column or stratum, the slower would follow in like manner, and thus eternity would be vainly expended in atomic descent without the production of a single organic body.

Democritus, with all his vagaries and eccentricities, was too sage to promulgate a theory so transparently incongruous. His \textit{real} theory has been made known by authentic writers of antiquity, and is such as to reflect credit on his sagacity, though it cuts up by the roots his tree of materialism.

Finding spirit, soul, mind, intelligence in the world, and being wholly unable to explain its existence by any clashing or concourse of particles of insensate matter, he attributed to his eternal atoms \textit{spiritual and vital} properties, by which means he at once solved the whole problem. Plutarch, who lived while many of the writings of Democritus were probably extant, expressly ascribes to him this saving theory concerning his

\textsuperscript{1} In fact, this simple view of the subject is attributed to Epicurus in the next sentence. The strange mistake, or "supressio veri," involved in the statements here given by Prof. Tyndall as to Epicurus and Lucretius will presently come under review. His words are these: "Epicurus, holding that empty space could offer no resistance to motion, ascribed to all the atoms the same velocity; but he seems to have overlooked the consequence that, under such circumstances, the atoms could never combine. Lucretius cut the knot by quitting the domain of physics altogether, and causing the atoms to move together by a kind of volition."—Address at Belfast, p. 83.
atoms. Saint Augustine, who lived in the fourth century, and who was profoundly learned, not only in theology, but in human history and science, gives similar testimony concerning the theory of Democritus, and ascribes to him the belief that his atoms brought together in their concourse a certain vital and spiritual force, and declares that in this respect his system differs from that of Epicurus, who put nothing into the eternal principles of things except atoms. And hence, although Democritus did not believe in an Eternal Spirit or Deity, yet, by means of his spiritual atoms, he constructed gods far superior to the utterly careless and alien divinities first introduced to mankind by Epicurus and Lucretius. He taught that the images and ideas excited by outward objects, and the act of the human mind in perceiving them, were all the immediate presence and work of the gods. Strange and mystic as may be this notion, it is such as would never have been conceived by a weak or small mind, and compares favorably with the reveries given to the world two thousand years afterwards by the Père Malebranche.

1 O de θεοποροντες παντα μετεχειν ψυχι πνευμ. — Plutarch De Plac. Philos., Lib. IV., Cap. iv., p. 908. The verb μετεχειν very strongly expresses the idea of "participating in," "partaking of," "enjoying or having in common." The whole passage from Plutarch is given by Bayle, Art. Leucippe, Dict., Vol. II., p. 1701, and he annexes a translation by Amiot, whose authority as to an ancient theory is held in high esteem: "Democritus met que toutes choses sont participantes de quelque sorte d'âme jusques aux corps morts d' autreant que manifestement ils sont encore participants de quelque chaleur et de quelque sentiment."

2 "Democritus hoc distare in naturalibus questionibus ab Epicuro dicitur, quod iste sentit inesse concursioni atomorum vim quamdem animalem et spiritualenum."—Augustine, Epistola LVI., p. 273.

3 Tum enim censet (Democritus) imaginum divinitate praeditas inesse in universitate rerum, tum principia mentis quae sunt in codem universo deos esse dicit, tum animantes imagine.—Cicero, De Natura Deorum, Lib. I., xliii., 120. This passage is not quoted by Bayle, but he gives the belief of Democritus, and adds: "I'ose bien dire que cette erreur quelque
Thus it appears that Democritus, the Greek father of materialism, was compelled, by the stress of his own logical mind, to ignore his system in its very cradle. For when he ascribed spiritual and vital powers to his atoms, they ceased to be matter. Whatever afterwards was accomplished by their concourse—whether the making of a world like the earth, or the making of an animal like man—could excite no astonishment and involve no contradiction; for spirit, mind, intelligence being present and working upon adequate material, all the results of the Cosmos could come to pass.\(^1\)

It is a significant fact that after the lapse of more than twenty centuries, several scientists who would willingly be materialists if they could, have found themselves driven back to the same ground that Democritus occupied by the same difficulties which environed him, and which will continue to baffle and overthrow every theory that attempts to exclude spirit, mind, intelligence from the universe.

De la Mettrie lived during the reign of the Great Frederick of Prussia, and was one of his boon companions. "He was a grossière qu' elle soit, ne sera jamais cette d' un petit esprit, et qu' il n' ya que de grands génies qui soient capables de la produire. Je ne sais si jamais personne a pris garde que le sentiment de l' un des plus sublimes esprits de ce siècle, 'Que nous voions toutes choses dans l' Etre infini dans Dieu,' n' est qu' un développement et qu' une reparation du dogme de Democrite.'"—Bayle, Dict., II., p. 984.

\(^1\) Professor Tyndall shows plainly that he had made a very imperfect and superficial examination of the theory of Democritus when he asserts that "the great enigma, the exquisite adaptation of one part of an organism to another part and to the conditions of life, more especially the construction of the human body, Democritus made no attempt to solve," (Address at Belfast, p. 37). In truth, Democritus, by giving life and spirituality to his atoms, came nearer to a solution of the "great enigma" than Empedocles, who was driven to ascribe the passions of love and hate to the eternal atoms, or than the modern philosophers, Huxley, Spencer and Darwin, who offer no solution better than the "harmony of environment," and the "survival of the fittest."
bon vivant, a diner out, and a wit, as well as a philosopher. He wrote two books, "Man a Machine" and "Man a Plant," in which the doctrine of a spiritual-matter is strongly intimated, if not declared in express terms. He taught that "man is framed of materials not exceeding in value those of other animals—nature has made use of one and the same paste; she has only diversified the ferment in working it up. We may call the body an enlightened machine; it is a clock, and the fresh chyle from the food is the spring." He sought, by various examples, to prove that matter has "an inherent activity," and, in truth, he might have claimed that the vital and spiritual atoms of Democritus had furnished to him all the elements of his theory.

Joseph Priestley, the discoverer of oxygen gas, was not better known as a chemist and naturalist than as a theologian and psychologist. His writings contain distinct and extended arguments in favor of "the single-substance doctrine," as materialism has been called by one of its most ingenious advocates. Priestley argued that matter was not what it had been generally thought to be—a solid, impenetrable, inert substance, wholly passive and indifferent to rest or motion, except as acted on by some power foreign to itself. On the contrary, he insisted that matter is essentially active, and is, in fact, nothing else than an aggregate of centres of force, and that there is no reason why the special activity of thought should not be attributed to matter. And as the Occam doctrine of parsimony forbade that causes should be multiplied without necessity, Priestley insisted that we should adhere to a single substance until it be shown that mere matter is incapable of thought.

Professor Alexander Bain dwells at considerable length and


with special satisfaction on Priestley's view, and states that it was the creed of "great numbers at the end of that century or the beginning of this." He adds that the celebrated Robert Hall was for many years a materialist in Priestley's sense, and utters a sarcasm on the confession of the great preacher that "he buried his materialism in his father's grave." If Robert Hall was ever a materialist, it was while he was insane, or at least when his "stronger and healthier thought" was in eclipse.

Under the influence of these teachings, and of the united advance of such leaders as Müller, Wagner, Liebig, DuBois, Raymond, Moleschott, Vagt and Büchner on the continent, and of Robert Hooke, Ferrier, Huxley, Spencer, Darwin and Tyndall in England, the enlightened and subtle mind of the Aberdeen professor has formulated the final doctrine on which materialism seems content to rest its claims in our age. His summing up is in these words: "The arguments for the two substances have, we believe, now entirely lost their validity; they are no longer compatible with ascertained science and clear thinking. The one substance, with two sets of properties, two sides, the physical and the mental—a double-faced unity—would appear to comply with all the exigencies of the case." 1

And such would appear to be the view of Prof. Tyndall, though whether he would hold it "in hours of clearness and vigor," or "in the presence of stronger and healthier thought," may be doubtful. He has nowhere given us in authoritative and responsible form his own definition of matter; but he has declared that "the ideas concerning matter which were drilled into us when young" must be abandoned under the pressure of science, and especially of evolution. 2 And in his address at Belfast he stated the alternative: "Either let us open our doors

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3 Address on the Scientific Use of the Imagination, 1870.
freely to the conception of creative acts, or, abandoning them, let us radically change our notions of matter."\(^1\) This "radical change" is supposed to express itself in his declaration that he discerns in matter the promise and potency of all terrestrial life, and the farther assertion that "emotion, intellect, will, and all their phenomena, were once latent in a fiery cloud."\(^2\)

Now, this definition of matter, thus deliberately adopted and announced in modern times, is no advance whatever on the spiritual and vital atoms of Democritus. It is simply a reproduction of what was always an impossible theory—a theory repudiated by the common sense of mankind. No sane intellect can form any conception of a substance which is mind-body, or corporeal-spirit, or intellect-matter. The ideas involved are as self-contradictory as those of a living-dead man, or a dead-living man. For nearly six thousand years the world has been taught by infallible intuition that mind is not matter, and matter is not mind—that the thinking, reasoning, will-exerting Ego is not the extended, inert, palpable outside world. If these philosophers of the "single-substance" school were asked whether gold was copper, or whether oxygen gas was hydrogen, they would probably answer in the negative, with some contempt for the questioner. Yet there would be far more reason in declaring that these material elements were one and the same essence than in holding that mind is matter.\(^3\) For, all

\(^1\) This passage, from the Belfast Address, p. 88, is the rebuke with which Prof. Tyndall closes his remarks on Darwin's satisfaction at the thought that possibly God might exist—a thought suggested by the words of "a celebrated author and divine," who had "gradually learned to see that it is just as noble a conception of the Deity to believe He created a few original forms, capable of self-development into other and needful forms, as to believe that He required a fresh act of creation to supply the voids caused by the action of His laws."

\(^2\) Belfast Address, p. 85; Fragments of Science, Eng. ed., p. 168.

\(^3\) The belief of the essential unity of matter is yearly growing in favor with men of real science. It will be adverted to again in this work.
elements that are really material, however they may differ in their properties and phenomena, have many properties common to all, and may, therefore, be united in one category; but mind does not manifest or suggest the possession of one single property of matter.\footnote{This view of the subject has been presented in the well-known "Boston Monday Lectures," by Rev. Joseph Cook, (Biology, pp. 14, 20, 221–241), with so much of learning, clearness, and power, that I would not have deemed it proper to re-argue it, but for the fact that the object of this work required it, and that it was important to show that the modern materialists have not advanced a step beyond the ancient—a point to which the eloquent lecturer seems not to have turned his attention.} If, therefore, mind exists at all, it is not matter; and that mind exists we have stronger evidence in our consciousness than we can ever have of the existence of matter.

So much for the system of Democritus. He was followed by Epicurus and Lucretius, and in them we have materialism pure and simple. Yet the concessions they found themselves compelled to make present them in a pitiable light when compared with their great predecessor. Epicurus taught the atomic theory, and represented his atoms—in infinitesimally small particles of pure matter—as falling through empty space and through eternal duration directly downwards. But as he perceived that, by this method, no clashings, nor collisions, nor unions could take place, he was in some trouble how to create his worlds, as he denied all-mind, all Providence, all intelligent design. In this stress he invented the notion that at times and places unfixed and uncertain, some of the atoms declined or deflected from the perpendicular lines of descent. Thus he managed very cleverly to bring them into contact with other atoms, and so the work of making the universe would commence. He postulated also that many of the atoms should be of an amazingly subtle, ethereal, smooth, and even fiery nature, and so, by the collision and working of these, he solved the great enigma of the human mind and of the vital systems of animals.
their hearts, nerves and lungs. In all these points his disciple, Lucretius, closely followed him, and, in fact, did not pretend to do anything more than to put into Latin verses the teachings of his Greek master.¹

Lucretius does not deny the existence of gods, but disposes of them in the beginning of his poem by assigning to them the enjoyment of an immortal age and perfect peace, totally separated from human affairs and anxieties.² He denies in the broadest terms all Providential interference of the Divine in the creation or conduct of the world. In fact, he considers religion only another name for superstition, and declares, as one of the most cherished objects of his poem, the purpose to inculcate the philosophy of Epicurus, by means of which mankind shall be delivered from the dominion of this horrible demon—religion—and may crush him under their feet.³

With such principles and purposes announced by these ma-

¹ That the doctrine of declination or deflection of the atoms was first taught by Epicurus is distinctly proved by the best authorities. Cicero attributes it to him: "Scil Epicurus declinatione atomi vitari fati necessitatem putat: itaque tertius quidem motus oritur extra pondus et plagam, quum declinat atomus intervallo minimo id appellant σιαγωνον: quam declinationem sine causâ fieri si minus verbis re cogit tur confiteri."—Cicero De Fato, p. 80. Bayle collects and comments on the authorities, Dict., Tom. II., p. 1085, and says, very wisely: "Il est absurde de supposer qu’un être qui n’a raison ni sentiment ni volonté, s’écarte de la ligne droite dans un espace vide, et qu’il s’en écarte non pas toujours mais en certains temps en certains points de l’espace non reglés."

² "Omnis enim per se Divini natura necesse est
Immortali aevum summum pace fruatum
Semita ab nostris rebus sejuncta que longe
Nam privata dolore omni privata periclis
Ipsa suis pollices opibus nihil indiga nostri
Nec bene pro meritis capitur nec tangitur ira."

³ "Quare religio pedibus subjector vicissim
Obteritur, nos exequat victoria coelo."
terialists, it is an unanswerable argument against their system, that they found themselves compelled, at the very outset, to postulate a movement of atoms, which was a departure from the "naturales motus," the natural movements which they, in common with Cicero and all other thinking men of the age, ascribed to matter.

This declination or deflexion from the perpendicular being a departure from the natural, necessarily involved the supernatural. The strong common sense of Cicero pierced at once the core of the difficulty. In his words already cited he shows that, however infinitesimally small this declination might be, so as to be characterized by Epicurus as εἰκοσιηθος, —the smallest, —yet (upon the principles assumed by the materialists, in fact if not in words,) it must be confessed to be without cause. Now this would at once overthrow the whole system, which was founded on the maxim "ex nihil nihil fit," and denied that any fact in nature could exist without a cause. Hence the conclusion was inevitable, that this declination of the atoms, necessary to creation, and not natural, was caused by a supernatural power. Thus God emerged from the very abyss of the system invented to annihilate Him.

Though the passages from Lucretius bearing the "declination" doctrine do not appear to have been selected by him.

\[ \text{(Equation or explanation)} \]

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DECLINATION DOCTRINE.

It has often been observed that a philosophy purely atheistic cannot be true to itself. It is constantly tempted, by the observed facts of the universe, to deny and depart from its own principles. Lucretius denied that the gods had any interest or control in human affairs, yet he opens his poem with an apostrophe and appeal to Venus, the goddess of love, so beautiful and earnest that it seems impossible to believe that he banished Divine power from his system; and though he denied all Providence, yet he felt himself compelled to admit the influence of some mysterious power which seemed to mock at and to overthrow all the wisest efforts of human dignity and skill. Thus, after describing the terror excited in people and kings alike by the august forces of nature,

"Cui non correparent membra pavore
Fulminis horribili cum plaga torrida tellus
Contremet et magnum percurrunt murmura coelum?"

he introduces the picture of a great admiral, with his fleet laden with legions and war elephants, swept by violent winds and waves, and seeking by vows and prayers to obtain peace from the gods. His vows and prayers do not save him from the quicksands of death, but the poet is led, by his intuitions of truth, to pass over the blind forces of the storm, and to attribute the ruin of one so exalted in dignity and power to some broken, and how this "free power wrenched from the fates" exists in animals unless such "declinando motus" exists; and finally, in lines 292, 293, he renews the assertion:

"Id facit exiguum clivamen principiorum
Nec regione loci certa nec tempore certo."

In view of this assumed departure from the natural, invented by Epicurus, and simply expanded by Lucretius, it is not easy to acquit Prof. Tyndall either of want of accuracy or want of candor in his remarks previously quoted from page 88, Belfast Address. As to the inconsistency of Epicurus and his followers in asserting this "clivamen" motion, see Cudworth's "Intellec. System of the Universe," Edit. 1820, Vol. III., pp. 465, 466.
mystic and occult force which laughs at the insignia of human authority:

"Usque adeo res humanas vis abolita quaelam
Opterit, et pulchros fascis saevasque securis
Proculcare ac ludibrio sibi habere videtur." 1

Yet with all their difficulties and misgivings, Epicurus and Lucretius, with their small but wealthy and intellectual sect, went on to construct their universe without the aid of mind and intelligence. Having provided their atoms with an infinite void of space to fall in, clash in, cohere in, work in, and with infinite time for all possible combinations, they taught that, by their concourse and mutual adaptations, they had at last worked out the beautiful, symmetrical, orderly cosmos, and that all its myriads of mouldings of design and purpose were nothing but the result of "the fortuitous concourse of atoms."

Even in their own day and age they met from the common sense of mankind a protest so firm and unyielding that their system withered under it; and within less than two hundred years from the death of Lucretius it was held by nobody of note, and was universally regarded as an exploded philosophy. Cicero met it with grave objections and ingenious ridicule, and has supplied us with an illustration not less convincing now than when first used. Let us examine it:

Ennius of Calabria obtained the name and privileges of a Roman citizen by the extent of his learning and the brilliancy of his genius. He wrote the annals of the Roman republic in eighteen books of heroic verse. Fragments only of this really great work have come down to us, but it was all extant in the days of Cicero and Virgil. Cicero, in arguing against the Epicurean system, puts into the mouth of his stoic philosopher, Balbus, this unanswerable enquiry: Suppose imnumerable forms or copies of the twenty-one letters should be thrown together, and

1 "De Rerum Natura," Lib. V., 1216–1233.
subjected for eternity to all the various clashings, concourses, contacts, unions which chance could produce, would they ever empty out on the earth "the annals of Ennius" so that they might be read just as he had written them? Would even one single verse in its proper form and meaning ever be thus produced by chance? Yet this would be a less incredible result than the production of all the marvellous forms of beauty and wisdom with which the universe abounds from the chance union of insensate atoms.¹

In our own age we might repeat the illustration thus: The English version of the holy Scriptures contains about eight hundred and thirty-eight thousand words, composed of about three millions three hundred thousand letters, so arranged in words as to convey thoughts and ideas that have civilized and spiritualized the world. Now, if innumerable copies of the twenty-six letters of the English alphabet were thrown out into empty space, with unlimited opportunities for colliding, clashing, meeting each other, when, where, how would they come together, by fortuitous conourse, so as to give us the connected composition from the beginning of Genesis to the end of the Apocalypse?

¹ The passage from Cicero deserves to be quoted in full: "Hic ego non mirer esse quemquam qui sibi persuadat corpora quaedam solida atque individua vi et gravitate ferri mundumque effici ornatissimum et pulcherrimum ex eorum corporum concursione fortuita? Hoc qui existimat fieri potuisse, non intelligo cur non idem putet, si innumerables unius et viginti formae litterarum vel aureae vel qualeslibet aliquo conjiciantur, posse ex his in terram excussis Annales Ennii, ut deinceps legi possint, effici: quod nescio an ne in uno quidem versu possit tantum valere fortuna. Isti antem quem ad modum adseverant, ex corpussulis non colore, non qualitate aliqua quam πωςγηζα Græci vocant, non sensu praeditis, sed concurrentibus temere atque casu numdum esse perfectum, vel innumerables potius in omnium puncto temporis alios nasci alios interire? Quod si numdum efficere potest concursus atomorum, cur porticum, cur templum, cur domum, cur urbem non potest? quae sunt minus operosa et multo quidem facilliora."—"De Natura Deorum," Lib. II., xxxvii., 93; Lipsiae, 1877, pp. 70, 71.
These questions have never been answered, and cannot be consistently with reason. Yet they remain an insoluble difficulty, blocking up the way of the modern materialist as thoroughly as they stopped the progress of Epicureanism in the days of Cicero; for Darwin, Huxley, Spencer and Tyndall have not advanced a step nearer to the construction of the universe without the aid of a spiritual intelligence than Lucretius did in his poem.

The modern theory of "evolution," which, suggested by the skull of a stag to the German, Oken, has run through such channels as the "Vestiges of Creation" down to Darwin and his admirers, is essentially founded on the same basis of falsehood that was laid by the ancient materialists. Although Darwin shrunk back from the avowal of atheism, and sought to make his theory consist with the idea of a great first cause, possessing spirit and intelligence, yet his more hardy coadjutors, Huxley, Spencer and Tyndall, have passed the line, and, adopting his system, show that it legitimately demands a cosmos developed by evolution from unthinking matter. 1

The untiring industry and mental power of Doctor Darwin have given to the world a great body of facts as to varieties in the animal kingdom, and the transmission of acquired qualities by generation and descent, and his labors will be of service to the cause of science long after the abuses of his doctrine have disappeared. But Darwin has never succeeded in showing a single instance in which the line of species has been transcended by evolution or heredity. He has never shown that the tiger has come from the lion, or the elephant from the mammoth, or the sheep from the goat; yet his system, by inexorable logic, demands that he shall trace man by descent from the orang

1 We have already noted Tyndall's words on this subject, (Belfast Address, page 88). Dr. R. L. Dabney shows it fully in his "Sensational Philosophy," pp. 165-176.
outang or the ape! Therefore common sense takes leave of him, and explodes his system like a soap bubble.

The doctrine of evolution announces three modes by which all the differences in species, indeed all the wonderful facts of the universe are wrought out without the aid of an intelligent Creator. First, by natural selection; secondly, by the modification of an organism by its environment; thirdly, by the survival of the fittest. Now, as to the first, the very term indicates an intelligent origin; for what is selection but choice, and what is choice but the work of mind or will? To suppose that insensate atoms have any choice in their unions with other atoms is to endow them, either with intellect, and make them vital and spiritual, as Democritus did, or to endow them with passions, such as love and hatred, as Empedocles did. But neither of these endowments of matter can be conceded by the materialist without destroying his own system.

As to the second, it may be admitted that surroundings do modify organization, but no facts have ever shown that environ-

1 It was not, therefore, a mere impulse of wit which called from the English bishop the cry, "Ye men of science! leave me my ancestors in paradise, and find your own, if ye will, in the zoological gardens." Dr. Draper says: "The doctrine that every living form is derived from some preceding form is scientifically in a much more advanced position than that concerning force, and probably may be considered as established, whatever may become of the additions with which it has recently been overlaid."—"Conflict between Religion and Science," pp. 358, 359. Yet, in his argument for "evolution," p. 247, he adds no strength to previous views, and does not attempt to meet the unanswerable objection that geologic strata contain absolutely none of the innumerable specimens of changing species which must have existed if evolution, in his sense, were true. The acute and eloquent Canon Liddon, of the Anglican church, evidently believes neither in evolution (in its modern scientific sense), nor in creation ex nihilo. His words are: "The creative will must have intervened otherwise than by way of evolution, that is, out of existing material, to create mind, to create life, to create matter."—Sermon on Ancient and Modern Doubters, Homiletic Monthly, N. Y., August, 1882, p. 619.
ment can so change the nature of one species as to make it another species. And, moreover, who has arranged these surroundings? How has the environment been so brought to bear as to bring forth a new creature at the right time and place? If the materialist choose to call this "chance" or "fortuna," it is certain the man of common sense will not agree with him, but will say it is the work of some intelligent designer, who knew beforehand what means would work out a certain end. And as to the last, we may well ask, "Is the 'survival of the fittest' a fact in nature? Where it does exist, is it not rather an artificial fact, due solely to human providence, or that of some other rational being? Striking variations in species are indeed produced by the arts of cattle and dog breeders and bird-fanciers. But what becomes of them when left to nature? Surrender any individual of a 'developed' variety to the rude hand of nature, and its uniform tendency is to degradation. On a prairie, in a state of nature, the developed horse or ox or swine would be the first to perish of his kind."  

But the doctrine of evolution, according to the concessions of its special advocates, demands immense duration in time for its working; and innumerable efforts and failures of its material agents before the happy result is at last attained. And so it is as completely subject to the objection urged by Cicero as was the scheme of Epicurns. It is subject to another objection not less fatal. They admit that "natural selection," acting blindly and without intelligence, must have made myriads of failures where it succeeded once, and that its success would only establish the slightest "differentiation" from pre-existing species. "The remains of the failures in this blind striving towards development ought, then, to be a myriad times as numerous as the remains of the successes." "The vast genera of crustaceous

1 Dalby's "Sensualistic Philosophy," Ed. 1875, pp. 174, 178. The facts and reasoning on these pages have never been answered.
and vertebrate fishes and animals all left behind them remains capable of preservation as fossils." "Great masses of these fossils actually remain, many of them of almost incredible age. But they all represent established genera. Where are the fossils of the transitional and intermediate links, which ought to be a myriad times more numerous? Were evolution true, the world would not be large enough to contain them."  

Herbert Spencer founds his materialism on the theory that the universe has been constructed from matter and force. The forces which work in nature, such as attraction, electricity, magnetism, heat, the vital force, are all admitted by the most advanced physicists to be utterly inscrutable in their essence. It may be true that they may all come from and be resolvable into one, to-wit: motion; and that they may be indestructible and at work for ever; and that they may be correlated, or, in other words, that any one mode of force may be transformed into any other, and will be found equivalent thereto. But it has never been proved that they are matter, or necessary and eternal properties of matter. It has never been proved that they would exist at all, or work upon matter, without the presence and will of an Eternal Mind. Until this is proved, the

1 Dr. Dabney presents this view with perfect fairness and with wealth of illustration in his "Sensualistic Philosophy," pp. 173, 174.

2 "Concerning the real nature of these forces we are entirely ignorant."—Wells' "Principles of Chemistry," p. 12. Prof. Tyndall admits this as fully as the most devout scientist: "The whole process of evolution is the manifestation of a power absolutely inscrutable to the intellect of man." Belfast Lecture, p. 87.

3 This subject is inseparably connected with the central thought of the present work, and must, therefore, receive farther attention. At this point it will be appropriate to quote the words of Prof. Joseph Le Conte, of the University of California: "Many modern philosophers object to the use of the distinction matter and force. I believe the distinction not only necessary but fundamental. There is a fundamental and irreconcilable antithesis in human philosophy which meets us on every side, and is evidently the result of the limits of human thought. In the language
temple of Spencer’s materialism wants its chief corner-stone, and must fall.

Postulating, however, the unproved and impossible-to-be proved point, that force is an eternal and indestructible property of matter, Spencer has no more and no less difficulty in constructing the universe than other materialists. Although he admits that in its nature force is inscrutable and unknowable, and although he holds that it operates blindly, and not under the control and direction of an intelligent Creator, yet he finds it (together with matter) sufficient for his purposes. “Force does and undoes all—concentrating matter and dissipating motion, or dissipating matter as it concentrates motion. These two laws make all the suns and planets. They also make all the plants and animals, and all the (so-called) minds.”

Spencer’s system of creation is, therefore, identical with that of Darwin. It is evolution, carried out not merely through the successions of plants and animals, but through all the worlds which adorn space. In common with Darwin, he calls for a tract of time approaching the endless, and for a number of throws of the dice, represented by blind force and insensate matter, to be computed, not by millions, but by myriads of myriads. Therefore the objection of Cicero still applies in all its strength. Evolution is the old falsehood of Epicurus and Lucretius, revamped with modern appliances, but none the less a falsehood.

A single illustration will suffice to show how little materialism has gained since the days of its Greek and Roman advocates.

of general philosophy, it is expressed by the terms phenomena and cause; in the language of science, as matter and force; in the language of psychology, matter and spirit; in the language of theology, nature and God. These are fundamentally antithetic.” —“Man’s Place in Nature,” by Prof. Le Conte, Princeton Review, Nov., 1878, p. 778.

1 Thus Spencer’s theory is summed up by Dr. Dabney, “Sensualistic Philosophy,” p. 127.
Lucretius, of course, rejected entirely the *teleological* view of the universe, denied all foresight, all design in nature, all intelligent purpose to adapt means for attaining ends. Hence he followed out logically the results of his system, and vehemently warned his readers against the error of believing that the eye was made to see with, or that the thighs and legs and feet, with their joints, were made to walk with, or that the arms and hands were made to minister to our wants!! He insisted that any such notion was a perverse and preposterous error—that the eye was not made to be used in seeing, but that, by seeking and striving to see, and practising itself in these endeavors, it gradually learned to see; in like manner as the tongue, which was originated long before speech, by *usus* learned to speak; and as the ears were created before sound, they were not made to hear, but by practice gradually learned to hear.

We may well suppose that when these opinions were first promulgated, they were received with astonishment and in-

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1 Lest it should be supposed that the Epicurean philosopher is misrepresented, the whole passage is given:

> "Illud in his rebus vitium vehementer avenus
Te fugere, errorem vitae, quem premetuentor,
Lunina ne facias occulorum clara creats.
Prospicere ut possemus, et ut proferre queamus
Praceras passus, ideo fastigia posse
Surarum ac feminum pedibus fundata plicari,
Brachia tum porro validis ex apta lacertis
Esse manus que datas ultra que ex parte ministras
Ut facere ad vitam possemus quae forat usus."


2 "Nec dictis orare prius quam lingua creata 'st
Sed potius longe linguae precessit origo
Sermonem, muito que creatae sunt prior aures
Quam sonus est auditor, et omnia denique membra
Ante fuere, ut opinor, corum quam forat usus."

credulity by an age capable of appreciating the teleological argument which Cicero had put into the mouth of his stoic philosopher. It is surely not wonderful that, when materialism exhibited such an outcome, it should have been speedily ignored and dropped from the serious thoughts of mankind. Yet, in our present age of light, we find this same opinion renewed and gravely urged for acceptance by Herbert Spencer and Professor Tyndall.

Spencer defines life to be "a continuous adjustment of internal relations to external relations." "The organism is played upon by the environment, and is modified to meet the requirements of the environment." And thus he seeks to show that no intelligent Creator formed the eye that it might see, but that it was formed by innumerable and gradual efforts of the skin and its companion parts to adapt themselves to the environment. Its formation was on this wise: "The action of light, in the first instance, appears to be a mere disturbance of the chemical processes in the animal organism, similar to that which occurs in the leaves of plants. By degrees the action becomes localized in a few pigment cells, more sensitive to light than the surrounding tissue. The eye is here incipient. At first it is merely capable of revealing differences of light and shade produced by bodies close at hand. Followed, as the interception of the light is, in almost all cases, by the contact of the closely adjacent opaque body, sight, in this condition, becomes a kind of 'anticipatory touch.' The adjustment continues; a slight bulging out of the epidermis over the pigment-granules supervenes. A lens is incipient, and through the operation of infinite adjustments, at length reaches the perfection that it displays in the hawk and eagle." 1

When divested of its scientific garb, this opinion seems to

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1 Thus Prof. Tyndall expresses and approves of Spencer's view.—Belfast Lecture, pp. 77, 78.
FRENCH ADVOCATE OF DARWIN. 81

correspond accurately with that of Lucretius. It means that
the eye is not that exquisitely beautiful and useful optical
instrument created for the purpose of seeing, but that it is the
result of innumerable efforts at seeing, or efforts for adjustment,
which at last brought about the desirable organ.

To a man guided simply by common sense the mere state-
ment of this opinion is its refutation. The world will never
believe a proposition so elaborately and ingeniously absurd as
this notion, borrowed by its modern advocates from a philos-
ophy exploded eighteen hundred years ago.

Thus it appears that the evolution theory, which asks us to be-
lieve that the marvellous adaptations and adjustments of means
to ends displayed in the cosmos are the result of myriads of efforts,
generally unsuccessful, made by insensate matter acted on by
blind force, is open to the full sweep of the objection made by
the stoic sage whom Cicero introduces into his treatise on the
Divine nature. Yet it is said that in our age a bold admirer
of Darwin has met this objection full in the face and sought
to answer it. He says: "Give me an infinite number of throws,
and an eternity to throw in, then, amidst the infinite numbers
of possible collocations which the letters may assume, may be
the very one constituting the poems of Ennius."¹

Now, when we reflect that a million only of letters would be
susceptible of different collocations so numerous that human
language hardly furnishes apt terms to express them, and that
the displacement of a single letter would render it needful to
recommence the process, and that the letters are not merely
a million in number, but innumerable, we see little encour-
gement in the proposition of this bold man towards the work of
making an orderly world. His theory is not addressed to com-
mon sense, but is, in fact, a gigantic and unthinkable fraud on

¹ Quoted from "A French Advocate of Darwin," by Dr. Dabney, "Sens-
common sense, from which mankind turns away with contempt. The proposition can do no harm. Its author can take his place among the forgotten sophists of the past.

Only two other theories of modern materialism will need our attention. One is the attempted revival of the notion of heterogenesis, or spontaneous generation, which claims that perfectly insensate and dead matter is capable of generating living creatures by its own action, unaided by any foreign life-germ, and this notion is specially applied to the invented primitive substance to which the name of "protoplasm" has been given. It will be sufficient to say that, after most laborious and exhaustive experiments by opposing microscopists, not one single case of spontaneous generation of life has ever been produced; and Prof. Tyndall, in his latest and most thoughtful essays, has thrown the weight of his opinion against the genuineness, if not the possibility, of any such production of life. And as to protoplasm, its powers as a life-producer might now, without metaphor, be declared to have been finally extinguished, but for the fact that they never existed. The claims of its advocates received their death blow from Dr. Lionel Beale, of London, who is justly ranked among the greatest microscopists in the world, and have been finally buried by other attendants on the obsequies.

The other theory to be noted is drawn from the intimate re-

1 Such were Prof. Tyndall's views, as set forth in the two memoirs on the subject, published in the "Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society," for 1876-77; and they are adhered to in his articles on "Spontaneous Generation," Popular Science Monthly for February, March and April, 1878. See also Prof. Le Conte's note; "Man's Place in Nature," Princeton Review, November, 1878.

lotion between soul and body in man. At no time in the history of the world has this relation been so keenly and exhaustively studied as during the quarter of a century just past, and a great accumulation of interesting facts and inferences has taken place, and been embodied in such works as Prof. Huxley's "Physical Basis of Life," Lionel Beale's "Protoplasm; or, Matter and Life," Dr. Wm. B. Carpenter's "Mental Physiology," Prof. Alexander Bain's "Mind and Body," and Joseph Cook's "Lectures on Biology." Those who espouse the material or "one substance" side of the question, rely on the evidences for assertions like the following: That life never manifests itself separately from organism; that what is called mind is developed in exact proportion to the complication and fulness of the nervous system; that the cerebrum, or brain especially, is the indispensable condition of mind; that all succession of thought is attended by corresponding changes in the molecular adjustment of brain; that injury to the brain will impair, arrest, even destroy the operation of mind, though life may remain; that memory especially is affected by the state of the brain, and is not unlimited, but dependent for its acquisitions and retentions upon the size and volume of the brain; 1 in short, that man is nothing but a thinking machine, wholly dependent on material changes in his cerebrum or nervous system for every mental change, so that he may justly say: "In material conditions I find the origin of all religions, all philosophies, all opinions, all virtues, all spiritual conditions and influences in the same manner that I find the origin of all diseases and of all insanities in material conditions and causes." "I am what I am—a creature of necessity; I claim neither merit nor demerit." "I feel that I am as completely the result of my nature, and impelled to do what I do, as the needle to point to the north, or

1 This view is presented with special force by Prof. Bain, "Mind and Body," pp. 91–100.
the puppet to move according as the string is pulled." "I cannot alter my will, or be other than what I am, and cannot deserve either reward or punishment."¹

To state such a theory, leading to such results, is to refute it, on the principle of *reductio ad absurdum*, which, since the days of Euclid, has been held adequate negative demonstration.

Many valuable results have followed from the researches and speculations of materialists. It may be now assumed as reasonably certain that man is a single though a complex being; that his body is as truly a part of his individuality as his mind; that his organs and members, such as his eye, his tongue, his arm, his hand, are not mere instruments, unconnected with his essence, and simply used by the Ego, the mind, for its own purposes;² that they are, in truth, a part of himself, and that their own automatic action may, under proper circumstances, influence his mind; and hence, that no complete and philosophic view of man can be taken which does not regard his body as a subject of study and care, little, if at all, inferior to that bestowed on his soul.

In all this we may concur, and it will be found strongly to confirm the leading thought which this work is intended to present.

¹ These are literally and exactly the conclusions to which Henry G. Atkinson and Harriet Martineau have been brought by materialistic philosophy, and which they have declared in their "Letters on Man's Nature and Development," cited by Dr. Wm. B. Carpenter, "Mental Physiology," Am. Edit., p. 4.

² This theory of the mere instrumentalization of the body, and of the perfectly separate power and control of the mind, was a favorite one of Bishop Butler, and is insisted on in his Analogy. It is also very fully presented in an instructive and thoughtful work on "The Soul and the Body," by Dr. George Moore, of London, Harper's Am. Edit., 1847, Chap. II., pp. 25–29. But it must now be considered as abandoned, or greatly modified.—Carpenter's "Mental Physiology," Am. Edit., pp. 7–17; Prof. Tyndall's Belfast Address, pp. 57–65.
But when all the facts that have been ascertained, tending to show the influence of brain, nerves, blood and muscle upon mind, will, intellect and emotion are fully admitted, it will be found that they bring the common sense of mankind no nearer to materialism than it was in the age of Epicurus.

For still the insoluble mystery of life remains, and life concentrates in itself all the powers of mind, intellect, emotion, will. Without life these powers do not exist. With life, in man, and even in the lower animals, they all, in greater or less degree, co-exist. If life be taken away, matter remains—the brain, the nerves, the blood, the muscles still exist, but because the life or the spirit or the mind is wanting, this matter, once so highly organized, goes rapidly to decomposition and decay. And thus the very perfection of the man, and the close relations between his soul and his body, prove that spirit or mind exists.

Upon a review, therefore, of all the facts and arguments bearing on the subject, we are led to the conclusion that materialism as a system of the universe is false and inadmissible.
CHAPTER III.

IS ETERNAL BEING SOLELY SPIRIT?

HAVING endeavored to show that Eternal Being is not and cannot be solely matter, we come to the consideration of the next system of the universe, in the order set forth in the first chapter. Is Eternal Being solely pure spirit? Has matter been created out of nothing? These two questions are closely united.

The concession has already been made that this is the system frequently, but not universally, taught in the prevailing creeds of Christian theology. As it is proposed to discuss it with perfect freedom and candor, it will be most prudent at once to survey the field, and to ascertain how far the various corps or divisions of the great army who profess to march under the orders of a Divine Leader are committed on this point. How many of them have this dictum of faith inscribed on their standards, so that, for the present at least, they are pledged to contend for it? And how far is it fundamental, so that the integrity of their system demands that it shall not be abandoned?

The authoritative creeds of the Christian world, in all that is fundamental, challenge and must receive our profound reverence and regard. He would be a bold man indeed, and rash as bold, who would advance any theory distinctly contradicting any article of faith taught in all these formulae. But creeds, formulated and written out by man, are not the infallible word of God. They are only the answer—often lisping, stammering, trembling—which fallible man makes to the inspired Word, setting forth the confession of what the creature understands
to be the teachings of the Creator. And as man is fallible, so all men are fallible; and men, taken collectively, have erred, and may err still, as to the interpretation of inspired Scripture. When, indeed, after the lapse of ages, and after the light from thousands of devout intellects has fallen on the subject, men's creeds are found universally to agree on any point asserted to be Christian faith, there arises a powerful presumption that they are right on that point, and no attempt should be made to disturb it, until increased light and knowledge have reached a concentration tending to show that the point must be re-examined. But when forms of faith do not agree upon any point, when some forms assert it with dogmatic sharpness of outline, while other forms leave it vague and indistinct, and others yet do not assert it at all, then the question of its fundamental truth may be, in all fairness and without irreverence, considered open to examination.

Such is believed to be the state of the question whether God—the Eternal Spirit—made all things out of nothing. Although taught in the authoritative creeds of some Christian churches, it is not universally taught. In many of these formulæ, adopted by great divisions of the visible church, no such proposition, nor any equivalent for it, can be found. It is important that this assertion shall be sustained.

The division of the army of Christ known as the Roman Catholic Church is supposed to represent by its symbols the faith of one hundred and seventy millions of the human race. The council of Trent, which assembled in 1545, and sat till 1563, sought to embody in its "Canons and Decrees" all the essentials of the faith held from the beginning. It is a fact

1 "The Bible is the Word of God to man: the creed is man's answer to God." Such is the declaration of the learned and devout Dr. Philip Schaff in his great book, recently published, "The Creeds of Christendom," Vol. II., p. 3.
worthy of notice that it no where announces as the doctrine of the church a creation out of nothing. On this subject the Council was content simply to declare as its symbol of faith the Apostolic Creed, "in the very same words in which it is read in all the churches." That venerable creed uses only this language: "I believe in one God, the Father Almighty, maker of heaven and earth—of all things visible and invisible." 1

Assuredly no creation out of nothing is taught in this canon, unless the pretence can be sustained that the very word "maker" (factorem) necessarily implies a Creator out of nothing—a pretence too absurd to have any weight.

Upon this form of the doctrine of creation the Roman Catholic Church stood, not only for the period between its origin and the session of the Council of Trent, but for the period of three hundred and sixteen years between 1564 and 1870. In this last named year the Vatican Council, which had assembled in Rome for the acknowledged purpose of fixing, by a final decree, the doctrine of papal infallibility in matters of faith and morals, undertook also to revise the canon of the Council of Trent on the subject of creation. Then, for the first time by any authorized council, was announced as the faith of this church the proposition that "the one only true God created, out of nothing, from the very first beginning of time, both the spiritual and the corporeal creature, to-wit: the angelical and the mundane." 2

When it is remembered that this same council decreed that the Pope of Rome, when he speaks ex cathedra on faith and

1 "Credo in Unum Deum Patrem omnipotentem, factorem coeli et terrae, visibilium omnium et invisibilium."—Canons and Decrees of the Council of Trent, Sessio Tertia, "Credos of Christendom," Vol. II., p. 79.
2 "Hic solus Deus s s liberrimo consilio simul ab initio temporis utramque de nihilo condidit creaturam, spiritualem et corporalem, angelicam videlicet et mundanam."—Doxmatic Decrees of the Vatican Council, "Credos of Christendom," Vol. II., p. 239.
GREEK CHURCH.

morals, is infallible; and that, on the day before this decree was voted, one hundred and sixteen prelates, members of the council, left Rome because they did not assent to or believe in papal infallibility, we are in condition to estimate how much weight ought to be given to any decree of the remnant of this unfortunate council. The common sense and the Biblical knowledge of the world alike refuse to accept from such a source any teaching on the subject of Christian doctrine.

The division known as the Greek Church is supposed to influence the faith of eighty-five millions of the human race. In 1643 a systematic statement of its creed was drawn up by Peter Mogilas, Metropolitan of Kieff, and father of Russian theology, which was revised and adopted by the Greco-Russian Synod, at Jassy, in the same year, and signed by the Eastern Patriarchs, and approved again by the Synod of Jerusalem in 1672. The answer to the seventh question of this confession of faith is supposed to contain a distinct announcement of the doctrine of creation out of nothing. It declares that the Triune God made all things, visible as well as invisible, out of the non-existing. But it greatly weakens, if not wholly destroys, the basis for this announced doctrine when it adds that the psalmist testifies to it in the thirty-third psalm, ninth verse, where he says: “He spake and they were made; He commanded and they were created.”

Weak as is this testimony of the Eastern Church in its bear-

1 The words from the confession are as follows: "IIONX HOSX O EN TRODI THEOS EPIROGEV EX TIOX HOSX PANTA TA HUPATA KAI APARTA."—Orthodox Confession of the Eastern Church, Question VII., "Creeds of Christendom." Vol. II., p. 280. Our English version renders the verse from the Psalm: "For He spake and it was done; He commanded and it stood fast." The Latin, as given by Dr. Schaff, is: "Ipse dixit et facta sunt. Ipse jussit et creata sunt." The English is nearest to the original Hebrew. The verb hamad means "to stand," "to stand firm," "to persist," "to endure," never "to create." But neither the original nor these versions give countenance to the idea of a creation out of nothing.
ing on the question of creation, it is still further weakened by a subsequent declaration. In 1839 the "Longer Catechism of the Orthodox Catholic Eastern Church" was approved by the Most Holy Governing Synod, and ordered to be published by his Imperial Majesty the Czar of all the Russians. The imperial order is dated at Moscow. This authoritative doctrinal standard has practically superseded the older form of the orthodox confession prepared by Mogilas.¹ It may, therefore, be considered the modern representative of the faith held by the Greek Church. It is remarkable that it departs from the substantive declaration of a making of all things out of the non-existent by the Triune God, as held by Mogilas; and, on the subject of creation, gives only the well known form of the Apostolic Creed: "I believe in one God, the Father, Almighty, maker of heaven and earth, and of all things, visible and invisible."² The change is significant, and forbids us to reckon the great Eastern church as at present holding the doctrine in question.

The Protestant bodies of Christians throughout the world are supposed to influence one hundred millions of the human family. They may be considered as forming, in the aggregate, a great "Corps d'Armée," all under the standard of the Cross, and all opposed to papal claims, yet divided into a great number of divisions, brigades, even regiments, independent in their visible organization. It will suffice for our purposes to examine the doctrinal position of the chief representative Protestant denominations on the matter of creation out of nothing.

The Episcopal churches, including the Church of England

² Question and answer 67. Longer Catechism of the Eastern Church.—"Creeds of Christendom," Vol. II., p. 456. This "Orthodox Catechism" has been translated from the Slavonic-Russian language into several other tongues, but it never appeared in English until Dr. Schaff introduced it in his valuable work, p. 445.
in Great Britain and her colonies, and the several bodies governed by prelatical forms in America and elsewhere, have never, on this point, gone beyond the declarations in the thirty-nine articles and the Apostle’s Creed. The first article, “Of Faith in the Holy Trinity,” states the doctrine of creation thus: “There is but one living and true God, everlasting, without body, parts or passions; of infinite power, wisdom and goodness; the Maker and Preserver of all things, both visible and invisible.”¹ The form of the Apostle’s Creed, as given in the Anglican Catechism, is, on this point, even more simple than the article of faith. It is in these words: “I believe in God, the Father, Almighty, Maker of heaven and earth.”² It is worthy of special notice that the “Irish Articles of Religion,” probably composed by the learned Archbishop James Ussher, Professor of Divinity in Dublin, and which were adopted by the archbishops, bishops, and convocation of the Irish Episcopal Church, and approved by the Viceroy of Ireland in 1615, stated the doctrine of creation in the following form: “In the beginning of time, when no creature had any being, God, by His word alone, in the space of six days, created all things.” Yet even this form does not declare a creation out of nothing, for though no creature had any being, and every creature had and must have a beginning, yet uncreated being must have existed, and thus the question whether matter be uncreated remains open. Moreover, the Irish Articles did not remain in force, but were practically superseded by the present articles and creed of the Episcopal Church.³

¹ Thirty-Nine Articles, I., “Creeds of Christendom,” Vol. III., p. 487. Dr. Schaff gives the Latin form, the old English of 1571, and the American revised form of 1801. They are all, on this point, equivalent.
The "Reformed Episcopal Church in America," organized in 1875, which has so carefully sought to exclude from its symbols the errors of past generations, has retained the essentials of the Thirty-nine Articles, and gives that on "The Holy Trinity" as follows: "There is but one living and true God, who is a Spirit, everlasting, of infinite power, wisdom and goodness; the Maker and Preserver of all things, both visible and invisible. And in unity of this Godhead there be three persons, of one substance, power and eternity, the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost."¹

The Methodist Episcopal Church, which influences millions of minds in Europe and America, in its article of faith on the Holy Trinity, adopts the belief of the Anglican Church in substance, and declares that "There is but one living and true God, everlasting, without body or parts; of infinite power, wisdom and goodness; the Maker and Preserver of all things visible and invisible."²

The Baptist communion throughout the world, which is not much below the Methodist in the numbers on which it operates, so far as it has announced any distinctive articles of faith, gives no expression to the doctrine of creation out of nothing. It declares its view of "the true God" thus: "We believe that there is one, and only one, living and true God, an infinite, intelligent Spirit, whose name is Jehovah, the Maker and Supreme Ruler of heaven and earth."³

³ Baptist Confession (New Hampshire), A. D. 1838, "Creeds of Christendom," Vol. III., p. 742. The "Confession of the Free Will Baptists," 1834, 1868, gives the doctrine thus: "The Scriptures teach that there is only one true and living God, who is a Spirit, self-existent, eternal, immutable, omnipresent, omniscient, omnipotent, independent, good, wise, holy, just and merciful: the Creator, Preserver and Governor of the
The Congregational Churches of Great Britain and America simply declare in their "Principles of Religion" that "They believe in one God, essentially wise, holy, just and good; eternal, infinite and immutable in all natural and moral perfections; the Creator, Supporter and Governor of all beings and of all things." 1

The Reformed Church of Germany, whether in its organization as the Lutheran Church or as the German Reformed Church, has borne its testimony on the point now in question with such variations as to give little weight to its occasional deliverances in favor of a creation out of nothing. The Augsburg Confession, in its first article, simply adopts the "decree of the Nicene Synod," and declares that there is one Divine Essence, which is called and is God, eternal, without body, indivisible (without part), of infinite power, wisdom, goodness; the Creator and Preserver of all things, visible and invisible. 2 And Luther's Enchiridion, or Small Catechism, put forth in 1529, adopts only the formula of the Apostle's Creed, "I believe in God, the Father Almighty, Maker of heaven and earth;" and, in answer to the question "What does this mean?" says it means "I believe that God has created me and all that exists." 3


1 Declaration of the Congregational Union of England and Wales, A.D. 1833, Article 2, "Creeds of Christendom," Vol. III., p. 731. The Declaration of Faith of the National Council of the Congregational Churches, held at Boston, Mass., June 14-24, 1865, has no article on creation.—Ibid., pp. 734-736. Nor has the Oberlin Declaration of 1871.—Ibid., p. 737. It is worthy of note that the "Savoy Declaration," of 1658, which gave the faith and order of the Congregational Churches of England at that time, contained an article similar to that of the Westminster Confession as to creation out of nothing, but this is not repeated in their "Principles of Religion."—Ibid., Vol. III., p. 707.


3 Luther's Small Catechism, Ibid., Vol. III., pp. 77, 78.
No creation out of nothing is taught thus far. But the first Helvetic Confession, adopted in 1536 by the German-speaking Cantons of Switzerland, in its sixth article, which is "On God," distinctly declares that He has created by His Word, that is, by His Son, all things out of nothing. Yet again we are called on to note that this first confession was not satisfactory, and that thirty years afterwards the second or later Helvetic Confession was adopted, which was highly approved by nearly all the reformed churches on the continent and in England and Scotland, as being the most elaborate and most catholic among the Swiss confessions. It discards entirely the doctrine of creation out of nothing, and adopts substantially the words of the Augsburg Confession, declaring that God is the Creator of all things, visible and invisible, and that He has created them by His co-eternal Word, and preserves them by his co-eternal Spirit.

The Heidelberg Catechism, composed in 1563, and which is so deservedly esteemed for its genial and devout spirit, is remarkable in this, that it undertakes to depart from Luther's interpretation of the Apostle's Creed, and to introduce an element outside of and beyond its natural meaning. We have seen in what sense Luther understood the article "I believe in God, the Father, Almighty, Maker of heaven and earth." The Heidelberg has a question on the meaning of the same article, and makes answer that the Eternal Father, out of nothing, made

1 "Der alle dinge durch sein wort, das ist durch Seinen Sohn, aus nichts geschaffen habe." The Latin form is equally distinct, "considerit omnia ex nihilo."—"Creeds of Christendom," Vol. III., p. 218.

2 It was composed by Henry Bullinger, of Zurich, Zwingli's successor. —Note of Dr. Schaff introducing this confession, Ibid., Vol. III., p. 283.

heaven and earth, with all that in them is.¹ And such is the form of doctrine now taught to the children of the German reformed congregations. But when we remember that the doctrine in question does not appear in the Augsburg Confession, nor in Luther’s Catechism, nor in the second and highly approved Helvetic Confession, we are hardly authorized to consider it a tenet of the great reformed church of Germany.

We are now to consider the views on this subject held by the large and influential division of the Christian Church known, in all its sub-divisions, and through all its secessions, as Presbyterian. It has always been held in high esteem for the learning and intellectual strength of its ministry, and for its steady adherence to such interpretation of the inspired word as it believed to be sound.

It is worthy of special remark that the earliest confessions of faith of this enlightened church, adopted in France, Belgium and Scotland soon after the dawn of the Reformation, contained no statements of the doctrine of creation out of nothing. The French Confession, prepared by John Calvin and his pupil De Chaudié, and approved by a Synod at Paris in 1559, sets forth the doctrine of creation in these terms: “We believe that God, in three co-working persons, by His power, wisdom and incomprehensible goodness, created all things, not only the heavens and the earth, and all that in them is, but also invisible spirits.”² The Belgic Confession, composed in 1561 for the

¹ “Dass der ewige Fater unsers Herrn Jesu Christi, der Himmel und Erde samt allem was darinnen ist, aus Nichts erschaffen”—Question and answer 26, Heidelberg Catechism, “Creeds of Christendom,” Vol. III., p. 315.

² “Nous croyons que Dieu, en trois personnes co-opérantes, par sa vertu, sagesse et bonté incompréhensible, a créé toutes choses non seulement le ciel, la terre et tout ce qui y est contenu ; mais aussi les esprits invisibles.”—French Confession of Faith, “Creeds of Christendom,” Vol. III., p. 363. It may be questioned whether the English translation, made
churches in Flanders and the Netherlands, by Guy De Brés, who died, a martyr, in 1567, declares, in its second article, that we know God by two means: first, by the creation, preservation and government of the universe; secondly, and more clearly and fully, by His holy and divine Word. And, in the eighth article, that "the Father is the cause, origin and beginning of all things visible and invisible; the Son is the word, wisdom and image of the Father; the Holy Ghost is the eternal power and might, proceeding from the Father and the Son." 1 The Scotch Confession of 1560, which is so old that it gives Scripture passages according to the ancient version of Tyndale and Coverdale, in its first article, "Of God," states the doctrine of creation thus: "Be whom we confesse and beleve all thingis in hevin and eirth, aswel visible as invisible, to have been created, to be reteined in their being, and to be ruled and guyded be His inscrutable providence." 2 None of these forms express the doctrine in question.

In fact, this doctrine never emerged in the forms of belief of the followers of Calvin and John Knox until the Westminster Assembly incorporated it in their Confession of Faith in 1647. There it appears in the chapter on creation, and is thus expressed: "It pleased God the Father, Son and Holy Ghost, for the manifestation of the glory of His eternal power, wisdom and goodness, in the beginning, to create or make of nothing the world and all things therein, whether visible or invisible, in the space of six days, and all very good." 3

by Miss Emily O. Butler, and adopted by Dr. Schaff, is perfectly accurate in one point, i. e., whether "incomprehensible" ought not to qualify "power" and "wisdom" as well as "goodness."


RESULT SUMMED UP.

And this doctrine is distinctly reaffirmed in the "Larger Catechism" of the Presbyterian Church, and in the Shorter Catechism, where it is briefly expressed thus, in answer to the ninth question: "The work of creation is God's making all things of nothing, by the word of His power, in the space of six days, and all very good." Moreover, this doctrine is asserted to be vital, and upheld in argument by some of the most eminent divines of the Presbyterian Church. Her position, therefore, on the subject is definite, at least for the present.

We have thus reviewed the doctrinal status of each of the great divisions of Christendom on this point. Our review has shown that many of the most influential Christian bodies do not assert the doctrine of creation out of nothing; that it does not now appear in the authoritative creeds of the Greek and Eastern Churches, nor of the Episcopal, Methodist, Baptist, Congregational, Lutheran, German, nor Dutch Reformed Churches. Under such circumstances, it cannot be held to be a tenet sustained by the common "consensus" of Christians, and, therefore, its truth is open for discussion in the forum of reason and revelation.

It is a notable fact that the only churches which now assert it in their symbols are the Roman Catholic and the Presbyterian. Yet, on other points of doctrine, confessedly vital, no III., p. 611. Constitution of the Presbyterian Church in the United States, Confession of Faith, Chap. IV., p. 32. The Confession of the Waldenses, made in 1655, is equally explicit on this point: "Nous croyons que Dieu a fait toutes choses de rien, par sa volonté toute libre, et par la puissance infinie de sa Parole."—Art. 5, Brève Confession de Foy des Eglises Reformées de Piémont, "Creeds of Christendom," Vol. III., p. 760. This Confession of a pious and persecuted people belongs to the Calvinistic family.

1 Question and answer 15th, Larger Catechism; Confession of Faith, p. 181; Shorter Catechism, p. 382.

two churches are more in conflict than these. Neither, alone, represents a majority of Christendom. Their wide differences on other points detract essentially from the weight of their "consensus" on this point.

The Roman Catholic Church never asserted the doctrine until eighteen centuries of the Christian era had passed away, and then asserted it by a council not "œcumenical" in any proper sense of the term. And as the Presbyterian Church asserts it as true doctrine solely on the alleged authority of the Holy Scriptures, and refers in her standards to the Scriptures on which she relies to maintain it, we are relieved from the authority of human creeds, and brought face to face with the question: Has God revealed to man that He created all things out of nothing?

But before we approach this grave question, it will be proper to investigate, as far as may be needed, another, which lies directly on the line of approach. The attentive student will have noted the fact that a very large number of the Christian churches express their belief on the subject of creation substantially in the forms given to us in the creed adopted by the Council at Nice (which assembled in the summer of the year 325 A. D.), or in those used in the well known "Apostle's Creed," which, although its several articles had been repeated by a number of Christian writers before and after the Council of Nice, never took its present form in the Latin Church until about the middle of the eighth century.¹

As to the decrees of the Council of Nice, they can of course claim no inspired authority—no authority save that attaching to the decision of a majority of the three hundred and eighteen prelates and presbyters who composed it. As to the Apostle's

APOSTLE'S CREED.

Creed, it was at one time common to claim that it was written by the apostles of Christ themselves, and that it is older than the New Testament.¹ This claim began with a passage from Ambrose, in the fourth century, and Pope Leo the Great committed himself to it, denouncing the enemies of the church as rejecting "the symbol instituted by the apostles."² A tradition, founded on a spurious sermon attributed to St. Augustine, went so far as to assign a designated clause to each apostle.³ But the doubts of Laurentius Valla and Erasmus led to fuller investigation, and the work of Gerard Vossius finally overthrew the claim. From the time when his book appeared, no competent scholar has ever renewed the assertion of apostolic origin. This venerable creed stands no higher in authority than other human symbols of revealed truth.

Thus it appears that neither the Nicene decree nor the ancient creed of the church can claim any inspired authority. Whatever they may declare about creation cannot be said to come from God. But what do they declare? Creation out of nothing? Assuredly not.

The received text of the original decree at Nice may be thus translated: "We believe in one God, the Father, Almighty, Maker of heaven and earth, of all things, visible and invisible."⁴

¹ This claim, which was deliberately repeated in a sermon in Richmond, Va., by a Roman Catholic clergyman within a few years past, was completely undermined by Gerard Vossius, who, in his work "De Tribus Symbolis," published in 1642, demonstrated that the claim rests upon no solid evidence whatever.—Swainson on the Creeds, cited in Prof. Withrow's article on "The Three Creeds," So. Pres. Review, April, 1877, p. 363.

² Migne in his Cols., Vol. 54, c. 466, gives the words: "Instituto a sanctis apostolis symbolo repugnantes."

³ Prof. Withrow's Article, So. Pres. Review, April, 1877, p. 362.

⁴ "Ιστέωμεν εἰς ὙΕΩΝ ΠΑΤΕΡΑ παντοκράτωρα, ποιήσας ωάρανον καὶ γῆς, ωρατῶν το παντόν καὶ ωρατῶν."—Forma Recepta Ecclesiae Orientalis, Nicæo-Constantinopolitan Creed, Dr. Schaff's "Creeds of Christendom," Vol. II., p. 57.
The received form of the first article in the Apostle’s Creed is: “I believe in God, the Father, Almighty; Creator of heaven and earth.”¹ Now, the Greek word used in these forms is “τῷ ἐργασίᾳ,”² and the Latin words used are “Creator,” “Factor,” “Conditor,” “Fabricator.” None of these words convey the idea of a creation out of nothing. They convey the simple thought of a maker, a builder, an architect, a founder, former or framer of a new fabric or composition out of existing materials. Even the word “poet,” which comes directly from the Greek word, never conveyed to the ancient mind the notion of a creator out of nothing. No poet, however great and however creative his faculties, has ever brought something out of nothing. His highest achievement and glory have never gone beyond the creation of new thoughts and forms of beauty or grandeur from the treasures of the past.

In fact, it would have been impossible for the men who spoke and wrote in the Greek and Latin tongues to have coined any verb or noun which, in its own unaided strength, would have conveyed the idea of creation out of nothing. They never had conceived such an idea, and they could not invent the symbol of an idea which did not exist. They would have been compelled to use a circuitry of words in order to bring out a thought involving a contradiction of their received truth “Ex nihilo nil fit.”

But those who uphold the belief in creation out of nothing assert that a presumption necessarily arises that this belief was derived from the Holy Scriptures. They argue thus: None of the heathen philosophers of the East, or of Greece, or of Rome, believed this doctrine. They all held that matter was not


² St. Irenaeus, who wrote a creed A. D. 200, has “τῶν πεποιημένων τῶν υμάς καὶ τῶν γῆς.”—Ibid., Vol. II., pp. 13, 52. But there is not an appreciable shadow of difference in the meaning.
created out of nothing, but was eternal; and that the function
of the spiritual Creator was to create, mould and fashion into
forms of usefulness and beauty this eternal matter. But re-
ligious philosophers, under the teachings of the inspired Hebrew
and Greek Scriptures, began to teach a different doctrine, to-wit:
that matter itself was, like all things made out of it, the creature
of God. As this belief was entirely novel, and was asserted
several times by Christian apologists within the period of two
hundred and twenty-five years which intervened between the
death of the apostle St. John and the opening of the Council
of Nice, it is argued that such a belief, being in conflict with
all heathen philosophy, must have been obtained from the in-
spired Scripture. Such is the argument.

Even if this were true—if the belief came from an inter-
pretation of Scripture, adopted in good faith by these Christian
writers—the question would still be open whether their inter-
pretation was sound.

But the point is plausible enough to justify farther investiga-
tion. We must, therefore, enquire what Christian writers of
the early period in question did assert this belief, and what
weight is to be given to their opinions on the subject.

Saint Ignatius, Bishop of Antioch, in Syria, who suffered mar-
tyrdom A. D. 107, is the earliest writer, after the Apostle John,
who has left any testimony approaching to a creed. In his epistle
to the Trallians, he gives several declarations of points of Christ-
ian faith, but no announcement of creation out of nothing.¹

Saint Irenæus comes next in time. He was a native of Asia
Minor, and a disciple of Polycarp, the martyr of Smyrna, who
had unquestionably enjoyed the personal friendship and in-
struction of the Apostle John. This renders the testimony of

¹ Ignatius of Antioch, A. D. 107, Epistola ad Trallianos, Cap. 9, “Creeds
of Christendom,” Vol. II., p. 11; Appleton’s Cyclop. of Biography, p.
413, Edit. 1870.
Irenæus specially valuable and significant. He became bishop of the church at Lugdunum (known afterwards as Lyons), in the south of France, in the year 177, and in the year 180 wrote his great work against heresies. It is probable that this work was written in Greek as well as in Latin; but if so, nothing remains of the Greek version except a few fragments preserved by subsequent writers. Among those fragments we have three forms of a creed, two of which are in Greek as well as Latin, while the third is in Latin only.¹

It is worthy of note that this work, "Contra Haereses," was specially written against the early heretics known as "Gnostics." They were distinguished as the most polished, learned and wealthy of the Christian name, and their very title indicates a claim to superiority of knowledge, "either assumed by their own pride, or ironically bestowed by the envy of their adversaries."²

Although they professed Christianity, they were, almost without exception, of the Gentile race, and their principal founders seem to have been natives of Syria or Egypt, and deeply imbued with the ideas of Oriental philosophy. They blended with the faith of Christ many tenets obscure, yet, in their view, sublime, which they derived from the religion of Zoroaster, and among which were the eternity of matter, the existence of a good and evil principle, and a mysterious hierarchy of the invisible world.³

Now, with such opinions to meet and refute, it is certain that Irenæus would have at once and distinctly asserted the doctrine

³ Ibid., Vol. I., p. 521. Milman, in his deprecatory note, page 520, does not question the statements. Indeed, however sceptical Gibbon may have been concerning the Divine origin of Christianity, his accuracy as a historian seems to be confirmed rather than impeached by all subsequent criticism.
of creation out of nothing if he had found it plainly taught in
the Hebrew and Greek Scriptures received by the church as
inspired. But in neither of the three forms of the creed left
by him does he assert any such tenet. In the Greek form of
the first, he declares the faith of the church in one God, the
Father, Almighty, who made the heaven and the earth and the
seas, and all that in them is.\footnote{1} The second form, which is in
Latin, declares the belief of Christians in one God, Maker of
heaven and earth, and all that in them is.\footnote{2} In the third form,
which is in Greek, Irenæus declares that the spiritual man has
a full faith \(\piστευ  \ ουκείμενος\) "in one God, Almighty, from whom
are all things."\footnote{3} This form comes nearer to the doctrine in
question than either of the others; but it is, at most, ambiguous
and indefinite. For "all things," according to the usage of
that age, meant the whole creation—all worlds and creatures,
visible and invisible; and to declare God to be the Creator of
these by no means declared Him to have created them out of
nothing. Moreover, this form, being from the same writer,
must be construed with reference to and in the same sense with
the other forms which do not assert the doctrine in question.
It must, therefore, be conceded that this early Christian father,
though writing against heretics, one of whose tenets was the
eternity of matter, has not designated and condemned that tenet
as a heresy.

Cyprian, the great bishop and martyr of Carthage, died A. D.
258, leaving a few fragments of a creed, in which the doctrine
of creation out of nothing does not appear.\footnote{4}

\footnote{1} "Εις ευθείαν θεον Πατερα παρθενοται των πεπερασμα των ουρανων και των
γης και των ημασμα τα εν οιωνοι."—Contra Heresies, Lib. I.,

\footnote{2} In Unum Deum, credentes, Fabricatorem coeli et terrae et omnium
quae in cissunt.—Ibid., Vol. II., p. 15.

\footnote{3} " Εις ου τα πασατα."—Adv. Her., Lib. IV., Cap. 33, Ibid., Vol. II., p. 16.

\footnote{4} One of these fragments is in the Epistle to Magnus, Ep. 69, Al. 76.
Novatian, first a presbyter and afterwards a schismatical bishop of Rome, composed, about A.D. 250, a creed in the Latin language, which simply declares belief in God, the Father, and Almighty Lord, that is, the most perfect Maker of all things.¹

Gregory, surnamed Thaumaturgus from his supposed power of working miracles, was Bishop of Neo-Caesarea from A.D. 240 to 270, and, by his preaching and influence, changed it from a heathen to a Christian city. Three forms of a creed are ascribed to him, two of which are certainly spurious. The genuine form is in Greek, and it is a strong proof how early superstitious traditions crept into the church, to mark that Gregory of Nyssa, who lived a hundred years after the supposed miracle-working Gregory, gives us a legend that this form of creed was revealed in a vision by the Apostle John, at the request of the Virgin Mary!² From whatever source it was obtained, it is certain that it announces no doctrine of creation out of nothing, but does declare, in strong words, the divinity of Christ, and that He is “the Power which produces all creation.”³

Lucian, of Antioch, was a very learned presbyter, who died by martyrdom, A.D. 311, under the Emperor Maximin. His creed was found after his death, and was, with three similar forms, laid before the Synod of Antioch, held in 341, with the hope that it might be substituted for the Nicene Creed. It is sometimes called “the Second Antiochian formula,” and is esteemed for fullness and ingenuity. It declares a belief in

The other in the Synodical Epistle to Januarius and other Numidian bishops, Ep. 70.—“Creeds of Christendom,” Vol. II., p. 20.

¹ “Rerum omnium perfectissimum coditorem.”—Ibid., Vol. II., p. 21.

² Introductory note, by Dr. Schaff, to Gregorius Thaumaturgus, of Neo-Caesarea, about A.D. 270.—Ibid., Vol. II., p. 24.

³ “Ἰούναγος της οἰκῆς κτισίως ποιητικῶς.”—Ibid.
one God, the Father, Almighty, the Maker and Provider of all things.1

Arius, the presbyter of Alexandria, whose heresy as to Christ, the Son of God, kindled the greatest theological controversy of the early church, and became the occasion of the Nicene Council and decrees, has left on record his private creed, composed about A. D. 328. It is to be condemned, not for the beliefs it expresses, but for those it omits. It declares that the Lord Jesus Christ is Son of the Almighty Father, and was begotten of Him before all ages, and is the Divine Logos, through whom all things were made, both those in the heavens and those on the earth.2

And, last but not least, we have Eusebius, Bishop of Caesarea, in Palestine, the church historian, the friend and eulogist of the Emperor Constantine, and a prominent member of the Council of Nice. He has given us the form of a creed, which he declares that his church at Caesarea had received from former bishops in catechizing and at baptism, and that he himself had learned it from Scripture, and believed and taught it, and had laid it before the Emperor and the Council. This creed, in the articles on creation, goes no farther than the Nicene decree, which we have already examined.3 It asserts no doctrine of creation out of nothing.

In truth, this doctrine appears only in two writers of creeds

1 "Τον των ολων ὅγιαμορφον τε καὶ πνευμην και πρωσομορπον." This creed is given in Socrates, Hist. Eccl., Lib. II., Cap. 10–18; Sozomen, Hist. Eccl., Lib. III., Cap. 5, VI., 12.— "Creeds of Christendom," Vol. II., pp. 25–28. It is noticeable that Plato’s word "ἀγιαμορφον." as applied to the Divine Creator, seems to have been introduced here for the first time in a Christian creed. The classical scholar needs not to be told that it is not a stronger word than "πνευμην," and, in fact, means "an artisan," "an artist," "one who exercises a handicraft trade." Voltaire, with all his badinage, does no more than justice to Plato in his "Songe De Platon."— Romans, Tome II., pp. 365–368.


3 It is given by Dr. Schaff, "Creeds of Christendom," Vol. II., pp. 29, 30.
during the period from the death of John the Apostle to the Council of Nice. These writers are Tertullian and Origen. That they were both learned and eminent is conceded. But in estimating the weight of their authority on this point we must consider certain facts which take much from it.

Quintus Septimius Florens Tertullian was the son of a Roman centurion, and was born in Carthage about A. D. 160. He was trained a lawyer, and rose to eminence in the courts. Born and raised a heathen, he was converted to Christianity, and was soon afterwards ordained a presbyter in the church of Carthage. He entered keenly into all the debated questions of the church, and wrote thirty treatises on them, which, although they exhibit the unconquerable zeal and fervor of his heart, do not give us so favorable a view of his head. His arguments are frequently edged with satire and loaded with severe vituperation. Figures swell into absurd hyperbole, and his language is often "so twisted as to be obscure." It is true that all this might have been consistent with soundness and orthodoxy, but he fell into worse errors than faults of rhetoric.

In his day, the heresy of the Phrygian Montanus broke out into flame. Carried away by a temperament for which his compatriots had long been famed, and which led them into those forms of nature-worship that delighted in magic and ecstasies, Montanus mused on the supernatural element in Christianity until he conceived the idea that he was himself the Paraclete promised by Christ. He did not claim to be the Holy Ghost, but the predicted Enlivener, Purifier, Comforter. He threw himself into states of transport and raved with fluent sublimity. Many followers, among whom were two ladies, caught the infection. A new church was founded at Pepuza, which they called the "New Jerusalem," and visions, tongues and nervous spasms were a daily spectacle.¹

¹ Prof. Eadie's Article "Montanus," Appleton's Cyclop. of Biography, 587; Gibbon's "Decline and Fall," Am. Edit., Vol. IV., p. 529. Such
CREATION FROM NOTHING.

To this heretical folly Tertullian gave in his adhesion, about the close of the second century, and he began immediately to maintain it in writing, and continued to do so up to the time of his death, which occurred about A. D. 220. And even before he professed Montanism, some of his works exhibit a mysticism which showed a leaning in that direction. From such a man, capable of such extravagance, we ought not to expect a form of sound words, nor ought we to give weight to any disputed article of faith announced by him.

Now, it was this hot-headed and heretical African who first gave expression to the idea of creation out of nothing as an article of Christian belief. He has given three forms of the creed, all in his own Latin tongue. The first form declares a belief in "one God, Almighty, the Maker of the world." The second form, which bears internal evidence that it was written after he had adopted the paraclete heresy, declares a belief in the Son of the one God, His word (Logos) who proceeded from Him, by whom all things were made, and without whom nothing was made. The last form is the only one that states the doctrine in question. It is in these words: "We believe that extravagancies have not been unknown in modern times. Edward Irving's follies in London, into which he was betrayed by first yielding to the mystic teachings of Coleridge, approach the borders of Montanism, and are still alive in the Irvingite Church.

1 Article "Tertullian," by Prof. Eadie, Appleton's Cyclop. of Biography, p. 982; Article "Montanists," New Am. Cyclop., Vol. XI., p. 677; Introductory note to Tertullian, A. D. 200, by Dr. Schaff, "Creeds of Christendom," Vol. II., p. 16. The learned English Bishop, Dr. Lightfoot, throws additional discredit upon Tertullian by showing that he "is the first to assert direct sacerdotal claims on behalf of the Christian ministry."


* Adversus Praxeum (a Unitarian who taught that the Father suffered), Cap. 2. He begins this form "Nos vero et semper, et nunc magis ut instructores per Paracletum."—Ibid., Vol. II., p. 17.
there is but one God, and no other besides the Maker of the world, who produced the universe out of nothing.”¹

Considering the progress that Tertullian had made in the belief in ecstasies, visions, spasms and other heresies, and considering also that the prior forms of belief expressed by him contain no such doctrine, we are justified in the conclusion that he threw out this statement without authority and without any deliberate thought on the subject.

We come now to the testimony of Origen, surnamed Adimantius. He was born in Alexandria, in Egypt, A. D. 185, and died in the city of Tyre, A. D. 254. He was, therefore, twenty-five years younger than Tertullian. It is impossible to withhold from him our admiration, on account of his genius, his piety, his immense learning and labors, his heroic constancy under persecution; it is equally impossible to deny his numerous heresies and follies, which were so great and so apparent in his writings that his orthodoxy was impeached in his life time, and long after his death he was solemnly condemned as a heretic by the Council of Constantinople, A. D. 544; and the emperor required that he himself, as well as his errors, should be condemned.² In obedience to this requisition, the council launched ten anathemas against “the venomous doctrine” of Origen, and wound up by a solemn sentence of damnation on himself personally, designating him by his surname also, lest any question of identity should arise.³ From this time it has


³ “Anathema etiam ipsi Origeni qui dicitur Adimantius.” There was another Origen, the disciple and friend of Porphyry, who was cotemporary
been the fixed belief of a large number of theologians in the communion of Rome that Origen is in hell. Very few persons in that communion dare to doubt concerning his eternal damnation.¹

Charity may induce us to take the side advocated by the Jesuit Binet and others, who hope better things for Origen. But it remains true that, both in creed and practice, he adopted errors so grave as entirely to destroy confidence in his judgment. Early in life he practised against himself a deed not to be named, and which can be alluded to only to show that he was capable of a misinterpretation of Scripture gross and suicidal. His doctrine of salvation, so universal as to include lost men and devils, would not now be objected to by that part of the Anglican Church who sympathize with Canon Farrar, and the author of "Death of Death;" but his teachings that souls had sinned before they were in human bodies; that the sun, moon and stars are living creatures; that, at the day of judgment, guardian angels will be chastised if they have not done well their duty in guarding the men committed to their care; that the stars are books, in which angels have written the horoscopes of men, and that they have taught to men so much of this judicial astrology as will enable them to draw the secrets


¹ "Il ya beaucoup de théologiens dans la communion de Rome qui croient que ce Père est dans les Enfers."—Bayle, Dict., III., 2124. "Peu de personnes dans cette communion osent douter de sa damnation éternelle."—Ibid, p. 2128. Bayle sustains these statements by abundant authorities, and even gives an alleged vision, seen by a good man, who, finding himself troubled concerning the salvation of Origen, after ardent prayers of a holy old man, saw a part of hell opened, and there recognized a number of noted heresiarchs, in the midst of whom was Origen, "qui étoit là damné parmi les autres, et chargé d'horreur, de flammes et de confusion."—Ibid, p. 2125, note D.
of nativity, though without violence to free will; that the earth is a large animal, capable of good and evil, and, therefore, worthy of reward or punishment, according to its conduct; and that after the day of judgment women will be transformed into men,¹ and other similar vagaries, deprive him of all claim to the confidence of men of sober minds.

We are thus prepared to receive with suspicion and to attach very little weight to Origen’s declarations of the belief of the church. His work, Ἡ ἔρημος ἀρχαία, “On the Principles of Christianity,” was written in Greek, but only exists now in the Latin version of Rufinus, which has long been regarded by competent scholars as loose and inaccurate.² This work sets forth a creed as the "form of those things which are manifestly delivered by the preaching of the apostles.” The first article is, that there is one God, who created and framed everything, and who, when nothing was, brought everything into being.³

Admitting the translation by Rufinus to be correct, the sense is plain and unequivocal, but, for reasons above given, it cannot have any more authority than the similar declaration of Tertullian.

Thus we reach the fact that, in the period between the Apostle John and the Council of Nice, eight noted Christian writers—Ignatius, Irenæus, Cyprian, Novatian, Gregory Thaumaturgus, Lucian, Arius and Eusebius—gave forms of creeds, all professedly drawn from the Scriptures, or from the teachings of the apostles, and in none of them is the doctrine of creation out of nothing set forth; while two only—Tertullian and Origen—

¹ All these tenets were attributed as heresies to Origen by the church. —Bayle, Dict. Hist. et Crit., Tome III., pp. 2124, 2125.
² Dr. Schaff so characterizes it.—Introductory note to Origen, of Alexandria, about A. D. 280, "Creeds of Christendom," Vol. II., p. 21.
³ "Primo, quod unus Deus est, qui omnia creavit atque composuit, quique, cum nihil esset, esse fecit universa.”—De Principiis, Lib. I., Pref., 4–6, Ibid., Vol. II., p. 22.
gave forms expressing this doctrine, and their authority is greatly weakened, if not entirely destroyed, by their own grave departures from orthodoxy. Certainly the weight of authority, during this formative period, is against the doctrine in question.

This relieves the subject from the last trammel of human creeds, and enables us to come, without prejudice or prepossession, to the simple question: Do the inspired Scriptures teach that God created the universe out of nothing?

In discussing this question, we can hardly go amiss in taking, as the strongest alleged proofs of this doctrine, those passages from the Holy Scriptures which are referred to and relied on in the Confession of Faith and Larger and Shorter Catechisms of the Westminster Assembly, and those put forth by eminent divines of the Presbyterian Church. If these do not establish the doctrine, it is safe to say that it is not found in the Scriptures. These passages will, therefore, be considered in their proper order.

The first passage is the whole of the first chapter of Genesis, but especially the first verse. That verse, in our received English translation, is as follows: “In the beginning, God created the heaven and the earth.”

Assuming, for the present, that this is a perfectly accurate translation of the original, the question arises, how can creation out of nothing be held as taught in it? Certainly it is not expressed, unless it be previously shown that the verb “to create” means, by its own unaided significance, “to create out of nothing.” Such a pretence will be found to be contradicted by the usage of the verb in thousands of instances since it was first introduced into our language from the Latin tongue, in which, as we have already noted, it is constantly used to convey

1 Westminster Confession of Faith, on Creation, p. 32; Larger Catechism, question 15th and answer, p. 181; Shorter Catechism, question 9th and answer, p. 382; “Creeds of Christendom,” Vol. III., pp. 611, 677.
the idea of moulding, forming, fabricating, making new things out of existing materials. No sound scholar will hazard his reputation by deliberately asserting that a making out of nothing is meant by the plain English word "create."

But it has been sometimes asserted, by writers claiming to be philologists, and especially learned in the Hebrew language, that the verb *bara*, in the inspired original, and which is translated by the English verb *create*, certainly means "created out of nothing" in this opening verse of the holy Scriptures. It is impossible to maintain this ground; for the radical and primary idea conveyed by this word *bara* is that of cutting, cutting out, carving, paring—ideas which can only exist on the condition of something previously existing from which a new form can be cut out or carved. In the radical syllable *bar*, from which the verb is formed, the notion of cutting, breaking, separating, is inexorably inherent. The farther meanings of the verb *bara*, given by the highest authority on the subject, are: to form, to create, to produce, to beget, to bring forth; and the German word *schaffen*, Danish *skabe*, Belge-Dutch *schaaren*, English *shave* all belong to the same stock. No competent Hebraist has ever ventured to assign as even one of the meanings of *bara* the definition "to create out of nothing." The only approach to it is the definition that the word "implies the creation of something new, not before existing," which is readily admitted.

This same verb *bara* is four times again used in the first chapter of Genesis. In the twenty-first verse we read, "And

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1 This ground is distinctly taken by Principal Dawson, of the McGill University, Montreal, in his recent work, "The Origin of the World According to Revelation and Science." Harper's Edi., 1877, pp. 90-92.

2 No higher authority exists than Gesenius, so long Professor in the University of Halle, Wittenberg. His reputation as a Hebrew scholar and lexicographer has constantly increased. It will be sufficient to refer to his "Hebrew and English Lexicon." On this verb, p. 172.
HEBREW WORD BARA.

God created great whales, and every living creature that moveth, which the waters brought forth abundantly, after their kind, and every winged fowl after his kind." To say that these great fish and winged fowl were created out of nothing is an assumption unfounded and hardly reverent. The world of earth, air and waters was in existence, furnishing all the needed material elements, and, in the previous verse, the power of God is declared in causing the waters to bring forth abundantly moving creatures, with life, and fowls to fly above the earth in the atmosphere. No bringing out of nothing is anywhere expressed or implied; for even the inscrutable principle of life came, not from nothing, but from the Almighty Spirit.

The remaining instances of the use of the verb bara in this chapter are in the twenty-seventh verse, where it is used three times in declaring the creation of man, in the image of God, and male and female. It is difficult to see how any competent biblical scholar can contend that the word in this verse means to create out of nothing. It cannot have such meaning; for we are expressly taught in the next chapter that "the Lord God formed man of the dust of the earth," and that woman was made from a part of man, taken from him for the purpose. And as to the informing and individual spirit with which man was endowed, we are taught that God "breathed into his nostrils the breath of life, and man became a living soul."1 That man was not created out of nothing likewise appears by the twenty-sixth verse of the first chapter, in which "God said: Let us make man in our image." Here the verb used is hasha, which is constantly used in the sense of the German machen, and the English make, and signifies to build, to manufacture, to prepare, to produce by labor.2 No scholar pretends that this verb means to create out of nothing.

1 Genesis ii. 7.
2 Gesenius' Lexicon, p. 802.
If the verb *bara* cannot be proved to mean a creation out of nothing in the first chapter of Genesis, it certainly cannot be proved to have that meaning anywhere in the Scriptures. That it often means the production of something *new*—something theretofore unknown, some novel phenomenon—is readily admitted. God’s creation of material worlds, and of miraculous phenomena in this world, have been *new* in all creative and miraculous ages, and we have no reason to doubt that such new exhibitions of His power are yet to come; but they do not come *out of nothing*. In truth, as though to negative by inspired usage this pretension, this verb *bara* is sometimes so used in the Scriptures that it *cannot* mean creation out of nothing. An example occurs in Isaiah liv. 16: “Behold, I have created (the verb is *bara*) the smith that bloweth the coals in the fire, and that bringeth forth an instrument for his work; and I have created (same verb) the waster to destroy.” Neither the context nor the plain meaning of this verse will, without sacrilegious violence, justify the pretense of a creation out of nothing.

Principal Dawson quotes, with evident approbation, the statement of Professor Moses Stuart of Andover, that if this word *bara* “does not mean to create in the highest sense,” (that is, in the sense of creating out of nothing)—“then the Hebrews had no word by which they could designate this idea.”

No doubt this is true, but it does not at all help the cause of the advocates of creation out of nothing. In truth, there is no

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1 To this category must be referred the instances cited by Principal Dawson—one from Numbers xvi. 30, where the perfectly new phenomenon of the earth’s opening and swallowing up Dathan and his co-rebels is spoken of as God’s act of “creating *bara* a creation;” the other, from Exodus xxxiv. 10, where the same verb is used in reference to the “marvels such as have not been done in all the earth, nor in any nation,” by means whereof God would establish the Israelites in Palestine.—*Origin of the World.* p. 91.

2 Ibid. p. 90.
such *single word* in Hebrew, or in any other language known to philology. We will not say that no such word can be invented, because, as the *idea* or *notion* exists, human ingenuity may be competent to invent a *sign*, in a single *verb*, of such idea. But the fact that no such single word has been found in any language, dead or living, affords a strong presumption against the doctrine.

But Principal Dawson, adopting apparently the view of another writer, insists that “in the Hebrew Scriptures this word *bara* is applied to God only, as an Agent, and *not* to any human artificer;” and he adds that this asserted fact “is very important with reference to its (*bara’s*) true significance.”1 Unfortunately for this argument, its whole weight depends on an assertion which is not true. The asserted “fact,” when examined, disappears, and the argument vanishes with it. The verb *bara*, in its proper and primary sense of *to cut, to carve, to cut down*, is used in several places in the Hebrew Scriptures where it is not applied to God, but to man as the agent performing the act. Thus, in Exodus xxxiv. 13, the Israelites are told that when they come among the idolatrous nations of Palestine, they shall destroy their altars, break their images and *cut down* their groves.2 And in Numbers xiii. 23 the human agency is still more unequivocally stated: “And they (the Israelite spies) came unto the brook of Eshcol, and *cut down* from thence a branch.” And in Joshua xvii. 15, 18, the action is to be entirely that of the people: “If thou be a great people, then get thee up to the wood country and *cut down* for thyself there.” “But the mountain shall be thine; for it is a wood, and thou shalt *cut it down*.”3 Thus it appears that the use of the verb *bara* in the

1 “Origin of the World,” p. 92, citing McDonald’s “Creation and Fall.”
2 *Bara* is here used, but in the *Piel* form.—Gesenius’ *Lexicon*, p. 172.
3 These uses of the verb *bara* are pointed out in Gesenius’ “Hebrew and English Lexicon,” Edit. 1886, p. 172.
Hebrew Scriptures is not confined to God as the Agent, but frequently applied to man.

In view of these facts, we cannot avoid a feeling of regret that any devout Christian scholar should hazard the statements made by Principal Dawson. An eminent theologian, the creed of whose church expressly asserts the doctrine of creation out of nothing, has abandoned all argument founded on the Hebrew verb. His words are: "The proof of the doctrine of a creation ex nihilo does not rest on the usage of the words bara or \( \tau \varsigma \varepsilon \iota \nu \), which are interchanged with hasha and \( \pi \nu \iota \varepsilon \iota \nu \). God is said to have created the world, and also to be the Maker of the heavens and the earth. Plants and animals are said to be created, although formed out of the dust of the earth." \(^1\)

But it is argued that the doctrine in question is necessarily inferred from the expression "In the beginning God created." It is insisted that this expression there used applies to all being except God, and means that all being except God had a beginning, and, therefore, matter had a beginning. But this claim involves an obvious "petitio principii," a begging of the question at issue, and thus violates sound logic. For, how does it appear that the "heavens and the earth," which had a beginning, comprehend all being save God? The earth certainly does not, for it is only our planet with its necessary adjuncts. Neither does "the heaven," according to the true meaning of the original Hebrew word shamaim; for this word means the firmament which seems spread out like an arch above the earth, and is represented as supported on foundations and columns. \(^2\) Hence the same word is used when Jacob, in his dream, saw a ladder set up on the earth, the top of which reached to heaven, and

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\(^2\) This appears in the 8th verse: "And God called the firmament heaven," (shamaim).
said the place he was in was the gate of heaven. It was certainly impossible even in a dream to have seen the top of this ladder, if it reached beyond the fixed stars on the side of the earth antipodal to Jacob. Therefore, the “heaven” was the firmament. The same meaning appears in 2 Samuel xxii. 8: “the earth shook and trembled: the foundations of heaven (shamaim) moved and shook,” showing that the idea of “heaven” was the visible arch, supported as with foundations and columns; and this same idea appears in Job, the oldest book of the sacred canon. In xxvi. 11 we read: “The pillars of heaven (shamaim) tremble.” And in Psalm lxxviii., which details the miracles of power by which the Israelites were brought out of Egypt and maintained in the wilderness, this same meaning of “heaven” appears in the 23d and 24th verses, where it is stated that God had “opened the doors of heaven (shamaim), and had rained down manna upon them to eat.”

No meaning ever attached to this Hebrew noun in any passage of the Scriptures will authorize the claim of those who uphold the doctrine of creation ex nihilo. For this claim necessarily requires that the single word “heaven” shall include, not merely our atmosphere and visible firmament, but the sun, moon and planets, the illimitable æther which fills space, the fixed stars, some of which are so distant that millions of years are required for the light from them to reach the earth, and all the hierarchy of exalted beings known as the arch-angels and angels, thrones, dominions, principalities, and powers. This extravagant claim is plainly rebuked and rejected by the Scriptures themselves, which show that the sun and moon were made after God had stretched out the firmament and called it heaven (shamaim), and after land and water were divided on the earth, and after

1 Genesis xxviii. 12, 17. The noun is the same as in Genesis i. 1, shamaim, in the plural.

2 Gesenius' "Hebrew and English Lexicon," p. 1026.
grass and herbs began to grow on its surface. And it is farther contradicted by the uniform belief of the church, founded on many hints in the Scriptures, that arch-angels and angels had been created long before the creation described in the first chapter of Genesis; and that from this exalted hierarchy a number had fallen by rebellion, the chief of whom was the tempting spirit, who, in the body of the serpent, seduced Eve from her duty.

It is, therefore, obvious that "the heaven and the earth," spoken of in Genesis, may have had "a beginning," and yet the matter out of which they were made may have had no beginning. In truth, "a beginning" must be predicated of all created things, because, as we have shown, the word create means to make, to mould, to manufacture, and some new or beginning phenomenon or form must emerge when creation takes place. In the same sense, every city, every palace, every house built by man has had a beginning—not because they were made out of nothing, but because a new mode of being has been made out of pre-existing material.

But critical examination throws another difficulty in the path of advocates of creation ex nihilo, arising from this same word "beginning." It is not by any means philologically certain that the Hebrew word reashith, translated "beginning," was intended, in this opening verse of the Scriptures, to convey strictly and solely the idea of the English word beginning or commencement. It may be, with much reason, contended that the real signification of the words bi reashith here used is "in eternity." For in the Greek language the equivalent expression is "εἰ αὐτῇ." The Septuagint translation of the Hebrew Scriptures, made by the most learned Greek and Hebrew scholars who could be collected in Alexandria about two hundred and eighty-five years before the advent of Christ, thus renders this
expression in the first verse of Genesis. Now this same Greek form of expression is used in the opening verse of the gospel by St. John: "In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God." Assuredly "εις αρχήν," in the beginning, here means "in eternity;" any lower meaning would degrade the Divine Word to the condition of a creature. If, then, the expression means "in eternity" in the Evangel, why not in Genesis? No judgment save one entirely arbitrary can draw a valid distinction between the significance of the two expressions, which are, in form, identical.

Upon these grounds, therefore, it must be held that the declaration "in the beginning God created the heaven and the earth" furnishes no sound argument tending to prove creation ex nihilo.

The learned and pious Dr. Charles Hodge has sought to infer this doctrine from passages of Scripture which assert the absolute dependence of all things on God and His absolute sovereignty over them. For this purpose he quotes three

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1 "Εν αρχή εποιήσεν ο Θεος τον ουρανον και την γην."—Septuagint, Edit. Lipsiae, 1885.

2 "Εν αρχή τοῦ Λόγου καὶ τοῦ Λογος τον Θεον καὶ Θεου τον Λογος."—Gospel by John i. 1. This is Mill's text; Griesbach has a slight various reading. The learned George Christian Knapp, of Halle, in his edition of the Greek Testament, gives the above reading. Knapp's "Text" of the Testament is, as a whole, probably the best now in use. In the "Commentatio Isagogica," introducing the work, he states that he had availed himself of the labors of Walton, Simon, Mill, Mühler, Wetzstein, Blanchini, Bengel, Ansoldi, C. B. Michaelis, I. D. Michaelis, Ernesti, Semler, Griesbach, Matthaei, Münter, Knittel, Treschkovits and Adler. The "various readings" that could have escaped the scrutiny and critical judgment of such a body of scholars must be few and small in importance. And the best Biblical critics of the Christian world are far from conceding that the late critical edition of the Greek Testament put forth by the learned Doctors Westcott and Hort (on which the Revised Version of 1881 is supposed to be chiefly founded), is, on the whole, an improvement on the edition of Knapp.
passages, which, it is fair to presume, he regarded as sufficient. The first is from Nehemiah ix. 6: "Thou, even Thou, art Jehovah alone; Thou hast made heaven, the heaven of heavens, with all their host, the earth, and all things that are therein, the seas, and all that is therein, and Thou preservest them all." The second is the grand passage from Colossians i. 16, 17, attributing creation to Christ the Son: "By Him were all things created, that are in heaven, and that are in earth, visible and invisible, whether they be thrones, or dominions, or principalities, or powers; all things were created by Him, and for Him: and He is before all things, and by Him all things consist." The third is from Revelations iv. 11: "Thou hast created all things, and for Thy pleasure they are and were created." After quoting these passages, Dr. Hodge gives, as his inferences from them, the following statements: "The all things spoken of in these passages is made to include every thing out of God. There can, therefore, be no pre-existing matter, existing independently of His will." ¹

In answer, it is sufficient to deny the logical accuracy of each of these inferences. The "all things" spoken of in these passages are not made to include every thing out of God. The passage from Nehemiah in express terms sets forth the things which God has made, viz.: "heaven, the heaven of heavens, with all their host, the earth, and all things that are therein, the seas, and all that is therein." Now all these are made by God, are His créations, and therefore dependent on Him. He may, by His power, destroy them, dissolve them into other forms of being; but if they were made from an eternal matter, that will still exist, and the passage does not negative its existence. And in like manner the passage from Colossians declares that the "all things," "τα πάντα," spoken of are the "all things" created by Him, that is to say, the créations of

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God. Assuredly these are absolutely dependent on His will. But to say that these creations, which are thus declared to be dependent, were made out of nothing, is to beg the question at issue. The "all things created" may be and are dependent on God, yet they may have been created out of a "pre-existing matter," and these passages prove nothing to the contrary. The passage from Revelations is still more distinct. The "all things" spoken of there are certainly the creations of God; and in declaring that "Thou hast created all things, and for Thy pleasure they are and were created," the inspired seer cannot be held to include anything except what is created, and leaves open the question whether the things created were made ex nihilo.

The next passage from holy Scripture to be considered is that found in the third verse of the eleventh chapter of the Epistle to the Hebrews. This is relied on as strong testimony in their favor by advocates of the doctrine in question. It is referred to as a proof text by the Westminster divines. Dr. Hodge devotes to it a critical examination, covering a page of his "Systematic Theology." His conclusion is that the true meaning of this verse may be thus expressed: "The worlds were not made out of anything which reveals itself as existing even in the sight of God, but out of nothing."

To this astonishing conclusion, reached by a learned and conscientious man, nothing need be opposed except the verse itself. It reads thus in our received English version: "Through faith we understand that the worlds were framed by the word of God, so that things which are seen were not made of things

1 "οὐ πρὸς εξίσους τὰ πάντα, καὶ ὅπερ τὸ ἡλένη μιᾷ εἰσί, καὶ εξεπεκτείνεται."
—Rev. iv. 11, Griesbach.

2 Larger Catechism, question and answer 15th; Confession of Faith, published under act of U. S. Presbyterian General Assembly of May 29, 1839, p. 181.

3 Vol. I., pp. 559, 560.
which do appear."¹ From these plain English words, it is
difficult, or rather impossible, that any English reader, under
the guidance merely of common sense, could reach the con-
clusion of Dr. Hodge; for there is the total absence of the
two leading ideas of his conclusion—i. e., 1st, Absence of the
negation that the worlds were made of any thing which reveals
itself as existing even in the sight of God; and 2d, Absence of
the affirmation that the worlds were made out of nothing.

But lest it be supposed that the original Greek has furnished
to the learned Doctor what the English version does not furnish,
this original must be examined. It has been given in a note
with a "various reading," which does not affect the sense.
Adopting the commonly received Greek text, the following is
an exact rendering into English: "By faith, we understand
that the eternal worlds are framed by the word of God, so that

¹ King James' English Version, Hebrews xi. 3. As the original Greek
must be resorted to for the true meaning, we give at once Knapp's rea-
ding of the text: "Πασαὶ τῶν ἐκ τοῦ θεοῦ πνευμάτων τῶν ἐπι-
τικοῦ ἀληθινοῦ εἰς τὸ γενὲς ἐκ παρθένου τὰ ἐκ τοῦ θεοῦ ἐγενε-" The English biblical scholars
Conybeare and Howson, in their "Life and Epistles of St. Paul," Am.
Edit., p. 875, say that the best manuscripts have the participle in the
singular, το ἐκ τοῦ θεοῦ. But this would not affect the present discussion.
Their rendering of the verse is as follows: "By faith we understand
that the universe is framed by the word of God, so that the world which we
behold springs not from things that can be seen,"—an imperfect trans-
lation, for το ἐκ τοῦ θεοῦ, that which is seen, may include much more than
"the world" in its ordinary sense. The learned authors of the "Revised
Version" (1881) of the New Testament render the verse as follows: "By
faith we understand that the worlds (marginal note, "Gr. ages,") have
been framed by the word of God, so that what is seen hath not been made
out of things which do appear." This rendering shows evident marks of
the anxious wish of the revisors to conform their version as nearly as
possible to the King James Bible, but, in its essential meaning, it assuredly
does not teach creation ex nihilo. The critical Greek Testament of Doctors
Westcott and Hort gives the text as follows: "Πασαὶ τῶν ἐκ τοῦ θεοῦ πνε-
μάτων τῶν ἐκ τοῦ θεοῦ πνευμάτων εἰς τὸ γενὲς ἐκ παρθένου τὰ ἐκ τοῦ θεοῦ ἐγενε-
να,"—simply adopting "the seen" as singular, and giving no support to the
doctrine of creation ex nihilo.
ETERNAL WORLDS.

not from phenomenal things seen things have been produced." The adoption of the reading in the singular, τοις ἔλεγμενοις, given by Griesbach and preferred by Conybeare and Howson, would only make the English run thus: "So that not from phenomenal things that which is seen has been produced."

A careful analysis of the original (thus literally translated) will show that, so far from proving, or tending to prove, the doctrine of creation out of nothing, it tends strongly to establish the contrary doctrine.

First, the inspired writer uses the word αἰωνας to designate the created universe. This is the same word used in the first chapter of the Epistle to the Hebrews, second verse, where, in

1 Some manuscripts instead of τοις ἔλεγμενοις read τοις ἔλεγμεν. This would not affect the sense, as the English version would read "from things not phenomenal," &c. Dr. Hodge notes this question as to τοις ἔλεγμενοις, and says, "Others, however, prefer to connect the τοις with γεγονεναι," i. e., the worlds were not made out of the phenomenal.—"Systematic Theology," Vol. I., p. 560. This rendering would involve a violent dislocation of the Greek sentence, but would not in the slightest degree help the doctrine of creation ex nihilo. It is worthy of special note that John Calvin himself, with all his marvellous learning and devout insight into the meaning and spirit of holy Scripture, does not find in this verse (Heb. xi. 3) any evidence of the doctrine of creation ex nihilo. He adopts the following as the proper Latin version: "Fide intelligimus aptata esse saecula verbo Dei, ut non apparentium spectacula fient." His comments are acute, suggestive and far reaching; but he not only fails to find any intimation of creation out of nothing in the verse, but finds the contrary; for he says we have in this place the excellent doctrine that in the visible creation we have a conspicuous image of God,—"conspicuum Dei imaginem,"—and that here is taught the same doctrine which Paul teaches in the first chapter of Romans; and that God renders bright testimony to His own eternal wisdom, goodness and power in the whole architecture of the world"—"in tota mundi architectura." Architecture is assuredly not building out of nothing. And that Calvin did not find in all inspired Scripture the doctrine of creation ex nihilo is plainly evidenced by the fact that in the French Confession of Faith (Confessio Fidei Gallicana), prepared by Calvin and his pupil De Chandieu, revised and approved by a Synod at Paris in 1559, delivered by Beza to Charles IX. at Poissy, and solemnly sanctioned by Henry IV., that doctrine does not appear.
speaking of God the Son, it is declared that by Him God "made the worlds." Now the Greek word αἰῶνας, of which the plural is in these places rendered "worlds," conveys the idea of an eternal element. It is derived from αἰώς (αἰ in the Αἰολικ form) and ὄν, i.e., always being, or for ever being. And if the Greek adjective αἰωνιός, derived from this word, does not mean "eternal," it is certain there is no word in the Greek language which does convey that idea. It appearing, therefore, that the element of eternity does in some sort enter into the word here used by inspiration to describe the created universe, and it being admitted that in their present forms and modes the worlds had a beginning, it is not a rash or unreasonable solution that the eternal element is found in the matter out of which they were created.

Secondly, the verb rendered in our English version "were framed" is very significant. It is the infinitive καταρτίσθαι, from καταρτίζω, which means "to put in proper order," "to adjust," "to set to rights," "to restore," "to renew," "to repair," "to frame," "to re-unite," and never means "to create out of nothing." In truth, it may be said without irreverence, that if the sacred writer had chosen terms from the Greek language for the purpose of conveying the complex idea of a forming or framing of worlds out of an eternal matter, he could not have selected words more appropriate than αἰωνιός and καταρτίσθαι in the juxta-position in which he has placed them.

Thirdly, the expression "so that not from phenomenal things, (or from things not phenomenal,) seen things (or that which is seen) have (or has) been produced," in its true and scientific meaning, shuts out the idea of a creation out of nothing. For it has long been established in science that in looking upon and studying anything formed of matter, we do not perceive the essence, or the matter itself, we perceive only the phenomenal qualities inhering in it, such as its hardness, its weight, its
shape, its color. And as we have a right to believe that all the truthful discoveries and deductions of science, whether mental or physical, are consistent with and contemplated in the work of inspiration, so we have a right to hold that the meaning of the Spirit in this verse is, that all visible things have been produced, not from the phenomenal, but from the actual, the real, the essential, that is, from matter itself. In truth, there is no escape from this conclusion, except in holding that God has produced the material universe out of Himself—out of His own essence—a belief for which there is no foundation in holy Scripture, and which is expressly condemned by the great theologian to whom reference has been made. This belief, then, being rejected, no alternative remains except to hold that visible creation was framed from essential matter.

Dr. Hodge has been driven by the stress of the question, and perhaps also by the want of inspired authority, to resort to a passage from an apocryphal writer in favor of creation ex nihilo. He quotes a part of the twenty-eighth verse of the seventh chapter of Second Maccabees.

Let it be remembered that this apocryphal book was never a part of the Hebrew canon. It was never in the Hebrew Bible. It was never a part of those sacred writings known as the Law, the Prophets, and the Hagiographa, which Christ recognized as of Divine authority. It was not written in the Hebrew language, and never made its appearance, even as a posthumous part of the Septuagint, until more than a hundred years after the translation of the inspired Hebrew Scriptures at Alexandria. In common with the other books of the Apocrypha,

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1 This view of matter will, of necessity, farther engage our attention in the progress of this work.

2 Hodge's "Systematic Theology," Vol. I., pp. 558, 559. The theory that matter is an emanation from God will be recurred to in this work.

it was always and steadily rejected from the Palestinian canon by devout Jews as well as Christians of the Holy Land. It was rejected by Jerome as uninspired, and though Luther translated it, he criticized it with severity, and rejected its Divine authority. All Protestants reject it with the other apocryphal books, for reasons which, to common sense, seem unanswerable. The British and Foreign Bible Society, which formerly published (especially in the copies issued by its continental subordinates) the Apocrypha, in a detached form, between the inspired writings of the Old and New Testaments, have ceased to publish them after a long and able discussion, which commenced in 1811 and ended in 1827. The American Bible Societies have never admitted them into any of their immense issues of the holy Scriptures. And although the Roman Catholic Church, by the decrees of the Council of Trent, in 1546, adopted most of the apocryphal books as part of the sacred canon, and pronounced a solemn anathema against any one who should not receive them "as sacred and canonical," and adopted also the "old and vulgate edition" of the Scriptures as the only one to be held authentic, and declared that no one should dare or presume to reject it under any pretext whatever; yet the weight and authority of these decrees are fatally impugned by the fact that the list adopted by the Council of Trent leaves out

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2 They are ably summed up by Bishop Thomas Hartwell Horne, of the Anglican Church, "Introduction to Critical Study of Holy Scriptures," Vol. I., pp. 627-629.


4 "Pro sacris et canonicis non suscepit."—Decree, Sessio quarta, "Credos de Christendom," Vol. II., pp. 81, 82.

5 "Ut nemo illam rejicere quovis praetextu audeat vel presumat."—Ibid., Vol. II., p. 82.
the first and second books of Esdras and the third book of the Maccabees, all of which are in the Greek canon known commonly as the Septuagint, which was the version used in preparing the old Itala or Vulgate; ¹ and by the farther fact that the "old and vulgate edition," which no one was to dare or presume to reject, was found so full of errors that pope after pope called conclaves of learned men to the Vatican to revise and correct it, and its present form and wording were not settled for more than forty years after the Council of Trent. ²

The conclusion from this brief review is that no scripture quoted from Second Maccabees can have inspired authority—can be received as the word of God. On the doctrine in question, such a scripture would not be even as good authority as a dictum of Tertullian or Origen, for they had all the divine

¹ The list in the decree does indeed name "Esdræ primus et secundus, qui dicitur Nehemias." ("Creeds of Christendom," Vol. II., p. 81), but the books thus indicated are "Ezra" and "Nehemiah," of the inspired canon, which, otherwise, would not be included at all in the list. Thus the first and second Esdras of the Apocryphal list are omitted. As to the books of Maccabees, although only the first and second are in the English Apocrypha, yet in fact, there are five books which have that title, all by different writers, and of very different degrees of historical weight and literary merit. The first is supposed to have been written in Hebrew, on the authority of Jerome, who says he saw the original, (New Am. Cyclop., Art. Maccabees, Vol. X., pp. 774. 775.) The second, third and fourth never appeared except in Greek: the fifth is in Arabic and Syriac, by an unknown author, who must have lived after the destruction of the Jewish temple by Titus. (Ibid.) None of the five have any inspired authority. The Encyclop. Britan., Art. Apocrypha, Vol. II., p. 188, says all the apocryphal books, "except 1st and 2d Esdras, and the Prayer of Manasses, were declared canonical at Trent." No such book as the "Prayer of Manasses" appears in the received list of the Septuagint or Alexandrian canon. (Septuagint, Edit. Lipsiæ, 1835, Ordo Lib., pp. III. and IV.

² New Am. Cyclop., Art. Bible, Vol. III., pp. 232, 233. Three popes—Pius IV., Pius V., and Gregory XIV.—took part in the successive corrections; the learned Bellarmine labored on them; and the final revision was published in 1692.
teachings of both the Old and New Testaments to guide them, while the writer of these narratives of the Maccabees was entirely without the words of Christ, His evangelists and apostles.

Nevertheless, respect for the eminent Princeton theologian, and for all thoughtful persons in every communion, who are disposed to attribute more than common historical weight to the second book of Maccabees, requires that the passage cited shall be carefully considered. It cannot be fairly and discreetly weighed without attention to the circumstances under which it purports to have originated.

Antiochus, King of Syria, who claimed the surname of Epiphanes, ("the illustrious," but whom many of his people more appropriately named Epimanes, ("the madman,")) succeeded to the throne B. C. 175, and died B. C. 164. Early in his reign Egypt demanded from him the surrender of the provinces of Coele-Syria and Palestine, on pretensions which he resisted with vigor; and, knowing the importance of the first blow, he marched into Egypt with a strong army, and for a time gained decisive successes. While in this campaign, a false report of his death was spread throughout Palestine, and the intriguing Jewish leader, Jason, made it the occasion for marching with a thousand followers to Jerusalem, and becoming master of the city. Hearing of these disorders, and being specially enraged because the rumor of his death had been received with great rejoicing throughout Palestine, Antiochus immediately left Egypt, with part of his army, besieged Jerusalem, took it by storm, and abandoned it for three days to the fury and cupidty of his soldiers. Eighty thousand Jews are said to have been inhumanly butchered, forty thousand were made prisoners, and the like number were sold as slaves to the neighboring nations. The temple was forcibly entered,—even the Holy of Holies was polluted,—the altar of incense, the table for the shew-bread,
the golden candlesticks, and many vases, utensils and other gifts from kings, of immense value, were carried with him to Antioch.¹ The Jews for a time were overwhelmed with horror and despair.

Returning to Egypt, Antiochus pressed the war with such success that King Ptolemy Euergetes and his sister Cleopatra found themselves driven to the humiliating step of imploring the aid of the Romans. The senate immediately sent ambassadors to Egypt, with Popilius at their head, and bearing a stern message to Antiochus. He was then advancing to besiege Alexandria, and the Roman ambassadors came up with him at Eleusine, which is not a mile distant from that city. Antiochus, in his youth, had been a hostage in Rome. He had there been on terms of friendship with Popilius, and now meeting him, he offered to receive him with open arms as a friend; but the Roman envoy drew back, and asked him rather to say whether he was a friend or an enemy to Rome, handing him at the same time the decree of the senate, bidding him read it and return an immediate answer. Antiochus, having read it, said he would examine the contents with his friends, and give his answer in a short time. Popilius instantly drew, with a wand which he held, a circle around the king, and, raising his voice, said, “Answer the senate before you stir out of that circle!”² Confounded and frightened by this imperious order, coming from the most formidable people on earth, King Antiochus yielded and promised compliance with all the demands of the senate. Thus Egypt was saved. Having done his high duty, Popilius then descended to the level of the king and renewed

¹ Rollin's "Ancient History," Am. Edit., 1849, Vol. VII., p. 67. Rollin cites as authority Julian Justin, Diodorus Siculus, Josephus, and 1st Maccabees. As these all corroborate each other, the facts may be considered reasonably well established.

² Valerius Maximus, Lib. VI., c. 4; Rollin’s "Ancient History," Am. Edit., Vol. VII., pp. 72-73.
their former friendship. A treaty was concluded by which peace between Syria and Egypt was restored.

Baffled and furious, Antiochus turned upon the unhappy Jews of Palestine, and sought to drown the bitterness of his humiliation by acts of unheard-of cruelty. His general, Apollonius, with twenty-two thousand men, marched upon Jerusalem, and by a mingling of treachery and force overcame the city, butchered the men and sold women and children into slavery. At the same time, Antiochus, from the city of Antioch, published a decree commanding the people of his subject provinces to lay aside their ancient religious faith and ceremonies, to conform to the religion of the king, to worship the same gods and in the same manner as he did.¹

The pagan provinces under his rule found little difficulty and no scruples of conscience in submitting to this order; but in Palestine, where the true God had been made known and His worship established, no part of the people were willing to obey except the Samaritans. The Jews, finding their rights of conscience outraged, and themselves driven to the wall by cruelties from which death was a welcome relief, organized for open rebellion. The devout and venerable Mattathias, with his five brave sons, among whom was the hero Judas Maccabeus, defied the king's commands, and, after having struck down an apostate Jew who was about to submit, slew the king's commissioner and his followers, and, retreating to the mountains, called on all who were zealous for the worship of God to join them. Soon the fastnesses and deserts of Judea were filled with fearless and desperate people, who, under their heroic leader Maccabeus, resisted until the yoke of the oppressor was broken.

Thus far we have been treading on firm historic ground; but as we approach the narrative in which the passage from the

¹ Josephus, Antiq., Lib. XII., c. 7; Rollin, Vol. VII., pp. 74-75.
Second Maccabees is introduced, we are not permitted to entertain the same confidence. The narrative in question is the well known account of the Jewish mother and her seven sons, whose piety and constancy under torture, even to death, has excited the sympathies and admiration of all who have ever read or heard of it. The account is, in substance, that Antiochus, hearing that his decree was not obeyed in Judea, went in person to Jerusalem to see its execution; that a mother and her seven sons were seized and brought before the tyrant; that he commanded them to eat swine's flesh, and on their refusal, had them tortured, beginning with the oldest, and compelling the others, with the mother, to witness the agonies inflicted, until only the youngest son was left; that the king offered him his life, and assured him, with oaths, that he would make him both rich and happy if he would turn from the laws of his fathers; that he firmly refused, and the king then called the mother and exhorted her to counsel the young man to save his life; that the mother bowed herself towards him, but in her heart laughed him to scorn, and addressed her son “in her country language,” exhorting him to firmness.¹

It is in this address of the mother to her son that the passage occurs on which Dr. Hodge relies, at least indirectly, for support of the doctrine of creation ex nihilo. It will presently be quoted in full. The youngest son died with unwavering constancy, and the mother soon followed her sons; and thus the sad drama ends with the words: “Let this be enough now to have spoken concerning the idolatrous feasts and the extreme tortures.”²

The first question to be considered as to this pathetic narrative is whether it be historically true. There is much reason to doubt this—much reason to consider it one of the legends

¹ Second Maccabees, Chapter vii., Apocrypha.
² Verse 42, Chapter vii., Second Maccabees.
so abundant in the Apocrypha and in the lives of the Christian saints of centuries after the close of the New Testament canon—legends often as remarkable for their pathos and beauty as for their utter want of historic verity.

This account of the torture and martyrdom of seven sons and their mother under the eye of Antiochus Epiphanes is so striking, and stands out so sharply from the ordinary events of life, even in those days, that if true it would have found its place in the annals of that age. Yet it is not mentioned by the Greek historians Polybius and Diodorus Siculus, nor by the Roman Julianus Justinus, nor by the Jewish Josephus. They have all left histories, in many respects minute and circumstantial, of the reign of Antiochus, which ran only through eleven years. And if it be supposed that such events, terrible as they were, might have escaped the notice of the Greek and Roman writers, who had strong prejudices against the Jews, yet how could they have escaped Josephus, who was proud of his people, and gloried in the divine origin of their religion and in their constancy as martyrs therefor? He had access to the extant books of Maccabees, and has given a full account of the revolt of Judas Maccabaeus and the heroic struggle that followed it. He has narrated the Judean career of King Antiochus down to his death, and has even corrected what he imputed as error to the historian Polybius, viz.: that he attributed the lingering and horrible death of this king to a contemplated but not accomplished spoliation of the temple of Diana in Elymais; whereas Josephus insists that as this rested merely in intent, it was not a crime; and, therefore, he attributes the tyrant’s death of unusual pain to his outrages on the temple at Jerusa-

1 Though they are all silent on the subject, Rollin gives full credence to the narrative, and inserts it in his history, but entirely on the authority of Second Maccabees.—“Ancient History.” Am. Edit., 1849, Vol. VII., pp. 78–80. Rollin was as pious as he was learned, and almost as credulous as he was pious.
lem. As he does not narrate the martyrdom of the mother and her sons, he could not have regarded it as historical.

This narrative is farther discredited by the fact that in the fourth book of Maccabees, which is confessedly apocryphal and of very low historic value, this same account of the mother and her sons is given, with amplifications and exaggerations which, if true, could hardly have escaped the original historian, but which are the common and significant indices of an ever-growing legend.

If this view be correct, then it must be admitted that an unhistorical legend from an apocryphal book cannot furnish a passage which can have any weight in sustaining the doctrine in question.

But if we dismiss these difficulties, and admit that the narrative as given in Second Maccabees is historic, we are brought no nearer to inspired authority. The address of the mother to her seventh and last son contains the words quoted by Dr. Hodge. They are in the 28th verse, which, in the English

1 Polybius in Excerpt. Vales, p. 146; Josephus, translated by Whiston, Edinburgh Edit., Book XII., Chap. 5th, p. 267: chap. ix., p. 262. Rollin, of course, agrees with Josephus in attributing the death of Antiochus to his sacriligious conduct in Jerusalem, but makes no criticism on his remark on Polybius. He could hardly have agreed with Josephus that there is no sin in a wicked intent merely. See his note, and that in Josephus.—Rollin's "Ancient History," Vol. VII., pp. 88.

2 It is hardly necessary to present the conclusive reasons for the opinion now almost universally held by competent scholars as to the spurious work entitled "Eις Μαξαγαζος," falsely attributed to Josephus. The learned Prideaux, in his "Connection," does indeed seem to give a passing sanction to it, in writing of this alleged martyrdom of the mother and her seven sons, but cautiously shrinks from repeating the narrative itself as part of his history.

3 New Am. Cyclop., Art. Maccabees, Vol. X., p. 775. The names of the mother and sons are not given at all in Second Maccabees. She is called Hannah in this fourth book. Rollin says the mother and her seven sons are "commonly called the Maccabees," ("Ancient History," VII., p. 77,) but on what authority he does not inform us.
version, reads as follows: "I beseech thee, my son, look upon the heaven and the earth, and all that is therein, and consider that God made them of things that were not; and so was mankind made likewise."  

This mother did not pretend to be inspired, but, on the contrary, humbly avowed her ignorance of the mysteries of nature, and submitted them to the Great "Creator of the world, who formed the generation of man and found out the beginning of all things." Therefore her opinion that all things were created *ex nihilo*, even if distinctly declared, could not have had any more weight on a subject so deep than the opinion of any other good woman living a hundred and sixty-seven years before the birth of Christ.

But, in truth, we discover on careful analysis of her words that she announced no such opinion. She beseeches her son to look upon the heaven and earth, and all things seen therein, and to know that God made these "out of things not existing," and that the race of men was also thus produced. Now, if this devout Jewish mother had any knowledge of the Pentateuch, she assuredly knew that the "race of men" was not produced *out of nothing*, but that Adam, the progenitor, was formed out of the dust of the earth, and Eve from his rib, and that all the race had sprung from them. Therefore, unless she was incon- 

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1 "Αξιων σε τεκνων, αναβλεψας εις των υματων και της γης και τα εν αυτως πασα ειδων, γνωριζο φη ο εξ υπαρξεων επικηραυη αυτα το θεου, και τα των ανθρωπων γενος υπαρξεως γεγενηται."—2 Maccabees, Septuagint, Chap. VII., v. 28, Edit. Lips., 1855, p. 998.

2 Verses 22d and 23d, 2d Maccabees, Chap. VII.

3 No rule of evidence is better established in law than that which requires that, in deciding upon the proper construction and true meaning of any part of a written instrument, the whole of the writing relating to the subject must be considered.—Greenleaf on Evidence, pp. 316–342; Chitty on Contracts, Amer. Edit., 1855, pp. 86, 87. Dr. Hodge (System. Theology, Vol. I., p. 560) does violence to this rule by quoting and relying upon *part* of the original verse—εξ ὑπαρξεων επικηραυη αυτα το θεου—
sistent and illogical, her meaning was that the heaven and earth and all seen in them were made “from things not existing” as heaven and earth, but may, nevertheless, have been formed out of pre-existing matter, just as the “race of man” was.

Upon any view that can be truthfully taken, this passage, therefore, proves nothing for creation ex nihilo.

Another scripture relied on for this doctrine is the seventeenth verse of the fourth chapter of Romans. 1 In this chapter Saint Paul is teaching that faith in Christ is the means of salvation, and that it avails, not only to the circumcised, but to the uncircumcised; not only to Abraham and his seed by nature, but to the Gentiles; “not to that only which is of the law, but to that also which is of the faith of Abraham, who is the father of us all, in the presence of (κατεναντί) Him in whom he believed, even God, who maketh the dead to be alive, and calleth things which are not as though they were.” 2 The obvious meaning of this passage, as settled by the context, is that God exerts the power of quickening into saving faith the

and leaving out the residue,—και τα των ανθρωπων γενος ουτως γεγενηται
—which is material in ascertaining the meaning of the whole. He relies also on the very inadequate Latin version of the Greek original found in the Vulgate: “Quia ex nihilo fecit illa Deus, et hominum genus.” This is certainly not equivalent to the original, which, literally rendered into English, reads: “That God made these things from things not existing, and that the race of men was also thus produced.” The inaccurate Vulgate is closely followed as to this verse by the Douay English Bible, approved in 1852 by the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Baltimore, and the Bishops of New York, Philadelphia, and Boston, (Douay Bible, 2 Maccabees, Chap. vii., v. 28); but something more faithful to the original might have been expected from Dr. Hodge, who was learned in both Greek and Latin. The King James version is much nearer the Greek original.


2 Των ζωοποιησας των νεκρων, και καλωσας τα μη ουτα ας ουτα. — Mill’s text; no various reading appears.
Gentiles who are uncircumcised as well as the Jews who are circumcised; and thus He makes those who are "dead in trespasses and sins" alive through faith; and thus He calls those who are not by natural descent the children of Abraham as though they were his children. The interpretation which seeks to apply this scripture to the original work of creation is unnatural, far-fetched and illegitimate. The verb translated " calleth" is simply πελάσω. It is used one hundred and forty-three times in the New Testament, and in not one single instance does it depart from its plain and common signification of " to call," "to name," "to invite," "to summon." In the gospels and Acts of the Apostles it is used in the primary forms of these significations; in the Epistles, and especially in that to the Romans, the First Epistle to the Corinthians, and the First Epistle of Peter, it takes higher forms of the same meaning, and conveys the idea of that efficient call which God makes by His Spirit, and which calls the dead sinner to life and holiness. Hence the same word has given to the church her name in its only true sense, that is, the ἐκκλησία—called out from the world and consecrated to Christ. But in every instance, whether in the lower or higher sense, the idea conveyed is a call or summons addressed to an existing being, under which he may simply change his worldly place or state, or he may be radically changed and become a new creature. No idea of a creation out of nothing is ever implied, but, on the contrary, such idea is excluded.

Dr. Robert L. Dabney, another very able theologian of the Presbyterian Church, admits that to the ancient mind it seemed impossible that the material universe and its inhabitants could

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1 Compare in original Matthew i. 21, 23, 25; ii. 7, 15, 23; iv. 21; x. 25; Mark i. 20; ii. 17; xii. 17; Luke i. 13; xiv. passim; Acts i. 12, 19; iii. 11; xxvii. 14, with Romans viii. 30; ix. 24; 1 Cor. vii. 15; 1 Peter ii. 9, 21; v. 10.
have been brought out of "non-existence into existence." Hence, he says, the ancients held the opposite doctrine, and expressed it in their axiom "ex nihilo nihil fit," and this lay "at the basis of every system of human device." From this Dr. Dabney infers that "the true doctrine of creation is purely one of faith," and as he considers the "true doctrine" on the subject to be creation out of nothing, his principles require him to establish this doctrine (of faith) from the testimony of the holy scriptures.

And here commences his difficulty, or rather, his impossible task. He is compelled, by his knowledge of the Hebrew and Greek tongues, to admit that the words bara and xριζω, and any other words ever translated "to create," cannot be considered in their etymology and usage as "very distinctive of the nature of the act," i.e., of creating out of nothing. Indeed, after showing the true usage and meaning of these original words, he distinctly says: "It will be clearly seen, hence, that the nature of the creative act is but faintly defined by the mere force of the words." He ought rather to have said that the original words do not define at all, either faintly or otherwise, the "creative act" in the sense of creating ex nihilo, but do define it plainly in the sense of forming, cutting, carving, making, building, founding, all of which words pre-suppose a material to be acted on. He relies on Hebrews xi. 3 as "our most emphatic proof text." This is an important concession from a learned biblical scholar; for we have sought to show by a careful analysis and examination of that verse, that so far from proving creation ex nihilo, it tends to establish the opposite doctrine. Dr. Dabney says: "We may add to it Romans iv. 17; perhaps 1 Corinthians i. 28; 2 Corinthians iv. 6; Acts xvii. 28; Colossians i. 17." We have examined the passage from Romans, and shown that its genuine exegesis gives no countenance to the doctrine. As

to the other passages, concerning which this acute theologian
speaks so doubtfully himself, his doubts, perhaps, ought to
absolve us from the task of examining them. But when we
come to look at them, we find so little that tends even remotely
to establish the doctrine in question, that we see at once how
slender must be the alleged basis in Scripture for this doctrine,
when such passages are pointed out as among its evidences.
The first has no reference whatever to creation.1 The next,
in declaring that God “commanded the light to shine out of
darkness,” proves, not that light was created “out of nothing,”
or out of darkness, but that the ineffable and glorious light, in
which God has dwelt from eternity, was caused by Him to
drive away the darkness in which this small earth, in its early
stages of creation, was shrouded. The next simply declares
that in God we live and move and have our being, and, in confir-
mation of this, quotes the sentiment of the Greek poet Aratus—
and of the poet-stoic Cleanthes, (whose hymn to God approaches
inspiration)—that we are the offspring of God. How this
declaration can be held as teaching creation out of nothing
common sense fails to see, especially as it is declared to be the
same sentiment as that uttered by heathen poets who never
doubted that matter is eternal. The next is the closing verse
of the passage from Colossians, on which we have already com-
mented. The verse expresses only the grand doctrine that
Christ, not being a creature, is before, or above, or in advance

1 “And base things of the world, and things which are despised, hath
God chosen, yea, and things which are not, to bring to nought things that
are.”—Authorized English Version, 1 Cor. i. 28. The translation, faulty
though it be, gives no support to creation ex nihilo. The original of the
last clause is καὶ τὰ μην ὄστα, ἵνα τὰ ὄστα καταργησῇ. The verb καταργεῖν
has no element of “bringing to nought” in it. It is a compound of καταργεῖν,
and means “to render useless or unproductive,” “to neglect,” “to leave
unemployed.” The context shows that Paul meant simply to present
strong illustrations of the truth that “God hath chosen the foolish things
of the world to confound the wise.”
of all things created, and that by Him all things created continue to exist. This doctrine we steadfastly hold, and will advert to hereafter. Not one of these passages, in its natural and proper interpretation, has any tendency to prove creation ex nihilo.

Dr. Dabney then refers again to the first verse of Genesis, and, strangely, argues that the work designated in this verse "left the earth a chaos," and therefore cannot "contain the idea of fashioning, so that if you refuse to it the sense of an absolute production out of nothing, you seem to leave it no meaning whatever." To this the obvious answer is: that the creative work set forth in this verse may well enough have been a collecting, "fashioning," and preparing of the "heaven and the earth" from pre-existing material. In the second verse the earth is described as a waste and emptiness, and darkness was upon the face of the deep. It would be difficult in so few words to present a more striking picture of those geologic conditions of alternate convulsion under the tremendous forces then at work, and the subsidence into desolate calm, which our planet passed through before it was fit for the habitation of the lowest forms of vegetable life. The word "chaos" is never used in the Bible; it belongs to purely pagan ideas. Milton's description is that of a poet, but not of a scientific man. The earth never was a chaos, but was always in the hands of an

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1 The Hebrew word tohu means not "without form," but "a waste," "a desolation."—Gesenius, p. 1065. The Septuagint has γη δε γη γη αορατος και ακαταστασις—the earth was invisible and unwrought; invisible because darkness yet rested on it—unwrought because yet in a crude and unfinished state. The learned author of the article "Cosmogony," in the Encycl. Britan., Vol. VI., pp. 446-448, says: "The pre-existence of matter seems to be asserted in verses 2 and 3 of the first chapter of Genesis: 'Now the earth was (i.e., was involved in) chaos, and darkness was upon the face of the flood, and the wind of Elohim was hovering upon the face of the waters.' But the Hebrew words tohu va bohu convey no such idea as "chaos."
all-intelligent fashioner, moulder, creator. Thus the learned theologian's argument, based on the notion that the grand opening verse of Genesis "left the earth a chaos," drops to the ground.

He is equally inconsequent in his reference to Psalm xc. 2; Matt. xxv. 34; 2 Tim. i. 9; Rev. i. 11; and Proverbs viii. 23–26, and his inference from these passages. He insists that they present very strongly the contrast between God's eternity and the temporal nature of the creation; and, after quoting part of the passage from Proverbs, which asserts that the divine wisdom existed from everlasting, while as yet the Lord had not made the earth nor the fields, "nor the highest part of the dust of the world," he says: "It is hard to see how it could be more strongly asserted, that not only was the organization, but the very material of the world, as yet all non-existent." Now, on examining these passages, it will be found that they all refer to the completed creations of God—the mountains, the earth, the world, the depths, the fountains abounding with water, the hills, the fields, the highest part of the dust of the world, all of which, being completed creations, had a beginning in time, and, therefore, are proper subjects for impressive contrast with the eternity of God. The "highest point of the dust of the world" is still only a part of the world, and therefore only a part of a finished creation. How, with any logical nexus, can this contrast between things confessedly temporal in their origin, and the eternal and self-existing Spirit, lead to the inference that "the very material of the world was as yet non-existent"? Obviously this is a non sequitur.

Thus all the passages of Scripture relied on to sustain the doctrine of creation ex nihilo have been examined, and it is not found in them, either singly or taken together.

Against it are the numerous passages which represent the Creator, not as bringing the worlds out of nothing, but as
making, shaping, framing, moulding, forming them by His infinite wisdom and power. These passages will be hereafter more appropriately cited when the theory of dualism is presented, that is, the Eternal Spirit working upon eternal matter.

But there is one scriptural argument against creation ex nihilo which remains to be mentioned. If this doctrine be, as is alleged, vital in revealed religion, and one, therefore, for which ample credentials ought to be found, why has it not been set forth in the Word of God so plainly as to exclude reasonable doubt? The doctrine of the divinity of the Son of God is fundamental in Christianity, and, therefore, it is taught in the inspired Scriptures in plain and direct terms. The names and titles of God are applied to Christ; the attributes of God are ascribed to Christ; the works of God are attributed to Christ; the worship, due to God only, is rendered to Christ. It would be hard to conceive of any more efficient method in which human language could have taught the divine nature of the Son than these.

If, then, the doctrine of creation ex nihilo be fundamental, it ought to be found in the holy Scriptures, taught with as much clearness as the doctrine of the divinity of Christ. No difficulty in such teaching arose from any defect in the original tongues in which revelation has been made. The Hebrew and Greek languages have words conveying distinctly the idea or notion of nothing. Thus, in the oldest book of the Hebrew canon, we read: "He stretcheth out the north over the empty place, and hangeth the earth upon nothing." 1 The Hebrew word bilimah, here rendered nothing, is the equivalent of the Greek

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1 English version, Job xxvi. 7. The Septuagint has εκτεινων θεραπευειν ουδεν χρηματων γυν επι ουδενος. As to bilimah, the Jewish Rabbins have given some fanciful analogies, seeking to establish the idea of a bridle or band, but the Syriac, Chaldee, Septuagint and Vulgate, reinforced by the strong authority of Gesenius, all give the meaning "nothing."
and of the Latin nilhil. There was, therefore, not even the necessity for a paraphrase or circuity if the revealing Spirit had intended to teach that the worlds were created out of nothing. Such a declaration would have been as simple and as easily understood as the declaration "the Word was with God, and the Word was God." But no such declaration is found in the Bible.

We have thus reviewed the creeds of man and the Word of God. In the first we have found some expressions—sometimes retracted and then again advanced—of a belief in this doctrine, but no general and prevailing consensus declaring it to be the faith of the church; in the last we have found no revelation of the doctrine—certainly none such as to exclude reasonable doubt as to its truth. We are thus liberated from the shackles, either of human creeds or of supposed revelation, and are at liberty to examine the doctrine in the light of pure reason and common sense. It is proposed, therefore, in the next chapter, to present with freedom and candor, though with becoming reverence, the objections which reason, enlightened not only by human science, but by the principles of revealed truth, presents to the admissibility of the theory that the Eternal Spirit created all things out of nothing.

1 John i. 1.
CHAPTER IV.

CREATION EX NIHILO CONSIDERED.

In order to a fair presentation of the objections which reason and the principles of revealed truth offer to the doctrine of creation ex nihilo, we must first have a clear definition—not of God, for He is infinite, and cannot be defined, but of the highest idea which reason, instructed by revelation, can have of God.

That idea cannot be better expressed than in these words: "God is a Spirit, infinite, eternal and unchangeable in His being, wisdom, power, holiness, justice, goodness and truth." 1

Adopting this definition in all its breadth and fulness, we proceed to consider the asserted theory that God created the material universe and all its inhabitants out of nothing.

The first objection to this theory is that reason furnishes no foundation for the belief that creation out of nothing is possible. The dictum of reason on this subject had been expressed for four thousand years before the theory in question was ever asserted by men of thought and learning. "Ex nihilo nihil fit" was the dictate of common sense, and although this

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1 Answer to Question 4th, Westminster Shorter Catechism; "Creeds of Christendom," Vol. III., p. 676; the Roman Catholic Church, Canons and Decrees of the Council of Trent, Ibid., Vol. II., p. 79; Greek Church, Ὀρθόδοξας Ὀμολογία, Answer to Questions VII. and VIII., Ibid., Vol. II., p. 280; Longer Catechism, Ibid., 459; Lutheran Church, Augsburg Confession, Ibid., Vol. III., p. 7; Episcopal Churches, Ibid., pp. 487, 814; Baptist Church, Ibid., Vol. III., p. 742; Congregational Church, Ibid., Vol. III., p. 731; Methodist Church, Ibid., Vol. III., p. 807, all concur in deffinitions of man’s idea of God.
truth did not deny the existence of spirit, yet the common 

sense of mankind found it impossible to conceive how spirit 
could, out of nothing, create matter. Therefore the ancient 

world, including all the best thinkers of its most enlightened 
and classic ages, rejected the theory of creation ex nihilo, and 
held that matter is eternal.¹

¹ "Among various theories of the generation of the world, the idea of 
a creation out of nothing seems to have been altogether foreign to ancient 
philosophy."—Mansel's "Limits of Religious Thoughts," Am. Edit., 
1870, p. 100. Whatever questions may have been raised as to the sound-
ness of Dean Mansel's philosophy of religion, none have denied his learn-
ing in ancient literature. In a previous note we have shown the almost 
universal concurrence of ancient thought as to the eternity of matter. 
Plato's theory on this question has been a subject of some debate among 
the learned, but it seems difficult to reconcile his words in "The Timaeus" 
with any theory, other than that the Creator formed and arranged the 
universe out of pre-existing matter; "there was a separation of the dis-
similar parts and a crowding together of those most alike, in consequence of 
which these other things also occupied a different position before the 
universe was created, and, from such materials, reduced to order. Before 
this, indeed, they all subsisted irrationally and without measure; but 
when the Creator undertook to arrange the universe, He first gave shapes, 
with forms and numbers, to fire and earth, water and air."—Henry Davis's 
This translation of the Timaeus is founded on Stallbaum's text, and aided 
by his notes and those of Prof. T. H. Martin in his learned work "Etudes 
sur le Timée," 2 Vols., Paris, 1841. The author of the article on "Plato," 
in the New Am. Cyclop., Vol. XIII., p. 387, seems to estimate at a very 
low value these translations of Plato's works by Henry Cary, Henry Davis 
and George Burges, published at different times in Bohn's Classical 
Library; but these translators, though not widely known to fame, were 
held as good Greek scholars in their own circle. They had the aid of the 
Latin version of Ficinus, the German of Stallbaum and Scheirmacher, 
the French of Victor Cousin, and the English of Taylor and Sydenham. 
Taylor's is confessedly bad, and Sydenham's, although highly commended 
(New Am. Cyclop., Vol. XIII., p. 387), is a mere paraphrase—so much 
so that in his rendering of the "Banquet," "more than a third of what he 
has put down is the mere coinage of his own brain, and not a vestige of it 
is to be found in the original Greek." It is true that Plato sometimes 
wrote incomprehensible nonsense, of which abundant instances are found
To escape the dilemma of holding that matter is eternal or that it has been created out of nothing, some thoughtful men of modern ages have resorted to the theory that matter is an emanation from God—that God, by His power, has produced matter from His own essence.

John Milton agreed with the ancient philosophers in opposing the doctrine of creation out of nothing. His words are as follows: "It is clear, then, that the world was framed out of matter of some kind or other; for since action and passion are relative terms, and since, consequently, no agent can act externally unless there be some patient, such as matter, it appears impossible that God could have created this world out of nothing,—not from any defect of power on His part, but because it was necessary that something should have previously existed capable of receiving passively the exertion of the Divine efficacy. Since, therefore, both Scripture and reason concur in pronouncing that all these things were made, not out of nothing, but out of matter, it necessarily follows that matter must either have always existed independently of God, or have originated from God at some particular point of time. That matter should have been always independent of God (seeing that it is only a passive principle, dependent on the Deity, and subservient to Him; and seeing, moreover, that, as in number, considered abstractly, so also in time or eternity, there is no inherent force or efficacy), that matter, I say, should have existed of itself from all eternity, is inconceivable. If, on the contrary, it did not exist from all eternity, it is difficult to understand from whence it derives its origin. There re-

in the "Parmenides"; but he also wrote much beautiful speculation and excellent sense. The above passage from the "Timaeus" seems to be rendered with reasonable fidelity. See also note XII., and foot-note 1, with authorities cited, in notes to Mansel's "Limits of Religious Thought," Am. Edit., p. 281.
mains, therefore, but one solution of the difficulty, for which, moreover, we have the authority of Scripture, namely, that all things are of God."¹

The adoption of this theory, that matter is "an efflux from Deity," logically led Milton to adopt the further error that there is no real distinction in essence between the body and the soul of man, and hence he has declared: "That man is a living being, intrinsically and properly one and individual, not compound or separable, not, according to the common opinion, made up and framed of two distinct natures, as of soul and body, but the whole man is soul and the soul man; that is to say, a body or substance, individual, animated, sensitive and rational."²

Hence Dr. Channing has supposed that this error continued to cling to Milton's mind, and that even in old age and blindness he gave expression to his own theory when he put into the mouth of the angel Raphael the beautiful passage in his address to Adam in paradise:

"O Adam, one Almighty is, from whom
All things proceed and up to Him return;
If not depraved from good, created all
Such to perfection, one first matter all,
Endued with various forms, various degrees
Of substance, and to things that live of life:
But more refined, more spirituous and pure
As nearer to Him placed or nearer tending

Each in their several active spheres assigned
Till body up to spirit work, in bounds
Proportioned to each kind." 1

But Milton, however sublime as a poet, was erratic and visionary as a theologian. Hence he has never convinced the Christian world that matter is an efflux from God, or that body and mind are the same substance, or that Christ, though first of creation, is still only a creature of God. 2

Nevertheless, Milton’s theory as to creation has been, in substance, announced by the greatest metaphysician of modern times as a necessary law of thought, unless we accept the doctrine that matter is eternal. Sir William Hamilton says: “We are utterly unable to construe it in thought as possible that the complement of existence has been either increased or diminished. We cannot conceive, either, on the one hand, nothing becoming something, or, on the other, something becoming nothing. When God is said to create the universe out of nothing, we think this by supposing that He evolves the universe out of Himself;” and he quotes the words of Lucretius and Persius, that “from nothing, nothing can be produced,” as enunciating a physical axiom of antiquity. 3

2 That these errors are all taught by Milton is unhappily too clear for doubt.—“Treatise on Christian Doctrine,” Vol. I., pp. 108–106; Channing’s Works, Vol. I., pp. 44–45, and ante.
3 Sir Wm. Hamilton’s “Philosophy of the Conditioned,” American edition, 1857, edited by Wight, pp. 498, 494. Dean Mansel, in his note XXXIII. to Lecture II., “Limits of Religious Thought,” after quoting a passage to the same effect from Hamilton’s “Discussions,” p. 60, says: “With all deference to this great philosopher, I cannot help thinking that a different representation would have been more in harmony with the main principles of his own system. We cannot conceive creation at all, neither as a springing of nothing into something, nor as an evolution of the relative from the absolute, for the simple reason that the first terms of both hypotheses, nothing and the absolute, are equally beyond the reach
The all-sufficient answer to the notion that the universe is an efflux from Deity is that neither revelation nor reason sanctions it. The holy Scriptures never represent God as drawing or generating the universe from His own essence. On the contrary, they constantly represent Him as creating, making, framing, forming it by His divine power and wisdom. And if revealed truth negatives this notion, certainly reason, science, and common sense concur in the negative. It is impossible to conceive how pure spirit can, from its own essence, draw pure matter. These substances are essentially different. The one can never, by any lapse of time or any process of evolution, produce the other, except by change of nature or essence; and if God, the pure Spirit, change His essence, He is no longer unchangeable. But fundamental truth declares Him unchangeable, therefore matter cannot be an efflux or emanation from Him.

The theory that matter is an efflux from Deity being thus overthrown, Milton and Sir Wm. Hamilton would be driven, by their own principles, to admit that matter is eternal; for they found it impossible to believe that the universe was created ex nihilo.

We are thus brought back to the first objection to this of human conception," pp. 262, 263. In addition to the moderns, Milton, Cousin and Sir Wm. Hamilton, it ought also to be stated that many of the Neo-Platonists, such as Plotinus, Porphyry, Jamblichus, Hierocles and Proclus, held that matter is an emanation from God.—Dr. Ralph Cudworth's "Intellectual System of the Universe," Edit. 1820, Vol. III., pp. 439–441.

1 Victor Cousin is no pantheist, and yet he is with Milton and Hamilton in denying a creation out of nothing. His words are: "Dieu crée donc: il crée en vertu de sa puissance créatrice; il tire le monde, non du néant qui n'est pas, mais de lui—Même, qui est l'existence absolu."—"Cours de l'Histoire de la Philosophie," Lecon V. See also Amer. Edit., 1864, edited by Wight, pp. 93, 94; "The Mystery; or, Evil and God," by Dr. John Young, of Edinburgh, Edit. Phila., 1858, pp. 51, 52.
doctrine as already presented. Let it be remembered that we are now dealing with the question in the forum of reason, science,—common sense,—which in their highest development are identical. We have seen that mankind, under their guidance only, have uniformly and for thousands of years rejected the notion of creation out of nothing as impossible. Why have they so rejected it? The answer is obvious. **Power** is incompetent to bring something out of nothing. Power is **cause**, and cause cannot, out of nothing, produce effect. All-power is no more competent to create matter out of nothing than the smallest power. Omnipotence, or All-power, can only do what power can do; and power has no relation to **nothing**. To the human mind, even in its most exalted and advanced state of intelligence, it is inconceivable—unthinkable—that any actual being should be brought out of nothing. Power is as powerless in attempting to exert itself upon nothing as man would be powerless to draw air from a vacuum. In the light of reason, we know of power only this, that it cannot work except on an existing subject. A cause, without a subject to operate on, cannot produce an effect. Therefore, while bowing in reverence before Almighty power, reason is still compelled, by the very laws which God has given her, to reject the notion that even Almighty power can produce an effect without a subject on which the Great First Cause shall work. Had God, in His inspired Word, revealed in plain terms that He had created the universe out of nothing, our duty would be to believe—to receive by faith what was incomprehensible to reason. But we have seen, by a careful examination of His Word, that He has not so taught us. Therefore we are left to the guidance of reason, which, in all ages and in all states of intelligence, has rejected the doctrine of creation **ex nihilo**.

Various attempts to answer this objection have been made. It will be sufficient that we notice the answer given by an
eminent theologian of the church which, of all the Protestant sisterhood, has most steadily announced the doctrine in question. Dr. James Henley Thornwell has always been esteemed a profound thinker and an able writer, and the collection of his writings, published since his death, has added to his reputation. We will quote at some length his argument on the point under consideration:

"The objection that the idea of creation (out of nothing) is self-contradictory and absurd, proceeds upon a double misconception.¹ It first assumes that *nothing* is a positive subject of operation—a real pre-existing material upon which power is exerted. It takes for granted that the preposition *ex*, in the philosophic axiom *ex nihilo nihil fit*, represents the material cause. This is a gross mistake. *Nothing* is simply the term from which existence begins. The meaning is, that something now is where there was nothing before; that something, in other words, has begun to be. Creation is an energy of God, an effect of the Divine omnipotence, produced without the concurrence of any other principle. His power as infinite is without limits. It is, therefore, not restricted, like that of the creature, to the modification of a pre-existing material; it not only changes, but makes its objects. There is no more contradiction in the notion of power as giving being than there is in the notion of power as changing being. Both may be incomprehensible, but neither is absurd. The second error is that the notion of power is determined to only one class of effects. It is true, experience presents us with no instances of power but those produced through the medium of motion. But the concept may be separated in thought from any specific form in which it is realized; it is simply that which produces effects without reference to their nature or the conditions under which

¹ The words in parenthesis are not in the text, but are supplied to indicate clearly the objection and the relevancy of the answer.
it is exerted. Hence creation, as an effect, is as clearly an instance of power as motion. It is, indeed, the highest exemplification of it. To say that God wills and a world follows, requires no other simple idea to understand it than is involved in the assertion, I will and my arm moves. The mode in which the power operates is different, but the idea of power is the same. In neither case do we understand the mode of operation. Because one is a matter of daily experience, we confound familiarity with knowledge, and think we understand it when we do not. What power is in itself we are unable to conceive. It is a mystery in every form of its exhibition; and as we cannot grasp it in itself, it is perfectly preposterous to limit it to one class of effects. There is consequently mystery, but no absurdity, no self-contradiction, in saying that the worlds were made by the power of God."

This elaborate answer is a chain of reasoning, consisting of several links, or propositions and conclusions. The soundness of each and all of these links is necessary to the integrity of the chain. If any link be unsound, the chain breaks under pressure. We proceed, therefore, to sound each link.

First, then, it is not true that the objection "assumes that nothing is a positive subject of operation—a real pre-existing material upon which power is exerted." The very reverse of this is true. The objection "assumes" that nothing is just what it purports to be—that is, no thing, no being, no entity, no material—and, therefore, the objection insists that power, however great or subtle or far reaching, has no relation to nothing, and cannot bring something out of nothing. Next, it is not true that this objection takes for granted that ex, in the axiom ex nihilo nihil fit, represents the material cause. Distinctly the reverse is true. It is on the want of material cause,

1 Thornwell's Collected Writings, Richmond Edit., 1871, Vol. I., pp. 211-213, Lecture IX., on Creation.
or rather of material subject, that the objection founds itself. *Ex* is a preposition, which, in this axiom, expresses the relation "from," "out of," or "by," and the axiom declares the necessary and unalterable truth that from, by or out of nothing, nothing can be made. Next, the declaration that "nothing is simply the term from which existence begins;" that "something now is where there was nothing before;" that "something, in other words, has begun to be," is neither more nor less than an attempt to make that *conceivable* which is not *conceivable* by the laws of the human mind. To conceive of an absolute beginning of existence is beyond the power of thought. And if we conceive of a void space, in which there is absolutely nothing—no entity, not even God—then matter cannot begin to be there without a cause, and a cause involves power, and power cannot work on *nothing*; and, therefore, God must either have filled this void space with matter from other parts of space, or, if no such matter existed, have drawn it from His own essence, in which case it has not been created from nothing.¹

¹ "To create is a thing not difficult to be conceived, for it is a thing that we do every moment; in short, we create every time that we perform a free act. I will, I take a resolution, I take another, then another still; I modify it, I suspend it, I pursue it, etc. What is it that I do? I produce an effect which I refer to myself as the cause and only cause; and, in regard to the existence of this effect, I seek nothing beyond myself. We create a free act; we create it, I say, for we refer it to no other principle than ourselves; we impute it to ourselves, and to ourselves alone. It existed not; and now it begins to exist by virtue of the causative power which we possess. This, then, is to create; but with what? *With nothing.* No, doubtless; but on the contrary, we create with the foundation even of our existence. Man draws not from nothing the action which he has not yet performed, but is about to perform. He draws it from the very real power which he has to perform it. Divine creation is of the same nature. God, in creating the universe, draws it not from nothing, which exists not, which cannot exist, which is a mere word; He draws it from Himself, from this power of causation and of creation, of which we possess a feeble portion; and all the difference between our creation and that of God is the general difference between God and man, the difference
Next, the assertion that because the power of God is infinite, therefore infinite power can create matter—not out of Divine essence, but out of nothing—is an unproved assertion—a mere assumption of the very point in debate. For be it remembered, that here Dr. Thornwell is seeking to meet the objector in the forum of reason only. He is bound, therefore, to prove that reason admits that Almighty power can create something out of nothing. But this, reason denies. All she knows of power is derived from her sense of causality—from the relation of cause and effect, and this relation absolutely denies that any cause can create any effect, unless a subject exists for the cause to work upon. When, therefore, this eminent theologian says: "There is no more contradiction in the notion of power as giving being than there is in the notion of power as changing being," he asserts a mere truism, not at all conducive to the success of his argument. For, taking the word "being" to have the same meaning in both sections of his sentence, reason asserts that God neither gives being in the sense of creating it out of nothing, nor changes being in any other sense than the phenomenal and the finite. Being, in its absolute sense of either mind or matter, God never changes, so far as reason can decide. A change in the sum total of being in the universe is inconceivable to reason.


"We cannot know, we cannot think a thing except under the attribute of existence; we cannot know or think a thing to exist except as in time; and we cannot know or think a thing to exist in time and think it absolutely to commence."—Sir Wm. Hamilton's "Philosophy of the Conditioned," Amer. Edit., 1857, p. 501.

"An act of creation, in the highest sense of the term—that is to say, an absolutely first link in the chain of phenomena, preceded by no temporal antecedent—is to human thought inconceivable."—Mansel's "Limits of Religious Thought," Amer. Edit., 1870, p. 99, and note xi.; Lect. III., p. 279.
Mind and matter are all she knows, and power or cause brings about every change, and every change is phenomenal, and not essential, that is not a change of being.¹

Next, it is not true that this objection determines "the notion of power to only one class of effects." Reason is willing to extend the notion of power to as many classes of effects as all her knowledge, all her experience, and all her reasonable conjectures can find, and still she finds nothing to justify her in believing that power can create something out of nothing. Dr. Thornwell admits that we have no experience of any effects produced by power, except "through the medium of motion." But he insists there may be other modes of working effects. He illustrates by the power of will: "I will, and my arm moves;" and, he says, no other simple idea is required to understand that "God wills and a world follows," than to understand that when I will my arm moves. "In neither case do we understand the mode of operation." Now, the inscrutable nature of the soul and the will of man may be freely admitted, and yet this illustration does not, in the slightest degree, disturb the objection to creation ex nihilo. It rather confirms it; for reason, experience, common sense testify that every change, every decision of the will, is preceded by something antecedent, internal or external, or both. Therefore we come back to the constant verdict of reason. We have a cause or power acting upon a subject and producing an effect. Is this a creation ex nihilo? Does this illustration help us to the conclusion that cause, even when it is the Great First Cause—that power, even when it is All-power—can create something out of nothing? Surely not.

Thus it seems to a common-sense observer that every essential link in the chain of reasoning adopted by Dr. Thornwell as his

SECOND OBJECTION.

answer to the objection, when tested by the hammer of analytic reason, breaks, and the chain disappears.

The Second objection to the doctrine in question is that it necessarily attributes to the Divine and All-Wise Spirit a course of action which reason cannot reconcile with her highest ideas of wisdom. It teaches that God, a pure spirit, after having existed for eternal ages, in His own perfect and blessed essence, did, suddenly, by His power acting upon nothing, call into being the universe of material and spiritual creatures. Now it is certain that reason, left to herself, would never conceive such a notion. Her highest idea of God is that He is and has been from all eternity perfectly happy, perfectly blessed in the enjoyment of His own adorable nature, needing no creatures to increase His glory, nor to supplement His plenitude. And even when instructed by revelation in the doctrine of the Trinity, reason is still more effectually repelled from the thought that creation was necessary; for the Divine Three were not alone, but from all eternity had been in the ineffable enjoyment of their own communion. What possible reason, motive or cause could induce the change involved in creation *ex nihilo*, mind is unable to conceive. Therefore unaided reason pronounces strongly against the doctrine. No possible reason could exist why creation should flash out from nothing into being at one moment any more than at another moment. The only conception of eternity which reason can form is time without limit—time infinitely extended in the past and in the future; therefore she is unable to adopt the notion that the Divine Spirit, after existing in all His power and wisdom for illimitable ages, suddenly seized a special moment of time, and, in that moment, called the universe out of nothing into being.

1 Lord Littleton, in his excellent treatise on "The Conversion of St. Paul," states this difficulty very strongly. He assumes creation *ex nihilo* as established truth, but insists that it is as much a difficulty in the way of the sceptical deist as of the Christian philosopher.
No answer, in the forum of reason, has ever been found sufficient to meet this objection. The only answer attempted is the denial of the jurisdiction of reason over the question. Thus, Dr. Thornwell says, in undertaking a reply to this objection, with others equally grave:

"Of these four classes of arguments, this general criticism may be made, that they labor under the capital vice of attempting to bring within the forms of the understanding what transcends the capacity of thought. They assume the infinite, the unconditioned, the absolutely perfect, as a thing about which we are as competent to speculate as the facts of experience. They bring it into the relations and under the conditions of our faculties of knowledge without being conscious that the very circumstance of subjecting it to these limitations destroys its nature. It is the infinite no longer if it is comprehended within the narrow sphere of human cogitation. What is apprehended as the infinite, and reasoned upon as the infinite, is a tissue of negations, which, the human mind accepting as positive elements of consciousness, becomes involved in an endless series of contradictions. Hence such absurdities are not arguments. They are only puzzles, or logical riddles. They prove nothing but the incompetency of reason, and the incompetency of philosophy to transcend with its logical forms the sphere of experience."¹

After insisting that the infinite is a subject of faith and not of knowledge, he adds: "Now, in the question of creation, the great difficulty is the co-existence of finite and infinite—the one and the many—the perfect and the imperfect. In attempting to adjust the relations betwixt them, we imperceptibly take for granted that we know the positive properties and attributes of the infinite, as we know the positive properties and attributes of the finite, whereas we know the infinite only as the negation

¹ Thornwell's Collected Writings, Vol. I., pp. 210, 211.
of the finite. These negations we preposterously make positive. We confound, in other words, a non-positing of the infinite with a real posit-ing, and, setting out with a fundamental blunder, it is no wonder that every step should plunge us in deeper darkness. He that reasons upon no as if it were yes, must not be surprised at the perplexity of his conclusions.”

To this labored pleading against the competency of reason as a judge in the matter of creation, a very simple yet sufficient reply presents itself.

The learned professor admits—nay, insists—that the doctrine of creation ex nihilo is a subject of faith, and not of knowledge, because it involves the relation between the infinite and the finite, which relation transcends the powers of the human understanding and calls for faith. But faith never arises without evidence. God never requires His creature man to believe except on evidence. And while it is true that the efficiency of evidence in producing faith depends very much on the subjective condition of the mind itself, so that some minds reject, as insufficient, evidence which ought to work faith; yet, it is equally true that no mind can believe without some evidence, and, therefore, God calls on His creature to exercise faith only in what is proved by evidence.

Now there are only two sources of evidence that God has given to man: revelation and reason. If any doctrine be presented, and our faith in it be invited, we cannot be called on to believe it unless evidence, from one or both of these sources, be furnished tending to establish it.

But we have already shown, by a critical and extended ex-

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1 Thornwell's Collected Writings, Vol. I., p. 211.

2 Reason is here used in its widest sense—as including not only the discursive, but the intuitional and representative faculties; in short, as including all sources from which man can obtain evidence, except the inspired Word of God.
amination, that the first of these sources—revelation—does not establish the truth of the doctrine of creation *ex nihilo*—certainly does not testify to it in such a manner as to exclude all reasonable doubt from a fair and honest mind. In fact, Dr. Thornwell does not rely on the Holy Scriptures to prove it. In his whole lecture on "Creation," covering sixteen printed pages, he never makes a quotation from, or a reference to, a single passage of the Bible, although he earnestly insists that his doctrine on the subject is "vital in theology."¹

If, then, this doctrine is not proved true by revelation, to what sources of evidence can we resort except to those furnished by reason? No other evidence exists; at least none other is furnished to man. Whatever may be the limitations and imperfections of reason when dealing with the infinite, we are driven to it when revelation is silent. And, therefore, the learned professor's plea against the jurisdiction of reason is bad. It must be rejected on his own principles. He cannot object to the competency of the forum of reason, when—revelation being silent—no other forum is open; and when he has himself voluntarily entered that forum and submitted the question to its decision. He is bound to meet, *on their merits*, the objections which reason urges against creation *ex nihilo*, and if these objections cannot be answered on their merits, then they must prevail. The doctrine is rejected because it is not sustained either by revelation or reason.

But the learned professor's plea is defeated on another ground. Its statements are not *true in fact*. It is not true that reason is wholly incompetent to deal with questions relating to the attributes and action of the Infinite Being. Reason was bestowed by Him on man for the purpose of enabling the creature humbly to approach and study the Creator, and if it be wholly

¹ Thornwell's Collected Writings, Vol. I., Lect. IX., pp. 206-222; especially on pages 206, 221, 222.
incompetent for that purpose because God is infinite, then the millions of this world who have never enjoyed the light of revealed truth could never, by the light of reason, learn enough of God to make them responsible beings. But this conclusion is not only negatived by the express testimony of Scripture, but most solemnly repudiated by Dr. Thornwell in his teachings.¹ The theory that the infinite Spirit, because beyond our comprehension, is therefore beyond the utmost reach of man’s spiritual powers, when carried to its logical results, will for ever shut man from all knowledge of his Maker.²


² Dean Mansel, in his “Limits of Religious Thought,” has pushed this theory hardly, to such an extent as to draw down on his book heavy and disabling blows from some of the stalwart theologians of our age.—Dr. Charles Hodge’s “Systematic Theology,” Vol. I., pp. 846–866; Dr. R. L. Dabney’s “Sensualistic Philosophy,” pp. 119, 120. See also “The Modern Doctrine of the Unknowable,” So. Pres. Review, October, 1876, pp. 662–696. Some incautious statements of Sir Wm. Hamilton, in his “Philosophy of the Conditioned,” have been subjected to ingenious perversion by Herbert Spencer and his followers, who deny that the Infinite can, in any sense, be known to man. Dean Mansel goes so far as to admit that “the metaphysical representation of the Deity, as absolute and infinite, must necessarily, as the profoundest metaphysicians have acknowledged, amount to nothing less than the sum of all reality.” “What kind of an Absolute Being is that,” says Hegel, “which does not contain in itself all that is actual, even evil included?” Dean Mansel adds: “We may repudiate the conclusion with indignation, but the reasoning is unassailable.”—“Limits of Religious Thoughts,” p. 76. If this “reasoning” means anything, it means that man is obliged, by the laws of his own spiritual nature, to conclude that God is the author of evil. Horrible as this conclusion is, it seems inevitably to follow from Dr. Thornwell’s view that “the creature has no reality which it does not derive from God. Though separate and distinct from Him, it is not independent of Him. His will is the basis of all the reality it contains.” “God alone is equal, in the sum of being, to God plus the universe.”—Thornwell’s Collected Writings, Vol. I., Lect. IX., p. 218. If the universe, then, contains evil, God is the author, because His being contains the universe. Therefore, Dr. Thornwell’s view is inadmissible.
Now, it is true that the finite cannot comprehend the infinite; that is, cannot hold it, because the limited cannot hold the unlimited. But it does not, therefore, follow that the creature, endowed with spiritual powers, cannot have any knowledge or any intelligent apprehension of the Infinite Spirit in His attributes and His works. On this subject a great and clear mind in our age has said:

"We grant that God is incomprehensible, in the sense already given; but He is not, therefore, unintelligible; and this distinction we conceive to be important. We do not pretend to know the whole nature and properties of God, but still we can form some clear ideas of Him, and can reason from these ideas as justly as from any other." "Because God is infinite, His name is not, therefore, a mere sound. It is a representative of some distinct conceptions of our Creator; and these conceptions are as sure and important, and as proper materials for the reasoning faculty, as they would be if our views were indefinitely enlarged. We cannot, indeed, trace God's goodness and rectitude through the whole field of His operations; but we know the essential nature of these attributes, and, therefore, can often judge what accords with and opposes them. God's goodness, because infinite, does not cease to be goodness, or essentially differ from the same attribute in man; nor does justice change its nature, so that it cannot be understood, because it is seated in an unbounded mind. There have, indeed, been philosophers, 'falsely so called,' who have argued, from the unlimited nature of God, that we cannot ascribe to Him justice and other moral attributes in any proper or definite sense of those words; and the inference is plain that all religion or worship, wanting an intelligible object, must be a misplaced, wasted offering. This doctrine from the infidel we reject with abhorrence; but something not very different too often reaches us from the mistaken Christian, who, to save his creed, shrouds the Creator in utter
darkness. In opposition to both, we maintain that God's attributes are intelligible, and that we can conceive as truly of His goodness and justice as of these qualities in men. In fact, these qualities are essentially the same in God and man, though differing in degree, in purity, and in extent of operation. We know not, and we cannot conceive of, any other justice or goodness than we learn from our own nature, and if God have not these, He is altogether unknown to us as a moral Being; He offers nothing for esteem and love to rest upon; the objection of the infidel is just, that worship is wasted: 'We worship we know not what.'”¹

To this reasoning, in substance, we apprehend that no successful answer can be given. If the idea of goodness or benevolence in the mind of man be not in its nature the same with the attribute of goodness or benevolence in God, then it is impossible for man ever to know that God is good. Instead of taking pleasure in the happiness of His creatures, He may be delighted with their misery; for, upon the unknowable theory, goodness in the Infinite may be the very reverse of goodness in the creature. And if the idea of justice in the human mind be not, in its nature, the same with the attribute of justice in God, then man is shut up to the dismal thought that God may take pleasure in punishing the innocent instead of the guilty—He may delight in inflicting penalties, not for sins against Him, but for humble services to Him; not for crimes, but for prayers and praises. And if the idea of truth in the mind of man be not in its nature the same with the attribute of truth in God, then man is for ever debarred from all possibility of having

¹ Dr. Wm. E. Channing's Works, Edit. 1848, Vol. I., pp. 228–230. It is greatly to be regretted that a man with a mind so clear and strong, and so full of the noblest "enthusiasm of humanity," should have embraced the cold heresy of Unitarianism, and thereby frozen to death much of his usefulness as a minister of Christ.
confidence in God; for even if the Infinite One should, by direct communication, tell His creature what is his duty and how he must act to attain happiness, yet the creature could not, with safety, trust to these declarations, because he could not know them to be true, inasmuch as the attribute of truth in God may not correspond with the idea of truth in man.

To such horrors will the doctrine of the unknowable Infinite infallibly lead all who perseveringly commit themselves to it. We may well ask to be excused from adopting it. It follows, that when the highest exercise of reason advances a distinctive objection to the doctrine of creation ex nihilo, the advocates of this doctrine must answer such objection on its merits; otherwise the doctrine cannot stand. No mere plea against the jurisdiction of reason will avail.

The third objection to the doctrine in question is that it impinges, fatally to itself, upon the attribute of immutability in the Eternal Spirit. The definition of God which we have adopted declares that He is not only infinite and eternal, but unchangeable in His being and all His attributes. And, therefore, theologians of the widest grasp of thought tell us that “as an infinite and absolute Being, self-existent and absolutely independent, God is exalted above all the causes of, and even above the possibility of, change.” “He can neither increase nor decrease. He is subject to no process of development or of self-evolution. His knowledge and power can never be greater or less.” He is “without limitation or necessary relation to any thing out of Himself.”

Now, if God called the material universe into being out of

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1 Dr. Charles Hodge's "Systematic Theology," Vol. I., pp. 390, 392; Dr. J. H. Thornwell's Collected Writings, Vol. I., pp. 199, 200; Dr. R. L. Dabney's "Syllabus and Notes of Lectures in Theology," Lec. 13, pp. 152-154; Turretin, Loc. III., Qu. 11; Dr. Thomas Dick's Theology, Lec. 20; Charnock on the Attributes of God.
nothing, at some moment in the tract of eternal duration, then, of necessity, during the existence of this new being, God is not the same that He was before its existence; for the advocates of creation *ex nihilo* admit that the material universe is actual, real being, and that it is not a part of God; that is, not a part of His self-existence. They claim that as He called it out of nothing, so He can bring it again to nothing; He can annihilate it, though none of them pretend that either revelation or reason gives us any ground to believe He will do so. While the material universe stands, it is actual being, and God, its creator, stands in relation to it. This is inevitable. Before its existence the Divine Spirit stood in relation to no being but Himself; after its creation, and during its existence, the Divine Spirit stands in relation, not only to His own being, but to the new being. This conclusion cannot be evaded, unless it can be held that the material universe can exist and not exist at the same moment, which is contradictory to the law of being. Changes of form—of the phenomenal—do not involve any change in God; but change of being does; the introduction and maintenance of a new being does. Therefore the doctrine of creation *ex nihilo* impinges upon the immutability of God, and cannot be true.¹

¹ Dr. Thornwell sees clearly and admits candidly this difficulty. He says: "The absolute immutability of God seems to be contradicted by the fact of creation. A new relation was certainly superinduced. The answer commonly given is: Relations *ad extra* imply no change in the essence related; God acquires a new denomination, but no new accession to His being; the title Creator imparts no addition to His nature; the only real change in the case takes place in the creatures which pass from nonentity to being. But the question is, whether there is not a modification of the Divine will in passing from non-creation to creation. The universe began; and when it began by the fiat of the Almighty, was not His will differently determined from what it was before? *This difficulty we conceive it impossible to answer.* To say that He willed from eternity to create just when He did—that the purpose included the time and mode of its execution—does not solve the problem. A will to create and a will
But the attribute of unchangeableness is not the only attribute of the Divine Spirit on which this doctrine impinges with self-destructive force. It clashes with the infinite, eternal and unchangeable holiness, justice and goodness of God. This is the Fourth objection, and to the moral sense and moral intuitions which our Creator has bestowed upon us as the basis of our being and of His government, it is the objection of objections, and, unless it can be successfully answered, the doctrine cannot be maintained.

Let it be borne in mind that the doctrine of creation ex nihilo assumes that God, the Almighty Spirit, had existed during an eternity past; that, being Omniscient, He held in contemplation of the Divine mind all possible modes and plans on which a universe could be created or could exist, and that He deliberately chose and called out of nothing into being the present universe of material and spiritual worlds and creatures. Now, it is impossible to deny as a fact that this present universe abounds in most fearful physical evil, and, worse still, in moral evil so gigantic in scale, far reaching in effect, and horrible in malignity, that the world’s history, as recorded, consists chiefly of the history of crime. And, yet farther, the conclusions of creating do not seem to be the same. It is true that the universe adds nothing to God and takes nothing from Him; but does not the creation of the universe imply a new determination of His will? This is one of the questions which remind us of our ignorance whenever we undertake to speculate on the absolute.”—Thornwell’s Collected Writings, Vol. I., pp. 200, 201. Thus Dr. Thornwell seeks refuge in the doctrine of the unknowable infinite—a doctrine which, revelation being silent, cannot avail him in answer to an objection urged by reason. Dr. R. L. Dabney differs from his co-professor, and thinks there is no difficulty in understanding that creation ex nihilo infers no change in God, because the purpose to create in time was in the Divine mind from eternity.—“Syllabus and Notes,” p. 181. But did not creation (if ex nihilo) introduce new being, and, if so, a new relation, and hence, necessarily, a new determination of the Divine will?
the advocates of creation *ex nihilo*, drawn from revelation and reason together, are that this *moral evil* will be eternal in duration—that millions of fallen angels and impenitent men will be consigned, living and capable of suffering, to a state or a place in which, for their sins, committed and continuing, they shall suffer, *for ever*, torments of body and soul which have been feebly foreshadowed by persecutors in this world. In other words, this doctrine teaches that God—a Spirit, infinite, eternal and unchangeable in wisdom, justice and goodness, as well as in power, and, therefore, able to create a universe from which *evil* of every kind should be absolutely and for ever excluded—has chosen to call into being, *out of nothing*, a universe and a scheme of being, the outworking of which is not only enormous physical suffering and woe, but the eternal wretchedness of millions of his creatures!\(^1\)

\(^1\) The eschatology of the Christian Church holds firmly to the doctrine of eternal retribution, and must continue to hold it so long as our knowledge of the meaning of plain Scripture is in its present state. The hopes of universal salvation held out by such men as John Foster, Dr. Bellows, Frederick Denison Maurice, and Canon Farrar make feeble progress against the 25th chapter of Matthew, the 20th of the Apocalypse, and the 6th verse of Jude. Very recently "an orthodox layman" has published to the world another plea for that form of universalism known as *restoration*. His work is entitled "The Death of Death," Edit. 1878, Richmond, Va. He avail himself of the work of another anonymous author, who styles himself "an orthodox minister of the gospel," and whose book, entitled "Is Eternal Punishment Unending?" appeared in 1876, (Lockwood, Brooks & Co., Boston.) These works seek to prove that though the Greek word *αἰωνίος* means "eternal," it does not mean "endless"; and that if the inspired writers had meant to convey the latter idea they would have used the word *αἰτελευτητικός*, which is nowhere found in the Greek Testament.

* But *αἰτελευτητικός*, being formed on *τελευτάω* (from which we have teleology), is used in classic Greek to mean "without purpose," "without design," as often as to mean "endless." And, as it is admitted that *αἰωνίος* conveys the idea of duration—very long duration, indefinite ages of duration—no sound reason has ever been given why this same word in Matthew xxv. 46 should mean "endless" as to the happiness of the saved, yet not mean "endless" as to the punishment of the lost.
The system known as *Pantheism*, which has been and is still held by millions in India, and also by many in Germany, England and America, presents no aspect so revolting to the world’s conscience as that just stated. Pantheism teaches that there is but one substance in being—that God is this substance, existing from eternity, and that the material universe and all finite being are but God manifesting Himself. This system is denounced by all the leading divines of the Christian churches, and has drawn a special condemnation from the Pope of Rome in his “Syllabus of Errors,” issued in 1864.1

And the learned professor in a Protestant theological seminary, to whom reference has been previously made, says, in his Syllabus and Notes, (after speaking of the unfounded claims of Pantheism to deify nature and clothe everything which is sweet and grand with the immediate glory of divinity):

“Nay, but, say I, are the manifestations of the universal Being all lovely and good? If Pantheism is true, must we not equally regard all that is abhorrent in nature—the rending thunder and the rushing tornado, the desolating earthquake and volcanoes, the frantic sea, lashing helpless navies into wreck—as the throes of disorder or ruin in God? And when we picture the scenes of sin and woe which darken humanity—the remorse of the villain’s privacy, the orgies of crime and cruelty hidden beneath the veil of night, the despairing death-beds, the horrors of battle fields, the wails of nations growing pale before the pestilence, the din of burning and ravaged cities, and *all the world of eternal despair itself*—we see in the whole but the agony and crime of the Divine Substance. Would it then be best called devil or God? Since suffering and sin are so prevalent in this world, we may call it Pan-Diabolism with more

propriety than Pan-Theism. Nor is it any relief to this abhorrent conclusion to say that pain and evil are necessitated, and are only seeming evils. Consciousness declares them real."\(^1\)

And another great Protestant theologian, to whom reference has also been made, in speaking of the objections to creation \textit{ex nihilo}, arising from the existence of evil and sin, does not undertake to answer them, but turns his batteries wholly against Pantheism. He says: "The fourth class of objections, drawn from the existence of evil, is less formidable upon the scheme of Theism than that of Pantheism. God, according to the partisans of creation, is not the subject of evil; it exists separate and apart from Him. The Pantheist lodges it in His own nature. He is, if not evil, yet far from being the absolutely good. The truth is, Pantheism is obliged to repudiate all moral distinctions. Right and wrong are reduced to the contrasts of nature out of which is evolved universal harmony. The bad is as necessary as the good. The proportions of the universe equally demand both. If evil appears as disorder, it is only from our partial view of it. If we could take in the whole scene of things, we should perceive that the perfection of the whole would suffer without it. In this broad contradiction to the dictates of our moral nature, we see that Pantheism not only removes no difficulties in the notion of creation, but that it introduces absurdities and paradoxes which defy the possibility of unsophisticated assent. It annihilates man’s highest distinction, prostrates his noblest hopes, and chills his warmest aspirations."\(^2\)

With these assaults on Pantheism we have no quarrel. But it is certainly remarkable that these eminent divines—so able as logicians, and so devout as Christians—should not have seen

\(^1\) Dr. R. L. Dabney’s "Syllabus and Notes of Lectures in Theology," pp. 25, 26, Lec. II.; (initials ours).

\(^2\) Dr. Thornwell’s Collected Writings, Lec. IX., Vol. I., pp. 216, 217
that the system held and advocated by themselves is far worse, in the view of man’s moral consciousness, than any system of Pantheism ever announced to the world; for Pantheism necessarily, though seldom expressly, denies the personality of God. God is only τὸ ἄλλο, the all. But these theologians, and all others who think with them, hold strongly that God is a Person—eternal, infinite, almighty, but still a Person—and yet they likewise hold that, with all possible systems in His view, He chose and called out of nothing a system of being in which physical and moral evil were not only to exist for a time, but for eternity! This system gives to conscience a shock far greater than that given by Pantheism, because we inevitably feel a greater horror and disapprobation at the deeds of a Catiline, a Nero, a Borgia, a Marat or a Robespierre, than we do at the most terrific devastations of a whirlwind or an earthquake. The whirlwind and earthquake are not persons.

A system of divinity having for one of its corner-stones the doctrine of creation ex nihilo, and for another the doctrine of eternal torment for fallen angels and impenitent men, cannot endure the test of conscience. Any serious and thinking man, who deliberately reflects on such a system, is compelled to reject it. It is true that many wise and good men profess to hold it; but they do not in reality. Christian ministers do not present these doctrines together. It is only by keeping one or the other of them entirely out of the view of their hearers, and by strongly urging the true doctrines of the Scriptures—the justice of God, the love of Christ, and His all-sufficient righteousness—that men are brought to believe. But it is surely not wonderful that, when such systems of divinity are set forth in formal creeds and taught by learned professors, the thinking part of mankind should be repelled. Materialism, Pantheism, Atheism are rife in the world, because they are all preferred to such a system. The heart and head of man alike cry out in
agonize, "Give me no God at all, rather than a God whom I cannot love, revere or trust!"

Various answers to this objection have been attempted, but without success. Some, like Dr. Thornwell, say: "God, according to the partisans of creation, is not the subject of evil; it exists separate and apart from Him." But if God created the universe out of nothing, and if evil be now in the universe, and will be forever, then the act of creation has produced the evil, unless it be held that God, in eternity, and before creation, could not have foreseen, and, therefore, could not have prevented evil. This, being a distinct denial of the eternal knowledge and power of God, is inadmissible as an explanation.

Others seek refuge in mystery. They tell us that the existence of evil and sin in the universe is a mystery which God has not explained, and which man, therefore, ought not to pry into; that it is sufficient for us to know that sin is in the world and in our own natures, words and deeds, and that the all-important thing to us is, by faith, to use the remedy which God has provided. But however good may be the intentions of those who urge this view, they fail to see that, by the very system which they urge for our acceptance, they cut us off from the faith which is to save us... God has indeed given in His Word no explanation of evil and sin except what we find therein, and this we hold to be all-sufficient, as will be farther shown in this work. But neither has He, in His Word, revealed any doctrine of creation ex nihilo. Yet the very divines who take refuge in mystery assume the truth of creation out of nothing, and thus forbid common sense to exercise faith in a system contradictory to morals and reason.

Others boldly face the objection, and avow their belief that God is, in some sense, the author of evil and sin. Soame Jenyns, an English country-gentleman, a member of parliament,
and a very good scholar, who lived from 1704 to 1787, wrote a book on "The Nature and Origin of Evil," which was at one time quite popular with a certain class of theologians, but which has long since been dropped as announcing doctrines dishonor­ing to God. His doctrine, in substance, is that on the whole God foresaw that the introduction of evil and sin into the universe would increase the sum total of good; that if moral creatures were to exist, they must, of necessity, be free to sin; and, therefore, God predetermined its existence.\(^1\) He says: "If it be objected that this makes God the author of sin, I answer, God is, and must be, the author of everything; and to say that anything is or happens independently of the First Cause, is to say that something exists or happens without any cause at all." "If misery brings with it its utility, why may not wickedness?"

\(^1\) If storms and earthquakes break not heaven's design.

Why then a Borgia or a Catiline?\(^2\)

Wherefore it ought always to be considered, that though sin in us, who see no farther than the evils it produces, is evil, and justly punished, yet in God, who sees the cause and connections of all things, and the necessity of its admission, that admission is no evil at all, and that necessity a sufficient vindication of His goodness.\(^3\)

It does not seem to have occurred to Soame Jenyns that in adopting the thought expressed in the two lines from Pope's "Essay on Man," he was bound in fairness also to adopt Pope's theology, which, in this well known essay at least, is not the


\(^2\) Inaccurately quoted from Pope's "Essay on Man," Epist. I., lines 155, 156. "If plagues or earthquakes break not heaven's design," is the true reading.

doctrine of creation *ex nihilo*. And it is impossible for Jenyns to shield the character of God, *as he presents it*, by the plea of necessity, for he adopts and announces this doctrine of creation *ex nihilo* as his belief, and is, therefore, compelled to admit that God, having existed through a past eternity without creating, was under no necessity to create, and might have existed for a coming eternity without creation. Therefore his doctrine is simply a horror, and a reflection on the character of God, which has been justly rejected.

At very nearly the same time that Soame Jenyns was writing his treatise above mentioned in England, a great thinker in America was working on the same fearful problem, but indirectly, and only through his favorite theory on the subject of the human will. Jonathan Edwards, of Connecticut, was born only one year before Jenyns, but the English philosopher survived him about twenty-nine years. Edwards found himself compelled by the two doctrines—the creation of all things *ex nihilo*, and the moral necessity of the determinations of the will, both of which he firmly held—to make statements as to the agency of God in producing evil and sin which the boldest of Calvinists now dare not approve. In his treatise on the "Freedom of the Will," he says: "There is no inconsistency in supposing that God may hate a thing, as it is in itself, and considered as evil, and yet that it may be His will that it should come to pass, considering all consequences. I believe there is no person of good understanding who will venture to say he is certain that it is impossible it should be best, taking in the whole compass and extent of existence, and all consequences in the endless series of events, that there should be such a thing as moral evil in the world. And if so, it will certainly follow that an infinitely wise Being, who always chooses what is best,

1 The system really taught by this brilliant English poet in his "Essay on Man" will be farther adverted to hereafter.
must choose that there should be such a thing; and if so, then such a choice is not an evil, but a wise and holy choice; and if so, then Providence, which is agreeable to such a choice, is a wise and holy Providence. Men do will sin as sin, and so are the authors and actors of it; they love it as sin, and for evil ends and purposes. God does not will sin as sin, or for the sake of anything evil; though it be His pleasure so to order things that, He permitting, sin will come to pass for the sake of the great good that, by His disposal, shall be the consequence. His willing to order things so that evil shall come to pass for the sake of the contrary good, is no argument that He does not hate evil as evil."
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When relieved of its circuities and divested of its verbiage, the plain meaning of all this is that it has been the pleasure of God, the holy and just Creator, that His creatures shall commit sin, and bring on themselves eternal wretchedness, for the purpose of bringing to pass some good, foreseen to be greater because of the evil. Any such doctrine casts a pall of horror and blackness over the character of God. It is not only contradictory to the best thoughts which unaided reason gives of the Divine Being, but it is contradicted by every passage of holy Scripture which represents God as hating sin, and hating it from the beginning. It is therefore inadmissible as an answer to the objection now urged against the doctrine of creation ex nihilo.

The Fifth objection to this doctrine is that it necessarily makes God the author of sin. This conclusion is a corollary deduced from the doctrine with a certainty, falling very little below the demonstrations of exact science. In truth, the laws to which human thought is subject, and has been subject ever since man has existed on earth, as imperatively demand such a

conclusion from the premises of creation out of nothing as those same laws require the conclusion that the three angles of a right-lined triangle are equal to two right angles. This has been already made apparent by the discussion flowing from the fourth objection. For if God, the Omniscient and Omnipotent Spirit, has, out of nothing, made all creatures, material and spiritual, and if any of those creatures have sinned, then this sin has come from their creation; for without it there would have been no sin. The old attempt to evade this conclusion by the sophism that sin is not a creature—not a being, not an entity of any kind—and, therefore, God is not the author of it, has been abandoned by modern theologians. It has been seen and felt that sin is too real and terrible a thing to be dealt with by calling it a non-entity. But the effort to answer the objection by insisting that angels and men are free agents, and, therefore, if they commit sin, they are the authors and God is not, is equally futile.

For the doctrine of creation out of nothing, by logical necessity, denies either the free-agency of angels and men or the perfection of God. To hold that the Creator—All-wise, All-powerful and All-good—has brought moral creatures, out of nothing, into being, and has made them really free to choose evil as well as good, and yet has placed them in circumstances

1 "The student may be reminded here, in passing, of that speculation which some of the reformed divines borrowed from the Latin scholastics, by which they made sin out a negation. Their reason seemed to be mainly this: That God, as universal First Cause, must be the Agent of all that has entity; and so all entities must be per se good. Hence sin, which is evil, must be no entity—a negation."—Dabney's "Syllabus and Notes of Lectures in Theology," pp. 306, 307.

2 This is Dr. Dabney's sole answer: "As to the quibble that God is the Agent of all that has entity, we reply: Predicate the real free-agency of the sinning creature, and we shall have no philosophic trouble about that truth of common sense that the actor is the agent of his own sinful act, and not God."—Ibid., p. 307.
and under temptations which God foreknew, if not foreordained, would induce them to choose evil and wreck their happiness finally, is to hold a doctrine against which conscience revolts, and will revolt for ever. If an earthly parent, though necessarily without foreknowledge of the event, should place his child in circumstances and under temptations to sin which resulted in his downfall and ruin, he would be justly visited with the condemnation of thoughtful and conscientious men. Constantly, from Christian pulpits, we hear earnest reproof of such conduct in parents, and distinct charges that they are the authors of their child’s sin and ruin. Yet the able and devout men who utter these reproofs are often the advocates of a system of faith which imputes to the Deity a course of conduct far more revolting to the moral sense. The only answer they vouchsafe is that God is not man, and, therefore, cannot be judged by the moral canon applicable to man. But we have already shown that this answer, when carried to its legitimate conclusions, shuts out from the soul of man all possibility of confidence in God. For just as far as infinite wisdom, power and goodness in the Heavenly Father exceed the finite wisdom, power and goodness of the earthly father, just so far would such an imputation on the conduct of God towards His creatures be better founded than the imputation charged on the human parent.¹

There is no mode of thought or reasoning that mind can devise that can break the logical connection between creation ex nihilo and the authorship of evil—physical and moral. Whatever shades of difference may exist among the advocates of this doctrine, they all will be found to fall into one of two classes. First, those known as Calvinists, who hold that God not only foreknew, but, by His eternal decrees, foreordained

¹ See Dr. Hodge’s “Systematic Theology,” Vol. I., pp. 587–590; especially the last paragraph on 590.
all events. Second, those known as Arminians, who hold that God did not, by eternal decrees, foreordain events, but that He foreknew them. This last-mentioned view does not, in the slightest degree, remove the difficulty; for if God foreknew future events, then their occurrence was certain. Knowledge is only possible when an event has actually occurred; and foreknowledge is only possible when the occurrence of the event in the future is certain. Therefore, if God foreknew the fall of angels or the fall of man, the occurrence of these events was as fixed and certain as though it had been decreed. Hence the Arminian belief does nothing towards relieving creation ex nihilo from its difficulties, and is open to the charge of denying the eternal providence of God, which even the stoics of old upheld and gloried in.¹ Take away the doctrine of creation ex nihilo from each class, and the Calvinist will be found nearest to the teachings of revelation and of reason; but hold that doctrine, and each class makes the Creator the author of evil.

Now the holy Scriptures, in their constant tenor and meaning, teach that God is not the author of sin. Sin is that abominable thing which He hates. He cannot be tempted with evil, neither tempteth He any man.² The isolated passages which seem to attribute the authorship of sin directly to God must be construed with reference to the whole teachings of the Scriptures, and cannot be held as sufficient to establish a dogma so contradictory to the Divine nature and attributes.

One of these passages declares that “The Lord hath made all things for Himself; yea, even the wicked for the day of evil.”³ Now, it is worthy of note that the best Hebrew scholars

¹ “Primum, docent esse deos, deinde quales sint, tum mundum ab eis administrari, postremo consulere eos rebus humanis.”—Cicero, De Natura Deorum, Discourse of Balbus the Stoic; Edit. Lipsiae, 1827, p. 42, Sec. I. See also pp. 66–68.
² Jeremiah xliiv. 4; James i. 13.
³ Authorized Version, Proverbs xvi. 4.
living three hundred years before Christ did not so understand and so render the original. The Septuagint gives the thought of the verse as follows: "All the works of the Lord are with righteousness, therefore the wicked man is guarded for the evil day." The meaning evidently is that the righteous providence of God will be shown by the punishment of the wicked—a doctrine which all admit. Although the original Hebrew will admit of the translation given in the common English version, yet it will also admit of the following: "The Lord worketh all things for the purposes of His own righteous counsel, even the wicked to the evil day." This form is justified by the definitions given in Gesenius, and conforms more nearly to the Septuagint version, which is generally admitted to be an elegant and adequate representative of the book of Proverbs. From this we perceive that, so far from teaching that God is the author of sin, this verse teaches the contrary—that is, that His righteousness condemns and will punish it.

Another passage declares: "I am the Lord, and there is none else. I form the light and create darkness; I make peace and create evil; I, the Lord, do all these things." On this it must be observed that the Hebrew word רָאָח, here rendered "evil," is used in senses widely differing, and running from the slightest physical disorder to the deepest moral guilt. That God, in operating on matter by the forces coming from Himself, does produce earthquakes, tempests, volcanoes, and many other sublime phenomena, which men sometimes call evil, is not to be denied; and this may satisfy the meaning of this scripture.

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1 Ησυχ η τα εργα των κυριου μετα δικαιουνθης, φοιτασται, δε ο αισθης εις ημεραιν καιρην.—Septuagint, Edit. Lipsiae, 1885, p. 649. The Greek particle δε has often the sense of "therefore."

2 Gesenius' Lexicon, on Mahan, Edit. 1836, pp. 601-602; "Horne's "Introduction to Study of Scriptures."

3 Authorized Version, Isaiah xlv. 6, 7. The Septuagint has κτιςων κακα.
without the inadmissible construction that God is the author of sin.¹

Therefore, as God is not the author of sin, and as the doctrine of creation ex nihilo seems, by logical necessity, to make Him its author, the objection to the doctrine thus arising is formidable, and, if unanswered, must weigh powerfully against it.

Having thus presented five objections to this doctrine, any one of which, if valid, seems to be inconsistent with its truth, it is proper that we briefly advert to the positive arguments generally relied on by its advocates for its establishment. Only three of these arguments will here receive special notice, as all others of importance have been or will be elsewhere considered.

The first is that, however unreasonable, impossible, incongruous and incredible this doctrine may seem to be, yet it is taught in the holy Scriptures, which are the revealed truth of

¹ Dr. John Young, of Edinburgh, whose "Christ of History" and other works have brought to him well-merited reputation as an able and ingenious thinker, published about 1856 a work entitled "The Mystery; or, Evil and God." In this he strongly argues for the immaculate holiness of God, and insists that any theory which, directly or indirectly, imputes to Him foreordination of sin is inadmissible. He refers sin to the free choice of the moral creature, and argues that, as man, in order to be capable of moral action, was made absolutely a free agent, God could not control his will, because power had no relation to a free will. Therefore sin (to use Dr. Young's word) was inpreventable, (Note, p. 348). But though Dr. Young seems, in this work, to be feeling his way towards the truth, he strikes from beneath him his foundation, and falls, by substantially assuming as true the doctrine of creation ex nihilo. He says: "The almighty will of the Uncreated gave being to the creation. This moment it was not; the Eternal was alone; beside Him there was only the illimitable non-being; the next moment the creation was; new being, not composed of pre-existing materials, not formed out of God, a portion of His nature, an importation from within, but another and new existence, the product of His creative volition," p. 61. If the creature was absolutely new—created out of nothing—why could he not be made incapable of sin? Why was sin inpreventable? The "Mystery" furnishes no answer to these simple queries.
CREATION EX NIHIL0 CONSIDERED.

God, and, therefore, it must be accepted as an article of faith and believed. 1 We have already considered very fully this argument, and sought to show that the holy Scriptures do not reveal any such doctrine, and, therefore, as reason does not teach it, we are not bound to believe it.

The second argument is one presented by Dr. Robert J. Breckinridge, and on which he relies with confidence. He goes so far as to assert that, "If we will admit, or if it can be shown that any thing at all exists, and that we are capable of perceiving the proofs of that existence, then it may be demonstrated by an invincible chain of argument, and established with unshaken certainty by a series of irresistible deductions, that there has existed in our universe, from all eternity, a pure Spirit, who is the First Cause of all things; and that from eternity nothing else has had any existence, except as it has been created by this pure Spirit." 2

Such assertions from a mind justly held in high esteem for learning and logical power may properly challenge our atten-

1 This is the ground taken by Dr. Robert J. Breckinridge in his "Knowledge of God, Objectively Considered." This great man, who, after gaining distinction as a lawyer, became an eminent clergyman and professor of theology in the Presbyterian Church, says that the Scriptures mean continually to assert creation ex nihilo. "It is creation in the most absolute sense upon which they everywhere insist—the making of all things out of nothing by God, in the space of six days; and all very good. This creation may be called inexplicable, incomprehensible, incredible, impossible—it has been so called. What I insist on here is that, in defiance of all that, the Scriptures do not only assert it, with the most sublime conviction and directness. but that their doing this is one of the most pregnant and fruitful facts, and involves one of their highest titles to be called the word of God."—New York Edit., 1858, pp. 382–383. The learned Doctor cites no passages from Scripture except such as have been already considered. He would, if alive now, find few competent scholars, even in his own church, who would agree with him in the belief that, in the space of six days, God made all things out of nothing.

2 "Knowledge of God, Objectively Considered," p. 54.
tion, and call upon us to give to this announced demonstration a very respectful hearing. Lest it be suspected that we have inadequately stated or have misrepresented this argument, we propose to quote the very words in which it is given, after such introduction as is requisite.

The learned professor sets out with the assertion that has been already made, in somewhat different form, in the opening of this work. Two things, he says, exist which are thoroughly different from each other in all their manifestations—one of which we call mind and the other matter; and we are just as sure of the existence of both, and the difference between them, as we are that anything at all exists. It follows, therefore, either that both mind and matter must have existed from all eternity, or else that matter existed from all eternity and produced mind; or else that mind existed from all eternity and produced matter. One or other of these three alternatives must be true, for they exhaust the subject, and no other supposition is possible. He then insists that the present form of Pantheism is the only form of belief that can be held by advocates of the eternity of both mind and matter.\(^1\) In this he is inaccurate and unphilosophical; for the form of belief known as Dualism, which holds that the Eternal Being consists in the Eternal Spirit, immanent in and working upon eternal matter, and bringing out from it, in time, the best results possible to eternal power, wisdom and goodness, is not Pantheism in any form.

Dr. Breckinridge next insists that materialism, which holds that the Eternal Being is only matter, and that the production of mind from it is a mere result of organism, is, as a system, utterly inadmissible, and is destructive of the foundations of religion, and tends to produce in man, as he is, inward defile-

\(^1\) Dr. Ro. J. Breckinridge's "Knowledge of God, Objectively Considered," p. 51, Book I., Chap. V.
ment and outward pollution.\textsuperscript{1} In this conclusion we agree with him, as we have already abundantly shown.

He then proceeds as follows to the promised demonstration that Eternal Being is simply a pure spirit:\textsuperscript{2}

"We are perfectly sure that we did not create ourselves; perfectly sure that we did not create anything in the universe exterior to ourselves. We are equally certain that no being who is not infinitely superior to us did or could create us or anything else; it is, if possible, more certain that a baboon did not create man, than that man did not create him. It is also undeniably certain that man is a form of existence very much higher than any of the forms of mere inanimate existence, or any of the mere forces which exist in the universe. It is, therefore, obvious that what we are incapable of doing could not be done by any inanimate existence or mere force. And, as all inanimate existences and all mere forces are in their very nature thus inferior, it is certain that none of them could have created themselves, or us, or anything else. Moreover, the very same state of facts, and the very same method of reasoning, apply to all animate existences which are inferior to man in dignity and power. But it is as certain that man is superior to all animate existences known to us as that he is superior to all inanimate existences. Therefore the brute creation, singly or unitedly, could no more create themselves or us than the forces of the universe—gravitation, heat, light, electricity, chemical affinity, and the like—could create themselves or us. And again, as man is the only form of existence, of which we have knowledge, uniting rational with animate existence—the only being in whom matter and spirit are found united in their perfection, if at all,—and yet he is wholly incapable of any act

\textsuperscript{1} Dr. Ro. J. Breckinridge's "Knowledge of God, Objectively Considered," p. 51, Book I., Chap. V.

\textsuperscript{2} Ibid., pp. 52–55.
of creation at all, it necessarily follows that the union of spirit with matter, whether the matter be animate or inanimate, does not produce an existence which is capable of exercising any creative powers at all, even though the existence formed by this union were of the highest conceivable form. What is more, it also follows, in like manner, that if uncreated matter and uncreated spirit had existed only in this united form, and that of the very highest order, from all eternity, we cannot know or believe that they would have possessed in this united form any creative power; the probability, as far as our experience goes, being that they would not. We are driven, therefore, to the inevitable conclusion, that amongst the logical possibilities stated above (to-wit: the eternal existence both of matter and mind, or the eternal existence of matter-producing mind, or the eternal existence of mind-producing matter,) several new conditions are to be imposed: first, that inanimate matter, by itself, cannot create either matter or spirit; second, that inanimate matter, united with spirit, cannot create either matter by itself or spirit by itself, or matter and spirit united. We, therefore, reach the fourth step in our enquiry, namely: that if matter has existed from eternity, it has existed in a form wholly destitute of all creative efficiency, either singly or when united to mind; and that if mind exists at all, it must have existed from eternity, and must be the sole creative force in the universe at all.

"But to suppose the eternal existence of mind, which, if it exists at all, is inevitably certain, both of which have been shown; and to suppose it to possess creative force, if any creative force exists in the universe, which, it has been shown, it must possess if it exists eternally, and any creative force at all exists, and that eternal existence has been shown; and then to suppose that inert matter, whose eternal existence cannot be shown, and whose utter inability to create has been shown,
should exist, side by side with the eternal existence of mind, whose eternal existence has been proved, and whose creative power has been proved, provided any creative power exists in the universe, is self-contradictory and absurd. For, in the first place, there can be in the nature of the case but one first cause. The most enormous proposition that can be made to human reason is that there is no cause for any thing; and, therefore, of course, no first cause; since that there is not only a cause, but an adequate cause, for every thing is the first postulate of reason, and the one upon which every rational process of our understanding proceeds. However overwhelming the proposition may be, that the cause of all other causes should itself have no cause, it certainly doubles the difficulty to say that there are two such uncreated causes. We accept one of them only, because the structure of our mind obliges us to take it, and because the alternative of its rejection is infinitely worse, and utterly absurd, to-wit: that in a universe where everything is a cause, there is no cause at all. We reach this proposition of a first cause by perfectly clear processes; but every one of these processes results in a single first cause, as indeed the very words in which both the problem and the result are expressed absolutely imply, to-wit: a first cause—one cause. It is, therefore, a gratuitous absurdity, from which the human mind revolts, and is self-contradictory in terms, to say that eternal mind—creative, if anything is creative—being proved, may be accepted as a first cause, but that inert matter, proved to be uncreative and not proved to be eternal, must be accepted as another first cause, side by side with it from eternity. In the second place, if mind be shown to be eternal and creative, if anything is creative, as has been done, there is no need for the eternal existence of matter, even if it were creative, since its own creation would be accounted for as capable of occurring at any time, as well without as with it. But the
creation of the first cause is absurd and inconceivable. And, moreover, even if it were possible to suppose the existence of two first causes, it is ridiculous to do so when the second first cause is proved to be, of itself, an inefficient cause; and when it is further proved that its union with mind, so far from augmenting the creative force of mind, is, to the whole extent of our knowledge, destructive of it. But it has been shown that matter, of itself, has no creative power, and, when united with mind, can add nothing to the creative force of mind, and may destroy that creative force. Therefore, it could not from eternity be even an efficient cause, much less a first cause, even supposing it had existed from eternity. That which is neither a first cause, a creative cause, nor an efficient cause, cannot possibly be an eternal cause. It can be only an effect. The eternal existence of matter is impossible. It is created by mind. We reach, therefore, by the most rigorous logic, the fifth step in our enquiry, namely, that the only existence which is known to us, which by possibility could have existed from eternity, is a spiritual, immaterial, mental, rational existence. If, therefore, we will admit, or if it can be shown, that anything at all exists, and that we are capable of perceiving the proofs of that existence, both of which have been proved, then it may be demonstrated by an invincible chain of argument, and established with unshaken certainty by a series of irresistible deductions, that there has existed in our universe, from all eternity, a Pure Spirit, who is the First Cause of all things; and that from eternity nothing else has had any existence except as it has been created by this Pure Spirit."

Thus, relying only upon reason and the logical processes of the human mind, Dr. Breckinridge insists that he has demonstrated what all the best minds of antiquity, working on the subject for four thousand years, failed to discover! We may
be forgiven for feeling some doubt as to the validity of this asserted demonstration.

As in the case of a passage from the writings of another great theologian, we are compelled to move along the whole line of this extended *catena*, and sound each link in what is claimed to be “an invincible chain of argument.” If any link gives way, the whole chain is valueless. But if not only one but several links break under tension, the argument fatally collapses.

Before we enter upon this process of testing Dr. Breckinridge’s argument, let it be borne in mind that he makes it entirely in the forum of reason or common sense. In that forum we propose to meet it.

And, first, it is indispensable that it be ascertained what he means by some of his terms. No reasoning can be soundly conducted without clear definitions. Geometry, without its definitions, would be impotent to prove any proposition or solve any problem. In what sense then does the learned theologian use the words “create,” “creation,” “creative,” “uncreated,” which occur thirty-nine times in his three pages of reasoning. If he uses these words in the sense frequently, indeed generally, attached to them by the usage of the English language, that is, the production of a new form of being out of pre-existing materials, then, at once, many links in his “chain” break and fall out; for, in that sense, we are not “perfectly sure that we did not create anything in the universe exterior to ourselves.”

The reverse is true; for man is perfectly sure that he has created, out of pre-existing material, palaces, monuments, sculptures, paintings, books, which are new forms of being, and excite the wonder of the world. And even the creatures lower than man do the same; for the bee creates her cell with mathematical accuracy, and fills it with honey produced from flowers.

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1 Breckinridge’s “Knowledge of God, Objectively Considered,” p. 52.
by her own intelligent elaboration; and the spider spins her web from her own secretions with a marvellous adaptation to her own purposes. And even creatures devoid of animal life, and endowed with only vegetable life, produce wonderful creations—as the acorn produces the oak. Neither are we, in this sense, “certain that no being who is not infinitely superior to us did or could create us or anything else.”¹ For men know that they are produced, according to the laws of ordinary generation, by their parents, and although reverence is due to these parents, yet so far from being “infinitely superior” they are generally inferior to their children by at least the knowledge of one generation.

Therefore, as it seems impossible that the learned theologian can have intended to use these words in the sense of production out of existing materials, he must have meant by “create,” “creation,” “creative” a production out of nothing.

Taking this to be his meaning, the links of his argument break instantly and simultaneously; for, admitting that “man is the only form of existence, of which we have knowledge, uniting rational with animate existence—the only being in whom matter and spirit are found united in their perfection, if at all”—and that this composite being is not “capable of exercising any creative powers at all (viz.: creative of something out of nothing), yet assuredly it does not follow that spirit alone could possess such power. If matter and spirit united in man cannot create something out of nothing, then, according to the argument, matter and spirit united, “even though the existence formed by this union were of the highest conceivable form,” cannot exercise such power. How then can we conclude that mind alone can do what mind and matter “united in the highest conceivable form” cannot do? Reason and common sense give us no more ground to believe that mind alone can produce

¹ Breckinridge’s “Knowledge of God, Objectively Considered,” p. 52.
matter, than that matter alone can produce mind. If, therefore, "we cannot know or believe" that "uncreated matter and uncreated spirit," existing in united form "of the very highest order, from all eternity, would have possessed in this form any creative power," and "if the probability, as far as our experience goes, is that they would not," then much less can we know or believe that mind alone could exercise such power. The improbability, as far as our experience goes, amounts to a certainty of the negative.

Thus it appears that the conclusions to which the learned theologian finds himself driven do not advance his argument one step towards the goal at which he is aiming. We may admit that "inanimate matter, by itself, cannot create either matter or spirit;" and that "inanimate matter, united with spirit, cannot create either matter by itself, or spirit by itself or matter and spirit united;" and that "if matter has existed from eternity, it has existed in a form wholly destitute of all creative efficiency, either singly or when united to mind;" and that "if mind exists at all, it must have existed from eternity, and must be the sole creative force in the universe, if there is a creative force in the universe at all." All this, with the condition stated, we may admit, and yet the constant dictum of reason remains untouched. In the sense of producing something out of nothing, there is no creative force in the universe at all. Thus the whole argument drops to the ground. Until Dr. Breckinridge can demonstrate that power in mind can produce something out of nothing, he has not gained the first step in any argument drawn from reason and intended to prove that the Eternal Being is only pure spirit.

In his next paragraph he shifts his ground, and seeks to found an argument upon the law of causality in the human mind.

1 Breckinridge's "Knowledge of God, Objectively Considered," p. 52.
2 Ibid., p. 53.
We admit this law. We may even admit the somewhat exaggerated and loose form in which the learned theologian states it, viz.: that "The most enormous proposition that can be made to human reason is that there is no cause for anything, and, therefore, of course, no first cause; since that there is not only a cause, but an adequate cause, for everything is the first postulate of reason, and the one upon which every rational process of our understanding proceeds."\(^1\)

Taking his real meaning to be that "everything" means "every effect," his statement is in substance true. But what are the elements in the law of causality as recognized by the human mind? We have already alluded to them, but a farther recital is pertinent here. There are three elements in every such case: first, a cause, efficiently working; second, a subject worked on; third, an effect worked out. Reason, experience, common sense unite in declaring that each of these elements is necessary. Without the existence of each of them no operation of causality has ever taken place, or, so far as reason decides, can take place. Therefore, to suppose the First Cause to be pure spirit does not account for the existence of the material universe until it is demonstrated by reason, or shown by experience, that pure spirit can bring matter out of nothing, which is the very point in dispute. Dr. Breckinridge, and those who adopt his reasoning, seek to exclude a fundamental element from the law of causality. They ask us to believe that a working (or efficient) cause can produce a work (or effect) without working on anything, not even on itself, as they all deny that matter is an efflux or emanation from God.

Thus the whole of the elaborate argument which we have quoted is constructed of unsound materials, and drops to pieces under pressure.

It is proper also to say that a very able theologian, of the

\(^1\) Breckinridge's "Knowledge of God, Objectively Considered," p. 53.
same church and similar official responsibility as Dr. Breckinridge, has weighed this argument in the scales of his own logical powers and found it wanting. Dr. Robert L. Dabney, after presenting all the material points of the argument, thus speaks of it:

"First, the argument cannot apply in the mind of a pure idealist or of a materialist. Second, it is not rigidly demonstrated that there can be no substance but matter and spirit; all that can be done is to say negatively that no other is known to us. Third, the three. alternative propositions do not exhaust the case; the Pantheist and the Peripatetic, of eternal organization, show us that others are conceivable, as, obviously, does the Platonic. Fourth, that we, combined of matter and spirit, consciously cannot create, is short of proof that some higher being thus constituted cannot; Christ could create if He pleased; He is thus constituted. Last, it is unfortunate that an argument which aims to be so experimental should have the analogy of our natural experience so much against it; for we only witness human spirits producing effects when incorporate. As soon as they are disembodied (at death) they totally cease to be observed causes of any effects."\(^1\)

With the objections previously presented, and those just above stated, by a mind trained to rigorous reasoning, we may dismiss the argument of Dr. Breckinridge as invalid.

The third argument to be considered is that founded on the assumed nature and attributes of God. It cannot be more strongly presented than in the words of one of the great divines to whom previous reference has been made. After stating that there are five conceivable hypotheses on which the relations of the finite and infinite can be adjusted, among which Dualism, recognizing two eternal substances, mind and matter, is one, he thus seeks to dispose of it:

\(^1\) Dabney’s "Syllabus and Notes of Lectures in Theology," Lec. I., pp. 12, 18.
"It is clear that Dualism is inconsistent with the infinity and absoluteness of the Supreme Being. If matter exists independently of Him, His knowledge of its laws and properties has been acquired. He has had to learn them. His power, too, like that of man, is conditioned by the nature of the material upon which He has to work. Like ours, it is the handmaid of knowledge, and consists in obedience to laws which he has discovered. The eternity of matter evidently, then, reduces God to the category of the finite, the limited, the conditioned. He ceases to be self-sufficient. He ceases, in other words, to be God. He may be a skilful workman, an admirable contriver, a wonderful mechanic, but all in consequence of acquired knowledge. He is a man on a large scale. Dualism, therefore, is disguised Atheism. Hence creation is invested with so much importance in the Scriptures. God is everywhere presented in them as the Creator of the world, and not as the skilful architect of nature. This hypothesis of Dualism may, consequently, be discounted as essentially atheistic."  

The argument thus presented, when considered hastily and superficially, will seem to have weight and cogency. But when we penetrate beneath its surface, and analyze its essential elements, we find that its apparent strength disappears. In fact, the very objection it seeks to urge against Dualism is the one to which its own system—pure spirit creating ex nihilo—is fatally liable. We shall, of necessity, recur to this subject when we come to consider the objections urged against the system advocated in this work; but, at this point, it will be sufficient that we briefly indicate the answer furnished by reason and affirmed by revelation to the argument above stated.

First, then, it entirely misstates the Dualistic belief. That belief holds to the existence of Eternal Spirit as immanent in

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and working on eternal matter. This Eternal Spirit is infinite in wisdom (which necessarily includes all knowledge), infinite in power, and infinite in goodness or benevolence. Matter, though eternal, is inert and passive. It has neither wisdom, nor power, nor goodness. It is obvious, therefore, that all the evidences or properties of knowledge, or power, or goodness, or utility which matter, in its created forms, ever displays, come from God—the Spirit—who alone has these properties to impart. How then can it be asserted that because matter is eternal it was ever necessary (as a future acquirement) that God should acquire knowledge of its laws and properties? His knowledge on that subject is eternal and unlimited, and all the more certainly eternal and unlimited because matter is eternal and unlimited. The "laws and properties" of matter, of which mention is made, all come from God. So far, then, from limiting His knowledge, they assume His infinite attributes—His wisdom to devise such laws and properties, His power to apply them, and His goodness to direct them to the production of the happiness of His creatures.

But let us examine the argument with more minute relation to the infinite attributes of God. Take the attribute of wisdom. How is this limited in its exercise by the existence of eternal matter? All-wisdom is requisite and is exercised in bringing out from this eternal material the wisest results possible. No wisdom exists in the matter itself; therefore no limit is attributed to the Divine wisdom, unless all wisdom be held not to embrace all knowledge, which is absurd. But now take the opposing doctrine—creation ex nihilo. This doctrine necessarily supposes that, for eternal ages preceding the existence of creatures, God, the All-wise, had absolutely no material for His infinite wisdom to work upon. It was, therefore, dormant and inactive, if not limited; for it is inconceivable that any exercise of wisdom or knowledge could have been required when only the ineffable Three in One existed.
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justice and truth—are implicitly included in wisdom, power and
benevolence; or if any distinctions make them significant, the
same line of reasoning, which has already shown that no limitation
of the attributes of wisdom, power and goodness is imposed
on the Divine Nature by eternal matter, applies with greater
force to holiness, justice and truth; for how was it possible
that the attribute of infinite justice could find exercise at all
during the eternal ages preceding the existence of moral
creatures of God?

Thus it appears, by a very simple application of the principles
of common sense to the subject, that, on the one hand, the doc-
trine of Dualism, when properly understood, does not limit the
Eternal Spirit in any of His infinite attributes; but, on the
other hand, the doctrine of creation *ex nihilo* does suppose limi-
tations, at least upon the exercise of these infinite attributes,
during the eternal ages preceding creation; and, therefore, the
inevitable effect of this doctrine is to reduce God, during those
ages, from the high activities which essentially belong to and
attend the Divine Nature to a condition of dormancy, latency
and inertia hardly consistent with our most exalted ideas of God.
To the advocates of this doctrine might, without irreverence or
levity, be addressed the sharp irony used by the inspired pro-
phet Elijah to the priests of Baal: "Cry aloud; for he is a god;
either he is talking, or he is pursuing, or he is in a journey, or,
peradventure, he sleepeth and must be awakened."¹ But we
will not so address them, for they are among the most en-
lightened and devout of mankind. Their error is that they have
not considered, with adequate attention, the necessary logical
results of their own system.

In farther answer to the argument of Professor Thornwell,
we say that it is founded on the assumed ground, that in uphold-
ing the eternity of matter we necessarily maintain that this

¹ 1 Kings xviii. 27.
eternal matter is entirely independent of the Eternal Spirit. This view is not at all a part of Dualism when properly understood.

We do not pretend to dogmatize on the relation which the Eternal Mind holds to eternal matter. The nature of that relation belongs to those inscrutable mysteries of being which lie beyond the utmost grasp of the human faculties. But the inspired teachings of the Word of God have furnished to us a word which, however its deep signification may exceed the longest sounding line of human thought, was intended, as we believe, to express this mysterious relation. Matter is the 

υπόστασις, the substantia of God. What this means we know only thus far, to-wit: that it implies subordination and subjection of eternal matter to the Eternal Spirit. The Greek preposition ὑπό, Latin sub, English under or beneath, all convey the idea of subjection, though how this subordination may exist may be a question beyond the limits of thought.

We are not justified by anything in revelation or reason in styling matter the body of God. It is true that the stoics of classic ages, who, in moral teachings, went far beyond any other ancient school of philosophy, taught that the world was God—not the fire, air, earth and water of the world, but the indwelling spirit and intelligence which moved and informed the body of the world.¹ And in modern times, an English poet, distinguished in erudition, genius and penetrative thought, has taught in substance the same doctrine.² But the holy Scriptures

¹ Zeno's words are: "Nihil quod animi, quodque rationis est expers, id generare ex se potest animantem compotemque rationis. Mundus autem generat animantes compotesque rationis. Animans est igitur mundus composque rationis."—Cicero, "De Natura Deorum," Edit. Lip., p. 48. But Victor Cousin justly and truly denies that the stoic philosophy was Pantheistic.

² "All are but parts of one stupendous whole
Whose body nature is, and God the soul;
have not so taught, and the question transcends reason. We must be content, then, humbly to adopt the only word which inspiration has furnished to us, and to say that matter is the *upostasis* of God.

If, then, this matter, though eternal being, is in its eternal relation to the Divine Spirit subordinate and subject, being, in fact, only the subject on which the Divine attributes are exercised, and without which they would have been, so far as our highest reason enables us to judge, during all eternity, dormant and inert, then every argument founded on the supposed independence of matter drops at once to the ground. And on this ground we have seen that all the argument which asserted that eternal matter would impose limitations on the infinite attributes of God was founded. This argument, therefore, is invalid.

But in addition to the word "infinite," Dr. Thornwell has used two other words, viz.: "absolute" and "unconditioned," as applicable to God. These call for a brief notice here.

That changed through all and yet in all the same,
Great in the earth, as in the ethereal frame;
Warms in the sun, refreshes in the breeze,
Gloves in the stars and blossoms in the trees;
Lives through all life, extends through all extent,
Spreads undivided, operates unspent;
Breathes in our soul, informs our mortal part,
As full as perfect in a hair as heart;
As full as perfect in vile man that mourns,
As the rapt seraph that adores and burns;
To Him no high, no low, no great, no small:
He fills, He bounds, connects and equals all."


Pope was thought to have borrowed his philosophy from the sceptic Lord Bolingbroke, and the "Essay on Man" was severely criticized by the Swiss professor Crousaz as infidel and atheistic in its tendency. But the learned and devout Warburton defended it as entirely consistent with Christian faith, and the poet himself warmly expressed his gratitude for this defence. Pope was neither a Pyrrhonist nor a Pantheist. The real philosophy of the "Essay on Man" will be further touched upon herein.
Neither of these words, nor any equivalent for either of them in its modern meaning, is used by the revealing Spirit in the holy Scriptures. They have been both introduced into modern English thought from German sources, and though their introduction has not been without benefit in suggesting new lines of reflection, yet it is certain they have done nothing towards a solution of the problems of being. Notwithstanding the demonstrations of Kant and Sir William Hamilton that we know nothing of actual being, and know only its phenomena and finite relations, and that, therefore, a science of "ontology" is impossible,¹ yet many curious minds in Germany, France, Great Britain and America have continued to lurk around this impossible subject, and to write and talk about the "absolute" and the "unconditioned" as though it were possible for man to know something of a being filling the full meaning of those terms.

The word "absolute," in its widest sense, means *absolved, loosed, released* from every tie, every obligation, every relation, every impossibility. In this sense no being can possibly exist. God cannot, for He cannot be absolved from the conditions of His own being; He cannot exist and not exist at the same time. The word "unconditioned" is equally inapplicable to being. With reverence we are compelled to say that God is conditioned by His own infinite attributes. He *cannot* do an unholy act; therefore, the holy Scriptures teach that God cannot lie;² the conditions of His own unchangeable being for ever forbid it.

Thus any reasoning on these words, in the sense which modern dreams have attempted to force upon them, may be dis-


² Numbers xxiii. 19; 1 Samuel xv. 29; Titus i. 2; Hebrews vi. 18.
missed from our consideration. We are not bound to meet an argument founded on an impossible supposition.

The conclusion of the whole review through which we have passed may be summarily stated thus:

1. The revealed truth of God does not teach us, for our faith, the doctrine of creation *ex nihilo*.

2. Arguments drawn from reason and common sense do not establish it.

3. Several objections may be urged against it which have never been adequately answered, and which are, in their nature, destructive of the doctrine.

Hence the doctrine is inadmissible, and we are not required by either revelation or reason, or both, to believe that Eternal Being is solely Pure Spirit.
CHAPTER V.

ETERNAL SPIRIT WORKING ON ETERNAL MATTER.

We come now to the third system as stated in our introductory chapter, viz.: That Eternal Being consists in God, the Eternal Spirit, immanent in and working upon eternal matter, and bringing out from it, in time, the best results that infinite wisdom, power and goodness can produce.

If the facts, arguments and objections heretofore stated have been sufficient to show that the two other systems, to-wit: materialism and creation ex nihilo, are inadmissible, then substantial progress has been made in proving the validity of the third system. For whatever shades of distinction may be thrown over the various forms of these three systems, yet, in substance, these are the only beliefs that man can reasonably adopt concerning Eternal Being.

But, to obviate misconstruction and to elucidate this belief, we propose, in this chapter, with as much clearness and simplicity as a subject so deep will admit, to present:

1. Considerations furnished by reason, and consistent with revelation, which tend to establish it, and, incidentally, answers to objections that have been or may be urged against it.

2. A statement of what the system of Dualism herein advocated really is, and what it is not.

The first argument in favor of the system is that spirit and matter are, each in its essence, equally inscrutable and mysterious in the view of reason. If, then, any thought transcending human comprehension pronounces spirit to be Eternal Being, because its essence is inscrutable, the same thought would come
to the same conclusion as to matter. Both, in their essence, are beyond all finite understanding. Both, therefore, in their differing natures, would seem to be infinite, in reference both to time and space.¹

Though most persons are willing to admit that the nature or essence of mind is beyond our comprehension, they are not so willing to make the same admission as to matter. And yet it is certain that we know as much of the essence of the one as of the other; that is, we know nothing of the essence of either; and as we are finite beings, and, though immortal, will continue finite, it is not probable that we will ever penetrate into the real nature of Eternal Being.

We know of mind only its phenomena and manifestations; and the same is true of matter. We have an orange before us; we know that it has shape—it is a sphere; it has weight—it presses on the hand that holds it; it has color—it is yellow or golden; it has fragrance—it addresses delightfully the sense of smell; it has taste—its juices stimulate very pleasantly the nerves of gustation. But what is that substance in which these phenomena, or properties, or qualities inhere, which, when united, we call an orange? This question we cannot answer; we do not know; but this we do know—for chemistry has so informed us—that the very same elemental substances which make up the composition of an orange, when united in differ-

¹ Dr. Samuel Clarke, of Norwich, England, who was a friend of Sir Isaac Newton, and translated his Latin Treatise on Optics, was almost as great on physical science as on theology. His attempt to prove the necessary being of God from man’s necessary ideas of time and space, has been abandoned by modern theologians. Dr. Hodge says: “This argument, at best, gives us only the idea of a necessary and infinite something.”—“Systematic Theology,” Vol. I., p. 206. See also Appleton’s Cyclop. of Biography, p. 189. It is strange that so clear and acute a mind as Dr. Clarke’s did not perceive that though our ideas of time and space may make the idea of Eternal Being necessary, yet that Eternal Being is not, of necessity and solely, Eternal Spirit.
ent proportions, and under different conditions, will make an
object or union of phenomena which, instead of pleasing, may
disgust us, and instead of bringing refreshment and health, may
bring disease and death. And the reverse process is also true.
The elements which, in one form, are among the most offensive
to the sense of smelling, in another combinataion, yield the
most grateful odors. Thus, faetid fusil oil, when treated by
skilful methods, yields essential oils not to be distinguished from
those obtained from the pear and the apple. Noisome oils of
gas-tar produce oil of bitter almonds or essence of misbane, now
extensively used in giving a pleasant perfume to soap, and pre-
ferable for confectionery or cooking purposes to the oil ob-
tained by the common methods, because they hold no prussic
acid. And from the drainage of cow yards and cow houses is
extracted a necessary ingredient in the famous perfume known
in trade as "eau de mille fleurs!" The "thousand flowers"
may be there, but they have passed through an alembic which
the lady using the perfume has little suspected. The scientific
conclusion from these and similar successes is thus announced:
"A new and unlimited field is opened for the artificial produc-
tion of perfumes, and it is believed that, by the employment of
a few common essential oils and their organic radicals, all the
odors in the vegetable, animal and mineral kingdom may be
successfully reproduced."1 All this confirms the verdict of
true philosophy, that we may know and experiment upon phe-
nomena and properties, but essence or being remains beyond
our ken.

Therefore we know nothing more of the essential nature of
matter than of that of mind. Both are infinitely inscrutable—

1 Art. Perfume, New Amer. Cyclop., Vol. XIII., p. 130; Art. Essential
Oils, Ibid., Vol. VII., pp. 292–298; Wells' "Principles of Chemistry,"
pp. 448, 461–475.
mysterious beyond all limits of thought—and as such they indicate an eternal and united existence.

Nothing can more vividly show the incomprehensible nature of matter than the attempts that have been made by philosophers to define it. Matter cannot be defined, because it transcends all limits. Plato has designated matter as "the receptacle, and, as it were, the nurse of all production;" and God he designates as the Father and Fashioner of the universe.1 He also speaks of matter as one and the same with space, which furnishes a place for all generated things. But that matter is not space needs no argument, though it is reasonable to believe that matter exists everywhere in space. Hence, in commenting on Plato's definitions, the celebrated John William Ritter, of Silesia, undertakes to give another definition of matter. He says: "Matter is nothing more than the condition of all human existence, which, however, is a necessary condition, and so causes the natural itself to appear as necessary; whereas the shape received from the good is that which under this condition comes into being and has its actual existence in nature."2

After the lapse of more than two thousand years, and especially after the marvellous progress in physical science made during the last two centuries, it might be expected that modern scientists would improve on Plato's definition of matter. But certainly Ritter's effort shows no improvement; nor will we find anything better in the definitions of other moderns. Roger Joseph Boscovich, a learned Italian, born in 1711, at Ragusa, in Dalmatia, spent his life in scientific pursuits, and wrote a

1 Plato's words, in designating matter, are: "τελείως το θεός." Henry Davis, in his translation of the Timæus, renders ὁ τελείως receptacle, (Bohn's London Edit., Vol. II., pp. 315, 356); but the word conveys rather the idea of a "preparation for receiving guests" than a receptacle. In this sense it has a strange suggestion of truth, worthy of Plato.

number of books, among which was a prolix Latin poem, "De Solis et Lunae Defectibus," which he dedicated to the Royal Scientific Society of England, and which, though excessively learned, was characterized by Delambre as "uninstructive to the astronomer and unintelligible to anyone else." He suffered from vanity, egotism and petulance, which led him to melancholy, imbecility, and at last to insanity. He died on the 13th of February, 1787. But he was not mad when he undertook to define matter, which he asserted to consist in "centres of force—points without dimension—which attract and repel each other in such wise as to be kept at specific distances apart." And Herbert Spencer, after quoting this definition by the Italian physicist, gives his own definition or notion of matter, which is a "consciousness of co-existent positions that offer resistance." Professor Alexander Bain, of Aberdeen, more intelligibly says: "Extension is but the first of a long series of properties, all present in matter, all absent in mind. Inertia cannot belong to a pleasure, a pain, an idea, as experienced in the consciousness." "Inertia is accompanied with gravity, a peculiarly material property. So color is a truly material property; it cannot attach to a feeling, properly so called, a pleasure or a pain." And finally, Dr. Hermann Ulrici, of Germany, who may be fairly considered as representing the latest scientific conclusions of the present age, has (seemingly for want of a better definition) adopted the words of Fechner, who, after giving the more restricted notion that matter in physics "means that which makes itself apparent to the sense of touch—that which is palpable," adds that some phenomena

4 Nach Th. Fechner versteht die physik unter materie dasjenige "was
of matter, especially such as relate to equilibrium and motion, are more easily traced by the eye than by the touch; and that where there is nothing visible or palpable, immediately betraying the presence of matter, yet the phenomena of hearing, smelling and tasting have a causal connection with it. Hence the definition adopted by Fechner is: "Matter is the most general substratum for natural phenomena;" and the form of the definition adopted by Ulrici is: "Matter is the substratum of natural phenomena—that of which things consist—that which is what only appears in the phenomena."\(^1\)

On reviewing all these various definitions, we see at once that not one of them undertakes to tell us what matter really is—in what its essence consists. Not one of them goes beyond the properties, the phenomena of matter. And the definition of Boscovich contains, farther, this glaring vice, that in attempting to tell what matter is, he introduces into its essence elements which cannot be matter—elements merely metaphysical and imaginary. He says matter consists in "centres of force—points without dimension." Now that which is without dimension cannot be matter, for extension is one of the necessary properties of matter. Here, therefore, Professor Bain overthrows Boscovich; and Bain only repeats what common sense had settled long before. And though Herbert Spencer avoids, in his definition, this vice of Boscovich's, yet he does not advance us one step nearer to actual essence. For what are those "co-existent positions" of which we are conscious as "offering resistance"? The word position, which means simply situation, station, attitude, place, posture, gives us no idea of matter.

\(^1\) "Die Materie ist, nach der übereinstimmenden Ansicht der neueren Naturforscher, das Substrat der Naturerscheinungen, Dasjenige, waran die Dinge bestehen, was das Erscheinende in den Erscheinungen ist."—Ibid., pp. 18, 19.
What is the thing posited? It is that which offers resistance. What is it? Spencer does not tell us.

Thus we perceive that no subsequent definition of matter has gone beyond Plato's; not one is superior to his in scientific fulness or accuracy. The science, or pseudo-science, of ontology has made no progress in definiteness of knowledge within the past two thousand years; therefore it is not a science; for what has made no progress during that period does not deserve the name of science.¹

Yet it need not surprise us to find man, in all ages, whenever he can escape the immediate pressure of want, and can find time for reflection and observation, turn with insatiate curiosity to this knowledge of being, and seek earnestly to obtain it. Neither can we regret this tendency, for it has led to the most beautiful, useful and grand discoveries. In seeking to "bear the torch into the abyss of being" the adventurer discovers—not what he is in search of, but thousands of properties and phenomena attending matter and its companion, mind, which would otherwise have escaped detection. To these facts and observations concerning matter we must now attend, as they will lead us to consider what we now know concerning it, and what answers arise to arguments against its eternal existence.

The most obvious division into which all things known by us to be matter arrange themselves, is in the three classes that seem to have been observed from the earliest antiquity, viz.: the solid, the liquid, and the aéiform, or gaseous. But as men began to acquire some little knowledge of mechanics and chemistry, they adopted other classifications, and began to

¹ Dr. Ulrici presents what he calls "Scientific Ontology and Cosmology," set forth in the works of those acknowledged to be their most eminent representatives, but he reserves to himself the right to subject their views to the closest scrutiny.—"Gott und die Natur," p. 21. His whole discussion tends to prove that all we know of matter, force and law in nature point to an immanent and active Spirit.
speculate on eternal being. The grotesque and hideous mythologies of the Orient aid us but little in detecting the first feeble dawnings of science as to matter. The acute and spiritually-minded Greeks led the way. Thales, of Miletus, six hundred years before Christ, taught first that "The world has a soul and is full of demons;" and then taught that "water is the ground or primal element of all (material) things."¹ Anaximenes and Diogenes held this primal element to be air; Anaximander held primary matter to have been a vast chaos; and Heraclitus considered fire as the original element. Anaxagoras is believed to have been the first Greek philosopher who recognized a Supreme Intelligence (ὕπνος) as the principle of life and arranger of eternal matter; and Plato certainly derived from him many of his best ideas. Gradually the ancient philosophers adopted the theory that fire, air, earth and water were the elements out of which the material universe was created. Pythagoras, born in Samos, but passing most of his philosophic life in Crotona, in Italy, found it necessary to add to these four a fifth element, which he called æther; and his grand powers of abstract thought led him up to law as working through force on these primordial elements, and hence he held that number, form, harmony and music were underlying all created things.² In the age of Cicero we find the five elements

¹ Introduction to the Timæus; Plato's works, Bohn's Edit., Vol. II., p. 314; Art. Thales, Appleton's Encyclopaedia of Biography, p. 933.
² Art. Pythagoras, New Amer. Cyclop., Vol. XIII., pp. 687-689; Appleton's Cyclopaedia of Biography, Art. Pythagoras, pp. 748-745. Plato evidently adopted some of the ideas of Pythagoras: θεος ουτω δε τοι περιοιτα τοια πρωτον διεχμουσαν ειδει τε και αριθμους. Here he asserts that God formed things according to ideas and numbers.—Timæus, quoted in the "View of the Platonic System," Bohn's Edit., Vol. II., p. xii. The disparaging school-lesson that Pythagoras forbade his pupils to eat beans has been explained by Plutarch, and, after him, by the learned and devout Jeremy Taylor, who quotes the reason with the rule: "Fabis abstine, dixit Pythagoras. Olim nam magistratus per suffragia
recognized by Pythagoras held by the schools of philosophy as
the primordial *materies* out of which the universe came.\(^1\)

Little or no change in this view of the elements of matter
took place until modern chemistry commenced its career. Then
it was discovered that not one of the so-called elements of the
ancients had any claim to simplicity. *Fire* is not so much
material as it is the appearance or phenomenon of chemical
processes affording light and heat;\(^2\) air, or atmosphere is com-
posed of three or more distinct gases; earth is made up of
many simple elements; and water is the union of at least two
gases. The æther which spreads through space, beyond the
earth and all its adjuncta, is still retained in the admissions of
modern chemistry. It is a standing monument to the great
mental powers of Pythagoras, and approaches nearer to the
best notion we can form of normal matter than any other known
substance.

Great and marvellous as have been the discoveries of modern
chemistry, since the days when Roger Bacon, Alhazen, Bruno,
Francis Bacon and Gassendi began to point the way, we cannot
yet consider this field of investigation as entitled to the name
of a science. When compared with the fixed principles and
ascertained laws governing the sciences of astronomy and
mechanics, chemistry appears to be yet in her infancy. She
must be content to grope her way patiently and humbly by the
slow methods of experiment and analysis. Her most enlightened
students acknowledge this; and the moment a chemist begins
to dogmatize he is looked on with pity by his wiser brethren as
one "out of the way." Almost every month discoveries are

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\(^1\) Cicero's "De Natura Deorum," pp. 77, 78, Edit. Lips., 1877.

\(^2\) "Principles of Chemistry," by Dr. Julius Adolph Stöckhardt, of
Saxony, Amer. Edit., 1858, p. 28.
made in chemistry which tend to sweep away theories that had been regarded as firmly established.

At present chemists suppose that they have ascertained the separate existence of *sixty-four* substances, which they call *elements*, because all their art and all the processes they can apply have not availed to decompose these any farther.\(^1\) Therefore they suppose that out of these sixty-four elements all the material universe is made. Thus they repeat, on a wider scale, the original error of the ancient philosophers, who thought it necessary to suppose the existence of at least *four* or *five* elements as primeval matter.

But this number of sixty-four elements is not considered by the modern scientists as fixed and final. Some expect by additional discoveries to add to the number; and, in fact, the number of supposed elements has been increased from sixty to sixty-four within a few years past.\(^2\) Others expect that by the use of more potent processes and higher forces many which are now thought to be different elements will be ascertained to be the same element, existing under different forms and with different composition of particles. Thus the views of modern chemistry as to the elements of matter are not fixed and stable. We are at full liberty to question the real or *essential* differences asserted to exist, and to urge the reasons which tend powerfully to establish the *unity* of all matter in its essence.

The first argument tending to this conclusion is that it would seem, *a priori* and *prima facie*, very improbable that *matter*, which is *one* in every fundamental property, such as *extension*, *inertia*, *gravity*, *impenetrability*, should, in its necessary primeval being, exist in *sixty-four* differing substances. Those who

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\(^2\) Dr. Ulrici's "*Gott und Die Natur,*" p. 22.
believe that God called matter into existence out of nothing, will hardly contend that it was necessary for Him thus to create sixty-four differing substances when one would have sufficed. All sound thought and sound reasoning acquiesces in the law of parcimony, so successfully used by William of Occam, which requires us to believe that the smallest number possible of causes are to be predicated for effects, and that when one cause is sufficient, one only is to be held to exist. And analogous reasoning would lead us to believe that one subject only would be operated on by Divine Cause when one was sufficient for all the effects desired. Any other view would be in derogation of the wisdom of God.

Therefore, even from the standpoint of creation ex nihilo, there is a powerful presumption in favor of the unity of matter as to its essential nature. But when we consider matter as co-existing from eternity with the Eternal Mind—not separately and "side by side," but as the inscrutable οὐσίας of the Divine Spirit—then the presumption of its unity rises to a point which excludes reasonable doubt. As there is one Spirit operating, so there is one matter operated on. As God is one in essence, although manifesting His wisdom, power and goodness in millions of varied creations, so matter is one in essence, although appearing in millions of varied phenomena and forms. The essential is one—the formal is beyond number. And though power or cause cannot make something out of nothing, yet power or cause is able to produce from one οὐσίας or substance, to-wit: matter, by differing force and arrangement of particles, hydrogen, lithium, boron, carbon, nitrogen, oxygen, silver, gold, mercury, lead—in short, all the so-called elements which enter into the composition of the material cosmos.

2 Dr. Ro. J. Breckinridge's expression—"Knowledge of God, Objectively Considered," p. 58.
This strong a priori presumption is aided and confirmed by all the known facts as to the chemistry of nature and art. Thus it is known that all of the sixty-four elements are metals, (that is, metallic in base,) except fourteen, which are hydrogen, oxygen, sulphur, phosphorus, carbon, boron, nitrogen, silicon, selenium, tellurium, chlorine, bromine, iodine and fluorine. And of these fourteen, the single substance carbon is capable of uniting in a multiplicity of proportions with the same elements, and thus furnishing so great a variety of compounds that they probably exceed in number those of all the remaining compounds together. Thus the tendency to unity is manifest. These compounds differ, not so much in their elements (for one element is the base of all) as in the arrangement of the particles, and the pressure of the energies keeping them in union.

But, yet farther, the same element, without the least admixture of others, is known to exist in differing modes and arrangement of its own particles so as to form various bodies, so entirely unlike each other in their qualities, properties and (to use a very significant chemical word) conduct that we are compelled to consider them as different substances. Thus, pure carbon forms, in one arrangement of its particles, the charcoal used to kindle our fires; in another arrangement, the graphite, or black lead used in pencils for writing or drawing; and in its highest form of crystallization, the diamond, used for little else except to decorate the crown of royalty or the person of woman. Apparently no bodies in nature differ from each other more signally than these three, and yet they are the same element. The inference seems reasonable, that if one element alone, by mere change of the location and pressure of its particles, may

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2 These facts are too familiar to need authority, but the student will find, under the titles "Carbon," "Graphite," "Diamond," in the New American Cyclopedia, much interesting matter bearing on the subject.
produce three different substances, then one matter, by change of the arrangement and energy of its particles, may produce all different bodies. Power, cause, force are all that is needed.

These illustrations multiply themselves in nature and art. The element known as "phosphorus" is, in its normal condition, a soft, waxy, yellowish-white substance, highly inflammable, very poisonous, with strong odor and taste, luminous in the dark, and readily soluble in bi-sulphide of carbon. Yet this same element, without admixture with any other, may, by application of forces and processes well known to chemists, be converted into a substance dark red—nearly black in color, hard and brittle, without taste or smell, not poisonous so far as experiment has shown, not luminous, and perfectly insoluble in bi-sulphide of carbon. Neither is it inflammable, for it may be heated, without experiencing combustion, up to five hundred degrees of Fahrenheit. But, strange to say, at this high point of temperature it becomes re-converted into ordinary phosphorus. There is no change of essence; force does the whole work. Yet no two substances could be more unlike, more distinct, in their qualities, properties, conduct, than these two modes of existence of the same element, phosphorus.

So numerous are such conditions in the so-called elements that chemists have found it necessary to coin a word in order to designate it. They apply to substances susceptible of such changes the word allotropic, from ἀλλος and τροπος, another mode, manner or disposition. And it has been found that many of the elements take on themselves these changes. Sulphur admits them in great number; silenium has several allotropic modifications; phosphorus has several besides the one noted above; carbon has many besides the signal forms of charcoal or lamp black, graphite and diamond, of which we have spoken;

gold has many allotropic manifestations, some of which had been observed by the alchemists of past ages, and which encouraged their hopes of finding a chemical agent that would convert baser metals into gold.¹ In short, the fact that so many elements have been proved to be susceptible of these changes tends to establish the belief that all of them will be found thus allotropic when farther discoveries into the forces controlling them shall have been made.²

These facts clearly point the way to the conclusion that all matter is one in essence. For he would be a rash and unreliable chemist who would declare that there is a greater essential difference between gold and tin, or between carbon and boron, or between bismuth and lead, or between calcium and silenium, than there is between charcoal and diamond, or between lamp-black and graphite, or between yellow inflammable, poisonous phosphorus and black-red, incombustible, innocuous phosphorus. As in these last instances there is the greatest difference in form, phenomena, quality, property, but absolutely no difference in essence; so among the elements there may be great differences in form, phenomena, quality, property, but no difference in essential substance.

In truth, so many substances which are identical in essence appear in different forms or conditions throughout material nature that we are impelled to the belief of one matter in many phenomena. The notion of Thales that water was the condition of primeval matter was not wanting in ingenious suggestion. Water exists in immense volume on the earth, in the form of liquid; but it exists also in enormous volume in the form of ice, a solid, differing entirely in its qualities from the liquid;

² This belief is, in fact, openly expressed by chemists of reputation.—Art. Isomerism, New Amer. Cyclop., Vol. IX., p. 686.
the only difference, however, is the result of forces; heat, a
mode of motion, preserving the liquid form in the one case, and
its absence resulting in crystallization and the solid form in the
other. And water, in the form of what chemists call hydrates,
exists in immense quantity in substances apparently as distinct
from it as we can well conceive. In all animals and plants its
existence, in very large proportions, is, as a rule, with few ex-
ceptions, indispensable to the continuance of healthy nutrition
and reproduction. At the lowest estimate, fully five-sixths of
every living human body is simply water. A turnip appears
to be quite a solid vegetable, yet in a hundred parts ninety-two
parts of it are water; a potato seems compact, but seventy-five
parts are water; a mangold beet is firm, but eighty-eight parts
of it are water.

And thus we may pass, with curious and analytic eye and
hand, through all nature, and we find constantly repeated the
same lesson. Matter is one; its phenomena, under the opera-
tion of forces applied by Almighty Power, are millions—are
innumerable.

But there are other facts in science tending even more con-
clusively to prove the same point. Within a few years past
the revelations of the spectroscope have been marvellous in the
department of elementary matter. This scientific instrument
has been constructed by reason of the discovery that every
metallic element, when in the state of an incandescent gas, gives,
when its light is thrown through a prism, a "spectrum" or
form consisting of a greater or less number of sharply defined,
bright lines, each of which represents an image of the slit of
the spectroscope, and, therefore, corresponds exactly to a certain
wave-length of light. The spectra of metalloids (that is,


2 Wolff's Tables for Germany, in "American Agriculturist," January,
1879, p. 10.
elements not metallic), on the other hand, consist for the most part of colored bands of varying width, and not sharply defined. By means of this ingenious instrument, spectroscopists have been able to surmise, with reasonable certainty, that most of the metals, and a large number of the other elementary substances, which are found in our earth and atmosphere are found in the sun, and even in the fixed stars. Their observations are based on the belief that very high temperatures in the sun and stars have produced in and around those bodies incandescent gases; and as these are found to exhibit the same spectra, the same lines—some bright and sharply defined, some in colored bands of various widths and without sharply defined edges—which appear in observations with the spectroscope on earth, the conclusion seems rational that the same elements exist in the two cases.

Thus the important fact is furnished to us that throughout all the vast expanse of space, and throughout the material worlds that fill it, the same elements of matter exist which we find in the comparatively small world, with its waters and atmosphere, inhabited by us. And, therefore, the same reasons which have been presented, tending to the conclusion that the matter of our world and its adjuncts, varied though it be in form, mode, phenomena, is yet one in essence, apply throughout the material cosmos.

But we have yet stronger reasons for this conclusion. The revelations of the spectroscope, in competent hands, and within a comparatively short time, have developed farther facts tending, with a force which seems ever-growing, to establish the belief in the normal unity of matter.

The writer of this work humbly claims to be a student, seek-

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1 Translation from a German manuscript, furnished by Hans William Jänsen, a chemist and spectroscopist, born in Schleswig, Holstein, and educated at the University of Kiel.
ing in all the departments of knowledge, divine and human, a
system of faith which shall honor God and benefit man. He
does not claim to be a special scientist in chemistry, and, there-
fore, gladly avails himself of the labors of men who by experi-
ment, observation and patient thought have entered as far into
the *arcana* of nature as our present processes and apparatus
will enable us to do.

One of these industrious scientists has furnished to him a
manuscript extract from a treatise never yet made public. On
reading it, the facts and reasonings presented have seemed to
have such value for the purposes of this work that they are
here given:

"The processes applied in the chemical researches of to-day
are not very extensive. They are, the reduction of bodies from
the solid to the liquid state, or solution; the reverse process of
separating solids from a liquid by precipitation, or crystallization;
and the action of bodies upon each other at a higher temperature.
The highest temperature practically applied is about the melt-
ing heat of platinum. Experience has shown that these are
altogether insufficient to decompose the substances hitherto re-
garded as simple."

"But, recently, certain investigations in the field of spectrum
analysis have led to results that seem to be favorable to the
hypothesis of a uniform nature of matter, and whose further
perfection may perhaps lead to a well founded theory of the
nature of matter in the above sense."

Then, after giving the discoveries in spectra on which the
spectroscope and its observations are founded, the manuscript
continues:

"Solid and liquid bodies, in a state of incandescence,
give a continuous spectrum, whose length depends on the
temperature. A white-hot body gives a complete spectrum
from red to violet; but the lower the temperature of the
luminous body is, the more the spectrum appears shortened from the violet end, so that a dark red-hot body produces only a broad red band in the spectrum.

"With very few exceptions, metals can, only by means of the electric spark, be brought into the state of glowing incandescence. Electricity is, thus far, the only means known to us of imparting to a body the highest degree of energy that can be produced artificially. Lockyer, who has investigated this matter very closely and extensively, comes to the conclusion that in a glowing metallic gas the elementary atoms are no longer united to molecules, but separated from each other, and that they vibrate separately. That every single atom within a molecule, simple or compound, has a motion of its own, independent from the motion of the whole molecule, must be supposed, for the reason that otherwise the molecule could not be separated by a chemical process, because every action from without would affect the molecule as a whole, not its separate constituents. If, now, the energy of a molecule, i.e., its vis vivu, is increased, at the same time the proper motion of each single atom is increased, and, at a certain point, this increased proper motion of the atoms, by which also their mutual distance within the molecule is increased, may become so great that their mutual attraction is overcome, and the molecule dissolved into its atoms. This state is supposed to exist in glowing gases. If we adopt the view that the mode of motion which constitutes the energy of a body is a wave motion of a more or less simple nature, experience tells us that by increasing the energy of the body in question, not only the amplitude of the vibrating molecules is increased, but that also new waves of lesser length and shorter duration are added. By sufficiently increasing the original energy, oscillations may be produced which make upon the eye the impression of light; we then call the body incandescent. A well known example is furnished by the spectrum
of a body gradually heated from a dark red to a white heat. The spectrum expands gradually from red to violet; new vibrations of shorter duration are, therefore, constantly added.

"Spectrum analysis is founded upon the discovery of Kirchhoff that glowing gases absorb rays of their own wave-length. This one theoretical truth has been the cause of all those numerous and valuable discoveries to which the new method has led, above all in the field of physical astronomy.

"If we may take the line spectrum as a proof that the incandescent body in question possesses so high a degree of energy that its atoms are in a free state, and cannot even unite into elementary molecules, much less into chemical compounds, it follows that the matter of the sun possesses such an energy. At least this is true of the envelope of the sun which produces the line spectrum. Here all chemical elements composing the body of the sun are in a state of dissociation; the metals are in the form of glowing gases, and the atoms of the same are not yet united into molecules. A similar condition can be proved by the spectroscope in the case of many fixed stars; their spectrum resembles, on the whole, that of the sun. Some stars, however, especially those of a reddish color, show a band spectrum. In these we must suppose that the process of cooling has progressed far enough to enable the formation of chemical compounds. On the other hand, many nebulae show essentially only the spectrum of hydrogen, that is, the element of the lowest atomic weight.

"Now, Lockyer has advanced the hypothesis that the energy of matter may be so great that even the elementary atoms are dissolved into their last constituents—the original atoms, and that these latter exist in a free state; for the original atoms, composing the atom of a chemical element, must be imagined to be in a much closer connection than the elementary atoms, and, therefore, it requires a vastly greater energy in the former
case to separate them than in the latter. If now the energy of the separated original atoms is diminished, they will unite and form those bodies which we call chemical elements, and among them, those of the lowest atomic weights first. Under certain conditions, also, elements of higher atomic weights may be formed by the union of a greater number of original atoms. The element formed first would be hydrogen, in case no other element exists, unknown to us, whose atomic weight is still less, or unless we will consider hydrogen as the original matter itself, which might scarcely be justifiable.

"A number of fixed stars, conspicuous on account of their whiteness, exhibit a spectrum in which the dark lines in general are scarce, but a few of which, particularly the hydrogen lines, are very conspicuous. The temperature of these stars is supposed to be much higher than that of our own sun, and to be still so high that only a few elements, and those mostly of a low atomic weight, have been formed.

"It cannot be denied that these astronomical spectral observations admit very well of an explanation by the hypothesis of an original matter and the gradual formation of chemical elements." "We may not be justified in giving any other name to this supposition than that of an hypothesis. But that is by no means a reason for rejecting it; on the contrary, it will, under the supposition that future researches should verify it, be very serviceable in investigations concerning the nature of matter, for which purpose it is already employed by some scientists."

1 Translation of passages from a manuscript treatise by Hans William Jänsen, of Schleswig Holstein, now residing in the United States. The same hypothesis, in substance, is held and maintained by Professor Gustavus Hinrichs, also a native of Holstein and graduate of Copenhagen University, but now Professor of Chemistry in Iowa State University, and Director of Weather Service for that State. His works on "Elements of Chemistry," "Principles of Chemistry," and his "Contributions to Molecular Science," are held in high esteem.
Since this manuscript treatise was written, and an extract from it furnished, discoveries by Norman Lockyer, the great English spectroscopist, have been announced which have amazed the world, and gone very far towards the overthrow of previous beliefs in the simplicity of all the chemical elements. And these spectroscopic observations of Lockyer have been accompanied and reinforced by experiments and discoveries by William Crookes, of London, who, as a spectroscopist, is hardly inferior to Lockyer, and as an electrician and analytic chemist has probably no superior on earth. To the discoveries of these eminent scientists, and the inferences reasonably deduced from them, we must now attend.

It will not be necessary, and would involve presumption or affectation, to attempt in this work to explain at large the series of experiments and observations through which Lockyer and his coadjutor have reached their conclusions. Five years ago, in a letter to the eminent French chemist, Dumas, Lockyer suggested that probably all the sixty-three or sixty-four chemical elements—certainly many of them—are susceptible of decomposition, and that this resolution would yield gases of far lower atomic weights than the original element.¹ Since that letter was written more than one hundred thousand spectroscopic observations of the sun and various fixed stars, and at least two thousand photographs of the spectra thus obtained, have been made by Lockyer and his assistants, and the results have been embodied in an immense map, extending to a length of one hundred and ten yards, in which the metallic and other lines have been noted with sedulous care.² It cannot be objected, therefore, that hasty conclusions have been made, or that theories

have been sought to be erected on an insufficient basis of facts. Chemistry has never sought her beliefs from more patient and numerous experiments.

Even in the earlier discoveries and experiments of the German chemists, Bunsen, Kirchhoff and Fraunhofer, it has been ascertained that an infinitesimally small quantity of the gaseous product obtained by energetic caloric action on various metals would distinctly affect the colors and lines of the spectrum so soon as this gaseous product reached the instrument. Sodium is a metal having an atomic weight of twenty-three to one of hydrogen. A milligramme is one-thousandth part of the French gramme, which weighs about fifteen and a half grains of Troy weight. Now, it has been ascertained that one-three-millionth part of a milligramme of vaporized chloride of sodium, when set free in a room of ordinary size, under conditions enabling it to reach and react on the spectrum, will promptly produce in it bright and distinct yellow lines. Lithium is a metallic substance weighing about seven to one as compared with hydrogen; and its salts yield, under high temperature, a vapor of which an immeasurably small portion in a common room affects the spectrum with changes almost as distinct as those from sodium. Thus we are carried by this instrument far beyond the ordinary regions and states in which matter has heretofore been observed. To explain the marvels of his discoveries, Lockyer has found it desirable to invent a new lexicon and almost a new grammar!

The results of these very numerous observations and experiments of Lockyer and Crookes have been to bring up from probability to scientific certainty the belief that under the tremendous energies of the forces at work in the sun and the fixed stars, and especially under the mode of motion familiarly

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called heat, calcium, a metal weighing about forty to one compared with hydrogen, and which, on our earth, has sullenly resisted the greatest powers of decomposition known to chemists, is decomposed and resolved into gases—one of which, at least, and that the most abundant and radical, is hydrogen. In fact, this gas, the lightest of all the elements known on earth, and, therefore, reckoned as the atomic unit by which all other elementary weights are estimated, is ascertained to be the constituent into which all solar and stellar substances—such as sodium, iron, calcium, nickel, manganese, cobalt, copper—resolve themselves under the awful and sublime forces at work in the sun and stars.

1 The scientific form of Mr. Lockyer’s discoveries and suggestions may be seen in “Nature,” a scientific journal, published in London and New York; New York No. for Thursday, January 9, 1879, pp. 225–280. The Popular Science Monthly, for March, 1879, contains a very interesting article from Mr. Lockyer on “The Chemical Elements,” pp. 600–611. From the facts stated the inferences seem irresistible: 1st, That many stars are far hotter than our sun; 2d, That the hotter the star is the more simple is the spectrum from its incandescent gases; 3d, That the hottest stars observed exhibit only the element of hydrogen in enormous quantity, and the element of calcium or magnesium in comparatively small proportions; 4th, That our sun is far lower in temperature than these, and exhibits proofs of the presence of many so-called elements; hence, 6th, That “the running down of temperature in a mass of matter which is eventually to form a star is accompanied by a gradually increasing complexity of chemical forms,” p. 602. Even in our sun the temperature is so great that during several eclipses, including that of July 29, 1878, the spectroscope exhibited certain lines from the corona, among which was a green line, indicating the presence of a substance for which no name has ever been found except “matter.” It is marked 1474 on the scale of Kirchhoff, and he designated it simply as matter; and no subsequent observer has done more.—“Eclipses of the Sun,” by Professor Newcomb, Princeton Review, November, 1878, pp. 859, 860. All these facts point unmistakably to one normal matter, all of whose so-called elements or phenomena are produced by force.

2 Lockyer considers the presence of the following elements in the sun as certain, viz.: Sodium, iron, calcium, magnesium, nickel, barium, copper,
These forces are such that nothing in the modes of motion known on earth or its adjuncts can give us any adequate conception of them. The sun is an enormous body of matter, weighing three hundred and fifteen thousand times as much as our earth, and consequently exerting an attracting force according to his weight. If our earth weighed as much, by being increased in density without increase in bulk, then a half-ounce weight on her surface would press down with the power of four and a half tons. A man’s body would be crushed down by its own weight, which would be more than twenty thousand tons! And in this immense mass of the sun, an energy of motion is constantly at work which develops a heat that, in each single second of time, is sufficient to boil one hundred and ninety-five millions of cubic miles of ice-cold water! Under such a heat we may conceive that nothing can remain simple and permanently undecomposed except the essential, the indestructible element in matter. No conflagrations ever known on earth approach this power. No motions, no winds, no tempests and hurricanes of earth give us any idea of the fierce turmoil of the sun. “As in great fires there is a constant roar and tumult produced by the rush of air currents which the fire itself has generated, so in every part of the sun, on every square yard of that enormous surface, the most hideous uproar must prevail, as fierce cyclonic storms, bred by solar fires, rush with inconceivable velocity over the flaming surface.”

chrome, cobalt, hydrogeu, manganese, titanium, aluminium, zinc, strontium, lead, cadmium, potassium, cerium, uranium; and the presence of the following as probable, viz.: venadium, palladium, molybdeum, iridium, lithium, rubidium, caesium, bismuth, tin, lanthanum, beryllium (or glucinum), yttrium, erbium.—Manuscript note from Prof. Hans W. Janssen.

flames themselves, from the sun, are on a scale altogether beyond our conception. A considerable proportion attain a height exceeding ten times the diameter of our earth; and some have been observed which have attained twice that height. But tremendous as are the motions taking place in the solar flames, even more wonderful are the effects of solar eruptions. By these tremendous throes, matter is carried sometimes at the rate of four or five hundred miles per second from the visible surface of the sun. "No known celestial object has ever possessed a velocity approaching the tremendous rate at which glowing matter has been expelled from the sun's interior."

Such is our sun; such are the forces at work within him and on his surface. But now, when we remember that the fixed star *Sirius* is two thousand times heavier than the sun, and larger in proportion; that his white light, and all the observations which science can make of his surface and his interior, indicate an energy of forces at work within him, compared with which the forces at work in the sun are but infantile in power, we are prepared to conceive some faint idea of the power of the Almighty Spirit which works upon the one eternal and indestructible matter, and brings out from it all the harmonious and wonderful forms of creation.

We are thus led, by the best sources of knowledge within our reach, to the conclusion that matter, in its ultimate essence, is monadic, or one, throughout the universe.

The question may then reasonably arise, what is the original or primeval condition or form of being in which matter exists? But here we are met by the difficulty that language affords no adjective or epithet which conveys precisely the idea intended.

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to be embodied in the question. For if matter be eternal, it is
obvious that the words “original,” “primeval,” “primitive,”
and their equivalents, have no application to it. It had no
origin—no primitive or first state—for it has always existed.
Neither does the word “eternal” convey the exact meaning
intended in the question; for, as the Almighty Spirit has been
from eternity working upon matter, creation is an eternal re-
lation, and, therefore, there has never been a time when matter
was not undergoing and passing through the processes of
creation. Hence its “eternal” condition does not convey the
idea of its “uncreated” condition. Neither does the word
“crude” convey the proper idea; for though this word expresses
the condition of an unmanufactured material, yet the elements
of the “raw,” “unripe,” “immature,” “undigested,” and even
of the “sour,” “unpleasant,” “cruel,” are so inseparably con-
nected with crude that it can never apply to that eternal
ponderous and subject of God, which may be, in its essence, in-
conceivably beautiful and glorious.

Under such stress, we have ventured to use the word “normal”
ocasionally, as applying to matter considered in itself and as
unworked on by spirit. Yet this word is objectionable, for its
origin clings to it, and the idea of a regulum or rule can have no
application to a state existing with no reference to a regulator;
yet, for want of a better word, we are driven to this. By bear-
ing in mind the meaning of “unworked,” “unmanufactured,”
intended to be applied, we may avoid doubt.

In this sense, the question what matter is has never been
answered, and probably never will be. The answer would be
a solution of the mystery of being, which, as we have already
seen, is inscrutable, both as to mind and matter.

But we may form some conjectures, which will be confirmed

1 See the meanings attached to “Crudus” in any good Latin lexicon;
by the best results of science as thus far developed in our
world.

Perhaps the strangest vagary ever indulged in by a great
man was that of Sir Isaac Newton, who, in a conversation with
John Locke and the Earl of Pembroke, suggested to them his
own idea of the creation of matter. That idea was "that God,
by His power, had prevented the entrance of anything into a
certain portion of pure space (which is of its nature penetrable,
eternal, necessary, infinite); henceforward this portion of space
would be endowed with impenetrability, one of the essential
qualities of matter; and as pure space is absolutely uniform,
we have only again to suppose that God communicated the
same impenetrability to another portion of space, and we should
then obtain in a certain sort the notion of the mobility of matter
—another quality which is also very essential to it."¹

made public this theory in any of his writings. Locke dimly hinted at it
in his "Essay on the Human Understanding," when, in arguing against
the eternity of matter, he insists that God created ex nihilo the spirits of
individual men, and that the creation, out of nothing, of a spirit is more
difficult to conceive than the creation, out of nothing, of matter; and then
adds the passage: "Nay, possibly, if we could emancipate ourselves from
vulgar notions, and raise our thoughts, as far as they would reach, to a
closer contemplation of things, we might be able to aim at some dim and
seeming conception how matter might at first be made and begin to
exist by the power of that eternal First Being; but to give beginning and
being to a spirit would be found a more inconceivable effect of omnipotent
power."—"Essay on the Human Understanding," Book IV, Chap. 10th,
Sec. 18. This mysterious hint, thus suggested by Locke, had given his
readers and editors trouble until M. Coste, who translated the "Essay"
into French, and who, for seven years, lived in the same family and on
intimate terms with Locke, gave an explanation in a note to his fourth
French edition. Locke never, in his life time, threw any farther light on
the meaning of this passage; but, after his death, M. Coste had a conver-
sation with Sir Isaac Newton, who explained the mystery, and gave in
his own words the theory he had suggested to Locke and the Earl of
Pembroke. Sir Wm. Hamilton's note, cited above, gives the whole history
This theory involves neither more nor less than the idea that God originally created matter in a perfectly solid state. For if a "certain portion of space" was made entirely impenetrable, then the substance filling that space was necessarily solid—impenetrability being the essence of solidity. Now, while it is true that God, by His power, might change a perfectly opaque and solid substance into all the varied forms of the gaseous, the liquid and the firm structures of the earth and air that now exist, yet all analogy of nature, and all presumption from the known, tend resistlessly to overthrow any such theory.

For, as far as we can conjecture the processes of creation, they proceed from the aeriform to the liquid, from the liquid to the solid, from the lighter and more porous solids to the denser and heavier, until we reach those having the greatest compactness of particles, and, consequently, the largest specific gravity. Hydrogen and oxygen are both aeriform—both gases; but when brought together in certain proportions, and when force is applied (in the electric current), they instantly coalesce and form a liquid—water. And water, when the mode of motion of its particles is changed by the withdrawal of a considerable ratio of that motion, becomes a solid—ice. And it exists likewise as a solid in the numerous forms of the hydrates, which are hardly to be counted, so much are they diffused through animal and vegetable nature. The whole nebular hypothesis, which, from the time of Sir Wm. Herschel and La Place to the present day, has been growing in favor, is founded on the idea that creation proceeds from the aeriform or the aetherial to the more compact and solid forms of the universe.

Of this curious thought, suggested by a great astronomer to a great metaphysician. But neither Locke nor Newton knew much of chemistry, even as known in their own day. And it is worthy of note that Locke takes for granted the creation, out of nothing, of human souls, ignoring entirely the fact that neither revelation nor reason authorizes such belief.
We are not justified in the conjecture that hydrogen gas is the normal condition of matter. Though this gas is the lightest essence known to modern chemistry, and weighs fourteen times less than nitrogen, fifty-nine times less than oxygen, one hundred and ninety-six times less than platinum, two hundred and six times less than lead, and two hundred and seven times less than bismuth (the heaviest element yet known), still hydrogen is gross and heavy to what essential matter may be.

The nearest approach that we can at present make to fact on this subject is to suppose that the æther which extends beyond our atmosphere, and fills all space with its calm presence, is the normal condition of eternal and indestructible matter.¹ Force, power, cause, applied by Divine wisdom to this æther, in and from eternity, and working out its effects in time, have produced all the creations of the cosmos.

We are next led to the enquiry whether matter be continuous or atomic in its normal condition. By continuous we mean a state without break, interval, or vacuum, spreading through space; by atomic we mean existing in a state of particles or

¹ The observations and experiments of the eminent scientist William Crookes, of London, have led him to what he calls "an ultra-gaseous state of matter" in the "new world" to which the spectroscope has opened his view, and "where matter exists in a fourth condition," that is, a higher state than the solid—the liquid or the ceriform.—Letter from London, in New York Herald, January 31, 1879. The editor of the Herald, in his genial article on "The Fairy Land of Science," justly styles the expression "ultra-gaseous" an ugly term, and refers to Professor Joseph Henry's word, "etherial," applied to the same supposed state of matter, as "good enough for all practical purposes." And so it is; for Pythagoras had used it, substantially in the same sense, twenty-three hundred years before the birth of Professor Henry; and in the days of Cicero, this etherial matter had been recognized as an established element by the stoic philosophy.—De Natura Deorum, Edit. Lips., 1877, pp. 77, 78. Joseph Henry, certainly one of the greatest of American scientists, did not claim that either the word or the idea originated with him.
in the manner opposite to one another. This harmony has
ensured the tranquility of this system from a very early
age of the world, and protected, in some of the speculations
of the ancients, the sun from all appearance and power of
care to anger when the meekness, pure and surpassed, through
inexorable revenge, in removing them quickly and maintaining their
oppressive terror than their violence.

Nothing can be probably the first to maintain the
harmony and the security of nature. He maintained it under
the (stream of) history, and under the influence of it, and that
has caused from age to age, to cause him to live, and that
may not be caused, the history of him, who was perfectly
ingenious and skilled, but that in the parts, together in
producing unity, and personal to any purpose, to whom was
impossible. He was the owner of Persia, and mighty
influenciated for his learning and strength. To ages be
influenced in the learning of mystery, he was respected and
taught that a Supreme Intelligence
in order and given world. His words were: "All things
were in order, and same intelligence, which introduced order." Nevertheless he was,nor that at me, and if something worse
in a stream of Medes, was not necessary to favor Persian interests.
He lived the stream of the conditions of Persians, but he was
labeled from Athens and passed the remainder of his life at
Laconia, where he lived about 447 B.C. at the age of
eighty-four, renowned by respect and brood.

In the other hand, the real theory, as we have
seen, was maintained by the Paintmen [Menax; and by Leucippos, Dem-
ocrates and Epicurus in Greece, and by Lucceius in Rome. In
Lucceius, "De Roman Nature." Lucceius has commented on
and opposed the uses in the art of Anaxagoras, which were, in all re-

Leucippos, Cienz. and Att. Att. Antig. Apollon. Cycolop. of
spects, adverse to his materialism. He styles the system taught by the Ionian "ομοκομίεσθαι" (similarity of the parts to the whole), for want of an equivalent Latin word, and earnestly condemns his doctrine on account of its denial of the inane, that idea being one of the special pets of his own system.¹

The attentive student, in examining the respective processes of thought by which the ancient philosophers endeavored to maintain against each other these two contradictory theories of matter, will be struck by the fact that each process resulted in difficulties seemingly insuperable. And these same difficulties have been projected into modern thought on the same subject, and are as great now as they were in the days of Anaxagoras and Lucretius.

The word atom, ατομος, is Greek, and means a something which cannot be cut or divided. The old atomists, of whom Lucretius must be considered the exponent, held that a continuous state of matter could not be; for, if it were so, motion would be impossible. All space being filled with matter, and no empty spaces whatever existing, no particle of matter could move—could leave its own place—without the previous movement of another particle, which was equally immovable for the same reason. Therefore it was necessary to assume that matter did not exist continuously, but in separate atoms, which were supposed to be the ultimate, infinitesimally small particles, impenetrable, indivisible and indestructible, but with vacua or empty spaces between them, so as to make motion possible, and

¹ "Nunc et Anaxagorae scrutemur homoeomerian
Quam Graii memorant, nec nostra dicere linguâ
Concedit nobis patrii sermonis egestas

Nec tamem esse ulla idem ex parte in rebus inane
Concedit, neque corporibus finem esse secandis."
combinations into the forms of the universe a work only calling for time for its accomplishment.\(^1\)

The followers of Anaxagoras, embracing the great logician and naturalist Aristotle, insisted that matter filled all space, and that "nature abhorred a vacuum," i.e., a space in which there was nothing. Believing matter to be real being, having the properties of inertia and extension, they logically insisted that it is infinitely divisible, or (as Lucretius represents their opinion) "neque corporibus finem esse secundis."\(^2\) And this opinion is, in theory at least, true, if matter be a something of which extension is always to be predicated; "for all substance that has extension, however small it may be, has a right side and a left side, an upper surface and a lower surface; it is, therefore, an assemblage of distinct bodies; we can deny of the right side what we affirm of the left; these two sides are not in the same place; a body cannot be in two places at the same time, and,

\[\begin{align*}
\text{‘Nec tamen undique corporea stipata tenentur} \\
\text{Omnia natura; namque est in rebus \textit{inane}} \\
\text{Qua propter locus est intactus, inane vacansque} \\
\text{Quod si non esset, nulla ratione moveri} \\
\text{Res possent.}
\end{align*}\]


And inasmuch as the advocates of \textit{continuous} matter showed the possibility of motion in a homogeneous liquid, such as water, by the illustration of a fish moving through it, Lucretius most acutely and ingeniously answers this argument by insisting that the \textit{inane}—empty space—among the atoms of the water must be assumed, because otherwise the fish never could push them aside and make his way through them. The learned author of the article "Atom," in the Encyclop. Britan., Vol. III., pp. 36–49, refers to this illustration of the fish moving in water, and, strangely enough, says that the advocates of continuous matter have always maintained the possibility of motion on the same principle. He quotes the lines of Lucretius which introduce this illustration, but does not allude to his ingenious reply.

\(^2\) De Rerum Natura, Lib. I., 844.
consequently, all extension which occupies several parts of space contains several bodies." 1

Zeno of Elea, in Magna Græcia (who must be carefully distinguished from Zeno of Cyprus, one of the founders of the stoic philosophy), lived cotemporaneously with Anaxagoras, and doubtless studied his system, though he did not adopt it. He was a disciple of Parmenides, and carried his master's idealism to extremes. He is represented to have held the doctrine that mind or thought is the only real being in the universe, and that all material creations are not real being, but only appearances—as truly nothing in their essence as a dream. He had a small following, who have given the name of his native place to the philosophy known as Eleatic. Absurd and contrary to common sense as it is, it has had, in modern times, disciples as eminent as Arthur Collier and Bishop Berkeley, and in Germany its representatives have been eminent. 2 Even the immortal Kant himself has been represented as holding in substance the doctrine of Parmenides, because he taught that knowledge of real being is, to us, impossible, and that we can know nothing save phenomena. 3 Doubtless the teaching of Zeno of Elea, that the

1 "Car toute étendue, quelque petite qu'elle puisse être, a un coté droit et un coté gauche, un dessus et un dessous; elle est donc un assemblage de corps distincts. Je puis nier du coté droit ce que J'affirme du coté gauche; ces deux cotés ne sont pas au même lieu; un corps ne peut pas être en deux lieux tout à la fois, et par conséquent, toute étendue qui occupe plusieurs parties d'espace contient plusieurs corps."—Pierre Bayle, Art. Zenon, Dict. Hist. et Crit., Tome IV., p. 2910, note G. This reasoning is as unanswerable now as it was in the days of Aristotle or Bayle.

2 Within less than a year past the doctrine of pure idealism, as held by Berkeley, has found an apologist, who recommends it as a salutary antidote to materialism! See the article "Berkeley and the Philosophy of Idealism," by Rev. W. S. Bean, Washington, Ga., in Southern Pres. Review, October, 1878, pp. 666–672.

3 Art. Zeno of Elea, Appleton's Cyclop. of Biography, p. 1051.
material universe is *nothing*, has been misunderstood and mis-represented.¹ He was not inept to that extent.

But it is certain that he taught that *motion* is impossible. Seeing no sufficient answer to the objection of the atomists, that if matter is continuous and fills all space no particle of matter can move, he began to speculate on the subject, and soon found enough of metaphysical reasons to convince him that no motion was really possible—no body really moved, though it might *seem* to move.

Nor was he without disciples and admirers. A well-authenticated tradition has come down to us that the cynic Diogenes, being in a circle of Zeno’s followers who were earnestly arguing with by-standers that motion was impossible, suddenly rose and walked up and down before them, and when asked why he did this, answered, “I refute Zeno!”² This visible proof was received with a burst of applause. Nevertheless, it did not convince Zeno’s disciples; for one of them, Diodorus, the sophist, continued to deny the reality of all motion, until, one day, by some misfortune, his shoulder was dislocated—put out of its socket. He hastened to the skilful physician Herophilus and begged him to restore it. “Surely you are not thinking of what you say,” said Herophilus; “what! your shoulder dislocated! that cannot be; for it has not gone out from its place, neither where it was nor where it was not.” This was but a repetition of the ridiculous argument of Zeno that if a body

¹ Seneca attributes this doctrine to Zeno in a well-known passage reviewing the philosophical follies of Protagoras, Nausiphanes, Parmenides, Zeno of Elea, and Pyrrhonius: “Zeno Eleates omnia negotia de negotio deject, *aet nihil esse*.”—Epist. I., xxxviii., p. 361. But Justus Lipsius defends Zeno from Seneca’s charge, and asserts that no such dogma has been found among his teachings.—Lipsii Manuduct. ad Stoic. Philos., Lib. II., Deff. iv., p. 693. Bayle’s conclusion, on summing up the evidence, is that Zeno must be acquitted of any such folly.

² “Zenonem refello.” Libertus Fromondus has amplified the original account given by Diogenes Laertius, Lib. VI., num. 39.
moves, it must move either in the place where it is, or in the place where it is not; now it does not move in the place where it is, for if so, it would not be there; nor in the place where it is not, for it can neither do nor suffer anything where it is not. So the sophist's silly logic was turned against him. Diodorus implored the physician not to remember any longer such reasonings, but to furnish the needed remedy.¹

Aristotle thought the reasons urged by Zeno of Elea against the possibility of movement sufficiently grave and imposing to require from himself a serious statement and refutation of them.² Such were the ineptiae into which studies of "ontology" involved the best minds of antiquity, and the same studies have brought out equally absurd theories and beliefs in modern times.

The atomic theory of the ancients, after having slept for some fourteen hundred years, has been revived by modern scientists, led on by Gassendi and Boscovich, and has assumed some new forms and new strength until it is a prevailing belief among chemists of high reputation. It may, in fact, be said to have received the adhesion of such men as Dalton, Biot, Cauchy, Wallaston, Poisson, Moigno, Arago, Berzelius, Graham, Faraday, Liebig, W. Weber, Bunsen, Kirchhoff, Hoffmann, Tyndall,


² Pierre Bayle gives Aristotle's statements and answers on this subject, and adds some of his own ingenious comments.—Art. Zeno of Elea, Dict. Hist. et Crit., Tome IV., note F, pp. 2909–2913. It is a curious illustration of the perversity of human thought when dealing with subjects beyond its grasp, that Bayle, writing seventeen hundred years after the birth of Christ, prefers the arguments of Zeno to the answers of Aristotle, one of which he pronounces "pitiable." "La réponse d'Aristote est pitoiable," note, p. 2909. Bayle furthermore declares that Diogenes, in giving an ocular proof of motion by walking, was guilty of a greater sophism than Zeno, who denied not apparent motion, but real motion, pp. 2916, 2917, note K. Fortunately common sense is adequate to relieve us from these absurdities on the one side and on the other.
and Hermann Ulrici. And although many men eminent in science are not yet satisfied that this theory has been conclusively deduced from known facts, yet its claims, when advocated by such men as have been named above, necessarily require that it shall be respectfully considered.

The first question is, what is the essential feature of the belief as held in modern times? It is the same given by Boscovich a hundred years ago, and not materially added to or improved since. It is that matter is not continuous, but consists, in its essential nature, of separate atoms, indivisible and indestructible by any forces of nature, inconceivably small, and separated from each other by spaces, which, as compared with the atoms themselves, are infinitely great. No such thing as actual contact between atoms exists. They all attract or repel each other. If a number of atoms are within the sphere of each other's attraction, then the body made up by them becomes solid; if the atoms are within the sphere of mutual repulsion, then the body is gaseous and elastic; if the atoms are so placed that they neither attract nor repel, being on the lines of indifference, then the body is a liquid.¹

But let it be noted, that all modern atomists, from Boscovich down to the present time, are compelled to hold that the atom has no parts, no dimensions, no magnitude.² This is indispensable to the maintenance of the theory, for if any parts exist, or any dimensions, or any magnitude, however small, then the thing is not indivisible, and cannot be. Man may not be able to divide it, for his powers are limited, but force, power, God can divide it infinitely if wisdom and goodness require it.

¹ Art. Boscovich, Appleton's Cyclop. of Biography, p. 112; Art. Atom. Encyc. Britan., Vol. III., p. 38. This article is attributed to Professor J. Clerk Maxwell, of the University of Cambridge.
But such of the atomists as believe in God nevertheless hold that the atoms out of which all material worlds are created have no parts—no dimensions—themselves. If so, they are not matter, for one of the essential properties of matter is extension.

The nearest approach we can form to the chemical notion of the atom is the mathematical definition of a point—namely, that which has no parts or no magnitude.¹ Now, no man who knew anything of the subject ever believed that a mathematical point was matter—was ever seen, or heard, or tasted, or smelled, or felt. Dugald Stewart, some seventy years ago, demonstrated that mathematical reasoning and conclusion depend entirely on the definitions of the science, and that these definitions do not represent material realities, but metaphysical ideas and relations.²

Therefore the fundamental postulate of the atomic theory of matter destroys the system. Like the fabled Saturn of the heathen mythology, it eats its own children. For if atoms have no parts, no dimensions—if they be merely mathematical points, not material, but metaphysical and imaginary—then by no possible combinations or arrangements can these atomic points, or any number of them, form any material being. As well might we try to make a mountain by heaping thoughts upon one another, or construct a pyramid of granite by accumulating ideas. Ten millions of atoms which have no dimensions heaped on one another would not make a mass larger than one atom.

In sober truth, the final conclusion of atomic philosophy is that matter is not matter—that the physical is not physical, but metaphysical, and as such must be accepted by those who can have faith in the impossible. In view of the ultimate atoms, Hermann Ulrici says: “But then we must not define matter as

¹ This is Euclid’s definition, and has never been improved.
the palpable—that which is apparent to the sense of touch.”

“That of which matter consists—the substratum of this substratum of things—that which really is, in a physical sense, are the simply imperceptible atoms. The palpable in nature consists, therefore, of the impalpable, or is rather of itself something impalpable; the perceptible of itself is something imperceptible; the appearing, something not appearing; the sensible, something beyond our senses. The idea of atom is evidently, therefore, a metaphysical idea.¹

To a man exercising only common sense, the question how it is possible that matter can consist of atoms which are not matter—how the essence of anything can be that which is not its essence—would seem to admit of only one answer. We may, therefore, naturally enough wish to know how such a theory has been reconstructed in modern times, and has gained as its upholders so many eminent names.

There are two classes of modern atomists: those who have willingly borrowed this theory from the ancient materialists of the Epicurean and Lucretian school, for the purpose of enforcing the same system of philosophy and irreligion; and those

¹ “Nur darf man dann nicht behaupten dass der Stoff das handgreifliche, dem Tastsinne Bemerkbare sey. Das woraus die Materie besteht, das Substrat dieses Substrats der Dinge, das im physicalischen Sinne wahrhaft Seyende, sind die schlechthin unwahrnehmbaren Atome. Das Palpable in der Natur besteht mithin aus Unpalpablem oder ist vielmehr an sich ein Unpalpables, das Wahrnehmbare an sich ein Unwahrnehmbares, das Erscheinende an sich ein Nichterscheinendes, das Sinnliche an sich ein Un-oder Uebersinnliches. Der Begriff des Atoms ist mithin offenbar ein Metaphysicher Begriff.”—“Gott und Die Natur,” Leipzig, 1876, p. 31. To the same effect are the words of Prof. Francis Bowen: “After all, the atom of the chemist in a mere conception of the mind. It is too minute to be separately apprehended by the senses, and is properly thought, only as form, without substance. Hence it is but the ghost of matter, and that which is exclusively constituted from it by mere aggregation is equally unsubstantial.”—Art. Dualism, Materialism or Idealism, Princeton Review, March, 1878, p. 428.
who have adopted it as a scientific explanation of phenomena and ascertained facts in nature which cannot be otherwise explained at all, or explained so well. With the first of these classes we have already dealt in the chapter on materialism. The other class, though not more acute or learned, are more truly scientific and reasonable, and deserve respectful attention.

The English chemist, John Dalton, who lived from 1766 to 1844, is entitled to the credit of having given a strong modern impulse to the atomic theory. His experiments in the combinations of gases and liquids were patient and long continued, and his "New System of Chemistry," published, in different parts, from 1807 to 1810, maintained the doctrine of atoms with great scientific acumen and force. It is also true that when his views were first announced other chemists opposed them, and Dr. Wollaston only adopted them after careful investigation.¹

The theory as announced by Dalton was founded entirely on the well ascertained fact that elementary gases, in uniting to form another gaseous compound, or to form a liquid, always unite in certain fixed proportions or weights. Innumerable experiments have proved this. Thus, eight parts of oxygen unite invariably with six parts of carbon to form carbonic oxide. To this if eight parts more of oxygen be added we have carbonic acid. Fourteen parts of nitrogen unite with eight of oxygen to form nitrous oxide, or exhilarating gas. One part of hydrogen unites with eight of oxygen to generate water; but the oxygen is not, therefore, eight times superior to the hydrogen in saturating or neutralizing power, or effective value; they are exactly equal, and the quantities taken are hence called equivalents.²

As it is natural and proper for man to seek for the hidden cause of known phenomena, and also natural for him to invent a theory when he is at a loss for a cause, so we need not be

explained that this group seemed to them like a sufficient explanation of the phenomena and laws—of the whole of physical nature; and they were not altogether without a little else except as gravitation and its argument. They had found the same kind of reasoning applied to even more of the phenomena—such as number or division and mass—yet they could not reason anything on the premises. And hence it has been asserted that the phenomena invariable in one of each and every kind of substance is the immovable being changed in none. Yet, even here, not one fact can be proved to exist, or to operate, or to exist. And so it goes. And so it goes. And so it goes.

Since the time of has been, in every age, in every age, in every age. It is continually urged that only by assuming the scientific reality can we assure and true view, or of the retraction and polarization of light when it encounters a prism or crystallized substance. In the conclusion of heat through bodies, or of radiation of heat from bodies, it is given any satisfactory explanation of the properties and quality of different bodies in reference to density, hardness, elasticity, cleavage, expansion by heat, crystallized forms, &c., &c. And in short, that the atomic theory has to be necessary or chemistry that its abandonment would be equivalent to giving up all further investigation of nature.

Now, to a man, uncommitted to any theory, these high claims do not commend themselves. Herbert Spencer, who cannot be suspected of too much credulity in favor of any ancient belief, nevertheless declares that the argument for the infinite divi-

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1 This is a condensed statement of the reasons advanced by Ulrici, "Gott und Die Natur," pp. 25, 26. See also Prof. Clerk Maxwell's article, Atom, Encyc. Brit., Vol. III., pp. 25, 26.

ibility of matter is one impossible to be refuted by human reason. And one accustomed to deal with mooted questions in philosophy and religion has declared that "it has never been demonstrated that there are ultimate atoms, possessed of the necessary attributes demanded by this scheme. It is only a surmise from certain chemical facts." ¹

It is our duty, therefore, to look at these "chemical facts" more closely ere we permit them to seduce us into a theory that matter in its essence is not matter, but only certain immaterial or metaphysical points, having no parts and no dimensions.

In place, then, of the atomic theory, let another theory be assumed as the ultimate explanation of the phenomena of matter. This explanation may be styled (by a word coined from pure Greek metal) the nomian theory, or the hypothesis of law.²

In accordance with the views already announced and sought to be herein maintained, we assume that God, the almighty, all-wise and all-good Spirit, is the eternal Power, Force and Cause in the universe. He is one, and works upon one matter; for all facts and presumptions bring us to the result that matter is monadic, or one, in its essence.³ And matter, considered in itself, is only inert and extended; it has of itself no power, no force. The expression, so common in modern "molecular science," of the forces of matter is not a proved verity, but a mere accommodation to weakness of language. As spirit has been from eternity immanent in and working on matter, we have never known the material apart from the working of the forces appropriate to it; and, therefore, we attribute these

¹ Herbert Spencer, quoted in Dr. R. L. Dabney's "Sensualistic Philosophy," p. 167.


³ We are indebted to Godfrey William Liebnitz for the philosophic use of the word monad. He applies it to spirit, but it is also applicable to matter in the sense of oneness.
forces to the material itself. But only God supplies force; without Him the condition of all space filled with matter would be just the condition against which the Lucretian philosophy protested, and to remedy which it invented its theory of atoms, and of the inane or empty space. No answer is furnished by reason to the argument against the possibility of motion, unless reason admits a power other than matter—a power intelligent and spiritual, and able to work on matter without occupying space.

And such a power none but God is. From all eternity He has been active; He has been working; He moves all things that move. Motion never originated, never had a beginning. It is eternal in the past, will be eternal in the future. Motion is the fundamental form of force. From motion all other forms of force come,—heat, light, gravitation, repulsion, electricity, galvanism, magnetism, molecular forces, even to the most mysterious of all—the vital forces, vegetable life, animal life. All are indestructible, and all are related and correlated in such manner and substance that all refer themselves to the grand generating power—motion. Without motion we have no reason to believe that any of the creations of the cosmos could have been formed; with motion we have no difficulty in seeing, even with our feeble science of six thousand years, how a universe could be made.

Less than a hundred years ago, chemists almost universally believed that heat was an actual substance or element, and the name of caloric was given to it. Now that name has disappeared from chemical nomenclature, because the thing it represented non est—does not exist. Heat is not a material substance; it is a force, and a powerful one, but it is merely a

1 Prof. David A. Wells’ “Principles and Applications of Chemistry,” pp. 11–14; Notes de Chimie Moléculaire, par M. Gustave Henrichs, Paris, 878–5; Contributions to Molecular Science, by same, 1870.
mode of motion. Benjamin Thompson Rumford, a native of America, but a cosmopolite in practical science, filled a tight hogshead with cold water, and caused an axis with flanges to revolve rapidly in the water; and, though no heat was communicated from any other source, the motion alone, in the course of two and a half hours, caused the water to be \textit{boiling hot}.\footnote{Biography of Count Rumford, Chambers’ Miscel., Vol. 10, Part I., p. 30; Art. Heat, New Amer. Cyclop., Vol. IX., p. 21; Prof. W. B. Rogers’ Lectures, 1846–’47. Sir H. Davy, in 1799, melted, in a vacuum, two pieces of ice by their mutual friction.} From about the date of this experiment, the word \textit{caloric} began to drop out of chemical treatises of any repute.

Thus God, by His power, infuses all forces that act upon matter, and, by them, works out His wise and benevolent creations.\footnote{Since these views have been adopted and committed to writing, the attention of the writer has been called to Prof. Joseph Le Conte’s article, “Man’s Place in Nature,” Princeton Review, November, 1878. The evolution doctrine of that article is worse than heterodox, and dissent from it has been plainly expressed elsewhere in this work. But the following views from one so distinguished in modern science as Prof. Le Conte are worthy of serious thought: “The forces of nature I regard as an effluence from the Divine Person—an ever-present and all-pervading divine energy. The laws of nature are nought else but the \textit{regular} modes of operation of that energy—universal because He is omnipresent, invariable because He is unchanging; the phenomena of nature are the acts of Deity, perhaps not in the \textit{most direct} personal sense, but in a sense far more direct than even Christians in these modern times are accustomed to think. This is undoubtedly the Scripture doctrine: ‘Thou openest Thy hand, they are filled with good; Thou hidest Thy face, they are troubled; Thou takest away their breath, they die and return to dust.’ ‘He looketh upon the earth and it trembleth. He toucheth the hills and they smoke.’ ‘He maketh His sun to rise on the evil and the good, and sendeth rain on the just and on the unjust.’ God immanent, God pervading nature, and yet not identified with nature; this Christian Pantheism is the only true philosophic view.”—Princeton Review, November, 1878, p. 794.} Strange that such a mind should not have seen that to call this Christian \textit{Pantheism} involves an inconsistency and perversion of terms unworthy of a scientist. For \textit{Pantheism ex vi termini} can mean nothing except that God is all, and that all is God—a doctrine fundamentally \textit{unchristian}.\footnote{Since these views have been adopted and committed to writing, the attention of the writer has been called to Prof. Joseph Le Conte’s article, “Man’s Place in Nature,” Princeton Review, November, 1878. The evolution doctrine of that article is worse than heterodox, and dissent from it has been plainly expressed elsewhere in this work. But the following views from one so distinguished in modern science as Prof. Le Conte are worthy of serious thought: “The forces of nature I regard as an effluence from the Divine Person—an ever-present and all-pervading divine energy. The laws of nature are nought else but the \textit{regular} modes of operation of that energy—universal because He is omnipresent, invariable because He is unchanging; the phenomena of nature are the acts of Deity, perhaps not in the \textit{most direct} personal sense, but in a sense far more direct than even Christians in these modern times are accustomed to think. This is undoubtedly the Scripture doctrine: ‘Thou openest Thy hand, they are filled with good; Thou hidest Thy face, they are troubled; Thou takest away their breath, they die and return to dust.’ ‘He looketh upon the earth and it trembleth. He toucheth the hills and they smoke.’ ‘He maketh His sun to rise on the evil and the good, and sendeth rain on the just and on the unjust.’ God immanent, God pervading nature, and yet not identified with nature; this Christian Pantheism is the only true philosophic view.”—Princeton Review, November, 1878, p. 794.}
These forces act according to laws which He imposes. The common declaration of books called scientific that the forces of nature act blindly, is an absurd falsehood. They all act under laws of consummate wisdom. They act under certain modes of energy, which have at their bases certain arithmetical and mathematical relations. Thus the dim vision of the sage Pythagoras has been realized by the discoveries of modern experiment. Number, quantity, proportion enter into many of these laws; figure, monometric, triclinic, dimetric, trimetric, hexagonal, rhomboid, orthometric, pyramidal, prismatic, triangular, circular, elliptical, cubic, will be found to rule in others. Therefore it is that under law, the force of gravity counterbalanced by the force of centrifugal motion, causes the moon to revolve around the earth in twenty-eight days, and the earth to revolve around the sun in three hundred and sixty-five days; and these motions, under the same law of number and time, have been going on for a period beyond all memorials of man. Laws, especially such laws as announce the presence of abstract truth, of mathematical proportions, imply an intelligent lawgiver. The bee builds her cell upon the principle of the hexagon, because God works in the bee. The spider spreads her web in circular forms with radii and concentric lines, because God, by His immanent and indwelling forces, directs her.

This principle of law, as shown in the relations of number and figure, pervades all created nature, in every department, whether animal, vegetable or inorganic. All hens, from the days of the garden of Eden to the present time, have incubated their eggs and hatched their young in three weeks; turkeys in four weeks. The period of uterine gestation is fixed by the law of number as applied to time. And these periods are fixed by Divine Wisdom, though for purposes sometimes within, sometimes transcending, our comprehension. The rabbit's term of gestation is three weeks; the ewe's five months; the
female lion's one hundred and ten days; the mare's eleven months; the human female's ten lunar months; the elephant's twenty and one-half months. And these arithmetical periods have been observed for thousands of years with a regularity admitting of aberrations so few and so small that, instead of invalidating, they establish the law.

But in no department of created things is the nomian theory more beautifully illustrated and confirmed than in the formations of metals, stones, rocks, salts—of everything, in short, that we know in the earth not included in the departments of the animal or the vegetable. The presence of law in crystallization is so manifest that a man capable of watching the formation of a snow or ice crystal, without being impressed with a belief in a power intelligently working to produce regularity and beauty, must be incapable of exercising reason.

The word crystallization is derived from the Greek χρυσάλων, which, in its simple and primitive meaning, was ice, or something frozen. But modern research has shown that this process extends through much the larger part of inorganic nature, and is the mode by which, not only ice and snow, but solid lava, granite, marble, iron, spermaciti, gems of every kind, silica,

1 These periods have been adopted from the carefully compiled articles in the Encyc. Britan. and the New Amer. Cyclop.
2 Even Professor Tyndall, after reviewing the processes of crystallization and the building up of a grain of corn, and of the human organization, feels himself compelled to say: "I do not think the materialist is entitled to say that his molecular groupings and his molecular motions explain everything. In reality, they explain nothing. The utmost he can affirm is the association of two classes of phenomena, of whose real bond of union he is in absolute ignorance. The problem of the connection of body and soul is as insoluble in its modern form as it was in the prescientific ages."
—"Scientific Materialism," Appendix to Belfast Lectures, p. 116. As the molecular theory is founded on the atomic, we have here an admission of its impotency to explain known phenomena. Surely the learned professor may, without presumption, be invited to consider the nomian theory as offering an explanation.
alumina, spar, salts, are formed. The divine Geometrician has been working on all these, and impressing on them the nomian idea—the rule of law. Nearly every form known to solid geometry is repeated in crystallized substances. Curved forms are not entirely wanting, though they are rare; the regular octahedron, rhombic dodecahedron, and two four-sided pyramids, placed base to base, are found among the garnets, diamonds, lead and gold of our earth; square prisms and eight-sided double pyramids are found among the crystallized forms of idocrase, zircon and tin; right prisms with rectangular bases are among the specimens of heavy spar, sulphur, epsom salt and topaz. Carbonate of lime ordinarily crystallizes into rhombohedrons, and is called calcite; but if, during the process, a high temperature is applied, the crystals assume the forms of trimetric prisms, and the completed formation is called aragonite. Here again we see that force alone works very different results out of the same element, but always according to law. As these crystal formations conform to geometric rules, we might naturally expect that their cleavage (i.e., their susceptibility of being split or cut into regular forms), their hardness, color, elasticity, expansibility and conduction of heat, will differ in the direction of different axial lines, and will be alike in the direction of like axes. And this is the fact. Hence the variations in refraction and polarization of light, and all the phenomena attending the relations arising out of cleavage, density, hardness, elasticity, chemical proportion and crystallized forms, which Dr. Ulrici has pronounced to be best solved by the atomic theory, are, in fact, not solved at all by that theory (which is founded on a physical impossibility), but are perfectly explained by the simple hypothesis of law.

Having seen the relations of number, quantity, regular figure, imposed by the Almighty Spirit through the animal, vegetable

and inorganic kingdoms of creation, we are prepared to expect the same reign of law among what are called the elements of matter; and, accordingly, we find it so. By the simple application of force to essential matter, God causes such arrangement and combination of its parts as to create the element known as hydrogen, and that known as oxygen, and that known as gold, and silver, and boron, and each other element. And each of these has its own law to regulate its conduct.\(^1\) We are not surprised to find that the number eight expresses the law of action of oxygen gas so completely as to be adopted as its equivalent, and to give the proportion in which it consents to enter into the composition of water, and of many other useful compounds.\(^2\) This fact is no more astonishing than that the moon should revolve around the earth in twenty-eight days, or that a hen should incubate her eggs and hatch chickens from them in twenty-one days. It is all the result of law, and all perfectly inescrutable and inexplicable on any other theory. Neither the continuous theory nor the atomic theory can explain it. Each of these theories undertakes to enter into the question of the essence of matter—in other words, of ontology—a question concerning which we know absolutely nothing, in like manner as we know nothing of the essence of mind.

Therefore we reach the conclusion, that neither the theory of continuity nor the theory of separate atoms is necessary or competent to explain the chemical facts which patient experiment and analysis have made known to us. And as the atomic theory labors under the disadvantage of postulating that atoms

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\(^1\) This word "conduct," or "behavior," has become domesticated in modern chemistry. It is very appropriate to express what any given substance will do under given forces or influences.

are points, having no parts, no magnitude, no dimensions, from which it necessarily follows that they are not matter, we think it not unreasonable to say that this theory neither is, nor can be, proved to be true.

In fact, modern chemists seem to have been conscious that, in adopting a theory which ignores and denies a fundamental property of matter, to-wit: extension, they have imperilled their whole system. Any such theory necessarily puts the system founded on it beyond the pale of common sense. Hence they have not rested on the word "atom," but have invented another word to express their conception of the essence of actually subsisting physics. This word is "molecule." It is defined to be the smallest particle of any material thing capable of being contemplated by the mind as existing in a free or isolated state. They admit that atoms never can fill this condition. Atoms can never be thought of as existing alone, or isolated, although the very definition of them, which has been attempted, supposes them to be separated by distances great when compared with the atoms themselves. The molecule, therefore, can never be constituted of less than two atoms. If the substance be a pure element, then at least two of its atoms enter into the composition of its molecules. If the substance be compound—as, for instance, atmospheric air, made up of hydrogen, oxygen, nitrogen and a small modicum of carbonic acid; or cinnabar, made up of sulphur and mercury—then the molecule consists of three or four united atoms in the first case, and of two atoms in the other; the molecule being the smallest possible particle which represents the essential constituents of the body.¹

How it is possible that two or three or four atoms, by union, can make a molecule, and then that molecules, by union, can make an actual, palpable, material substance, these philosophers

do not tell us. They leave that to lively imaginations; or rather, they ask the uninitiated to believe the *impossible*. For the liveliest imagination ever possessed by man can do nothing but combine into new forms previously existing ideas. And as an atom has no dimensions, ten millions of united atoms can no more be imagined to form a molecule (which is defined to be a something having dimensions, though *very small dimensions,* than could one atom. Thus what is called “molecular science” seems to common sense to be founded on a delusion—an impossibility.

Nevertheless, modern chemists have expended immense labor upon this theory. Professor Tyndall, after a striking picture of the scenes probably attending the building of the pyramids of Egypt, the thousands and tens of thousands of living laborers, “swarming workers toiling at those vast erections, lifting the inert stones, and, guided by the volition, the skill, and possibly at times by the whip, of the architect, placing them in their proper positions,” passes immediately to his theory of molecules, working in swarms and innumerable crowds, building up the pyramidal forms of crystallization so common among the salts and rocks of the earth.¹ His stimulated imagination seems striving to see these molecular laborers, but in vain, for they are made up of atoms which have no dimensions, and, therefore, can never be seen or felt or tasted. And other philosophers in molecules have applied exhausting labor in working out problems concerning them, founded on arithmetic, algebra and geometry! In using mathematical methods, they are, of course, safe from all detection of their own delusions, either by themselves or others; because such methods are founded entirely on mathematical *definitions*, which do not represent material being in any shape or form, but represent merely ideas and abstrac-

¹ “Scientific Materialism,” Appendix to Belfast Lecture, Appleton’s Amer. Edit., 1875, pp. 109–111.
tions. Thus it has come to pass that the scientists, Loschmidt, Stoney and Sir William Thompson, by successive calculations and experiments, carried on by a commingling of arithmetic, algebra, galvanism, zinc, copper and soap bubbles, have ascertained the exact diameter and the exact weight of one molecule of hydrogen, the lightest of all the elements now known to us. For the benefit of the uninstructed, it is proper here to state this result. A millimeter is about one twenty-fifth part of an inch. Two millions of molecules of hydrogen, touching each other in a row, would extend a millimetre; that is, fifty millions would extend an inch; and two hundred millions of millions of millions of them would make a milligramme—that is, would weigh the thousandth part of fifteen grains! As these proportions are seriously given by the scientific, the common herd of mankind are expected to take them on trust. It is at least comforting to know that some advance has been made towards the palpable; and that, although one atom of hydrogen has absolutely no dimensions, and no weight, yet two atoms of the same, united in a molecule, extend the fifty-millionth part of an inch, and weigh about the thousandth part of a grain!

In addition to the arguments in favor of the atomic theory, founded on the constant proportions in which gases and other elements unite to form compounds, the refraction and polarization of light, and the symmetrical methods in which crystallization, cleavage, hardness, elasticity and expansibility manifest

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1 Professor Clerk Maxwell's article, Atom. Encyclop. Britan., Vol. III., p. 41. It ought to be borne in mind that Sir Wm. Thompson, with all his well-earned reputation, is the same gentleman who suggested as a solution of the question how vegetable and animal life originated on our planet, that the germs of life were brought hither by meteorites, coming from distant parts of space!—Popular Science Monthly, November, 1877, p. 85; Walter Flight's "Meteorites and the Origin of Life;" Froude's "Science and Theology, Ancient and Modern," Internat. Review, May-June, 1878, p. 302.
themselves, which arguments have been considered and refuted, Hermann Ulrici advances another argument, as follows: If a wire be extended and drawn upon by a uniform and constant force, acting in the direction of its length, it will stretch to a degree fixed by its strength and tensile power; but if the pulling force be continued, the wire will finally and inevitably break. From this he argues that the matter in the wire cannot be continuous, but must consist of separate atoms, because if the act of pulling or drawing acted on a continuous substance by affecting its density only, we could expect nothing but an infinite diminution of density even if the pull were infinitely prolonged.\textsuperscript{1}

This argument, though ingenious, is delusive and invalid. It is founded entirely on man’s experience of his own processes, which, though in themselves often marvellous in delicacy and beauty of adaptation, are always coarse and inadequate when compared with the processes of Divine power. That a wire will always break when subjected to the most uniform and cautious pull that man can apply is no evidence that the same wire would break if drawn out by the inconceivably delicate and nicely adjusted forces which God could apply. It might be thus extended infinitely if His purposes required such extension. The question reduces itself ultimately to that of the infinite divisibility of matter; for however fine and ineffably attenuated the wire might become, we are unable to conceive of its ever reaching a state in which it would have no dimensions; and so long as it had any dimensions, any right and left side,

\textsuperscript{1} “Aber auch schon die allbekante Thatsache, dass ein Draft oder Faden bei fortgehendem Zug sich immer mehr dehnt und endlich reisst, fordere die Annahme atomistischer Discretion. Denn die entgegengesetzte Ansicht, welche den Draft von Anfang an als continuirlich und die Wirkung des Zugs nur als auf die Dichtigkeit gehend betrachtete, kömne selbst bei einem undendlich verstärkten zug nur eine undendliche Dichtigkeitsverminderung erwarten.”—Ulrici’s “Gott und Die Natur,” p. 24.
any upper and lower surface, it could be extended, without rupture, by a power sufficiently cautious and uniform in its movement. The argument of Ulrici is also based on the notion that the ultimate breach of the wire, under man’s processes, results from the parting of separated atoms; but this notion is not merely unproved, but negatived by true science. Rupture is always the result of paramount force. Motion is the parent of all force. If motion, sufficiently energetic to overcome the force known as cohesion, takes place, rupture is the necessary result. A sudden jerk (a mere form of motion) will instantly break a wire which, under steady and uniform pull, might be indefinitely drawn out without rupture.

All experience confirms this view, and refutes the argument of Ulrici. It is well known that this quality of ductility or tensile strength differs greatly in the elementary and compound metals. Gold comes first, then platinum, then silver, then copper, then steel, then iron, then the compound brass, then zinc, then lead, then tin.¹ The ancient mythologic fable of Vulcan’s making a net of wire so fine that it was almost invisible, and yet so strong that his unfaithful wife, Venus, and her lover, Mars, could not break its meshes, is evidence that modern scientists know no more of the essence of wire than men did in the days of Hesiod and Lucian.

The difference in ductility, running up in successive and very distinct conditions, from tin to gold, through the intermediate metals, is simply a difference in mode of arrangement and cohesion of particles—in other words, a difference in the modes of force and law applied by Almighty Power to original matter. Hence it is that man, by patient observation and experiment, has been able to avail himself of this ever-growing ratio of ductility—to increase it in the same metal, by proper study and

application of known forces, and finally to attain results so astounding that they demonstrate the infinite divisibility of matter, and raise a resistless presumption that, with adequate power adequately applied, a wire need never break, but might be prolonged to infinity.

The ancient method of making wire was to beat out the metal into thin sheets and then cut and roll them by hand, aided with hammer and file.¹ This required the metal to be malleable, that is, susceptible of being beaten out into thin plates; and it has been long ascertained that all metals are not malleable in like proportion as they are ductile. Hence, in modern mechanics, better methods have been adopted, by first bringing the metal to cylindric form, and then drawing it through round apertures, gradually growing smaller and smaller, in very hard plates of steel, and, in some cases, through similar apertures drilled in the hardest of the precious stones. By this last named method, a silver wire has been drawn out, through an aperture of an inch in diameter, drilled in a ruby, until the wire, without once breaking, reached a length of eight hundred and ninety seven thousand six hundred feet, or one hundred and seventy miles! And, moreover, it was so uniform in size and structure that the most delicate tests applied by the micrometer detected no difference in weight between equal lengths at the two ends.² A fact like this plays havoc with Ulrici's argument; for if finite power has been able to elongate matter in quantity so small until its attenuation passes beyond the ordinary grasp of the senses, what limit on its elongation can reason impose on infinite power? In other words, what reason have we to deny that matter is infinitely divisible?

But we have other facts as to wire, tending to the same con-

² This was under a patent obtained by Mr. Brockedon in 1819; Art. Wire, New Amer. Cyclop., Vol. XVI., p. 498.
clusion. In drawing it, whether by machinery or by hand, it has been ascertained that, after successive drawings through holes, smaller and smaller, the wire becomes brittle under the process itself; and, therefore, before it can be drawn again, it must be annealed, i.e., placed in an oven, heated gradually, and then allowed to become, very slowly, cool. Now this demonstrates the important fact that the skilful and wise application of new force is all that is needed to subject the same matter to additional and indefinite prolongation. And other delicate processes are used—among them one invented by Dr. Wollaston, in 1813, by which a very small cylinder of gold or platinum is inserted compactly in a tube drilled through a somewhat longer cylinder of silver, and then this compound cylinder is drawn into wire. By means of this process the inner metal is less liable to rupture; and a wire, originally one-fifth of an inch in diameter, of silver and platinum has thus been drawn until, on removing the silver (by an acid), the platinum wire has been found to be of the diameter of one thirty-thousandth part of an inch! Of such wire, a mile's length would weigh but a single grain. Even brass wire has been made and woven of texture so wonderfully fine that sixty-seven thousand distinct meshes would cover an area of only one square inch.

The tendency of such facts is not to be mistaken. They demonstrate that there is no limit to the divisibility of matter; that a wire might exist of such metal and so drawn by Divine forces as never to part; that the only reason why a wire will ultimately break, when drawn out by finite skill, is that man is unable so to apply and adjust the force of motion as not to overcome the force of cohesion; that, nevertheless, this finite

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power has already accomplished such marvels in this direction as to satisfy the reason that infinite power could so maintain the force of cohesion among the particles of the wire as to make it paramount, during the whole process of drawing, to the motive force, and thus the wire would cohere for ever, though growing continuously more attenuated. And, moreover, inasmuch as the wire in human hands breaks, because the motive force becomes paramount to the cohesive force, and never breaks until that exact crisis is reached, it is demonstrated that such rupture must, of necessity, occur at such crisis, whether the matter of the wire be in its essence continuous or atomic. Therefore this illustration from the wire, so far from aiding the atomic theory, tends to destroy it.

Upon a review of the whole subject, common sense finds herself compelled to adopt the conclusion that the theory of separate atoms, as the essential constitution of matter, is not established by any adequate evidence; and as it contradicts the fundamental properties of matter, it is inadmissible in true science.

Modern scientists, however, especially those who make chemistry their exclusive study, claim that they ought to know, and do know, more about the essence of matter than other students; and that, therefore, when they assert that the atomic theory, and its progeny, the molecular theory, are the only theories adequate to explain existing phenomena, they ought to be believed.¹ In answer to this claim, a modest doubt is expressed whether these scientists know anything more of the essence, either of matter or mind, than did Thales or Aristotle,

¹ It is difficult to read the "Chimie Moleculaire," and the "Contributions to Molecular Science," of Prof. Hinrichs, or the "Atom" of J. C. M., in the Encyc. Britan., or the Appendix to Belfast Lecture, by Prof. Tyndall, without feeling some apprehension that the authors would regard a denial of atoms as evidence of ignorance or weakness.
Pythagoras or Plato, or than does the most ignorant peasant. These modern atomists have ventured beyond their depth, and as the region into which they have intruded themselves is filled only with aether, or something even infinitely lighter than aether, their swimming powers are not adequate to the exigency, and we are not surprised to find them sinking into depths of mire and gloom to which no light—no God—ever penetrates. Chemistry is not yet a science; astronomy is; and before chemistry can become actually scientific, her votaries must cease to believe that they have penetrated the inscrutable mystery of being; must cease to call ontology a part of knowledge, and must, for their methods, sit humbly at the feet of astronomers.

The great men who, by the observations and labors of successive ages, have built up the stately temple of astronomy into its now sublime proportions—Pythagoras, Copernicus, Galileo, Kepler, Cassini, Halley, Bradley, Clairant, Euler, La Grange, Newton, the Herschels, Bessel, Proctor—have never presumed to pry into the mystery of actual being. They have been, if not explicitly, yet implicitly and really, believers in the nomian theory—the hypothesis of law of which we have spoken. They have admitted that their whole function was, from observation of the phenomena of nature, to learn humbly the laws by which the Divine Architect creates and governs the material cosmos. Hence they have spent days and nights in study of the appearances and movements of the sun, moon, earth, planets, heavenly bodies, and in exhausting calculations and labors on fluxions, forces, conflicting movements, until they have wrought out and demonstrated the grand system of law under which all bodies move and act. And they have had their well deserved reward and triumph in that highest apex of all scientific glory, the discovery in the same year, by two separate astronomers,—first by Adams, of Cambridge, in England, and then by Leverrier, Paris, in France, each calculating independently—that there
must be a planet outside of the orbit of Uranus, and the actual appearance of that planet in the field of the telescope soon after the result of their calculations had been made known.¹

When chemists cease to dream of atoms and molecules, and apply themselves with devout industry to their legitimate function of ascertaining the phenomena and formal changes of matter, and of deducing therefrom the laws which Almighty wisdom and power have imposed, they may hope that chemistry will become a science, and yield triumphs cognate to those of astronomy and mechanics.

In concluding this necessary review of the theory of atoms, it is proper that notice be taken of a modern argument drawn from this theory, and impressed into the service of advocates of the doctrine of creation ex nihilo.

Some years ago, Sir John Herschel, leaving his legitimate domain of astronomy, undertook to use the atomic theory in favor of the teleological evidences for the existence of a God. As he believed in God, and wished to convince his brethren of atheistic proclivities that there is a God, he assumed the theory of atoms to be true, but apparently without severe scrutiny into its metaphysical character. He therefore compared original atoms to “manufactured articles,” because of their supposed

¹ John Couch Adams announced to Prof. Challis, Principal of the Cambridge Observatory, the result of his calculations in September, 1845, and it is stated that, guided by the notes of Adams, Challis actually saw the planet twice, and marked its place. In June, 1846, Leverrier announced his calculations and assigned the position of the planet. R. A. Proctor's "Expanse of Heaven," pp. 120–122; Art. Astronomy, New Amer. Cyclop., Vol. II., p. 253. But, per contra, Dr. Wm. B. Carpenter, who is certainly eminent as a physiologist, if not as an astronomer, denies all substantial merit either to Adams or Leverrier, and says if the search had been one year earlier or one year later than it occurred, the actual place of the planet would have been far from the place of computation, and therefore the discovery was only the result of "a lucky guess."—Art. Nature and Law, Littell's Living Age, December 18, 1880, note, p. 718.
uniformity and adaptation to building up material structures. His reasoning was familiar and persuasive, founded on the advantages of making great numbers of articles, such as Whitworth's bolts, or soldiers' shoes, exactly alike, and of making articles alike in weight and measure, so that they can be used beneficially and supplied at once, without the delay of isolated manufacture.¹

And in 1873, Professor Clerk Maxwell, in his scientific lecture, at Bradford, England, developed more fully the same idea, insisting that "atoms," or "molecules," are prepared materials, or "manufactured articles," formed by the skill of the Highest, and that, "though in the course of ages catastrophes have occurred, and may yet occur, in the heavens, though ancient systems may be dissolved, and new systems evolved out of their ruins, the molecules out of which these systems are built—the foundation stones of the material universe—remain unbroken."²

And, finally, Principal Dawson, of Montreal, refers approvingly to these dicta of Herschel and Maxwell, and, speaking of "atoms," says "they have the properties of a manufactured article," and that Genesis says they were created; and so says modern science, which declares that these are the ultimate particles, determined by weight and measure, and incapable of modification in their essential properties; and, therefore, he argues that God created them out of nothing.³

¹ Prof. J. Clerk Maxwell's article on Atom, Encyc. Britan., Vol. III., p. 49; Herschel's "Dissertation on the Study of Natural Philosophy."
² Maxwell's lecture before the British Association, quoted in Professor Tyndall's Belfast Lecture, pp. 56, 57. Tyndall evidently understands Maxwell as making no distinction, for the purposes of that part of his lecture, between "atoms" and "molecules." But, according to the best atomistic definitions, the distinction is as wide as that between a point having no dimensions and a point having the extent of one-fifty-millionth part of an inch at least! And such a distinction is as wide as infinity.
Now, to this argument we present three answers, each consistent with revelation and well supported by reason, and each, in its nature, fatal to the argument.

1. The theory of separate atoms is not proved to be true. It is not needed to explain the phenomena and conduct of matter, which are, in all respects, more satisfactorily explained by the hypothesis of law. And it is, according to its scientific definitions and central postulates, contradictory of the known and fundamental properties of matter. And the theory of free "molecules," being founded on that of atoms, falls with it.

2. Even if the ascertained facts of nature, relating to the composition of gaseous, liquid and solid bodies, the refraction and polarization of light, the cleavage, density and ductility of crystals, and especially of metals, were of such conclusive force as practically to exclude every hypothesis except the hypothesis of separate atoms as the foundation of all material constructions, yet this would not advance the theory of creation ex nihilo one step upon its path; for we would still be compelled, by the inexorable laws of thought, to conceive of atoms as particles—indivisible and indestructible and unchangeable indeed by man, but divisible and destructible and changeable by the power of God. And as we have no ascertained facts except as to the material universe, so far as it is known to us, which embraces only the heavenly bodies, the earth and its atmosphere, it is entirely possible and credible that God may have constructed all these by giving to normal and eternal matter atomic forms or bases, selected by His wisdom and moulded by His power; and thus, so far from proving, or tending to prove, creation ex nihilo, the atomic theory (in the only form in which it is admissible by reason, i.e., postulating atoms material and by infinite power divisible) negatives any such creation.

3. The form of the argument is inseparable from its substance, and its substance implicitly admits that atoms are created
out of pre-existing material; for it assumes that these atoms are "manufactured articles." Now, manufactured articles are such as are made by hand, or made by machinery, under intelligent supervision, but always made out of pre-existing material. In no scriptural sense—in no rational sense—can anything—any new being—be said to be "manufactured" if it be made out of nothing. The ideas involved are contradictory to each other. Manufacture never relates to any operation except that of moulding, forming, framing, uniting, compounding, harmonizing pre-existing material. Thus Principal Dawson's argument destroys itself.

We have now presented and considered at large the argument for the eternity of matter, deducible from its essence. We have shown that, as mind is inscrutable and transcendental, so is matter; as mind is monadic and one, so is matter; as mind is, according to our highest conceptions, the creator of law—the expression of intelligence and the source of motion, which is the parent of all force—so matter is fitted by its essence to be the usurae—the subject on which force shall for ever work, according to intelligent law. Mind working on matter is Eternal Being.

Next, we argue the eternity of matter from its universal diffusion in time and space.

Time and space are not mind and not matter, and not these in union. Therefore they are not creatures—not beings or entities. Since Kant demonstrated that they are merely "forms of intuition," moulds and shapes into which our intuitions are necessarily thrown, but yet without actual existence, the philosophic world has been content to take his demonstrated theorems concerning them.¹

But whether objectively real or not, it is certain that time and space are indispensable conditions of thought to us finite

¹ Prof. Tyndall's Belfast Address, p. 81.
beings. We cannot conceive of events without having the idea of time to emerge; we cannot conceive of any material thing without positing it somewhere in space. And as we are in this work dealing with time and space in their common sense relations, we may dismiss ideal and metaphysical difficulties about them.

The only notion that man can form of eternity is that of time without beginning and without end. Some philosophers tell us that time has no relation to eternity; that time once had a beginning and will have an end. But such is not the teaching either of revelation or reason. The inspired Scriptures tell us that if the people of Israel had walked in God's ways "their time should have endured for ever;" and speak of the eternal counsel of God to save His people as "from ancient time;" and of the eternal Redeemer as one who declares "I have not spoken in secret from the beginning; from the time that it was there, am I;" and of the everlasting attention and answer to prayer, which God gives to His people, as His purpose to hear

1 Thus Dr. John Young says: "Creation is the beginning of space, introducing an order of existences to which, for the first time, the relations of magnitude and number were possible. It is (also) the beginning of time, introducing an order of existences whose duration was limitable and measurable."—"The Mystery; or, God and Evil," pp. 49-50. But Victor Cousin, expanding the germs of thought furnished by Reid, Biran and Royer-Collard, has demonstrated, with a power approaching the mathematical, that our ideas of time and of space are necessarily ideas of the infinite, and that we cannot possibly construe in thought time as beginning or ending, or space as limited. Herein he shows the errors of Locke, who, deriving all ideas from sensation and reflection, confounded space with body, and time with succession of ideas, whereas, in truth, space is the mental idea or condition without filling which body cannot be conceived, and time exists and passes on when we have no succession of ideas, as in profound sleep without dreams.—Cousin's "History of Modern Philosophy," Wight's Edit., 1854, pp. 209-231.

2 Psalms lxxxi. 16.

3 Isaiah xlv. 21; xlviii. 10.
them “at all times.”¹ And the sublime passage in the Apocalypse, sometimes relied on to prove that time will end, proves nothing of the kind, but rather the reverse.²

Therefore the best idea we can form of the relation between time and eternity is that time is that of which eternity is made; time is so much of eternity as we measure by succession of events; eternity is time without beginning or end. The verse of the hymn sung by little children, and adapted to the mind of infancy, is equally fitted to convey the highest thought of a Plato, a Descartes, a Locke, or a Newton:

“And the little moments,
Fleeting though they be,
Make the endless ages
Of eternity!

Now, it is impossible for us to measure, by any successions of time with which we can deal, the duration of matter. The theological dogma that not only man, but all the material universe, began to be only about six thousand years ago, though held for truth by many throughout Christendom, within less than two hundred years past has faded nearly out of existence before the revelations of geology and of an improved exegesis of the Word of God. As to the race of man, the learned labors of James C. Southall, and of those who think with him, have thus far maintained unhurt the chronologic systems founded on the best lights at present attainable concerning the Mosaic record. There are no testimonies and no facts which require us to assign

¹ 1 Kings viii. 59; Psalms lxii. 8.
² Our authorized English version, which represents the mighty angel, who stood on the sea and earth, as lifting up his hand to heaven and swearing “that there should be time no longer,” is undoubtedly an inaccurate translation. The words ἡτὶ χρονὸς ὧν ἔσται ἤτι are grammatically connected with the next verse, so that the idea really expressed is “that the time shall not be yet, but in the days of the voice of the seventh angel, when he shall begin to sound, the mystery of God shall be finished.”—Revelation x. 6. 7.
to the human race on the earth a duration of more than some six or eight thousand years.¹ The Indian and Chinese legends, which purport to tell of dynasties and man's doings hundreds of thousands of years ago, are the flimsiest of fables.

But the formula of the Westminster Catechism, that "God made all things of nothing, by the word of His power, in the space of six days," has long since been abandoned by nearly all thoughtful students, whether in Europe or America, as not in accordance with ascertained facts, or with a proper interpretation of Holy Writ. A very few eminent men, of peculiar and eccentric tenacity of opinion, have indeed refused to relinquish the old exegesis. Dr. Robert J. Breckinridge taught, and continued to teach even to his death, that the Scriptures mean continually to assert, in the most absolute sense, "the making of all things out of nothing, by God, in the space of six days."² And Prof. Robert L. Dabney teaches the same doctrine, and has lately sanctioned the publication of a work in which he seeks to maintain it by reason and Scripture, used with learning and force.³ This able Professor admits, however, that his views are not generally held by living theologians, and is even

¹ Dr. Southall has permanently established his reputation as a judicious, laborious and scientific observer by his works, "The Recent Origin of Man," and "The Epoch of the Mammoth." In view of the facts and arguments set forth in those works, the counter-view of Dr. Draper, "Conflict," &c., pp. 196–200, seems weak indeed.

² The "Knowledge of God, Objectively Considered," Edit. 1858, pp. 332, 333.

³ "Syllabus and Notes in Theology," 1878, pp. 252–255, and Appendix, pp. 266–263. Dr. Dabney's argument, founded on "traits of naturalness" to be expected in perfectly new creatures, just from the creative hand of God, is not satisfactory. It is not easy to believe that a tree just created, though it may have been of full size, had in it the successive rings and layers which are only deposited by each year of natural growth. No man can assert such a fact from experience, and the Bible does not teach it. His argument against geologic ages, founded on the rules of circumstantial evidence in courts of justice, is even less satisfactory, (p. 260)
impelled to advise his students, if they cannot adopt his teachings, to urge upon their constituted ecclesiastical superiors to strike out or change the formula to which we have referred! But surely such a course would be neither necessary nor wise. This formula is a mere excrescence upon the stately tree of the Augustinian and Calvinistic systems of belief. It never made its appearance on the tree until St. Paul had been dead more than fifteen hundred years, St. Augustine more than twelve hundred years, and John Calvin more than eighty years. That it has originated in some abnormal and, perhaps, morbid action within or without the tree, and that it is not essential to its life, is shown by the fact that no such formula exists in the creeds of the Congregational, or Baptist, or Anglican or other Episcopal church; and yet all these have Augustinian and Calvinistic creeds, and live and grow. But, as the excrescence does not hurt the life of the tree, it would be unwise to attempt to cut it out, because unskilful cutting might harm the tree.

No judge ever informs a jury that they may test a suggested hypothesis "even by their imaginations." It requires a reasonable hypothesis to overthrow circumstantial evidence with which it conflicts. Therefore, if we admit that the testimony of azoic, palaeozoic, mesozoic and Cainozoic rocks, of strata, of alluvial formations, of fossil remains of extinct living species, to geologic ages, is all merely circumstantial, yet the circumstances exclude all other reasonable hypothesis, and the alleged testimony of the Mosaic record (which he says is the direct testimony of a credible witness, and, therefore, if really conflicting, is sufficient to overthrow the conclusion from circumstances,) turns out, in the opinion of such judges as Pye Smith, Chalmers, Hitchcock, Hodge, Hugh Miller and Tayler Lewis, not to conflict at all with the circumstantial evidence!

1 Dr. Schaff’s great work will enable the student to verify these statements with little labor. How hard it is to abandon old interpretations appears in a very instructive and interesting work, by Samuel B. Schieffelin, "The Foundations of History: a Series of First Things," Fourth Edit., N. Y., 1865 Here, on page 20, we have a dogmatic statement of the doctrine that God created the heavens and the earth in six days—"not indefinite eras or periods of time, but evenings and mornings—days." And a remark, somewhat apologetic, follows as to the "wise reasons" why
Upon the granted fact that the inspired Scriptures of the Old and New Testaments come from God, we might reasonably expect that the \textit{Word} of God would be, as studied by man, subject to the same difficulties and conditions as are the \textit{works} of God. And this is so; for though we soon learn enough of nature and her laws to live and fill our rôle as human beings, yet Sir Isaac Newton's illustration is still true: We are but children walking on the shores of the great ocean, picking up shells and pebbles. But we learn more and more of the \textit{works} of God in each succeeding age, provided we study them with humility and reverence. And precisely the same is true as to the \textit{Word} of God. On its very surface we find enough to save our souls; but within are depths of meaning which have never been sounded by the most diligent and devout of students. There is a passage of five short verses in the eighth chapter of Romans over which the learned in Paul's age, and in every age since his death, have studied and prayed in vain.\textsuperscript{1} We do not know its true interpretation to this day. And the Apocalypse—in many respects the most soul-inspiring book of the sacred canon—is, as to the true meaning of by far the larger part of its contents, a sealed book to this day. We are but in the outer court, the vestibule of the \textit{Word} of God. As we learn the meaning of the \textit{works}, gradually, slowly, and by patient and humble labor, in like manner we learn the meaning of the \textit{Word}. It is simple and easy on the subject of salvation—faith in Christ, the God-man, is the simplest of all acts of trust; but on such subjects as the being of God or of matter, creation, fixed fate, free will, foreknowledge, decrees from eternity, we might

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\textsuperscript{1} Romans viii. 19-23. The single word \textit{πρωτός}, in this passage, has had some thousands of pages written on it. Peter was not wrong in his statements, 2 Peter iii. 15, 16.
a priori and prima facie expect difficulty. No spirit can be more unfavorable to all prospect of studying savingly the Word of God than the spirit of dogmatism. The only difference between the dogmatist in the days of Galileo and the dogmatist of the present day, is that the civil government in the days of Urban VIII. was ready to help the dogmatist of the Roman Catholic Church to apply dungeon, rack and faggot to the astronomer for announcing scientific truth, and in the present day, governments have become too wise for such things, and to the dogmatist nothing is left except the weapons of church or social ostracism.\textsuperscript{1} And these are still used, until science makes her demonstrations so perfect as to convert the dogmatists themselves. Then, indeed, the Word is studied with new light and new industry, and its true interpretation is never found to conflict with ascertained fact.

The illustrious Buffon, in his "Natural History," advanced certain views concerning the formation and modification of mountains and valleys by the action of water, which were substantially true. But the "Faculty of Theology," in Paris, considering these views in conflict with their interpretation of Genesis, embodied them in fourteen propositions, and required him to renounce them. And Buffon did so; and in his next publication formally recanted, and declared his adherence to the ordinary interpretation of Genesis, both as to order of time and matter of fact.\textsuperscript{2} This was in 1749; and somewhat later, and in free and tolerant Britain, Dr. James Hutton, of Edinburgh, studied the conflicting action of fire and water on stratified rocks, until he came to the conclusion that immeasurable periods of time must have been required for the phenomena he observed. He took his favorite pupils, Professor Playfair and Sir James Hall, out to the cliffs near St. Abb's Head,

\textsuperscript{1} Rev. Dr. Wm. B. Carpenter's "Mental Physiology," pp. 698–699.
\textsuperscript{2} Art. Geology, New Amer. Cyclop., Vol. VIII., p. 150.
where the schists of the Lammermuir are undermined by the sea, and there pointed out the witnesses to enormous intervals and successive epochs of time, until, in the words of one of the awed listeners, "the mind grew giddy by looking so far into the abyss of time," and they realized "how much farther reason may sometimes go than imagination can venture to follow." Hutton was thus one of the pioneers of geology, and shadowed out truths which have since been fully established. But when he uttered the sentiment, "In the economy of the world, I can find no traces of a beginning, no prospect of an end," he was incautious and premature. Such an opinion, concerning the matter of which the world was made, would not have been unsound either in revelation or reason; but the form in which he announced it shocked the religious sense of the day, and for a season rolled back the wave of geologic investigation.1 When it resumed its movement, it was with increased strength and volume, gathered from past experience, and the result has been the permanent establishment of unmeasured geologic ages, and new interpretations of the Mosaic record.2

2 Mers. Pye Smith, Chalmers, Hitchcock and Hodge bring in geologic ages between the first and second verses of the first chapter of Genesis. Hugh Miller and Tayler Lewis, with many followers, teach that the six days were six successive geologic ages. And there is much ground for this theory; for the Hebrew word yom, translated day, in Genesis i., often means a long period of time. It is the same word which is used in Genesis ii. 17: "In the day thou eatest thereof thou shalt surely die." Now, as Adam, after eating the forbidden fruit, lived nine hundred and thirty years, either the Divine threat was not fulfilled (an irreverent and inadmissible alternative), or the day meant a long period. And if a day might be nine hundred years, why not nine millions? Moreover, as it was impossible that Moses could have had personal knowledge of the facts of creation, and as written records, unless inspired, could not be trusted, we naturally adopt the theory that the successive stages of creation were presented to his mind in tableaux, or visions, which he has concentrated in the narrative form.
The evidences of enormous tracts of time, furnished by the aqueous and igneous strata of rock formations, the stalactite accretions, and the fossils of extinct generations of creatures once living, are so cumulative in their power that a fair mind, when brought to contemplate these evidences, cannot resist the conviction that millions of years will not suffice to measure the age of the earth we inhabit. The writer of this work explored, some years ago, a celebrated cave in Virginia, under the guidance of a man who had been familiar with the cave from his childhood. This guide was intelligent, and possessed of strong common sense; not well educated by means of books, but of sound intuitions and judgment. He was a Christian by profession and practice, and was in the constant habit of reading the Word of God. He had never read any book on geology. After some time spent in the cave, the writer expressed the impressions made on him by the stalactites. The guide pointed out one pendant from a ledge of stone, and less than half an inch long, and remarked that he had watched that spot often, and knew that more than thirty years had passed in giving to this stalactite any appreciable growth. Then, passing into another room, the guide pointed out enormous columns of stalactite and stalagmite growth of solid stone—all wrought by drippings of water—stretching from the lofty roof of the cave to the floor; and, in answer to a question, said, very earnestly, "I have not a doubt that the earth is millions of years old." This was the conclusion of plain common sense from phenomena which had been closely and almost daily watched for many years.

There may have been, in the lapse of ages, many circumstances tending to retard or to hasten the growth of stalactite forms or aqueous strata, or even of the igneous rocks; but when all these irregularities are admitted, we are still compelled to estimate the age of our solid earth by years beyond the stretch of imagination. Sober students have estimated the time from
the beginning of the Palæozoic period to the present at fifty-one millions two hundred and eighty thousand years. But this is a mere passing moment when compared with the periods to be ascribed to that formative time when the normal æther was whirling in circular motion, and gradually and slowly, according to fixed law and under the action of forces put forth by the Almighty, was passing through those changes which have brought an essence millions of times lighter than hydrogen to the condition of the solid rocks and metals of our planet. The mind sinks under the attempt to conceive of such periods of duration, and finds no relief except in taking refuge in the eternity of matter.

If the notion of time lead us to this conclusion, that of space is equally persuasive. What limits shall be put upon the diffusion and existence of matter in space? Our earth is large; her circumference of twenty-four thousand miles requires many weary days for the ship that circumnavigates her; and if that ship could stretch across the expanse of air and æther that separates us from our satellite, ten times as many weary days would be required to navigate the two hundred and forty thousand miles. But our sun is ninety-one and a half millions of miles from us; so that if a railroad train could by possibility make the transit, and had started from the sun seventy years before the opening of the American Revolutionary war, and just about the time of the birth of Samuel Johnson, in the reign of Queen Anne, and had travelled directly towards our earth, night and day, without stopping a moment, and at the highest rate of express speed—sixty miles an hour—it would be just at this time drawing near to the earth—probably within her atmospheric envelope. But the planet Uranus is eighteen hundred millions of miles from the sun. Therefore, if such a

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2 Dr. J. L. Comstock's "Philosophy Revised," p. 382.
train, thus travelling, had left the sun for Uranus about the

time when Moses in Egypt was twenty-five years old, that is,
1546 B.C., it would be now just arrived at that planet. The
distance of the last discovered planet, Neptune, from the sun
has not yet been accurately ascertained, but assuming it to be
the least distance which reliable astronomic calculation has made-
it—twenty-eight hundred and sixty-two millions of miles\(^1\)—
then a railroad train, travelling as before stated, and starting
from the sun when Adam was in the prime of his life, would
barely have reached Neptune at this time.

Inconceivably great as are these planetary distances (all of
which are occupied by aetherial matter and intervening planets,
moons and planetoids), yet they shrink into less than a milli-
metre when compared with the distances between our earth and
the fixed stars. To measure these depths of space, astronomers
have no methods more reliable than those used for ascertaining
distances on our planet. When an engineer finds it necessary
to know the distance between himself and an inaccessible point
in his sight, he first establishes a base line of known length,
and then, by taking the angles made at each end of this base
line by lines intersecting in the point, he works out the result.
And the longer the base the more perfect will be the solu-
tion. And thus astronomers have proceeded; their base line is
the whole diameter of the earth's orbit, which is not less than
one hundred and eighty-three millions of miles—long enough,
it might be supposed, for any purpose of mensuration. And
yet so enormous are the distances of the nearest fixed stars, that
only some nine or ten, when observed carefully from opposite
points of the earth's orbit, have presented any appreciable
difference of angle; in other words, all the fixed stars, save
these nine or ten, are so infinitely distant from the earth that,
as to them, the whole diameter of her orbit—183,000,000 of

miles—ceases to be a \textit{line} (length without breadth), and dwindles to a \textit{point} which has no dimensions. And of \textit{those nine or ten}, the distance of only one has been ascertained with reasonable accuracy. This is the star \textit{Alpha Centauri}, in the constellation of the Centaur, in the southern hemisphere. Its distance from the earth is two hundred and ten thousand times that of the sun—that is, more than nineteen millions of millions of miles! The magnificent star \textit{Sirius} is five times as far from us as Alpha Centauri, and is supposed to be receding from the earth at the rate of twenty miles per second; so that, within the lifetime of some living men, this "king of suns" may increase his distance from us by forty-four millions of millions of miles, (more than twice the distance that Alpha Centauri is from us); and yet such is his mass of matter, and such the mighty energy of the forces under which heat and light are generated within him, that his brightness seems, to the naked eye, hardly diminished.

Under these immeasurable distances in space, all occupied by matter, we can do nothing to satisfy the mind that any limit can reasonably be predicated of the material universe; for, if we could stand on Sirius, doubtless beyond us would be an immeasurable ether and more distant suns. We are ready to see and believe in the vision of the German poet Richter, which De Quincey has so well rendered in English:

"And from all the listening stars that shone around issued a choral voice: 'The man speaketh truly; end there is none, that ever yet we heard of.' 'End is there none?' the angel solemnly demanded; 'is there indeed no end? And is this the sorrow

\footnote{Proctor's "Expanse of Heaven," London Edit., 1873, pp. 185, 242.}
\footnote{Ibid., pp. 248, 284-285. The opinion or conjecture as to the receding of Sirius from the earth is founded, not on angles and known base, but on observations upon the spectrum of this star, made by Dr. Huggins, a skilful spectroscopist.}
that fills you?' But no voice answered, that he might answer himself. Then the angel threw up his glorious hands to the heaven of heavens, saying: 'End there is none to the universe of God. Lo! also, there is no beginning!'\(^1\)

Finally, we argue the eternity of matter from all those very numerous passages of holy Scripture which represent God as producing His works of creation by processes, infinite indeed, and yet analogous to those employed by man in bringing new phenomena and forms out of existing material.

Thus we read in the inspired books that God made the firmament, made two great lights, made the stars, made the beasts of the earth after their kind, made man, made woman, made the heavens, made darkness pavilions round about Him, made the sea, made everything beautiful in His time, made Tophet.\(^2\)

Also, we read that He formed man of the dust of the earth, that out of the ground He formed every beast of the field and every fowl of the air, that His hand hath formed the crooked serpent, that He formed the earth and the world, that He formed the eye, that His hands formed the dry land, that He formed all things.\(^3\)

Also, we read that His hands have fashioned us, that our members in continuance were fashioned by Him, that He fashioneth alike the hearts of all the inhabitants of the earth, that our clay has been fashioned by Him, that our vile body

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1 The astronomer Proctor evidently considers this vision of Richter as at least the shadow of scientific truth, for he quoted it in one of his lectures in New York, and has again introduced it in closing his eloquent essays on "The Expanse of Heaven," pp. 303-305.

2 Genesis i. 7, 16, 25, 31; ii. 2, 4, 22; v. 1; 2 Samuel xxii. 12: 1 Chron. xvi. 16; Job x. 8; xxxiii. 4; Psalm xciv. 5; c. 3; cxxxvi. 5; Prov. xvi. 4; Ecclesiastes iii. 11; Isaiah xxx. 3; Exod. xx. 11; xxxi. 17; Psalm cxlvii. 6; Isaiah xlv. 18; Jeremiah x. 12.

3 Genesis ii. 7, 19; Job xxvi. 18; Psalm xc. 2; xciv. 9; xciv. 5; Proverbs xxvi. 10.
shall be changed by Christ that it may be *fashioned* like unto His glorious body.¹

Also, we read that He knoweth our *frame*, He remembereth that we are dust; that we are the thing *framed* which ought not to say of Him that framed it, He had no understanding; that the worlds were *framed* by the word of God.²

Also, we read that of the rib of man the Lord *built* a woman;³ and that Jehovah *built* His sanctuary like high palaces, like the earth which He hath established for ever; and that it is He that *buildeth* His stories in the heaven; and that if our earthly house of this tabernacle were dissolved, we have a *building* of God, an house not made with hands, eternal in the heavens; and that the *building* of the wall of the city of God was of jasper, and the city was pure gold.⁴

And when, in connection with these statements, we consider the fact that the holy Scriptures never declare that God created any of His creations *out of* nothing, and that the word "create" is frequently applied to cases in which it is certain that it cannot mean to produce out of nothing, as in the case of man and of woman, and of other creatures and works;⁵ we have a right to conclude that the inspired Word intended to represent God as producing His creations *out of* pre-existing material, for otherwise the words *make, form, fashion, frame, build, found,* could only mislead us.

The effort to escape the force of these scriptures by represen
ting that they speak of God *anthropomorphically*, that is, by attributing to Him the manner and conduct of man, and

¹ Job x. 8; Psalm cxix. 73; cxxxix. 16; Isaiah xlvi. 9; Philippians iii. 21.
² Psalm ciii. 14; Isaiah xxix. 16; Hebrews xi. 3.
³ This is the proper rendering of the Hebrew, Genesis ii. 22.
⁴ Psalms lxxviii. 69; Amos ix. 6; 2 Cor. v. 1; Revelation xxi. 18.
⁵ Genesis i. 21, 27; v. 1, 2; Isaiah xliii. 1, 7; xlvi. 7; liv. 16; Malachi ii. 10.
that, therefore, they do not represent Him *truly*, but only by way of accommodation to man’s ideas, is an inadmissible and dangerous effort, which, if pushed to its logical results, is certain to recoil on the heads of its patrons. For the very fact that man was created in the image of God establishes the likeness of his mental and moral intuitions to corresponding attributes of God.\(^1\) If we deny this, we are for ever cut off from all means of knowing or believing in God, as nothing in our nature will furnish any ground from which we may truly view Him. And, moreover, if the Scripture gives only an *anthropomorphic* view of God in attributing to Him acts of making, forming, fashioning, building, why not the same view in attributing to Him the act of creating. Man is constantly said to “create,” but never out of nothing.

Thus we are driven to the conclusion, that all these words must be interpreted in their plain and natural sense, as man understands them; for the inspired Word was given to man. Hence the true doctrine of Scripture is that God creates out of pre-existing material.

And, at this point, it is proper that we answer the objection to our view, urged by those who insist that to represent God as working in creation only as an artificer, or architect, or *εντυμωρφήγος*: or artisan, or builder, or smith, is to take a view unworthy of His character and perfections, and, therefore, untrue and inadmissible.\(^2\)

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\(^1\) The reasoning by which our right is shown to approach God in the "*anthropomorphic sense,*" that is, as possessing all of man’s mental and moral excellencies, carried to perfection and infinity, is unanswerable. See Dr. Hodge’s "*Systematic Theology,*" Vol. I., pp. 339–346. On page 348, this able reasoner says: "The only alternative is anthropomorphism (in this sense) or atheism." See, also, Dr. R. L. Dabney’s "*Syllabus and Notes.*" Dr. Wm. B. Carpenter’s cautions against "the extreme" of anthropomorphism are founded, not on the system itself, but its abuse.—"*Mental Physiology,*" Amer. Edit., 1877, pp. 701–702.

\(^2\) This objection is urged by Dr. Thornwell, *Collected Works,* Vol. I.,
GOD AN ARTISAN.

It is difficult to understand how the devout and enlightened men who urge this objection can reconcile it with any serious and reverent view of the Word of God. For it is certain that, as to the noblest creation of God, we are taught by inspiration that He was only a builder, an artificer, a workman—not a creator out of nothing. He was, indeed, an infinitely wise and powerful artificer, but still only an artificer. He “formed” the body of Adam out of the dust of the earth, and He builded the body of Eve out of a rib taken from Adam’s side. But so far from feeling that this unquestionable fact is degrading to our idea of God, it elevates our thought of Him to its highest point. God was an artificer, but His work was God-like. What artisan less than God could have made that marvellous and beautiful mechanism and union of material, on which spiritual, vital, chemical and mechanical forces play by turns—the human body? When we think of the blood, the flesh, the brain, the lungs, the heart, the nerves, the muscles, the sinews, the eye, the ear, the reproductive organs, we are lost in admiration, and ready to adore the Divine Artisan who has moulded, framed and wrought out this chef d’oeuvre. And the fact that it has been made “of dust,” rather than “of nothing,” increases instead of diminishing our adoration of the Maker.

But a farther answer presents itself to this objection. Let us look on two sketches or pictures of God and creation—the one offered by the advocates of creation ex nihilo, the other by the advocates of creation out of eternal matter. In the first we see God existing, but inactive, dormant, latent for eternal ages, and then, suddenly, and (so far as our highest reasoning can see) without motive, creating out of nothing a universe of material and moral beings. The material universe is subject to storms, whirlwinds, tornadoes, earthquakes, horrible and pp. 206, 207; and by Dr. Dabney, “Syllabus and Notes in Theology.” p. 250.
loathsome diseases, pain, agony, death; the moral creatures fall into sin, and grow worse and worse, until (in the language of one of the advocates of creation ex nihilo) we have in the picture "the scenes of sin and woe which darken humanity—the remorse of the villain's privacy, the orgies of crime and cruelty hidden beneath the veil of night, the despairing death-beds, the horrors of battle fields, the wails of nations growing pale before the pestilence, the din of burning and ravaged cities, and all the world of eternal despair itself." Such is the most attractive picture that can be presented on the one side. On the other, we have God—the Divine Spirit—infinite, eternal and unchangeable in power, wisdom and goodness, never inert or inactive—ever working on His potestas—eternal matter—bringing out of it the best and happiest results possible. An Architect indeed, but an Architect, not of pyramids and palaces, but of worlds; a Geometrician indeed, but dealing, not with earthly fields and angles, but with the spaces of heaven; compelling enormous planets—Jupiter, Saturn, Uranus, Neptune—to move in ellipses, cast by His wisdom; compelling the bee to adopt His hexagons, the spider His chords of circles; compelling even the inanimate diamond and garnet to crystallize into regular octahedrons and four-sided pyramids, base to base; an Artisan indeed, but one who manufactures, not watches or chronometers, but men; who takes a heap of dust and works it into bone, flesh, blood, brain, lungs, heart, muscles, nerves, sinews, eye, ear, limbs, hands, feet, and, when this Godlike work is completed, breathes into it the breath of life, and makes a living soul; a Founder and Smith indeed, but one whose everlasting furnaces glow with the divine energy of motion, so inconceivably intense that heat is generated in Sirius and Arcturus, and our sun, which dissolves into incandescent vapor iron and calcium, nickel, copper, cobalt, manganese, zinc and potassium—decomposes the elements themselves—diffuses them,
not only into hydrogen; but into normal ether, and which rushes forth from solar interiors with an uproar and turmoil like the rending of worlds, and causes flames to dart from solar surfaces to a height of sixteen thousand miles. And yet this Divine Architect, Geometrician, Artisan, Founder and Workman is, all the time, a Father, so tender and loving that all His children in heaven and on earth may look up to Him for comfort and protection. The question which of these two pictures presents the worthier idea of God may be safely left to unprejudiced common sense.

Thus have been reviewed the arguments tending to prove the eternity of matter and the objections urged against it. When considered in connection with the unanswerable objections that arise against the doctrine of creation ex nihilo, we hold that it is scriptural and reasonable to believe that Eternal Spirit is immanent in and works on eternal matter.

It now remains for us to show what this doctrine of dualism is, and what it is not.

And, first, we say it is consistent with the highest view that can be taken of God by the most devout and orthodox interpreters of what reason and revelation teach concerning Him. Dr. Archibald Alexander, formerly of the Princeton Theological Seminary, in New Jersey, will not be suspected of heterodoxy, yet he has spoken of this system as follows:

"Matter being divisible, inert and extended, cannot have intelligence as an attribute, which is active, indivisible and unextended. Extension and thought, therefore, cannot be properties of the same substance. If, then, the cause of the

1 Prof. Dabney's suggestion, that if God be viewed as "only an able artificer, He is no longer an object of religious trust and perfect confidence," ("Syllabus and Notes," p. 250), is strangely wanting in his usual logical exactness. He admits the propriety of anthropomorphic views of God, (pp. 294, 295). On this basis he can hardly deny that a good workman may be a most tender and affectionate father.
phenomena of nature, which indicate design, is in the world itself, the world must, besides the gross matter which we see and feel, be possessed of a soul or spiritual substance in which this intelligence resides. This would bring us to the old pagan theory of the soul of the world. Under the material part, but under this only, there is a spiritual substance, a soul; just as in a man, we can see and feel the body, but we know that within this case there exists a spiritual substance, or soul. This theory, then, admits the existence of a great spirit, possessing the attributes necessary to account for all the appearances of wisdom in the world. It differs from the common theistical doctrine only in this, that it would confine this being to the world; but for this there could be assigned no valid reason. A being possessing such power over matter as to mould it into every organized form found in animals, vegetables and minerals must have a complete control over matter, and be perfectly acquainted with all its most hidden properties and capabilities; and must be independent of matter, and must exist everywhere, to carry on the processes of nature. And as we do not know the extent of the material universe, we can set no limits to the presence of this spiritual, intelligent and omnipotent being."

It would not be easy to give, in lucid and succinct form, a more accurate statement of the true idea of dualism than is here given by the venerable Princeton professor. He truly states that no valid reason can be assigned for confining the intelligent spirit to the world (as some of the ancient stoics did), and that in no other respect does it differ from the common theistical doctrine. Now as, in this work, no limitation of the intelligent spirit to this world is suggested, but, on the contrary, He is held to pervade all space, and to be immanent in all matter occupying space, it follows that, in the view of a great

master in orthodox divinity, the system herein taught differs not from the "common theistical doctrine."

But if it be urged that Dr. Alexander, in this part of his treatise, was dealing only with the proofs which reason furnishes for the being of God, then we advance another step, and say that the system herein upheld is consistent with all the teachings of revealed truth concerning God. For we have already shown that the inspired Scriptures nowhere teach creation ex nihilo, and that this does not arise from any difficulty in expressing, in Hebrew or Greek, the notion of bringing something out of nothing. The idea or notion itself is absent in the Word of God. And we have shown that God is constantly represented in the Scriptures as holding to the universe the relation of maker, builder, former, framer, fashioner; and that, though He is likewise called Creator, yet that word, in its origin, is used in the human sense of cutting, forming, shaping, moulding. Therefore, by inevitable implication, the Scriptures teach the doctrine of the eternity of matter.

And if it be asked why there are there no explicit declarations in the Bible to that effect, we answer: The Scriptures nowhere undertake to demonstrate the eternal being of God any more than the eternal being of matter. The very first verse of the Bible assumes—takes for granted—the being of God. And although His being is often afterwards spoken of as a sublime truth known to man, as when He says to Moses, I AM THAT I AM; and as when Moses repeats this truth in his psalm, "Even from everlasting to everlasting Thou art God;" yet nowhere does God, in His revealed Word, condescend to demonstrate His own being. He remits man to the light of reason for the great truth of His own eternal being. And so He

\[1\] "For the invisible things of Him from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made, even His eternal power and Godhead; so that they are without excuse."—Romans i. 20.
remits man to the light of reason for the truth of the eternal being of His ὑποθέτοις—matter.

Next, we say that the system herein held is consistent with the highest ideas we can form of the personality of God. Indeed, this system postulates the personality of God, and cannot, in its integrity, exist without it. For if a person be a being who exercises intelligence and will—who first contrives wisely, then exercises choice among the modes of accomplishing his intelligent contrivances—then assuredly God is a Person.¹ And though God may not have passions and affections like man, yet the Scriptures everywhere ascribe to Him a nature which finds its best expression in such words as love, compassion, patience, long-suffering, mercy, pity; and all these men have no difficulty in understanding.² And so the system we uphold recognizes and glories in the Personality, the fatherhood of God.

Next, we humbly claim that the system herein presented furnishes the soundest method that can be adopted by man, under his present limitations, for explaining to the questionings of his own soul the awful and torturing enquiries which arise

¹ This is Dr. Alexander's view of personality, and none better has ever been presented.—"Outlines of Moral Science," pp. 216, 216.

² Perhaps in no point is the doctrine of the "Unknown Infinite," whether as taught in Germany, Scotland, England or America, more objectionable than in holding that positive contradictoriness of thought is involved in attempting to believe both the infinity and the personality of God. Yet Dean Mansel holds this notion, and reasons it out to his own satisfaction.—"Limits of Religious Thought," Amer. Edit., 1870, pp. 102-106. And though he afterwards says, "It is our duty to think of God as personal, and it is our duty to believe that He is infinite," (p. 106), yet the pious Dean, unfortunately for him and for those who accept his teachings, nowhere teaches us how we can do a duty the very discharge of which involves a breach of the fundamental law of our spiritual nature. Sir Wm. Hamilton's speculations do not justify the extremes to which Mansel pushes them. See Dr. Hodge's "Systematic Theology," Vol. I., pp. 356-364.
out of the existence of evil in the universe of God. Some religious teachers attempt to silence these questionings by telling us that such enquiries can never be answered, and ought not to be made. But all in vain are such admonitions. Men may cease to write of them, or to talk of them, but deep in the silent chambers of every human soul there is going on this question- ing—this yearning after an answer. To this subject we must recur when we come to speak of evil and sin.

We are now to show what the system herein upheld is not. And, first, be it observed that it is not Zoroastrism. It is not the doctrine of two eternal principles—the good and the evil, Ormuzd and Ahriman—contending with each other for the dominion of the universe.¹ The doctrine of God—the Spirit in whom is all power—immanent in and working upon eternal matter, in which no power is inherent, is removed as far as possible from this belief.

Next, the system herein upheld is not an attempt to revivify the ancient heresy known as Gnosticism, nor of any of its sub-sequent forms, such as Manichaeism or Paulicianism. Gnosti-
cism originated in a rationalistic, and therefore inadequate theory as to the mysterious hypostatic union between God and man in the second person of the Trinity. And though this system, with its progeny, held the tenet of all ancient philos-ophy as to the eternity of matter, yet they also gradually admitted the influx of abominations repugnant alike to reason and Scripture. Gnosticism, in all its forms, has, for many centuries, had no practical currency or effect in the world. This subject will require farther attention when we come to speak of the Son of God.

Next, this system is not Pantheism. For thousands of years the belief last mentioned has been held among men. It has

¹ Though Zoroaster did not teach the eternity of the evil principle, Ahriman, yet his system is generally represented as containing that notion.
some seductive adaptations to the human mind uninstructed by revelation. Man takes some pleasure in thinking himself a part of God, and that he shall be at last absorbed in God, who is τὸ πάν — the all. The people of India have for many centuries held a religious belief that differs in no essential feature from Pantheism.1 It has often been asserted that the philosophical sect known as "stoics," in ancient Greece and Rome, taught Pantheism as their religious belief; but this assertion is unfounded.2 It is based upon some incautious statements of the lesser lights among the stoics, who held the world to be God, because intelligence was everywhere manifested, not only in its structure, but in its providential government. But if a system of belief is to be judged by isolated vagaries, from time to time indulged in by its weaker advocates, no system could stand. The great men among the stoics held no Pantheism, but believed in God, the Soul of the world—animus mundi—fashioning and governing it with divine wisdom.3

In modern times, however, and under the full light of Christianity, Pantheism has been a prevalent belief in Germany, and not entirely without favor in Great Britain and America. The learned Jew, Baruch Spinoza, by his works, entitled "Des Cartes Principia Philosophiae Ethica," "Tractatus Theologic-


2 It is asserted without qualification by Professors Conybeare and Howson, "Life and Epistles of St. Paul," Amer. Edit., 1869, pp. 317, 318. Dr. R. L. Dabney also asserts it in distinct terms. "Syllabus and Notes," p. 218. But Victor Cousin, with unanswerable learning and logic, vindicates the stoic philosophy from any such charge. He proves that its highest exponents, such as Cleanthes, Epictetus, Seneca, Marcus Aurelius, held a very noble and pure Theism, far above Pantheistic folly.—Cousin's "History of Modern Philosophy," Wight's Amer. Edit., 1864. Vol. I., pp. 485, 486.

Politicus," and "Opera Posthuma," has formulated this system into a nexus of propositions and demonstrations which hold out a serious pretence to the accuracy of exact science; and subsequent advocates have wrought in the same field.\textsuperscript{1} Spinoza, by his great attainments in philosophical learning, had gained general reputation, and his Hebrew brethren would have been willing to retain him in their communion, notwithstanding his opinions, if he had been willing to conform outwardly to their ceremonial.\textsuperscript{2} But his views were regarded as atheistic, and excited the odium of Jewish fanatics, one of whom attempted to assassinate him as he came out at night from the representation of a comedy. Thenceforth Spinoza withdrew from the synagogue, and the Jews proceeded formally to excommunicate him.\textsuperscript{3}

Pantheism, in its essentials, has not improved in moral beauty since it was thrown into systematic form by Spinoza.\textsuperscript{4} Its foundation principle is that there is but one real substance in the universe, thereby ignoring the intuitive evidence for two substances, mind and matter. The one substance of Pantheism is God. All spiritual, mental and material forces, all thought, will, feeling, all worlds and their contents, all creatures and all their actions, are but manifestations of the one substance—God. Hence it inevitably follows that God is the author of all physical evil, and of all sin, or moral evil; but Pantheists do not admit

\textsuperscript{1} The work of Jules Simon, on "Natural Religion," is commended as "spirited" by Professor Thornwell.—Collected Works, Vol. I., p. 210.

\textsuperscript{2} Bayle's words are: "Pourvu qu'il voilait accommoder son extérieur à leur cérémonial."—Dict. Hist. et Crit., Art. Spinoza, Tome III., p. 2633.


\textsuperscript{4} He died in 1677, and Pierre Bayle, writing barely twenty years later, characterizes his system as "la plus monstrueuse hypothèse qui se puisse imaginer—la plus absurde de cela plus diamétralement opposée aux notions les plus évidentes de notre esprit."—Dict. Hist. et Crit., Tome III., p. 2637.
the existence of evil as such. Holding all events to be but the unfoldings of the one substance—God—and that all follow each other in one inexorable scheme of cause and effect, they of course deny all free will, and consequently all moral responsibility and all sin. The results of their system are not overstated by Bayle in his great work, from which we give a free translation:

"But if it be, physically speaking, a prodigious absurdity, that a subject, simple and unique, should be modified at the same time by the thoughts of all men, it is an execrable abomination when considered in the light of moral truth. What then? The infinite Being, the necessary Being, the Being sovereignly perfect—shall He not be firm, constant and immutable? But how is He immutable when He is not for one moment the same? His thoughts will succeed each other without end and without cessation; the same medley of passions and of sentiments will never by twice seen. That is hard to digest, but here is something worse. This continual mobility will nevertheless preserve much of uniformity in this sense, that always for one good thought the Infinite Being will have a thousand thoughts silly, extravagant, impure, abominable. He will produce in Himself all the follies, all the dreams, all the filthy imaginations, all the iniquities of the human race; He will be of them, not only the efficient cause, but also the passive subject, the subjectum infusionis: He will be joined to them by an union the most intimate that can be conceived; for it is a penetrative union, or rather, it is a true identity, since the mode is not really distinct from the modified substance. Many great philosophers, not being able to comprehend how it can be compatible with the Being sovereignly perfect to suffer man to be so wicked and so miserable, have supposed the existence of two principles—the one good and the other bad; but here is a philosopher (meaning Spinoza) who finds it good that God
should Himself be the agent and the subject of all the crimes and all the miseries of man. Let men hate each other, let them assassinate each other at the corner of a wood, let them assemble in corps d'armées to kill each other, let the victors sometimes devour the vanquished; all this is comprehensible so long as we suppose that they are distinct, one from another, and that thine and mine produce in these men conflicting passions. But that men should be only modifications of the same being—there being, consequently, no one but God who really acts, and the same God who modifies Himself into a Turk being the one who modifies Himself into a Hungarian, and that there should be wars and battles—this it is that surpasses all the monsters, and all the chimerical vagaries of the silliest heads that have ever been shut up in small houses."

"Thus, in the system of Spinoza, all those who say that "the Germans have killed ten thousand Turks," speak unwisely and falsely, unless they are to be understood as saying "God modified into Germans has killed God modified into ten thousand Turks;" and thus all the phrases by which we express what men do against each other have no other true sense than this: God hates Himself, He asks pardon of Himself, and refuses pardon to Himself; He persecutes Himself, kills Himself, eats Himself, calumniates Himself, sends Himself to the scaffold. This would be less inconceivable if Spinoza had represented God as an assemblage of many distinct parts, but he has reduced Him to the most perfect simplicity, to unity of substance, to indivisibility. He puts forth, therefore, the most infamous and the most furious extravagances that can be conceived, and infinitely more ridiculous than those of the poets concerning the gods of paganism. I am astonished either that he should not have perceived these results, or that, having looked them in the face, he should have adhered obstinately to his principle notwithstanding. A bon esprit would have preferred to scratch the ground
with teeth and nails rather than to maintain a system (une hypothèse) as shocking and as absurd as this.”¹

After this exposée, it seems hardly necessary to repeat the assertion that the system of Dualism herein advocated is not Pantheism.

Neither is it that form of optimism known as Hylozoism. This scheme of belief derives its name from υλή, matter, and ζωή, life, and is now commonly understood to admit the distinction between mind and matter, but to hold that they are intimately and inseparably united, as the soul and body in man. God, according to this view, is the soul of the world—an intelligent power, everywhere present, to which are to be referred all the manifestations of design in the external world, and all the activity of the human soul. Hence this system is attributed to the ancient stoics; and in its better thoughts it may be justly credited to them; but when it is represented as admitting “no personal God, to whom we are responsible, no freedom of the will, no sin, and no conscious existence after death,” it is assuredly only a grotesque caricatura of the system held by Epictetus and Seneca.²

The most symmetrical presentation of Hylozoism, in modern times, is probably that given in “The Essay on Man,” by the English poet Pope. He is said to have borrowed it from Lord Bolingbroke, but with little reason, for the poet claimed it as his own, and Bolingbroke never gave countenance to any such suspicion.³

That the system taught in this fine poem is Hylozoism has been made abundantly manifest in the extract quoted in a

² Yet such are the representations of Dr. Hodge.—“Systematic Theology,” Vol. I., pp. 246, 246.
previous part of this work; and that it is also Optimism may be made equally apparent. The central thought of the poem is that "whatever is is right." And hence neither physical nor moral evil can be held to be really evils, for they are requisite in order to the prosperity and happiness of the whole.

"If the great end be human happiness,
Then nature deviates, and can man do less?
As much that end a constant course requires
Of showers and sunshine as of man's desires;
As much eternal springs and cloudless skies
As men for ever temperate, calm and wise.
If plagues or earthquakes break not heaven's design,
Why then a Borgia or a Catiline?
Who knows but He whose hand the lightning forms,
Who heaves old ocean, and who wings the storms,
Pours fierce ambition in a Caesar's mind,
Or turns young Ammon loose to scourge mankind?"

The meaning conveyed in these strong lines we humbly apprehend to be this: that earthquakes, thunder storms, tempests, and such like, are "deviations" from her ordinary course, practised by nature (under the wise government of the Soul of the universe) for the best purposes, to-wit: for increase of the sum total of happiness, and that sins and crimes of deepest dye, such as those practised by Catiline or Caesar Borgia, are, in like manner, merely "deviations" from the ordinary track of human conduct, and are, therefore, to be held equally conducive to the highest happiness of all. And the summary of this philosophy appears in these words:

"Cease then, nor order imperfection name;
Our proper bliss depends on what we blame.
Know thy own point; this kind, this due degree
Of blindness, weakness, heaven bestows on thee
Submit. In this or any other sphere,
Secure to be as bless'd as thou canst bear,

ETERNAL SPIRIT WORKING ON ETERNAL MATTER.

Safe in the hand of one disposing Power,
Or in the natal or the mortal hour.
All nature is but art, unknown to thee;
All chance direction which thou canst not see;
All discord harmony not understood;
All partial evil universal good.
And spite of pride, in erring reason's spite,
One truth is clear, Whatever is is right.”¹

It cannot be denied that there is much of exalted truth in these sentiments, and that, when properly guarded on the right hand and the left, they may avail to teach the noblest lessons. But the system of optimism really taught in the poem does not correspond with the patent facts of the universe. We are too deeply conscious of the terrible physical evils which afflict us without, and of the more terrible moral evils, whose seat is within us, to cherish earnestly or long the opinion that “whatever is is right.” And hence, Voltaire held the vantage-ground in the scathing and overwhelming attack on optimism made in his “Candide.”² In His works and His Word—by reason and revelation alike—God teaches us that many things are which are not right. And the system in this work set forth fully recognizes these teachings, and thus differs essentially from the hylozoism or optimism of Alexander Pope.

It may be hardly necessary, in concluding this chapter, to say that the system herein upheld is not the horrible hypothesis of Pessimism, to which some modern currency has been given by the German Arthur Schopenhauer and his followers. While we are compelled, by the great amount of evil and sin in the world, to deny that all is right, we are still more strongly com-

² “Candide on L’Optimisme, Romans de Voltaire,” Paris Edit., 1819, Tome I., pp. 181–300. Yet this same Voltaire said of Pope:

“Il porta le flambeau dans l’abîme de l’etre
Et l’homme après lui, apprit à se connaitre.”
DUALISM NOT PESSIMISM.

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pelled, by the innumerable proofs of Divine wisdom and goodness in the world, to deny that all is wrong. Yet Schopenhauer held that all human life is either pain or weariness, and Goethe and Jean Paul spoke highly of his talents and of the value of his works! ¹

¹ In 1854, his disciple Frauenstädt, though not adopting his most dismal views, published, in Berlin, "Briefe über die Schopenhauersche Philosophie," in which he claims that Schopenhauer ought to be ranked among the great philosophers.—Art. Schopenhauer, New Amer. Cyclop., Vol. XIV., p. 418. The only safe antidote for pessimism is Christian faith. The dreamy follies into which the philosophy of the "Absolute" in Germany betrayed its advocates caused the reaction of Schopenhauer. He was the declared enemy of that philosophy. Hence neither he nor his followers were invited to fill the German lectureships. It is said that Dr. Dühring, a privat-docent at Heidelberg, is the only public advocate of pessimism now in Germany. Yet Schopenhauer's views are gaining ground, and are read, not only by the learned, but by numbers of ordinary readers. His thoughts seem to have the same charm for some minds that is found in the gloomy misanthropy of Byron, or the bitter and mocking attitude of Voltaire towards what men prize as good. And Schopenhauer has the advantage of being able to give to his system an appearance of logical form and coherence which enables it to "stand up." He professes to explain what Kant found to be inscrutable; that is, the relation between the "phenomenal," (Erscheinung), and the real (das Ding an Sich), the thing in itself. Schopenhauer assumes that the Ding an Sich is the Ego itself. Whatever appears is an appearance of the Ego, the I myself. The world is my presentation, (Vorstellung, a word with no English equivalent at present.) The world is my will. The will makes an object, not only of the world, but of itself. Will implies the constant willing of something. The something willed is the world. The will to live and the world are identical. The will is "thing in itself"—the only real thing in existence. It is the unchanging and the constant, underlying the phenomenal and the fleeting. The birth and death of the individual are simply phenomenal changes of this will. The individual is born—the individual dies. The will, of which both birth and death are the expression, remains. Although our birth and death do not affect the will in itself, still we are ever in fear of death; not merely in fear of the pain of death, but of death itself. The present alone is really ours; but we are always looking back into the past, which is a dreamy nothing, and forward into the future, where we discern only the dim outlines of the form of death. The will is free, but its presentations of phenomena are
Having sought in the foregoing discussions to establish the doctrine of the eternity of matter, and to show that belief in this doctrine is consistent with reason and revelation, we now proceed to show its adaptations to the facts attending the creation of the material universe, of angels and of man, to the mysteries of evil and sin, and to the Divine work of redemption through the Son of God.

under a law of necessity. Hence Schopenhauer ridicules the idea of moral obligation—the "categorical imperative"—of Kant. The pessimist insists that it is a contradiction to speak of free will, and yet prescribe laws to it. His scornful refutation is in the words: "Must will—as well say wooden iron!" Thus he infers his pessimism: "A will for something implies the lack of something. Yet it is essential to man to will. This lack of something is the cause of pain. The whole world is in want—is willing—longing to have something. Is this want supplied? Never. So soon as the will for anything is supplied, the longing begins once more. To supply a want is to create a new want. Perfect supply of want is ennui and weariness." Therefore, says the pessimist, "Life is like a pendulum, swinging to and fro between want and ennui. If all our pains and wants were banished to hell, we should have nothing left for heaven but eternal weariness." So his doctrine is that "human life is but the alternation of pain and weariness."—"German Thought and Schopenhauer's Pessimism," Princeton Review, March, 1878, pp. 492–604.
CHAPTER VI.

THEORIES OF CREATION.

The facts and arguments presented in the previous chapters have, we assume, established as a reasonable belief the eternity of being as consisting in Eternal Spirit immanent in and working on eternal matter. We are now to consider how far such a system will explain the phenomena of the universe, and will throw light on the deep problems of physical and moral evil, and the remedies and compensations therefor set in movement by the benevolence of God in providence and redemption.

At this point it becomes proper to point out the distinct senses in which the words "necessity," "necessary," and their equivalents, may be applied by the finite to the Infinite. These words have been sparingly and cautiously used in this work, and never when any risk of misunderstanding appeared. They express the idea of what must be, what is inevitable, essential, indispensable, needful, unavoidable. In this sense they may be applied to the question of eternal being; for if any being at all exists now, the existence of eternal being is necessary. It is a conclusion of the mind of man perfectly inevitable. But in what essence or mode that eternal being exists is not a necessary conclusion of our minds. This is a question for the exercise of at least one step of that reasoning faculty with which all normal mind is endowed. That the Eternal Being is intelligent—in other words, is Spirit—is the conclusion to which mankind have been led with an approach to unanimity which manifests
the potency of the evidence. That eternal matter exists as the subject of the intelligent power of the Eternal Spirit is the natural conclusion of the human mind, and we have shown that this natural conclusion is, in no wise, disturbed by revealed truth.

All systems of atheism and materialism are compelled to resort to postulates of "necessity," or the "necessary," in order to build up their worlds of material and intelligent being. Hence Lucretius, in his great poem, uses the formula "necessum est" not less than twenty-one times between the opening of his system and the point at which he finds it "necessary" to admit that his atoms, in their downward fall, decline slightly from the perpendicular.¹ And every time he is driven to admit that any action of his atoms (other than downward motion) is "necessary," he commits scientific suicide, for thereby he admits the Nomian theory, the hypothesis of law, which, as we have seen, inevitably postulates an intelligent law-giver.

And all systems which found the Divine Nature upon myths and legends are driven to the notion of some paramount fate or necessity—a mysterious power above all their gods—and supplying, by her eternal and unalterable decree, the defects in wisdom and power attributable to the highest deities that mythologies have been able to construct. Hence even in the brilliant age of Augustus Caesar, the philosophic and cultured Virgil represents "Fatum" as that inexpugnabile et inexorable something to which the gods themselves were obliged to submit; so that, although to Jupiter alone was committed the high

¹ "De Rerum Natura," Lib. I., lines 269, 302, 385, 389, 399, 512, 589, 579, 607, 624, 778, 790, 795, 826, 868, 974, 1049; Lib. II., lines 69, 88, 231, 243. His declaration as to the necessity for theclinamenis very emphatic, lines 243, 244:

"Quare, etiam atque etiam, paulum inclinare necess' est
Corpora."
function of knowing and uttering these decrees, called *futa deorum*, yet even he was compelled to regard them as fixed and immutable.\(^1\)

In the sense of a controlling fate or paramount power we can never connect the word “necessity” with God. In every thought, decision, decree, purpose or action of the Divine Being, He is absolutely free. Any lower view will at once dethrone God, and place on His throne the usurper fate. Nothing more horrible can be invented than this notion; for “fate” is not eternally and immutably wise, good, just and merciful, but often blind, malignant, iniquitous and cruel. Better no God than such a god as the classic and the Mohammedan fate.

But while God is for ever free—that is, can and will think, purpose and do as “His mere good pleasure” may incline Him—yet there is a sense in which, with awe and reverence, we are obliged to apply the word “necessity,” in the meaning of “it must be,” even to Him. Reason, reinforced by revelation, requires this.

There are two classes of impossibilities, correspondent to the

\(^1\) Ennis, Lib. I., ll. 16–23, 288–268; Lib. III., 251; 9th Edit., by Rev. J. G. Cooper, A. M. This learned editor, whose “Student’s Virgil” has been so deservedly popular, admits that the poet is said “by some” to make even Jupiter subject to fate, but insists that Virgil’s notion of fate was truly philosophical, being, in fact, neither more nor less than a belief in the fixed decrees “of heaven,” pronounced by the mouth of Jove.—Edit. 1858, p. 179. But what was the power here spoken of as “heaven,” if not that fate whose decrees might indeed be known only to Jove and declared by him, but which he could not change or annul? It would have been an incredible miracle that Virgil should have risen above Hesiod, Homer, Theocritus, Pindar and Euripides, and attained to the Christian, or even the Jewish, doctrine of Divine decrees. The stoic philosophy, as interpreted by Seneca and Marcus Aurelius, did indeed teach that a Divine Power controlled human affairs by a fixed and changeless providence; but this was because the stoics looked with incredulity and contempt on all mythologic gods. See Cicero’s “De Natura Deorum,” Lips. Edit., 1877, pp. 62, 63.
contrary necessities, which we are compelled to predicate of the Divine Spirit.¹

1. Spiritual or moral impossibilities.

2. Essential or material impossibilities.

All purposes and actions which are contradictory to the moral attributes of God are impossible to Him. He is free indeed, but His freedom consists in His acting according to His divine pleasure, which is always in accord with His essential attributes. Hence the Holy Scriptures declare that God cannot lie;² and that it is impossible for God to vary from the immutability of His counsel, confirmed by His oath.³ Now, we know by sad experience that man can lie, and that he can be untrue to solemn promises confirmed by an oath. Thus we are

¹ If it be urged that the words of Christ, in Matthew xix. 26, "With men this is impossible, but with God all things are possible," (παρα αὐθεντεῖς τοις ἀδυνατοις εστι, παρα δὲ θεῷ αὐτὰ ἀδυνατο), forbid us to predicate anything as impossible to God, several satisfactory answers present themselves: 1st, These words in Matthew must be construed in like manner as the parallel passage in Luke xviii. 27, "The things which are impossible with men are possible with God,"—a truth easy to understand, and accordant with other scriptures. 2d, Universals, such as αὐτὰ, are frequently used in the Bible to express a general rule, without intending to deny many exceptions, as in Romans v. 17. 18; this is admitted by all sound theologians. See Dabney’s "Syllabus and Notes," pp. 851, 861. 3d, The declarations of Scripture imputing to God power to do all things, such as Genesis xviii. 14; Job xlii. 2; Jeremiah xxxii. 17; Zechariah viii. 6; Luke i. 37, invariably refer to such acts as power is related to and competent for, and which do not impugn the attributes of God, or involve a contradiction in the essence of things. 4th, Other passages expressly teach that there are some acts which are impossible to God, (Titus i. 2.; Hebrews vi. 18), and therefore the αὐτὰ of Matthew xix. 26 must, by analogy of faith, let in these exceptions. Hence Prof. R. L. Dabney, who belongs to the highest school of believers in Divine sovereignty, admits the moral necessity of certain classes of acts ascribed by him to God. — "Syllabus and Notes," pp. 465, 468.

² ἰη εὐγενεῖα το ἀφευνὴς θεὸς. The epithet is very strong, and is here fairly reproduced in the authorized English version: "God, who cannot lie."

³ Ἀδυνατον.—Hebrews vi. 18.
plainly taught that the very perfection of the Divine character makes that impossible to God which is possible to man.

And as it is necessary that God shall conform all His purposes and actions to His infinite attribute of truth, in like manner is it necessary that He conform His purposes and actions to His infinite attributes of wisdom, holiness, justice and goodness.

But let us sedulously and always bear in mind that the complication of human affairs, and the innumerable and intricate conditions entering into the problems presented by the providence of God, and the sin of man in this world, may often remove the question, What is right?—what is in accord with the moral attributes of God? beyond the utmost reach of our limited faculties. In such cases we are not competent to sit in judgment on His ways; and all we can do is to fall back upon the fixed and eternal truth: "Shall not the judge of all the earth do right?"  

The dealings of God with His creatures on earth, as disclosed in His inspired Word, have been often the subject of derision by the unbelieving, and of perplexity and distress to the devout, because all the conditions of the question to be decided were not known to the observer, and could not be known in the existing state of finite knowledge. In many cases time, research and science have supplied at last the missing conditions, and that which once appeared dark and inconsistent with the moral attributes of God, when seen in the newly supplied light, has appeared worthy of the All-perfect One. Especially have questions involving the justice and the goodness of God in taking the property or the lives of His creatures been abundant. And pious men have sometimes been seduced into interpretations of Scripture which have thrown a pall of horror over the character of God, and imputed to Him as possible conduct which His

1 Genesis xviii. 25.
attributes declared impossible. But these "past offences" of unsound exegesis have been, one after another, abandoned; and it may be now, with confidence, declared that there is not a thought, word or deed, attributable to God by a true interpretation of Holy Writ, which is not in perfect accord with His moral attributes. It is, therefore, impossible for Him to violate these attributes.

Next, we are to consider the material impossibilities which must be predicated of God.

Although all the attributes of God are inseparably united so as to enter into the essential constitution of one perfect Spiritual Being, yet each of these attributes has its own distinct nature and its own distinct sphere of activity. Hence it is not improper to classify them, and to reckon as moral attributes the holiness, justice, goodness and truth of God, and as natural attributes His wisdom and power. His being expresses His essential nature.

1 Probably in no point is Morell’s "Philosophy of Religion" more objectionable than in seeking to maintain that God taught and permitted to His people a lower standard of morality in the Old Testament than in the New. Morell’s very low and defective theory of inspiration led to this error with many others, which are refuted in Dr. T. V. Moore’s lecture on "The Inspiration of the Scriptures."—University of Virginia Lectures on the Evidences of Christianity, Edit. 1853, pp. 277, 278.

2 Professor Dabney says the classification of the divine attributes into "natural" and "moral" is just and accurate, but he objects to the terms, because the moral attributes are as truly natural as any other.—"Syllabus and Notes," p. 150. He prefers "moral" and "non-moral," but this is open to the serious objection that none of God’s attributes can be non-moral. His power is controlled and conditioned in its exercise by His justice, goodness and truth. Dr. Breckinridge classifies the divine attributes into primary, essential, natural, moral and consummate, ("Knowledge of God, Objectively Considered," pp. 263–264), a complication not tending at all to elucidate the subject. These differences among able divines are only added illustrations of the fact that the nature of God cannot be comprehended by man, but may be apprehended to the extent required by his duties and destiny.
Now we are compelled, by the laws of thought, to hold it to be impossible for God to annihilate Himself. This would be to do worse than dethrone Himself; it would be an act by which all-power should reduce all-power to nothingness, all-wisdom should drive all-wisdom out of existence. Such acts imply contradictions, and are therefore impossible. And if God cannot annihilate Himself in His fulness, neither can He annihilate any one of His attributes; for if one, why not another, and thus all might be annihilated; and God without His attributes would not be God.

And so, by parity of reasoning, we reach the truth that it is impossible for God to annihilate that eternal matter which has been for ever His οὐσία—the basis and the indispensable condition of the exercise of His infinite wisdom and power. We have seen that reason teaches that power has no relation to nonentity—to nothing—and therefore All-power cannot create matter out of nothing. And if Almighty power cannot produce matter from nothing, neither can Almighty power reduce matter to nothing. Such a process is unthinkable; the human mind is incompetent to conceive it. Neither can Almighty power annihilate any essential property of matter, such as inertia or extension; for if one essential property could be annihilated, so might another and another, until all its essentials—that is, its being—should be annihilated, and the matter itself would be nothing, which implies a contradiction.

Therefore the action of Infinite power upon eternal matter is to produce, through all time, metamorphosis, change, phenomena to an extent and number conditioned only by the wisdom and will of God. As fast as these phenomena emerge from becoming into being, from preparation into completion, they are the creatures of God; and a beginning may be predicated of them and each of them. And as each of them may be completely changed, so that the creature that once existed no longer exists,
therefore an end likewise may in such cases be predicated of them and each of them. But the matter of which the body or material structure of the creature was formed is not annihilated, nor is any particle thereof reduced to nothing.

It was common among the old Augustinian divines, the followers of Descartes, and even the more rigid Calvinistic reformers, to seek to sustain the doctrine of the special providence of God by insisting that, as God created all things \textit{out of nothing}, therefore no being save God was self-existent. Hence the continued existence of any world, sun, moon or stars, or of any structures of earth, or of any man, woman or child, even for a single moment, was the result of God’s continued and ever renewed \textit{creative} power in sustaining them in being, and that if this continued creative power were suspended for one moment, in that moment all would relapse into \textit{nihility}—nothing!\footnote{Thus Heidegger, of the reformed theologians, says: “Conservatio continuata creatio Dei activa est.”—Corpus Theologiae, loc. VII., 22, Tiguri, 1782, p. 251. And Alsted is even more distinct: “Quemadmodum, creatio est prima productio rei ex nihilo, ita, est conservatio rei continuatio \textit{ne in nihilum recidat.”—Theol. Didact., Hanoviae, 1627, p. 283. Dr. Thomas Dick, in his theology, maintains in substance the same doctrine.}

But this notion has been abandoned and disapproved by the best of modern divines, who, while admitting creation \textit{ex nihilo}, are not quite prepared to admit that the incessant \textit{concursus} and creative \textit{act} of God are necessary in order to prevent His universe from incontinently lapsing into nothing!\footnote{Dr. Charles Hodge devotes two pages of unanswerable logic to a refutation of this notion.—“Systematic Theology,” Vol. I., pp. 578–581. Dr. R. L. Dabney also repudiates it, although under a protest in favor of creation \textit{ex nihilo}.—“Syllabus and Notes,” pp. 277–279.}

Nevertheless, the only safe avenue of escape from the conclusion of the older divines is in the belief consonant alike to reason and revelation, that God works upon matter by a process which has had no beginning and will have no end; that the forces and powers directly imparted by Him operate according to \textit{laws}
MATHERNICAL IMPOSSIBILITIES.

which only infinite wisdom could have devised, that He never
annihilates either spirit or matter, but changes the forms and
manner of being of His creations as His goodness, justice and
wisdom require.

It follows, from the impossibility of annihilating any essential
property of matter, that God cannot make a material being, any
more than a spiritual being, exist and not exist in the same
moment of time. And this necessity applies, not merely to
eternal spirit and eternal matter, but to the completed creations
of God; for though, by His power, He can change them in-
stantly, yet while unchanged each creature is itself and not
another. Therefore observance of the law of identity is an
essential or material necessity.

Next, we are compelled, by the fundamental laws of thought,
to hold that God cannot, in any case in which they are appli-
cable, work contrary to the laws of mathematical principle.
It is true that in all the material universe no such entities can
be found as those required by the definitions of mathematics.
No material thing can be a point, according to geometry, for
a point is that which has no parts or no magnitude; and the
smallest conceivable molecule of matter has some parts—a right
and left side, an upper and under surface; and some magnitude;
for if it has parts it might be smaller than it is. And no
material extension can be a geometrical line, for a line is length
without breadth, and nothing material can be entirely without
breadth, however attenuated it may be, because every material
line must have a right and left side, and, therefore, some breadth.
And no surface of matter can be a geometrical superficies, for,
being material, it has necessarily dimensions, that is, length,
breadth and thickness; but a superficies is length and breadth
without thickness.¹ And no solid ever existed in the material

¹ No apology is needed for adopting herein the definitions of Euclid, for
they have not been amended by any of the modern sciolists. Some of
universe which filled the definitions of solids in geometry; for the sides of a solid cube or hexahedron are plain superficies, and no human eye, even aided by the most powerful microscope, ever saw such a surface.

But although the definitions of mathematics do not represent material entities, yet they represent verities of thought, founded on the eternal nature of things. Therefore, whenever and wherever they apply, they cannot, by any possibility, be violated or contradicted. Hence God cannot make a circle to be an ellipse, nor a triangle a square; nor can He make one of these figures to cover exactly the superficies of another; nor can He make the three angles of a right-lined triangle greater or less than two right angles; nor can He make one radius of a circle of greater or less length than another; nor make two straight lines to enclose a space.

Mr. John Stuart Mill, of England, who was at one time an admirer of Compte's positive philosophy (which plants itself on the certainty of mathematics as one of its corner stones), and whose sombre views of the perfection, or rather imperfection, of God were expressed in a melancholy book, published after his death, has declared the belief that there may possibly be some place in the universe where two and two are equal to five.¹ Such a notion is not only absurd, but for ever impossible; for if there is a thought which God has realized to the human mind these small geometers have invented what they call a straight angle, made by one straight line!! It is not irreverent to say that, as God could not make such an angle, man cannot.

¹ Rights and Duties of Science. Princeton Review, November, 1878, pp. 684-685. Principal Dawson, of Montreal, who is the author of this able article, seems to intimate that "however absurd this idea of Mill may appear," it may nevertheless be true, as we can neither understand nor limit the sphere of miracle. No miracle ever violated eternal verities, or annihilated essential properties, either of mind or matter. That Mill was once half way to positivism, see Dabney's "Sensualistic Philosophy," pp. 95, 103, 104.
it is the idea of the one—the unit. And two of these are made by adding one to one, and three by adding one to two, and four by adding two to two, and five by adding three to two; and, therefore, to make two and two equal to five would make two equal to three, which is self-contradictory.\textsuperscript{1} Hence this idea of Mill is equivalent to the assertion that there is no truth in the universe—that what may be truth in one world may be falsehood in another world. And, from such philosophy, the inference is inevitable that we have no God—certainly no God whom we can trust; for if that which He communicates to us as truth in this world may not be truth in heaven, then, if we ever reach heaven, we may find that there happiness is not

\textsuperscript{1} It is surprising that a mind so learned and thoughtful as that of Dr. Edward B. Tylor should be disposed to adopt this notion of Mill, and to concede that our ideas about number are derived entirely from experience. See Tylor's "Primitive Culture," Amer. Edit., 1877, Vol. I., pp. 240, 241. It is yet more surprising to find a mathematician and astronomer as eminent as Prof. Simon Newcomb yielding to German transcendentalism so much as to speak with favor of Riemann's "Non-Euclidian Geometry," and to admit that two parallel straight lines, being produced, may meet or may diverge!—"Popular Astronomy," Edit. 1878, p. 518, note. When such modes of thought are admitted, we may take a final leave of truth, and Pidit's question will be for ever unanswerable. Yet even the learned and devout Professor T. J. Crawford, of Scotland, ventures very near to the verge of this absurdity in his "Mysteries of Christianity."—Baird Lecture, 1874. He considers that the relations of the hyperbola and asymptotes in the conic sections, by which it can be demonstrated that a curved line may for ever approach a right line without the possibility of ever meeting it, present an insoluble mystery in mathematics. But, in truth, there is no mystery in it; for space being infinitely divisible, the curved line approaches by regular ratio, say of one-half, one-fourth, one-eighth, one-sixteenth, etc., in a definite space, and as this division can be continued for ever, the lines can never meet. Prof. Crawford's assertion that a curved line of infinite length may, by revolving on its axis, form a solid of finite capacity, seems to be an evident misapprehension of Olithus Gregory's remarks in "Mathesis." See p. 50, and Appendix, note C, p. 397. No revolution of an infinite line can form a finite solid. The line may be infinite in theory, but \textit{quod} infinite it cannot form the finite.
happiness, peace is turmoil, righteousness is iniquity—in short, that heaven is hell!

We are driven, therefore, by the very perfections of God, and by the necessity for an eternal *opusculum*, without which His highest attributes would have been for ever dormant, to conclude that there are to Him impossibilities—spiritual and moral, essential and material. The long continued and profitless debate concerning the "Unconditioned," and consequently the "Unknowable Infinite," might have been spared, for the "Unconditioned," in the sense of a Being *absolutus*, or released from all necessity even of His own nature and of that of His necessary subordinate, does not exist.¹

Having sought to establish these preliminary principles, which must be borne in mind in considering the succeeding discussions of this work, we now proceed to consider the work of creation.

And, in the very outset, we must remark that, as this subject

¹ It has become common for mediocre metaphysicians to decry Sir Wm. Hamilton. Professor Mahaffy, of Ireland, in his enthusiasm for Kant's "Critical Philosophy," has lately declared that, "As regards Hamilton, his teaching may be called extinct, and it will be difficult in the history of philosophy to find a man more overrated while he lived and despised as soon as he was unable to defend his own opinions."—"Criticism of the Critical Philosophy," Princeton Review, November, 1878, p. 914, note. And President James McCosh, of Princeton College, who wrote this article, though he suggests the pungent question, "Is there anything here of the old jealousy of Edinburgh on the part of Dublin?" very complacently informs us of his own opinion of Hamilton: "I was one of the first to criticize him, which I did when his pupils regarded him as infallible," (same note.) But justice will prevail. Sir Wm. Hamilton was doubtless incautious in some of his statements of our inability to know the Infinite, and his words have been wrested by Mansel and Herbert Spencer to their own destruction. But had he never written anything except "The Philosophy of Common Sense," his name would never die. And his "Philosophy of the Conditioned," with some rash statements, contains the germs of truth which will yet prevail. His name will be held in high esteem when the Mahaffies are forgotten.
leads us into the "abyss of being," and as we have seen that
the being or essence of spirit, as well as the being or essence of
matter, is entirely beyond the utmost reach of our knowledge,
so we may naturally expect that any attempts to furnish a
satisfactory theory of creation will be unsuccessful. Nothing
can more signally illustrate this than the fact that men have
been essaying to construct such theories from the earliest times
of which we have any recorded thought; and that, notwithstanding
the enormous strides in material science made in
modern times, the conjectures concerning the modes of creation
made in our day have very little to boast of as compared with
the conjectures of the ancient days.

Man has been called a "microcosm of the universe." And
though we must be cautious not to push this metaphor to illegitimate results, yet, when used within discreet limits, it will
guide us into many analogies of truth.

Man has a material body, beautifully moulded and wrought,
with the bony frame, on which is built a structure of brain,
blood, nerves, interior organs, muscles, sinews, veins, arteries,
flesh, eyes, ears, limbs and enveloping epidermis. But all this
would be only an ingenious machine without the vital spirit.
That is the power that moves the man and makes him the lord
of creation. Without that he would be more powerless than a
blade of grass.

1 The expression was first met in Humboldt's "Cosmos," Amer. Edit.
1850, though it had been probably used previously, as it certainly has
been since, by other writers. In his text and note, pp. 68, 69, Humboldt
attributes to Pythagoras the first use of the word ἱλασμός to designate the
beauty and order that reign in the universe. The primary meaning of
the word is "ornament,"—something graceful, or imparting grace; and
it was surely a very happy application which extended its meaning to
the material universe—the ὄρνησσις—the investiture of God. The learned
but sceptical Swede, Viktor Rydberg, treats the doctrine that man is a
microcosm of creation as a tenet of mediaeval cosmic philosophy.—"Magic
of the Middle Ages," pp. 7, 8.
THEORIES OF CREATION.

And in one sense it is true that man's vital spirit has made his body what it is. From the time when he was brought into the world a helpless infant, this vital power has been at work, with divine intelligence and energy, building up his bones and flesh, assimilating his food to his growth, kindling a fire by his lungs to keep his blood warm, casting out effete and useless matter, until, by the time when he attains to maturity, it may be declared with certainty that not one particle of the matter of which his infant body consisted remains in his system; so that when he comes to be a man his vital spirit has made him the man that he is.

And this vital spirit has accomplished all this by activity—by motion. Motion has been the parent of all the forces—heat, electricity, magnetism, galvanism, even attraction and cohesion—that have been working on matter. And motion is the normal, the ceaseless activity put forth by the Eternal Spirit, working upon the eternal matter, and producing all the beauties and glories of the material cosmos.

Hence we are not surprised to find that in every theory of creation ever constructed, which rose above the dreams of the babyhood of man's intelligence, motion has been the mode of power to which has been attributed, directly or indirectly, all the wondrous work.

As soon as man gained leisure from the necessary work of providing for himself and his dependents food, raiment and shelter, he began to reflect—that is, to turn his acquired thought backward, inward and outward, and to look at himself and all around him from new positions. Then the question how creation came to pass began to occupy his mind.

In the regions of Asia, in which the human race began its career, we might expect to find the earliest of these speculations. And accordingly we do find them there; and except so far as their theories have gained evident light from the records after-
wards embodied in the Pentateuch of Moses, we find nowhere on earth so puerile and extravagant fancies as those on this subject coming from the ancient civilizations of the East.

It is from India that we get the wise system that the earth is an extended plain, resting on pillars; that these are supported by a platform, which rests on the back of an elephant, who stands on the back of a huge tortoise. But at this critical point in the system, all farther support fails, and, therefore, the whole structure has fallen in ruins.¹

The Brahmins of India and Siam taught that the heavens rest on the earth, and the sun and moon swim therein like fishes in the water, moving from east to west by day, and gliding along the edge of the horizon to their original stations during the night; but in the Puranas we have the attractive account that the earth is a vast plain, encircled by seven oceans of milk, nectar and other delicious liquids; that it is studded with seven mountains, and ornamented in its centre by a mountaneous rock of burnished gold; and that from time to time a great dragon swallows the moon, which accounts for her eclipses.²

The cuneiform inscriptions found on the fragments of stone exhumed from the mounds of Mosul, in the region covered by ancient Assyria and Babylonia, chiefly by the exertions of Layard, Rassam, Loftus, Sir Henry Rawlinson, and the indefatigable George Smith, of the British Museum, have recently been made public as far as deciphered, and have tended power-

¹ It is hoped that no one will dispute our right to avail ourselves of the learned labors of Diedrich Knickerbocker, whose erudite history extends from the beginning of the world to the end of the Dutch Dynasty in New York.

² Washington Irving's Works, Putnam's Edit., 1860, Vol. I., p. 36. Let it not be supposed that the genial spirit of "badinage" in which Mr. Knickerbocker's "History of New York" is written has betrayed the author into falsifications of legend or history. The authorities cited by him will be found fully to support all his statements.
fully to confirm the account of creation given in the book of
Genesis. The Babylonian legend of creation contains unmis-
takably a statement of that condition of the earth and heaven
frequently called chaos. The translation runs thus: "When
above were not raised the heavens, and below on the earth a
plant had not grown up; the abyss also had not broken open
its boundaries; the chaos (or water) tiamat (the sea) was the
producing mother of the whole of them. These waters at the
beginning were ordained, but a tree had not grown, a flower
had not unfolded."¹

The correspondence of description here to the time when the
earth was a waste and unwrought, and darkness was on the
face of the deep, and the Spirit of God moved on the face of
the waters, is striking. The Roman poet has reproduced the
same grand desolation of thought in his account of the meta-
morphoses through which nature has passed;² and one of the
greatest of English poets has given his sanction to the idea that
chaos was the primeval state of anarchy, confusion and hubbub
from which the earth was drawn out and rescued in the work
of creation.³ Assuredly, while desolation and barrenness of

¹ "Chaldean Account of Genesis," by George Smith, Amer. Edit., 1876,
pp. 62, 63, Babylonian legend of the creation.

² Ovid's words are: "Rudis indigesta que moles," and "Chaos rerum
non bene junctarum."—"Metamorphoseon," Lib. I.

³ The sublimity of Milton's conceptions of chaos is only exceeded by
their want of verity. Satan is approaching our earth:

"At length, a universal hubbub wild,
Of stunning sounds, and voices all confused,
Borne through the hollow dark, assaults his ear
With loudest vehemence; o o o
o o o When straight behold the throne
Of Chaos, and his dark pavilion spread
Wide on the wasteful deep; with him enthroned
Sat sable-vested Night, eldest of things,
The consort of his reign; and by them stood
vegetable or animal life may be a stage of material worlds through which they must pass to higher forms, there is nothing either in reason or Scripture to justify the notion of chaos, anarchy, lawlessness. Creation has ever been the successive expression of the nomian theory.

We have already seen that oriental fancy took pleasure in sometimes representing our earth as produced from an egg; and some of their accounts go into details as to the manner in which this egg floated in chaos and was cracked by the horns of the celestial bull, and thus the world was able to emerge. Thomas Burnet, of Yorkshire, England, who lived cotemporary with the learned and eccentric Gilbert Burnet, Bishop of Salisbury, and died in the same year with him, has written a book, entitled the "Sacred Theory of the Earth," in which he undertakes to

Orcus and Ades, and the dreaded name
Of Demogorgon; Rumor next, and Chance
And Tumult and Confusion all embroiled,
And Discord, with a thousand various mouths."

Satan boldly addresses Chaos, promising that if he will direct his course to the earth he will seek to—

"All usurpation thence expell'd, reduce
To her original darkness and your sway."

Whereupon "the Anarch old" replies, telling him he knows who he is, and how he and his rebellious angels fell through the dominions of Chaos into hell, but encouraging him to proceed, and showing him the way towards the earth.

"If that way be your walk, you have not far;
So much the nearer danger; go and speed!
Havoc and spoil and ruin are my gain."

—"Paradise Lost," Book II., Halifax Edit., 1864, pp. 45–47. See also Book III., p. 60.

Milton, as a poet, had full license for the expression of such ideas, but that Christian theologians should talk of chaos as once the condition of the earth approaches impiety.
give a drawing and description of this egg out of which the earth was hatched.\(^1\)

Absurd as this idea may seem, it has evidently originated in that deeply founded conviction of the human family that the mysteries of generation, when completely unfolded, will explain all the phenomena of creation; and that all generation begins its processes by the vivifying of an *ovum*, or egg, is a fact which science has yearly made more and more certain. Hence the old Greek poet and mythologist, Hesiod, who probably lived nine hundred years before the Christian era, derives all his gods and goddesses, including among the females Terra, the earth, by formal processes of generation.

But such crudities did not long satisfy the cravings of the acute and philosophic Greeks. Hence we find them speedily dealing in either *atoms*, which could be neither divided nor destroyed, or in *elements*, such as fire, air, earth, water, æther, out of which the material cosmos was constructed. Some represented the sun as a vast wheel of brilliant fire; others as a mirror or sphere of transparent crystal. Anaxagoras, although he taught that water was the original element out of which all things mundane were constituted, did not include the sun in his watery theory, but taught that it was a huge ignited mass of iron or stone; indeed, he is said to have declared the heavens to be merely a vault of metal or stone, and that the stars were stones whirled upward from the earth and set on fire by the velocity of its revolutions.\(^2\) These ideas of the Greek sage have had some modern support in the revelations of the spectroscope.

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2. For these interesting speculations, Irving cites Diog. Laertius, in Anaxag., l. II., Sec. 8; Plat. Apol., t. I., p. 26; Plutarch De Plac., Philo. Xenophon, Memor., l. IV., p. 815; Works, I., pp. 87, 88.
ANAXAGORAS; ABOUL HASSAN.

Each nation or tribe, savage or enlightened, seems to have had its own theories of creation, all of which were shaped or modified by its peculiar prejudices or predilections. Thus the Arabian writer, Aboul Hassan-Aly, who wrote in the 336th year of the Hegira, is said to represent the earth as a huge bird, Mecca and Medina being the head, Persia and India the right wing, the land of Gog, the left wing, and Africa the tail. He admits that divers deluges have swept over the earth, which needs renovation from time to time; and that, according to some well-informed Brahmins, these renovations occur at intervals of eight hundred and forty millions of years!1

Among the negroes of Congo, in Africa, the philosophic minds believe that angels made all the world except Congo, which, being greatly superior to all other parts, was the immediate handy-work of God, who took great pains, not only with the land, but the inhabitants, making them black in order to their perfect beauty; and that after making the first man black and comely, God put the finishing touch to his countenance by drawing a hand over his forehead, nose and lips.

The Mohawk Indians have a tradition that a pregnant woman fell down from heaven to the earth, which was then covered with water; that by reason of this, a tortoise took her upon its back; and that the woman, sitting upon the tortoise, paddled with her hands in the water, and gradually raked up the earth and made it higher than the water, so that her descendants could inhabit it.2

Leaving these early, or certainly infantile, speculations of the

1 It must be conceded that the citation of the erudite Diedrich Knickerbocker’s “MSS. Bibl. Roi Fr.” is somewhat vague for so imposing a theory!

2 Irving's Works, Vol. I., pp. 45, 46. He cites Johannes Megapolensis, Jun.'s, “Account of Maquaas, or Mohawk Indians.” Fenimore Cooper has very ingeniously used the traditional adoration of the tortoise in his novel, “The Last of the Mohicans.”
human race, we are now to examine some of the theories of scientific men in modern times on the mode of creation.

Descartes is said, by perhaps too partial biographers, to have united in himself the mental character and attainments of Plato and Aristotle, Bacon and Newton.¹ That he was a great man is not to be denied. He was also a Christian theist, although some of his incautious statements were mysticized by the Père Malebranche, and others were perverted to the defence of Pantheism by Spinoza.

He conceived that there were three laws of nature and seven secondary laws of impact.² In stating these secondary laws, he has fallen into errors arising from want of the experimental knowledge furnished by later research. But his three primary laws have not been subverted, but rather corroborated by all the results of empirical observation. They were: 1st, That the infinite space of the infinite universe, everywhere, contains matter. He believed that empty space is a fictitious abstraction—in other words, that there is no such entity as empty space. He denied the existence either of the inane, the vacuum, or of indivisible atoms. In this he joined issue sharply with the Lucretian philosophy; and that he was right all true science avouches. 2d, That all matter is fundamentally endowed with the property of inertia—i. e., of continuing in the same state (whether rest or motion) until this state is changed by paramount force. 3d, That simple or elementary motion is always in a straight line.

Holding that all space is occupied by matter, he consistently held also that motion must come from God, and that the motion of any one particle necessarily involved the motion of all other particles. Hence the movements of innumerable particles, even

¹ Art. Descartes, Appleton's Cyclop. of Biog., p. 288.
² Encyclop. Britan., Vol. VII., pp. 123–124, Art. Descartes. This instructive article is by Wm. Wallace, LL. D.
if primarily in right lines, would inevitably result, sooner or later, in innumerable hosts of movements more or less curved. And these circular movements throughout deep strata of matter would result in *vortices*, or whirlpools of material particles, varying in size and velocity. This movement would cause corners to be pared off by rubbing against each other, thus forming spherical particles of larger size than the parings or dust rubbed off; these round particles would have a centrifugal tendency in the direction of the axis of rotation, while the fine dust-filings or parings, gradually becoming finer and finer and losing their velocity, would tend centripetally and would gradually accumulate in the centre of the vortex, which will have been left more and more free by the receding particles of globular matter. Hence Descartes held that this finer matter gradually condensed in centres, and became suns and stars, while the larger spherical globules gradually formed the planets with their satellites.¹

Sir Isaac Newton was born eight years before Descartes' death. He thus lived in an age when he had the benefit, not only of that illustrious Frenchman's methods and speculations, but of the discoveries of Copernicus, Tycho Brahe, Kepler and Galileo.² His happy discovery and complete demonstration of the law of gravity, which pervades the whole universe, displaced the vortex theory of Descartes by its superior simplicity and methods. Except in the singular speculation as to the normal state of matter communicated to John Locke and the Earl of

¹ Dr. Wallace gives a full exposition of the ingenious *vortex* theory of Descartes, Encyc. Britan., Vol. VII., p. 128.

² Tycho Brahe lived from 1546 to 1601; Galileo from 1564 to 1642; Kepler from 1571 to 1631; Descartes from 1596 to 1660; and Sir Isaac Newton from 1642 to 1727. Though Tycho Brahe upheld the system of Ptolemy, which places the earth in the centre of the universe, yet his indefatigable labors and observations, and his costly apparatus, added much to astronomical knowledge.
Pembroke, Sir Isaac Newton seems wisely to have abstained from announcing any theories as to the mode in which God constructed the material universe, or any part of it. He contented himself with the legitimate pursuits of science, namely, the laborious discovery of facts, and of the laws under which these facts have necessarily arisen.

But his example was not profitably used, either by his contemporaries or his successors. William Whiston, of England, whose sad failure in his attempted discovery of a method for calculating longitude has consigned him to a wretched immortality under the foul wit of Dean Swift, undertook to account for the geologic condition and structure of our earth by conjecturing that it was originally a chaotic comet, which, after eccentric journeys in space, was selected for man’s abode and caused to revolve round the sun. He likewise supposed that the deluge spoken of in the Scriptures was the result of a brush from the watery tail of another comet coming unduly near the earth!¹

The renowned naturalist, Georges Louis Leclerc, Compte De Buffon, conjectured that the sun was an enormous globe of fiery matter, and that, by the stroke of a huge comet, enough of this matter was driven off to form the earth, and impelled in space until brought to a circular motion by attraction and original impulse; that it was at first surrounded by gross vapors, which, gradually cooling and condensing, constituted, according to their densities, earth, water and air, and that these slowly arranged themselves according to their respective gravities round the burning mass that formed their centre. In his preface to the

¹ Whiston lived from 1667 to 1752. In 1708 he was appointed to the high honor of succeeding Sir Isaac Newton as mathematical professor at Lowestoft, but seven years later was expelled, not for error in science, but for Arianism.—New Amer. Cyclop., Vol. XVI., p. 394; Irving’s Works, Vol. I., p. 47.
“Theory of the Earth,” Buffon asks, “How is it possible for man to flatter himself that he can unveil the mysteries of nature with nothing to guide him but his own imagination?” His own wild theory illustrates his question.¹

Dr. James Hutton, of Edinburgh, believed that the whole surface of the earth was once covered with water, and that after dry land appeared, many successive deluges (of which the Noachic deluge was one) swept the face of the planet in whole or in part; but that, under the influence of internal heat, the fertility and good order of our world have been gradually established.²

Erasmus Darwin was a physician who carried his studies into his poem styled the “Botanic Garden,” and into his grave work, intended to be scientific, and called “Zoonomia,”—the laws of life. In the first he personifies the individuals of the vegetable world, and introduces us to all the loves, “gallantries, amours, debaucheries and other topics of scandal of the court of Flora.” He therein likewise broaches the speculation, that in the vast mass of chaos, explosions take place from time to time (though under what explosive influences he does not clearly explain), and that by these the sun and other fixed stars were shot out, and the sun, by his explosions, shot out the earth and other planets.³ In the “Zoonomia,” which appeared in 1794—6, Darwin expressed some conjectures which his eminent grandson, Charles Darwin, says “anticipated the views and erroneous


² Dr. Hutton lived from 1726 to 1797. Although Mr. Knickerbocker entertains his readers by some witty shots at Hutton’s theories, many of them have reappeared in late science.—Art. Hutton, New Amer. Cyclop., Vol. IX., p. 400; Appleton’s Cyclop. of Biog., p. 410; Irving’s Works, Vol. I., pp. 46—47.

grounds of opinion of Lamarck." Certainly he shadowed forth the notions of protoplasm and evolution in the words, "Would it be too bold to imagine that in the great length of time since the earth began to exist—perhaps millions of ages before the commencement of the history of mankind—would it be too bold to imagine that all warm-blooded animals have arisen from one living filament, which the Great First Cause endued with animality, with the power of acquiring new parts, attended with new propensities, directed by irritations, sensations, volitions and associations, and thus possessing the faculty of continuing to improve by its own inherent activity, and of delivering down these improvements by generation to its posterity, world without end?" ¹

In this we discover folded up, but ready to be evolved with time and opportunity, all the evolution theory afterwards made famous by the author of "Vestiges of Creation," and by the interesting and laborious works of Charles Darwin, and which, in the final teaching of the Christian Professor LeConte, of California, is as unsound as in its origin. Yet the charge, said to have been made by Thomas Carlisle, that the Darwins were "atheists all," is unfounded. They expressly recognize the Great First Cause; but they make His action that of the clockmaker, who, having manufactured his clock with all its machinery and motive power, winds it up and sets it to work, and leaves it ever after to its own functions. This excludes all miracle, all successive creations of species, all providential control. Therefore it is not Christianity; nor is it science. The "Vestiges of Creation" were annihilated by Hugh Miller's "Footprints of the Creator;" and the great Agassiz, though a

believer in evolution in its proper scientific meaning, rejected to the day of his death all evolution of one species out of another, and believed that successive creative acts were needed for each new species, and especially for the introduction of man, the lord of creation.

We come now, at last, to the "Nebular Hypothesis" of creation, which still has wide currency in certain scientific circles, although discredited in others. It was first formulated by the eminent German-born English astronomer, Sir William Herschel, and afterwards fully developed by the gigantic labors of Pierre Simon, Marquis De La Place, who was as great in mathematics and astronomy as he was ignoble in his private and public conduct.

This hypothesis is founded upon the supposition that space before creation of existing worlds was occupied by seriform or

1 Professor LeConte's article, "Man's Place in Nature," Princeton Review, November, 1878, pp. 776–808, although written with clearness and force, has not improved his reputation as a sound scientist. His evolution theory is as vicious as Darwin's, and plainly points to the production of man from the lower animals. His illustration of the evolving process rising up through the vegetable world to the animal world, and through the lower animals to man, by a diagram representing a watery surface tending ever to perfect level, but with gravity abolished and cohesion only remaining, and then operated on by some force pulling upward against cohesion, and thus causing the water to rise, first in a mammilla, a little nipple (representing the plant kingdom), then in a rounded button (representing the lower animal kingdom), then in a globule, with a neck connecting it still with the watery surface, and finally in a globule, or bubble, completely separated from the water, and representing immortal man, is worse than puerile. For this bubble, although it may have become "individuated," instead of being stronger or better than the water protuberances, will be weaker and more short-lived. What can be thought of the science which hangs the creation of man, "in the image of God," and endowed with the spirit (breath) of immortal life, upon such an illustration? See the diagram and text, Princeton Review, pp. 796–798.

2 Sir Wm. Herschel lived from 1738 to 1822; La Place from 1749 to 1827. Art. La Place, New Amer. Cyclop., Vol. X., pp. 812–815.
nebulous masses of matter. In fact, Sir Wm. Herschel supposed it certain that parts of these masses yet remained unwrought by the operation of natural laws, and were seen in the heavenly spaces in those mysterious "nebulae," or cloud formations, which even his enormous forty-foot telescope failed to resolve into separate stars; and one of which was so distant from the earth that, by his calculation, light travelling through space at the rate of one hundred and ninety-two thousand miles in a second, must have occupied more than two millions of years in passing from this nebula to our planet! Of course the human mind refuses to take cognizance of a distance so immense, and considers the scientific fact as only tending to prove that matter is diffused through infinite space.

Now, it is true that since the death of both Sir Wm. Herschel and La Place, Lord Rosse's giant telescope has actually resolved some of the nearer nebulae into distinct stars, or galaxies of stars, and thus raised a strong presumption that with higher telescopic powers all the other nebular groups, even the most distant, might be in like manner resolved. And, in fact, Sir John Herschel's observations on the structure and position of the larger nebulae, known as the "magellanic clouds," led him to announce as a demonstrated fact that "stars of the seventh or eighth magnitude and irresolvable nebulae may co-exist within limits of distance not differing more than as nine to ten." These facts tended strongly to destroy the foundations of the "nebular hypothesis," and must operate at least to the extent of forbidding us to assume it as established truth. Yet men as scientific as Herbert Spencer and Professor John Tyndall still cling to it. They insist that even though every nebular group-

* Herbert Spencer defended this hypothesis in an elaborate article, Westminster Review, July, 1858; and Professor Tyndall, in December, 1874,
ing in the heavens were resolved into galaxies of stars, this would not prove that æriform or nebular matter did not exist. And it is impossible to refute them, because we do not know but that they may be right! We are thus brought back to the conclusion of common sense, that science has not yet discovered, and probably never will discover, any better method of creation than that suggested in the book of Genesis, which states the fact, and gives us only dim though suggestive hints as to the mode.

The reasoning of the nebular hypothesis has much to commend it. For if we assume the existence throughout space of a rare, homogeneous, nebulous matter, the following changes may be reasonably expected to take place, according to laws ascertained to exist by the most profound generalizations: First, mutual attraction of particles (or molecules, as the scientific may prefer to call them); then repulsion; then evolution of heat, which invariably comes with the motions of attraction and repulsion; then combinations at a certain stage of condensation, followed by sudden and great disengagement of heat; then lowering of temperature by radiation and consequent precipitation of particles, aggregating into irregular floating masses in the rarer medium, just as water precipitated from air collects into clouds; then movement of each flocculus, or little floating mass, towards the common centre of gravity of all; but the masses being irregular, and floating in a resisting medium, the movement will not be rectilinear, that is, not directly towards the common centre of gravity, but towards one side of it or the other; and thus a spiral movement will ensue, which will be communicated to the rarer medium through which the flocculus

writes thus: “I hold the nebular theory, as it was held by Kant, La Place and William Herschel, and as it is held by the best scientific intellects of to-day.”—Preface to last Eng. Edit., Belfast Lecture, Am. Edit., 1875, pp. 11–12.
is moving; and thus will come a preponderating momentum and rotation of the whole mass in one direction, converging in spirals towards the common centre of gravity.\(^1\) Having thus secured a spiral or circular movement of great masses of normal matter under the laws of force, which come from the Almighty, we have no longer any difficulty in conceiving how, in immense lapses of time, all the phenomena of the material universe, stars, suns, planets, satellites took their appropriate places and actions, and moved to "the music of the spheres."

And although creation be an eternal relation between God and His \(υπερστάσις\) matter—which relation never had a beginning and will never have an end, yet this does not forbid us to assume that, in the creation of any special planetary system like that of which our earth is a member, the Almighty Spirit selected the normal matter filling a certain space in the infinite, and applied to it the special workings of force necessary for making it the system He willed. Assuming that the lately discovered planet, Neptune, is indeed the outermost member of this system, the space occupied by ærisform or nebulous matter, thus elected by almighty power and infinite wisdom, would have been, in shape, nearly a sphere, having a diameter of about six thousand millions of miles. In this, by the movements, attractions, repulsions, condensations and crystallizations, which have been going on for millions of years, our system has

\(^1\) This summary of the nebular theory is from the article "Nebular Hypothesis," New Amer. Cyclop., Vol. XII., p. 158. Kant is really the father of the nebular hypothesis, but he assumed \(chaos\) as an original condition out of which order was slowly evolved by the play of attractive and repulsive forces. La Place's form of the theory was that the sun originally filled indefinite space with his fiery nebulous atmosphere in rotary motion, and that, by gradual cooling, planets and moons have been detached. Herschel built his theory on actual observations of the nebular masses through his immense telescope.—"Popular Astronomy," Edit. 1878, by Prof. Simon Newcomb, formerly of U. S. Naval Observatory, \(pp.\) 501-507.
been produced, with its vast sun in the centre, or in one of the
elliptic foci, and with Mercury, Venus, Terra, Mars, the plane-
toids, Jupiter, Saturn, Uranus and Neptune revolving in orderly
course, governed by laws of which the wise and uniform action
furnish to astronomy her sublime study.

But in ascertaining all we can concerning this system, we
encounter one most striking fact, or rather probability, i. e.,
that our earth is the only one of these vast worlds which
furnishes the conditions indispensable to human life.¹ The
sun was conjectured by Herschel to be habitable in its vast
interior, and that its light and heat, so widely diffused through-
out space, were produced by certain luminous clouds, diffused
around the magnificent world within.² But these pleasant
dreams have been dissipated by the spectroscope and shaded
telecope, which have shown beyond reasonable doubt that the
sun is a solid sphere of calcium, iron, nickel, cobalt, zinc and
other matter, in a state of incandescent energy, utterly forbid-
ding the notion that, either within or without, it can be habit-
able by beings having vital organizations like man's.³ As to

¹ No satisfactory answer has ever appeared to the facts and reasonings
set forth by Professor William Whewell, in his "Plurality of Worlds," in
which he insists that neither the sun nor any one of the planets, except
the earth, is inhabited by living creatures having the characteristics of
man. This work was published anonymously, but its science and dialectic
power soon introduced it to the reading world. See Amer. Edit., 1856,
with Introduction by Dr. Edward Hitchcock, of Amherst College. By his
lectures and publications, Prof. Whewell has wrought a radical reform in
regard to the study of the physical sciences in England. Prof. Newcomb,
of America, seems to coincide in substance with the conclusions of the
³ In addition to the scientific statements as to the terrific turmoil and
heat of the sun from Proctor, to which reference has been previously made,
we give the strong words of Prof. Simon Newcomb, formerly of the U. S.
Naval Observatory, Washington: "Its earthquakes extend over thousands
Mercury and Venus, no animals with constitutions less resistant to fire than that of the fabled salamander could live on their surfaces, and there is no reason to suspect them to be less solid than the earth.¹ Our satellite, the moon, is, so far as known, a bare and desolate rock, having mountains and volcanoes of stony structure, but having neither water nor air, without which it is certain man cannot live. And although only one and the same side of the moon is fully turned to us, yet in her changes enough of that mysterious hidden side is revealed to our telescopes to show that it differs not materially from what we see and know.²

Mars is the planet most nearly approaching the conditions of our earth. But his light and heat are less than one-half of

of square miles and bury its whole surface in a chasm of liquid fire; the craters of its volcanoes open widely enough to engulf the earth, and throw up flames fifty thousand miles high; its hurricanes sometimes blow one hundred, or even two hundred, miles a second, and would instantly reduce any terrestrial matter they might strike to a fiery cloud."—"Eclipses of the Sun," by Prof. Newcomb, Princeton Review, November, 1878, p. 848. See also his "Physical Constitution of the Sun," "Popular Astronomy," Edit. 1878, pp. 268–269.

¹ We need hardly say that if Prof. Watson, at Separation, and Mr. Lewis Swift, at Denver, did, on the 29th of July, 1878, while observing the total eclipse of the sun, discover a planet Vulcan and another planet, within the orbit of Mercury, these planets cannot have inhabitants like unto the genus man. Le Verrier's calculations and predictions had shown the probability of an intra-Mercurial planet. But the discrepancies between the observations of Messrs. Watson and Swift defy all power of reconciliation. And, moreover, Prof. Watson was accompanied by his wife, and Mr. Swift was near "a party of enthusiastic young ladies, who proved themselves quick-eyed and delicate observers." How was it possible not to discover new planets under such circumstances?—"The Recent Solar Eclipse," by Prof. Young, Princeton Review, November, 1878, pp. 873, 874, 884–887. Prof. Newcomb is evidently sceptical as to the intra-Mercurial planets. See his "Popular Astronomy," pp. 292–296. His "Eclipses of the Sun," Princeton Review, November, 1878, was written after the supposed discovery.

those enjoyed by the earth, which are by no means too great for the wants of man; and though his density is nearly equal to the earth's, his mass is so much smaller that gravity at his surface is only one-half of ours. His red colors are supposed to be land and his green colors water; but clouds around him often intercept the observer's view, and frequent and horrible snow storms seem to rage over large parts of his surface. His recently discovered satellites add very little to the argument for human inhabitancy. We have reason to think that Mars is not yet fitted for the habitation of any animals like men.\(^1\)

As to the small planetoids between the orbits of Mars and Jupiter, they are already nearly two hundred in number, and the discovery of each new one is said to be the signal for anathemas, "not loud, but deep," from the subordinates in the great observatories of Europe and America, whose duty it becomes to watch them and calculate their tedious and distracting elements.\(^2\) These small bodies seem, by reasonable conjecture, to be fragments of a larger planet, whose orbit, according to the analogies of our system, ought to have been between Mars and Jupiter. How this larger planet came to be rent asunder we know not. But certainly we have little reason to think

\(^1\) "Plurality of Worlds," Amer. Edit., 1856, pp. 212–215. The recent discovery of two moons revolving around Mars, by Professor Hall, of the Naval Observatory, at Washington, is a very interesting scientific fact, and tends towards the establishment of the probability that, after the lapse of countless ages, the planet may be hereafter fitted for inhabitants. See "The Recent Solar Eclipse," by Prof. Charles A. Young, Princeton Review, November, 1878, pp. 874–875; Prof. Newcomb's "Popular Astronomy," Edit. 1878, pp. 329–331.

\(^2\) This remark was heard not many years ago in a lecture delivered in Richmond, Va., by an able astronomer of Cambridge, Mass. In May, 1878, when Prof. Newcomb prepared his last edition of the admirable "Popular Astronomy" for publication, the number of these small planets actually discovered was one hundred and eighty-seven! But have none been discovered since?
that after such a catastrophe, and with the disadvantages of their separated existence, the fragments are fit for man’s abode.

Jupiter is a huge world, with specific gravity so far less than that of the earth that a large part of his material constitution cannot in density exceed that of slime or mud. A very large part of his body is water, so that his seas have been called *bottomless.*\(^1\) His heat and light from the sun are less than one-twenty-fifth of that received by the earth. Yet we have reason to believe that terrific internal heat is working within and upon this enormous planet. Storms of cloud and wind are driven across his surface, often for two consecutive months without intermission, and at a velocity of two hundred miles per hour—a rate to which no hurricane on earth ever approached. Such disturbances of air and vapor can come from nothing less than great heat, and as the heat from the sun cannot be sufficient, internal heat of frightful intensity must be supposed.\(^2\) Assuredly then Jupiter cannot be inhabited by living creatures.

The able astronomer, Proctor, of England, conceding that the planet itself cannot have inhabitants, has conjectured that the splendid satellites of Jupiter may be peopled worlds. He supposes that Jupiter and Saturn may, in fact, be *suns,* gradually growing cooler, though still giving out heat and light enough, together with those coming from the central sun, to supply the satellites of these immense planets. His argument is rather one of sentiment than of reason, and is apparently founded on nothing stronger than the feeling that systems so grand and glorious as those of Jupiter and Saturn ought to have living inhabitants *somewhere.* But the analogies of our planetary system, and of the earth and her satellite, seem to forbid the idea that the secondary world shall be inhabited though the primary world is not. Nor have we any ascertained facts which

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render it more probable that the moons of Jupiter are fitted for human habitation than the moon of our earth.

As to Saturn, Uranus and Neptune, the facts and reasonings all render it very improbable—almost impossible—that they contain inhabitants like man.

From these significant facts and arguments, the full force of which have been recognized only within the past half century, we think two legitimate inferences may be drawn:

First, That the work of creation, so far as it consists in preparing worlds for the habitation of beings like man—spiritual, rational, intelligent, and yet material—beings able to understand and adore the wisdom, power and goodness of the Creator, is not only not completed, but is yet hardly begun. The universe exists indeed, but so far it exists only in its infancy.

Second, That nothing in reason or Scripture requires us to believe that God completed His work of material creation throughout the infinity of space in six days, whether those days are considered as natural days of twenty-four hours, or as geologic days, each enduring millions of years, and then rested for ever, to resume never again the creative work.\(^1\) The finished

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\(^1\) This idea is founded on an exaggerated interpretation of Genesis ii. 1, 2: "Thus the heavens and the earth were finished, and all the host of them. And on the seventh day God ended His work which He had made; and He rested on the seventh day from all His work which He had made." But in the Hebrew, the words rendered "heavens and earth"—\(\text{shamaim}\) and \(\text{aaretz}\)—are the same as those used in Genesis i. 1, and mean the same—\(\text{i.e.}\), the firmament and the earth. And the word \(\text{Tsaba\textquotesingle}m\), rendered "hosts of them," even by the boldest figure cannot be extended beyond "all the inhabitants," or all that the earth and firmament contain. Such is Gesenius' view, (Lexicon, p. 855.) The finished creation, therefore, was our present earth and firmament, including plants, fowls, fishes, lower animals, man and woman. Principal Dawson, though he believes in geologic ages, seems to think the "rest of the Creator" here spoken of meant a final cessation of all creative work, ("Origin of the World," Chap. XII.)—an interpretation as unsound as the meaning he attributes to \(\text{bara}\).
creation of God spoken of in the Scriptures was confined to that which directly concerned His creature man—that is, the firmament and the earth, and all they contained, plants, flowers, fruits, fowls, fishes, lower animals and man. From this creation God rested; hence we have no reason to believe that any new species, either of vegetables or animals, have ever since appeared on the earth, although new varieties, races and mixed blood strains have frequently appeared. And certainly the lesson of rest which God has thus given to man, and which His inspired Word has since taught us to observe, is equally benevolent and equally obligatory, whether we regard the days of the first chapter of Genesis as enduring twenty-four hours or millions of years.

From all the foregoing considerations, it is reasonable to conclude that, although God may not be engaged in all parts of infinite space, at all times, in carrying on works of creation—although, for reasons hidden in the infinite depths of His own wisdom and goodness, He may elect to adorn parts of infinite space with planetary systems, and from one of those systems may elect to finish one world such as ours, and to finish in it the whole creative system of being applicable to it, yet the work of creation is an eternal work. The relation the Divine Worker holds to matter is an eternal relation. There never was a time when He was not active in creation somewhere in space. And from all eternity, creations worthy of the wisdom and goodness of God, and manifestations of His power, have been in existence, beginning, in progress, completed, disorganized, changed, renewed, as His almighty will, exercised in harmony with His infinite and immutable attributes, has elected.

That this is so will farther appear from the consideration we now propose to give to one of the most glorious and sublime of all the creations of God, and one as eternal as sublime. This creation is Light.
What light is we may not be able to discover, even after all
the science of the world has been intent upon the investigation
for six thousand years. But whatever it may be, this we
certainly know, that where light is not darkness is. And
therefore, we know assuredly that God has never been without light.
The words of the inspired John are not only figuratively, but
literally, true: “God is light, and in Him is no darkness at
all.”

The very fact that these words apply to the moral purity
and truth of God increases the certainty that the material
manifestation which we call light was never absent from the
Divine Being. For the metaphor would never have been ap-
propriate had God been without the glorious presence on which
it is based.

It is impossible to form any worthy conception of God as
dwelling through eternal ages in material darkness, surrounded
by gloom, blackness, horror! To rebuke such a conception,
the dim visions of the ancients would rise up against us, sur-
rounding their Olympus, the home of the superior gods, with
light and glory, while Tartarus, the home of the damned, was
shrouded in cimmerian gloom.

But we are not left to reason merely on this subject. The
whole texture of the teachings of inspired Scripture confirms
the conclusion that God has never been without the presence
of light. His Word encourages our belief that light is the
supreme material blessing of the universe. Hence we read
that, in the day when truth and right triumphed over Haman,
“the Jews had light and gladness, and joy and honor;”
and
that, as punishment, “the light of the wicked shall be put out,
and the spark of his fire shall not shine;” and the instinctive
prayer of faith is, “Lord! lift Thou up the light of Thy
countenance upon us;” and her ascription of praise is, “The

1 John i. 5. 2 Job xvi. 5. 3 Esther viii. 16. 4 Psalms iv. 6.
Lord is my light and my salvation;”¹ and the inspired psalmist thus addresses God, “Thou art clothed with honor and majesty, who coverest Thyself with light as with a garment;”² and the wisest of men, in his inspired teaching, thus eulogizes this glorious creation: “Truly the light is sweet, and a pleasant thing it is for the eyes to behold the sun.”³

But in the New Testament we have something more distinct. St. Paul, in his first epistle to Timothy, thus describes God, the first Person of the adorable Trinity: “Who only hath immortality, dwelling in the light which no man can approach unto; whom no man hath seen, nor can see; to whom be honor and power everlasting. Amen.”⁴ And Christ proclaimed, “I am the Light of the world;” and when He was transfigured, and assumed, even in part, His celestial glory, “His raiment was white as the light;” and in the heavenly Jerusalem, the city has no need of sun or moon, for “the glory of God doth lighten it, and the Lamb is the Light thereof.”⁵

Thus it appears that we have the full warrant of both reason and holy Scripture for declaring that God has never been without the presence of light. And if light be matter, or a manifestation of matter, then it follows, by the inexorable laws of thought, that God has never been without the presence of matter manifested in light.⁶ Therefore matter, to the extent of its manifestation in that “unapproachable light” in which

¹ Psalms xxvii. 1. ⁴ 1 Timothy vi. 16. The original is as strong as language can be to express the eternal dwelling of God—φως οἰκεῖαν ἀποκαταστάσιν.
² Psalms civ. 1, 2. ⁵ John viii. 12; Matthew xvi. 2; Revelation xxi. 23.
³ Ecclesiastes xi. 7. ⁶ The sublime words, “And God said, Let there be light, and there was light,” Genesis i. 3, which attracted the admiration of the Greek rhetorician Longinus, evidently apply merely to the introduction of light to our world. Yet there are alive some theologians who, holding creation ex nihilo and rejecting geologic ages, believe that light, being a creation of God, has only existed about six thousand years!
God dwells, is necessarily eternal. And if this be admitted, we have no farther difficulty in admitting that all matter is eternal.

Mysterious and inscrutable as are many of the scientific questions concerning light, we have no difficulty in demonstrating that it is either matter or a manifestation of matter. No facts are known which have the slightest tendency to prove that light has ever existed, or can exist, without the presence of matter.

On this subject we look in vain for aid from ancient learning. The most acute philosophers of Egypt and Greece knew very little of astronomy, and less of chemistry; and though they made remarkable advances in some branches of mathematical science, and applied its principles with success in constructing pyramids and other works of art, they seem never to have learned more than the lowest forms of the science of optics, though light was above them and around them every day of their lives.¹ They seem to have contented themselves with enjoying the cheer of the sunlight, the glories of the rainbow and the gorgeous splendors of the twilight hour, without troubling themselves as to the mode of being of these phenomena. In fact, we can hardly suppress a sentiment of compassion and surprise when we think of the nearsighted and the old of ancient days, when the refraction and polarization of light were hardly suspected, and double concave or convex lenses were unknown.²

From such epochs we learn very little of real light.

¹ The ancient Greeks knew something of the laws of reflected light; and Euclid wrote a treatise on optics, "τα υπερτιχα"; but both he and Plato taught that rays of light came from the eye itself, and not from the visible object.—Henry Davis' translation of the "Timaeus," Bohn's Clas. Lib., Plato, Vol. II., pp. 350, 351; Art. Optics, New Amer. Cyclop., Vol. XII., pp. 535, 536.

² We find no mention of such lenses, or "spectacles," earlier than the time of Roger Bacon, who died in 1292 A. D. On the tomb of Salvinus Armatus, a Florentine nobleman, who died in 1317, the inscription states that he was the inventor of spectacles.
In modern times two theories concerning light have battled with each other, supported on either side by eminent names. On the one side has been the corpuscular, or emission theory, of which Sir Isaac Newton was the leading advocate; on the other, the undulatory, or wave theory, first suggested by Descartes, afterwards sustained by Dr. Hooke and Huyghens against Newton, and which now, by successive experiments and observations by the French scientists, Foucault, Fizeau, and Fresnel, and the German Professor Eugene Lommel, may be considered as the established theory of to-day.\(^1\)

Sir Isaac Newton held that light is matter, although of ineffably subtle and aetherial nature and perfectly imponderable, that is, freed from all operation of the laws of gravity, so that no amount of light contained in or added to or absorbed by any material object would increase its weight. And it must be admitted that in holding light to be imponderable, and yet to be matter, the great astronomer violated no principle of consistency or intuitive truth. For although Professor Alexander Bain, the "two sided" materialist of Aberdeen, teaches that "inertia is accompanied by gravity, a peculiarly material property,"\(^2\) yet the true science, which holds that force is an

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\(^1\) Johnson's "Turner's Chemistry," pp. 60–61; Chambers' "Miscellany," Vol. X., Part 2d, pp. 14–15; Prof. Wells' "Principles and Applications of Chemistry," Edit. 1868, pp. 112, 113; Dr. Eugene Lommel's "Nature of Light," Internat. Scientific Series, Edit. 1876, Chap. XV. Lommel is professor of physics in the University of Erlangen. His work, though popular in form and style, purports to give the latest results of optical science. Yet light remains a mystery. Dr. Rankine, of Glasgow, suggests an oscillatory theory, which will dispense with a continuous medium of aether; and the daring suggestion has even been made that light may, like gravitation, require no interval of time for passing between worlds.—Art. Light, New Amer. Cyclop., Vol. X., p. 518. But this idea is negated by thousands of observations on the eclipses of the satellites of Jupiter, the aberration of fixed stars, and the actual velocity of light as ascertained by the apparatus of Foucault.

emanation from God, and that gravitation is force, denies that weight is an essential property of matter, like extension and inertia. The mind has no difficulty in conceiving of matter divorced by almighty power from the law of gravity, and, therefore, imponderable; but the mind cannot conceive of any substance without extension and yet material.

Newton's theory of light was formed in connection with his beautiful prismatic experiments, by which the compound nature of the ray of white light was demonstrated, and the spectrum was made to exhibit the formula of vibgyor—the violet, indigo, blue, green, yellow, orange and red, which shade themselves out from the three primary colors—red, yellow and blue. It seemed necessary, in developing his views of colors and of optics, to assume the existence of material particles coming from luminous bodies, and acting under laws similar to those which govern the sensations of smell—sensations known to be excited by material particles coming in the form of invisible effluvia from the odorous object.¹

But even in his own day, and on his own chosen battle-ground of the Cambridge University, Sir Isaac Newton found his corpuscular theory opposed by keen and stern belligerents. It was objected that, admitting light to be imponderable, yet if it was matter, its particles had dimensions, however ætherial and minute, and that millions of these particles, moving at the terrific velocity of 192,000 miles per second, would impinge upon the human eye and frame, and, indeed, upon all animal and vegetable life, with fatal effect. This objection had immense force; for a series of experiments had demonstrated that light is not instantaneous, but temporal, in its transit from one body to another; and the conclusion seemed inevitable that, although

¹ Prof. Wells' "Principles and Applications of Chemistry," p. 113; Dr. Eugene Lommel's "Nature of Light," Internat. Scientific Series, pp. 210-211.
not propelled by gravity, yet if emitted in rays of actual matter through a space of more than ninety millions of miles at this ascertained rate of speed, its momentum on reaching the earth would give it a power absolutely destructive. Moreover, the ingenious Huyghens, by a series of observations, "founded on the finest experimental analysis of the phenomena," discovered a very interesting law of double refraction of light in passing through the medium known as Iceland spar. But because this law (which is now fully established) aided the undulatory theory, and seemed hostile to his own, Sir Isaac Newton rejected it without proper examination!¹

Finally, many years after the death of Newton, the eminent French physicist, Augustin Jean Fresnel, brought to the point of demonstration the strange and complicated phenomena of double refraction and polarization of light in Iceland spar, quartz, tourmalin, and other crystals, and proved that these phenomena were inconsistent with the corpuscular theory of light, because they proved that when rays or waves of light encountered each other, under proper conditions, this interference, instead of increasing the amount of light (which the corpuscular theory required), not only diminished it, but in some cases destroyed it, and caused a line of darkness to manifest itself. Carrying out this idea, Fresnel caused to be constructed an ingenious apparatus, with two mirrors of black glass, and certain screws and hinges, by means of which he was able to project two cones of reflected light simultaneously upon the same spot of a screen, but from opposing directions. Immediately dark lines appeared on the screen at the points of interference; but when one of the reflecting mirror-surfaces was covered, these dark lines disappeared, and only an illuminated area was visible.²

² This experiment is fully described and illustrated in Lommel's "Nature of Light," Internat. Scientific Series, Edit. 1876, pp. 207–218.
WAVE THEORY.

From the time when these discoveries and experiments of Fresnel were made known, the wave theory has been steadily gaining ground, until now it must be considered as the received hypothesis of science as to the nature and transmission of light. We will seek briefly to explain it.

This undulatory theory supposes that the phenomena attending sight are not like those attending the sense of smell, but are rather like those attending the sense of hearing. We hear sounds, not by the entrance of material particles into the ear, but by means of motion or disturbance in our atmosphere, which manifests itself in undulations or waves, that finally reach the tympanum of the ear and communicate the sensation of sound. This transference of motion takes place medially, that is, through an elastic medium, in which the body originally in motion excites a vibratory movement that is propagated in waves, it may be to a great distance, without a particle of the originally moving body itself, or any portion of the propagating medium, moving from its original position to any considerable extent. This process is called undulatory movement.¹

Such is believed to be the mode in which light from the sun, agitating and exciting waves of inconceivable rapidity in the intervening medium, moves to our earth and blesses us with its presence. This theory is found to explain all the phenomena of color, of reflection, of refraction, of interference and of polarization which have, thus far, in scientific experience, been proved to exist. And it is free from the very grave objections applicable to the corpuscular theory. Nevertheless, so long had the theory of rays and the language proper to it been used, and so convenient was it found, that the terms of this theory

are still in common use, and seem little disposed to abandon the field.

But whether we adopt the corpuscular or the wave theory, it remains equally certain that the presence of light infallibly indicates the presence of matter. "Ohne Phosphor, kein Gedanke"—without phosphorus, no thought—is the rash saying of a German materialist, quoted by Professor Tyndall, with the admission, however, that this may or may not be true, and that the problem of the connection of body and soul is as insoluble in its modern form as it was in pre-scientific ages. The German was illogical, because, although phosphorus is an invariable constituent of the human brain, it is not necessary to thought, for divine thought existed before phosphorus was ever made as a material element. But without matter, no light is a scientific truth, established by all the ascertained facts of the universe which relate to the subject.

If the theory of Sir Isaac Newton be adopted, the question is of course ended; for that theory assumes that light is matter, and erects all its structures upon that basis.

But if we adopt the wave theory, which seems better sustained by fact and reason, we are still driven to the conclusion that the presence of matter is indispensable to the manifestation of light. And we must bear in mind that, in the necessary essence of things, light unmanifested is not light at all. Some things may really exist though not manifested to man; but nothing exists which is not manifested either to God or to man.

And with reverence we are compelled to declare, from principles of impossibility already established, that light, if not manifested to God, is not light at all; and if manifested, then the very presence of light indicates the presence of matter. No wisdom less than Divine uttered those words, "Neither do

1 Lecture on Scientific Materialism, Appendix to Belfast Address, pp. 106–117.
men light a candle and put it under a bushel, but on a candlestick, and it giveth light unto all that are in the house." "The light of the body is the eye: if therefore thine eye be single, thy whole body shall be full of light. But if thine eye be evil, thy whole body shall be full of darkness. If therefore the light that is in thee be darkness, how great is that darkness!"¹ There is a depth of meaning in these passages which may escape superficial thought. They authorize us to believe that light not manifested is as though it were not, and that God has never been without the presence of this glorious creation, of which the presence is the symbol of holiness and purity, as its absence is the symbol of depravity and sin.

That the existence of light indicates the existence of matter seems to be proved by the following arguments:

1. The wave theory requires the existence of a material, though exceedingly ætherial and elastic, medium by which light is manifested and transferred. Without this medium light would not be. This medium is not our atmospheric envelope, for that extends only some sixty miles above us, and if that were all, we could never have light from the sun or stars. And, moreover, our atmosphere, so far from being the only appropriate medium of light, refracts it, interferes with it, and sometimes seeks to shut it off from us. We are therefore compelled by this theory to hold what we have sought to demonstrate in this work: that is, that through all the illimitable fields of space, reaching millions of millions of miles beyond our sun and beyond the most distant fixed stars, there is diffused æther, or something far more etherial and fine than æther—matter, perhaps in some places in its normal state—and by means of which light reaches and blesses us from those phosphors—those light-bearers—spread through the heavens, and which God, by His

¹ Matthew v. 15; vi. 22, 28. The form of these divine words given by St. Luke is even more striking.—Luke xi. 32–36.
almighty energy, supplies from eternity with the forces needed to make them self-luminous. To us the chief of these is the sun; the assistants are the fixed stars, each of which is probably a sun. And by means of reflection, the moon and planets aid in the work of beauty and glory which God has wrought for our earthly home.

2. Light is invariably manifested by matter, when that matter is intensely elevated in temperature—in other words, intensely wrought upon by force—and is never thus manifested without matter. It had long been known that all solid matter, and especially all metallic substances, when intensely heated, emit light—become self-luminous; but it remained for modern experiment to prove that “every form of matter,” whether solid, liquid or gaseous, whether earth, water or air, “when sufficiently heated, has the power of emitting rays of light, and thus becomes self-luminous.” Therefore, so far as we have any knowledge from any source, we are able to say that light is a manifestation of matter, and has never been manifested without

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1 “As the view that light is itself a material substance is set aside, and it is regarded as an undulatory movement, it becomes necessary to admit the existence of a material in which the waves of light can propagate themselves. The air in which the waves of sound spread cannot be coincidently the carrier of luminous waves, for it only forms a thin investment around our earth, and perhaps other heavenly bodies; whilst in the immeasurable depths of space, through which the light of the sun and the fixed stars reaches us, no air is present. It must, therefore, be admitted that the universe is filled with an elastic material, which is so rarified that it opposes no appreciable resistance to the movement of the heavenly bodies. This attenuated elastic matter is called ‘ether.’”—Lommel’s “Nature of Light,” Internat. Scientific Series, Chap. XV., p. 213. Italics ours.

2 “All solid substances, heated to about 977° F., begin to emit light, and are then said to be incandescent.”—Art. Light, New Amer. Cyclop., Vol. X., p. 514.

matter. If it be insisted that God, by His omnipotence, may have created light without matter, then we answer that there is nothing in revelation and nothing in reason to justify any such assumption; for the holy Scriptures, whenever they speak of light literally, and not metaphorically, connect it with the existence of matter, and speak of it as a creation of God, just as is all the material universe. And every fact known to reason assures her that all matter, when heated to intensity, emits light, and that without matter light does not exist.

3. The fact that every ray of light, however attenuated and however dazzlingly white it may appear, is susceptible, by material instruments, of being decomposed and resolved into seven rays or pencils, each of different color, is strong evidence that matter is the necessary substratum of light; for we cannot, by any effort of mind, divorce the idea of color from the idea of matter of some kind in which this property or accident of color inheres. And hence color is properly reckoned as, either primarily or secondarily, a necessary intuition arising when the mind considers matter. Professor Bain accurately says: "Color is a truly material property; it cannot attach to a feeling, properly so called, a pleasure or a pain."¹ And sounder metaphysicians than Bain are equally distinct in regarding color as essentially and fundamentally an idea never attached to aught save matter.² To suppose that light, which gives color to everything else, has yet no color itself, is to suppose an effect greater than its cause, which is unphilosophical.

4. The fact that all rays of light, when passing obliquely from one material medium unto another of different density,

² The scientific definition of color is: "One of those simple and obvious qualities of physical objects, as perceived by us, which can only be defined by its synonyms, hue, dye, &c.—Art. Color, New Amer. Cyclop., Vol. V., p. 494. See Wight's edition of Sir Wm. Hamilton's Philosophy, pp. 318-372.
Theories of Creation.

are refracted—that is, deflected from the straight path theretofore travelled into a path forming a distinct angle with the original line—is farther evidence that light is inseparably related to matter. And the double refraction, interference and polarization of light, which have been subjects of so much skilful observation from the days of Huyghens and Fresnel to the present time, are added proofs of the same fact; for all these phenomena occur only when material conditions are present, and the very words, refraction, reflection, polarization, indicate material changes in the course of the ray. Without the presence of matter, it would be just as absurd to say that light is refracted and takes another course as it would be to say that a man walking along a road has turned into another road, when there was no other road, or no material substratum, on which he could walk.

5. The perfectly ascertained fact that light is not instantaneous in its transit from one material point to another, but occupies some measurable period of time in its passage, furnishes an argument for its material conditions which seems to be unanswerable. The force of gravity, which is the direct operation of an everywhere present God, requires no measurable time in passing between the most distant points of the material universe. The attraction of the sun on the earth is instantaneous; it cannot be measured in time; time is not an element entering into it, because gravity is not a creature, but a force coming directly from the eternal mind, who is paramount to all succession of time. But it is certain that light requires rather more

1 "The rate with which light travels has been measured in several ways, and no question can remain as to the accuracy of the result. It is certain light does not travel at a greater rate than about 190,000 miles per second."—Proctor's "Expanse of Heaven," London Edit., 1878, p. 202.

The able and devout astronomer, Richard A. Proctor, demonstrates that the action of gravity is, necessarily, millions of times more rapid than that of light, and adds the significant words, "even if it do not travel with
than eight minutes to travel from the sun to our earth; and requires about twenty years to travel from the huge fixed star Sirius to our earth! Now, if light were not an adjunct or manifestation of matter, it would not be thus subject to the inseparable conditions of matter, one of which is the necessity for time in transit from one point in space to another point. If light were only a force coming from the eternal mind, it might act without intervals or succession of time between the most distant points of the material universe; but it does not so act.

By all these ascertained facts, and the sound logical results coming from them, we are led to the conclusion that the presence of light indicates with certainty the presence of matter. And as God “dwelleth in light,” and has been invested with light from all eternity, and yet sovereignly claims light as His creation, it follows that from all eternity matter has existed as the υποστασις—the substratum of the dwelling of God.1

God is indeed everywhere. He fills immensity with His presence. Not only in every part of His material creations, but in every part of illimitable space He is. Yet the fact of the Divine ubiquity by no means forbids us to believe that, in some elected region of space, He may have His own peculiar dwelling.

infinite velocity, as some philosophers suppose.”—“Expans of Heaven,” p. 207. It is cheering to know that “some philosophers” are beginning to recognize that force is from God.

1 Milton’s sublime apostrophe to light is far more accurate in science and in theology than some of his prose teachings:

“Hail, holy light! offspring of heaven first born,
Or of the Eternal, co-eternal beam,
May I express thee unblamed? Since God is Light,
And never but in unapproachable light
Dwelt from eternity, dwelt then in thee,
Bright effluence of bright essence increa’t.”

—“Paradise Lost,” Book III., lines 1–6.
And when we contemplate the matchless beauty and glory with which He is able, by His created light, to bless our humble homes in this lower world—the colors of the rainbow, not seen merely in the prismatic arch thrown over the firmament by the sun's rays dispersed by drops of rain, but flashing in thousands of shells and crystals, the gorgeous paintings in cloud and sky spread over east and west in morning and evening, and meeting the eye and the imagination in forms of serene loveliness, which invite our thoughts to heaven, we may conceive some faint idea of that celestial dwelling of light and glory in which the elected home of God consists.

To this dwelling we are now seeking, with profound humility and reverence, to approach. That it is "unapproachable"—ἀπρόσκοπτοι—by unaided man is most true; but the Spirit of God, proceeding from the Father and the Son, has, in measure suited to our weakness, removed the veil, and enabled us to look, not on the Father, but on the Son of God.
CHAPTER VII.

THE SON OF GOD.

REASON is competent to teach man that there is a God, and to teach much of His necessarily spiritual being and of His attributes; but concerning the mode of His being, and the mysteries investing Him from eternity and veiling Him from unenlightened human ken, reason can teach nothing except the absolute necessity for revelation; and this revelation we have in the Holy Scriptures, given to us from time to time by “holy men of God, who spake as they were moved by the Holy Ghost.”¹

It does not enter into the plan of this work to demonstrate the authority and inspiration of the Holy Scriptures. That task has long been done; and, notwithstanding the active hostility of three thousand years in every form of objection that the unrenewed human soul could devise, the Bible endures, a standing miracle, a book not like other books, a work manifestly above the utmost powers of man, and supplying by its own internal light the deepest needs of the human soul. To this source of light we must look in order dimly to see through the solemn veil which hangs over Eternal Being.

Yet even reason in her widest sense, and when taken as embracing all human powers, thought, feeling and experience, apart from revealed knowledge, raises a faint and feeble suggestion that God may be a Father in a higher form than that implied in universal fatherhood. The paternal relation, and its

¹ 2 Peter i. 21.
accompanying and inscrutable mystery of generation, affect the thoughts of all mankind. Hence the happiest of heathen intuitions conceived of the universal generative energy as a divine impulse; and Venus, in her most genial and ennobling forms, was not the presiding deity of lust and foul debauchery, but the universal love pervading all nature, and urging all animated being to the sacred duty of reproduction.\(^1\)

The anthropomorphied spirit, when divorced from the restraints of revelation, is prone to attribute to God all that is found, most glorious, genial and delightful in man. Hence the family relation, by which a father is surrounded by his wife and his children, is freely attributed by all mythic religions to their gods. Jupiter, Latona, Ceres, Apollo have their children. Even Pluto, whose gloomy dwelling seemed to repel all hopes of a happy marriage, snatches Proserpine from her earthly paradise and becomes the father of the terrible Eumenides, while his beautiful wife divides with the fate Atropos the awful function of releasing by death the human soul by cutting off a lock of hair from the head of the dying.

And in our own times, and under the full light of Christianity, we have seen this same spirit perverted, by the German Ludwig Feuerbach, into a deliberate attempt to represent God as not a real being, but a dream of man, founded on his own nature and

\(^1\) Even the avowed materialist, who banished other gods to a serene and tranquil exclusion from earthly cares, is forced to invoke Venus:

``
Alma Venus! cæli subter labentia signa
Quae mare navigerum, quæ terras frugi ferentis
Concelebras, per te quoniam genus omne animantium
Concipitur visit quo exortum lumina solis.
Te, Dea, te fugiunt venti, te nubila cæli
Adventum quæ tuum, tibi suavis dædala tellus
Submittit flores, tibi rident aquora ponti
Placatum quæ nitet diffuso lumine calum."
environment in time—as, in fact, an imaginary being, projected on the thin and unreal veil of man’s fancy by his own relations in life; so that the relation of fatherhood in man has furnished his dream with the idea of God the Father, his relation to his own child has furnished the dream of God the Son, and his relation to his wife has furnished the unsubstantial vision of the Virgin Mary, which, Feuerbach insists, is far older and more vivid in man’s religious dream than that of the Holy Spirit.\(^1\) To such absurdities may the anthropomorphic tendency bring man, if not informed and controlled by the Spirit who dictated the inspired Scriptures.

Nevertheless, if it be true, as we have sought in this work to establish, that matter is the eternal substratum of mind, then arises at once a presumption or mental suggestion that if God should at any time be pleased to reveal to us as a truth that He has a Son, not created, but begotten, it will also appear that this mysterious and ineffable generation was an eternal generation, because it was the act of the Eternal Father, and that the element emanating from the material though eternal σωτήριος enters from eternity into the constitution of the Son. And such we believe and maintain to be the teaching of Scripture on this subject, which necessarily transcends all human reason and enquiry. To the Word of God we now appeal.

The inspired Scriptures plainly reveal that there is and has been from all eternity a Son of God—“the only begotten of the Father, full of grace and truth.”\(^2\) He is the one and only begotten of God. When this fact is revealed, we have no difficulty in finding for it the sanction of reason; for as God is

\(^1\) Feuerbach’s “Das Wesen des Christenthums,” passim. It has been translated into English under the title of “Essence of Christianity,” but happily has proved too dreamy to gain much currency among people wide awake.

\(^2\) St. John’s Gospel, i. 14.
one, infinite and eternal, the One infinite and eternal Son would be the only worthy contemplation that we could give to a generative relation which, being eternal, fills all time, extends beyond all time, never began, will never end, and therefore, of necessity, admits but The One. Those passages of Scripture which speak of "sons of God" may not all be easy of interpretation, yet not one of them raises the faintest presumption that, in the sense of the "Only begotten," the "Well beloved," the Son who is "in the bosom of the Father," any of these beings spoken of in the plural as "sons of God" were by generation related to The Son.¹

That the generation of this Son by the Divine Father is an eternal generation is taught in the Scriptures, and has been the creed of Christendom since any belief on this subject was formulated. The confessions of the inspired Peter, "Thou art the Christ, the Son of the living God," and "Thou art the Holy One of God," and of Thomas, "My Lord and my God," were included and gradually formed into the apostolic traditions which Ignatius, Irenæus, Tertullian, Cyprian, Novatian, Origen, Lucian of Antioch, and Eusebius of Cæsarea successively announced, until it assumed the form, "We believe in One God, the Father Almighty, Maker of all things, visible

¹ Genesis vi. 2 tells of "the sons of God" who took fair daughters of men as wives. Some fanciful interpreters think these "sons" were the angels of God. Even Gesenius favors this view, (Lexicon, Edit. 1836, p. 156), and Thomas Moore has founded on it his rich poem, "The Loves of the Angels." But a more sober and truthful exegesis contrasts these "sons of God" with the concurrent expression "sons of men," and supposes the first to be the religiously educated descendants of Seth, and the last to be the ungodly lineage of Cain. The "sons of God" in Job i. 6 and ii. 1 were doubtless the higher angels, among whom Satan once had a right to a place, and with whom, by Divine permission and for wise purposes, he was allowed "to present himself before the Lord." See Gesenius, p. 156; Cruden's Concordance, Edit. 1841, words "child" and "sons."
and invisible; and in one Lord Jesus Christ, the Word of God, God of God, Light of light, Life of life, the Only begotten Son, the First born of every creature, begotten of God the Father before all ages; by whom also all things were made. And being eternally generated, the Son is co-eternal with the Father, and equal in power and glory.

But though Christianity has realized and acknowledged the eternity of the Son, she has not in her human symbols heretofore realized and acknowledged that this Son has been, not only God, but the God-man from all eternity. To this all-important question we must now attend.

The most exalted form in which it is possible for matter to be constituted is the form of man. The ancients knew and recognized this. Hence they invariably embodied their highest ideal of the Divine Being in the best and most perfect model of the human form that their cultured imaginations could present. On this point there was a striking consensus among all the schools of Greece and Rome, the Socratic, the Platonic, the Peripatetic, the Epicurean, the Stoic, the Academic. And so Cicero puts this natural and intuitive conception into the

1 This is the creed of Eusebius, which his church at Caesarea had received from the bishops of former times in catechizing and at baptism, and which he himself had learned from Scripture, believed and taught. See Dr. Schaff's "Creeds of Christendom," Vol. II., pp. 29, 30. The Greek—Ἡμῖν πάντων τῶν αἰωνίων ἐκ τοῦ θεοῦ πατρός γεγεννημένω—will, without violence, admit the rendering, "From all eternal ages, by God the Father begotten." See Luther's Enchiridion, 2d Article. "Ich glaube dass Jesus Christus wahrhaftiger Gott, vom Vater in Ewigkeit geboren."—"Creeds of Christendom," Vol. III., p. 79. Athenasian Creed, Ibid., Vol. II., pp. 66, 67; Canons and Decrees of the Council of Trent, Ibid., Vol. II., p. 79; Thirty-nine Articles of the Anglican Church, Article 2d, Irish Articles, Ibid., Vol. III., p. 528; Westminster Confession, Cap. II. Filius autem a patre est aterne genus.—"Creeds of Christendom," Vol. III., p. 608. Isaiah liii. 8; John i. 14, 18; Dr. Charles Hodge's "Systematic Theology," Vol. I., pp. 468-471.
mouth of his Epicurean reasoner, Velleius, and of the Stoic, Balbus, and of the Academician, Cotta.

When we seek to analyze our conceptions of a perfect material being, we find that we cannot content ourselves with the idea merely of size or bulk, or of swiftness, or strength, or beauty. A mountain is large, but it is not as large—it does not contain as much in area or bulk—as the monotonous plain spread beneath it; an elephant or a hippopotamus is large, but he by no means excites our admiration (and, in a certain sense, our respect) as much as the horse, or even the tiny bee. And as to swiftness, the lightning is swift, but the temporary and blinding flash is far from giving us the idea of perfect material. A steam engine is strong, but when compared with the inventor standing by its side, the engine sinks into insignificance. Clouds piled in fantastic shapes, and lighted with prismatic colors after sunset, realize some of our highest conceptions of mere beauty; but we know that they are baseless, transitory, gone in an hour, and therefore they can never approach our ideal of the material perfect.

It is thus impossible for the mind of man to conceive of any

1 "Quod, si animantium formam vincit hominis figura, deus autem animans est, ea figura profecto est quae pulcherrima est omnium, quoniam que deos beatissimos esse constat, beatus autem sine virtute nemo potest, nec virtus sine ratione constare, nec ratio usquam inesse nisi in hominis figura, hominis esse specie deos contentum est.—'De Natura Deorum,' Lib. I., Cap. 18, p. 18, Lipsiae, 1877.

2 "A Diis immortalibus hominibus esse provisum, si erit tota hominis fabricatio perspecta omnisque humanae naturae figura atque perfectio." —Ibid., p 88, and post 84–90.

Cotta approves the Epicurean theory, that the perfect human form must be attributed to the gods, but sharply criticizes the notion that, nevertheless, these gods have no interest in human actions or affairs. "Quum vero deos nihil agere, nihil curare confirmat, membris que humanis esse praeditos sed eorum membrorum usum habere nullum, ludere videtur satisque putare, si dixerit esse quandam beatam naturam aeternam." —Ibid., p. 95.
material constituency more perfect than a perfect human form. It must not be gigantic, for giants have always been justly classed among the monstra of the world; it must not be diminutive, for dwarfs have always excited merely a curiosity akin to contempt; but a man, standing erect, firm, graceful, lithe, well proportioned, with shoulders not bowed, but square and easy; with head not drooped, nor yet bent back, but raised and self-poised; with eyes looking forward, around, above;—this is a material Being, highest of the high—the most exalted form in which matter can exist.

To this noble material being the words of the stoic philosopher, as Cicero has given them, may well apply: “From his perfections may be understood how many and how wonderful are the gifts bestowed on men by God, who first brought them from the dust, and constituted them tall and erect, that they might, by beholding heaven, take in a knowledge of God. For men, though from the earth, are not merely its colonists and inhabitants, but quasi spectators of Divine and celestial things, of which no other genus of animals enjoys the spectacle.” And the Roman poet attributes this same supreme dignity to the human form when he describes man as endowed by Divine Power:

“Os homini sublime dedit, calumque tueri
Jussit, et erectos ad sidera tollere vultus.”

Therefore, as we know that the second Person of the Godhead—the Son of God—is now man, has this sublime human form, and will be man for all eternity to come, so we do Him no manner of dishonor in asserting that, during all eternity past, He has been Man—God-man—the highest possible union of the material with the spiritual that we can conceive, or that eternal generation could beget.

But to this God-man we may not attribute the weaknesses and limitations of finite beings, whether angels or men. "In Him dwelleth all the fulness of the Godhead bodily." The word rendered "bodily" expresses the idea of the material more potently than any other adverb of the Greek language. And the use of the present tense, "dwelleth," indicates eternal, ceaseless existence. And if the fulness of the Godhead can now dwell in the Man Christ Jesus, no conceivable reason can be given why it should not thus dwell in the God-man from eternity. And if the Godhead in its fulness dwelt in His body, then that body, though material, was endowed with all the forces, powers, causes which Omnipotence possesses.

Hence we are prepared to find the body of the Son of God freed from all the laws of gravitation except when His will determined that His material frame should come under those laws. Light is sublimely rapid in its undulations, but the body freed from gravity might pass from world to world a million times more rapidly than light. And this body might stand in the midst of the hottest fire on earth, yes, of the sun or of Sirius, and receive no hurt; for its own immanent forces would be sufficient to repel the forces of motion which produce heat, and keep them in equilibrio around it. And such a body might walk on the liquid surface of a lake of water with as much safety as on solid ground; and might pass through solid walls and locked doors; and might disappear from human eyes, not slowly and gradually like vapor, but instantaneously; and might rise from the earth and ascend to the home where God dwelleth in unapproachable light. And all these conditions

1 Colossians ii. 9. The original is ὁτι εν αυτῳ κατοικει παν το πληρωμα της θεωτης σωματικως.

2 We have no difficulty in accepting such a conclusion as true in science when we remember that skilled empirics have, in several instances, ventured to dip the human hand (suitably moist) into a vessel full of molten metal, and have withdrawn it unhurt!
have been actually met and fulfilled by the material being of the Son of God. Therefore we are ready, with reverence, awe and assured faith, to believe the declarations of Scripture, that creation is His work. "All things were made by Him, and without Him was not anything made that was made." ¹ "By Him were all things created that are in heaven, and that are in earth, visible and invisible, whether they be thrones, or dominions, or principalities, or powers; all things were created by Him, and for Him; and He is before all things, and by Him all things consist." ²

But although infinite power and force are concentrated in the Son of God, and attend His material constitution, yet that constitution, being verily matter, is never to be held as existing or acting in modes contradictory to the essential properties of matter. His body has a place—a ubi—and it cannot be in more than one place at the same moment of time. It is not ubiquitous, as is the Divine Spirit of the Son. Hence the doctrine of the real corporeal presence of the body and blood of the Second Person of the Trinity in the elements of bread and wine, which may be consecrated by thousands of separate priests in thousands of different places in the same moment of time, is false and impossible. Such a doctrine cannot be supported by the assertion of miracle, for miracle, though supernatural and requiring infinite power, is never wrought, and cannot be wrought, in violation of the essential properties either of mind or matter. ³

¹ John i. 3. ² Colossians i. 16, 17. ³ Arthur Collier sought to commend his doctrine of idealism to Protestants by urging that it was a complete refutation and overthrow of the Roman Catholic doctrine of transubstantiation. For if, in fact, there is in the universe no matter—nothing but ideas—of course the body and blood of Christ exist neither in the elements consecrated in the mass nor elsewhere. See Sir Wm. Hamilton's "Philosophy of Perception," Wight's Amer. Edit., pp. 299–305. But in order to demonstrate that the same
Having thus presented the hypothesis that the Son of God has been from all eternity the God-man, and having given the needed preliminary illustrations, furnished alike by reason and revelation, we now proceed to test this hypothesis by Holy Scripture. To this test we submit such a question with absolute humility. If the inspired Word, by its direct statements, connected with the reasonable and proper inferences from its statements, is found to sustain this hypothesis, then it ought to be adopted and believed. If it do not sustain it, then the hypothesis ought to be discarded. We verily believe and will seek to show that scriptural authority establishes it as true.

And first, if the Son of God be God-man from eternity, we might expect to find intimations of this sublime truth in the earliest records of inspired teaching given to our race. And accordingly we do find in the opening chapter of the first book of Holy Scripture an intimation to this effect so plain, when taken in connection with other inspired words, that it goes very far towards the establishment of the doctrine.

After describing the progress of creation in our earth and firmament through the geologic changes necessary to fit them for their purposes, and through the successive creative acts by which grass, herbs, fruit trees, fishes, fowls, great whales, and all the lower animals were brought into being, the inspired seer opens the Divine dwelling and permits us to listen to a colloquy, in which none could have taken part except the co-equal persons of the Godhead: “And God said, Let us make man in our

material cannot be in more than one place in the same moment of time, we surely need not outrage common sense by denying the existence of a stone wall and running our heads against it! It is a significant proof of the imperfection of human creeds, and of the perverse ingenuity of man, that the doctrine of the absolute ubiquity of the material body and blood of Christ was a subject of embittered controversy among protestants for years after the Reformation. See Dr. Schaff’s “Creeds of Christen-
ist., Vol. I., and Creeds, Vol. III.
image, after our likeness: and let them have dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the fowl of the air, and over the cattle, and over all the earth, and over every creeping thing that creepeth upon the earth.”

Now the Hebrew word which is here rendered “image,” is Tselem, which assuredly conveys the idea of a material image or model. It is not indeed the same word which is used in the first given form of the Second Commandment, the moral law against idolatry. Here the word used is Pesel, which is properly rendered “graven image,” and which conveys the idea peculiarly of a form or figure, material indeed, but carved, moulded or graven by the handicraft of man. But the word Tselem is used in its plural form in Numbers xxxiii. 52: “Then ye shall drive out all the inhabitants of the land from before you, and destroy all their pictures, and destroy all their molten images (Tsalimey), and quite pluck down all their high places;” and in 2 Kings xi. 18: “And all the people of the land went into the house of Baal, and brake it down: his altars and his images (Tsilauma) brake they in pieces thoroughly;” and in the book of Daniel this same word in its Chaldee forms is used to express the idolatrous image set up by the King Nebuchadnezzar, and which he required all men to fall down before and worship, on pain of being cast into a “burning fiery furnace.”

The Greek equivalent used in the Septuagint is εἰκόν, which may be an image, or statue, or likeness, or portrait, but always conveys the idea of a material and visible figure.

We cannot, therefore, escape the conclusion that the image

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1 Genesis i. 26.  
3 Exodus xx. 3.  
4 Daniel iii. 1, 3, 7, 10, 12, 14, 16, 18, the form is Tselem; in Genesis i. 26, Bitsalimeni—“in the image of us.”  
5 The exact words are Πνευματικόν ανθρωπόν κατ' εἰκόνα μετέτρεψα—Septuagint, Lipsiae, 1835, p. 2.
spoken of in this celestial conference was a visible and material image. Any other conclusion would tend strongly to banish from the Scriptures the laws against idolatry, which is a sin of deepest dye, dishonoring to God and degrading to man.

But there is a peculiar and subtle significance in the word Tselem, here rendered image, which greatly adds to the strength of our argument. That word, though properly rendered "image," conveys also the idea of a shadow, a shade, a reflected or secondary representation. Gesenius gives this as one of its elements; and it is probably this shade of meaning which it takes on in Psalms lxiii. 20: "As a dream when one awaketh; so, O Lord, when Thou awakest, Thou shalt despise their image," (Tsalimah). And as Nebuchadnezzar had forgotten his dream, this element may also enter into Daniel ii. 31: "Thou, O king, sawest, and behold a great image," (Tsilem). And thus, when the Holy Trinity proposed to make man in the Tselem of the material body of the Son, they meant, not that man should bear a full resemblance to that form of ineffable majesty and beauty, but should bear a faint, reflected likeness of its Divine model.

But the Divine counsel proposed also that man should be made "after our likeness." The Hebrew word here rendered "likeness," is Dimuth. It is not the same word which is employed in the Second Commandment; there the word is Timunah. But the word in Genesis i. 26 conveys, beyond question, in its primary sense, the idea of a visible likeness of a material object. The same word is used in Isaiah xl. 18: "To whom then will ye liken God, or what likeness (Dimuth) will ye compare unto Him?" And the inspired prophet, after asking this question, goes on immediately to show its relevancy by speaking of the "graven image," (Pesel, the same word used in the Second Commandment,) melted together by a workman, and adorned by the goldsmith, and of the wooden image, rudely
carved from a firm tree by a man too poor to have a more costly idol. Thus the sin and folly of idolatry are vividly presented. But the conclusion remains unshaken that this Hebrew word, in its primary sense, means a visible imitation of a material object.

That it may have a secondary and metaphorical sense, and convey likewise the idea of a spiritual and moral likeness or resemblance, is perfectly true. But to permit the secondary to displace and annihilate the primary meaning would be a violation of the fundamental laws of language. Both may well co-exist. The one does not exclude the other.

It is a significant fact, evincing how little dogmatic systems of divinity, in their details, are entitled to implicit faith, that nearly all professed theologians ignore entirely the ineradicable material sense of both these words, Tselem and Dimuth, and seek to confine the meaning of the words, "in our own image, after our likeness," entirely to the spiritual and moral resemblance which man in his first estate bore to his Creator. They found their argument upon two passages from the New Testament, viz.: these words from Ephesians iv. 24: "And that ye put on the new man, which after God is created in righteousness and true holiness;" and these from Colossians iii. 10: "And have put on the new man, which is renewed in knowledge after the image of Him that created him." From these they seek to infer that the whole meaning of "in our image, after our likeness," used in the Divine colloquy, is exhausted by

1 That Dimuth, and its near relations, Dimiy, Dimiyou, may have this secondary sense seems sanctioned by the authority of Gesenius, (Lexicon, p. 251); and it so appears by the use in the Septuagint (Genesis i. 26) of the word ομοίωσιν, which, in classic Greek, frequently means merely assimilation, resemblance—it may be physical or psychical, material or spiritual.

2 Κατ' οσιωτητι της αληθειας, literally "the holiness of truth."
attributing to man in his first estate "knowledge, righteousness, and true holiness."

Now, that this meaning is included in the words we gladly admit. And this is all that can be claimed for the teachings of the apostle in the passages just quoted. He does declare positively that this spiritual and moral resemblance is included in the image and likeness of God. He does not declare, negatively, that no visible image and likeness existed in the first man to a divine model. And in one other place in the New Testament the word εἰκών—image—is used to express the idea of a spiritual and moral likeness. It is in 2 Corinthians iii. 18, where it is said of true Christians that they "all, with open face beholding as in a glass the glory of the Lord, are changed into the same image—εἰκόνα—from glory to glory." Yet even here it is by no means certain that the glorious resurrected body of the saint may not be contemplated and included. And it is certain that, out of the twenty-two instances in which the word εἰκών is used in the New Testament, the true meaning in twenty is a visible and material structure.¹ And when the inspired apostle declared that Christ, the Son of God, who was then assuredly God-man, in human form, occupying the mediatorial throne in heaven, is "the image of the invisible God,"² it is impossible to construe in thought the idea he intends to convey except by attributing that form to the Son from all eternity.

From this review of the meaning of the words θειλημ and Dimuth in the Old Testament, and εἰκόνα in the Septuagint and the New Testament, we are justified in holding that if a pious and intelligent Hebrew, exercising sound common sense, had

¹ Thus in Matthew xxii. 20; Mark xii. 16; Luke xx. 24.; Romans i. 28; Hebrews x. 1; Revelation xiii. 14, 15—three times; xiv. 9; xv. 2; xvi. 9; xix. 20; xx. 4. Nor can it be proved that Romans viii. 29, or Colossians i. 15.
read the original colloquy, "Let us make man in our own Tselem, after our Dimuth," he would naturally and properly have concluded that a material though Divine being existed as the model after whom man was to be moulded. And the same natural and proper conclusion would have been reached by a devout Greek reading εἰκὼν and ομοιωτάτῳ, and by a fair-minded English-speaking man reading "our own image, our likeness." Any principles of interpretation, not plainly taught by Scripture itself, which lead us away from the obvious, natural and proper meaning of the words used, must be delusive and dangerous. We prefer not to adopt such principles in this case.

Thus it appears that in the very first chapter of the inspired Word, a plain intimation is given that the Son of God is God-man from eternity. And as we proceed in the sacred record we find this intimation confirmed and realized until the evidence attains an intensity amounting to reasonable exegetical proof.

Hebrew scholars have long noted the fact, that in passing from the first to the second chapter of Genesis, the title applied to the Supreme Being changes from Elohim to Jehovah—the Lord. This latter word conveys in its fulness the idea of the living God, and is the root from which springs the sublime title assumed by God in His interview with Moses, I AM THAT I AM. And this incommunicable title of Jehovah is applied to the Son of God in many passages of Scripture, and thus we have one of the strongest testimonies to His Divinity furnished in the Word.¹

It is Jehovah the Son of God who, on the model of His own eternal though material body, "formed man of the dust of the ground, and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life." And it was He who caused a deep sleep to fall upon Adam, and

¹ Psalms xlv. and cx., passim; Isaiah iv. 2; vi., vii., ix.; Micah v. 1-5; Jeremiah xxiii.; Daniel ii. 44; vii. 9, 14; Malachi i. 1-4; Dr. Hodge's "Systematic Theology," Vol. I., pp. 491-495.
took from his side a rib and builded it (yiben) into a woman—that is, a female man, the complement and completion of the man, his refined and finished image and likeness, bone of his bones, flesh of his flesh, united to him for ever for weal or for woe. 1

The attentive reader of the early chapters of Genesis will not fail to notice that the "Lord God," who is Jehovah the Son of God, appeared to Adam, Eve and some of their immediate descendants in His human form. He "took the man and put him into the garden of Eden, to dress it and keep it." He talked with Adam, and commanded him to abstain from eating the forbidden fruit. He brought the lower animals to Adam that he might name them. And after the fall of Adam and Eve into sin, Jehovah walked in the garden, and in the cool of the day the guilty pair heard His voice as He walked, and they hid themselves from His presence among the trees. 2 Such statements are inconsistent with any idea except a visible presence of the God-man. And as part of the punishment for their sin, Jehovah sent them forth from the garden; yet He did not leave them finally. He talked with Cain in reasonable remonstrance, and even appeared to the murderer after the deed, and uttered those thrilling words: "The voice of thy brother's blood crieth unto Me from the ground." 3 And Cain "went out from the presence of the Lord"—a presence which we cannot doubt was a visible presence of the Divine Man, looking with majestic solemnity and sorrow on the convicted fratricide.

As men multiplied on the earth, and increased in wickedness as in numbers, the visits of their Creator, whether regarded as Elohim or Jehovah—whether as the Spiritual and Omnipotent Father, who never manifested Himself except to the Spirit; or as the Son, who, in His human form, had walked with Adam

1 Genesis ii. 21-25. 2 Genesis ii. 15-19; iii. 8. 3 Genesis iv. 10.
—became less and less frequent, until in the days of Noah they were only made to save him and his family and the chosen ones of the lower animals from the waters of the deluge.

Nineteen hundred years before the advent of Christ, Abram was chosen and sent out from Ur of the Chaldees, that he might become the forerunner of that long line of believers in God without whom the world would have been a moral desolation. And Abraham rejoiced to see the day of the Son of God; he saw it, and was glad.\(^1\) When Hagar, the Egyptian handmaid whom Sarah had given to her husband, Abram, to be his wife, fled from the jealousy and ill nature of the older wife, she took refuge in the wilderness; and there the Son of God appeared to her, and sent her back to her duty of self-denial and sorrow, but with promises of future greatness and unconquerable spirit in her offspring. He who appeared is called the "Angel of the Lord," but He was the "Angel of the Covenant," the Second Person of the Trinity. This was the Son of God.\(^2\) He appeared in human form, for we shall see abundant evidence that the angelic form was the human form, although angels exceeded men in the exercise of the forces operating on matter. And we read in the inspired narrative that Hagar "called the name of the Lord (Jehovah) that spake unto her, Thou God seest me."\(^3\) Thus, in a single narrative, we find that the Son is God, that His name is Jehovah, and that the human form in its most majestic and glorious mould is His form.

And thirteen years afterwards, as Abraham sat in the door of his tent on the plains of Mamre, the Son of God appeared to him, and appeared in His proper human form—as a man.

\(^1\) St. John's Gospel, viii. 56.

\(^2\) The passages of Scripture and their teachings concerning "The Angel Jehovah" are ably shown and commented on by Dr. Hodge, "Systematic Theology," Vol. I., pp. 484-489.

\(^3\) Genesis xvi. 18.
For we read that three men stood by him; and that he ran to meet them, and bowed himself to the earth. And already one from the three had attracted his special worship, for he addressed Him: "My Lord, if now I have found favor in Thy sight, pass not away, I pray Thee, from Thy servant." 1 And yet we find all three of these men eating of the healthful food—the cakes of fine flour, the butter, milk and cooked veal—prepared by the patriarch and his wife and set before them. 2 Afterwards two of them went their way towards Sodom, to rescue Lot and his family; but one remained with Abraham, and He was the Son of God, the Lord Jehovah. 3 He was not different in material form from the others; they are all described as men.

After the death of Abraham, and while Isaac was yet living, though feeble and bed-ridden; his son Jacob was taught, by self-denial and hardship, the path to virtue, from which he had greatly strayed. When he was drawing near to an interview, which he feared would be hostile, with his brother Esau, he sent over the ford Jabbok his wives, his sons, his servants and property, but he remained on the farther bank of the brook. And here the Son of God visited him in His proper human form. "And Jacob was left alone; and there wrestled a man. with him until the breaking of the day." And Jacob evidently knew that one able to bless was wrestling with him, for to the request "Let me go, for the day breaketh," he answered, "I

1 Genesis xviii. 2, 8. The Hebrew word by which Abraham addresses one of these men is Adonai, "a title given only to the true God."—Hodge's "Systematic Theology," Vol. I., p. 486. The other two were angels, as appears by Genesis xix. 1, 15; yet they also had the human form, as fully appears by the narrative in the 18th chapter, and in Genesis xix. 5, 8, 10, 12, 16. The human form is the highest possible constitution of matter.

2 Genesis xviii. 6, 7, 8.

3 Examine specially the connection of Genesis xviii. 18, 16, 17, 20, 22, and Genesis xix., passim.
will not let thee go, except thou bless me.” And his prayer prevailed. Then and there he received the title Israel; “for as a prince hast thou power with God and with men, and hast prevailed.” And though this Divine Man did not reveal His name, yet Jacob called the name of the place Peniel (the face of God), for he had “seen God face to face,” and yet his life was preserved. ¹ It would not be easy to suggest how the material being in human form of the Son of God could be proved, if it be not proved in this inspired narrative; the facts exclude all other reasonable hypothesis.

When the inspired leader, prophet and law-giver, Moses, was elected by God to be the human instrument for delivering his people from Egyptian bondage, and for establishing institutions which separated a peculiar people finally from idolatry and set in motion divine causes that have ever since been an unspeakable blessing to the world, this leader was made the recipient of many visits from the Supreme Being, all of them profoundly interesting and instructive. That the Son of God was the visitant in the pasturage near the desert at the foot of Mount Horeb, seems probable from the fact that He is first called “the Angel of the Lord” when He manifests Himself in a flame of fire out of the midst of a bush, and that He is afterwards called Jehovah, and I AM THAT I AM, and that this same sublime title is appropriated to Himself by Christ in the Gospel,² and that He talked with Moses as if face to face. Neither would the mention of the burning bush necessarily exclude the idea that the Son appeared in human form, although surrounded by conditions of intense mystery and glory. For it is said the angel appeared to Moses, and many inspired passages prove that the angelic figure is the human figure; and Moses was only prevented by the awe and solemnity, which caused him to

¹ Genesis xxxii. 22–30. ² John's Gospel, viii. 58.
hide his face, from actually seeing the form of the God-man who spoke to him.¹

In the awe-inspiring scenes of Mount Sinai, when there were thunderings and lightnings and a thick cloud upon the mount, and the voice of the trumpet sounded long, and waxed louder and louder, and there was blackness and tempest, and so terrible was the sight that Moses said, "I exceedingly quake and fear," and all the people in the camp trembled, God came down upon Mount Sinai, and called up Moses to the top of the mount, and there delivered to him the law. But it is a significant and impressive fact that this was God the Father—the spiritual representative of law, which He has the right to impose, and does impose, on all His creatures, whether spiritual or material, and of which all violations are, by eternal and necessary conditions, followed by suffering and punishment. The law on Sinai was delivered by the ministry of angels. And though it is said that "God spake all these words," yet, in a certain sense, sanctioned by Scripture, the law was "the word spoken by angels."² It is not affirmed that the law was given by angels, but that the people received it "by disposition of angels," and that "it was ordained by angels."³ "Hence it is evident that what is ascribed to angels is not the original authoritative giving of the law, but the ministerial ordering of things in its promulgation. They raised the fire and smoke; they shook and rent the rocks; they framed the sound of the trumpet; they effected the articulate voices which conveyed the words of the law to the ears of the people, and thus proclaimed and published the law, whereby it became "the word spoken by angels."⁴

But in all the pomp and majesty of these solemn scenes, God

¹ Exodus iii. 2, 3, 6, 14. ² Hebrews ii. 2.
never appeared to Moses, nor to the people of Israel. When the inspired leader delivered to the people his final admonitions, he reminded them that, though the Lord spake unto them out of the midst of the fire, and they heard the voice of the words, yet they saw no similitude; and again the warning against idolatry is repeated: "Take ye therefore good heed unto yourselves; for ye saw no manner of similitude on the day that the Lord spake unto you in Horeb, out of the midst of the fire."¹

When God delivers law to man, it is the Eternal Spirit reaching the finite spirit; it is not the God-man, the Friend of sinners, standing face to face with man and inviting him to repentance.

But after the law had been delivered on Sinai, and written on two tables of stone, and after the wretched defection in which the children of Israel, seeing that Moses delayed his return, said to Aaron, "Up, make us gods which shall go before us; for as for this Moses, the man that brought us up out of the land of Egypt, we wot not what is become of him;" and after Aaron had moulded a golden calf, and fashioned it with a graving tool, and after the people rose up early in the morning and offered worship with burnt offerings and peace offerings to the idol-calf, and sat down to eat and drink and rose up to play, then the Eternal Father, representing the spirit of law, announced the fixed dictum of law: "Let Me alone, that My wrath may wax hot against them, and that I may consume them."² And, doubtless, but for the intercession of Moses, who was therein a type and representative of the Divine Intercessor, law would have taken its course, and all the idolatrous transgressors would have been destroyed. Moses, on coming near the camp and seeing the calf and the dancing, was moved to zealous anger, and cast down the two tables of the law and "brake them beneath the mount."³ And although his inter-

¹ Deuteronomy iv. 12, 15. ² Exodus xxxii. 1, 4, 6, 10. ³ Ibid., 19.
cession availed to save most of the people, it did not save all. The divine and necessary principle of election manifested itself, and "there fell of the people that day about three thousand men." The rest were spared, but chastised; for we read that "The Lord plagued the people because they made the calf which Aaron made."°

But the next appearance of the Supreme Being to Moses was in the person of God the Son, and it is represented under conditions intensely significant. The Father, representing law in its unbroken purity, commands Moses to move with the people towards the promised land, but warns them: "I will not go up in the midst of thee, for thou art a stiff-necked people; lest I consume thee in the way." These were evil tidings, and the people seem to have felt true repentance, and proved it by self-denying acts, for we read immediately that Moses took the tabernacle and pitched it without, afar off from the camp, and called it the tabernacle of the congregation. Now this tabernacle was the visible emblem of the way of salvation through the Son of God—the Lamb slain from the foundation of the world. And hence we read that "every one which sought the Lord went out unto the tabernacle of the congregation." And though all the tabernacle was consecrated, yet within it was the sacred veil, separating the holy place from the holy of holies, in which was the mercyseat and the ark of the testimony. And when Moses went out from the camp to enter the tabernacle, all the people rose up and looked after him, and when he entered, the cloudy pillar descended and stood at the door, and the Lord talked with Moses. The people rose up and

1 Exodus xxxii. 26, 27, 28.
2 Exodus xxxii. 35. The form of the expression indicates that the people were far more blameworthy than Aaron. Indeed, he seems to have acted under a sort of coercion, and therefore was not only spared, but retained in the priesthood.
3 Exodus xxxiii. 3–7. 4 Exodus xxvi, 33, 34.
worshipped, every man in his tent door. "And the Lord spake unto Moses face to face, as a man speaketh unto his friend." ¹

Here we cannot but notice the difference between this mild and loving access, permitted to a sinful man, and the terrors surrounding Sinai, when the law was delivered by the disposition of angels; but no similitude, no Divine appearance, no presentation face to face, no friendly interview occurred. And we can only account for this difference by the hypothesis that in this conversation in the holy of holies, God the Son, in His human form, permitted Moses, the elected leader, to approach Him and talk with Him face to face, as friend with friend.

This interview was concluded, for we read that Moses turned again into the camp, leaving only his servant Joshua, the son of Nun, in the tabernacle.² And after this gracious and friendly appearance of the God-man, again the spirit of law, the Father eternal, manifests Himself, and promises that His presence shall go up with the people, and that He will give them rest. And to the prayer of Moses for a sight of His glory, the reply is made that He will make all His goodness pass before him, and will proclaim His name before Him; but Moses is solemnly warned, "Thou canst not see my face, for there shall no man see Me and live."³ It is impossible to reconcile this declaration with the previous positive statement that "the Lord spake unto Moses face to face, as a man speaketh unto his friend," by any other reasonable hypothesis than the one we have herein announced and sought to prove.

After the ministrations of the tabernacle had been established, and after these were succeeded by the temple service, in which the daily sacrifices by the priests and the yearly entrance of the high priest into the holy of holies symbolized the constant presence and intercession of the Son of God, His personal

¹ Exodus xxxiii. 11. ² Exodus xxxiii. 11. ³ Exodus xxxiii. 19, 20.
appearance to His chosen servants became less needful. But the time came when, for their sins, the Jews were invaded and conquered by the king of the Chaldees, who slew their young men with the sword in the house of their sanctuary, and had no compassion upon young man or maiden, old man, or him that stooped for age; all were given into his hand; and he brought to Babylon all the vessels of the house of God, great and small, and the treasures of the house of the Lord, and of the Jewish king, and his princes; and burned the house of God, and brake down the wall of Jerusalem, and burned all the palaces thereof, and all the goodly vessels therein, and carried away the people captives into Babylon.¹ Then again the Son of God appeared in His own human form to save His chosen friends.

Nebuchadnezzar, the king, made a golden image, of which the height was sixty cubits, and the breadth six cubits, and caused it to be erected on the plain of Dura, in the province of Babylon. And he issued a decree, commanding, in his arrogance, "people, nations, and languages," that when the sound of musical instruments was heard, all should fall down and worship the golden image, on pain of being cast into a burning fiery furnace in case of disobedience. Three faithful Hebrews, Shadrach, Meshach, and Abednego, refused to obey, and when threatened by the king with the fiery furnace, and asked, "who is that God that shall deliver you out of my hands?" calmly replied: "O Nebuchadnezzar, we are not careful to answer thee in this matter. If it be so, our God whom we serve is able to deliver us from the burning fiery furnace, and He will deliver us out of thine hand, O king. But if not, be it known unto thee, O king, that we will not serve thy gods, nor worship the golden image which thou hast set up."²

¹ 2 Chronicles xxxvii. 17-20.
² Daniel iii. 15-18. It must be borne in mind that the book of Daniel is the last book containing both narrative and prophecy, in point of time
Then the king was lashed into fury by their calm defiance, and commanded that the furnace should be heated seven times hotter than usual, and that the most mighty men of his army should bind the three Hebrews and cast them into the fiery prison. And so intense were the flames that these mighty men, in obeying the tyrant, were burned to death, and the three men, Shadrach, Meshach, and Abed-nego, fell down bound into the furnace. But behold a miracle of intervention! for Nebuchadnezzar, astonished, cried out to his counsellors, "Did not we cast three men bound into the midst of the fire?" They answered: "True, O king." Then the king said: "Lo! I see four men loose, walking in the midst of the fire, and they have no hurt; and the form of the fourth is like the Son of God." And he called them out: "Come forth, and come hither." And then the three saved Hebrews came forth of the midst of the fire; and the princes, governors, captains and king's counsellors saw these men, upon whose bodies the fire had no power, nor was a hair of their heads singed, nor were their garments changed in texture, nor had the smell of fire passed on them! But the fourth man, the Son of God, having done His work of salvation, had returned to His dwelling in heaven.

Thus we have shown, by a series of inspired testimonies, running from the first chapter of the first book to the last book of prophecy and narrative in the canon of the Old Testament, that the Son of God is God-man, and has from eternity had a material form, of which the human form is an image—secondary,

given in the Old Testament canon. The arrangement of the sacred books in the Hebrew Bible, after 2 Kings, is as follows: Isaiah, Jeremiah, Ezekiel, Hosea, Joel, Amos, Obadiah, Jonah, Micah, Nahum, Habakkuk, Zephaniah, Haggai, Zechariah, Malachi, Psalms, Proverbs, Job, Song of Songs, Ruth, Lamentations, Ecclesiastes, Esther, Daniel, Ezra, Nehemiah, 1 Chronicles, 2 Chronicles. Up to 2 Kings the arrangement is the same as in the English authorized version.

1 Daniel iii. 25.
reflected, infinitely inferior in beauty, grace, majesty, force, power, but still an image.

To escape the plain and obvious meaning of these numerous testimonies from Scripture, a word has been coined from the Greek language and used by certain classes of writers on theology. They call the various appearances of the Supreme Being on earth, in Old Testament times, *theopanies*. This word, literally rendered, means *God-appearances*. But as it is not found in the Greek of the New Testament, and seldom, if ever, in classic Greek authors, it is proper to explain in what sense it is used by the writers just mentioned. They deny all substantive reality of being to the material appearances in which the Supreme Being from time to time exhibited Himself in Old Testament ages. They insist that the forms, figures, shapes which it pleased Him to assume, were in the nature of "phantoms," or spectres—some insubstantial and strictly phenomenal shapes—made visible indeed by miraculous power, but having no real entity. Now, to this view, two grave objections seem to apply: First, that the plain and simple declarations of inspired scripture are against it. These declarations purport to state facts; and so far from representing the God-man, when He appeared, as a phantom or spectre, they represent His material constitution as having all the essentials of being, as appearing, talking, walking, wrestling, eating,\(^1\)—as having, indeed, supernatural and divine powers and forces, but still as a real entity in which those powers and forces inhere. Second, that the principles of interpretation required by this theory are false and dangerous. The sinner who adopts and acts upon the *theopanic hypothesis* will speedily find himself without a real and material Savior occupying the throne of redemption and intervening prevalently

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\(^1\) Genesis i. 26; ii. 16, 19; iii. 8; iv. 6, 7; xvi. 7, 18; xviii. 8; xxxii. 24, 28, 30; Exodus xxxiii. 11; Daniel iii. 25.
with the Father, and in His stead will find offered to his faith only a phantom or a spectre!

We therefore decline to adopt this hypothesis. We prefer to trust to the plain declarations of holy men of old, who represent the Son of God as the God-man during the eternity of ages preceding His actual incarnation in the womb of the Virgin. To this transcendently important fact we now approach.

With profound reverence and undoubting faith we accept the teaching of the New Testament that Christ, the anointed Son of God, was conceived by the power of the Holy Ghost in the womb of the Virgin Mary, and was born of her, a babe, who increased in material strength and stature until He became a man; that He was crucified, dead and buried; that He saw not corruption; that He rose from the dead on the third day after His death; that He passed forty days on earth after His resurrection, showing "Himself alive, after His passion, by many infallible proofs," being seen, talked with, eaten with, touched by the hands of many, and seen at one time by five hundred witnesses, all present on the same occasion,¹ and that in the body He ascended into heaven, where He is now, and will ever be, the God-man.

With the facts of the incarnation and subsequent life, death and resurrection of the Man, Christ Jesus, and their adaptation to the conditions of sinful man, we will find it proper to deal more at large in speaking of sin, its nature, consequences and remedies. At present we propose to speak of the incarnation and life of the Son of God on earth only in their material relations.

The inspired writers of the New Testament constantly speak

¹ John xx. 27, 28; xxi. 12, 18; Acts x. 41; 1 Corinthians xv. 6. "God manifest in the flesh" is part of all religions, whether Pagan, Jewish or Christian.—Schleffelin's "Foundations of History," &c., New York, 1865, p. 173.
of the Man Christ Jesus as very God. Thus the testimony of
the Divine Father Himself was given at the baptism. Whether
this rite was performed by immersion or affusion, it is equally
certain that the person of the Man Jesus was the subject thereof,
and as He came up straightway from the water, the heavens
were opened, the Spirit in the shape of a dove descended and
lighted on Him, and a voice from heaven proclaimed: "This is
My beloved Son." And St. Paul declares that the wisdom he
was able to speak was of God, and was a mystery and hidden
wisdom ordained of God before the world began to be, and
that this mystery of being was not known to the prince of this
world, for had they known it "they would not have crucified
the Lord of Glory." This is a distinct declaration that the
Being who was crucified (who was assuredly the man) was
nevertheless the Lord of Glory, one of the strongest of state-
ments that this was the God-man, for God declares, "My glory
will I not give unto another." And the inspired Peter declared
that He who is Lord of all, and who is a Prince and a Savior,
is the same man, Christ Jesus, whom the Jews slew and hanged
on a tree. And in apocalyptic vision, John, in Patmos, heard
the voice of one who said: "I am Alpha and Omega—the first
and the last;" "one who held in His right hand seven stars, and
who has the keys of hell and of death," and who is the "I am
that I am," who liveth of Himself, and is therefore God, yet
who is also like unto the Son of Man, and who was dead and
yet is alive for evermore.

From these scriptures, and many others of like import, we
obtain a firm foundation for the belief that Christ, the Man
who was once a babe in Bethlehem, and grew in stature, and

1 Matthew iii. 16. "Ο Ηγους αυξης έοδους απο του οδατον."
2 1 Corinthians ii. 7, 8.
3 Isaiah xlii. 8; xlviii. 11. See also Psalms xxiv. 7-10; xxix. 3.
4 Acts v. 30, 31; x. 36-39.  
5 Revelation i. 11-18.
was crucified, dead and buried, and who rose again and ascended in a visible body to heaven, is the same Son of God who in eternity was in the form of which Adam and Eve were the faint and reflected image, who appeared as the Angel Jehovah to Hagar, who, in His human form, visited Abraham on the plains of Mamre, and ate and talked with him, who wrestled with Jacob, who appeared face to face, as a man talketh with his friend, to Moses, and who, in His own majestic material and human form, endowed with divine forces, which repelled the inferior forces of fire in the furnace, walked with Shadrach, Meshach and Abed-nego, and sent them from the fire unhurt.

The Epistle to the Hebrews is an inspired commentary, not only on the eternal Priesthood of Christ, but on the eternal relation which the Man, Christ Jesus, bears to God, the everlasting Father. In the opening chapter of this Epistle we have some deeply interesting and mysterious statements concerning the Son of God, which, even to the dazzled glances and the feeble gaze of human eyes, reveal to us something of the eternal mystery of His being. God made the worlds by Him, and we have seen that the άνων as thus made suggest the eternal matter out of which His forces formed them into worlds. And then we have a statement over which we must pause and ponder with awe and reverence, yet with adoring wish to learn its true meaning. Our English version renders the whole verse thus: “Who, being the brightness of His glory and the express image of His person, and upholding all things by the word of His power, when He had by Himself purged our sins, sat down on the right hand of the Majesty on high.” But it has long been known to competent scholars that this is a mistranslation, and gives no adequate view of the inspired original.

1 Hebrews i. 3. θος ουν απαγογείς της δύνασ ει και χαρακτηρ της ουσίας του αυτού

The Greek word here rendered “brightness” is ἀπαύγασμα. It occurs nowhere else in the New Testament. The word generally used to convey the idea of effulgence or brightness is λαμπρότης, and light simply is represented by the word φως.¹ That some element beyond mere brightness is included in ἀπαύγασμα is plain. As the word is closely related to ἀπαύγασμα—“to see from afar”—as well as to ἀπαύγαζω—“to shine, to be brilliant, to radiate, to emit light or splendor”—we gather the full idea, and suppose it to be that the Son of God (who in this chapter is presented as eternal and almighty, and therefore Divine) is a visible and resplendent representation of the glorious perfections of God. But the next clause is yet more interesting. The word rendered “person” in our authorized version is ὑποστάσις. It is not rash to say that, previous to and at the time when the inspired letter to the Hebrews was written, this Greek word never had the meaning of “person.” Not until some four hundred years afterwards was it used in this sense in theologic language. The plain and natural meaning of the word is “sub-
pp. 855, 866, render it: “Who, being an emanation of His glory and an express image of His substance;” and, in a note, insist on “emanation” instead of “brightness,” saying that the true idea is that of efflux or emanation, as of light from the sun, and that the word and idea occur in Philo. But Philo was a devotee of the Platonic philosophy, and may, in fact, be considered the forerunner of Neo-Platonism, which held that matter is an efflux or emanation from God. Professor F. S. Sampson, a fine Greek and Hebrew scholar, rejects this rendering, and holds the true meaning to be that Christ, in His own person and nature, is “the splendid representation to men of Divine perfections.”—Commentary on Hebrews, New York Edit., 1857, pp. 47–48. DeWette renders the first clause, “Ein Abglanz seiner Herrlichkeit”—a reflection of His glory; and the latter, “Abdruck seines Wesens”—the impression of His being. But both of these are inadequate. DeWette, though a great biblical scholar, was strongly tinctured with the Germanisms of his age.

¹ Thus, in the Septuagint version of Isaiah lx. 8, we have “to thy light” rendered τῷ φως σου, and “to the brightness of thy rising,” τῷ λαμπρότητι σου. And in Acts xxvi. 13, for a light from heaven “above the brightness of the sun,” we have οὔπερ τῷ λαμπρότητα τιν ἡλίου.
stantia," substratum, substance. It does not mean "essence" or "being." The use of the word in the sense either of "person" or of "essence" is strained and unnatural—involves, in fact, a dislocation of ideas. It means frequently a basis, a foundation, a bottom, a substraction, a ground or motive for action, a first principle, a support for confidence or trust. But all these secondary meanings come from the primary meaning of substance.\footnote{Thus in Hebrews xi. 1, we have, "Now faith is the substance—\(\upsilon\sigma\sigma\tau\alpha\iota\sigma\iota\iota\) of things hoped for."} And the word substance means something standing under or subordinate to some other being. We are thus led to the clear and obvious meaning of the word in this verse. It does not mean the being or essence of God, for His essence is Himself, and cannot be under or subordinate to Him. It means some something, not Himself, but standing or existing under Him, though existing with Him in eternity. Hence we have in this verse an implied and mysterious yet discoverable revelation of the existence of that eternal matter which is the \(\upsilon\sigma\sigma\tau\alpha\iota\sigma\iota\iota\), the substance of God—not Himself, not His being, nor any part of it, and yet His substance, so eternally and substantially connected with Him as to lay a foundation of fact for an eternal relation of His Son to this \(\upsilon\sigma\sigma\tau\alpha\iota\sigma\iota\iota\).

This relation is expressed, in the verse we are considering, by the Greek word \(\chi\alpha\rho\alpha\kappa\tau\iota\rho\). There is a depth of meaning in this word which is very inadequately sounded by the English phrase "the express image." In fact, that is not and cannot be the meaning of the word in this place. For the word image means a visible and material form, resembling the object of which it is the image; and the word "express" only intensifies this meaning. Now the human mind is incapable of conceiving any conditions by which it can be true that the Son of God is the visible and material form, resembling the substance of God. For if by \(\upsilon\sigma\sigma\tau\alpha\iota\sigma\iota\iota\) we understand (as DeWette
renders it) the Being of God, then we are forbidden by numerous and distinct passages of Holy Writ to ascribe to this Being any body or figure of which a visible and material object could be the image or resemblance. And if for ὑποτάσσεις we adopt the meaning which we have sought to establish—that is, eternal and illimitable matter—then no power of thought is adequate to conceive how a visible and material image or resemblance thereof could be predicated of the Son of God. And there is no other sense of ὑποτάσσεις that can be adopted with any reasonable truth of exegesis which will in the slightest degree aid us in evading this dilemma. We conclude, therefore, that "express image" is not the idea conveyed by the word χαρακτηρ.

This word never occurs in the New Testament except in this verse; therefore, as one instance cannot constitute usage, we have no inspired usage to fix its meaning. We are thus driven to the general use of the word in the Greek language. It is quite certain that the primary and proper meaning is a tool or instrument for making a mark, incision or impression. From this original idea, however, the transition was easy to the mark, incision or impression itself; and in this sense De Wette understands it, as appears by his use of the German word "Abdruck," which means an impression, copy, stamp or mark. But the Greek word gradually acquired a depth and flexibility of meaning expressed by a sculpture, a stamp on a coin, a letter or figure cut, engraved or stamped, the form, appearance and peculiar disposition of a person, all embodied in the word "character," the distinct form or nature of anything, that by which a person or a thing is distinguished and discriminated from any other person or thing. Each of these meanings must be ascribed to the word according to its use and context in classic Greek.

THE GOD-MAN IMMUTABLE.

We are, therefore, not required to attach to the word in this place any idea of image or resemblance. But we are justified in attaching to it the idea of a visible and material or palpable form, embodying in the highest degree all that can enter into the word “character.” And therefore we humbly hold that the true idea conveyed by this phrase—\( \varkappa \alpha ραξης της υποστασεως αυτου \)—is that the Son of God is the highest and best possible visible and material form and constituency of that eternal matter which is the substantia—the \( \upsilon \rho ας \upsilon ις \)—of God, and that to the person of His Son, thus constituted from eternity, the Father, almighty, all-wise and all-good, has, in eternal generation, imparted His own character—\( \varkappa \alpha ραξης \). No other meaning will fully meet all the deep significance of the words, or escape the vice of self-contradiction.

In this same chapter the inspired writer adopts the declaration of the psalmist, and proves that it applies to the Son of God from eternity: “Thou, Lord, in the beginning hast laid the foundation of the earth; and the heavens are the works of Thine hands; they shall perish, but Thou remainest; and they all shall wax old as doth a garment; and as a vesture shalt Thou fold them up, and they shall be changed; but 

Thou art the same, and Thy years shall not fail.”

And the same declaration of the immutability of the Son of God is repeated in this inspired letter, chapter xiii. verse 8: “Jesus Christ, the same yesterday, and to-day, and for ever.”

1 Hebrews i. 10–12. The quotation is evidently from the 102d Psalm, 25–27, although the Septuagint version is followed more closely than the Hebrew original. So far from having any difficulty as to the Messianic character of this Psalm, it seems full of Christ when interpreted by the heart of a saved but afflicted sinner, taught to know its full meaning by the inspired commentary in Hebrews. See the genial and sound exposition of Prof. Sampson, “Commentary on Hebrews,” pp. 71–74.

2 It is worthy of note that the same form of words is used in each passage to express the immutable and eternal identity of the Son. In Hebrews i. 12, it is: \( \sigmaυ \ δε \ αυτου \ \epsilon ει \); in Hebrews xiii. 8: \( \Ις πους Χριστους χθες και σημερον \ αυτου \ και εις τους αιωνας \).
But this second declaration is accompanied by this most important addition, that it is applied distinctly and in words to Jesus Christ, who, although the Son of God, was also born of the Virgin Mary. The same declaration of immutability and identity is, by necessary implication, made in the Apocalypse of St. John concerning Jesus Christ, the Lamb slain from the foundation of the world, Him who was dead and is alive again, and who is the Alpha and Omega, the I am, the ever-living One.

But if the Son of God be the same being with Jesus Christ, our Saviour, then this identity of being must of necessity exist from eternity, and it must apply, not merely to spiritual being, but to the material being in which the Holy Scriptures teach us that Christ exists now, and will exist for ever. Form, mode, phenomena may change, and yet the substratum, whether spiritual or material, may remain unchanged. But if being change, then, whether that being be spiritual or material, it is not the same that it was before the change. Hence, if the Son of God be (as Scripture plainly teaches) immutable and the same, then, of necessity, it follows that His material being is for ever the same.

The incarnation of the Son of God was an event mysterious,

1 If any suppose this reasoning can be evaded by adopting the notion of Locke, that the personal identity of every man consists entirely in his soul or spiritual nature, and not at all in his body, we would recall the well-known controversy between Locke and Edward Stillingfleet, Bishop of Worcester, in which the great metaphysician was compelled, by his own principles, to deny entirely the "resurrection of the body," and to deny that Holy Scripture teaches it. Locke insisted that the New Testament teaches a resurrection of the dead, but not a resurrection of the body. But it seems impossible to reconcile this notion with the obvious meaning of 1 Corinthians xv. The whole subject of identity—what it is, in what it consists—transcends human intelligence, because it involves the mystery of being, which we have seen to be equally inscrutable as to both mind and matter. But we can believe what we cannot comprehend, provided the thing asserted involve no self-contradiction, no spiritual or material impossibility.
supernatural, miraculous, infinitely beyond all that the wisdom of man could have devised, or his highest conceptions of Divine mercy would have led him to expect; yet now, when it has occurred, and when its blessed significance and incalculably benign consequences are being every day more and more clearly opened to our view, we do not wonder that "the angels desire to look into" this Divine mystery; and we are permitted, by angelic example, humbly to approach and seek for farther knowledge.

There is no self-contradiction, no spiritual or physical impossibility, forbidding us to believe that the same material being in whose image man was created, who appeared to and talked with Adam and Eve, and ate of the food prepared by Abraham, and wrestled with Jacob, and conferred face to face with Moses, as a man talks with his friend, and stood in the seven-times heated furnace without hurt, is the same material being who was conceived, without human father, but by the almighty power of the Holy Ghost, in the womb of the Virgin Mary, and born of her, yet without sin.

This mystery involved the special work of the Third Person of the Trinity—the Holy Ghost. And in this we can discover a revealed appropriateness; for as God the Father is the infinite and invisible administrator of the principle of intelligence and law, carried out with infinite wisdom and adaptation through all the universe of mind and matter, and as God the Son is the God-man for ever, by whom the material worlds were created, so God the Holy Ghost is the infinite and almighty representative and executor of force, proceeding from the Father and the Son, and carrying out in the work of creation, and of re-creation, and of the numberless changes in forms and phenomena, spiritual and material, those laws and those remedies for broken laws which the eternal Father has devised. That this is the appropriate function of the Holy Spirit we learn from the first
chapter of Genesis, which represents the Spirit of God as moving on the face of the waters that covered a dark and desolate earth, and bringing out order, beauty and varied forms of being.\(^1\) And we learn it farther from the sixth chapter, where the Divine Spirit is represented as engaged in that sublime struggle and “striving” with the depraved will of sinful man, by which the ruins of the fall are to be repaired;\(^2\) and from those many scriptures which attribute to the Holy Ghost the creation of a new heart and a right spirit, and which represent the people of God, in times of temptation and sin, as imploring that He shall not be taken away;\(^3\) and from the passage which declares of all the living creatures of God: “Thou hidest Thy face, they are troubled; Thou takest away their breath, they die and return to their dust. Thou sendest forth Thy Spirit, they are created; and Thou renewest the face of the earth;”\(^4\) and from the impressive vision of Ezekiel, in which he was carried “in the Spirit of the Lord” to the valley of dry bones, and saw these bones, under the power of the Spirit, come together, bone to his bone, so that the sinews and the flesh came upon them, and the skin covered them, and the breath of life entered into them, and “they lived and stood upon their feet, an exceeding great army;”\(^5\) and, as the crowning work, from the revelation that the Holy Ghost came upon the Virgin Mary and the power of the highest overshadowed her, and that the Holy Being who was conceived in her womb, and afterwards born of her, was the Son of God.\(^6\)

Nothing forbids us to believe that the material being who, by the almighty power of the Holy Spirit, was conceived in the womb of the Virgin, and was afterwards born of her, and increased in stature until He was a fully grown man, was

\(\text{\scriptsize 1} \) Genesis i. 2. \(\text{\scriptsize 2} \) Genesis vi. 3. \(\text{\scriptsize 3} \) Psalms li. 10, 12. \(\text{\scriptsize 4} \) Psalms civ. 29, 30. \(\text{\scriptsize 5} \) Ezekiel xxxvii. 1-10. \(\text{\scriptsize 6} \) Matthew i. 18, 20, 23, 25; Luke i. 31, 32, 34, 35; ii. 5, 6, 10, 11, 14.
identically the material being who was from eternity the χαρακτήρ τῆς ουσίας τοῦ Θεοῦ. For the incarnation is a miracle and a mystery so great and incomprehensible that inspiration itself, which reveals truth without exaggeration, states as the "great mystery of godliness," "God manifest in the flesh."

Nature furnishes to us no analogies adequate to convey even a dim and distant glimpse of this supreme mystery. We know that the grain of wheat contains within itself the potency of the blade, the leaf, the stalk, the full grown ear with many grains upon it; that the small acorn contains wrapped up in its minute folds all the roots, the trunk, the spreading branches of the oak tree, which towers aloft, the monarch of the forest; that the caterpillar is a crawling worm, until, when full grown, it assumes the pupa or chrysalis state, and then, in a few days, the marvellous, apparent, but not real, metamorphosis occurs, by which the pupa case is burst open, and there emerges a being of resplendent beauty, with wings membranous and veined and covered with feather-scales of varied colors, and so numerous that 400,000 of them have been estimated as existing on the wings of the silk-worm moth. All such illustrations are insufficient to do more than forbid us to stagger in faith when we are called on to believe that the whole material being of the Son of God was concentrated by the power of the Holy Ghost, and contained in the man Christ Jesus, our Lord.

When we review hereafter the nature and consequences of sin and its only remedy, we shall see, dimly and as through a glass, darkly, that it was necessary that the Son of God should become the Son of man, and obedient, not only to law, but to suffering and death. And all this we know He became.

Yet even while in His estate of humiliation on earth, flashes and glimpses of that eternal power, glory and majesty that had

1 1 Timothy iii. 16: μεγά εστι το τῆς ευσεβείας μυστήριον: Θεος εμφανερωθή εν σαρκί. If the true reading be Θεός instead of Θεοῦ, the meaning is the same.
attended His material nature for the eternity previous to His incarnation, and that will attend it for the eternity to come since His resurrection, manifested themselves to trustworthy witnesses. He ascended the Mount, and in the presence of Peter, James and John was transfigured, so that His face did shine as the sun, and His raiment was white as the light, and so entrancing was His material glory that the three witnesses fell on their faces and were beside themselves, and Peter said: “Master, it is good for us to be here!” He compelled the needed vinous elements from distant nature to unite chemically with the water at the marriage in Cana; He compelled (after prayer for the forceful Spirit) a few loaves and fishes to draw into chemical union with them the distant but existing elements for their expansion and multiplication; He rose from sleep on a pillow in the hinder part of the ship and rebuked raging winds and waves, and said, “Peace, be still!” and there was a great calm; He walked on the surface of the lake of Galilee, the submissive water being compelled to bear its Divine Master as though it were a solid pavement; in His presence and under His power, death himself was impotent to hold his prey, and the daughter of Jairus, the only son of the widow of Nain, and Lazarus, the brother of Mary and Martha, all returned from the dead at His word of command. And though He was “obedient unto death,” that sinners might be delivered from its power, yet death could not hold Him. His material body saw not corruption; and He rose from the dead by His own power. And after His resurrection, He passed through solid walls and locked doors, and appeared in the midst of His disciples; and He vanished in like miraculous manner. And when at length the time came when He should resume His eternal majesty and regain His heavenly dwelling, greater forces than those of gravity were present at His will; and, in the presence of

Matthew xvii. 1–7; Mark ix. 2–7; Luke ix. 28–35.
numerous witnesses, He rose bodily from the earth, and a cloud received Him out of their sight.\footnote{Mark iv. 36-41; v. 36-43; John ii. 1-11; vi. 18-21; xi. 18-45; xx. 19; Luke viii. 49-56; ix. 18-17; xxiv. 16, 31, 36, 50-52; Acts i. 9. The hypothesis maintained in this work, viz.: that the Son of God has from all eternity been invested with a material element of constitution, and that this material is the same that, by miraculous power, was conceived in the womb of the Virgin Mary, and was born of her, and that entered into the constitution of the ‘Man, Christ Jesus,’ furnishes the only consistent and satisfactory explanation of the difficult text, John vi. 62: “What and if ye shall see the Son of man ascend up where He was before?” Ean ouv θεωρητε τον αυτον του ανθρωπου αναβαςωτα οπω εν το πρωτεμον. Few verses in the New Testament have caused more perplexity to interpreters, and few explanations have been suggested that were not hopelessly incongruous. One of the last is that offered by the late venerable Professor Wm. S. Plumer, of Columbia Theological Seminary, in his “Person and Sinless Character of Christ,” Edit. 1876, p. 98. He adopts the view of previous theologians, that “The Son of God took, not a man, but a human nature into His one eternal, inseparable personality.” “Christ became man (ανθρωπος) truly, (τελειως) perfectly, (αδιαιρετως) indivisibly, (αδιοδετως) unconfusedly. Thus we get the last explanation of that sublime and difficult passage in John vi. 62, ‘What and if ye shall see the Son of man ascend up where He was before?’” But this does not explain the verse; for Christ therein expressly refers to τον αυτον του ανθρωπου—the Son of man—which is His own elected mode of designating His being after the incarnation. Now, Professor Plumer, in common with many divines of his school, strongly insists that the material element in the constitution of the “Man, Christ Jesus,” was derived from Mary, His mother. “He was made of a woman. Mary was truly His mother.” “Christ was made of a woman—took flesh of a sinful woman, though the flesh He took of her was not sinful, being sanctified by the Spirit of God, the former of Christ’s human nature,” pp. 87, 88. Yet this material element is as truly a part of the Son of man as the Spiritual. Both make up the God-man, who ever liveth. How then can it be said that the Son of man ascended up where He was before if an essential part of His composite being was never in heaven before, but began first to exist four thousand years after Adam and Eve were created?
though we have not, either in the inspired Scripture or from any trustworthy testimony, a reliable hint as to what were His lineaments on earth, yet it is not to be doubted that in heaven He is "chiefest among ten thousand," and "altogether lovely."
CHAPTER VIII.

ANGELS AND MEN.

We have seen that creation is the eternal relation between God and matter; that there never was a time when this relation began to be, although it is necessary to hold and believe that each finished creation had a beginning. And we are also required, by the results of sound intuition, to hold that, out of the illimitable spaces through which normal matter is diffused, God, the Almighty Spirit, must be supposed to have exercised an eternal election (for reasons which, though beyond our ken, were doubtless wise and good,) as to what spaces He would work upon in order to create the atovas—the eternal worlds.

Now, as activity, energy, force, power are essentially the properties of spirit, we assume, without irreverence, that the works of God—His creations—are the certain conditions of His intelligence, benevolence and power as applied to matter. We cannot, without disparaging thought concerning Him, conceive of Him as dormant or inactive. Therefore we might, a priori, have reasoned to the cosmos as we find it and view it (though imperfectly) even now. We might have expected to find a material universe of ineffable grandeur and beauty, ordered by law, and worthy of the Divine Creator.

But when we remember the spiritual and moral attributes of God, we would not have expected Him to stop at material creations merely, in His infinite progress. We would have expected Him to create beings of higher order than the sun or the stars, or the moon or the planets. And if of higher order,
how shall this higher plane be reached? Not by giving them
greater material size, for though the planet Jupiter is far larger
than our earth, it is far below our earth in its forms of life,
power and beauty; and not by imparting to them greater
energies through the forces by which matter is affected, for in
our sun and in the fixed stars there are in progress sublime and
sometimes paroxysmal exercises of force, before which all that
we know of force on earth sinks into insignificance.

Therefore the higher plane of creation to which the Divine
Creator would be expected, according to the conditions of His
own being, to direct His power, would be that on which a moral
creature should stand—a being, created indeed, material indeed,
yet so devised and informed by the eternal Father, so made by
the eternal Son, and so endowed by the eternal Spirit, that he
should be able to think and know and feel, to revere and adore
his Maker, to love and hope and pray, to understand and obey
law—in short, to be the worthy creature of God, and in obeying
the laws of his being, to be happy for ever. No creature
more worthy of the creative power of the Supreme can be con-
ceived, and therefore the dictates of reason on this subject
anticipate the facts of revelation, and we are prepared for that
point in the eternal history of creation at which such a created
being should come upon the stage of action.

But though reason might anticipate and postulate the existence
of such a being, she could not have predicted the form and
mode of his existence. For this we are indebted to revelation.
And herein we discover renewed evidences of the wisdom and
benevolence of God. He elected, for the material form of the
angels whom He created, that same Divine form of majesty and
glory which had been from eternity the form of the God-man
—the only begotten Son—and which was afterwards, though
by dimmer and more reflected grace, the form of man.

At what time the angels were created, the Holy Scriptures
do not inform us. But we know that it was prior to the time when the primeval foundations of our earth were established, for the oldest of the inspired books gives to us the august scene in which God answered Job out of the whirlwind: "Where wast thou when I laid the foundations of the earth?" "where- upon are the foundations thereof fastened? Or, who laid the corner-stone thereof, when the morning stars sang together, and all the sons of God shouted for joy?" 1 Here the expression "sons of God" must mean the angels, as it is the same used in describing their previous appearance before Him; and as men were not in existence, and no other beings that could possibly fill the idea of "sons of God" are mentioned in Scripture.

That the human figure, which is the material form of the Son of God, is also the angelic form, appears from many parts of Scripture, the plain and obvious meaning of which will not permit any other view.

The first instance in which the word "angel" is used in the Scriptures is in the interview with Hagar when she fled into the wilderness from the harshness of Sarai. Everything actually revealed as to this interview conduces to the impression that

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1 Job xxxviii. 4-7. In the age of Origen, theologians had not been able to come to any settled conclusion as to the time of the creation of angels or what was their definite nature. The Latin form of Origen's doubt is, "Quando isti creati sint vel quales aut quo modo sint." Art. Angel, Encyc. Britan., Vol. II., p. 28. This article is from the pen of Professor W. Robertson Smith, of Free Church College, Aberdeen, and with his articles "Bible," "Canticles," and "Chronicles," in the last edition of the Encyclopaedia, has constituted a ground for a suggestion of heresy against him in his church. It is quite certain that none of these articles assumes that standpoint as to inspiration, which is the only one to give peace to a sinner. This essay on "Angels" distinctly denies that the long established identity between the Angel Jehovah and the Second Person of the Trinity is justified by "the sense of the Old Testament writers," p. 27. But as the learned Professor does not condescend to give reasons for his opinions, we retain the old belief.

2 Job i. 6; ii. 1.
this Angel Jehovah, although He was the God that saw Hagar, and on whom she looked, appeared to her in human form. As to the angels who appeared to Abraham and to Lot, we have no ground for doubt. They were men. They appeared in human form, ate and spake as men, and when the sensual inhabitants of Sodom saw them go into Lot's residence, they came around the house, and called, "Where are the men which came into thee this night? Bring them out unto us that we may know them." And when Lot made his unworthy attempt to satisfy these Sodomites, and they pressed sorely on him and came near to break the door, then we are told that "the men put forth their hand and pulled Lot into the house to them, and shut to the door." And the next day, while he lingered, "the men laid hold upon his hand, and upon the hand of his wife, and upon the hand of his two daughters; the Lord being merciful unto him; and they brought him forth and set him without the city."

In the thirteenth chapter of Judges, we have the inspired narrative of the events preceding and attending the birth of Samson, the son of Manoah and of a mother whose name is not given. So important was the approach of this child—this strong material deliverer—who was destined to avenge Israel on the Philistines, that two special visits of an angel were made to the wife of Manoah, and the husband participated in the benefit of the last visit. After the angel had made his first visit, the wife told her husband that "A man of God came to her, and his countenance was like the countenance of an angel of God, very awe-inspiring." Then Manoah prayed that the same man of God might come to them again, and his prayer was granted. The angel came again to her in the field, apart from her husband; but she made haste and ran, and said to Manoah: "Behold! the man hath appeared unto me that came

¹ Genesis xix. 5, 9, 10. ² Judges xiii. 3, 6.
unto me the other day.” Then Manoah came to the man, and asked: “Art thou the man that spakest unto the woman?” And he said, “I am.” Then Manoah, after receiving farther instructions as to his wife’s conduct until the birth of the promised son, said to the angel: “I pray thee let us detain thee until we shall have made ready a kid for thee.” But the angel declined the proffered meal, saying, however, to Manoah: “If thou wilt offer a burnt offering, thou must offer it unto the Lord,” showing that, though great and intelligent, he was not the Lord. Then Manoah took a kid, with a meat offering, and offered it upon a rock unto the Lord, and the angel did wondrously, while Manoah and his wife looked on; for when the flame went up toward heaven from the altar, the angel ascended in the flame; and, overwhelmed by this miraculous sight, Manoah and his wife fell on their faces to the ground.¹

Now, if a plain narrative can teach the truth, then from this scriptural account we gather the following facts: 1st, That this being was not God the Son; 2d, That he was an angel; 3d, That he had the human form, having so appeared—as a man—twice to the wife and once to Manoah; 4th, That he was endowed with forces and intelligence far transcending those of men, for no mere man would have known the purpose of God, and no mere man could have ascended to heaven in the flame.

The human forms of angels, though not so plainly revealed, seem to be assumed as a fact in subsequent narratives of the Old Testament.²

And in the New Testament all the appearances of angels are spoken of as though they were men. They appear, they stand, they talk, they support the drooping head, they trouble the waters of a pool, they smite on the side, they lead through iron

¹ Judges xiii. 13-21.

² 2 Samuel xxiv. 16, 17; 1 Chronicles xxi. 15, 20, 27; Daniel iii. 28; Zechariah i. 9, 13, 14, 19; ii. 8; iii. 3; v. 5.
gates, they pass on through a street and then depart; they are so perfectly in human form that when Peter, released from prison, stands in person at the door of his friends, and the damsel Rhoda affirms that it is he, those within say "It is his angel." And when the first Christian martyr, Stephen, appeared before the Jewish council, all who looked on him saw "his face as it had been the face of an angel;" yet he was a man.

These inspired testimonies abundantly establish the truth that those exalted beings—the first moral creatures of God—the angels, were created by God in that majestic form which the Son of God had held from eternity. And therefore there was a special propriety in their being called "the sons of God," although they were only created beings, and infinitely removed from the only-begotten and well-beloved Son.

Not only were angels created in reflected image of the Son, but they were endowed with very exalted spiritual and material

1 Luke i. 18, 19, 26, 30; ii. 10, 13; xxii. 43: John v. 4; xii. 29; Acts vi. 15; xii. 8, 9, 10, 11, 15.
2 Acts vi. 15.
3 In the face of these plain teachings of Holy Writ, it is passing strange to find theologians of high learning and intelligence adhering to the notion that angels have no material element in their being, but are pure spirits. Professor Dabney, in his "Syllabus and Notes," (a very late treatise on systematic theology) announces this idea unreservedly, and seems disposed to regard the frequent appearances of angels in this world as phantoms, spectres or temporary and immaterial vestitures, assumed for the occasion, "like Sunday coats" taken from a wardrobe.—"Syllabus and Notes," pp. 266–267, 827. Any such mode of interpretation will tend to deprive us of a real Christ. Angels are indeed "ministering spirits": but are not men spirits, and is not Christ a spirit, though a man? Schieffelin, in his "Foundations of History," &c., adopts the same error, teaching that angels are merely spirits, though he finds himself compelled to admit that "angels have often made themselves visible—sometimes appearing like men, at other times as glorious beings having great power," p. 21. That pure should have power to "make itself visible" is a novelty both in sophy and revelation.
powers. Their intelligence, though finite, is wonderful and comprehensive; and their bodies are so constituted and so endowed with the forces proper to matter that they have marvellous strength and swiftness. The old masters, who have painted angels, have sometimes adorned their shoulders with wings, but there is no scriptural authority for this feature.¹ Neither would wings have been adequate to the rates of swiftness at which angels sometimes moved; for no wings could have been anything but an incumbrance to Gabriel, the holy angel, who, at the beginning of Daniel's prayer, about the time of the evening-oblation, left the courts of heaven, and, being caused to fly swiftly, touched the prophet before his prayer was ended.² We do not know where heaven is—whether it be beyond or within the distance of the fixed stars; but our ignorance increases rather than lessens our idea of the incalculable velocity of this angelic visitant.

The question of different orders, ranks or classes of angels is one concerning which much learning has been expended with little profit. It is quite certain that the earlier books of the sacred canon contain no distinct allusions to different angelic orders, nor do we find in any book of the Old Testament, except Daniel, such statements concerning these exalted beings as would tend to prove such orders. Yet there is nothing in right reason to forbid such ordination; for although the optimism of Pope may be untenable, yet he was not wrong when he wrote:

"Order is heaven's first law, and this confest,
Some are, and must be, greater than the rest."

In the tenth and twelfth chapters of Daniel, we have allusions to the arch-angel Michael as "one of the chief princes," and as

¹ The Cherubim and Seraphim had wings, but they were symbolic types, and not angels. Exodus xxv. 20; xxxvi. 9; 1 Kings viii. 7; Isaiah vi. 2; Ezekiel i. 6 and post. Art. Angels, Schaff-Herzog Encyc.
² Daniel ix. 21–23.
the “great prince, which standeth for the children of the people” of Israel. And the Apocryphal writers of the period between the Old Testament and the New abound in suggestions and statements of angelic orders. Men of sceptical tendencies have, from these facts, sought to assail the whole scriptural doctrine of angels. They have insisted that these orders and classes of arch-angels, princes and ministering spirits, were substantially the reproduction of the celestial and infernal hierarchy of angels and demons invented by Zoroaster, probably 1200 years before Christ, and perfected by his followers in Persia and Babylonia. This system taught the existence of six resplendent arch-angels, or amshaspands—Ormuzd being the highest; of six arch-devs, of whom Ahriman was the supreme; of twenty-eight Izeds, or beneficent spirits; and twenty-eight devs, to work evil. These led the hosts on either side in the great war between good and evil. From these Persian and Babylonian fables the Jews are supposed to have obtained their ideas of different orders of angels, and to have transmitted them to later times.

But in recognizing the inspiration of the New Testament writers, we find ourselves compelled to admit that angelic orders may have been a part of the Divine constitution for these beings, either imposed at their creation or established thereafter, and in either case for reasons which, though unknown to us, were assuredly wise and good. Nor is there anything inconsistent

1 Daniel x. 13; xii. 1.
2 Prof. W. Robertson Smith’s article, Angel, Encyc. Britan., Vol. II., pp. 27–28. The book of “Enoch,” cited by Prof. Smith, is not one of the recognized books of the Alexandrian canon, but an apocryphal composition, certainly very ancient, as is noticed by Justin Martyr, Irenæus, Clement of Alexandria, Tertullian, Origen, Augustine, Jerome, Hillary and Eusebius. Three copies of it, in the Ethiopic language, were brought home from Abyssinia by Bruce, the traveller, and excited great interest in Europe. A complete English version, by Dr. Laurence, Professor of Hebrew in Oxford University, appeared in 1826.
with our highest views of inspiration in supposing that these distinctions of rank among angels might not have been known to the earlier writers of the inspired records, because a knowledge thereof was not necessary to the purposes of their writings, but may have been made known and alluded to by evangelists and apostles for the information of the Christian church. The reasonableness of this view is confirmed by the fact that the hideous and grotesque system of angelic or demon orders invented by Zoroaster, and held even to the present day by the Guebres and others imbued with the ideas of “The Arabian Nights,” bears no resemblance whatever to the arch-angels, angels, princes, thrones, dominions, powers, introduced to our minds with awe-inspiring dignity by the sacred writers.  

We have no revelation of the definite number of angels created. That they were worthy in number to be ranked as a great host, and to be reckoned by thousands, we are distinctly taught. “The chariots of God are twenty thousand, even

1 Colossians i. 16; 1 Thessalonians iv. 16; Jude, verse 9. Nothing can more vividly prove that the hints in the New Testament on these subjects are high in dignified power than to read their reproduction in Milton:

“Hear, all ye angels, progeny of light,
Thrones, dominations, princedoms, virtues, powers,
Hear my decree, which unrevoked shall stand.”

After the command of the Father that all angels shall worship His only-begotten Son, Satan begins to infuse “bad influence” into the hearts of his inferior angels, and urges them to seek their quarters in the north:

“There to prepare
Fit entertainment to receive our King,
The Great Messiah, and His new commands,
Who speedily, through all the hierarchies,
Intends to pass triumphant, and give laws.”

—“Paradise Lost,” Book V., pp. 109, 111,
Halifax Edit., 1874.

And, in his subsequent address to his followers, Satan uses the same titles that God had used, but with a spiteful irony appropriate to the occasion.
thousands of angels; the Lord is among them as in Sinai in the holy place.”¹ And when the Son of God, incarnate and obedient unto death, was assaulted in the garden by a band led by the traitor Judas, and when Peter, with impetuous zeal, drew his sword and smote off the ear of the high-priest’s servant, the God-man calmly healed the wound, and said: “Put up again thy sword into his place, for all they that take the sword shall perish with the sword. Thinkest thou that I cannot now pray to My Father, and He shall presently give Me more than twelve legions of angels?”² As the Roman legion, when full, numbered four thousand five hundred soldiers, besides camp attendants, an angelic army of more than fifty thousand would have been instantly present had this prayer been made. But how could the Scripture in that case have been fulfilled, and how could sinners have been saved?

Whatever may have been their numbers, and whatever differences of order or rank may have existed among them, it seems reasonably certain that they were all brought into existence at one and the same time; at least we have nothing in revelation to authorize the contrary belief. They were also created without distinction of sex, and without any pro-creative constitution by which their numbers might be multiplied.³ In this respect they differed radically from the later creation, man.

From these facts we infer that each of these exalted moral beings—the angels—stood for himself, and for no others. Each was created with a nature, mingled indeed, and made up of spiritual and material elements, yet upright and free from sin

¹ Psalms lxviii. 17.
² Matthew xxvi. 52, 53. The Greek word is λεγεωνας, the equivalent of the Latin legio. But, in fact, New Testament usage as to “legion” indicates an immense and indefinite number, which may have been thousands or millions. Mark v. 9, 15; Luke viii. 30.
³ This is a very plain inference from Matthew xxii. 30; Mark xii. 25; Luke xx. 35, 36.
or sinful disposition. Each was noble in intelligence, and was furnished with actual knowledge of the law of God binding on him as a moral creature. Each was perfectly blessed and happy according to his nature and capacity. And each was fully apprized of the unchangeable divine constitution of things, by which punishment is a necessary and infallible consequence of the violation of law.

And yet we know, from Holy Scripture, that many of these angels “kept not their first estate,” but broke the law of God, and have been since suffering its righteous penalty, “reserved in everlasting chains, under darkness, unto the judgment of the great day.” 1 How many or what proportion of them thus fell we have never known. The number may have been small when compared with the number of those who remained faithful and righteous. 2

What their sin was, and under what influences they committed it, we shall humbly seek to discover at a subsequent stage of this work. It is now only spoken of to preserve the connection, in time, between the creation and fall of angels and similar events in the history of man.

It is certain that the sin and defection of Satan and his companions in guilt preceded the creation of Adam and Eve; nor

1 Jude, verse 6.

2 Milton, in the fifth book of “Paradise Lost,” makes the rebellious angels—

"An host
Innumerable as the stars of night
Or stars of morning, dew-drops which the sun
Impearls on every leaf, and every flower;"

and even estimates their proportion to the holy angels definitely, for he tells us that Satan

"Drew after him the third part of heaven’s host."

But this notion is evidently founded on the passage in the Apocalypse, xii. 3, 4, which is too sublimely obscure to justify any such conclusion.

26
can we pronounce the suggestion of the great English poet, that
the first of these events was inducement to the other, to be un-
natural or unfounded; for we know that when man was created,
though that same image of the God-man, which was the model
that angels were formed on, was again adopted as the material
form, yet in other respects a very different constitution was
given. A world had been gradually prepared, through millions
of years of geologic changes, for the home of the new being.
And instead of peopling this world at once with millions of
men, each one standing for himself, as each angel stood, the
eternal Father, in His infinite wisdom, saw fit to create, in the
material image of His only-begotten and well-beloved Son, man
—male and female, a man and a woman—upright and pure,
perfectly informed in their duty and perfectly able to perform
it, specially warned of the danger of disobedience, and perfectly
blessed and happy so long as they continued in obedience.
But Adam was made of the dust of the ground, and Eve was
made of a rib taken from Adam's side, and into each God
breathed the breath of life and made them living souls—
spiritual essence, informing and working in material frame—
a microcosm of the universe.

Thus we have learned, from the best light of revelation that
our reason and faith will enable us to gather, the great truth
that all the moral creatures of God were originally created with
material being in the image of His Son, and with spiritual
being after the likeness of His own eternal uprightness and
purity, "in knowledge, righteousness and the holiness of truth."
From these facts we gather three inferences that seem specially
important in the present stage of the progressive thought of
mankind:

1. That the "development" or "evolution" theory, so far as
it seeks to establish a belief that man is developed or evolved
from the lower orders of animality, is an impious horror, in-
sulting to God and His Son, and dishonoring to man. In so saying we do not utter unadvised words. Development or evolution is a fact in nature widely operative, and worthy of the most industrious and intelligent research that science can apply. But no facts have ever been ascertained which prove that one of the originally creative acts of God has ever lost its significance—in other words, that any one species of living animal has ever by evolution become another species. To go over the facts and arguments applicable to this subject would not here be proper. It is sufficient to say that the very fact that differing races of men and varieties of animals may be developed under differing conditions, establishes rather than overthrows the doctrine of the permanence of species. The arguments against the possibility of the evolution of man from the gorilla or the orang-outang were strong and convincing when rested on what was known in worldly science, but when, in addition, we learn from fair interpretation of the Word of God that the higher order of moral creatures was created long before—perhaps millions of years before—the lower order; that evolution of the one from the other was impossible; that both were created, as to their material being, on the model of the material being of the Son of God, then indeed this outcome of the doctrine of evolution stamps indelible dishonor and disgrace on all who seriously hold and teach it.

1 It is a fact somewhat damaging to the "evolution theory" in its worst sense, that in that sense it did not originate in modern brains, but in the brain of Basilides, a famous heretic and Gnostic of the second century. He taught that man was evolved by successive stages from lower animality. He taught also that Christ had no real body, but only a phantom body, and that Cimon the Cyrenian was really crucified in His place. He held, likewise, that there were 365 spheres between earth and heaven; at the head of each an angel, its creator, and at the head of all God, creator of all. God, therefore, was *Aβραατς*, a name made from the letters which stood for 365 according to the system then in use.

2 One of the latest announcements of evolution in its most hideous form—that is, the development of both animality and spirituality in man from
2. That all the races of man in this world are lineal descendants of Adam and Eve—the first man, for God made man male and female. The declaration of inspired Scripture, that God "hath made of one blood all nations of men for to dwell on all the face of the earth," is confirmed by the present number of the lower nature—is set forth with fascinating graces of language in Professor Joseph Le Conte's article, "Man's Place in Nature," Princeton Review, November, 1878. We give an extract: "The essential character of immortal spirit, then, is complete individuation and separation from the pervading divine energy, separation from the Divine Spirit, separation from God. Alas, is this then, it will be asked, the sum of our philosophy? Yes, I answer, separation physically, but only in order to meet again with Him morally. Physical bonds are broken only that thereby higher moral, personal relations may be established. As by the nebular hypothesis the earth must break away from cohesive connection, and become a separate planet before she can establish higher gravitative relations with the central sun and with other planets, and move with them in sweet accord, making spherical music, even so spirit must break away from cohesive physical connection with the Divine energy, and become a distinct, self-conscious entity, before she can enter into higher moral relations with the central sun of righteousness; or with other spirits, and move with them in the beauty of holiness, making far sweeter moral harmony."—Princeton Review, November, 1878, p. 801. This is fine writing, and must be presumed to mean something. If so, it must be what is elsewhere held in the article, to-wit: that man's body and spirit have been, by development, individuated from lower stages of animal and spiritual being in nature. This is, in substance, the very worst teaching of the evolution doctrines. The illustration, drawn by Professor Le Conte from the nebular hypothesis, is no more really applicable or true than his illustration, previously noted herein, of a watery surface rising into mamillae and button-like protuberances, and finally individuated in a separate bubble!

1 Acts xvii. 26: Ἑποιεσε τε ἐξ ἐνος αἵματος πάν ἐθνῶν ανθρώπων κατοικεῖσθαι επὶ τὰν το προσωπον τῆς γῆς. The discussions of the scientific world as to this vexed question have been long and earnest, but the advantage in the argument can hardly be a question. It remains with the advocates of the Scripture doctrine of "one blood." Unfortunately, the opinions and sentiments arising out of African slavery confused the scientific question by introducing an element which did not properly belong to it. Nott and Gliddon's "Types of Mankind" proved this. The right side has been advocated by Dr. Pritchard, in England, Dr. Cabell, of the University of Virginia, and many others equally able. See Rev. Dr. T. V. Moore's
earth's human inhabitants as compared with the probable generations of man, and by the almost numberless points of proof of a common origin found among all peoples, enlightened, civilized, semi-barbarous or savage, and is in no true sense negativd by the different races and varieties, originating in differences of climate, habit, condition and forms of life, all of which are capable of transmitting their acquired results by generative descent.

But when, in addition, we consider the radical difference between the constitution of the angels, each standing for himself, with its apparently disastrous results, and the constitution of man, in which one—male and female—stood at the head of the whole line, and held in the one dual being—man—the whole of the countless numbers of the human race, and consider the divine remedy for violated law applied in the case of man, we cannot doubt a common origin. For it would have been nothing more than a repetition of the angelic conditions and of the angelic result had God created many different men, of different colors and characters, in different parts of the earth, as progenitors of differing species of the genus man.

This was not the plan of divine wisdom, as we learn from many parts of Scripture, and especially from the teachings of the apostle, favored with "the abundance of the revelations" given to him.¹

3. From this review of his origin in creation, we infer that lecture on "The Ethnological Objection."—"Evidences of Christianity," University of Virginia, pp. 411-455. Canon Rawlinson (Princeton Rev. Nov., 1878,) gives ably the arguments establishing unity, but advocates amalgamation—a doctrine condemned by the true spirit of Holy Scripture. As to the Greek reading given in this note, it is that of the textus receptus, and of Knapp, Griesbach, Mill,—in short, of all the best editions. Westcott and Hort, misled by principles unacknowledged by competent scholars, leave out αὐτάς, but in their "notes on select readings," give no reasons for the omission. Of course the R. V. of 1881 follows them! ¹ Romans v.; 2 Corinthians xii. 7.
man is a highly exalted being, adapted by his Creator to a
noble destiny. If, by his own sin, he has lowered himself, he
is still worthy of the wondrous remedy intended for him by the
counsels of eternity. To the dark problem of evil and sin in
the universe, and to the remedial system therefor, devised from
all eternity and working through all time, we now proceed.
CHAPTER IX.

PHYSICAL AND MORAL EVIL.

Evil, whether physical or moral, always consists in and involves a violation of law.

That this is the doctrine of Scripture as to moral evil, or sin, is apparent from the explicit words, "Whoso committeth sin transgresseth also the law; for sin is the transgression of the law." 1

But as the Scriptures were given for the purpose of instructing moral creatures in their duty and destiny, and how their moral evil may be remedied, and not for the purpose of teaching material science, or the laws which apply to matter merely, we are not surprised to find them giving only suggestive allusions and hints as to the nature and origin of physical evil.

Yet all their teachings are consistent with the assertion that physical evil consists in and involves a violation of law as truly as does sin.

We have already sought to show that the true theory of the universe is the Nomian theory—the hypothesis of law.

Law is the result of intelligence and benevolence in the eternal Spirit. It is the regulative principle according to which God applies force or power to matter, and according to which He directs it to the ends designed.

There has been from eternity past, and will continue to be during eternity to come, but one Being constituted of spirit and matter united, to whom violation of law was impossible. This

1 John iii. 4. Ἡ αμαρτία και τὴν ανησυχίαν ποιεῖ, και ἡ ἀμαρτία εστὶν ἡ ἀνησυχία.
Being is the Son of God. As God, He could not violate law, because He was not under law, but over all law, and, in fact, its author and administrator. There was a period of thirty-three years, known as His state of humiliation, during which, for the sublime purposes of redemption, He was made under the law.¹ That He did not sin during that period, we well know, for thus were we saved. Whether, during that period, He was impeccable—that is, incapable of sin, unable to sin—we will hereinafter enquire.

But the Son of God—the God-man—was not a creature. He was eternally generated, the only begotten of God, the same yesterday and to-day and for ever. And therefore what was true of Him may not be with safety predicated of any creation of God, however exalted in purpose and endowment.

God, being essentially the spirit of all energy, has been from eternity operating upon matter, and bringing out from it in time the best results possible. Among these possible results we are not authorized, either by reason or revelation, to reckon as one an entire exemption from physical evil.

But let us not fall into dangerous error here. Matter is not essentially evil, is not essentially in antagonism to the law of God. Matter is, in its normal state, the worthy—υποστάσις—and eternal companion of God,—what, in its essence, we do not know, but, we have no reason to doubt, ineffably æthernal, beautiful and good in a material sense. The old and long-clinging theory of the Gnostics, Manicheans and Paulicians, that matter is essentially evil, and is therefore the efficient cause of all the evil, physical and moral, in the universe, is an attempt to solve the mystery of evil very little above the system of Zoroaster, and liable to all its abuses.² It is founded on a

¹ Galations iv. 4. Ἐνεπέλαθεν ὑπὸ νομον.
² In fact, the Persian Manes, who attempted to engraft the dualism of Zoroaster on Christianity, was but a seconder of the Gnosticism of previous
falsehood, and can lead to nothing save false philosophy, asceticism and impurity.¹

But though matter, in its essence, is no more evil than mind is, yet it has certain essential properties which enter so necessarily into its being that power, however great, cannot annihilate them. Among these necessary properties, we need, for the purposes of this discussion, mention only two—extension and inertia. We cannot conceive of matter, or construe it to ourselves in thought, without attributing to it extension—that is, thinking of it as occupying space. However minute may be the particle of matter—even if so small as not to be reached by the microscope—still it must, of necessity, have a right and a left side, an upper and a lower surface, and if so, it must occupy space. And extension necessarily implies impenetrability, so that it is impossible that two particles of matter shall occupy the same space at the same time. And although some metaphysicians have doubted whether inertia be, by necessary mental intuition, a primary property of matter, yet others have, with strong reason, so held. And none can deny that inertia belongs essentially to matter; for matter, having extension, and, by consequence, impenetrability, occupies its space in quietude until force puts it in motion, and when once in motion so continues until conflicting force stops it, or changes the direction of its movement.² This is inertia, and is a property so essen-

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² Descartes considered inertia to be, not a primary property of matter, but only an accidental property, resulting from extension. This would seem to common sense to be a distinction without a difference. Yet Sir Wm. Hamilton seems to think that Descartes' view may be maintained.
tially belonging to matter that all knowledge, all experience, in all ages have united in conceding it.

The inevitable result of these properties of matter, which are eternal and indestructible, is that matter, although not evil in itself, resists divine forces, and may resist so long and so pertinaciously that, in a given volume of matter, while much the larger part may yield obedience to the laws under which force operates, and which are intended to work out an intelligent and worthy end, yet another part, gathering to itself the resistant properties of the whole volume, may be the occasion of what is called evil. Thus, we conceive, physical evil comes into the universe of an almighty, all wise and all benevolent Supreme Spirit. It is, in each case, the result of the concentrated property of resistance which impenetrability and inertia necessarily oppose to power or force. And hence it follows (and all experience and observation confirm the conclusion) that as creation—which is the application of force to matter—is an eternal relation, physical evil has always been in the universe, and we have no reason to believe that it will ever entirely cease to exist.

But we must at this point carefully note, that this property of resistance which matter has is perfectly consistent with the

on psychological grounds, though false in physicals. This is an incalculable statement, like some others from the great Scottish metaphysician; for if false in physics, it was false in fact, and therefore could not be true in mental philosophy. See Hamilton’s “Philosophy of Perception,” Wight’s Amer. Edit., 1857, pp. 365–367. Lord Kames regarded inertia as a primary attribute of matter. Professor Joseph Haven, whose work on mental philosophy is a thoughtful and judicious concentration of his own views, after study of Plato, Aristotle, Cicero, Descartes, Leibnitz, Malebranche, Locke, Reid, Dugald Stewart, Brown, Upham, Wayland, Winslow, Mahan, Cousin, Jouffroy, Royer Collard, Damiron, Hegel, Rosenkrantz, Kant, Hamilton, Hume, Collier, Berkeley, Adam Smith, Compte, Buffier, Amédée Jacques, St. Hilaire, Edwards and Bledsoe, reckoned inertia among the secundo-primary properties of matter. Edit. 1865, p. 86.
doctrine herein announced and steadfastly held, that all power, force, cause, are from God. Matter has, in itself, no power or force, and is never, in any true sense, efficient cause. It has simply the properties of impenetrability and inertia, and as these have been and will be in ceaseless resistance and intractable opposition to force, a residuum of unsubdued resistance emerges in the work of creation, and occasions evil.

We cannot expect to find in nature and art, as known in human experience, any analogies or illustrations adequate to make this deep subject clear and plain. God’s power is infinite; man’s finite. God is Creator; man is creature. God devises, moulds and sends on their career through space, stars, planets, systems, suns, moons; man can do nothing but mould, by his intelligence and skill, a few structures and manufactures, exhibiting in their humble measure utility, grace and beauty. Yet, all this being admitted, it remains true that man was made an image and likeness, dim and reflected, but actual and real, of God, and therefore the works of man may aid us in studying the works of God.

As a conative illustration, then, let us take a human artisan. We will suppose him to be a skilful watchmaker—a workman as perfect in his craft as the highest standard of earth will furnish. He is about to make a watch—to create it, in the only sense in which man can create. To do this, he must have before his mind, or in his hands:

I. The design or end for which the manufactured article is intended—its raison d’être. This is, in case of a simple watch, the useful and economical design of measuring time, and thus saving and properly employing time; and in case of the higher form of clock or watch known as a chronometer, the design is to ascertain with perfect accuracy the difference in time between two points on the earth’s surface, in order to find the longitude of a ship at sea, and thus save her crew of living souls from peril of violent death. The end is high and worthy.
II. Suitable and proper material for constructing and putting together the one hundred and twenty pieces (at least) of which a well-made watch consists.\footnote{Art. Clocks and Watches, New Amer. Cyclop., Vol. V., p. 361. American watches are, in their separate parts, made almost entirely by machinery. English watches of the more elaborate sort are made by hand, and often have as many as eight hundred parts.}

This material must, of necessity, be selected with skill and care, and must be varied in substance or properties according to the uses in the mechanism to which it is to be applied. It will be only necessary, for the purposes of our illustration, that we mention the important parts of the watch. Each of these has its law, or, in other words, its regulative principle proper to its intended use, and given by the intelligence of the artisan, and without obedience to which something evil or wrong will speedily manifest itself.

1. The frame or plate and cover for the support and protection of the mechanism. This frame must be of firm and generally unelastic material. Its law is strength and firmness in small space; for if it break or bend easily, not merely evil, but ruin, quickly follows.

2. The spiral spring, with its barrel, for the motive power of the watch. Its law is intense strength and hardness, united with high elasticity. Hence it is made of steel, which is not an elementary metal, but compounded of iron and carbon, in modes and proportions so empirical that more than two thousand years of experience have been required to prepare it for watch-springs.\footnote{Daimachus, a writer cotemporary with Alexander the Great (B. C. 330), mentions four varieties of steel: the Chalybdic, suited for carpenter’s tools; the Laecedæmonian, suited for files, drills, gravers and chisels; the Lydian, for swords, knives and razors; and the Lynopic, for other purposes. Art. Steel, New Amer. Cyclop., Vol. XIV., p. 70.}

3. The escapement mechanism, by which the rate of movement of the watch is regulated. This consists of wheels and teeth—
a balance wheel of nicely adjusted metals, which shall, by their differing rates of expansion under heat or contraction under cold, counteract and balance each other, and keep the movement of the wheel uniform; and a hair-spring of the finest and most highly tempered steel. The law of the whole escapement apparatus is perfect regularity of operation under the most delicate and sensitive conditions. And to conduce to obedience to this law, hair-springs have been made, so marvellously uniting delicacy and strength that, in 1851, Mr. Lutz, of Geneva, exhibited one at the London Crystal Palace which bore the test of being stretched out at length and pulled without breaking, and of being laid on a hot plate without injury; and a balance wheel in a chronometer, made by the English artisan, Harrison, obeyed law so well that its error in time did not amount to one second in ten years; and another, from the same manufacturer, sent to the island of Jamaica by the British government, showed the difference of longitude within one minute and one-quarter of the result obtained by careful astronomical calculation on the spot! But between these almost perfect instruments and the tens of thousands of watches made and used, great discrepancies would appear, and each discrepancy would involve a violation of law, and result in evil, greater or less.

4. The face and hands, with the circle and figures on the face. On these a very a simple law is imposed—that of pointing distinctly to the figures and lines which indicate the hours and minutes of passing time. Yet, simple as this law is, it is often violated through defects of material, and every violation is an evil, which may bring in its train serious suffering.

5. The outer case of the watch, with its front of convex glass or crystal. The law of this part is protection of the inner

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works and frame, and clearness or transparency so complete that every part of the face and hands may be instantly seen. This law is broken whenever the back is of material or constitution easily pierced or bent, and whenever the glass is so opaque, bleared, toughened, cracked or polarized as to intercept the view of the face.

Now, in order to reach the present point (near to perfection) in the making of clocks, watches and chronometers, men, paying continuous attention to the subject, have been at work on material for at least twenty-two centuries. The end or design has been always the same—that is, to measure time with accuracy, and point out the measurement to man. But between the ancient ἡρατομορία of the Greek and Roman civilization² and the modern chronometer, who can tell how many failures, renewals of efforts, thwarted hopes, patient experiments, rejected wheels, springs, cords, chains, pulleys, pendulums, keys have attended the persevering resolution of man to overcome the evils resulting from the non-correspondence between his own ideal and the results of resistant and intractable matter? The convex glass fronts have required all the time, labor and thought expended on the fusion of silica with an alkali and metallic oxide since the days of the Egyptian monarch, who lived fifteen hundred years before Christ, and in memory of whose reign a bead of thick crown glass, bearing his name inscribed on it, was made, which has been found at Thebes.³ And the spiral

¹ One of the earliest instruments for measurement of time was the clepsydra, which was known to the Chaldeans in principle, but seems to have had no name until some of the colonists from Greece took possession of it. It was a rude and inaccurate water-clock, in which, from an orifice in a large vessel, equal quantities of water were supposed to flow in equal times. It was introduced into Rome and used in courts of justice and public assemblies to limit the duration of speeches. Hence Cicero's sarcasm: "Latrare ad clepsydras"—to bark by the clock. Our modern half-hour glass with sand is similar in principle.

² This was long prior to the very doubtful discovery ascribed by Pliny
springs have cost hundreds of years of thought and experiment. The substitution of catgut for cord, and of metallic chain for catgut, and finally the rejection of the chain entirely, with its numerous links and pivots, numbering in all some five or six hundred separate parts, have marked the patient purpose and progress of man in seeking and applying remedies for the evils resulting from resistant matter.

We gather from this review of a single branch of human manufacture the following inferences, which will illustrate, though very inadequately, the causes and remedies of physical evil in the universe:

1. That the intractable and resistant residuum of matter opposing intelligent force, which sought to impose law upon it, has led to evil.

2. That this evil is necessary and inevitable.

3. That remedies may, nevertheless, be sought and found; and chief among these remedies are the element of time, which affords a field for patient and persevering effort, and the element of force, constantly renewed and continued with increased intelligence and attention, until the residuum of resistance is brought to its minimum, and all the evils of previous mechanisms are removed as completely as possible, so that the machine approaches perfection in fulfilling the end for which it was made.

4. That such a result, in a particular manufacture (as of chronometers), by no means brings with it perfection in other manufactures. Each of these must run its own course of

to certain Phoenician merchants, who are said to have lighted a fire on the sands where they had deposited packages of soda, and who, after the fire was out, found glass as the product of the fusion of sand and soda. No fire thus kindled, impromptu and with ordinary fuel, would have been hot enough to produce such fusion. Our faith is not increased by finding Pliny's story reproduced in a pleasant German costume. See Otto's German Grammar, Edit. 1874, pp. 201–202. Art. Glass, New Amer. Cyclop., Vol. VIII., pp. 281, 282.
repeated resistance by matter, repeated evils, repeated rejections of material, crude or manufactured, repeated experiments, partial successes, patient and long-enduring struggles to overcome the residuum of material resistance, skilful arrays of one substance with certain properties against another with differing properties, until, in time, the nearest approach to perfection is reached. And then another branch of manufacture is reached and mastered in like manner. But so long as man's destiny binds him to this earth and to the conditions of this life, physical evils will continue to oppose him, and he will continuously seek to remedy and subdue them.

And although, in the successive stages of watch-making, it is probable that millions of men may have been, from the beginning to the present time, employed with mind and body, yet as the end to be fulfilled by the machine has been always the same and always in their view, the intelligence and works of all these millions of men may be considered as that of one man. Therefore what they have all done, or sought to do, one being, representing their united intelligence and forces, and living through all their lives, would have done, or sought to do.

But this one man, though concentrating in himself the mental power and the aptness for applying force possessed by millions of men in successive generations, would, nevertheless, be only a finite being, and, therefore, immeasurably below the Infinite Creator. Hence we must guard ourselves carefully from conceiving that illustrations drawn from human power and skill, continued through all ages, will convey any sufficient idea of the conditions existing between the eternal Spirit and this eternal substratum.

Nevertheless such illustrations may aid us in rising to the contemplation of the universe of material being as it actually exists, and as we have reason to believe it has, in successive changes, existed during an eternity past.
Two considerations make such aid pertinent and important: First, That God has taught us in His revealed truth a sacred *anthropomorphism*, which authorizes us to believe that our spiritual nature is, in a certain sense, like His; that our intelligence and wisdom are, in their humble kind and degree, analogous to His infinite intelligence and wisdom; that what is *really* knowledge to us is knowledge to Him, what is *truth* to us is truth to Him; for if it were not, we could never know that what He reveals to us is true. Second, That the forces which man employs in this world, and applies to his manufactures, are not *human* forces; they do not originate in man or belong to man; they are the forces of God—the same that He has employed in building, developing, improving and carrying on His works of creation. Man does not invent them; he merely discovers them, and finds out more and more about them by patient experiment, continued through thousands of years. Hence, as these forces are from God—are *really* and essentially Divine forces, though employed by man—it is not irreverent or unreasonable to believe that the same resistance and inertia opposed by matter to power (wielded by man as a mere agent of God) will be found to exist when Almighty power works on eternal matter.

Let us then humbly approach the works of God in the light of these human illustrations, and seek to discover the nature and operation of physical evil, and the *remedies* therefor, which Divine wisdom and benevolence have devised and are constantly applying.

Election—though some ill-poised people object to the very word—is a necessity of the intelligence of God. He *must* elect, and has been electing from all eternity, but always for reasons good and worthy, though, in most cases, unknown to us. Hence God, having determined that our solar and planetary system should exist, *elected* the portion of space in which it should
exist, and elected the matter out of which it should be formed. But it by no means follows that only the normal matter filling that portion of space was used for the purpose intended. Not only such matter as occupied that space, but matter from the distant parts of space—some of it perhaps already worked on and partly prepared—may have been summoned to the elected field of creation.

This field was the enormous space, having a diameter or imaginary axis of about six thousand millions of miles, in or near the centre whereof our sun is situated, and on the outskirts whereof the planet Neptune wheels in his huge orbit.

How many millions of years have elapsed since the first creative movement of the matter occupying this space occurred, the human mind is incompetent to compute. The nebular hypothesis, with so much of scientific reason to commend it, and nothing in revelation which, upon proper exegesis, opposes it, requires us to believe that by spiral motions, on an immense scale, the system has been gradually evolved. The settling of the huge mass of incandescent matter composing the sun in or near the centre, and the successive detachments of planet after planet, and moon after moon, which have continued to whirl around the central mass, must have required immense tracts of time, and been accompanied by stupendous physical turmoil. And as the process of coalescing and hardening went on, under the working of forces suited to the purpose, while other forces, suited to maintain motion, and consequently heat, were in equal activity, we can appreciate dimly the terrific stress to which matter was subjected, and the resistance and opposition which its impenetrability and inertia constantly made—perhaps with increased intensity as the resistance of the greater mass was radually overcome, and the opposition became concentrated in a residuum of material inertia, drawn from the whole original volume.
Yet never for a moment are we to suppose that the result of this necessary conflict was at any time a chaos. The illustration of human manufacture will guide us here. The end or design was before the creative Mind from eternity, and time was one of the conditions for its accomplishment. Law was present from the beginning of the process. Each successive stage of material being was subjected to law, and just in proportion as that law was obeyed or disobeyed was the end or design pervading all, forwarded or retarded. In speaking of law as applicable to material working, we are liable to two errors. One is involved in the assertion so often made, that the material creations of God never disobey law.\(^1\) To hold this is to ignore entirely the essential properties of extension, impenetrability and inertia, which belong to matter, and which of necessity resist the law's force that intelligent Spirit imposes. For unless God can and shall annihilate these essential properties, it remains true that a residuum of resistance in matter will steadily oppose and sometimes disobey law, however wise and benevolent that law may be. The other error is to seek a perfect assimilation between obedience or disobedience to law in material creations and in moral creatures. The difference is wide and perfectly defined. It is a difference of constitution, as we shall hereafter more fully see. And when constitutions differ, assimilation cannot be established. The processes and results are radically different, though they may indirectly come from the same source.

\(^1\) Such assertions from theologians are common. Thus Dr. Ro. J. Breckenridge says, in speaking of the material universe of God: "A step further reveals to us that these principles manifest themselves through laws which are invariable, irresistible and immutable; laws which, with an exactitude perfectly rigorous, and with an intelligence which omits nothing and which usurps nothing, control and direct throughout every portion of the universe, every manifestation of its varied and immeasurable life."—"Knowledge of God, Objectively Considered," Edit. 1858, p. 340.
Assuming it then to be true that matter will always offer a residuum of resistance to the regulative forces according to which God wills that it shall act, we can no longer doubt that those great, and sometimes terrible, irregularities, commotions and failures which mark the course of nature, and which we call physical evils, have been occasioned by this resistance. Thus God, who is all wisdom, goodness and justice, and who is also all force and power, is at once and for ever relieved from all imputation of being the author even of physical evil. All His attributes are adverse to it, and if His will were done on earth, or throughout the material universe, as it is in heaven, it would never exist. But the very form of that God-composed prayer which His Son has taught His people constantly to offer, proves that such is not the case. We are therefore justified in saying that neither physical nor moral evil is according to the will of God. Each involves a violation of His laws, and for each His infinite attributes urge Him to provide and to apply a remedy that shall reduce each to its minimum.

We are so much accustomed to consider only those events or those phenomena as evils which produce inconvenience or suffering to sentient beings such as we are, that we find it difficult to realize how any real physical evil could have occurred in the

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1 The theologic notion that all physical evil was part of the curse which followed the sin of Adam and Eve, though sometimes heard from the lesser powers of the pulpit, is not taught in Holy Scripture, and is seldom heard now from sound Christian thinkers. The evidences that storms, earthquakes, plagues, disease and death had been abundant in our world before man existed are too strong to be resisted. Dr. John Young seems to admit that God is the author of physical evil ("The Mystery of Evil and God," pp. 238–240); but he holds to creation ex nihilo, which, of course, makes such admission inevitable.

2 Ἐσχάτω τοῦ θελήματος αὐτοῦ ἐν πάσῃ καὶ εἰς τὴν γῆν. —Matthew vi. 10; Luke xi. 2. It is remarkable that though some differences, more or less important, exist between the forms of the Lord’s Prayer given by the two evangelists, in the above petition they are perfectly identical.
universe prior to the introduction of organized living creatures. As convulsions, earthquakes, hurricanes, tornadoes, destructive explosions, furious conflagrations of worlds could not have inflicted any suffering unless there were beings susceptible of suffering, and exposed to them, we are prone to look on such events, occurring in pre-angelic ages (or certainly in pre-Adamite ages), as hardly to be reckoned among physical evils. And this impression may have possibly tended to give strength to that form of exegesis which attributes all physical evil to the sin of Adam and Eve, and supposes it to have commenced then. But this is a very narrow and unworthy view of the Divine plans and remedies; and it is contradicted by facts. God’s law, which is the expression of His intelligence and will, was from all eternity imposed, as right and wise, upon His creations from their beginning, throughout their action and being. And matter, by its constant impenetrability and inertia, resisted that law. And hence came physical evils—violations of that law and eternally devised remedies for such violations.

In our solar system, astronomers long ago discovered evidences of the imposition of law in the election and arrangement of the intervals of space between the sun and each planet, beginning with Mercury, and embracing in succession Venus, the earth, Mars, Jupiter, Saturn and Uranus. This law assumed the form of regular numerical proportions according to a propounded ratio, first pointed out by Titius. Hence this proportion is

1 It is usual with theologians to seek to deduce this doctrine from Genesis iii. 17–19; but the immense and extended forms of physical evil in the universe cannot be included in the curse upon the ground, the thorns and thistles, and the necessity for man’s earning his bread by the sweat of his face. The mysterious passage—Romans viii. 19–23—so far from teaching that all physical evil came from Adam’s sin, seems to teach, in verse 22, that pain and suffering have been the heritage of “the whole creation (παντὸς τοῦ κόσμου) during all its existence, and until now,” (αχρί τοῦ νόμου.)
called the law of Titius. It is thus expressed: Take the figures 0, 3, 6, 12, 24, 48, 96, each, after the second, being found by doubling the preceding figure; to each of the series add 4, and we have a series of numbers giving so nearly the relative distances of the seven planets named (with the marked exception to be presently noted) from the sun, that a law was apparent in this planetary arrangement. And although it has been said that the elements of the planet Neptune depart so widely from this observed proportion as to destroy the basis of the supposed law, yet this is by no means certain; for the real distance of Neptune is not yet known within some eighty millions of miles. And when we remember that, from the time of Copernicus down to within a few years past, a constant astronomical error of at least four millions of miles existed in the estimated distance of our earth from the sun, we are not yet authorized to consider the distance of Neptune from the sun as fixed. It may vary from the present estimate by from eighty to one hundred millions of miles, and it is admitted that a difference of eighty-seven millions would bring this planet into accord with the law of Titius.


2 Prof. Newcomb says "the discovery of this planet (Neptune), in 1846, completely disproved the supposed law," "Popular Astronomy," Edit. 1878, p. 287. But this is a premature declaration; LeVerrier and Adams, in 1846, both estimated the distance of Neptune from the sun at thirty-five hundred millions of miles. This is said to be a mistake; but at least two differing distances have since been assumed, one of 2,862,000,000, and the other of 2,775,000,000. Compare tables in Dr. Comstock's Astronomy, Edit. 1866, p. 338, and Art. Astronomy, New Amer. Cyclop., Vol. II., p. 253, with Table V., Elements of the Orbits of the Eight Major Planets for 1850, Prof. Newcomb's "Popular Astronomy," Edit. 1878, p. 538. And the axial motion of Neptune is unknown. His elements, therefore, must be held as yet too obscure to destroy the law of Titius.

3 See the table in Prof. Newcomb's "Popular Astronomy," p. 287.
A PLANETARY SPACE VACANT.

But there was one gap which seemed to break the regularity of the solar system, and to destroy entirely either the symmetry of the system itself, or the presumption of divine law as its regulative principle. This gap was the immense void space that seemed to interpose between the orbit of Mars and that of Jupiter, a gap of some three hundred and forty millions of miles. No planet had been found within this space up to January 1, 1801, and yet so strong was the mental assurance of astronomers that law required the presence of a planet within this huge belt of space, that, in 1800, an association of twenty-four astronomers was formed, having for its object a systematic search for this supposed planet by all the methods that science and art could furnish. The results of this search, from that year to the present time, have been of singular import. They have proved and vindicated the law, but they have proved also or at least raised a potent presumption, that the law has been violated, and thus the beauty and symmetry of the planetary system have been marred and defaced for a season, so that time and new applications of force are needed as the remedy.

By a marked but not uncommon illustration of the truth that "man proposes, but God disposes," the honor of the first discovery did not fall to one of the twenty-four. Giuseppe Piazzi was not a member of the association, but he was enthusiastic in his devotion to the heavenly science. On the first night in January, 1801, from his observatory in Palermo, Italy, he discovered Ceres, the first of the planetoids, between Mars and Jupiter. This stimulated the German Heinrich Wilhelm Matthias Olbers, who was a member of the band of twenty-

Dr. Wm. B. Carpenter adopts Prof. Newcomb's view, and says "the discovery of Neptune effectually demolished the credit of this law," (Nature and Law, Littell's Living Age, December 18, 1880, p. 718); but he presents only the facts noted by Prof. Newcomb, which cannot yet be regarded as conclusive.
four, to renewed efforts, which were rewarded on the 28th of March, 1802, by the discovery of Pallas, in a distant part of the heavens, from Ceres, but having about the same mean distance from the sun. Olbers immediately adopted and published the belief that these two planetoids (or asteroids, as they were generally called,) were fragments of a larger planet, and that other fragments would be found on proper search. And his prediction was fulfilled; for, in September, 1804, M. Harding, of Lilienthal, while in Bremen, accidentally discovered Juno; and on the 29th of March, 1807, the indefatigable Olbers added a fourth—Vesta—to the "sisters three."

Only one more was discovered up to the year 1845, but, since that time, it would not be extravagant to say that these planetoids, occupying substantially the same belt of space, have been discovered in yearly showers. In the five years preceding 1850, eight were discovered; in the next five years, twenty-four; in the next, twenty-five; in the next, twenty-three; in the next, twenty-seven; in the next, forty-five; in the year 1876, twelve; in 1877, eleven; and up to May, in 1878, seven had been discovered. And thus the process goes on until names for them threaten to fail. They vary in size from Ceres and Pallas, with diameters of between two hundred and four hundred miles, to Atalanta, Maia and Sappho, each having a diameter of from twenty to forty miles. All of them move in the region of space extending from about forty millions of miles beyond the orbit of Mars to within forty millions of miles of the orbit of Jupiter. So numerous and harassing to astronomers have they become, that nothing less than the patience and assiduity of German

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1 Piazzi lived between 1746 and 1826; Olbers between 1758 and 1840. He was a physician as well as astronomer. His observatory at Bremen was erected at his own expense. Arts. Piazzi, New Amer. Cyclop., Vol. XIII., p. 307; Olbers, Ibid., Vol. XII., pp. 508–509.

students avails to keep them listed and calculated; and an eminent German astronomer has seriously suggested the expedition of letting all of them, except the more important, escape and become lost again, so that they shall not be followed in their orbits by either the telescope or the mind of the modern computer.\(^1\) Who can tell what would be the exact results of such preterition?

From past experience in discovering these little planets, it seems evident that the number of them discovered in the future will be limited only by the smallness of their size, the necessary imperfection of human instruments, and the prevalence of such suggestions as that just recorded, which would be as applicable to future searches for new ones as to observations on those already discovered.

But even if they were now entirely ignored and pretermitted by astronomers for the future, enough concerning them has been already discovered and published to raise to a very high degree of probability the truth of the following inferences from all the known facts of our planetary system:

1. That a planet once existed between the orbits of Mars and Jupiter, approaching in size the lesser members of the system, to-wit: our earth, Venus, Mars and Mercury, and revolving in an orbit corresponding with the law heretofore noted, which would give to this orbit a mean distance of about two hundred and eighty millions of miles from the sun.

The *prima facie* or *a priori* presumption in favor of such a planet is exceedingly strong, and is greatly increased by the very fact of the existence of these two hundred or more minute fragments in that region. The symmetry of the system, and the analogy of every other part, requires us to believe that a planet of size and mass corresponding with its sisters would have been there, and that numberless insignificant planetoids

would not have been assigned to a system otherwise so beautiful. And as to the size of the once existing planet, we may justly urge that, although it is true that if all of the 187 or more now known to exist were combined into one, it would not be more than 400 miles in diameter;¹ yet it is equally true that, as only five had been discovered during the first forty-five years of this century, and 182 have been since discovered within thirty-three years, a proportionate advance in the numbers discovered would furnish enough in one or two centuries to combine into a planet comparing reasonably well in size with the minor members of our system.

2. That this original planet has been, by a violent explosion, occurring at a point in the past reckoned by indefinite millions of years, rent into many separate fragments of differing sizes and shapes, which have, since their paroxysmal disjunction, continued to revolve around the sun in the general region of space between the orbits of Mars and Jupiter, but not in the same orbit pursued by the original planet. All of these fragments are invisible to the naked eye; nearly two hundred have been discovered by the telescope; many others may be, in like manner, discovered, but it is not impossible that the greater number will remain unseen, though pursuing their courses, in the same region, round the sun.

If the powerful presumption in favor of the existence of the original planet be not rebutted by any scientific evidence hereafter disclosed, it may be reasonably claimed to be conclusive, for all the evidence thus far is in its favor. Assuming then its existence in the remote past, we have now to consider it in its natural and logical relations to the known fact, that in the same region of space where it once was, these numerous and apparently

insignificant little planets now are. Common sense, elevated to high scientific intuition in Olbers, decided that the small bodies are parts of what once composed the planet. We believe he was right. We will briefly consider, first the objections urged against this view, and then the arguments in its favor.

It is urged that if these planetoids are fragments of a larger planet, then as, at the moment of the catastrophe, they were all projected into space from the same point, they ought to be found returning to that point, and arriving at it after their orbital period at nearly the same time. And, in truth, the rupture theory of Olbers derived strong confirmation from the fact that the first four of the small planets were discovered at points which would indicate a near approach at the intersection of their orbits.

But the planetoids since discovered have not corresponded to this law. They exhibit very great differences in greatest, least and mean distances from the sun, in daily motion, periodic times of revolution, eccentricity of orbit, and inclination to the plane of the ecliptic. But when we come to reflect on these differ-

1 Olbers died before even the fifth planetoid had been found. It is not to be denied that since his time astronomers generally have drifted away from his view of this subject. They seem to have abandoned it prematurely, for the facts thus far known do not exclude it. See Art. Olbers, New Amer. Cyclop., Vol. XII., p. 509; Prof. Newcomb's "Popular Astronomy," pp. 384, 385.


3 Of these little planets, that known as Hilda attains the greatest distance from the sun, to-wit: about 460,000,000 miles, which is only 20,000,000 from the mean distance of Jupiter. Aetna comes to within the least distance, 161,000,000 miles. The mean distance of all is about 280,000,000, which would be very nearly the orbit of the original planet. Hilda has the longest periodic time of revolution, 7.86 years; Medusa the shortest, 3.12 years. Elements of the Small Planets, Table VI., compiled by D. P. Wood, chiefly from the "Berliner Astronomisches Jahr-
ences in connection with the hypothesis of a violent rupture, and energetic emission of thousands of separate fragments, millions of years ago, we shall find that, so far from overthrowing this hypothesis, these discordant elements of the planetoids support and confirm it; for the short period of some half a century, during which any scientific observation of them has been possible to man, gives us very faint knowledge of what their eccentricities and irregularities of movement may have been during pre-Adamite ages. High scientific authority assures us that "if a planet were shattered, the orbit of each fragment would at first pass through the point at which the explosion occurred, however widely they might be separated through the rest of their course; but owing to the secular changes produced by the attractions of the other planets this coincidence would not continue. The orbits would slowly move away, and after the lapse of a few thousand years, no trace of a common intersection would be seen." Doubtless all this is true, and sufficiently accounts for the differences among the elements of these small planets. But may it not be also true, that the same violation of law, which manifested itself in the original explosion and shattering, produced in past ages greater differences than those which now exist, and that the remedial system which the wisdom, power and benevolence of the Creative Spirit are sure to devise and apply, have reduced the discrepancies among these fragments rather than increased them? A glance at the table of their elements (imperfect as it is admitted to be) will confirm the impression that, widely as these planetoids still differ, they are still within the grasp of

bach."—"Popular Astronomy," by Prof. Newcomb, pp. 588-542. A recent newspaper rumor reports little Hilda as lost!


2 At least eighteen of these small wanderers are yet without names; several have no calculated elements, and the diameters, densities and real shapes of all are more or less uncertain.
law, and working under a remedial system, which has kept their eccentric movements and positions within bounds, and which may yet, in the distant future, combine them again into a world fitted for the habitation of sentient creatures.

Another objection to the rupture theory is drawn from one theoretic phase of another theory! It is insisted that if the La Place view of the nebular theory be adopted, we might reasonably expect, at some part of the spaces covered by the solar system, that the rotary motion of matter of uniform consistency would not tend to mould one large planet like Jupiter, or Saturn, or our earth, but would tend to separate into many small planets like the asteroids. And this notion seems to have proved quite satisfactory to some cosmogonists, though not specially convincing to astronomers! A sufficient answer to the objection would be that it is founded on an unsound phase of an unproved hypothesis. La Place's idea that our solar system has been gradually and slowly developed from the vast incandescent material of the sun, is far from being the most reasonable phase of the nebular hypothesis, and is open to many and serious objections. One of them has been well stated by Professor Simon Newcomb thus: "La Place's explanation of how the planets might have been formed from the atmosphere of the sun is not mathematical enough to be conclusive. In the absence of a mathematical investigation of the subject, it seems more likely that the solar atmosphere would, under the conditions supposed by La Place, condense into a swarm of small bodies like the asteroids, filling the whole space now occupied by the planets."

That the result thus pointed out by this eminent scientist would have been the normal and natural outcome from such

1 Prof. Newcomb has noticed it judiciously.—"Popular Astronomy," Edit. 1878, pp. 385, 504, 528.

causes as the theory of La Place postulates there can be little doubt. And it is equally certain that it would not have accomplished the end or design which the great Architect had in view in creating our solar system. That design was evidently to create a series of worlds, in the just sense of the word, revolving round a central sun, so enormous in size and mass and so energetic in action as properly to influence them all. How little this end—worthy of the Divine intelligence—would have been accomplished by the diffusion of millions of small bodies like the asteroids through the great space enclosed by the orbit of Neptune, even our finite powers are adequate to judge. Therefore this objection, founded on an incongruous view of a theory worthy of more consistent expansion, falls lifeless to the ground.

Having thus sought to remove the objections, we sum up the arguments tending to sustain the rupture theory thus: 1, The symmetry of the rest of the system, the analogies applicable to it, and the law deduced from ascertained distances, all require the presence of a planet of size and mass proportioned to the minor class of planets, at a distance of about two hundred and eighty millions of miles from the sun. Such a planet is not there; but in its stead we find there large numbers of small planets, which, with others presumably existing, would make up the required bulk and weight. 2, The eccentricity of the orbits of these planetoids, their abnormal inclinations to the ecliptic, their greatly variant periodic times of revolution, their extraordinary approaches to and departures from the central mass of gravitation, and their small and almost insignificant bulk and weight, all indicate a catastrophe involving a violation of law, grave and sudden. 3, The fact that, notwithstanding these striking irregularities, these small planets have been, for a period immeasurable by any methods known to us, confined in their wanderings to the belt of space between Mars and
Jupiter, so that none bearing any resemblance to them have ever been detected in the regions nearer to our earth or to the sun. 4. The apparently irregular, angular and uncouth shapes and figures inferred from variations of light in some of them—a result not to be looked for if they were original planetary formations, but certain to result from violent explosion and shattering.¹

In view of these and other confirmatory arguments, and of the insufficiency of the objections urged, we adopt the belief of Olbers, that the primary planet once existing in this region has been the subject of a fearful calamity—a violation of law resulting in physical evil on a scale far exceeding in extent any other of which we have any knowledge or suggestion in our system. It is not necessary that we shall attempt the impossible task of tracing in detail the successive steps of resistance and opposition to force offered by matter which ended in an event so terrific. But this we feel warranted in saying, that such an event was not the result of law, nor of Divine force, which is always applied according to law, but was the result of broken law—of the intractable resistance of unsubdued matter.

If it be thought that such a catastrophe cannot be considered an evil, because no sentient creature has, within our knowledge, suffered by it, we answer that every violation of law must involve evil, and one on a scale so large must be held to be a great evil. Our knowledge is too limited to authorize us to say how much effect such a catastrophe has had on the axial inclination, periods, climate, meteorological conditions and health of our world. And but for the remedies which Divine

¹ These irregular shapes had been often a subject of comment by astronomical observers. Prof. Newcomb is doubtful whether the observations are reliable on this point.—"Popular Astronomy," p. 334. Of course no telescopic power has ever been sufficient to define the actual figure, but variations in light and shade indicated marked irregularity.
wisdom, goodness and power have contrived and applied, it is impossible to say what disastrous collisions the fragments of a shattered planet might have brought to pass.

If storms, tempests, hurricanes, tornadoes, earthquakes, conflagrations, volcanic eruptions, are to be considered as evils, or manifestations of evil, then it is certain that for millions of years before Adam was created the universe was subject to such evils. We are to be on our guard, however, in deciding whether such events are evil. The test is simple in principle, but very difficult in application. Whenever the physical movement or action is kept within the bounds of law, it is not evil in itself, however energetic, violent and terrific it may be. In such case it is obedient to law, and is therefore conducing to work out the end which the creative power and intelligence have in view. But whenever the resistance and opposition presented by extension and inertia to force reach a point at which law is transgressed, or gone over, or violated, or exceeded, then the result must be recognized as physical evil. And it can hardly be doubted that such departures from the track of law often occurred in pre-Adamite ages, calling for remedies which only infinite wisdom could suggest and infinite power apply.

The planet Mars is often swept by wintry storms, leaving expanses of snow on his surface which, if prevalent in like proportion on the earth, would desolate a large part of at least two of her zones; the planet Jupiter is often raged over by horrible hurricanes of wind, blowing and moving at the rate of two hundred miles per hour, for six or seven weeks, without intermission. Before the power and persistence of such tempests no living creature known to us could endure: the mightiest pyramids and buildings of earth would crumble away in a few minutes, and every region over which they raged

Parker's "Expans of Heaven," 1st Ed., 1878, pp. 62, 63;
would be desolated. Our moon exhibits vast craters and cavernous depths which were once the seat of volcanic fires that have left her a field of utter desolation. The sun is the arena on which battles have been fought, and are still in progress, compared with which all the united tumult and noise of rending worlds would be as silence; and conflagrations break out from his chromosphere in which incandescent hydrogen and magnesium vapors are projected outwards at a rate of one hundred and fifty miles a second, and in such hurricanes of flame that, “coming down upon us from the north, they would in thirty seconds after they had crossed the St. Lawrence river be in the Gulf of Mexico, carrying with them the whole surface of the continent in a mass, not simply of ruin, but of glowing vapor.”

In the presence of such abnormal departures from the ordinary condition of these great bodies, we are compelled to admit the existence of physical evil, resulting from the resistance made by the unsubdued residuum of matter to the reign of law, but we are equally compelled to admire the infinite intelligence, goodness and power which overrule and remedy these aberrations.

We come now to the condition of our earth before man existed. Organized living beings existed for many ages previous to man. And we have the strongest evidence—no less than “the testimony of the rocks” themselves—that physical evil, in its gravest forms, had existed long before Adam was made. Passing over geologic cataclysms, convulsions, earthquakes and plutonic eruptions, which rent and shattered the forming crust of the earth, and heaped strata upon strata, beyond all demands of intelligent law, we come to the period when organized plants

1 Proctor’s “Expanse of Heaven,” pp. 80, 81; Newcomb’s “Popular Astronomy,” p. 343.
and animals, became endowed by the creative power with the
vital spirit, force of life, and thus became subject to the same
inherent, physical suffering, diseases, and deaths. He would be
able then and thereby to use the same, who would deny that
these are merely the results of material existence.

Now, it is a commonplace of right demonstration that each of
these exists in the realm of material existence. Physical suffering
would never have been experienced without a physical frame
and mechanism; and what is called mental suffering never
would have existed without the irregularities and disturbances
which result from material agents. It is entirely incomprehensible
how mental anxiety or pain could have originated in pure spirit
without material surroundings. There would have been nothing
on which to hang a doubt or anxiety. Physical disease never
could have arisen without a material apparatus to get out of
order; and mental disease is a misnomer; it is an impossibility
in the nature of things. The spiritual principle is never diseased,
for if diseased, it could die! All insanity or mental disease
(as called) is the mere outworking of physical disease.1

The abnormal and morbid state of the cerebral blood vessels or
nerves, or of the organs regulating the movements of the heart,
lungs, stomach and liver, may be too obscure to be detected by
even the most experienced and skilful physician; but it may be
held to be a truth absolutely certain, that when mental aberration
manifests itself, material disease is the originator and agent.
The machinery through which the mind works is out of order

1 This is the ever growing and widening opinion of medical science.
Hence the transition from dungeons, chains and whips for the insane to
asylums and wholesome hospitals, healthful food, abstinence from physical
stimulants, and constant attention from skilled physicians. See Dr. Wm.
162-164. Physicians and divines have come to agreement on this point.
—not the mind itself. Hence we conclude that all disease is the result of the resistance of matter to the spiritual forces of health and life.

And when we come to look, as closely as we can, at that supreme evil—that evil of evils, that king of terrors—known as Death, we find strong evidence of an origin in matter. Some advocates of the "positive philosophy" have sought to prove that death is not really an evil; that nothing but man's fears and man's imprudence makes it an evil; that when man dismisses his fears about the future world (under the teachings of atheism), and learns to adapt his habits to his surroundings, his death, instead of being an evil, will be "euthanasia"—a tranquil and painless fading out of organized existence. But these views, like the idealism of Collier and Berkeley, are liable to sudden overthrow by the hard facts of the case. The actual approach of the grim tyrant to the positivist might disturb his dream of "euthanasia," as collision with a stone wall might destroy the theory of the most confirmed idealist. Death is and must continue to be the greatest and most dreadful of all physical evils.

Death is an event applicable to vegetable and animal organizations and to man. We do not know of any other beings reached by it. What is death? None have ever returned from the dead who have told us; therefore we can only look on death from its hither side.

1 These views will be found elaborated in pleasant style in the articles "The Soul and Future Life," by Frederic Harrison, Nos. 3 and 4, Popular Science Monthly, 1877, pp. 287 No. 3, 309 No. 4; and the article Euthanasia, in the same scientific periodical.

2 The attempt is sometimes made to confine the Scriptural idea of death to moral evil, alienation from God, want of spiritual harmony with God. Such is the view of the ingenious author of a recent publication, "Death of Death," Richmond Edit., 1878, pp. 28–38. But the natural and primary meaning is always the true meaning. All beyond is metaphor. And who can tell all contained in the true meaning?
From all its known phenomena, we define death to be the triumph of the resistance of matter to the *vital force* which comes from spirit. This triumph, though temporary and local, is, for a time, complete. The material element, at the moment of death, drops *lifeless* to the ground. The spirit—the vital power—is gone. And this is true whether the once living organization was a leaf, or flower, or tree, or insect, or serpent, or quadruped, or man—whether it is vegetable, or animal, or human. *For a time* the material has triumphed over the spiritual; the grasp of the vital force, which had, in the living organism, reached every minute fibre and vesicle and part, is shaken off; the material falls apart from the spiritual, but *not to return to the condition of normal matter*; that is for ever impossible. Matter once worked upon by Spirit will never be normal matter again. It has been honored by the embrace of the infinite force; and if, by its resistance to that force, it break away from that embrace, then it violates *law*—law intelligent, benevolent, pervasive, and it must endure the penalty. It cannot become the aetherial and beautiful essence that we believe normal matter is. It is no longer the *substantia*, the substance of *creation*; it is simply the subject of *remedy*.

Death is speedily followed by decay, dissolution, decomposition—the falling apart of that which the potent spirit alone had kept united; and in every form of organization, this change is accompanied by the awful symbol and manifestation of death, that indescribable and horrible odor—the breath of the demon dwelling in the charnel-house of nature—from which spirit recoils with a shudder.\(^1\) It is worthy of note that in vegetable

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\(^1\) Robert Blair's poem, "The Grave," which was rejected by two publishers consulted by Dr. Watts, but which, when finally published, in 1748, won its way into public notice, and continued to be read until its intense gloom and sadness banished it from cheerful society, has a passage as grimly satirical as true, illustrative of this subject:

"But see! the well plumed hearse comes nodding on, Stately and slow; and properly attended
organisms this revolting attendant of death is not so offensive as in animals, and that the higher and more complicated the material frame-work becomes, the more repulsive is this result of death.¹

Now, we know from testimony stronger and more unimpeachable than any human record, that death—this consummate physical evil—had occurred in our world in millions of instances through the long ages which preceded the creation of man. In the coal strata evidences of death in vegetable organisms are piled up through many miles of extent and many thousand feet of depth. And the fossil-footprints and remains of animals are found in unnumbered quantities in the rock strata of the earth, running from the lower silurian formations in Europe

By the whole sable tribe, that painful watch
The sick man's door, and live upon the dead,
By letting out their persons by the hour,
To mimic sorrow, when the heart's not sad.
How rich the trappings! now they're all unfurled,
And glittering in the sun; triumphant entries
Of conquerors and coronation poms,
In glory scarce exceed. Great gluts of people
Retard th' unwieldy show; whilst from the casements,
And house-tops, ranks behind ranks close-wedged
Hang bellying o'er. But tell us why this waste?
Why this ado in earthing up a carcass
That's fallen into disgrace, and in the nostril
Smells horrible? Ye undertakers, tell us
Midst all the gorgeous figures you exhibit,
Why is the principle concealed, for which
You make this mighty stir? 'Tis wisely done:
What would offend the eye in a good picture
The painter casts discreetly into shade."


¹ Chemistry removes none of this horror by telling us that it is but the presence of carburetted hydrogen gas, which is nothing more than our common illuminating agent; or of sulphuretted hydrogen, the product of decaying eggs. For death soon follows exposure to either of these gases, and we cannot separate from them the mental associations of death.
and America, through the carboniferous limestones, the eocene period, the devonian rocks, the old and new red sand-stones, and the palæozoic rocks, all of which necessarily preceded the alluvium formations which fitted the earth to be the habitation of man. These fossil remains of animals, all of whom were once alive, embrace sponges, graptolites and other polypi, coral insects, madrepores, sea-urchins, star-fish, spiders, nautili, ammonites, fishes of many shapes, reptiles, huge saurians, crocodiles, serpents of immense size, and finally birds, of which the footprints are first detected in the new red sand-stones. ¹

Not only has death visited each of these once living creatures, but in many cases the attitudes and writhings manifested by the remains prove that suffering and pain preceded death, and we cannot doubt that disease also, in many cases, caused it. ²

Unless, therefore, we are prepared to adopt the absurd and unworthy view (held by the ultra-orthodox interpreters of Scripture) that these fossil remains do not survive from real animals, but are mere imitations, created apparently for the very purpose of misleading our minds, we are compelled to admit that, long before Adam and Eve ever sinned, or even existed, physical evil, embracing earthquakes, hurricanes, tempests, fiery explosions, watery deluges, suffering, pain, disease, and finally death, existed in large abundance in our world. To suppose that all such evils followed the sin of man as part of the curse imposed by the Creator is to reverse the course of events—to make the river of time run upward instead of downward, and to ignore facts which stand in eternal contradiction to any such doctrine.

Is there then no part of space where matter exists and yet where evil does not exist? We answer, yes. In the dwelling

place of God, sometimes called heaven, the God-man ever lives, and holy angels ever serve, and light unapproachable ever is. There all resistance of the inconceivably glorious material Being there dwelling to the power and force of love and benevolence has been for ever subdued. All residuum of evil has been banished or eliminated. And hence revealed truth tells us that there "they which came out of great tribulation, and have washed their robes and made them white in the blood of the Lamb, are before the throne of God, and serve Him day and night in His temple; and He that sitteth on the throne shall dwell among them. They shall hunger no more, neither thirst any more; neither shall the sun light on them; nor any heat. For the Lamb which is in the midst of the throne shall feed them, and shall lead them unto living fountains of water; and God shall wipe away all tears from their eyes." ¹ And we read also of that place, that it "has no need of the sun, neither of the moon, to shine in it, for the glory of God doth lighten it, and the Lamb is the light thereof;" "and there shall in no wise enter into it anything that defileth, neither whatsoever worketh abomination or maketh a lie." ² "And there shall be no more curse; but the throne of God and of the Lamb shall be in it, and His servants shall serve Him, and they shall see His face." ³ In this dwelling-place of Christ, then, matter exists and material beings exist, but evil is for ever excluded. And if, after the physical changes which await this world, the "new heavens and the new earth" ⁴ that are predicted be on the site of our present earth and firmament, then we have equal warrant for believing that here evil will for ever cease to exist, for the God-man will dwell here, and will have subdued the last enemy—death.

¹ Revelation vii. 14-17. ² Revelation xxii. 23, 27. ³ Revelation xxii. 3, 4. ⁴ 2 Peter iii. 13: "New heavens and a new earth, wherein dwelleth righteousness,"—ἐν ὑσ τῆς δικαιοσύνης κατοικεῖ.
Having thus sought to show the nature and origin of physical evil, and permitted to ourselves the refreshment of a glance at a place and state from which it is for ever excluded, we proceed to deal with the more complicated problem of moral evil. Even on this, however, we believe that much light will be thrown by the dual hypothesis herein maintained.

We have seen that angels are exalted creatures, endowed by the Creator with a dual constitution, composed of a material body and a spiritual principle; that man was also created with a dual constitution of like nature. The differences are rather of degree than of kind. Each has a material frame in the image of the God-man, and each had originally a spiritual nature endowed with knowledge, righteousness and true holiness. But man was gifted with a body far below the angelic in the control and possession of the forces by which strength, swiftness and continuance are imparted; and with a mind far inferior to the angelic in grasp and intelligence. Man was made "a little lower than the angels." But what was little in the all-comprehending eye of God would be a large interval according to human standards. And there was a difference in function in this, that man was made male and female for the purpose of increase by generation, but we have no reason to believe that any procreative energy has ever existed in angels, and fair inferences from Scripture seem to negative such constitution in them.

Both angels and man were moral creatures. In this respect they were alike. Both occupied this high platform in the continuous work of creation. And on the question what was

1 Psalms viii. 5. It is the sixth verse in the Hebrew and Septuagint. The English version reproduces the Hebrew accurately. The Septuagint is Ἡλιαστὴς αὐτῶν βραχύν τι παρ' ἀγγέλων, which is followed exactly in Hebrews ii. 7; this will bear the rendering "He made him less than (or short of) the angels."
essential to the constitution of a moral creature, we are happily
spared the necessity for a resort to human speculations. We
have the facts revealed to us. We know how the angels and
man were originally constituted as to all points entering into
the essence of a moral being. We need therefore only to re-
capitulate them clearly.

1. They were endowed with reason or intelligence; that is,
the capacity to acquire knowledge, and to understand its rela-
tions to God and to themselves, so far as was necessary to their
complete obligation and accountability.

2. They were endowed with actual knowledge of the law of
God as applicable to them; in other words, knowledge of their
duty.

3. They were endowed with natures perfectly free from the
slightest taint of unholiness. They possessed \(\omega \sigma \omega \tau \eta \varsigma \tau \eta \varsigma \alpha \kappa \gamma \theta \varepsilon \iota \varsigma \) —the holiness of truth.\(^1\) Their spiritual natures bore the like-
ness of God; and their bodies, though material, were made on
the highest model possible in the universe. And we have fully
shown that matter in itself is not only free from evil, but
normally beautiful and worthy. Hence their affections were
originally pure, and they not only knew what duty was, but
fell that they were under obligation to perform it. They felt
that they ought to love, revere, serve and obey their Creator.
The “categorical imperative,” on which the great German so
much insisted as a part of man’s nature, was fully developed in
the original constitution of angels and man.\(^2\)

4. They were endowed with perfect freedom of will. They
had perfect liberty of choice as to the course of conduct they
would pursue. Without entire freedom of will, they could not
be moral creatures—could not be accountable for their conduct.

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\(^1\) Ephesians iv. 24.

\(^2\) President McCosh, of Princeton College, very justly declares that this
is the best part of Kant’s system.—Princeton Review, November, 1878.
tending for hundreds of years. We are able to discard all these flimsy distinctions in speaking of the original constitution of angels and men. For if they had not ability to do their duty, then they could not be justly held accountable for not doing it, whether the inability under which their failure occurred was natural or moral.

These are all the elements entering into their constitutions which can be considered indispensable to make them moral creatures. Some knowledge of the penalty attached to disobedience of law, and some capacity to understand it, are implicitly contained in the postulates of intelligence and knowledge. But full capacity and knowledge on that point were not essential to accountability. No subject of government, human or divine, knows or has capacity to know beforehand all the sufferings he will endure if he chooses to disobey and encounter the penalty. To make such capacity and knowledge essential elements in a moral creature would be to make the existence of such a creature for ever impossible.

All these elements, thus formulated, entered into the dual beings—angels and men. This we learn from Holy Scripture and the natural and necessary inferences drawn therefrom.1 And reason affirms it all.

We now approach the deep and melancholy question: How came these moral creatures—thus perfect in their constitution, thus nobly gifted—endowed with intelligence, knowledge, holy dispositions, freedom of will, and full ability to obey the law of their Creator—a law wise, just, good—how came they to fall—to violate that law, and thus to encounter its necessary penalty?

We are sometimes told that it is unwise to seek to penetrate

1 "God hath made man upright," Ecclesiastes vii. 29. All original beings created were "very good," Genesis i. 31; Ephesians iv. 24; Colossians iii. 10. The angels "kept not their first estate," Jude, verse 6.
the mystery of moral evil; that God has hidden it from our eyes; that it is of the number of those “secret things” which belong to Him and not to us; that wisdom requires a man who cannot swim, and yet has fallen into deep water, not to waste his strength and presence of mind in seeking to find out how he fell into the water, but to apply himself at once to the remedy—the means of getting out. But all such admonitions have been little heeded, and all such illustrations fail, because they have no real adaptedness to the subject. It is true that many sinners, who never spent a thought upon the origin of evil, have had deep conviction of their own demerit, and, embracing Christ by faith, have been saved; but it is also true that many minds (and among them the higher minds) cannot be convinced that they are sinners, and cannot be persuaded of the sufficiency of the remedy offered, unless the ordinary doctrines preached in Christian pulpits can be freed from the radical vice of imputing to the Great Creator the authorship of evil as a necessary inference from creation ex nihilo and the absolute sovereignty of God.

The resultant is that this question constantly recurs, and has been recurring, and answers have been attempted, for more than two thousand years. The sombre belief of Zoroastrism in a good and evil principle working from eternity is the answer of oriental thought, and how firmly it clings to the intuitions of man is shown in the persistent attempts of Gnosticism, Manichæism and Paulicianism to engraft it on Christian doctrine.\(^1\) Plato and Aristotle sought to solve the mystery of evil by attributing it to the necessary imperfection of the creature.\(^2\) Plato asserted that the generation of this world is

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\(^1\) We have heretofore noted that St. Augustine fell, for a season, under the dominion of this belief.

mixed and made up of a certain composition of mind and necessity, both existing together, yet so as that mind does (in some sense) rule over necessity; and that necessity does often struggle against God, and, as it were, "shake off His bridle."¹

And hence comes evil.

From Tertullian, Origen and Augustine to the present time, it would be not easy to find a Christian divine who has written systematically on theology without introducing some attempt to answer this question. To state all the explanations given by different writers during these fifteen centuries would be an un-called for waste of time. It will be sufficient for the purposes of this work that we seek to distil these answers to their essence, and give only their fundamental elements.

An explanation attempted by many divines is in substance the following: That angels and man, though originally upright and holy, were finite and imperfect beings; that perfect obedience to law could not have been maintained by them without special grace, imparted by God; that He was not and could not be under any obligation to impart such special grace; that justice required nothing from Him except the endowments actually bestowed, to-wit: intelligence, knowledge, freedom of will, holy dispositions and ability to obey; that these did not include special grace; that such grace is a gift, which the Creator was free to bestow or to withhold as He pleased; that He did bestow it on some angels, and therefore they kept their first estate; that He did not bestow it on other angels and on man, and therefore they fell.²


² To refer to all treatises of Christian divinity in which this view is given would require undue space and labor; but a few citations may guide the reader: Turretin, commenting on Adam's first sin, draws the distinction between ordinary Divine aid, and the "auxiliam quo seu efficax gratia
To this view an objection immediately arises, founded on the moral attributes of God. It is impossible to separate the grace supposed to be bestowed by the Creator from His almighty power. We are therefore compelled to admit, that if He had power to bestow this gift or grace on one, He had power to bestow it on each one, and on all. If then, before the angels were created, He determined that, at their creation, this grace of standing firm in obedience should be bestowed on some, but not bestowed on others, He must, by His infinite knowledge, have foreknown that those not thus specially endowed would fall, would disobey His law and incur its fearful penalty—final ruin and wretchedness. And a consistent view would require us to go farther, and to say that He must not only have foreknown, but decreed or foreordained their fall, inasmuch as if foreknown it was necessarily certain. Therefore any such view makes God the author of sin. But this is contrary to reason and Scripture.

Human thought is not capable of any mode of reasoning by which this view of special grace—efficient grace, “superinduced confirming grace,”—bestowed upon some angels, but withheld from other angels and man, can be reconciled with the benevolence, the goodness of God. In vain do its advocates reason through pages of sophistical and misleading distinctions to quae non dabat tantum posse si velit sed velle quod posset.”—“Francisci Turrentini Opera,” N. Y. Edit., 1847, Tome I., p. 550. Augustine’s view is given by Dr. Charles Hodge, “Systematic Theology,” Vol. II., pp. 157–162; Anselm’s, p. 169; Abelard’s, pp. 169–71; Thomas Aquinas’, pp. 171–173; Duns Scotus and his followers, pp. 173–174; The Roman Catholic divines, pp. 174–188. All unite in the negation to Adam of the supernatural grace needed to uphold him in temptation. Professor A. A. Hodge says “the infallibility of saints and angels is not inherent, but is a superinduced confirming grace of God. They are not in a state of probation. Adam was; his will was free, but not confirmed.”—“Outlines of Theology,” pp. 236–237; Breckinridge’s “Knowledge of God,” &c., 488–495; Dabney’s “Syllabus and Notes in Theology,” pp. 311–312.
endeavor to convince us that the *justice* of God did not require him to bestow this efficacious gift on any, and therefore He might righteously withhold it from some.\(^1\) All the moral attributes of God cohere and support each other. His justice cannot be separated from His goodness; and if such a course were imputed truly to an earthly parent, the conscience of the world would recoil from him with horror! Neither is it true that the Creator was under no obligation to bestow this supposed special grace on all His moral creatures. We have seen that, in a proper sense, the word *necessity* applies to God. He cannot contradict Himself. "He is *obliged*—not by any exterior and supreme necessity, like the fate of the classic heathen, but by

\[^1\] "This was righteously withheld from Satan and Adam."—"Syllabus and Notes," by Prof. R. L. Dabney, p. 311. Some divines, apparently more anxious to conserve the symmetry of their theologic system than to guard from dishonor the moral attributes of God, have sought to derive the doctrine of efficacious and sustaining grace bestowed by the almighty Creator on some angels, and, by Him, withheld from others equally innocent, pure and holy in their original natures, from the isolated scripture, 1 Timothy v. 21: "I charge thee, in the sight of God and Christ Jesus and the elect angels, that thou observe these things," &c. The original expression is: ἐκλεκτῶν τῶν θεων καὶ Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ καὶ τῶν ἐκλεκτῶν αγγέλων. It is therefore reasonably certain that the innocent angels—the unfallen angels—who have kept their first estate and have retained their right to the heavenly residence, are here meant. But it is a frightful perversion of the word *ἐκλεκτῶν* to derive it from the doctrine that God withheld sustaining strength and grace from some of His innocent angelic creatures, with knowledge and purpose on His part, from eternity, that they should sin and fall into remediless wretchedness. Even if the word here means "elected," "chosen," "selected," no such horror can be legitimately inferred from it; for the unfallen angels, who proved their virtue in the time of the fall and rebellion of Satan and his comrades, may have been, *then and for that reason*, elected and chosen by God. Where is there any evidence to the contrary in revelation or reason? But the word means not only "elected" or "chosen," but "beloved," "dear," "approved," "choice," "distinguished," "excellent," in all of which senses it is used in the New Testament as well as in classic Greek. How is it possible then, from this word here applied to the unfallen angels, to infer the dishonoring doctrine above stated?
the necessity of His own ineffable moral perfections—to endow each moral creature brought by Him into being with every gift tending to the purpose of his being which power could bestow.

Therefore, to adopt the explanation of special or confirming grace—given to some, withheld from others, all being equally innocent—is to adopt a doctrine which throws a pall of horror and blackness over the loveliest attributes of God. It is rejected by common sense. It is not taught in the Scriptures. It may be laid aside as inadmissible.

The difficulty of explaining how moral evil originated in a pure and holy being is greatly increased to all those theologians who hold the unscriptural belief that angels are simply pure spirits, without the dual constitution bestowed on man. This difficulty is entirely out of our path herein; for we have demonstrated that angels are but men, more exalted in intelligence and material forces, and not made male and female in nature.

Before offering our explanation of this deep mystery, we propose to give what may be considered the final and matured statement of the reply to the question as to the origin of moral evil, formulated upon the study of scriptural, patristic and modern opinions, all viewed from the standpoint of creation ex nihilo. On this we shall briefly comment, and will then offer in contrast the explanation founded on the dual nature.

Professor Robert L. Dabney thus writes on moral evil: "A finite creature can only be indefectible through the perpetual indwelling and superintendence of infinite wisdom and grace, guarding the finite and fallible attention of the soul against sin. This was righteously withheld from Satan and Adam." "While righteousness is a positive attribute, incipient sin is a privative

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1 This difficulty is felt and sometimes expressed by Prof. Dabney, ("Syllabus and Notes," pp. 270, 311, 312); but it seems never to have led him to review his belief as to the angelic constitution.
trait of human conduct. The mere absence of an element of active regard for God’s will constitutes a disposition or volition wrong. Now while the positive requires a positive cause, it is not therefore inferrible that the negative equally demands a positive cause. To make a candle burn, it must be lighted; to make it go out, it need only be let alone.” “The most probable account of the way sin entered a holy breast first is this: An object was apprehended as in its mere nature desirable; not yet as unlawful; so far there is no sin. But as the soul, finite and fallible in its attention, permitted an overweening apprehension and desire of its natural adaptation to confer pleasure to override the feeling of its unlawfulness, concupiscence was developed. And the element that first caused the mere innocent sense of the natural goodness of the object to pass into evil concupiscence was privative, viz.: the failure to consider and prefer God’s will as the superior good to mere natural good. Thus natural desire passed into sinful selfishness, which is the root of all evil. So that we have only the privative element to account for. When we assert the certainty of ungodly choice in an evil will, we only assert that a state of volition whose moral quality is a defect, a negation, cannot become the cause of a positive righteousness. When we assert the mutability of a holy will in a finite creature, we only say that the positive element of righteousness of disposition may, in the shape of defect, admit the negative, not being infinite. So that the cases are not parallel, and the result, though mysterious, is not impossible. To make a candle positively give light, it must be lighted; to cause it to sink into darkness, it is only necessary to let it alone. Its length being limited, it burns out.”

This explanation of the learned professor is probably the best and most concentrated form in which the thought of theological ages for fifteen centuries on this subject has sought

1 “Syllabus and Notes in Theology,” pp. 311, 312.
expression. But when dissected and analyzed it will be found to throw no light whatever on the dark problem—rather to make it darker. We must examine it step by step.

1. It takes as its foundation-stone the vicious principle of special and perpetual "indwelling and superintendence of infinite wisdom and grace guarding the finite and fallible attention of the soul against sin;" which special grace it assumes to have been within the power of the Creator to bestow upon all; for it farther assumes that it was granted to some angels, but "was righteously withheld from Satan and Adam." We have shown that any such assumption impeaches the moral attributes of God, and is therefore inadmissible. It is true the learned professor may claim to be in good company, for he adopts this principle in common with a long line of Christian divines who wrote before him. But this does not relieve the principle from its inherent and fatal vice. Like a hideous birth-mark, continued from father to son through generations, it gives a ghastly distinction to each and every explanation of the origin of moral evil of which it is the base, and enables us to say at once—rejected! And when the corner-stone fails the structure must speedily fall.

2. It attempts to establish (or rather to maintain) a distinction between the positive and the privative element entering into "incipient sin." This attempt is, of course, not original with the learned professor. It is at least as old as Augustine, if not as old as Plato, and it has been twisted, turned and tortured through mediaeval and modern ages in all the endless mazes of debate concerning the origin and nature of "concupiscence." But it is a distinction without a difference. For the moment a moral creature (however holy previously) consents with the will to disobey Divine law, in the same moment that moral creature commits an act (perhaps of the soul only, but still an act) positively evil. To call this incipient sin only "a
positive trait of human conduct" is to drop out of sight the eternal distinction between the holy and the sinful, the right and the wrong, the good and the evil, heaven and hell. If Eve, at the moment when her soul yielded to temptation and her will determined to take and eat the forbidden fruit, did not commit positive sin, then we may dismiss for ever all expectation of finding a case of positive sin in the universe. Common sense comes to our rescue here; the attempted distinction is too thin and shadowy to be maintained, and especially on such a subject.

3. No one has been more persevering and successful than this learned professor in maintaining as a sound principle in mental philosophy that the will of a moral creature is determined in its acts of choice, by the internal disposition or habitus of the creature himself, and not by any outward motives or inducements, however strong.1 If this be true (and all human experience seems to establish it), then how vain is the attempt of this explanation to attribute a sinful choice of a holy will to something merely privative or negative! The impossibility that any such explanation can be satisfying is vividly shown by the learned professor himself. For his theory of angels is that they are pure spirits, without material organisms, and as his psychology requires him to insist that a holy disposition or habitus determines the will to holy choice, there is no consistent mode of explanation left to him for the first sin of a holy angelic being. He writes of it thus: "The great difficulty is how, in a will prevalently holy, and not even swayed by innocent bodily wants and appetites, and where there was not in the whole universe a single creature to entice to sin, the first

1 This appears, repeated and re-enforced with every form of argument and illustration, in articles entitled "The Philosophy of Dr. Bledsoe," Southern Pres. Review, October, 1876; "Dr. Bledsoe's Philosophy of Volition," Ibid., July, 1877, continued October, 1877—all attributed to Prof. Dabney.
wrong volition could have place.”¹ What he here styles a “great difficulty” is, in fact, an impossibility from his standpoint. And therefore, if an explanation is to be found, his theory of the angelic constitution must be abandoned; and his system of mental philosophy negatives his explanation of the origin of moral evil.

4. His illustration drawn from the candle must be regarded by him as peculiarly pertinent and instructive, or he would not have presented it twice within a single page. And yet, it is in every respect irrelevant and misleading. To make a candle give light, it is certainly necessary to light it; and if left lighted, it will certainly go out in darkness at last, because its length is limited. But how does this help us to understand the first sin of a holy moral creature? Look at the holy angels as originally created; if the learned professor chooses to liken them to candles, be it so. They were created, and were instantly “lighted” with knowledge, righteousness and true holiness; for this was the endowment of man, and he was made, not higher, but “a little lower than the angels.” But at this point the illustration of the candle fails and becomes illusive. The angels were not limited as a candle is. They were immortal spirits, not subject to death in any part of their constitution. It is true they were finite in intelligence and power; but such limitation did not limit their length of life (like the limit of length in a candle, whereby it burns out), and therefore there was no reason why the holiness—the light with which they were originally endowed—should not be retained for ever. And the same reasoning applies, mutatis mutandis, to the case of man. If he was like a candle originally, he was lighted with “the holiness of truth.” And we have reason to believe, from plain teachings of Holy Writ and legitimate inferences therefrom, that if Adam and Eve had never sinned they would have lived

¹ Dr. R. L. Dabney’s “Syllabus and Notes in Theology,” p. 270.
for ever, soul and body. Death would not have had dominion
over them.\footnote{Compare Genesis i. 31; ii. 17; iii. 17-19; v. 3-5; Romans v. 12, 14, 17; vi. 23; vii. 24; 1 Corinthians xv. 26, 54, 56, 56; 2 Timothy i. 10; Hebrews ii. 14; James i. 16; Revelations xxi. 4.} Therefore these “candles” would never have
burned out. There would have been nothing in their case, any
more than in that of the angels, to have quenched or exting-
guished the light of holiness. The limitations on their intelli-
genence and power, as finite creatures, were not limitations on their
holiness or length of life.

From this review we conclude that the explanation of the
origin of moral evil given by the learned professor is inadequate
and unsatisfactory. And as it is but the concentrated substance
of all previous explanations given from the stand-point of
creation \textit{ex nihilo}, we conclude that they are all insufficient.

We now approach the subject from the standpoint of the
dual constitution of angels and of man.

We are not taught explicitly in Holy Scripture what the first
sin of angels was. In this respect their sin differs from that
of man, as to whom we are plainly taught that the eating of
the forbidden fruit was the first act of disobedience to law.
This difference ought not to surprise us when we remember
that the inspired record was given to guide sinful \textit{men} to salva-
tion, and that only so far as was needful for this end are angels
mentioned at all. Nevertheless, we have some scriptural hints
and suggestions on this subject which we have a right to use,
provided we do so discreetly and humbly; for if they had not
been intended for our use they would not be in the Holy Word.

We have seen that the Son of God has existed from eternity
as God-man—omnipotent Spirit united with a material body,
which together constitute the highest union of spirit and matter
that can exist. But this Divine Being was generated, not
created; He was \textit{born}, not \textit{made}. His generation was eternal,
and therefore transcends all powers of human comprehension. As God, He is omnipresent. Nevertheless, as His material being is real, a place, a *ubi*, must be predicated concerning it. This place is heaven—the dwelling place of God, environed by inaccessible light.

When that point had been reached in the work of creation at which angels were created, a place was also necessary for them. For although they were endowed with spirits, intelligent, righteous and holy, they were also endowed with bodies—material frames, in the image of the God-man; but unlike His body in this, that, whereas He was eternally born of that mysterious and Divine generation which will for ever transcend reason, and which finds its expression in a Being, omnipotent both in spirit and matter, the bodies as well as the spirits of angels were *created*. They were not created *ex nihilo*. Their spirits were furnished from the omnipotent and boundless Spirit of the Father; their bodies were made from the normal matter of eternity, either directly used and shaped, or indirectly worked out from other modes of material being.

The *place* in which this angelic host was first assembled we do not know. That it was not in the heaven which constitutes the peculiar dwelling place of the Son of God we have reason to believe. It is spoken of as "the world" in a passage of Scripture which seems strongly to point to some august occasion when the Son of God was presented to the angels, and they were required to worship Him.1 But the Greek words here

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1 Hebrews i. 6, 7. Ὅτων δὲ πάλιν εισαγαγῇ τὸν πρωτοτοκὸν εἰς τὴν ὁλιγομερὴν λέγει καὶ προσκομιστῶσαν αὐτῷ πάντες ἄγγελοι θεοῦ. The passage of the Old Testament from which the inspired apostle makes the supposed quotation, "And let all the angels of God worship Him," has been a subject of difficulty and debate. The Septuagint version of Deuteronomy xxxii. 43 gives the exact words, ἴσω προσκομιστῶσαν αὐτῷ πάντες ἄγγελοι θεοῦ, but this is certainly not an accurate rendering of the Hebrew, nor has the context any reference to such an occasion. Most biblical scholars think the quotation is from Psalm xcvi. 7: "Worship Him all
rendered "the world" by no means confine us to the habitable parts of our own earth. They may mean any habitable world—habitable for angels rather than men.\footnote{1} Neither is it at all certain how long a time passed between the original creation of the angels and this occasion. The interval may have been measured by millions of years, during which the angels were innocent and happy.

The scripture above cited plainly reveals that, on the special occasion referred to, the God-man was presented before the angelic host, and they were commanded to yield to Him the homage of their spiritual and material natures. He was not only their Lord and Master, but their Creator.\footnote{2} Only by rendering supreme devotion and worship to Him could they fulfil the purpose of their being. It was, therefore, not merely an act of righteousness, but of benevolence, in God to require them to acknowledge by an open act of worship the supreme authority of His Son.

We have no reason to doubt, and every reason to believe, that the long-cherished opinion of christendom as to the first sin of Satan is a correct opinion. His sin was pride, and the special occasion on which it gained such mastery over him as to manifest itself in an act of distinct disobedience to law was that just mentioned, when he and his comrade-angels were required to bow down in humble love and reverence to the God-man.

\footnote{1} Ἰησοῦς Χριστός, from Ἰησοῦς, to dwell, to inhabit, to keep house, to manage, to govern. Prof. Sampson makes no comment on the word, but seems to take it for granted it means the habitable earth. But this is far from certain.

\footnote{2} Colossians i. 16.
Milton, in adopting this opinion, did but express the Christian thought of many centuries previous to his own era; but in expanding the few and obscure hints given in Scripture, he has presented us in his sublime epic an episode which leaves the grandest thoughts of Homer, Virgil and Dante at an immeasurable distance beneath him.

That pride was the sin of the devil which brought on him righteous condemnation, the inspired apostle seems clearly to teach. This sin is peculiar in this, that, at first sight, it seems of all others the most intensely spiritual in its nature—the farthest removed from sins resulting from material appetites and passions. But when we come to analyze it, we shall find that, in its radical nature, it is the resultant of material resistance to spiritual law, and could never arise unless material conditions gave occasion for it.

Spirit in itself is pure intelligence, love and will. It is the source of all power, cause and force. It can never experience an emotion of pride until, by immanence and individual organisms, a sense of inequality arises. Then, and not till then, a sense of offended superiority, or claim of superiority, may emerge from the innermost depths of the dual nature.

All scholars are familiar with the successive steps through which the great English poet carries his angelic leader, Satan, in his moral descent from a condition of righteousness and holy obedience, first to a subjective state, in which the inward workings of pride began to incite him, then to discontented and subtle appeals to his trusted companion-angel, then to an open and ingenious plea, addressed to his angel followers, for rebel-

1 1 Timothy iii. 6. "Lest, being lifted up with pride, he fall into the condemnation of the devil," (ἵνα μὴ τοῦφθείς εἰς κρίμα εἰσεπεσθῇ τῷ διαβόλῳ.) No word could more strongly convey the idea of being inflated or lifted up with pride than τοῦφθείς; and κρίμα, from κρίνω, means primarily a separation, a discriminating judgment, and hence a righteous condemnation for disobedience to law.
lion against the dominion of the Son of God, and finally to the warfare on the fields of heaven, which resulted in the disastrous overthrow of the "angels who kept not their first estate," and their banishment from light and happiness to "everlasting chains under darkness unto the judgment of the great day."\(^1\)

Powerfully as the ideal element prevails in these descriptions, the element of truth and reality is equally prevalent, underlying the whole, and giving us the insight of one of the greatest of human minds into the dark problem of sin. Our purpose of seeking to expose the true origin of moral evil will be aided by quoting parts of this marvellous episode.

The exalted position and powers of the archangel are skilfully presented as the point from which the sin of his dual nature took its first movement:

"Melodious hymns about the sovereign throne
Alternate all night long; but not so waked
Satan: so call him now—his former name
Is heard no more in heaven; he of the first,
If not the first, archangel, great in power,
In favor and pre-eminence, yet fraught
With envy against the Son of God, that day
Honored by His great Father, and proclaimed
Messiah, King anointed, could not bear,
Through pride, that sight, and thought himself impaired.
Deep malice then conceiving, and disdain,
Soon as midnight brought on the dusky hour
Friendliest to sleep and silence, he resolved
With all his legions to dislodge, and leave
Unworshipped, \textit{unobeyed}, the throne supreme."
\(^2\)

Satan then approaches his "next subordinate," and awakening him, infuses into another the disobedient thoughts already prevalent in his own breast. With consummate skill, the poet selects the point on which complaint against the law of the Highest would be expected to arise in such conjuncture. Satan

\(^1\) Jude, verse 6.
He boldly rebukes the rebel leader, and reminds him of the conclusive fact that he and all other angels were but the creatures of God the Son, created by His word, and therefore bound by the highest duty to love and obey Him, who was not created, but born from eternity of the Almighty Father. To this rebuke Satan, now far advanced in sin, answers by boldly denying the fact that he and his followers were created, and thus denying the duty of loyalty to the Son of God. This answer is conceived in the highest strain of arrogant falsehood:

"That we were formed then, say'st thou? and the work
Of secondary hands, by task transferred
From Father to His Son? Strange point and new!
Doctrine which we would know whence learned; who saw
When this creation was? rememberest thou
Thy making, while the Maker gave thee being?
We know no time when we were not as now;
Know none before us; self-begot, self-raised
By our own quickening power, when fatal course
Had circled his full orb, the birth mature
Of this our native heaven, ethereal sons.
Our puissance is our own; our own right hand
Shall teach us highest deeds, by proof to try
Who is our equal; then thou shalt behold
Whether by supplication we intend
Address, and to begirt the Almighty throne,
Beseeching or besieging." 1

Then, hopeless of reclaiming one so far gone in rebellion, Abdiel takes his flight to the unfallen. Satan leads his host to battle; the Son of God overpowers them; they are driven out of heaven and confined in that place so appropriately called "the prison-house of God's dominions."

Having accompanied a poet through the stages of angelic sin, let us now seek to discover and follow with microscopic eye the actual uprising of moral evil and violation of law in a

nature, dual indeed, yet, therefore, intelligent, righteous and holy in disposition and habit.

We have seen that, from the standpoint of creation ex nihilo, and of sound psychology applicable to that doctrine, the solution of this problem is for ever impossible.

But when we bear in mind the fact that Satan and his rebel followers were all endowed with natures material as well as spiritual, we begin to see faint glimmers of light around the edges of this dark question. So exalted were these natures—so perfectly possessed of all the needed intelligence, knowledge, freedom of will, ability to obey, and original rectitude of disposition that Almighty wisdom, power and benevolence could bestow, that if they fell, they fell, not because God had denied to them any gift needed for the purposes of their being, but because, with full ability to stand, they yielded to the resistant opposition which their material natures made to the perfect dominion of God’s spiritual law.

The sin of pride, which (so far as our knowledge, revealed or natural, informs us) was the first sin ever committed in the universe, belongs to the class of moral evils which have been designated as nala in se, sins in themselves—sins so essentially and radically sinful that they arise out of the eternal relations between the Holy Creator and the moral creature.\(^1\) The sin of rebellion, first committed by Satan and then by all his followers, belongs to the same class. It is the unlawful resistance of the heart first, and then of the whole creature, to just government. This government, in the case of Satan and his angels, was nothing less than the infinitely just, wise and benevolent government of the Supreme Creator. Upon the maintenance of that government depend the safety, welfare and happiness of the whole creation of God, moral and material. To rebel against

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a human government has always been considered the gravest crime possible, and is therefore punished with death, even by the most enlightened nations. But to rebel against God's government included within it every conceivable malum, pride, envy, hatred of good, ingratitude, horrible blackness of evil. If such a crime had been neglected or lightly punished by the Divine Law-maker, imagination fails in the task of conceiving the dire consequences that would have followed.

To this crime of crimes Satan came by the resistance of his material nature to the spiritual law of submission and obedience righteously and wisely imposed by the Divine Law-giver. We have seen that an interval—possibly a very long interval—of time elapsed between the original creation of the angels and the fall of those who sinned. We have every reason to believe that during this interval temptations to pride existed, because material distinctions existed among the angels; some were greater than others in rank and dignity, and some may have been superior to others in the material glory and beauty dependent on outward form and mein. Nevertheless, so nobly constituted were they for the purposes of their being that these temptations were successfully resisted up to the time when the God-man was presented for their love and worship. We have heretofore remarked that time is an element used by the Almighty for working out His purposes, and that though the resistance of the material to the law of the spiritual causes, and will always cause, evil, time is used for the remedial methods by which evils are as far as possible overruled and removed.

Therefore the time came when this presentation of the Son of God to the angels was right and needful for working out the wise and good purposes of God. If a caviller should ask why


2 Hebrews i. 6. The words οταν δε παλιν εισαγωγη των πρωτοτεκνων εις
was such presentation made if it was to result in the sin of Satan and his fellow-rebels, we have no difficulty in answering that such an objection is so contrary to common sense that it is self-destructive. God's essential activity made creation essential; God's eternally begotten Son was the Divine Head and Model of all these angels, and that the time should come when He should receive their love and homage in person was according to the eternal fitness of things. Beyond all doubt, it added ineflable joy and happiness to the millions of angelic beings who kept "their first estate," resisted all temptation to unhallowed pride, and loved and worshipped their Divine Creator. It would have added like joy to Satan and his followers if they had obeyed, and they had full power to obey. No grace was withheld from them needful to endow them with full ability to obey. Therefore God is for ever free from all complicity in their sin—as free as is the best of human law-givers from complicity in the treason of the worst of traitors.

The fact that so large a proportion of the angels resisted successfully all temptation to pride and rebellion, and stood firm in love and loyalty to their Prince—the Son of God—is unanswerable evidence that Satan and his followers had ability to do likewise. All stood in "their first estate" on the same platform of knowledge, righteousness, free will, holy dispositions and perfect ability to obey the law. The pretence that special grace was given to some and withheld from others is nowhere

τὴν αὐτοκεφαλὴν necessarily convey the idea of a fixed time when this presentation was made. The Greek will also bear the translation: "When He brought the first-born again (or back again) into the world;" connecting πάλιν with the verb, and thus indicating that this was not the first presentation of the Son of God to the angels. But there are strong reasons for preferring the authorized English rendering, "And again, when He bringeth in," &c. Πάλιν is constantly used in the New Testament to introduce a new argument or a new illustration. See Prof. Sampson on Hebrews, New York Edit., 1857, pp. 63-65.
taught in Holy Scripture, and is an imputation on the moral attributes of the Creator which is for ever inadmissible.

But when we fix our eyes on the archangel who first sinned, and seek to penetrate even to the secret recesses of his composite nature, we are able logically to trace something of the process through which he passed in his downward course. Previous to the presentation of the God-man, Satan had known no being adapted to excite the resistance of his material constitution. There may have been material worlds, mountains, hills, oceans, lakes, rivers, majestic trees, even gigantic living organisms, around him, but he felt himself superior to them all, for mere expanse and size could not raise an emotion of envy. And not one of his companion-angels was superior in rank, dignity or glory to him. But now he beholds before him a Being whom he instantly recognizes as more powerful, beautiful, glorious, than himself, yet a being like himself in this, that the God-man unites in Himself a spiritual power and a material frame. And Satan, who never before saw his superior—hardly ever his equal—is commanded to bow down and worship this God-man. Instantly that intense and highly-strung material nature which recognizes its own inferiority is in arms and in resistance to the law which demanded his obedience. And this resistance of the material to the spiritual was successful in this sad case, as it had been successful in many instances of physical evil in the universe previous to Satan's fall. In no manner or substance did God cause this fall. The causes which Divine power had set at work were all in opposition to it; but the resistance of matter to spirit prevailed. Satan fell in the moment when—this resistance having overcome the spiritual influences that had previously been the law of his being—his will consented to entertain the emotion of unlawful pride and envy, which was soon swollen into a raging tide of rebellion and enmity against the Son of God. He was perfectly able to have resisted suc-
cessfully the temptation if he had chosen so to do. He had only to summon to his aid, by attentive prayer, resignation and submission of spirit, the forces which the Divine Spirit could furnish, and he would thus have overcome the resistance of the intractable matter which entered into the lower elements of his nature. But, unlike the unfallen angels, he did not do so. Thus, while the archangels Michael and Gabriel stood firm in their integrity, though subjected to the same species of temptation, Satan fell, and carried with him to ruin a numerous host of angels once upright and holy.

The punishment which was inflicted on these traitors and rebels was what might have been expected from the dignity and power of the Divine law-giver. They were not subjected to death, because their material natures had been so constituted under the Divine forces brought to bear upon them that death was an impossibility. We have seen that death is the triumphant resistance of organized matter to the spiritual law of its organization. We know not that death had ever existed in the universe up to the time when the angels sinned. We have reason to believe that they were not subject to death. But they were banished from heaven—from their own previous habitation—and from happiness, and cast down to a world of darkness and despair.¹

¹ The passages of Holy Writ which bear on this subject are numerous: Psalms xxii. 16; xci. 8, 18; Job ii. 1, 6; Isaiah xxvii. 1; xiv. 12; Matthew xviii. 34; 2 Corinthians iv. 4; Revelations ix. 11; Ephesians vi. 12; 1 Peter v. 8; 1 John iii. 8; Revelations xii. 7; Jude, verses 6 and 9; Revelations xx. 10. Milton's grand word-painting may be again gazed at:

"Him, the Almighty Power
Hurled headlong, flaming from the ethereal sky
With hideous ruin and combustion, down
To bottomless perdition; there to dwell
In adamantine chains and penal fire,
Who durst defy the Omnipotent to arms."

"Paradise Lost," Book I.
ETERNAL PRISON-HOUSE.

There is absolutely nothing either in revelation or reason to authorize us to believe that these fallen angels shall ever be restored to their lost estate of holiness and peace. The Scriptures hold out no such hope. On the contrary, if language can convey the idea of eternal duration, such duration is assigned to the imprisonment of these criminals. And reason gives no contrary verdict. Unsound and superficial sentimentalism often seeks to find some foundation for hope that there may come a time when these fallen beings may be restored by the power and benevolence of God to His grace and favor. But benevolence, so far from being enlisted in their behalf, is arrayed against them. In their prison of darkness they are still within the dominions of the Eternal Law-giver—still subject to His law. And this law they still continue to violate, so that each moment of their existence only renders it the more needful that they be confined the next moment, and the next moment the next, and so eternity only can measure their doom. Under the most enlightened and humane governments on earth, modes of crime exist which are punished with imprisonment for life; and under the government of God these deathless criminals meet a similar penalty. Their imprisonment is for life, but their life is endless! With the finally impenitent and lost from this world, they form a part of that eternal evil which has ever existed, and will ever exist, in the universe, and all we can hope is that Divine power, wisdom and goodness will reduce this eternal evil to the minimum possible.

And if weak sentiment urge that such a result is too sombre to be contemplated without sadness, and that even the happiness of the unfallen angels and of saved men from this world may be marred by the thought of the endless woe of the lost, let it

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1 Matthew xxv. 41, 46. ἀπολογία is the word, expressing the duration alike of the blessedness of the saved and of the punishment of lost angels and men. Jude, verse 6; Revelations xx. 10, 14, 15; xxi. 8, 27.
be remembered that the *justice* of God needs an eternal and monumental evidence as much as His *mercy*; that, out of millions of angels once equally holy, a large number did actually fall into sin; that the first man and woman ever created fell into sin, and that we have no assurance that the unfallen angels and saved sinners in heaven would continue steadfast in obedience were not the fact ever present to their minds that disobedience to law is punished in the same universe in which they live, with endless imprisonment. The wisdom of God is immeasurably above that of man, and we may be assured that He knows best what motives are needed to keep that grand but fallible being—a moral agent—in a state of obedience. It is easy to say that His divine and almighty grace sustains the unfallen angels and saved men and women in obedience, but who can venture to deny that that grace itself may be inseparably and necessarily connected with the eternal proof of His justice found in the everlasting prison-house of the lost? It is easy to say that the law of *love* governs angels and saints in heaven; that they are kept in obedience by love and not by fear. But we know that the law of *love* pervaded the whole angelic host in their first estate, yet Satan and his angels fell; and we know that the law of holy love burned in the breasts of Adam and Eve, for they were created in the holiness of truth, and the love of God was shed abroad in their hearts, yet they fell. Who shall say that a salutary fear of punishment—of such punishment as will eternally rest upon the lost—may not be part of the sustaining grace by which heavenly angels and saints are kept in uprightness?

We come now to the question: How did the first sin of *man* originate? If the discussion as to the first sin of an angel has thrown any light on the subject, that light is cast with concentrated power over the first transgression of Adam and Eve. But in approaching this subject we must pass through some
preliminary stages of thought, founded on facts known from human experience or from Divine revelation.

The united and symmetrical development of the Divine attributes justifies the assertion that in the constitution of the angels, every endowment, spiritual and material, was bestowed which creative power could bestow in order to enable them to stand firmly in duty, and thus to retain and enjoy eternal happiness. We have no reason to doubt that all angels did thus stand innocent and happy for an indefinite period—probably millions of years. We are also assured that much the larger number of them resisted successfully the temptation to pride and envy arising on their presentation to the Son of God, and have continued to this day firm in virtue and happiness. But in the case of the residue, the residuum of resistance to spiritual law offered by their material natures prevailed. They sinned and fell. Then, instantly, Divine wisdom, power and goodness applied the only remedy possible as to the angelic host, fallen and unfallen. No knowledge in the universe, whether naturally acquired or revealed, gives to us the slightest hint of any possible mode by which God could be just and yet restore the fallen angels to "their first estate." Upon the overthrow of this angelic treason and rebellion, only two conditions remained to be fulfilled by way of remedy of an evil so tremendous: First, That the justice of God should be vindicated by adequate punishment of the traitors and rebels; second, That the goodness and mercy of God should be manifested by separating the guilty from the innocent, and by upholding the innocence and virtue of the unfallen angels in the very act of exciting their salutary fear of sin by exhibition of its certain

1 Genesis xlviii. 16; Numbers xx. 16; 1 Chronicles xxi.; xv. 20, 27; Daniel iii. 28; Luke i. 19, 26; ii. 10, 18; xxii. 48; 2 Corinthians xi. 14, Job i. and ii.; Psalms lxviii. 17; lxxviii. 49; Revelation xii. 7, 9; Jude, verse 6.
penalty. Both of these conditions were fulfilled. Both are consistent with our highest view of all the moral attributes of the Divine nature.

We cannot doubt that the defection and disastrous overthrow of Satan and his followers was the occasion of feelings and thoughts in the spiritual natures of the unfallen angels closely analogous to sentiments of profound concern and sorrow in human breasts. But we are authorized to go farther, and say that this failure in duty among creatures so exalted and so highly endowed gave rise in the Eternal Mind itself to changes which can only be expressed in human thought by words akin to grief and regret. The Holy Scriptures, in various places, hold out distinctly for our acceptance these anthropomorphic views of God. And these views are real—not merely apparent and phenomenal. It may possibly for ever remain an insoluble mystery to us how the Divine nature, in its eternal and ineffable blessedness, can yet have phases representative of the most tender or the most energetic human emotions; but we are not authorized to reject this belief as incredible because inexplicable. Inspired Scripture teaches us that when wickedness waxed great on the earth, so that every imagination of the thoughts of man's heart was only evil continually, then "it repented the Lord that He had made man on the earth, and it grieved Him at His heart."¹ And in the next verse God Himself declares concerning men who had so thoroughly corrupted themselves: "It repenteth Me that I have made them."² And similar declarations concerning the sentiments of sorrow and regret representative of Divine feelings are found in other scriptures.³ It may be that the solution of these mysteries will be found in God the Son, who has been man from eternity past, and will

¹ Genesis vi. 6. ² Genesis vi. 7. ³ Exodus xxxii. 12; Deuteronomy xxxii. 36; Psalms xc. 13; cxxxv. 14; Jeremiah xviii. 8; xxvi. 8; xlii. 9, 10; Joel ii. 13, 14; Jonah iii. 9.
DIVINE COMPASSION.

be man through eternity to come, yet always God. For of Him the Old Testament scriptures, written seven hundred years before His incarnation, declare that He is "a Man of sorrows and acquainted with grief;" that He was "stricken, smitten of God, and afflicted;" that "He was oppressed and was afflicted, yet He opened not His mouth;" that "it pleased the Lord to bruise Him; He hath put Him to grief." And while He was on earth, though He was then as truly God as while in heaven, yet we are taught that He experienced phases of all the strongest emotions of man—love, compassion, tenderness, grief, holy anger, contempt for deceit and self-righteousness. He "had compassion" on the fainting and fasting multitude, and on the blind men who sat by the way-side, and on the widow of Nain, whose only son had died; He wept at the grave of Lazarus, and over the doomed city of Jerusalem; He looked round about with anger on the Pharisees who coldly and maliciously held their peace when He asked if it was lawful to heal on the Sabbath day, and was grieved for the hardness of their heart; He beheld the young ruler and loved him, though He put him to a divine test too searching to be borne; He turned and looked on Peter with emotions of grief, reproach and tenderness beyond any experienced by man. In all this, it is true, He was man; but it is also true that He was God—God and man inseparably united, so that we are not authorized to say that what was spiritually present to the human was not likewise spiritually present to the Divine nature.

Such being the revealed heart of God, we cannot doubt that the failure in duty and necessary punishment of Satan and his

1 Isaiah liii. 3, 4, 5, 7, 10.
2 Matthew xv. 32; Mark viii. 2; Matthew xx. 34; Luke vii. 13.
3 Mark iii. 4, 5.
4 Matthew xix. 20; Mark x. 20; Luke xviii. 21.
5 Luke xxii. 61, 62.
angels moved the Divine Spirit with emotions, which in man would have been deep sorrow and firm resolve not to repeat an experiment which, although by the application of remedies means the evil was reduced to its minimum, had nevertheless resulted in the hopeless ruin and wretchedness of each and every angel that fell from the platform of duty.

But we may be equally certain that the high creative purpose of bringing into being moral creatures, endowed with reason, knowledge, free will, holiness of disposition and complete ability to obey law, was not abandoned by the Almighty. He prepared to create man in the image of the God-man, but with certain differences from the angelic constitution, which were intended for the highest good of the new creature, and intended to reduce the risk of material opposition to law to the minimum, and to make the remedy, in case such opposition was successful, as complete, glorious and God-like as infinite wisdom, benevolence and power could devise and execute. To these differences we must now attend.

1. Of all the millions of holy angels originally created, each stood for himself, and so stood for eternity. Some divines speak of a time of probation having been appointed for these angels—so that if they perfectly obeyed during that time, they would thenceforth be confirmed for ever in holiness and happiness. But the Scriptures do not any where clearly teach this doctrine, and its inferential evidences are far-fetched and inconclusive. The “first estate” in which all angels were created was an estate of purity and happiness for which they were adapted and intended; and we have a scriptural right to believe that, in the ethical sense, it was the will of God that

1 This idea of probation is implicitly contained in all statements that the unfallen angels were “confirmed for ever in their estate of glory and blessedness.” See Breckinridge’s “Knowledge of God,” &c., p. 368. Hodge’s “Outlines of Theology,” pp. 236–237.
Differences.

they should all continue in that estate for eternity. But it was also the will of God that they should be dual beings, composed of a spiritual and a material element, united so as to form a person in each angel, made in the image of the Son of God, but, unlike Him, created, not generated; and that each of these high angelic persons should have perfect freedom of will; for without such freedom they could not have been moral and accountable creatures. Hence it followed that each angel of the many who fell sinned in himself, by reason of the triumph in himself of the material over the spiritual—of matter resisting law—and of the consent of his individual will to such triumph. This did not exclude the operation of temptation, one upon another, but did exclude the principle of generative similarity.

2. Up to the time of the fall of the sinning angels, and the preparatory steps for the creation of man, we have no reason to believe that death had been known in the universe. We have seen that death is the temporal triumph of the resistance of organized matter over the spiritual principle of life. When angels were created, very high creative powers were exercised—powers, in fact, intended to call into being a creature in the likeness of the Son of God. And so intense and far-reaching was this exercise that the organized matter composing the body of each angel was made incapable of disorganization—insusceptible of death. Hence, although sin degraded each angel—each dual being—and cast him down to the prison-house of despair, it did not work death on his material organism. That remained to live for ever, degraded with its companion spirit.

3. The law made known to the angels as the rule of their action and lives was the general moral law of God, arising out of the necessary and eternal relations existing between the Creator and His moral creatures. It required of them the great duties of love, loyalty, faithfulness, truth, obedience; it
forbade the correlative transgressions or sins of hatred to good, pride, envy, malice, treason, rebellion, unbelief of God's word, lying, slander, disobedience. Hence all the moral evils forbidden to angels were malum in se, evils in themselves—evils in their essential nature. No mere malum prohibitum was forbidden to them. In other words, no act, innocent and indifferent in itself, but made evil by the fact that it was prohibited to them by the express command of God, was set before them as a test of obedience and a constant warning against the danger of sin arising from their material natures.

These statements will guide us to the differences between the angels and man, and will enable us to see the wisdom and goodness of God in the selection of the conditions surrounding the new moral creature when brought into the field of being.

First, instead of creating at once millions of men, each standing for himself. He created one man, male and female, and subjected him to a short and easy probation. He introduced into his nature a high principle, unknown in the angelic constitution—the principle of generative faculty. This principle was not unknown in the universe. It was a modification of that eternal and ineffable mystery by which the Son of God had his being; for He was eternally begotten of the Father. His generation is eternal. Assuredly in applying this mysterious relation to the limited and humble conditions necessarily surrounding man, the great Creator showed him special favor—a favor designed for his highest good, and ever expanding, even under the sad results of sin, in its blessed remedies. The experiment in the garden of Eden has shown that if all the many thousands of millions of men who have ever existed on earth had been created singly, and each standing only for himself, the result would have been either the hopeless fall of all of them, or the fall and final ruin of a larger proportion of the man family than will be borne by the ultimately lost to the
number saved and confirmed in holiness by the remedy which the generative constitution enables the Son of God to apply to our race. This being true, it is impossible to lay any reasonable ground for doubt that the constitution of male and female was given to man (in preference to the angelic constitution) for purposes worthy of infinite wisdom and benevolence. What is contained and implied in the generative constitution will be hereafter considered.

Next, a world was prepared as the temporal home of man and his future progeny which differed from all the conditions (so far as revealed knowledge gives us light) environing the habitable world of the angels—and differed in points all favorable to the success of the probative experiment to which the virtue of man was necessarily subjected. In this world, for the first time, so far as we know, organisms of matter were created having the principle of spiritual life, and yet capable of disorganization—susceptible of death. But though this susceptibility existed by reason of less intense and concentrated creative power being exercised than in the case of the bodies of the angels, we are not to conclude that death was in any case—even that of the most delicate flower or the frailest animal—the result of the direct will of God. In every case, death involved a violation of law. Life was the law; the Spirit called for life, and spread its life-giving and life-maintaining energy to the most minute parts and bounds of the organization. But against this law, the resistance of the material organism, whether vegetable or animal, was ceaseless; and inasmuch as the wise and good purposes of God did not require, as to such organisms preceding in this world the creation of man, the exercise of the high creative powers employed upon angelic bodies, this resistance was left to work its result; and that result was, sooner or later, the death of every individual vegetable and animal organism—the temporary triumph of the material over the spiritual,
the ghastly and alarming phenomena attending such temporary triumph, the falling to earth of the disorganized material, and the instant rally of spiritual force to remedy as far as possible the evil of death and reduce it to its minimum.

At this point comes naturally and properly into our view the relation of the lower animals of our world to man, especially in the light of the phenomena of life and death. That these animals manifest in their sphere of action, and according to the end of their existence here, the same spiritual functions which man exhibits—such as memory, the reasoning power which draws logical conclusions from known premises, the power of willing or choice, and the affections, love, fear, hate, and such like, is too plain for doubt. These powers in them have been called instinct, and in many cases, such as the bee, the beaver, the elephant, they are admitted to rise higher and to lead to more unerring results than reason in man ever reaches. Nevertheless, many scientists regard all the lower animals as merely automata—mere organized machines, somewhat like the mechanical trumpeter, or bird, or calculator.¹ But this view is as far from the truth as is the contrary view of the ultra-Brahminical school of India, who consider the lower animals as so nearly

¹ This view, which is substantially that of Descartes, has received some impetus in our age from the experiments on frogs and other animals practised by Professors Huxley, Ferrier, and others. See Huxley's Lectures, and the article "Cotemporary Philosophy, Mind and Brain," by President McCosh, Princeton Review, March, 1878, pp. 606–632. Dr. Edward B. Tylor has some remarks on the conflicting beliefs of philosophic divines concerning "the souls of animals" which are characteristic of his thoughtful and scholarly methods.—"Primitive Culture," N. Y. Edit., 1877, Vol. I., p. 471. And see the judicious review of Dr. W. Lauder Lindsay's "Mind in the Lower Animals in Health and Disease," London, 1879, in Littell's Living Age, September 18, 1880, pp. 707–725, especially the concluding sentences. Dr. John William Draper, in his "Conflict between Religion and Science," pp. 128–180, 138, presents some strong ta and inferences against the doctrine of Descartes and Huxley that the r animals were merely automata.
akin, spiritually and materially, to man that they forbid as a
crime the act of killing them for human food. The view which
avoids on the right hand and on the left all these difficulties is
that the same Divine Spirit who informs the spirits of angels
and of man dwells likewise in the lower animals and in the
vegetable organisms, according to their respective spheres and
ends in creation. Hence the lower animals are not, in any
sense, *automata*. Their automatic instincts and movements
correspond to like instincts and movements in man, and, for
aught we know, in angels. But beyond all mechanism—beyond
all involuntary and unconscious exercise of power—they exercise
functions of reason, intelligence, memory, will and affection,
which manifest the presence of spirit as unmistakably as in man.
The immeasurable and impassable gulf between them and the
lowest races of man is found in the revealed fact that they were
*not* made in the image of the God-man, nor after His likeness.
Death terminates for ever the existence of the individual lower
animal. The spirit does not return to God who gave it, but
passes out into the ever-pervading spirit ready to animate
similar natures. There is no personality, no conscious individu-
ation, and hence no accountability, no immortality, no future
life for the insect, reptile, bird, or beast.¹ If any personal

¹ Psalms xlix. 12, 20. The passage in Ecclesiastes iii. 18–21, is the
melancholy cry of one who passed through many stages of bitter experience
on his way to the final wisdom. At one stage he is tempted to reject
hope of immortality, and to believe that the sons of men die as the beasts
die. Yet even in this dismal phase of thought he recognizes the great
fact, that the spirit of man ascends and the spirit of the beast "goeth
downward" to the earth. In the latter, the Hebrew verb used is *yarad*,
the common meaning of which is certainly "to go down," "to descend,"
but which sometimes means "to go forth," "to go out," as in Ruth iii. 3,
6; 1 Samuel ix. 27; 2 Kings vi. 18. The Septuagint renders it, *Ei* 
καταβαίνειν αυτο κατο εἰς τὴν. Here the preposition compounded with
the verb is κατα, which means "against," "on," "at," "to," "towards,"
"near to," as often as "under;" and though κατο generally means "be-
low" or "underneath," it sometimes conveys simply the idea of "against"
responsibility for the deeds done in the body, or any future life, awaited them, then the idea of the Brahmin would be just, and it would have been, at all times, unlawful to put them to death for the purpose of supplying food to man.\textsuperscript{1}

The measureless gulf lying between the lower creatures and man is farther shown by the fact that they were all subjected to his dominion by a divine ordinance. No such dominion prevails among different orders of inferior animated nature, although great differences in strength, courage and intelligence are found among them. The lion is far superior in all these qualities to the sheep, yet the lion is never found exercising government and dominion over flocks and herds, nor are sheep ever found willingly submitting to be ruled by the lion. The old fictions, which represent the lion as king of beasts, and the eagle as king of birds, are neither more nor less than what they purport to be—pure fables, sometimes teaching truth, but never true in themselves. Man only has been from the beginning recognized as lord of creation, because he is the image of the Lord Creator. To man, all beasts, birds, reptiles, insects, submit as to their lawful master; and all lower nature submits to his control. This dominion was more complete before he sinned than it has ever been since.\textsuperscript{2}

or "opposite to." An admissible translation, therefore, would be that the spirit of the beast "goeth forth into the earth."

\textsuperscript{1} Genesis iii. 21; viii. 20, 21; ix. 2, 3.

\textsuperscript{2} Genesis i. 28; ii. 19–20; iii. 14, 15. Here again Milton presents an ideal full of suggested truth:

"Beast now with beast 'gan war, and fowl with fowl,
And fish with fish; to graze the herb all leaving,
Devoured each other; nor stood much in awe
Of man, but fled him; or with countenance grim
Glared on him passing."

—"Paradise Lost," Book X., p. 221.

But we must bear in mind that Milton wrote while the effete notion that all physical evil in this world followed the sin of Adam was in full force.
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Next, in addition to this mastership, man, as originally created, was separated by an impassible gulf from all the lower animals in this, that his material frame was so highly wrought that he was not subject to disorganization and death; and had he not sinned, he would never have been so subject. This is a point of much significance. The angelic material constitution was originally and for ever so elaborately wrought that it was not subject to death. They were immortal in spirit and body. But to those of them who sinned and fell, this God-like gift, intended by the Divine will and wisdom to be their bliss, became necessarily their curse. Therefore, subsequent organisms were not so intensely wrought, and became subjects of that evil which material resistance, striving against the grasp of spirit, accomplishes; so that, when man was created and placed in Eden, the dismal features and accompaniments of death were speedily before his eyes. His Creator and Law-giver was thus provided with an additional and powerful deterrent to use upon man which could not be used upon angels. The solemn prohibitory mandate, "Of every tree of the garden thou mayest freely eat: but of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, thou shalt not eat of it; for in the day that thou eatest thereof thou shalt surely die," would have lost much of its force if man had been entirely without knowledge of the meaning of death! It does not appear that any verbal explanation of its meaning was given him; but he had before his eyes an explanation more powerful than words. In the fall of the lower animal, the gloomy failure of organization, the silence, the stillness, the horrors of decomposition, man knew all of death that he could learn without passing through the "dark valley" himself, and assuredly its known side and its unknown side must have united in constituting one of his strongest motives to obedience.

Yet, by that divine alchemy which ever seeks to remedy the

1 Genesis ii. 16, 17.
wrong, and to bring good out of evil, this very fact of death which was denied to angels and held out in terror to man, was to be the means of perfecting the plan of salvation intended for man in case he fell into sin and ruin.

Next, man differed from the angels in this, that though, like them, he was subject to the general moral law applicable to him, and arising from the immutable relations he bore to his Creator, and was intended to bear to his wife and descendants yet, for his good and safety, God was pleased to appoint for him a period of probation and a simple and easy test of obedience, being neither more nor less than the mere malum prohibitum, the denial of the use of the fruit of one single tree among the thousands of trees in the garden which were "very good" and "pleasant to the sight" and "good for food."\(^1\) We need not torture our imaginations (after the manner of the mediæval fathers) by seeking to impute inherent and essential properties to "the tree of life also in the midst of the garden and the tree of knowledge of good and evil,"\(^2\) as though the first would, by its very juices, have infused an elixir of life and immortality into man's veins, and the last, in like manner, would have infused a fatal poison. Both of these trees seem, from the inspired narrative, to have been like the other fruit trees of the garden, though they were doubtless (to prevent innocent mistake) easily distinguishable by size, shape, color, formation of leaves and fruit, and position in Eden from the other trees. Both were simply used as formal and visible signs or sacrament—the forbidden tree to act as a ceaseless memorial of law and duty and danger, the tree of life to act as a memorial of the reward of obedience, the consummation of good works, the sign of immortal happiness.\(^3\) They were material and visible signs addressed to the spiritual element in man.

\(^1\) Genesis i. 29, 31; ii. 9, 16, 17.  
\(^2\) Genesis ii. 9.  
\(^3\) Against this view, the words in Genesis iii. 22, are supposed to militate: "And now, lest he put forth his hand, and take also of the tre
We do not know what the forbidden fruit was. It may have been, according to a prevalent but baseless tradition, an apple; it may, just as well, have been an orange or a pear. The fact that its nature was not revealed is strong evidence that it was not of the least importance. In itself, it was, like other fruits in the garden, good for food and pleasant to the eyes. Its whole significance consisted in the fact that it was elected of God as the test of man's virtue. It was in no other sense a tree of knowledge—"a tree to be desired to make one wise"—than in this, that if man disobeyed the mandate of God by touching and eating of its fruit, he instantly passed the fatal line between innocence and guilt, and instantly knew by his own experience what no unfallen angel (however exalted in intelligence) ever has known, to-wit: a personal knowledge of evil, the pangs of a guilty conscience, the premonitions of a judgment to come.

Thus we see that, by this term of easy and probably brief probation—by this simple test of malum prohibitum, abstinence from a fruit not needed, not more desirable than thousands of other fruits around him, which were freely offered for his use and pleasure—God, in His infinite wisdom, goodness and power, placed His new moral creature, man, in the most favorable conditions possible for attaining success in the great experiment of standing obedient to law. Those who cavil at the divine constitution which made Adam the head and representative of life, and eat, and live for ever." But the original Hebrew, vahay lisholam, may be, without strain, rendered "as living for ever." The true teaching, therefore, of verses 22, 23, 24 is that man, having broken the positive law which forbade him to eat the forbidden fruit, was no longer entitled to the sign of immortality—the tree of life; and lest he should incur further guilt by unworthily partaking of a sacrament—lest he put forth his hand and take also of the tree of life, and eat as if living for ever—he was driven out from the garden.

1 Genesis iii. 6.
his race, have not taken into consideration all the facts bearing
on the case. They do not look into the dark abyss before them
when they say they would have preferred to stand for them-
selves. Failure would have been certain; and it would have
been failure without remedy so far as they were concerned.
The only remedial process possible would have been, as in the
case of angels, eternal banishment and imprisonment of the
guilty, to aid in saving the holy by salutary fear.

The conditions environing man, male and female, were: 1, A
constitution different from the angelic, in that generative descent
from them was possible, and they had the powerful motive to
obedience drawn from the benefit they would thus confer on
their descendants; 2, Insusceptibility of death if they obeyed,
liability to death if they disobeyed, and the horrible phenomena
of death in the lower animals before their eyes that they might
take warning; 3, A period of probation, the duration of which
is not revealed, but which we have no reason to believe to have
been long; 4, A simple and easy test of obedience—an isolated
malum prohibitum—a single act forbidden, and that act pre-
senting no strong or reasonable temptation, because it was a
mere act of material touching and eating the fruit of a tree, in
no respect more attractive than other fruits to the enjoyment
whereof they had full license; 5, An external and visible sign
and symbol of eternal life set before their eyes as a perpetual
memorial of the blessing waiting on obedience. Surely under
such conditions man might have been expected to stand.

We are therefore able to say that God did for His new moral
creature all that power could do to create him upright and keep
him in that state. But there was one exposure to which man
was subjected, which, at first sight, seems seriously to impinge
on this Divine care and guardianship, and to give ground for
cavil against the wisdom or the goodness of God. This was
exposure to the temptation of Satan, the old serpent, the devil the evil one, the accuser, the destroyer.\(^1\)

But when we approach this subject closely and seek to analyze its elements, we find much to justify the conclusion that the temptation of man by Satan really involves the freedom of will necessary in a moral creature; that however inscrutable may be the mystery of free will, we are compelled to admit its existence, and therefore to admit that if the will be really free, power in another being cannot determine it, even though that power be All-power. Hence we reach the reasonable belief, that the exposure of man to the temptation of Satan was a necessary and inevitable part of man's probation; that the temptation was not according to the will of God, but according to a will in opposition to His; and that this foul transaction on the part of Satan has been overruled and remedied, as far as infinite power could avail, by the added condemnation and punishment of Satan and his accessories, and by the eternal safety won for His followers by the God-man, who, in the days of His humiliation, successfully resisted the temptation of the Evil Will, to which He was also necessarily exposed. "Woe unto the world because of offences! for it must needs be that offences come; but woe to that man by whom the offence cometh!"\(^2\)

We must bear in mind that Satan and each of his angels was a person in the highest sense of the word. Satan was endowed with a material frame, moulded after the most exalted model

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\(^1\) Genesis iii. 1, 4, 14, 15; Numbers xxi. 8, 9; 2 Kings xviii. 4: Revelation xii. 9. The prayer taught us by the Son of God, "Deliver us from evil," (αλλα μὴ μοι τὴν απὸ τοῦ ποιήμου), Matthew vi. 13, may well be rendered "from the evil one." Revelation ix. 11; xii. 10.

\(^2\) Matthew xviii. 7; Luke xvii. 1; 1 Corinthians xi. 19. It would be impossible in Greek to express more clearly the idea of "the necessary" than in these passages. In Matthew it is, ἀμὴν γὰρ εὔτως, in Luke, ἀμὴν γὰρ εὐθὺς ἐκεῖν ὁ ποιήμον—"it is impossible but that offences will come." In Paul's epistle, ἀμὴν γάρ,—"it is necessary, it must needs be."
of the universe, and so exquisitely and nobly wrought that
disease, disorganization and death were impossible. To this
majestic body corresponded a spiritual nature, fitted by its
grandeur and power to inform a creature than whom no other
created being was greater. All our utmost conceptions of
mental fulness and grasp, strength of will, and intensity of
spiritual emotion sink into insignificance when compared with
those proper to the gifts of this archangel.

In modern psychology, two great thinkers have taught that
reason is essentially impersonal—that it never belongs merely
to the individual angel, or man, or thinking being, but is in them
only a part of the Infinite reason. But they, and all other
students of mind, admit that will must of necessity be predicated
of the individual moral agent. The will—good or evil—of the
angel or the man must be his will, and not God's; otherwise
all accountability, all moral agency, would be negatived; the
good decisions of the creature would imply no virtue in him,
and his evil decisions would imply no vice in him; all would be
thrown back on his Creator.

Since, then, we are compelled to ascribe the function will to
the individual moral creature, whether angel or man, there can
be no good reason why the other functions of spirit, reason,
memory and affections, should not likewise be so ascribed.
The mere fact that reason in the creature must be analogous
to reason in the Creator, because it deals with eternal and
necessary truth, does not justify the conclusion that reason in

1 Victor Cousin's "History of Modern Philosophy," Wight's Translation,
Edit. 1864, Vol. I., pp. 85-87, and his remarks on Kant, pp. 130-134.

2 This is Cousin's argument: "Reason conceives a mathematical truth;
can it change this conception, as my will changed just now my resolution?
Can it conceive that two and two do not make four? Try, and you will
not succeed; and not only in mathematics, but in all the other spheres of
reason the same phenomenon takes place."—"History of Modern Phil-
osophy," Vol. I., p. 86. The simple answer is, that because man, like
the creature is not personal to him, not a part of his individuality. Made in the image and after the likeness of the God-man, each individual moral creature was endowed with an individual spiritual nature proper to him, and suited to the accomplishment of the high ends for which he was designed; and we have seen that the elements of reason, free will and holy disposition all are essential to such a creature. They are, therefore, his own, and go to make up the important elements of his individual spirit.

It being thus shown that all the spiritual elements essential to a personal creature—an accountable being—must be attributed as his own to each angel and to man, we must now consider specially what is involved in that exalted element known as freedom of the will. If the teachings of Jonathan Edwards and others of the ultra-Calvinistic school of divinity be true, then it is certain that no such exercise as that of free will has ever taken place. There may be will, and strong will, in angel or man, and it may have been exercised in the choice of good or of evil, but, according to that school, it has never been free, but has always been exercised according to resistless influences set in motion by preceding events.

Yet it is true that the perfect freedom of the will in angel and man has been a constant proposition, expressly asserted or implicitly contained, in all prevalent Christian creeds constructed since the question of free will assumed theologic importance.¹

¹ Canons and Decrees of the Council of Trent, Caput V., "Creeds of Christendom," Vol. II., p. 92; Canons IV., V. and VI., Ibid., p. 111; Question and Answer XXVII., Orthodox Confession of the Eastern Church, Ibid., pp. 307, 308; Augsburg Confession, Ibid., Vol. III., pp. 18, 19; First Helvetic Confession, 1536, Ibid., p. 214: Second Helvetic Confession, Ibid., pp. 249-262; Thirty-nine Articles of the Church of England, Article X., Ibid., pp. 498-494. These articles are strongly Calvinistic;
And it is farther true, that the whole tenor and texture of the inspired Word treats man, unfallen and fallen, as having freedom of will, and freely exercising the power of choice between good and evil, life and death. It is passing strange that any who revere the divine authority of Scripture should ever have denied the power of contrary choice after reading such passages as these: "I call heaven and earth to record this day against you, that I have set before you life and death, blessing and cursing: therefore choose life, that both thou and thy seed may live."  

"Choose ye this day whom ye will serve; but as for me and my house, we will serve the Lord."  

"And whatsoever thou shalt require of me (in the Hebrew, choose of me), that will I do for thee."  

"Should it be according to thy mind? He will recompense it, whether thou refuse or whether thou choose."  

"For that they hated knowledge and did not choose the fear of the Lord."  

"Therefore will I number you to the sword, and ye shall all bow down to the slaughter; because when I called ye did not answer; when I spake ye did not hear; but did evil before mine eyes, and did choose that wherein I delighted not."  

In the New Testament the burden of the accusation and complaint of the Son of God against sinful men is: "Ye will not come to me that ye might have life."  

And out of the fifty-nine instances in which the word "will" (θελημα, power of choice) is used in the New Testament, by far the larger number expressly or impliedly teach the mysterious truth that man has yet, by implication, they admit the freedom of man's will before the fall by denying it after the fall. Westminster Confession, Chap. IX.: "God hath endued the will of man with that natural liberty that is neither forced nor by any absolute necessity of nature determined to good or evil."—Ibid., p. 623. "Our first parents, being left to the freedom of their own will, fell from the estate wherein they were created by sinning against God."—Westminster Shorter Catechism, Question and Answer 18, Ibid., p. 678.

1 Deuteronomy xxx. 19.  
2 Joshua xxiv. 15.  
3 2 Samuel xix. 38.  
4 Job xxxiv. 33.  
5 Proverbs i. 29.  
6 Isaiah lxv. 12.  
7 John v. 40.
the power of exercising his will in opposition to the will of God. Could there be plainer proof that man's will is free?

And it is farther true, that our personal consciousness (than which no stronger evidence can exist for us) tells us that we are free; that we have freedom of will—so absolute, so perfect, that no power in heaven, earth or hell can force the will to assent unless it choose so to do.¹

And it is farther true, that the whole system of criminal jurisprudence in every nation throughout the world, whether enlightened, civilized, semi-barbarous or savage, is founded upon the _concessum_ that the will of man is free in its choices and decisions. Upon no other ground would it be just and righteous to hold the criminal accountable and punish him for his evil deeds.

¹ Notwithstanding this universal testimony of consciousness, it is not to be denied that some men of excellent powers of thought have denied that consciousness assures us of the freedom of the will. Even one so eminent as a scholar and Christian gentleman as the late Dr. James W. Alexander, in writing seriously to his friend, Dr. John Hall, as to his personal interest in Christ, could address him thus: "Look back on your past life and tell me how many free acts you ever did. Did you ever do one thing, or take one step which was not the effect of some preceding view or feeling? If you have, name it, and I will grant you the freedom of your will. Can you will to be everlastingly miserable? Sit down and try; and then say whether your will is free. If it is as much dependent on motives as the wheels of a watch on the spring, it is about as free. If it is not absolutely and literally independent in all possible cases, to call it free is nugatory. The carnal mind, believe me, is enmity against God, and is not subject to His will, neither indeed can be."—"Forty Years' Familiar Letters," of Dr. J. W. Alexander, Edit. 1860, Vol. I., p. 63. But these views, expressed when the distinguished writer was but twenty years old, were greatly modified and changed in subsequent life. See his remarks on Edwards on the Will, Ibid., p. 71; and on p. 150, he says: "I have heard horrid extremes of fatalism under the notion of Calvinistic doctrine." Ultra-Calvinistic Christians and atheistic fatalists of the Harriet Martineau school reach the same conclusion as to the absence of freedom of will in man. See Dr. W. B. Carpenter's "Mental Physiology," N. Y. Edit., 1877, p. 4.
And if the will of man be free still, even in his fallen state, when hereditary proclivity to evil is carried down from father to son, and exists as a fixed habitus or disposition of the soul, much more was it true that, in the first estate of angel and man, the will of the moral creature was absolutely and unconditionally free. And the slightest coercion or compulsion imposed on it by the power of God, however exercised, would have instantly destroyed its freedom—would have degraded the moral creature to an automaton or a machine.

We assume, therefore, as either conceded or demonstrated, the freedom of the will in angels and man. We are next to inquire what conditions were necessary in order to the existence of such freedom.

Will is not a separate substance or entity; nor is it a part of the mind. It is an exercise of the mind—of the whole mind. By the will, we mean the mind willing, or deciding, or determining. Will is therefore a function of spirit. No spirit, no will, is a truth of universal application. Even in the case of the lower animals it is true that, as far as the exercise of will can be imputed to them, it is because they have their measure of the all-pervading spirit.

Therefore God, the infinite and eternal Spirit, exercises will. And we have seen that His will is free. It is free because no power outside of itself coerces or controls it. Its freedom is not in the slightest degree impaired by the fact that its exercises are always in accordance with the attributes of the Divine Spirit. Rather is it thus confirmed, for we cannot conceive of any higher freedom in a Spiritual Being than that He should will to do what pleases Him. Neither is this freedom in the will of God at all impaired by the fact that reasons, drawn from infinite wisdom and goodness, should exist cotemporaneously with the exercise of the Divine will, and that its decisions should be in accord with such reasons. These con-
siderations of wisdom and goodness may be reasons why the Divine will should decide as it does. But reasons are not causes. The free decision of the Divine will is self-caused; otherwise God would not be free.¹

The essential condition of free will is thus seen to be that the spirit shall be the cause of its own volitions. If any power outside of the spirit itself, whether that power be called God, or demon, or motive, or inducement, or reason, be the real and efficient cause of the volition, or decision, or choice of the spirit, then its act has not been free. It has been coerced or compelled, as certainly as that a stone falling from a height is compelled by the power of gravitation to seek the ground. To call the action of such a stone free action is a palpable absurdity.

God is Cause in the universe. Hence the Divine volitions are free. The decisions of His will are self-caused. If these decisions were only effects of some pre-existing cause or causes, then they would be as truly coerced or compelled as the fall of

¹ The reasoning of Prof. Joseph Haven on this subject is the more satisfactory, because adopted after an exhaustive review of all adverse opinions. "If mind is not the cause of its own volitions, then how is it with the volitions of the infinite and eternal mind? Are they caused or uncaused? If caused, then by what? If by Himself, then there is again the infinitely recurring series according to the dictum necessitatis (of Edwards). If by something else, still we do not escape the series, for each causative act must have its prior cause. Are the volitions of Deity then uncaused? Then certainly there is no such thing as cause in the universe. Motives then are no longer to be called causes. Deity is not, in fact, the cause of anything, since not the cause of those volitions by which alone all things are produced. If He is not the cause of these, then not the cause of their consequences and effects. In either case, you shut out all cause from the universe."—"Mental Philosophy," Edit. 1865, pp. 559, 560. See also Prof. J. L. Girardeau's "Freedom of the Will in its Theological Relations," Southern Pres. Review, October, 1878, and January, 1879. Edwards' views on the will may be now considered as abandoned, except by fatalists.
a stone is when, in mid air, gravity acts on it. The fall is an effect of a cause, and therefore not free action.

From these premises the conclusion is inevitable, that in order to create angel or man really a moral creature, really endowed with freedom of will, it was necessary that God should endow such creature with His own spiritual nature in mode and measure suited to the end of his being, yet really and truly, so as to make the spirit of such moral creature a cause in the universe. And so He did. Sublime and overwhelming as may be the thought, it is yet proper that we entertain it. On no lower conditions could the purpose of God have been accomplished. Angel and man were free in will, by reason that each was endowed with a spirit, drawn out by God from His own eternal spirit, and thus fitted to be cause, and to exercise free volition, uncoerced, un compelled by any power or influence outside of itself.  

1 This seems to be a sufficient answer to the difficulty felt by Sir Wm. Hamilton (and by Dr. Reid before him) in conceiving that any act of man's will can be really free. Reid expresses it thus: "To conceive a free act is to conceive an act which, being a cause, is not itself an effect; in other words, to conceive an absolute commencement. But is such by us conceivable?"—Reid, p. 602; Note by Wight to Sir Wm. Hamilton's "Philosophy of the Conditioned," Works, Amer. Edit., 1857, pp. 507–515. Here Victor Cousin is wiser than Reid or Hamilton. He held that man's spirit is cause, and therefore free. "To create is a thing not difficult to be conceived, for it is a thing that we do every moment; in short, we create every time that we perform a free act. I will. I take a resolution, I take another, then another still; I modify it, I suspend it, I pursue it, &c. What is it that I do? I produce an effect which I refer to myself as the cause and only cause; and in regard to the existence of this effect, I seek nothing beyond myself."—"History of Modern Philosophy," Amer. Edit., p. 93. The doctrine that the soul is the cause of its own volitions, and is thus possessed of freedom of will, is not new in the world. It has been held for at least two thousand years. It was distinctly announced by the great Greek thinker and orator, Carneades, who was born at Cyrene, about 217 B.C., and lived to be nearly ninety years old. His words, as attributed to him by Cicero, are: "Similiter ad animorum motus volun-
Thus the spiritual nature of Satan, being in itself a cause partaking of the divine nature, and being free in will, assented to the temptation to pride furnished by his material nature. And when pride and envy had once gained the ascendancy, they soon swelled into treason and rebellion, and on his overthrow and banishment from the home of his "first estate," his capacious soul became the ever-flowing spring of all moral evil. His habitus or disposition was changed from the pure and holy to the foul and devilish.

We are now able to see—dimly it may be, yet by a gloomy light—the nature and power of that fallen archangel who was the tempter in Eden. His reason was vast and acute, his knowledge wide and far reaching, his memory full of the overthrows and mortifications perhaps of millions of years, his disposition only evil continually, so that Milton has not exaggerated his thought—

"Evil! be thou my good."

His will was the master power of his terrific spiritual nature, to which all other powers were subordinated. And that will was not only free, and able to work as cause in the universe, but was in eternal and inflexible opposition to the will of God. Divine power itself had no relation to that Satanic will, for in creating the archangel free, power had for ever withdrawn from all conditions of coercion or compulsion upon that will.

Let it be farther borne in mind that, though a majestic material frame belonged to Satan, yet he was by no means con-

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Pierre Bayle, in quoting these words, adds his tribute to Carneades:
"Il est certam que Carneade leur fournissait là une repousse non seulement beaucoup plus solide que celle qu’ils emploient. mais aussi, la plus ingenieuse et la plus forte que l’ esprit humain puisse produire."—Dict. Hist. et Crit., Art. Carneade, Tome II., p. 1086.
fined in power to constant agency in this frame under its original form—the image of the Son of God. Holy Scripture teaches us that "Satan himself is transformed into an angel of light."\(^1\) Yet we have the same reason to believe that evil passions and practices wrought a brutalizing effect on his once God-like frame that we have for the well-known corresponding fact in man. Now if this being, demonized in soul and body, was yet able to change the form or \textit{species} of that body so completely as to make it bear the appearance of a holy angel, and of an angel admitted to that very \textit{light} which is the dwelling-place of God, we need feel no difficulty in believing that to accomplish his purposes of deceit, Satan is able to transform his body into the appearance of a toad, a serpent, a bull, or a dragon.\(^2\)

Thus we are led to the conclusion that the exposure of our first parents to temptation by Satan detracts not at all from that benevolence and power which, in creating them \textit{free} agents,

\(^1\) 2 Corinthians xi. 14. The Greek words are: \textit{Αὐτοὶ γὰρ ὁ Σατανᾶς μετασχηματίζεται εἰς σχῆμα φωτός}. The verb is very strong in expressing the idea of changing the form \textit{σχῆμα} of his own material substance.

\(^2\) Milton therefore violated no principle either of philosophic or revealed truth in representing Satan in Eden as taking the form, first of a lion, then of a tiger, and at last

\begin{quote}
"Squat like a toad, close at the ear of Eve,
Assaying by his devilish art to reach
The organs of her fancy."
\end{quote}

—"Paradise Lost," Book IV.

And, when driven from the garden by Gabriel, Ithuriel and Zephon, as resolving to assume the form of mist for the purpose of eluding the angelic guard and re-entering the garden:

\begin{quote}
"Thus wrapt in mist
Of midnight vapor glide obscure, and pry
In every bush and brake, where hap may find
The serpent sleeping, in whose many folds
To hide me and the dark intent I bring."
\end{quote}

—Ibid., Book IX.
had yet surrounded them by all the conditions of guardianship which benevolence, wisdom and power could supply.

We know the result. With consummate and diabolical art Satan, in the form of the serpent, sought the woman rather than the man—sought her when alone, and plied her with tempting lies and proposals to eat the forbidden fruit. Eve, although she was the weaker vessel, was perfectly inexcusable in the transaction; for she knew her duty and had ability to perform it. She knew the Divine prohibition, and distinctly repeated it to the tempter. But Eve was material; she was taken from the side of Adam, and he was formed of the dust of the ground. No power in the universe could have compelled her will to assent to the tempting proposal of Satan. While she repelled it she was safe—safe as the guardianship of innocence and heaven could make her—safe beyond all the power of evil. But her material nature pleaded that the fruit was “good for food and pleasant to the eyes,” and that same material nature presented the stronger temptation arising from human curiosity; for without the inequalities, limitations and distinctions arising from material individuation, it would be wholly impossible for a creature to crave forbidden knowledge. And in Eve’s case, as in Satan’s, the material triumphed over the spiritual; faith failed in the word of God; free will as cause put forth a volition; the hand was outstretched; the fruit was grasped and eaten; law was broken, and instantly Eve was a sinner!

And soon Adam joined her in her sin. She “gave also unto her husband with her, and he did eat.” We are prepared for this. It does not surprise us. No wilder or more unpractical question can be conceived than that which has been sometimes asked: What would have been the result had Adam refused to eat the forbidden fruit after Eve had done so? Adam sinned

1 Genesis iii. 1-6; Revelations xii. 7-9.  
2 Genesis iii. 6.
with deliberate intention. He was not deceived nor beguiled by the serpent; Eve was. And yet his continued obedience after her fall would have been an exercise of virtue and free will such as the universe has never known. If Eve disobeyed under the influence of her material nature, much more might we expect Adam to fall, with the beautiful being, who was "bone of his bone, and flesh of his flesh," standing before him with the fruit in her hand, acknowledging that she had eaten and urging him to eat. He did eat, and was with Eve in the transgression.

They were driven out from the garden of Eden, and from the very sight of the tree of life. Adam was to gain their food in the sweat of his face, and Eve was to experience that pain in child-bearing which she would never have known but for her sin, and which was the sad foretaste of that suffering and pain and death which passed upon all men, for that all have sinned. But even already mercy had begun her work; Divine remedy was at hand. Before they were driven from Eden, the words of coming hope and salvation were spoken: "And I will put enmity between thee and the woman, and between thy seed and her seed; it shall bruise thy head, and thou shalt bruise his heel." To suppose that these words were addressed only to the reptile animal, whose body had been used by Satan, is to do signal injustice to the dignity of inspiration, and to ignore the dawning glory of the Church of Christ. The words were addressed to Satan himself, and were the first trumpet notes of that battle which redeemed men and women have been called in all subsequent ages to fight, under the leadership of the seed of the woman—the Second Adam, the Son of Mary.

How long our first parents continued innocent after their creation we are not explicitly taught in Scripture. But we are

1 1 Timothy ii. 14; Genesis iii. 13. 2 Romans v. 12. 3 Genesis iii. 15; Romans v.
informed of certain facts from which the inference seems reasonable and strong that the period of their innocence was sadly brief. The narrative in the fourth chapter of Genesis seems, by its connection, to intimate that the marriage of Adam and Eve was not consummated until after the fall, or at least that the first child of our great mother was not conceived until after that sad event. And therefore whatever of the spiritual and material effects of the fall was susceptible of transmission by generative descent had full opportunity to pass to the offspring of our first parents. What those effects were, and how far they were transmitted to the descendants of Adam and Eve, has been a subject of almost boundless discussion among students of the Scriptures in all ages, and never has the discussion been more keenly conducted than in the present century. For the purposes of this work, we are happily relieved from the necessity of entering upon this discussion any farther than to indicate simply and briefly the teachings which common sense and inspired Scripture unite in giving us on the subject.

First, what were those effects, and how far did they operate, by generative descent, in view of the moral law of God, the Law-giver?

As to Adam and Eve themselves—the actual transgressors of a known law—there is no difficulty in answering this question. They had wilfully broken the law imposed righteously and benevolently by their Creator. They were, therefore, justly under condemnation; and unless some remedy could be found, by which God could be just, and yet justify condemned sinners, they must have endured the penalty, to their unspeakable suffering and ruin.

But as to the offspring of Adam and Eve, the case was very different. Yet many able theologians teach that, by reason of what they call the federal relation between Adam and his posterity, his sin was gratuitously imputed to them by the
righteous Law-giver; in other words, that God condemns all the lineal descendants of Adam as sinners by reason of his original sin.¹ To such doctrine we strongly obje

¹ Dr. Charles Hodge, of Princeton, announces this doctrine in the following words: “Therefore, it is for the one offence of the one man that a condemning sentence (the 

χρισμα εις κατα χρισμα) has passed on men.”—Princeton Essays, First Series, p. 161, Wiley & Putnam, 1846, and again: “There is a causal relation between the sin of Adam and its condemnation and sinfulness of his posterity.” “His sin was not ours. Its guilt does not belong to us personally. It is imputed to us as something not our own, a peccatum aticenum, and the penalty of it, the forfeiture of the Divine favor, the loss of original righteousness, a spiritual death, are its sad consequences.”—“Systematic Theology,” V II., pp. 215, 225. But this doctrine, which is neither more nor less than that God as a Sovereign gratuitously imputes the sin of Adam to its posterity, and condemns them therefore, has never been the doctrine of the Christian church in any age. See article, “The Gratuitous Imputation of Sin,” Southern Pres. Review, April, 1876, pp. 318–368, in which Dr. Hodge’s statements of the doctrine of imputation are successfully assailed. The doctrine of imputation is not taught by the Roman Catholic Church, though some of her divines have approached it very nearly. The clause of the “Decretum de Peccato Originali” of the Council of Trent comes nearest to it, but yet escapes it. (“Creeds of Christendom,” Vol. I p. 87.) Neither is imputation of Adam’s sin held by the Greek Church, though the “Orthodox Confession,” by Mogilas, teaches that all men, being in Adam during his state of innocence, fell with him, and have remained in a state of sin, (Questio XXIV., Ibid., p. 303.) The “Long Catechism of the Eastern Church,” (first made known in America in English by Dr. Schaff,) does not teach imputation, but does teach that original sin is transmitted by generative descent, (Question Answered 168, Ibid., p. 470.) The “Augsburg Confession” (1580) does not teach the imputation of Adam’s sin to his posterity, but teaches the imputation of Christ’s righteousness to the believer, whereby he is justified (Art. IV., Ibid., III., p. 10); thus showing that these doctrines are not separable. The “Formula of Concord,” (1617–1648) by inference at least denies imputed sin, but expressly teaches the imputation of Christ’s righteousness, (Ibid., pp. 101, 116. The “Second Helvetic Confession” (1566) written by Henry Bullinger, of Zürich, and very highly esteemed, where teaches imputed sin, though very strong on inherited corruption and misery, and equally so on imputed righteousness, (Ibid., Vol. III., p. 247, 266.) Even “The French Confession of Faith,” (1559) prepared
Common sense at once repudiates it. It imputes to God as a righteous law-maker conduct which in a human sovereign or human government would be cruel and unjust beyond expression. Even the approach to it in those governments which have enacted laws of attainder has been condemned by the sense of justice in mankind, which declares that to impute to the child the crime of the father is a horrible iniquity. And to the decision of common sense herein the inspired Word of God agrees, by announcing every where that God is just; and by explicitly laying down the principles by which the justice of Calvin and his pupil De Chandieu, does not assert imputation of Adam’s sin, strong as its statements are, (Ibid., pp. 365, 366), but asserts justification by the imputed obedience of Christ: “l’obéissance de Jésus-Christ laquelle nous est allouée,” (Ibid., p. 370.) The “Belgic Confession” (1561) does not expressly teach imputed sin, though it contains an expression which looks obliquely in that direction; but it says distinctly that “Jesus Christ, imputing to us all His merits, and so many holy works which He hath done for us and in our stead, is our righteousness,” (Ibid., pp. 400, 401, 408.) The “Scotch Confession of Faith” (1560) asserts no imputed sin, but imputed “justice of (the) Son,” (Ibid., p. 457.) The “Thirty-nine Articles of the Anglican Church” (Lat. Edit., 1563; Eng. Edit., 1571, Amer. Rev., 1801), though strong as to original sin in Adam’s race, assert no imputation of sin, but “reputamur” we are accounted righteous before God only for the merit of Christ, (Ibid., pp. 492, 493, 494.) The “Five Arminian Articles” (1610) and “Canons of the Synod of Dort (1619) assert no imputed sin, and although they assert original sin, assert also “residuum quidem lumen”—“glimmerings of natural light” since the fall, (Ibid., pp. 564, 565, 588.) The “Declaration of Faith” of the Congregational Church (1833) asserts inherited depravity, but not imputed sin, (Ibid., p. 731.) The Baptist Creeds assert no imputation of sin, (Ibid., pp. 743, 750); nor the Methodist Articles, (Ibid., pp. 808, 809); nor the Cumberland Presbyterian, (Ibid., pp. 771-778.) The only creeds which teach it in any form are the Westminster; “The Confession of the Waldenses” (1655), (Ibid., p. 761); and perhaps the “Auburn Declaration” (1837), (Ibid., p. 778.) It certainly cannot be declared that the doctrine of “gratuitous imputation” is the consensus of the Christian Church.

1 Constitution of the United States, Sec. IX., Clause 3; Blackstone’s Commentaries, with Christian’s notes, Edit. 1886, Vol. II., Book 4th, pp. 305-307, with authorities cited.
God determines the relation of His moral law in the case of father and child. He declares of the child who avoids the sins of his father that "he shall not die for the iniquity of his father; he shall surely live." And in answer to questioners, who have found their exact parallels in modern times, the Divine Justice says: "Yet say ye, why? doth not the son bear the iniquity of the father? When the son hath done that which is lawful and right, and hath kept all my statutes, and hath done them, he shall surely live. The soul that sinneth, it shall die. The son shall not bear the iniquity of the father, neither shall the father bear the iniquity of the son, the righteousness of the righteous shall be upon him, and the wickedness of the wicked shall be upon him."¹

Here the principle of immutable justice is plainly declared to be that, in the view of the moral government of God, such a notion as gratuitously imputing to a child the sin of his father is unrecognized. Each man is judged and condemned by the law of God for his own sins, and not for the sins of another. Other inspired passages to the same effect are not wanting.²

¹ Ezekiel xviii. 17, 19, 20.

² Deuteronomy xxiv. 16; 2 Kings xiv. 6; 2 Chronicles xxv. 4; Jeremiah xxxi. 29, 30; Ezekiel xviii. 2–9. These passages manifest the principle of justice which governs the dealings of God as to parent and child, and which utterly repudiates the doctrine of imputation of sin. Therefore it is impossible to find in the Scriptures any teaching really inconsistent with these passages, inasmuch as principles sanctioned by God never conflict with each other. 2 Corinthians xii. 14 goes even farther, and shows that justice would be less plainly violated by imputing the sin of the child to the father than the sin of the father to the child. Nor do such passages as Exodus xx. 5, declaring that God visits "the iniquity of the fathers upon the children," at all help the dogma of imputation. The divine constitution of events, especially in generative descent, which was intended for the highest good of parent and children, does necessarily transmit to offspring, to the third and fourth generation, the dire consequences of the iniquities of parents. All science unites with revelation in so declaring; but does this give the slightest sanction to the idea that God,
FIFTH CHAPTER OF ROMANS.

But theologians of the school just referred to tell us that their doctrine is plainly taught in the fifth chapter of Romans, and that if it be not conceded as taught there, then the doctrine of the imputed righteousness of Christ is not taught there, and sinners lose all scriptural hopes of salvation. To this we answer that any interpretation of any part of Scripture which impugns the moral attributes of God must be unsound. Therefore it may well be questioned whether the Divine Spirit, in the fifth chapter of Romans, intended to contradict or overrule the teachings of the Divine Spirit in the eighteenth chapter of Ezekiel. Moreover, it is by no means necessary to hold that God imputes to the descendants of Adam the sin he committed in Eden in order to believe that God imputes to sinners who believe in Christ the righteousness which He wrought out in His life and His death. What inspiration intended to teach in that wonderful chapter may not yet be fully known, but it is certain that a mode of interpreting it has been suggested which relieves God of all imputation of injustice, while it maintains in full the real and efficacious and gratuitous application and imputation of the righteousness of Christ to the penitent and believing sinner.¹

as a righteous Sovereign and Law-giver, imputes by a judicial sentence the sin of the parent to the child, and treats the child as guilty of the parent’s sin?

¹ In that remarkable book, "The Conflict of Ages," by Dr. Edward Beecher, the teachings of Paul in the fifth chapter of Romans are carefully considered. The typical and pictorial mode of treatment adopted in Hebrews as to Melchizedek, king of Salem, is used to illustrate the doctrine in Romans as to Adam and Christ. Melchizedek is represented as "without father, without mother, without descent, having neither beginning of days nor end of life," and therefore a suitable type of the Son of God. Now Melchizedek, being a descendant of Adam, had really a father, mother, descent, beginning of days, and end of life; but as no mention of these is made in the Scriptures, therefore the inspired writer of Hebrews uses him as he is represented, typically and pictorially, but not really, to illustrate actual and real functions in Christ. And so with...
To give to the doctrine of the gratuitous imputation of Adam's sin to each of his descendants even a faint color of justice, it would be necessary to prove that Adam is identical with each descendant—is, in fact, the very same person as is each descendant. It is not sufficient to show that Adam is like to—similar to—each descendant. A man may be very like to another man in mental traits, habits, features and material frame; but to impute, for that reason, the crimes committed by the one to the other would be a shocking iniquity, against which the conscience of the world would cry out. But if it were possible for one man to be really identical in person with another man, then no injustice would be committed, because the sins of the one would be the sins of the other, inasmuch as the one is the other. And hence in modern times there has been a revival of old thoughts, and the attempt has been seriously made to identify Adam really and numerically with each and every one of his descendants.1 Such an attempt can

Adam in Romans. He is represented as typically and pictorially, but not really, the one man by whose sin death passed on all men, by whose offence many are dead, and judgment came on all men to condemnation, to illustrate the real and efficacious work of Christ, whereby the free gift of righteousness came to many for their justification. "The Conflict of Ages" was a failure, because its central idea was the attempt to account for moral evil in this world by supposing that men's souls had all sinned in a previous life, and were only put into bodies in this world as patients in a hospital, for medication! This idea is absurd; for, instead of explaining the origin of moral evil, it only throws it back farther into the past. But the interpretation of Romans v. is valuable, at least suggestively. Since its appearance we have had fewer believers in the idea that God gratuitously imputes Adam's sin to his descendants. The able article, "The Gratuitous Imputation of Sin," in the Southern Presbyterian Review, for April, 1876, shows clearly that, without adopting any pictorial or typical interpretation like Dr. Beecher's, we are yet authorized to treat the mode and principle of the gratuitous imputation of the righteousness of Christ to the sinner as different from, if not antithetic to, the imputation of Adam's sin to his posterity.

This is, in substance, the theory supported by Dr. Samuel J. Baird,
never succeed any more than would an attempt to demonstrate historically that Philip of Macedon was the same person as his son Alexander, or that John Adams and John Quincy Adams were identical. Adam was not Cain, nor Seth, nor Methuselah, nor David, nor the Apostle Paul, although all these were descended from him, and were like him in many important respects.

Therefore we dismiss the dogma that, by reason of the federal relation, or any other relation, between Adam and his posterity, God sovereignly and gratuitously imputed the sin of Adam to each of his descendants. It is negatived by both common sense and Holy Scripture.¹

with much ingenuity and logical acumen, in his work entitled "The First Adam and the Second: The Elohim Revealed in the Creation and Redemption of Man." And Professor J. H. Thoruwell has regarded it as formidable enough to call for a long refutation.—Collected Writings, Vol. I., pp. 513–568. This refutation appeared first in the Southern Pres. Review, April, 1860. Rev. Dr. Shedd, in his "Commentary on the Romans," avows his adhesion to the doctrine of the numerical oneness of Adam and the race; and though his reviewer, Rev. Dr. H. C. Alexander, maintains that such doctrine is "open to fatal objections on the score of logic, metaphysics, history and theology," yet the learned editors of the Central Presbyterian think Dr. Shedd's position on this point "the tenable one."—Central Presbyterian, February 11, 1880.

¹ It is worthy of note, that if the fifth chapter of Romans was intended to teach a real and forensic imputation by God of Adam's sin to his descendants, it must also be considered as teaching the doctrine of universal salvation for Adam's race. For it is entirely impossible to vindicate the justice of God in imputing the sin of the first Adam to the whole race, unless God be held as also imputing the righteousness of the Second Adam to the whole race. In such case there would be no injustice, because the Sovereign's arbitrary judicial sentence of condemnation against all would be instantly substituted by a judicial sentence of justification in favor of all. The curse would be instantly removed by a greater blessing. But to impute a sin not their own to all, and yet to impute a righteousness not their own only to some, leaving others under condemnation, is a view not reconcilable with the attribute of infinite justice. And as Scripture and reason alike teach that many of Adam's race will persevere in evil and
But we cannot so readily dismiss the answer usually made by
divines to the question what material and spiritual effects were
wrought in Adam and Eve by their fall, and how far these
effects are transmitted by generative descent to their posterity.
This question is one in which both religious and scientific
elements are involved, and we must seek aid in both depart-
ments of knowledge.

As to the material effects, we are plainly taught in Scripture
that their fall made Adam and Eve susceptible of pain, disease
and death, all of which they would have escaped had they
persevered in uprightness. Neither can we consider this formid-
able change in their bodily constitutions as unnatural or
abnormal in view of violated law. For we have seen that all
these physical evils are the results of broken law. They would
never have been known but for the resistance of intractable
matter to law. Hence, when Adam and Eve broke the law
righteously imposed on them by their Creator, they could have
expected nothing less than the reaction of broken law in their own
constitutions. They fell at once from the high platform above
the lower animals that their bodily constitution had previously
maintained. They became subject to death. And this sus-
ceptibility, being an affection of their material natures, was, of
necessity, transmitted to their children. "Like begets like."
"Adam lived a hundred and thirty years, and begat a son in his
own likeness, after his image; and called his name Seth." Sad
indeed was the change from the image of the God-man

endure its penal consequences through eternity, the doctrine of gratuitously
imputed sin is logically inadmissible.

1 The sentence as pronounced was accurately carried out in execution.
"Dying, thou shalt die." They did not die immediately—Adam lived
more than nine hundred years—but at the moment of the fall the mysteri-
ous change passed over him; he was "dying" from that hour, (Genesis
17.) In the Hebrew sabathomath, both words from the same verb.

Genesis v. 3.
which, in case of perseverance in holiness, Adam would have transmitted to his children, and this image of himself liable to pain, sorrow, suffering, grey hairs, bowed shoulders, death!

From that time, through all the corridors and avenues of man's proudest temples, has constantly sounded that saddest of refrains, "Dust thou art, and unto dust thou shalt return."

And the spiritual effects of the fall were correspondingly sad. We need not adopt the sombre and exaggerated statements in which these effects have been from time to time expressed. That the fall did not immediately cut off all mankind from communion with God is shown by the fact that, notwithstanding their sin, God sought Adam and Eve in the garden, and held out to them the promise of the Redeemer; that even to the revengeful and disobedient Cain God appeared and held converse, which ought to have led him to repentance; and that in the days of Seth family worship was established, the visible Church of Christ commenced its career, and "then began men to call upon the name of the Lord." ¹

But the truth as to the spiritual results of the fall was melancholy enough; and over-statements concerning it are rather adapted to diminish than to increase its impressions. The sense of guilty fear which drove Adam and Eve to a hiding place among the trees when they heard the voice of the Lord as He walked in the garden could not have been less than overwhelming. All experience shows that the difference between the spiritual status of the innocent man and the guilty man is almost the difference between heaven and hell.

Yet we are not authorized to believe, as some would have us to believe, that, immediately upon their fall, the spiritual condition of Adam and Eve became as wicked as it could possibly be—that their habitus or disposition became at once a fountain of unholiness, sending forth nought but ungodly and corrupt

¹ Genesis iii. 8–15; iv. 6, 7, 26; v. 8.
desires, thoughts, words and actions. Nothing in Scripture teaches this, and everything in the philosophy of habit and life negatives it. Man was not at once as wicked as Satan was when he tempted Eve. Satan commenced his fall with grave *mala in se*—pride and envy; proceeded promptly to graver crimes—treason and rebellion; and soon reached the fixed *habitus* or disposition of hatred, malice and enmity against all good. But man began only with *malum prohibitum*—an act which would not have been evil at all had not God forbidden it. And Eve's glad cry when her first son was born—"I have gotten a man—the Lord"—shows not only that the remembrance and worship of God were preserved in her family, but that the hope of the coming Messiah was already strong in her bosom.

But the unbelief of Cain—his self-asserting offering on the altar, and his horrible crime of murder, committed on his own brother, followed by his career of worldliness, proved that all was not right in the spiritual state of man, that evil habit was gaining ground, that evil disposition was becoming more and more prevalent. For a time the worship of God established in the family of Seth, and the sacred influences diffused around the separated and visible church, stemmed the tide of human sin. But gradually these barriers became more and more feeble.

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1 This is the proper translation of Eve's words in Genesis iv. 1. The Hebrew words are *aeth yihovah*. The primary meaning of *aeth* is "the same," "he himself," "ipse," (Gesenius, Hebrew and English Lexicon, pp. 113, 114); and although the word gradually drifted from this primitive meaning, yet it seems to have always retained substantially the idea of "this thing," "the thing itself," "the same thing," as Gesenius shows by a wide examination. It is the same word which is used in Genesis i. 1, *viadth haavartse*—"and the earth itself." As a preposition, it means "with," "at," "by," "near," but never "from." Gesenius prefers as the rendering of Eve's words: "I have gotten a man-child with Jehovah," that is, "with His help," "through His aid," (Lex., p. 116); but there seems no good reason why *aeth* should here have the force of a position instead of its primary or ordinary meaning.
Instead of aggressions by the church on the world, the world assailed the church with material beauty and palpable forms. "The sons of God saw the daughters of men, that they were fair; and they took them wives of all which they chose." The result of these unhallowed marriages was not slow in manifesting itself. The men of the world waxed worse and worse; the women of the world aided in seducing the feeble remnant of godly men from duty. The church almost disappeared. Two thousand years after the fall of Adam, spiritual wickedness had reached its height of power, and material corruption kept pace with it. The description is short, but terrible in strength: "And God saw that the wickedness of man was great in the earth, and that every imagination of the thoughts of his heart was only evil continually." And then came the deluge of water, and all the human inhabitants of the earth perished save Noah and the seven persons who were with him in the ark.

We have now seen something of the nature of moral evil, of its probable origin, of its tendency to grow strong by habit, until it reaches a height requiring the direct and miraculous intervention of God. Another chapter will bring this work to an appropriate close by exhibiting the great remedial plan devised in the counsels of heaven, and applied for the gradual removal of all this moral evil, except that residuum which will exist for eternity. It will so exist, because all that Divine wisdom, power and goodness can do will have been done; and this remainder of evil will have been reduced to its minimum. Woe to him or her who, by the neglect of this great remedial plan, shall form a part of that eternal remnant of evil!

1 Genesis vi. 2.  
2 Genesis vi. 5.  
2 Peter ii. 5; Genesis vii. 7. "And Noah went in, and his sons, and his wife, and his sons' wives with him, into the ark, because of the waters of the flood."
CHAPTER X.

THE DIVINE REMEDIES FOR EVIL.

We have seen that physical or material evil always involves a violation of law, as certainly as does moral evil. We have seen also that it is necessary carefully to distinguish between those operations of nature, often intensely energetic and violent, which are yet in real accord with law, and those disorders and convulsions which indicate the successful resistance of intractable matter to the dominion of law, and which, by their nature and effects, prove that the regulative principles devised and applied by divine wisdom have been transgressed, broken, exceeded or departed from. This distinction, however well founded, is not easy of application in all cases, because the working of law under the rule of the Infinite Spirit is often exceedingly subtle and mysterious. We yet see only in part, and "through a glass darkly." But we are making progress—yearly learning more and more of the Divine methods. Hence we are not surprised that many operations of nature, especially those resulting from electrical laws, which were once regarded with awe and terror, and spoken of as gigantic evils, and which savages still consider such, are proved by scientific experience to be "blessings in disguise."

But in the present condition of our empirical knowledge, we are obliged to admit that material evils exist in the universe, and more particularly in our own world, on a large scale and with unequivocal distinctness. As to these, our knowledge of the attributes of the Divine Creator will justify us in believing that they do not occur without His notice and disapproval; that
DIVINE POWER CONDITIONED.

He will vindicate the wise laws enacted by Him, even when those laws apply only to matter, and have been transgressed by its resistance; and that He will apply such remedies to these evils as the necessary conditions of time and space and force will admit.

We must seek to dismiss from our minds the idea often thrown out by ultra-devout and unreflecting persons, that infinite power in God would enable Him, in an instant of time and by a single volition, to create or to annihilate a material universe—to abolish evil, and have only good every where and for ever.\(^1\) Such notions are neither in harmony with common sense nor Scripture. They emerge from imagination rather than from reason or revealed truth. We have seen that Divine power itself, though infinite—that is, without limits—is not unconditioned nor absolute in any sense which divorces it from the terms imposed by the indestructible attributes of Eternal Spirit and eternal matter. Therefore power works the purposes of wisdom and the impulses of benevolence, through the realms of space, in the ages of time, and by means of the energies of force.\(^2\) All these are necessary conditions for the accomplish-

\(^1\) This mode of thought results from the doctrine of creation ex nihilo, and is not unfrequently employed by men of learning as well as piety. Thus in Schieffelin's "Foundations of History" we have the following statement: "For wise reasons the Creator took that time (six days of twenty-four hours each) instead of speaking all things into being in one instant, which He could as easily have done."—N. Y., Fourth Edit., p. 20.

\(^2\) Time is a necessary condition of created and finite being. And of time the spiritual principle in angel and man takes cognizance only by succession of ideas passing through the mind. But it is all-important to bear in mind that time is not a condition of the being of God. With Him there is no succession of ideas, for if there were, the words young and old would properly apply to God. The succession of ideas in the Divine Spirit would, by inevitable mental law, force on us the view that God is older now than at the beginning of past ages. But such view is contradictory to the whole tenor of Scripture and reason. To God, all past, all present, all future is one eternal now. Psalms xc. 4; cii. 25-27; Hebrews
ment of the Divine will in applying remedy for evil. He will asserts the contrary, and holds that All-power can do any imagi
able work without space, without time, and without force, wi
find the burden of proof resting on him. And he will look in vain either to reason, experience or revelation for such proof; it does not exist.

But when we admit the reasonable conditions required for spiritual and material essence, we find beautiful and abundant evidence that the remedial methods of God have been in operation in our world for unnumbered ages, overruling and correcting the disorders which have resulted from broken law applicable to matter. If earthquakes, volcanic eruption, tornadoes, hurricanes, storms and tempests must be admitted to be physical evils in many cases, it is equally plain that the changes in strata, deposits, courses of rivers, alluvial formation and atmospheric purifyings which have been indirectly produced by them have more than compensated for their ravages; that, by Divine ordering, the remedy appears in many such instances to be complete, and to leave the world in better condition than it was previous to the occurrence of the evil.

Suffering and pain be admitted evils, they are yet also used as safeguards to warn men away from exposure to greater evil. If disease be certainly an evil, it is equally certain that marvellous and potent vis medicatrix inheres in nature and the forces inspired by God, and that it is ceaselessly contended

i. 10–12; 2 Peter iii. 8. All statements of Scripture which seem to ascribe the conditions of time to God, give the anthropomorphic, and not the real view of Him. And such are all the passages which speak of foreknowledge, foreordination and predestination in relation to the means and the decrees of God. All such passages necessarily involve the anthropomorphic element. Beyond their apparent sense there must lie a reg of transcendental truth to which finite thought cannot attain. Had the simple and humbling view been kept steadily in mind, the world would have been spared much of the profitless debate of centuries between

Calvinism and Arminianism.
with disease and restoring health even to higher levels than it held before disease assailed it. All nature in our world teems with remedy for disease, which man’s science, under the leadership of the Divine Physician, is discovering and applying more efficiently every year. The spas and mineral springs—sulphur, saline, chalybeate—which abound through the earth, are so many proofs that divine wisdom, love and power unceasingly oppose the progress and triumph of disease, and are united in reducing its dire results to the minimum possible. And if death be the greatest of material evils—a woe from which nature recoils and life shrinks with horror—then it is equally true that God, who is eternal life, fights constantly with death, and that though this grim tyrant will persevere to the last, and will be the last enemy that shall be destroyed, yet his destruction is certainly foretold in the word of truth.\(^1\)

But however wonderful and perfect may be the remedies which God contrives and applies to overrule and correct material evils, it is evident they would do very little and very short-lived good to sinners of the race of Adam, so long as no remedy was found for the evil known as sin.

We are now, therefore, to enter upon this, the grandest and noblest remedial system ever displayed by infinite love, wisdom and power in the universe—the salvation of sinful men of Adam’s race by the Son of God. To the principles on which this system is founded, and the methods by which it is carried out, let us attend.

When a wise and good man, according to the earthly standard, is called to deal with any, the smallest, evil, and to seek to apply a remedy which shall either remove it and all its effects

\(^1\) “The last enemy that shall be destroyed is death,” 1 Corinthians xv. 26. ἔσχατος εὐθὺς καταρρίθησαι νὰ θανάτωσ. Literally, “Death, the last enemy, shall be destroyed.” The verb conveys the ideas “to render inactive,” “to make null and void,” “to remove,” “to take away,” “to abrogate,” “to vanquish.”
entirely, or shall reduce it to the least possible dimensions, and shall prevent its recurrence in the future, he considers maturely three questions: First, What is the true nature of the evil, or in other words, the principle which has brought it into existence? Second, What is the proper remedy? Third, What method is wisest and best for applying this remedy?

And as pure reason in the mind of man corresponds, though at an infinite distance, to pure reason in the Divine Spirit, we may humbly believe that when Adam and Eve were contemplated in eternal counsels, and the possibility of their sin was known in its principles, nature and consequences, the proper and only remedy was devised, and the wisest methods for applying it were determined.

Adopting then this order of inquiry, we proceed to develop, as far as the subject requires, the innermost principle, the true nature of sin.

We have already seen that all evil involves violation of law, and that sin is violation of law by a moral creature of God. We have seen, farther, that in the case of physical and material evil this violation of law is the result of the resistance which the essential properties of matter—extension, impenetrability, inertia—necessarily offer to the regulative principles under which force is applied to matter in the creations of God. We have seen that this resistance is, as to the greater part of the matter worked on, successfully overcome by force, for otherwise the Divine creations could never be accomplished, but that the resistance is driven in time to a residuum, and at last to a minimum, which continues to resist, and thus causes material evil.

In like manner moral evil has arisen. It is true, that as the moral creature was far higher in the scale of being than organisms in which the material is the chief element, and as he was endowed with reason, intelligence, knowledge of law and its
penalty, freedom of will, and original rectitude of disposition, it might rationally have been expected that he would obey the law of his being, and thus preserve himself from evil. But as he was a dual being—having a material as well as a spiritual nature—the question how far the resistance always offered by the material to the spiritual would operate against the remonstrances of reason and conscience was a question to be decided by probation or trial; and in the case of both the moral creatures of God thus far created, to-wit: the angel and the man, this probation has resulted in fall—disobedience to known law. From this we may infer how strong is the resistance to spiritual law made by material properties, however highly organized in form they may be.

Hence we conclude that the innermost principle, the true nature of sin in man (of whom only we need now speak), consists in the resistance offered by his material propensities to the perfect dominion of the spiritual law of God.

We have hitherto considered this question only in the light of reason; but, as it is one of paramount importance, we must now test the truth of our conclusion by the authority of inspired Scripture. And upon honest and proper principles of interpretation, we believe this divine evidence will confirm our view of sin.

The most natural and obvious method by which inspired men in all ages of inspiration could express the concentrated essence of man’s material nature is by the use of the simple word “flesh.”¹ The composite expression “flesh and blood,” though used in a few instances in that sense, is not often so used. For hardly had man fallen before “the blood” became a holy symbol,

¹ Schaff-Herzog Encyc. of Rel. Knowl., Vol. I., Art. Flesh. Professor Cremer, in his Bib. Theol. Lex. of N. T. Greek, gives an exhaustive analysis of the meanings of the word σαρκί, by which it appears that the material element is predominant.
by the institution, under divine guidance, of bloody sacrifices, to prefigure the Lamb of God slain from the foundation of the world. Thus the word "flesh," and its equivalents in all languages, best express the material proclivities of man. The word "matter" could not have been so used, for it had not appeared in any human language when the Old Testament was composed, having been derived, in fact, from the Latin mater, and used to express the idea of that entity which is the mother of all phenomena.\(^1\)

Taking, then, the word "flesh" to convey the idea of man's material propensities, we find very early in the inspired canon distinct intimations that sin is the result of the resistance of these material propensities to spiritual law. When men were waxing more and more sinful under the influence of unhallowed unions and unbridled passions, we read the solemn words of God Himself: "And the Lord said, My Spirit shall not always strive with man, for that he also is flesh."\(^2\) Here the fixed opposition of the flesh—the material nature—to the Spirit, and the resistance of the flesh to the impulses of the Spirit; so pathetically described as the striving of this blessed Spirit to overcome the evil of man's nature, are set forth in unmistakable terms. It would seem as though the Holy Spirit, who taught the scribe to use these words, intended in the very opening of the sacred record to show the true nature of sin.

In the seventy-eighth Psalm, which reviews the dealings of God with the sinning children of Israel, we read that He, "being full of compassion, forgave their iniquity, and destroyed them not," "for He remembered that they were but flesh."\(^3\)

And when we come to the New Testament, we find the declarations of its inspired writers on this subject perfectly

\(^1\) Such appears to be the opinion of the learned Dr. Edward B. Tylor, "Primitive Culture," Vol. II., p. 246.
\(^2\) Genesis vi. 3. \(^3\) Psalm lxviii. 38, 39.
distinct. The words of Christ Himself, uttered in the garden of Gethsemane, are in perfect accord with the words in Genesis: “Watch and pray that ye enter not into temptation: the spirit indeed is willing, but the flesh is weak.”¹ Nothing could more tenderly indicate the weak point in the human constitution than these gentle words of Him who “knew what was in man.”

In the seventh chapter of Romans, the Apostle Paul teaches the same truth with marvellous plainness. The same old conflict of the flesh with the Spirit, which began in Eden and raged from the fall to the deluge, and which is still in progress in every man and woman who experiences any visitations of the Spirit, is depicted by Paul in expressive words: “For when we were in the flesh, the motions of sins which were by the law did work in our members to bring forth fruit unto death.”² “For we know that the law is spiritual, but I am carnal, sold under sin.”³ And after vividly describing the conflict, and showing the resistance made by the material nature to the work of the spiritual, he adds: “For I know that in me (that is, in my flesh) dwelleth no good thing; for to will is present with me; but how to perform that which is good I find not.”⁴ Thus he is led to that deep insight, expressed in words that have found an echo in thousands of renewed natures: “I find then a law, that when I would do good, evil is present with me. For I delight in the law of God after the inward man; but I

¹ Matthew xxvi. 41. ² Romans vii. 5.
³ Οἶδαμεν γὰρ σὺν τῷ νόμῳ πνευματικῷ εἰσὶν εἰς δὲ σαρκίους εἰμι πεπραγμένος ὑπὸ τὸν αἵματιν. “I am carnal,” (σαρκίους;) literally, “made of flesh.”
⁴—Romans vii. 14.
⁴ Romans vii. 18. The parenthetic phrase here (τοῦτοςτίν εν τῇ σαρκὶ μνῶν) is strong to convey the idea that Paul did not mean to assert that in himself, as a whole, no good dwelt; for his own spirit, with its conscience and immortal aspirations, still existed, and he had moreover been born again of the Divine Spirit. His meaning, therefore, was that his flesh—his material nature—constantly opposed and resisted τὸ θέλειν, the will which the Good Spirit inspired in him.
see another law in my members warring against the law of my mind, and bringing me into captivity to the law of sin which is in my members. O wretched man that I am! who shall deliver me from the body of this death? I thank God, through Jesus Christ our Lord. So then, with the mind I myself serve the law of God; but with the flesh the law of sin.”

In the next chapter of this great didactic epistle Paul teaches the same truth with ever-increasing force and clearness. In fact, the first thirteen verses of this chapter are a continued repetition of this truth. The first verse contains the doctrine of salvation through Christ in epitome, by declaring, as the logical consequence of all the previous teachings, that “there is therefore now no condemnation to them which are in Christ Jesus, who walk not after the flesh, but after the Spirit.”

1 Romans vii. 21–25. The word μέλος, “member,” “part of the body,” occurs twenty-eight times in the New Testament, and in twenty-six of these it means the material frame in part or in whole. In the two instances where it is used metaphorically (1 Cor. xii. 27, and Eph. v. 30) the figure is self-revealing. The expression, verse 23, τω νομω της αμαρτίας των οντων εν τισι μελέσι μου—“to the law of sin which is in my members,”—is singular; for νόμος—the law—throughout the great body of Scripture, involves spiritual rule, and means generally the rules prescribed by God for the government of His creatures. But in this passage it can mean nothing except the principle of resistance to spiritual requirement made by matter, which resistance is so constant and regular as to be called “a law.” It is thus a strong scriptural confirmation of our doctrine.

2 Romans viii. 1. The words μη κατά σαρκα περιπατήσωμεν αλλά κατα πνεύμα are not found in many of the best Greek MSS. Knapp inserts them in his text, but encloses them in double brackets, thus indicating his opinion: “His ea notantur, quae sine dubio spuria esse sensebam.”—Nov. Test. Comment. Isagog., pp. xxvii., xxviii. Conybeare and Howson reject them entirely from their version; but Griesbach and Mill, in their critical editions, retain them. They are rendered in the Vulgate, which was founded on the old Italica. Drs. Westcott and Hort, in their Greek Testament, discard these words in verse 1, but retain them (as do all the critical editions, and the textus receptus,) in verse 4, where they have the same meaning and application.
third and fourth verses are full of rich revelation, which will need our attention again in this chapter. The fifth verse introduces the idea of mind as affected by matter and by pure spirit, which is the Divine Spirit: "For they that are after the flesh do mind the things of the flesh; but they that are after the Spirit the things of the Spirit." And then follow two verses which must receive our most careful thought: "For to be carnally minded is death; but to be spiritually minded is life and peace; because the carnal mind is enmity against God; for it is not subject to the law of God, neither indeed can be." 1

The faithful rendering into English of the original words will present the following: "For the spiritual product of the flesh is death, but the spiritual product of the spirit is life and peace; because the spiritual product of the flesh is enmity to God, for it is not subject to the law of God, nor can it so be." The Greek word ἐροτέω, which we render "spiritual product," occurs nowhere in the New Testament except in this chapter, and in it only four times, viz.: twice in verse 6, once in verse 7, once in verse 27. But the verb ἰσοτέω, from which it comes, occurs twenty-nine times—quite often enough to enable us to decide (without much aid from classic Greek) that it means spiritual action in its widest sense—not only "to think," "to understand," "to reflect," "to conclude," "to judge," "to be of opinion," but also "to feel," "to relish," "to affect," "to be animated or moved by," "to regard with affection," "to care for," and hence also "to wish for," "to will." 2 Therefore the

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1 To get at the rich meaning of these wonderful verses, we must present the original. Τὸ γὰρ Φρονήσεως τῆς σαρκὸς θανάτου τὸ δὲ Φρονήμα τοῦ πνεύματος ἐνίκη καὶ εἰρηκή. Ισοτέω τὸ Φρονήμα τῆς σαρκὸς εἰρηκή εἰς Θεόν. Τὸ γὰρ νομὸν τοῦ Θεοῦ τοιούτου οὐκ ὑπερασπάται μόνο γὰρ ἐκκαθαρίζεται. There is no "various reading"; but the authorized English version is strangely inadequate—almost misleading.—Romans viii. 6, 7.

2 All these meanings will be found carefully drawn from usage and attached to ἰσοτέω and Φρονήσεως in the New Testament by the learned
noun ἐφορημα does not mean "mind," but the product or result of action on spirit in its widest sense.¹

Now, to a mind trained to accurate thought, a question at once presents itself on this analysis of the ideas involved in these words of the inspired apostle: What can be the significance of the phrase "the spiritual product of the flesh"? How can there be any spiritual product from flesh? Is not this a philosophic impossibility, if spirit and flesh or matter be different entities? And if we admit that it is possible that flesh may have a spiritual product, then do we not thereby convict the apostle of teaching materialism?²

But patient and humble thought will solve the difficulty. Paul, by inspiration, knew more of the deep nature of sin than we do, and he has here opened it to us by a suggestion so far-reaching that we have only to follow it in order to gain his meaning. It is certain that matter cannot produce spirit ex nihilo; and that spirit cannot produce matter ex nihilo; but it is equally certain that when flesh and spirit are united so intimately as to constitute one person, then flesh may work on spirit in that person so potently that in time the spirit may take on a habitus or disposition from the flesh which may well be called "a spiritual product of the flesh,"—το ἐφορημα τῆς σαρκός, as the apostle hath it; and on the other hand, spirit, indwelling

Editors of the Greek text, founded on Mill and Griesbach, London Edit., Samuel Bagster, Publisher, p. 279. A curious and suggestive commentary on the different meanings that have been assigned to ἐφορημα σαρκός is given in Article IX. of the "Thirty-nine Articles of the Church of England." In the "Creeds of Christendom," Vol. III., p. 493, will be found three forms of this article: The Latin, of 1563; the old English, of 1571; and the revised American form, of 1801.

¹ Neither in the New Testament nor in classic or secular Greek does ἐφορημα ever mean "mind," or "soul," or "spirit," as a monad. It always conveys the idea of some product or resultant of spirit, such as "thought," "reflection," "sentiment," "a mode of thinking," "elevation of thought," and in a sinister sense, "haughtiness," "pride," "insolence," "ting."
SPIRITUAL PRODUCT OF THE FLESH.

and holy, may so work on flesh in that person that in time the “earthly, sensual, devilish” principle and residuum in that flesh which resists good may be subdued and eliminated, and that body may become a “spiritual body”;¹ not, indeed, in the sense that spirit can ever be body, or body can ever be spirit, but in the higher sense, that the body shall be so endowed and permeated by the forces and graces of the spirit that it shall be not only insusceptible of death, as was Adam’s body before the fall, but for ever delivered from liability to sin and death. This surely will be life and peace. This will be “the spiritual product of the spirit,”—τον φρονημα των πνευματων, as the apostle expresses it.

Hence we learn the meaning of the inspired writer when he declares that this “spiritual product of the flesh” is enmity to God, and cannot be subject or submissive to His law. In the moment when the resistance of the flesh (matter) to the spirit (law) gained such ascendancy in Eve that her will consented to take and eat the forbidden fruit, in that same moment the spiritual product of the flesh—φρονημα της σαρκος—commenced its dire existence in man.² It was necessarily hostile, inimical to God, because it broke His law; in other words, it opposed the human will to the Divine will. And in proportion as man continued to practise sin, in like proportion, and with ever growing ratio, the habitus or disposition of the human spirit grew in evil strength, until the φρονημα της σαρκος was fully formed, and was not only hostile, inimical to God, but was enmity itself—εχθρα εις θεων. Evidently such habitus or disposition cannot be submissive to the law of God. Its very nature

¹ Thus only can we understand something of the same apostle’s meaning in another place, where he says: “It is sown a natural body, it is raised a spiritual body. There is a natural body, and there is a spiritual body.” Ἐστι σωμα φυσικου και εστι σωμα πνευματικου.—1 Corinthians xv. 44.

² Compare Genesis i. 26; ii. 17; iii. 6, 7, 8: vi. 3, 5, with Romans vii. and viii.
is opposition, not subjection, to His law. And as will in every being, however free, is normally exercised according to the disposition of that being, and must be so exercised in order to be free (for otherwise such being would not be exercising such will as he is pleased to exercise it, and so not free); therefore it follows that when the habitus or disposition in which consists the spiritual product of the flesh is once established in a person, the will of that person is enmity to the will of God, and cannot be otherwise.

We reach, then, the meaning of these deep utterances of inspiration. They mean that, in the dual nature of man, the resistance of the material elements—the flesh—to the spiritual influences, which God, the Holy Spirit, is striving to impart, results in sin; that sin, repeated again and again, grows in strength; that the individual spirit of man is more and more affected by this continued resistance which the flesh offers to the Holy Spirit; that the habitus or disposition which is naturally and necessarily transmitted by generative descent from parent to child increases in evil power with every actual sin—that is, with every successful resistance of the flesh to the Holy Spirit—until such ascendency is gained over the individual spirit by the individual flesh that a result is established which is called by inspiration “the spiritual product of the flesh,”—τὸ ἐνοχιά τῆς σαρκὸς; that this is enmity to God, and every previous stage of it is likewise enmity to God, and that it is death. It was this ἐνοχιά τῆς σαρκὸς which in Adam and Eve instantly cast their bodies down from the platform of immortality and made them susceptible of death, so that “dying, they died.” And unless a remedy has been found and been applied, the same “spiritual product of the flesh” will bring eternal—death. Man, created for immortal life and , may, by his own free will and his own conduct, bring himself to endless death and misery.
To this view of the subject correspond all the farther teachings of the New Testament. Thus we are told that in order to our safety we must "put on the Lord Jesus Christ; and make not provision for the flesh, to fulfil the lusts thereof;" \(^1\) that "flesh and blood cannot inherit the kingdom of God, neither doth corruption inherit incorruption;" \(^2\) that they are foolish who, having begun in the spirit, suppose they can be made "perfect by the flesh;" \(^3\) that saved sinners are indeed called unto liberty, but need to be solemnly warned that they shall not use that liberty "for an occasion to the flesh;" \(^4\) that if we would be saved we must walk in the Spirit, and so "shall not fulfil the lust of the flesh." \(^5\) Then immediately follows that inspired echo to the words of God uttered more than two thousand years before, which revealed that earnest conflict between Spirit and matter, which has caused all evil: "For the flesh lusteth against the Spirit, and the Spirit against the flesh: and these are contrary the one to the other; so that ye cannot do the things that ye would." \(^6\)

Having declared this conflict, and comforted his believing readers by the assurance that, if they were led by the Spirit, they were not under the law—that is, not under its condemnation—the apostle proceeds to that inventory of the works of the flesh introduced and given in our authorized English version in the following words: "Now the works of the flesh are

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1 Romans xiii. 14.  2 1 Corinthians xv. 50.  3 Galatians iii. 3.  
4 ἐκ σκέφτησιν τῆς αρπαγής—an opportunity or means of accomplishing the purposes sought by the flesh.—Galatians v. 18.  
5 Galatians v. 16.  
6 Galatians v. 17. The verb is ἐπιθυμεῖται, which expresses earnest longing, ardent desire, and sometimes lawless desire; but the rendering, "lusteth," in the received version is not happy. The verb is followed by the preposition κατά, which here expresses opposition or antagonism. The meaning is, the flesh strongly desires those things which the Spirit opposes, and the Spirit strongly desires those things which the flesh opposes.
manifest, which are these: adultery, fornication, uncleanness, lasciviousness, idolatry, witchcraft, hatred, variance, emulations, wrath, strife, seditions, heresies, envyings, murders, drunkenness, revellings, and such like: of the which I tell you before, as I have also told you in time past, that they which do such things shall not inherit the kingdom of God.”

As these sins, “and such like,” are all declared by this inspired writer to be “the works of the flesh, and as the flesh must of necessity mean the material nature and propensities of man, we might reasonably claim this passage as a complete and unanswerable argument in favor of the view heretofore so often presented. But inasmuch as theologians have adopted a definition of “the flesh” (to be hereafter more fully considered) which perverts the word from its natural and real meaning, we feel bound, by way of anticipation, to consider separately each of the classes of sins here set forth, and to show that each finds its root and origin in the material nature and proclivities derived from Adam after his fall by all his descendants.

As to the six sins in this list respectively named—adultery, fornication, uncleanness, lasciviousness, drunkenness, revellings

1 Galatians v. 19, 20, 21. Full as this list of sins seems to be, the apostle, by introducing it with ἀπεικόνισα σοι ("whatsoever they are"), and following it with ἔστω τὰ πράγματα τοῦ θεοῦ ("and things like these"), teaches us that it is only a general, not specific, inventory. Inspiration itself never undertakes to particularize all sins. Their name is legion. Knapp, in his Greek Testament, puts the word "μοίχεια" in brackets, and the authors of the "Revised Version" (1881) reject this word as unauthorized, and hence omit the word "adultery" in their rendering. They are probably right on the "preponderating evidence," and as "adultery" is a more heinous crime than "fornication," Paul may have omitted it because all civilized nations condemned it as a crime, while fornication was hardly regarded as criminal by people untaught by Christianity.

2 The word ἀπανταίον, here rendered "revellings," represents, in its primary meaning, those processions and festive gatherings of men and women which were observed generally in honor of Bacchus or Venus, and which bly attended by music, songs and games, and often by in-
we suppose very few words will suffice to show that they all come from a material origin, and could never have existed had man been only pure spirit. But it is very important that we shall have a clear understanding of the element which constitutes these acts real sins. We shall find it to be the same element which enters into all evil—a violation of law, either by transgression, going over, or going beyond, or falling below the regulative principle intended by Divine wisdom and benevolence for the government of the dual creature.

Man—male and female—was endowed with the instincts and adaptations proper for reproduction, and in a state of innocence, was commanded to "be fruitful, and multiply, and replenish the earth, and subdue it." It is absolutely certain, therefore, that the power of reproduction was intended to be exercised. But it was to be exercised according to law, and that law was the union of one man and woman as husband and wife for the purpose of procreating offspring like themselves. Any departure from that law, whether by transgression, or abuse, or excess, or defect, is sin; and among all the forms of sin that have afflicted humanity, none has been more common and more fatal in results than this. It is sin flowing directly from the unruled impulses of the material nature. The law which is applicable and which ought to govern and direct those impulses is indeed (like all other regulative principles imposed on moral creatures) apprehended and understood only by the spirit of the dual being, but how constantly and universally this law is violated the conscience of all of Adam's race will answer.

The law of temperance, which is violated by drunkenness, gluttony, revellings, "and such like," authorizes the temperate intoxication and licentiousness. Hence the word, in the days of Paul, had come to mean any lascivious revels, feastings and dancings.

1 Genesis i. 28.

* Genesis ii. 18–25; Mark x. 2–9; 1 Corinthians vi. 16; Ephesians v. 22–23; Hebrews xiii. 4.
use of all material good. When that line is passed, the law is broken and its penalty is sure to follow. But while the principle is thus clear, its application is often difficult. What temperance involves a question concerning which we can only quote the legal maxim, and say "lex non exacte definite sed arbitrio boni viri permittit." 1 Whenever indulgence in material good tends against the end for which the moral creature was made, then such indulgence is intemperate and unlawful. It may not be a sin to partake temperately of alcoholic spirit, or wine, or tobacco, or opium, or the seed of the Indian hemp, or any other material essence whereby the animal spirits may be temporarily elevated above their normal condition. 2 But if reason be dethroned, or even shaken in her poise, or if lawless desire be stimulated, or lawful desire be directed to wrong ends or by wrong means, or if the eater, or drinker, or partaker lose his attractiveness to another, or his proper influence with another, or offend, or cause another to offend, or lead another into temptation, then the law is broken, the end of the being is swerved from, and such swerving, if persisted in, will lead to perdition. 3

Thus we perceive that matter is not evil, nor is the material constitution of man in itself sinful. But whenever that constitution successfully resists spiritual law, or successfully inclines to a transgression, or abuse, or evasion of spiritual law, then

1 Blackstone's Commentaries, Edit. 1836, Vol. I., p. 42. The quotation is from Grotius.

2 Deuteronomy xiv. 23-27; Judges ix. 13; xix. 19; 2 Samuel vi. 19; 1 Chronicles xvi. 3; 2 Samuel xvi. 2; Psalms lxxviii. 65; civ. 16; Proverbs xxxi. 6; John ii. 3-10; 1 Timothy v. 23.

3 Genesis ix. 20-25; Numbers vi. 3-10; Deuteronomy xxxii. 33; 1 Samuel xxv. 34-37; Psalm lxxv. 8; Proverbs xx. 1; xxiii. 29, 30, 81; Isaiah v. 11; xxviii. 7; Joel i. 5; Habakkuk ii. 5; Ephesians v. 18; 1 Timothy iii. 3, 8; Titus i. 7; ii. 3; Revelation xvi. 19; xvii. 2; 1 Corinthians viii. 13.
IDOLATRY.

sin emerges, as it were, from the innermost depths of the dual nature.

The next sin to be noticed is "idolatry," εἰδωλολατρεία—the worship of a visible idol, or image, or object of any kind. This is a sin that has been very common in all ages of the world. In a previous chapter of this work we have seen that men have not been so stupid as really to worship stocks, or stones, or bulls, or leeks, or onions. It is the invisible spirit supposed to dwell in and inform the visible object which is the real object of worship. But this powerful tendency of the fallen nature of man is not, therefore, the less to be deplored. All experience has shown that when idolatry becomes the prevalent sin of a people they speedily throw off all the restraints which the remains of natural light and conscience and the remonstrances of the Divine Spirit would impose, and become given up to brutal wickedness. And it is certain that idolatry arises from the material nature of man. Having by sin lost the image and likeness of the God-man, the benighted material organism seeks to erect a deity for itself in sun, or moon, or star, or graceful forms, or hideous imitations of monsters wrought by the cunning workman, or in the bodies of living men, or "birds, and four-footed beasts, and creeping things." Were man pure spirit idolatry would be impossible.

1 This is abundantly illustrated in those chapters of Dr. Edward B. Tylor on "Animism," which deal with idolatry, ancient and modern.—"Primitive Culture," Vol. I., pp. 157, 463; Vol. II., pp. 168, 170, 171, 172, 405.

2 It is only by bearing this fact in mind that we can understand the commands of God to the Hebrews utterly to exterminate the idolatrous nations who dwelt in Canaan; and also the cumbersome ceremonies and ritual imposed on the Jews, by which it was rendered impossible for them (except by total apostasy as a people) to commingle with idolaters. To this the world is indebted for the preservation of the "light of the world." Dr. John Young, of Edinburgh, has written well on this subject.

3 Romans i. 22, 23. The account of the horrible moral pollution given
The next sin is called in our English version "witchcraft;" but this is not a faithful rendering. It came from the scholars of the age of King James, when witchcraft was believed in, witch-hunting was a trade, and supposed witches were burned or drowned. The Greek word is ἡκατονευρία, the primary meaning of which is simply our modern "pharmacy,"—the art of compounding and administering drugs and medicines. But in the age of Paul this business had been to a large extent monopolized by artful and unscrupulous persons, generally women, who filled the role of the enchantress, the venefica, the σαγα, mixed love philtres and malignant poisons, and were the worthy predecessors of the Italian and French female poisoners of the age of Lucretia Borgia. It would be hard to conceive of a more diabolic type of sin than this. It came, of course, from material propensities, which are ever seeking to discover and use the occult powers supposed to be hidden in field and forest, mineral and vegetable, living and dead matter throughout the world.

Next we notice "hatred," εφθανοντι, literally enmities; "variance," επειδις, contentions, altercations, and sometimes contentious dispositions; "wrath," θυμος, violent passions and emotions, generally of anger; "strife," επίθεων, from επίς, and hardly distinguishable in meaning; all of which, although they flow from dispositions and passions of man’s spirit, are yet the outcome of the material nature. For had it not been for the distinctions and limitations arising from material creations, it is impossible to understand how any ground of anger or contention could exist. Pure spirit never could find cause for strife. It is only in this chapter is but a reproduction of the picture presented by every thoroughly idolatrous people.

1 The "Revised Version," 1881, renders the word "sorcery." Their entire list is as follows: "Fornication, uncleanness, lasciviousness, idolatry, sorcery, enmities, strife, jealousies, wraths, factions, divisions (or parties), heresies, envyings, drunkenness, revellings."
when it is individuated by being the life-power in different bodies that a sense of superiority or of inferiority could arise, to be soon followed by wrath, strife, insatiable ambition—\( \delta\omicron\upsilon\mu\omicron\).

We have purposely reserved for some special remarks the word rendered "emulations." It is in the Greek \( \zeta\gamma\lambda\omicron\omicron\). The word \( \zeta\gamma\lambda\omicron\omicron \) means simply "zeal." It occurs seventeen times in the New Testament, and in eight of these instances it expresses a \textit{virtue} beyond question; in one instance a holy zeal felt by Christ Himself; in another, a blessed fruit of true repentance, hanging in a rich cluster of such fruits.\(^1\) In other cases, however, it expresses most vehement and ugly vice—the vice of fanatical and cruel zeal.\(^2\) In one case it must be held as used in a high and righteous sense, being used figuratively for the fire of infinite zeal and justice against persistent sin.\(^3\)

Thus we find in inspired language that the same word, without affix, or suffix, or epithet, expresses in some cases \textit{virtue}, in other cases \textit{sin}. We could not have a stronger illustration of the truth that moral evil consists not in the spiritual act or the material act, considered in itself, but simply in the successful resistance made by the material propensities to spiritual \textit{law}. The very same material act is good or evil according to its conformity or nonconformity to the regulative principle devised by Divine wisdom as the rule of the creature's action.

The next class of sins requiring our notice is that expressed by the word "seditions," \( \delta\iota\chi\mu\nu\sigma\tau\alpha\omicron\omicron\omicron \), literally division into two parts or two factions. The word conveys the secondary idea of doubt, or irresolution, or dissension. How impossible this sin would be without material conditions requires no argument. The same is true of the sins named "murders," \( \varphi\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron \), assassinations.

\(^1\) John ii. 17; 2 Corinthians vii. 11.
\(^2\) Acts v. 17; xiii. 46; Philippians iii. 6.
\(^3\) Hebrews x. 27.
Then comes the class designated as “heresies,” ἀπολίσσεις—a word which the history of Christendom would justify us in regarding as rather the occasion and cause of horrible sin in people calling themselves Christians than as indicating sin in the people called “heretics.” Yet when we find the word “heresies” in the very bad company of sins set forth in this passage, and when we find another inspired apostle speaking of the false prophets who were among the ancient people of God, and predicting the advent, in like manner, of false teachers in the Christian Church, who should privily bring in “heresies of destruction,”¹ even denying the Lord that bought them, and bring upon themselves swift destruction, we are compelled to admit that there may be sins which properly fall under the name of “heresies,” and that the litany of the Anglican Church may righteously pray that her worshippers shall be delivered “from all false doctrine, heresy and schism.”

Nevertheless, we must take careful notice that the Greek word ἀπολίσσεις, in its primary sense, means merely the “act of taking away,” or “taking one thing rather than another,” and hence “a preference,” “choice,” or “election.” And in its secondary sense it means a sect, or school, or party, or select or chosen body, holding certain opinions, rather than the opinions themselves.² And it is certain that the followers of Christ, and especially the great apostle of the Gentiles, were themselves honored by the application of this same word to them in apostolic ages. While, therefore, we easily trace the sin of “hersesy” to those material distinctions and conditions without which it would be impossible to teach that the Son of God is a creature, or that the Holy Ghost is a “breath” (πνεῦμα), or a mere influence, or that man is born without original sin, or

¹ ἀπολίσσεις ἀπολίσσεις—heresies of destruction. The last noun is the same afterwards translated from the same verse “destruction.”—2 Peter ii. 1.
² Acts v. 17; xv. 5; xxiv. 5; xxviii. 22.
that regenerate persons are relieved from the moral law as a rule of life, or that eternal penalty will not rest on the finally impenitent; yet we can also see that “heresy,” whenever it is a sin, must consist, as all other sins do, in a wilful trangression of spiritual law. Therefore no humble and honest inquirer after truth can ever be guilty of this sin in the sight of God. Mistakes of judgment may be perfectly innocent. God does not impute as sin to man any act consisting wholly in an error of judgment. “He knoweth our frame: He remembereth that we are dust.”

Heresy, therefore, as a sin, can consist in nothing less than a transgression of God’s moral law, assented to by the will of the heretic, and known at the time to be such transgression. Any one or all the commands of the decalogue, may be the subject of transgression in real heresy. But the apostle Paul had no license and no intention to add to the moral law when he placed “heresies” in his catalogue of sins—“manifest works of the flesh.” As all the other acts named can be shown to come under the condemnation of the moral law, so what is imputed as “heresy” must be shown to come under like condemnation. Otherwise it is imputed falsely; it is not sin.

These scriptural and common sense principles as to “heresy” do by no means forbid that any church or religious organization shall require its ministers or public teachers to adopt in good faith its creed, to conform their public ministrations to that creed, and to cease to exercise such public ministrations; in other words, to cease to be ministers or public teachers in that church or religious organization when they can no longer sincerely adopt its system of belief. How far the rejection of special and isolated statements in the series of propositions constituting a creed is to be held as a repudiation of the system itself, is a question that can be properly decided only by the church or religious organization according to its constitutional

1 Psalm ciii. 14.
methods and according to the principles of the Word of God. But from all this, it by no means follows that the minister or public teacher thus admonished or displaced has been guilty of the sin of heresy. He may have been perfectly honest, careful and conscientious in adopting his opinions. If so, he has committed no sin whatever, no matter how grave may be the mistakes or errors of judgment into which he has fallen; or he may have properly reached his new opinions. They may be well founded in reason and revelation; they may be supported by sound scriptural interpretation and scientific truth. To hold anything less than this is to hold that each human creed is infallible—as infallibly true as the Word of God! Therefore all that, in the supposed case, the church or religious organization can do is to suspend or displace from religious teaching or functions within its own jurisdiction the minister or teacher who has ceased to approve and inculcate its system of faith.

Hence all church censures against persons charged with "heresy" are in the sight of God null and void, unless the act so charged has been done with the motives and environment which properly bring it under the condemnation of one or more of the ten commandments. All attempts to censure acts imputed as heresy, on any principle other than this, are in their nature persecutions, usurpations and impious cruelties.

Probably the greater part of those who shall be confined in the eternal prison-house will be those who in this world have been guilty of religious persecution.

From this apparent, but not impertinent, digression, we return to notice the last class of sins named by the apostle, viz.: "envyings," εμμονα. The translation expresses the idea of the Greek word with sufficient accuracy. And like the sin of pride, which was the cause of Satan's fall, we have no difficulty in tracing these envyings to their root in the material nature. Envy is the corroding disquietude—sometimes torment—felt
by one moral creature in view of the superiority, real or sup-
posed, enjoyed by another. This sin could never have existed
but for those material distinctions arising out of individual
creations and endowments.

Thus we have reviewed all the sins in this formidable cata-
logue, and discover in each one the same birth-mark. All are
"the works of the flesh." All betray their origin in the resist-
ance of the flesh to the law—of matter to Spirit.

We have now only to consider and refute two objections that
may be urged against this view.

One arises from the fact already alluded to, viz.: that, from
an early period in church history, it has been common among
theologians to explain this word "flesh," so often used in
Scripture, and especially in the New Testament, as really mean-
ing the spiritual element in man's nature, corrupted by original
sin, and farther degraded and brutalized by a long course of
sinful habit and indulgence. To this we need make no reply,
except the same urged in answering similar distortions of
scriptural language. Flesh is flesh, spirit is spirit; body is body,
mind is mind. If flesh means spirit, then body may mean
mind, good may mean evil, life may mean death, heaven may
mean hell, God may mean Satan. Those who attempt thus to
explain the meaning of the plain word "flesh," invite us to
adopt principles of interpretation which would reduce the
inspired word to a nullity, or something worse. It would lose
its true significance as a book of heavenly instructions, intended
to teach man the way of life, and would become a mere mass
of crude and unmeaning forms of words, from which each man
would be at liberty to draw out, not the meaning of the Holy
Spirit, but such meaning as his own depraved wishes and
purposes should suggest. We cannot so degrade the sacred
words of Scripture.

The other objection is that the inspired volume itself teaches
us that sin finds its root and origin in the spiritual nature of man, and not in his material propensities. To prove this we are referred to such passages as the following: "O ye sons of men! in heart ye work wickedness." 1 "The hypocrites in heart heap up wrath." 2 "They search out iniquities: they accomplish a diligent search: both the inward thoughts of every one of them and the heart is deep." 3 "A froward heart shall depart from me; I will not know a wicked person." 4 "An heart that deviseth wicked imaginations." 5 "The heart of the wicked is little worth." 6 "Foolishness is bound in the heart of a child." 7 "The heart of the sons of men is fully set in them to do evil." 8 "And God saw that the wickedness of man was great in the earth, and that every imagination of the thoughts of his heart was only evil continually." 9 "The heart is deceitful above all things, and desperately wicked: who can know it?" 10 And the words of Christ Himself: "But those things which proceed out of the mouth come forth from the heart; and they defile the man. For out of the heart proceed evil thoughts, murders, adulteries, fornications, thefts, false witness, blasphemies; these are the things which defile a man; but to eat with unwashed hands defileth not a man." 11 We are referred also to passages of Scripture which seem to impute the origin of evil to the mind or soul, such as: "The sacrifice of

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1 Proverbs lvi. 1, 2. 2 Job xxxvi. 13. 3 Psalm lixiv. 6.
4 Psalm ci. 4. The true meaning is farther shown by verse 6: "Him that hath an high look and a proud heart will not I suffer."
5 Proverbs vi. 18. 6 Proverbs x. 20. 7 Proverbs xxii. 15.
8 Ecclesiastes viii. 11, and ix. 3. "Yea, also the heart of the sons of men is full of evil."
9 Genesis vi. 5. 10 Jeremiah xvii. 9.
11 Matthew xv. 18, 19, 20. The catalogue of sins is even more complete in Mark vii. 21-23: "For from within, out of the heart of men, proceed evil thoughts, adulteries, fornications, murders, thefts, covetousness, wickedness, deceit, lasciviousness, an evil eye, blasphemy, pride, foolishness: all these evil things come from within, and defile the man."
the wicked is abomination: how much more when he bringeth it with a wicked mind?" 1 “But when his heart was lifted up, and his mind hardened in pride, he was deposed from his kingly throne, and they took his glory from him.” 2 “God gave them up to a reprobate mind.” 3 “Among whom also we all had our conversation in times past in the lusts of our flesh, fulfilling the desires of the flesh and of the mind: and were by nature the children of wrath, even as others.” 4 “Unto them that are defiled and unbelieving is nothing pure, but even their mind and conscience is defiled.” 5 “And you that were sometime alienated and enemies in your mind by wicked works, yet now hath He reconciled.” 6 “But if our gospel be hid, it is hid to them that are lost: in whom the god of this world hath blinded the minds of them which believe not.” 7 “Perverse disputings of men of corrupt minds.” 8 “The soul that sinneth, it shall die.” 9 “If a soul shall sin through ignorance against any of the commandments of the Lord.” 10 “If a soul sin and hear the voice of swearing.” “If a soul swear, pronouncing with his lips, to do evil.” “If a soul sin and commit a trespass, and lie unto his neighbor.” “If your soul abhor My judgments.” “They shall accept of the punishment of their iniquity; because, even because they despised My judgments, and because their soul abhorred My statutes.” 11

Now, in relation to the scriptures which declare that sin proceeds from the heart of man, and that this heart is deceitful and desperately wicked, we insist that they confirm rather than weaken the testimony of the numerous scriptures already quoted

1 Proverbs xxii. 27.  2 Daniel v. 20.  3 Romans i. 28.
4 Ephesians ii. 3.  5 Titus i. 15.  6 Colossians i. 21.
7 2 Corinthians iv. 4.
8 1 Timothy vi. 5; 2 Timothy iii. 8. “Men of corrupt minds reprobate concerning the faith.”
9 Ezekiel xviii. 4, 20.  10 Leviticus iv. 2.
11 Leviticus v. 1; vi. 2; xxvi. 15, 43.
which describe sin as "the work of the flesh." For the heart is not a part of man's spiritual nature, but a part of his material constitution, and a part so strongly representative of his affections, passions, propensities and proclivities that even when used not literally, but figuratively, it means the concentrated essence of the material being. So that when used in an evil sense it is but another form of that same depraved habitus or disposition which is the φρυγίμα σαρκώς—the "spiritual product of the flesh."

And as to the word "mind," the expression used in Proverbs means merely that the wicked brings his sacrifice with an evil "purpose, intent or motive," and therefore it is sin. The expression in Daniel has no more spiritual meaning than the "heart lifted up" conveys. The declarations in the New Testament concerning the "reprobate mind," the corrupt "desires of the mind," the "mind and conscience defiled," the "enemies in mind" by wicked works, "the mind blinded by the god of this world," the "corrupt minds," are perfectly consistent with the view already given as to the φρυγίμα σαρκώς. For we have seen that φρυγίμα embraces the widest possible definition of spiritual resultant, whether of the understanding, or the affections, or the will. And that the evil habitus coming from the successful resistance of the material propensities to the Holy Spirit will corrupt and defile the νοεῖν, "mind," in its widest sense, is a truth taught alike by revelation and experience.

1 The Hebrew word leb, equivalent to lehab, "heart," which is used in the expressive verse from Jeremiah, is the same word used to express the bodily organ on which life depends. Its primary meaning is something hollow and filled with blood.—Gesenius, Lex., p. 517. So the Greek word χαμίκα, used by Christ to express the impure fountain of sin within depraved man, is the same word used by Homer to express the material organ whence the blood flows, where pulsation is felt, and which is the motive power of physical life.—"Iliad." 10th, p. 94; 13th, pp. 282, 442. Other languages exhibit the same literal and figurative meanings, but the literal must always be taken as the real and true.
The same explanation applies to the ascription of sin to the soul of man. In fact, the word "soul" is used in the Scriptures in several senses—from that which includes the whole individual person, body and soul, to the simplest animal appetites. Thus we are informed that Abram took Sarai and Lot and their substance, and "the souls they had gotten in Haran," and they went forth to go into the land of Canaan. And when Abram returned from his successful attack on the king who had despoiled Sodom and Gomorrah, the king of Sodom said to him: "Give me the persons (in the Hebrew, souls), and take the goods to thyself." And the souls (persons) which came with Jacob into Egypt were threescore and ten. And when the sons of Reuben and the Gadites, and half the tribe of Manasseh, overcame the Hagarites in war, we are told "they took their cattle; of their camels fifty thousand, of sheep two hundred and fifty thousand, and of asses two thousand, and of souls of men a hundred thousand." 1 We read also that "the liberal soul shall be made fat,"—a process more appropriate to body than spirit; that "an idle soul shall suffer hunger," that "the full soul loatheth a honey-comb, but to the hungry soul every bitter thing is sweet;" that when man is suffering pain "his life abhorreth bread and his soul daintiness;" that Joseph's "feet were hurt with fetters, and his soul came into iron." 2 Certainly, therefore, the ascription of sin to the soul in the Scriptures proves nothing adverse to the doctrine of Paul in Romans and Galatians.

Having thus shown from the inspired Word that the innermost principle and essential nature of sin consists in successful resistance of the material element in man to the dominion of

1 Genesis xii. 5; xiv. 21; xlvi. 26; 1 Chronicles v. 21.
2 Proverbs xi. 28; xix. 15; xxvii. 7; Job xxxiii. 20; Psalm cv. 18. The Hebrew of the last citation requires the rendering given in the text, which does not appear in our English Bible.
spirit, we are now to consider another attitude of sin which brings it into antagonism to God as the righteous Law-giver of the universe.

It has always been held to be an infallible evidence of weakness and impending disruption in a human government that it suffers its laws to be broken with impunity. A good government among men is one that enacts good laws and justly enforces them. Even the wicked and abandoned on earth learn to look with contempt on the government which is too feeble or too corrupt to inflict the sanctions denounced by its laws against crime. Therefore the very perfections of God require that He shall punish sin in His moral creatures. We have seen how inexorably this principle has been carried out in the cases of the angels who sinned and rebelled. And similar would have been the fate of fallen man had not a remedy been found by which God could be just and yet justify the sinner.

We come then, in the second place, to consider this great remedial plan, devised in the counsels of eternity and for the execution and perfection whereof all the Persons of the adorable Godhead united their appropriate offices. This plan was to save from eternal perdition and to restore to righteousness and happiness all of the race of Adam that it was possible to save according to the indestructible and unalterable conditions of spirit and matter. It was a plan worthy of its divine origin.

The first and indispensable condition of this remedy was that it should be fully adequate to the purpose of saving from dishonor the violated law of God. That law, being the expression of the moral attributes of God, could not be abrogated, or suspended, or lowered in its claims. If obeyed, it was honored, as in the case of the unfallen angels; if disobeyed and its penalty was inflicted, it was honored, as in the case of the fallen angels; the problem solved in the counsels of the Trinity
was how to honor this law in the case of disobedient man and yet not to inflict on him its awful penalty. None but God could have solved it.

The principle of substitution—vicarious atonement—furnished the solution needed. It is not intended in this work to enter upon the "debate of ages," to which this doctrine has given origin. The objections to it have all been founded in vain attempts to bring a transcendent principle of Divine action to the test of human conditions, which cannot furnish even a distant and faint analogy. Yet even amid the dazzling light which breaks out from the "excellent glory" of that celestial covenant, and projects itself down through eternal years to the "marriage-supper of the Lamb," we are able to see and feel something of the right and justice and mercy that combined to make this remedy suitable and complete.

1. It is evident that no created being could fill the conditions required. However exalted he might be, he would still be under the law of God, and bound to obey for himself all its demands. He could not, therefore, obey for another; and even if willing to suffer for another's sin, his suffering could not atone for the transgression of another.

2. No created being could offer a sacrifice equal in dignity and worth to the eternal penalty of God's law.

3. No created being could, while retaining his identity, take upon himself the nature of man so perfectly that he should stand in his place, obey for him, work righteousness for him, suffer for him, die for him, and thus open for him the gates of a new Eden and a higher immortality.

4. No created being could have successfully endured and withstood the temptation of τῶν πονηρῶν—the evil one—to which the first Adam was of necessity subjected, and under which he succumbed and fell; and to which the Second Adam was, by the same necessity, subjected, but over which He triumphed,
and thus overcame him who "had the power of death, that is, the devil." 1

5. No created being could have become "submissive unto death, even the death of the cross," 2 and yet risen from the dead by his own power, without corruption, and thereby completed the work of redeeming man from death and furnishing to him a perfected righteousness.

All these offices were embraced in the necessary remedy for the ruin of man in relation to the law of God; and all these were undertaken and performed by the God-man—the Son of God.

The followers of Socinus, in former and in recent times, have often urged that the mere fact of the willingness of the Son of God to suffer and die in the place of man does not make the principle of vicarious atonement a righteous one in the Divine economy, because even if an innocent man were willing to suffer and die in the place of a guilty one, the government which would accept such substitution would be doing essential injustice. 3 But the answer to this objection is that the consent

1 Hebrews ii. 14. The words are: Τὸν τὸ κρατοῦσα εἰρωτα τοῦ θανάτου τοῦτον τῷ διάβολον. Κρατοῦσα is not δυναμική. It expresses rather physical strength than Divine force.

2 Philippians ii. 8. Προσευχομένος υπὲρ εἰρωτα τοῦ θανάτου. Υπὲρ is from ὑπὸ and αἰρομαι, and contains the idea of "hearing attentively," and hence submitting, obeying.

3 Faustus Socinus, who lived from 1539 to 1604, completed by his works the system inaugurated by his uncle, Lelius. He denied the Trinity in the Godhead, the Deity of Christ, the personality of the devil, the native and total depravity of man, the vicarious atonement of Christ, and the eternity of punishment of sinners. The Socini were descendants from an Italian family, illustrious for talent. Bayle, in his Dict. Hist. et Crit., Tome III., pp. 2604–2616, gives a full account of them. Marianus Socinus (1401–1467) was a celebrated lawyer—"jurisconsulte célèbre." His grandson, Marianus (1482–1556), was equally distinguished in the same profession. Lelius was one of his children, (1525–1562). Another was Alexander Socinus, a learned lawyer,—"docete jurisconsulte,"—who was
of the will of a creature, however innocent and exalted, can bear no analogy whatever to the consent of the will of the God-man. The will of the creature is required to be under the law, and conformed thereto; and as that law absolutely forbids that an innocent creature (even with his own consent) shall bear the penalty justly due to the transgression of a guilty creature, therefore no righteous government can accept such substitution. But the Son of God never was a creature—was not under the law when in eternity He gave the consent of His will to become the substitute for man in the eye of the law, to become manifest in the same flesh which had sinned, and in that flesh to withstand temptation, perfectly obey the law, suffer, die and rise again for man's redemption and justification. Therefore the consent of that Divine Will in the counsels of the Holy Trinity is an element which transcends and rises above all conditions emerging from the facts of human law and human governments. We cannot comprehend its height and depth and length and breadth. We can only wonder and adore, and gratefully receive by faith the righteousness wrought out for us in His life and death by our Divine Substitute. His own words authorize us to say, "Even so, Father; for so it seemed good in Thy sight."¹

Nevertheless, now that this marvellous transaction has actually taken place in our world, in which the Divine Being has taken upon Himself the lowliest of human forms and conditions, and served, and ministered, and suffered, and died for men, the world has learned a lesson against selfishness and in favor of self-sacrifice which will never be forgotten, and which is work-

father of Faustus. Probably so much inherited legal aptitude led the latter to the attempt to deal with the question of "vicarious atonement" as coming merely under the conditions of human law, and as involving no transcendent element—a grave and fatal error.

¹ Matthew xi. 26; Luke x. 21.
ing in millions of human hearts with ever-increasing power, and will so work to the day of a completely regenerated humanity. Willing self-devotion and self-sacrifice for the good of others is the only principle worth living for in this world.¹ The Son of God has taught that lesson. Without learning it and practising it, in the sphere assigned to each, there is no salvation.

But in addition to this first element of the needed remedy for guilty and ruined man, there was another element which was also devised in eternity, and which it is the peculiar office of God—the Holy Ghost to administer and make effectual.

The effect of the fall of Adam was to bring his dual nature instantly down from the high platform which it occupied in innocence to a status which needed renovation. And as “like begets like,” each child and lineal descendant of Adam comes into the world with a spiritual habitus or disposition, which is accurately described by the apostle Paul as ἐπαθήμα τῆς σαρκός, and which is certainly averse to holiness; and with a material frame subject to pain, disease and death. All this evil was wrought by the fall, and, except so far as the remedy was received and applied, it became greater and greater in the progress of the human race. Now, so long as God’s immutable law stood between the offender and restoration to Divine favor, it was evidently impossible that any means could be applied for renovation of the dual nature degraded by the fall. And had

¹ The apostle sanctions this view, and exalts the merit of Christ in his words: “For scarcely for a righteous man will one die: yet peradventure for a good man some would even dare to die. But God commendeth His love toward us, in that, while we were yet sinners, Christ died for us.”—Romans v. 7, 8. Hence preachers of the gospel have a right to use illustrations drawn from the pathetic lessons of self-sacrifice recorded in profane and sacred history. No book ever written by the late popular English novelist, Charles Dickens, equals in real power his “Tale of Two Cities,” wherein a crisis of supreme interest is reached in an act of quiet but complete self-sacrifice.
the condemning sentence of that law continued in force, Adam
and his posterity must have sunk lower and lower in moral ruin
and material debasement. But when, in the counsels of the
Holy Trinity, the means had been devised for magnifying the
law and making it honorable,¹ by the marvellous covenant of
the Son of God, wherein He consented to assume the nature of
man, to be made under the law, to obey the law, to suffer and
die and rise again, thus perfecting righteousness for man, then
instantly all obstacle to the spiritual and material restoration of
man was removed, and the Holy Spirit took upon Himself this
high office in the plan of salvation.

It is singular that, under the system of thoughtful philosophy
to which Christianity has educated mankind, any serious doubt
should have prevailed on the question whether the soul as well
as the body of the child is born from the parents. Yet this
question has greatly divided Christian divines; and until compa-
rettive modern times, the vast majority accepted with
unquestioning confidence the negative of this question as
established truth. In the days of John Locke the opinion that
the soul of each individual child was newly created by God, and
put by Divine ordination and power into the body born from
the parents, was so universally prevalent and so firmly established
that he refers to it as a fixed fact in the universe. Hence, in
arguing that Eternal Being must be only pure Spirit, he seeks
to refute the objection urged by common sense that we are
unable to conceive how cause, however powerful, could bring
something out of nothing, by asking why common sense does
not, on the same principle, deny that each individual man began
to exist some twenty, forty or sixty years ago; for he insists,
as a fact universally granted, that each individual soul was
made out of nothing before it was put into its individual body.²

¹ Isa:ah xlii. 21.
² Locke’s words on this point are curious as furnishing, by suggestion,
But, in recent times, the arguments in favor of the doctrine of *traducianism* (that is, the derivation of both the soul and body of the child from its parents) have been brought out and arrayed in such strength that now it is believed to be adopted by the larger number of thoughtful divines. These arguments are in substance as follows:

1. That the derivation of the soul by generative descent involves no more and no less mystery than the derivation thus of the body; each involves a mystery transcending all human powers of explanation.

2. That all experience for thousands of years has shown that the *spiritual* traits, habits, dispositions and peculiarities of parents are transmitted to their children; not only the general spiritual constitution, depravity and defects which Adam may have had, and which descended to all, but the special traits of mind which special and individual parents may exhibit. And *acquired* mental powers and habits pass to children in like manner.¹

3. That the unity of the human race cannot be demonstrated on any other principle.

4. That the doctrine of human depravity, so conspicuously

a strong argument against creation *ex nihilo*: "If, therefore, you can allow a thinking thing to be made out of nothing, (as all things that are not eternal must be,) why, also, can you not allow it possible for a material being to be made out of nothing by an equal power, but that you have the experience of the one in view and not of the other? Though, when well considered, creation of a spirit will be found to require no less power than the creation of matter."—"Essay on the Human Understanding," Book IV., Chap. X., Sec. 18. As Locke, in the last sentence, means by "creation" creation *out of nothing*, he is accurate in saying that such creation of a spirit would require no less power than such creation of matter. Either is impossible.

¹ The patient and accurate labor and research of Dr. Charles Darwin among the lower creatures have thrown valuable light on the subject of hereditary descent of acquired and artificial habits.
taught in the Scriptures and so fully confirmed by all experience, rests necessarily on *traducianism* for its vindication. For the contrary belief holds that God creates *ex nihilo* pure spirits, and imprisons them in bodies, the result being the *instant* contamination of the spirit, and in many cases its continued degeneracy and final perdition. Any such belief dishonors God.

5. That family piety—the prospect of the salvation of children by reason of the Christian *habitus* of their parents—is strongly insisted on in Scripture, and is encouraged by *traducianism*.

The doctrine may therefore be considered as well founded in reason and revelation.

Now the work of the Holy Spirit in executing His part of the remedial plan of salvation is performed in two offices. One is called in the Word of God *regeneration*, the other *sanctification*. Each is rendered indispensable by the conditions of depravity which, as we have seen, were inherent in Adam and his descendants after the fall.

Regeneration means literally being *born again*. But we must carefully avoid the error of relying upon any analogy drawn from the birth of a human infant as the result of the material union of the sexes. This was the gross error which perplexed the mind of Nicodemus, the Jewish ruler, in his interview with Christ. Although the Old Testament scriptures give plain intimations of the necessity and effects of this work of the Holy Spirit; yet the long diversion of the Pharisaic mind into forms cherishing self-righteousness had obscured this great truth and rendered its announcement by Christ an inscrutable mystery to Nicodemus. Hence he asked, "How can a man be born when he is old? Can he enter the second time into his mother's

1 Psalms xxii. 31; lxxxvii. 4, 5; Isaiah lxvi. 8; Genesis vi. 3; 2 Kings x. 5; Job xxxii. 8; Psalms li. 10, 12; cxxxix. 7; Proverbs i. 23; Ecclesiastes xi. 5; Isaiah xxxii. 15; xxxiv. 16; xlii. 1, 5; xlv. 8; lix. 21; Ezekiel xxxvi. 29; xxxix. 29; Joel ii. 28; Zechariah iv. 6; xii. 1.
womb and be born?” 1 To this question Christ answered only by repeating the necessity for the new birth, and intimating that it is entirely possible for the spiritual product of flesh to be born of flesh, and to come by generative descent. On no other principle can we understand his declaration, “That which is born of the flesh is flesh, and that which is born of the spirit is spirit.” 2 And He does not attempt to explain the high mystery of regeneration farther than by this illustration: “The wind bloweth where it listeth, and thou hearest the sound thereof, but canst not tell whence it cometh, and whither it goeth: so is every one that is born of the Spirit.” 1 Here the grammatical construction requires that we shall refer the freedom of will (αὐτῶν θέλει) attributed to the wind, not merely to the Spirit itself, but to “every one that is born of the Spirit,”—

ωστός εστι πας ο γενομένος εκ των θεομάτων. The deep significance of this lesson will presently appear.

It is manifest from all the teachings of Christ in this chapter, that though regeneration by the Holy Spirit involves a mystery beyond our comprehension, yet it is more nearly analogous to that heavenly and eternal generation whereby the Son of God was born than to any process of generation and birth from earthly parents. When Nicodemus continued to express his amazement—approaching incredulity—Christ said to him: “Art thou a master of Israel and knowest not these things?” “Verily, verily, I say unto thee, We speak that we do know, and testify that we have seen; and ye receive not our witness. If I have told yon of earthly things, and ye believe not, how shall ye be-

1 John iii. 4. 2 John iii. 6.

3 John iii. 8. Το πνεῦμα αὐτῶν θέλει πνευματικά. But for the context—καὶ τὸ πνεῦμα αὐτῶν ακούει, &c.—it would not be easy to fix the meaning of “the wind” upon τὸ πνεῦμα in this verse. Christ spoke in accommodation to the common ideas entertained by his hearer and by people generally who hold that nothing is more wilful than the wind; “au gré des vents” is a French proverb.
lieve if I tell you of heavenly things? And no man hath
ascended up to heaven, but He that came down from heaven;
even the Son of Man which is in heaven.”1 Here the Divine
Teacher first gently rebukes the Jewish rabbi for not having
entered into the spirit and meaning of the Old Testament; then
declares His own personal knowledge of generation by the
Spirit; then strongly intimates that this is of those heavenly
mysteries which far transcend such earthy mysteries as the
coming and going of the wind; and finally refers His revelation
of the great doctrine of spiritual generation to His residence in
heaven as the eternally generated Son of God, who is also “the
Son of man.”

And all those passages of Scripture which teach that all of
Adam’s race who are regenerated by the Spirit of God thereby
become the “sons of God” confirm this view. For as Christ
is born of God, so, in this transcendent sense, they are born of
God. And hence He is declared to be “a Friend that sticketh
closer than a brother.” And all men regenerated are “heirs
of God and joint heirs with Christ.”2

Thus we are taught that regeneration by the Holy Ghost is
a necessary part of the Divine remedy for fallen man. And
sanctification, which is the continuance and completion of the
work whereof the proper foundation is laid in the new birth, is,
in like manner, ascribed to the Holy Spirit.3

Having thus, in this chapter, considered first the essential
nature of sin, secondly the Divine remedial plan therefor,
adopted in the eternal counsels of the Triune God, we are now,
in the third and last place, to consider the methods by which

1 John iii. 9–13. Ο διδασκαλός του Ἰσραήλ—a teacher of Israel; one
whose special duty it was to study and expound the Hebrew Scriptures. The
words αὐτὸν ἐν τῷ οὐρανῷ could not be stronger to express the divine
residence of the Son of Man.
2 Romans viii. 17.
3 Romans xv. 16; 2 Thessalonians ii. 18; 1 Peter i. 2.
this remedy is applied and made effectual to the salvation of
the largest possible number and proportion of the human race.
God will save all that He can save from the disastrous conse-
quences of Adam's sin. And all who are finally lost and
consigned to the eternal prison-house will be lost by reason of
their own obstinate perseverance in sin and rejection of the
remedy offered for their acceptance.

The Divine methods adopted were the best, wisest, most far-
reaching, most effectual that could have been applied. But
they were adopted with reference to conditions of time and
space which the indestructible nature of things imposed.

The time at which the actual historical facts of the incarna-
tion, birth, life, death and resurrection of the Son of God
occurred was elected with divine wisdom and benevolence in
order to render these great facts as efficient as possible for the
end designed. Many small intellects have expressed surprise
that these events (all of which were embraced within a period
of thirty-three years) did not occur at the opening of the history
of man—immediately after the fall of Adam. But it requires
only moderate mental power and knowledge to see that if these
events had then occurred, their efficacy in reaching the heart
of humanity and working the greatest effect on the greatest
number would have been far less than under the elected
method.

Would these facts have wrought any spiritual effect during
the period of declension, degeneracy and universal corruption
which culminated in the days of Noah? Would such an event
as the birth from a virgin, or the resurrection of the God-man,
have been so authenticated by testimony in those primeval days
that doubt would have been unreasonable in our day?

The point in the world's history actually elected by Divine
Wisdom for the manifestation of the Son of God in the flesh is

1 Psalm cxlvi. 11; Ezekiel xviii. 28, 30, 31, 32; xxxiii. 11; 2 Peter iii. 9.
designated by inspired language as "the fulness of the time." It was a momentous point. The world had reached the apex of mere worldly wisdom. Egypt, the Orient, Greece, Rome, had exhausted all that man's unaided powers could do in philosophy, language, art, religion. The Greek language was the most perfect vehicle of human thought that had ever existed, and one not exceeded by any that has existed since. So that the conditions for a new revelation in human words were there. The works of art—Egyptian pyramids and pillars, Greek sculpture and painting, and Roman roads and aqueducts—were in a state of perfection beyond which no advance has been made. Yet humanity was dissatisfied. Its gods were idols, and the spirits supposed to inform them, and which were worshipped through them, were foul χειροκρατα απαριθμω—spiritual emanations of the flesh. They could not satisfy immortal souls. Therefore men everywhere were stretching forth their necks and holding out their hands in expectation of the coming Personage whose advent had been not only foretold in the Hebrew Scriptures, but anticipated by the longing intuitions of heathen poets and seers.

Had the cross on which the Son of God in human flesh died been erected in the valley between the Euphrates and Tigris soon after Adam was driven from Eden, it would have been surrounded by the darkness of the early ages, and the gloom of forgetfulness would soon have shadowed it. But when that cross was actually raised on the hill called Calvary, in Palestine, during the reign of the Emperor Tiberius Caesar of Rome, it looked down on all succeeding centuries of man's life on earth, and from it came a light so clear and strong that all men may see it and rejoice.

But although the actual manifestation of God in the flesh was thus posited in time and place far from the day of Adam's

1 To πληρωμα του χρονου. Galatians iv. 4.
sin and the garden of Eden, yet as that covenant had been made, which could not be broken, the Lamb was slain from the foundation of the world.¹ Hence the Holy Spirit commenced His appropriate work of regeneration and sanctification immediately after the fall of Adam and Eve.

In proof of His purpose to save as large a number of Adam’s race as can be saved, we remark first, that He regenerates and thus saves all infants who die in infancy, no matter in what land, from what parentage, at what era of the world’s history, or under what circumstances they are born and die. How many millions upon millions of the human race are thus saved we have no sufficient statistics for computing; but when it is remembered that a very large proportion of all the infants born in the world die under two years of age, the number thus saved must constitute a very large part of that “great multitude which no man could number,” out of all nations and kindreds and people and tongues, who shall stand before the throne and before the Lamb, clothed with white robes and with palms in their hands.

That infants dying in infancy are regenerated and saved the Scriptures teach us: 1. Because Christ said, “Suffer the little children to come unto Me, and forbid them not, for of such is the kingdom of heaven.”² 2. Because Christ died for them, and, as they have never rejected Him, they are necessarily justified, their sin, inherited from the first Adam, being atoned for.³ 3. Because, not having committed any actual sin, no “works of the flesh,”—τοῦτος ἁμαρτίας—can be charged against them, and therefore, not having “done such things,” they inherit the kingdom of God through the merits of Christ.⁴ 4. Because the work of the Holy Spirit in regenerating them is easily and

¹ Galatians iii. 16, 17; Revelation v. 6, 9, 12; xiii. 8.
² Matthew xix. 14; Mark x. 14; Luke xviii. 16.
³ Romans v. 17–21; 1 Corinthians xv. 22.
⁴ Galatians v. 19, 21.
joyfully performed, as they have only the depraved nature derived from generative descent, and not the hardened ἀρνητικός, the rigid habitus of evil derived from long continued and repeated transgression of known law. 5. Above all, because they do not quench the Spirit, do not grieve the Spirit, do not resist the Spirit with that fearful though sublime endowment of free will, which is a cause in the universe, and a cause that effecteth the first sin and that effecteth the final perdition of all who are lost.

Probably it would be difficult now to find any professed Christians who would admit a belief that any infants dying in infancy are lost. But such has not always been the case. Many divines of the Roman Catholic Church have taught that the infants of heretics and heathen, dying in infancy, are lost; and that even the infants of faithful Catholics, dying in infancy without baptism, are not certainly saved. Even the learned and loving Abelard, and the enlightened and ingenious Pascal, held these opinions. Neither have Protestants escaped the just odium of such doctrines. John Calvin, liberal and magnanimous in many doctrinal views, yet held and formally taught that infants of the heathen, dying in infancy, share the perdition of their parents; and within thirty years past a Protestant divine has given his written opinion to this effect: “I am no more a

1 1 Thessalonians v. 19; Ephesians iv. 30; Psalm lxxxviii. 40; Acts vii. 51; Romans xiii. 2; 2 Timothy iii. 8.

2 During the persecutions under the English Roman Catholic Queen, Mary, a poor woman in Guernsey, far advanced in pregnancy, was burned at the stake. The fierce pain caused premature delivery. The infant was snatched from the flames, but a Roman Catholic magistrate in attendance pronounced the newly born babe to be a heretic, and caused it to be re-committed to the fire!—Hume’s History of England, Boston Edit., 1851, Vol. III., pp. 422–423; Fox, Vol. III., p. 747; Heylin, p. 57; Burnet, Vol. II., p. 337.

3 Calvini Comment. in Romanos, Cap. V.
universalist as to infants dying in infancy than as to other sinners of Adam's race?"

And it is a sad truth that several living forms of human creeds contain statements strongly savoring of these pernicious doctrines. The idea of the necessity for baptism in order to the salvation of infants dying in infancy is explicitly contained in the Decree of the Council of Trent concerning original sin;¹ the same is true of the Augsburg Confession, by a statement even stronger than the Tridentine;² the Thirty-nine Articles of the Church of England, by necessary inference, teach the same;³ and the Westminster Confession, under the head of "Effectual Calling," contains a clause which, taken in connection with the other teachings of that symbol, teaches, by apparently inevitable logical deduction, that some infants dying in infancy, not being "elect," are not regenerated and saved by Christ through the Spirit, who worketh when and where and how He pleaseth.⁴ So far have human inventions done despite to the loving heart of God.

In farther exposition of the method by which the Holy Spirit seeks to save as many as possible of the human family, we remark that the Scriptures give us strong ground for believing that, after parents are regenerated and embarked in the divine life, the children born to them are regenerated in infancy, although the evidences of such regeneration may be obscured for years by youthful worldliness and sin, and may not manifest

² Ibid., Vol. III., p. 8; and Article 9th, "On Baptism," Ibid., p. 13.
³ Ibid., pp. 492, 493. Article 9th, after strongly declaring original sin, says, "And although there is no condemnation for them that believe and are baptised; yet," &c., &c. The Reformed Episcopal Articles avoid this error by using the words, "And although there is no condemnation for them that are in Christ Jesus, yet," &c., &c.—Ibid., p. 817.
⁴ Westminster Confession, Cap. X., Clause 3d.—Ibid., p. 625.
themselves until some season of special test presents itself.\(^1\) Thus millions of the race of Adam in successive generations have been saved.

In farther confirmation of the same great truth, we remark that, immediately after the fall, God took special care that Adam and Eve should be instructed in His remedial plan, in order that a knowledge of its methods should be transmitted from them to all their succeeding posterity. A long-established tradition encourages the belief that our first parents, both, accepted the benefits of this plan, and were both among the saved. Both were early induced in the righteousness of the "Lamb Slain," of which the skins taken from animals sacrificed were the types and emblems. The first promise of the Gospel was made to them, and Eve's glad cry on the birth of her first born shows that faith was then active and strong. Thus Adam and Eve were made the depositaries of sufficient religious knowledge to make all their descendants wise unto salvation. And the Holy Spirit was ever ready to accompany the word and make it work effectually to the regeneration of all who would, with the will, consent to receive it and act upon it.

And it deserves our careful notice that, after the flood, when the whole human family consisted of Noah and his wife, and his three sons and their wives, again God communicated full knowledge of His remedial plan, and gave all needed instruction in order that it might be sent down throughout all the lines of descent from Shem, Ham and Japhet, from whom all the present inhabitants of the earth are descended.\(^2\) Thus it is

\(^1\) Proverbs xxii. 6; 2 Timothy iii. 15; Proverbs xxxi. 28; Malachi iv. 6; Deuteronomy xi. 19; xxxii. 46; Acts ii. 39; 1 Corinthians vii. 14; Deuteronomy i. 8; xi. 9; iv. 7; xi. 15; Psalms xxii. 30; lxix. 36; cii. 23; Proverbs xi. 21; Isaiah vi. 13; xlv. 25; lxix. 9; lxxv. 23; Malachi ii. 15; Psalms xcv. 13; xcviiii. 25, 26; Isaiah xlii. 3; lxx. 21.

\(^2\) Genesis viii. and ix.; Isaiah liv. 8, 9; Ezekiel xiv. 14, 20; Hebrews xi. 7; 1 Peter iii. 20; 2 Peter ii. 5.
apparent that, on *two separate and impressive occasions*, God took care that His divine methods should be effectual to the dissemination *among all men* of the truths of the Gospel of His Son, and of the power and willingness of the Holy Spirit to apply those truths to the regeneration of every individual man and woman of Adam's race who would receive them by the assent of the will—that is, by the faith not merely of the understanding, but of the heart.

Hence it is that among all nations, not merely Jewish and Christian, but those commonly spoken of as pagan or heathen, the knowledge of the Son of God and of His righteousness, and of the presence and power of the Spirit of God and His willingness to apply that knowledge to the salvation of the individual, has been in the possession of every person competent by age and spiritual sanity to receive it. Job belonged to a nation and land not in the line of Abrahamic descent,¹ yet Job knew of Christ the Redeemer, the Son of God, and was saved by Him, and was able to say, "I know that my Redeemer liveth, and that He shall stand at the latter day upon the earth; and though after my skin worms destroy this body, yet in my flesh shall I see God; whom I shall see for myself, and mine eyes shall behold, and not another."² And that many others besides Job, in that "land of U'z," had put on the righteousness of this same Redeemer, we cannot doubt.

Thus we reach the reasonable conclusion which Peter, the Apostle of God, declared eighteen hundred years ago: "Of a truth, I perceive that God is no respecter of persons; but in

¹ There are strong reasons, some of them founded on astronomical data, for supposing that Abraham and Job were cotemporaries, though they inhabited different lands. See Dr. Kitto's Notes on Job, English Pictorial Bible, Vol. II.

² Job xix. 25-27. Frederick Denison Maurice has some profoundly suggestive thoughts on the depth and extent of this scripture. See his Theological Essays, N. Y. Edit., 1854, pp. 44-47, and note on p. 45.
every nation, he that feareth Him and worketh righteousness is accepted with Him.”¹ And Christ’s own words are even stronger to teach the same truth: “And I say unto you, That many shall come from the east and west, and shall sit down with Abraham, and Isaac, and Jacob, in the kingdom of heaven; but the children of the kingdom shall be cast out into outer darkness; there shall be weeping and gnashing of teeth.”²

Such men as Confucius, in China, Socrates, Plato, Aristides and Aristotle, in Greece, Cincinnatus, Seneca and Marcus Aurelius, in Rome, and many others, whose names have been too humble to emerge from the “cool sequestered vale of life” into the light of human records, have, we permit ourselves to hope, been saved, and are now enjoying in heaven a more serene and ennobling philosophy than any they attained to on earth. But they were all saved by the same remedial plan which saved Abraham, and David, and Isaiah, and Peter, and John, and Paul. They were all saved by faith in the Divine Man—the same faith taught to Adam and Noah, and through them to all “nations, and kindreds, and peoples, and tongues;” they were all saved by looking, and longing, and striving for a better righteousness than their own. And the Holy Spirit, who visits all men, and who is ever ready to help the weak and to lead the blind by a way they know not of, helped these men of

¹ Acts x. 34, 35. To the same effect is Paul’s declaration in Galatians ii. 6: “God accepteth no man’s person.” Ἡμῶν θεὸς ἀνθρώπινον ἀνθρώπων ἱκανόν ἐκλέγειν.

² Matthew viii. 11, 12. And broader still in Luke xiii. 29: “And they shall come from the east, and from the west, and from the north, and from the south, and shall sit down in the kingdom of God.” See also Malachi i. 11. The centurions, whose devout faith in an unseen Redeemer of the human race, and in a better righteousness than their own, led to the statements of Christ and Peter, were of the heathen Roman nation. How many more may have had like faith who never heard of the Hebrew Scriptures? The God-man is revealed to every human heart that honestly seeks light.
heathen nations, and formed in them the image of the God-man in a higher sense than even that borne by Adam in the innocence of Eden. For Adam fell, and, for a time, lost that image; but he who, by the regenerating power of the Holy Spirit, has that image restored to him and stamped upon his dual nature, loses it no more. He is sealed with the seal of the Prince Immanuel—the Son of God.¹

Since, then, we have seen that all infants dying in infancy are saved, that children of pious parents are often regenerated in infancy, and that all persons of Adam’s race, male and female, who attain to such age as brings with it knowledge and responsibility, have transmitted and intuitional knowledge sufficient to enable them to believe on the Divine Man—the Second Adam—and to seek a better righteousness than their own, and that the Holy Spirit visits every man and woman, and is ever ready and willing to apply and make effectual the truth which regenerates the whole nature, it follows that, if any of Adam’s race are finally lost, it will be by their own fault. It will not be by reason of any decree of God, or any limitation of the terms of salvation, or the extent of the atonement. God, in His paternal and loving regard for the whole race of man, has never limited nor intended to limit His offer of salvation. It is offered to all;² and all may accept

¹ 2 Timothy ii. 19; John iii. 33; Revelation vii. 2; ix. 4; 2 Corinthians i. 22; Ephesians i. 18; iv. 30.

² “Look unto Me, and be ye saved, all the ends of the earth; for I am God, and there is none else.”—Isaiah xlv. 22. “For this is good and acceptable in the sight of God our Saviour; who will have all men to be saved, and to come unto the knowledge of the truth.”—1 Timothy ii. 3, 4.

The attempts of professed theologians of the ultra-Calvinistic school to vindicate the sincerity and good faith of God (as they represent Him) in offering salvation to all men, and declaring it to be His will that all shall be saved, and yet decreeing from eternity that millions shall be lost, are worse than pitiable. Better to have no creed about election than such a creed as that. Yet election, properly understood, is taught in the Scrip-
and be saved if they will. In view of the methods adopted by God for making known His plan of salvation, and making it effectual for saving all, it may well be said that He has "so loved the world" that He has made it His vineyard, and has asked: "What could have been done more to My vineyard, that I have not done in it?"\(^1\)

It is worthy of remark, that the most sober and well-considered Christian creeds, though they speak of regeneration, do not undertake to define it. And a form of instruction, intended for the intelligent youth of the world, and which has been justly admired for the clearness of its definitions and the depth and extent of the Christian knowledge imparted by it, does not even mention regeneration as one of the points of the course through which the sinner of Adam's race passes in his journey from original sin to faith in Christ, sanctification and heaven. The instructions given by this formula, covering this point, are in the following words: "The Spirit applieth to us the redemption purchased by Christ, by working faith in us, and thereby uniting us to Christ in our effectual calling, which is the work of God's Spirit, whereby, convincing us of our sin and misery, enlightening our minds in the knowledge of Christ, and renewing our wills, He doth persuade and enable us to embrace Jesus Christ, freely offered to us in the Gospel."\(^2\)

\(^1\) This question, it is true, is asked with special relation to the Jews, but may it not well apply to all the human family? Isaiah v. 4.

\(^2\) Westminster Shorter Catechism, Questions and Answers 30 and 31; "Creeds of Christendom," Vol. III., p. 682. Nothing can more clearly evince the wide mental calibre and profound Christian intuitions of the
Now, evidently the processes thus indicated are only applicable in the cases of adult men and women—of persons at least old enough to be responsible, to understand and to embrace offers made to them.

We are therefore justified in asserting that, in regeneration by the Holy Spirit, in the case of a person old enough and intelligent enough to apprehend the spiritual truth which is used as the instrument for the purpose, the concurrence of that person in the process is an indispensable condition to its existence and operation. The Holy Spirit never regenerates man or woman who continues to quench and grieve and resist that Spirit.

The simplest truths of that revelation made to Adam and to Noah, and, in more complete form, in the Holy Scriptures, are a sufficient instrument for regeneration. But no instrument is in itself sufficient for any purpose, however well adapted in men who formulated the Westminster symbols than the fact that they nowhere attempt to define or explain regeneration. No question or answer concerning it is found in either the Larger or Shorter Catechism. And, in the Confession proper, the word “regenerated” is only found in connection with the salvation of infants dying in infancy, and of other elect persons, “who are incapable of being outwardly called by the ministry of the Word.” Some persons, who seek to be wiser than the Holy Scriptures and the interpretation thereof given in the Westminster symbols, have drawn out from the effects thought of past ages the word “synergism,” which they apply as a term of reproach to the belief that, in regeneration, the human spirit, by its power of free will, consents concurrently to the operation of the Holy Spirit. And another error is sought to be inculcated by teaching that, even in the regeneration of a sane and intelligent adult, the Holy Spirit operates entirely without the instrumentality of the inspired Word. See tract entitled “Pray for the Holy Spirit,” by Rev. Wm. Scribner, N. Y., 1882, pp. 23–28. This error is in obvious contradiction of Scripture,—1 Peter i. 23–25. If any truth be taught plainly in Holy Scripture, it is that the fallen human spirit, by its own power and to its own perdition, may strive against, limit, vex, resist, grieve and quench the Holy Spirit. And so, by its own power and to its own salvation, it may yield and consent to the regenerating work of the Holy Spirit.
THE WILL MUST CONSENT.

form it may be. Intelligent force must wield it, accompany it, apply it. So the Holy Spirit wields, accompanies, applies spiritual truth to the adult sinner. It is adapted to his heart and conscience. But the φρονήμα σαρκός, the spiritual product of the flesh, which is born in him, and which has been increased in strength by indulgence in actual sin, resists this force applied by the Holy Spirit. What shall turn the scale? What shall save the soul? What shall decide this conflict (in which the Spirit strives with the flesh) in favor of Christ? We answer, the will of the adult man or woman. That will must submit, must consent to the offered terms, must cease to resist, or the Holy Spirit, grieved by continued obstinacy, may take His flight to return no more. Then the destiny of such adult is sealed for time and eternity.

We have seen that God has endowed His moral creature, man, with freedom of will; that this freedom continues notwithstanding the fall; that it is necessary to accountability; and that it necessarily implies that the spirit of man is a free cause in the universe, for it cannot be free on any lower hypothesis. It is to this grand endowment, still existing in a fallen being, that the Holy Spirit appeals; to this He addresses the instrumental force of the Word; with this He strives. If the soul, in the exercise of its free will, chooses life in Christ, that soul is saved; if it chooses to resist, and continues to resist, the Spirit, it is lost!"^1

^1 Maurice, in one of his lectures, has the following words: "I ask no one to pronounce, for I dare not pronounce myself, what are the possibilities of resistance in a human will to the loving will of God. There are times when they seem to me—thinking of myself more than of others—almost infinite. But I know that there is something which must be infinite. I am obliged to believe in an abyss of love which is deeper than the abyss of death. I dare not lose faith in that love; I sink into death, eternal death, if I do. I must feel that this love is compassing the universe. More about it I cannot know. But God knows. I leave myself
From this it plainly appears that every man and woman in the world, who reaches years of responsibility and who is not saved, is lost wholly by his or her own obstinate continuance in sin—obstinate resistance and grieving of the Holy Spirit.

To confirm this view many passages of inspired Scripture combine in their testimony, such as the following: "And thou, Solomon, my son, know thou the God of thy father, and serve Him with a perfect heart and with a willing mind, for the Lord searcheth all hearts and understandeth all the imaginations of the thoughts; if thou seek Him, He will be found of thee; but if thou forsake Him, He will cast thee off for ever." 1 "And who then is willing to consecrate his service this day unto the Lord?" 2 "Woe unto thee, O Jerusalem! will thou not be made clean? when shall it once be?" 3 "He shall offer (his sacrifice) of his own voluntary will." 4 "And if ye offer a sacrifice of peace offerings unto the Lord, ye shall offer it at your own will." 4 "Ye will not come to Me that ye may have life." 5 "The Lord is not slack concerning His promise as some men count slackness; but is long-suffering to us-ward, not willing that any should perish, but that all should come to repentance." 6

And the expressive passage, "Work out your own salvation with fear and trembling, for it is God that worketh in you both

and all to Him."—"Theological Essays," p. 360. Here is an admission that he dares not pronounce what are the possibilities of resistance in a human will to the will of God. Was it, then, wise to adopt the dangerous doctrine of universal salvation, against the explicit declarations to the contrary contained in the Holy Scriptures?

1 1 Chronicles xxviii. 9.  2 Ibid., xxix. 5.  3 Jeremiah xiii. 27.
4 Leviticus i. 8; xix. 15; xxii. 19, 29.  5 John v. 40.
6 2 Peter iii. 9. The expression is μὴ βουλιμενῶς, very strong, for it means not merely "not willing, wishing or desiring, but not decreeing, purposing or determining;" and in Homer the verb is applied specially to the decrees of the gods.
to will and to do of His good pleasure,”¹ when properly rendered and interpreted, confirms this view. For it proves that the work of the adult soul must be simultaneous and concurrent with that of the Holy Spirit; the will must be conformed to the Divine will, otherwise salvation is not obtained.

Therefore the true doctrine taught by Holy Scripture, and confirmed by experience, is that regeneration is the act of God only, and that no power less than Almighty power can work it. In the case of infants dying in infancy, and of others saved who are incapable of being outwardly called by the ministry of the Word, this sovereign act is done without concurrence or consent in the spiritual nature regenerated. But in the case of intelligent adults, the soul regenerated simultaneously consents to and concurs in the divine and merciful act, and without such consent and concurrence of the free will of the subject, the act of regeneration is never done.

Nor is this view overthrown by such scriptures as these: “Thy people shall be willing in the day of Thy power.”² For assuredly none deserve the special title of “the people of God” except those who do submit their wills to His will; and that this is done at the same time at which and in the day of the power with which the Holy Spirit works on them, is perfectly true. But all who will thus submit are of His people; and the only reason why all who hear the truth and the invitations uttered by the Spirit are not of His people is that they are not willing to be so.

¹ Philippians ii. 12, 13. Ἔναντι φιλίως καὶ τρομοῦ τῷ εὐωδίαν σωμάτων κατατροφεύεται Θεός γὰρ εἰς τὸν εὐωδίαν εν ἑαυτῷ καὶ τὸ θέλειν καὶ τὸ εὐνοεῖν ὕπερ τῆς εὐωδίας. The simultaneous and concurrent working and willing are strongly expressed. It is worthy of note that ἀνωτῶ is omitted after εὐωδίας; contrary to Paul’s usage, if he intended to say that this εὐωδία was God’s. He applies this same word to himself (Romans x. 1) and to other men (Philippians i. 10).

² Psalm cx. 3.
Nor do such declarations as that of John in his gospel, "Which were born, not of blood, nor of the will of the flesh, nor of the will of man, but of God," overthrow this view. For we have seen that the ερωτημα σαρκων—the spiritual product of the flesh—is the heritage of every man of Adam's race; and, therefore, it is impossible for the power of generative descent (αναγεννησις, literally the bloods), or the θελημα σαρκων, or the θελημα ανδρων to produce the new birth necessary to salvation. That is indeed of God the Holy Ghost; but does it, therefore, follow that the will of the sinner must not simultaneously assent to and concur in the truths offered for acceptance by the Holy Spirit? And will regeneration be effected without such assent and concurrence by the will of the adult man? Regeneration, therefore, although it is entirely the act of the Almighty Spirit, is never, in the economy of God's grace to adult and responsible though fallen man, effected without the concurrence of the will of such man.

But as Scripture and sound science must always agree, we are next to consider an objection urged against this view by the advocates of a certain system of mental philosophy. They tell us that the habitus or disposition of a moral being determines the volitions or acts of will by him made; that a good man chooses good things, and a wicked man chooses wicked things. And therefore they argue that the Holy Spirit must change the disposition of the sinner in order that his will may assent to the terms of salvation—that the new birth must take effect in the disposition before the will can be conformed to the will of God. But these philosophers ignore certain facts which militate powerfully, indeed victoriously, against their conclusions. They ignore the fact that Satan was originally endowed with a disposition perfectly holy and pure, yet he chose evil—assented with his will to evil. And the same was true as
to the *holy* disposition and the *evil* choice of each angel that fell, and of Eve and of Adam.

Therefore, although God always freely *chooses*—*wills*—according to His infinitely holy spiritual nature, and never *wills* otherwise, the same cannot be said of His moral creatures. They were but *creatures* at best. They were endowed with dual natures; and hence, although perfectly *holy* in *disposition*, yet the resistance of the material to the spiritual—of the flesh to the law—was such that their *wills*, being perfectly *free*, chose evil, and they sinned and fell.

Hence the principle that the *habitus* or disposition of a moral agent always determines his choice—the acts of his will—cannot be taken as universally true. Like many other principles which are found generally true in our limited human experience, it will suffice for our guidance in most cases which occur in this life, but it fails utterly when applied to the problems touching the infinite and the eternal. The human will is so truly cause—so absolutely free—that its volitions are projected beyond all experience founded on the finite and the mundane philosophies.

We therefore conclude that true philosophy conforms to the teaching of Scripture; that God, everywhere in His providence and His Word, treats man as a *free* moral being, accountable for the evil of his own disposition, for the desperate wickedness of his own heart, which his own conduct has brought on himself, and hence bound to change that heart under the methods and forces which the Holy Spirit offers freely to him. It is only on this basis of truth that we can understand the commands of inspiration to sinful men: "Repent, and turn yourselves from all your transgressions; so iniquity shall not be your ruin. Cast away from you all your transgressions, whereby ye have transgressed; and *make you a new heart and a new spirit*; for why will ye die, O house of Israel?"¹

¹ Ezekiel xviii. 30, 31.
"Wash ye, make you clean; put away the evil of your doings from before Mine eyes; cease to do evil; learn to do well."\(^1\)

Neither is there anything inconsistent with a sound psychology in the belief that the simultaneous and concurrent acts, on the one hand, of the Holy Spirit in applying divine truth to the heart and conscience, and, on the other hand, of the will of the adult sinner in humbly assenting to and accepting that truth, constitute that regenerating change in the disposition or \textit{habituis}\(^2\) of the sinner which is necessary to salvation. Therefore every descendant of Adam, in every land, old enough and sane enough to understand simple truth, may be saved if he will, and can blame none but himself if he be lost.

And this doctrine, thus understood, does not encourage self-righteousness, does not contravene such scriptures as these: "By grace are ye saved through faith; and that not of yourselves; it is the gift of God; not of works, lest any man should boast."\(^3\) "And if by grace, then it is no more of works; otherwise grace is no more grace; but if it be of works, then it is no more grace; otherwise work is no more work."\(^4\) For the whole remedy of sin, and methods for making it effectual, are from God. The sinner who truly submits his will to the Holy Spirit, and accepts Christ by faith, will never believe or boast that he has saved himself.

We have seen that God made known to Adam and Eve, after their fall into sin, the remedial plan devised by Him for their salvation and that of their descendants, and the methods of its application. Doubtless the loving will of God desired that not only our first parents should accept this plan, but all their posterity, as fast as they came to years of intelligence and accountability. And as the regeneration of all who died in infancy was committed to the Holy Spirit, everything was done needful for the salvation of the whole race. But the obstinate

\(^1\) Isaiah i. 16. \(^3\) Ephesians ii. 8, 9. \(^4\) Romans xi. 6.
and wilful resistance of the children of men to the strivings of the Holy Spirit, made farther methods necessary in order to save as many of the human family as possible.

The first of these methods requiring notice was the establishment in the family of Seth of regular forms of public worship of God. It was after the birth of his son Enos that we read that men "began to call upon the name of the Lord."¹ As this was after the murder of Abel by Cain, which occurred when Abel was about one hundred and twenty-eight years of age, it is quite certain that the population of the earth was numbered by many hundreds of thousands.² Thus there were enough to furnish with inhabitants the city which Cain built, and enough to render it important that a regular cultus should be established to keep alive the instructions which God had given for the salvation of men.

But though this method doubtless was the means of saving many, and though eminent examples of piety, approaching that of Enoch, may have occurred, yet the great mass of mankind, instead of yielding their wills to the dominion of the Holy Spirit, grew worse and worse. The "sons of God" yielded to the seductions of the "daughters of men," and the church was speedily swallowed up in the world. We have noted the lurid painting of universal human wickedness then presented. Then a method was adopted, short, sharp and decisive, yet adapted to secure "the greatest good to the greatest number," taking into consideration the whole race. The deluge of water swept away all of the race of Adam save Noah, his wife, his three sons and their wives, who were saved in the ark.

¹ Genesis iv. 26.
² In the well-matured and ingenious article, entitled "Cain, a Speculation," Southern Presbyterian Review, July, 1878, pp. 475-489, the writer, Rev. Dr. J. W. Pratt, estimates the population of the earth at the death of Abel as about one million souls, pp. 479, 480.
Again the Church of God was established in visible form, and a knowledge of the Divine remedy for sin was communicated to every human being, to be transmitted to his or her descendants. But soon the ἐρωτήματα αἰκροτών began to manifest itself. And in passing years the descendants of Noah began to vie in wickedness with the descendants of Adam before the flood. Then again God instituted other methods by which the ever-rising tide of human depravity should be kept within bounds, and should be prevented from overflowing and sweeping away all knowledge of the plan of salvation.

To two only of these methods will it be necessary herein to make special reference:

*First,* The ritual or ceremonial law, which was commenced with a special rite in the family of Abraham, and was continued in the line of Jacob, one of his grandchildren, up to the time when—the Son of God having been manifested in the flesh, the Sun of Righteousness having reached the zenith—all shadows disappeared.

We are now able to see that two all-important purposes were accomplished by these ceremonial severities, which constituted a burden, the weight of which was powerfully described by the apostle Peter in the Christian synod of Jerusalem when he said, "Now therefore why tempt ye God, to put a yoke upon the neck of the disciples, which neither our fathers nor we were able to bear?"1 These purposes were:

1. That a great magazine of symbols, emblems, types and figures should be provided, all pointing to the Lamb of God, and all serving wonderfully to stimulate the minds of worshippers to bear in memory the vicarious sacrifice and the lessons of self-denial and imputed righteousness coming therefrom. These symbols and types have long ago fulfilled their mission, and are now only to be used as illustrations of the completeness of the

1 *Acts xv. 10.*
great remedial plan. To use them or imitate them now as subsisting symbols is to deform their beauty and degrade their nature. For us, the Great High Priest has, once for all, offered Himself up and entered into the holy of holies, and the veil that once hung between heaven and earth is rent in twain. We are no longer in religious childhood, to be taught by ceremonies and types, but are encouraged to come boldly to the throne of grace through Jesus Christ, "by whom also we have access by faith and by one Spirit unto the Father."1

2. That, by means of these rigid ceremonial requirements, the Jews were kept a peculiar people, free from idolatry, except by way of occasional lapses, and unable and unwilling to commingle with the nations surrounding them. Thus a knowledge of the true God, of His law and remedial plan, was kept alive until το πλήρες του χρόνου—"the fulness of the time"—was come. And, so far as we can see, this was the only method by which the truth could be preserved through the ages of darkness and guilt, extending from the exodus of the Hebrews from Egypt to the establishment of the Roman empire. The Jews were accustomed to regard themselves as the favored people of God, and such opinions clung to the minds even of inspired Christians, taken from the Jewish race;2 but they were only used as the elected conduit through whom the mercy of God was to flow to the greatest possible proportion of the race of Adam.

Secondly, The special and extraordinary interventions which God, from time to time, made, during the progress of the world’s history, for the purpose of giving added authority and power to His remedial plan. These interventions are generally called miracles. They were suspensions of the ordinary course of nature, and were never enacted except in reference to some

1 Romans v. 2; Ephesians ii. 18; iii. 12.
2 Romans ix. 1–5; x. 1–3; iii. 1–3; Galatians ii. 1–16.
crisis which called for them. We have insisted constantly throughout this work that God works upon His \textit{opusculum}—matter—according to law. And as this law is the expression of the Divine wisdom and intelligence, it must be uniform in its operation in the ordinary course of nature; for if it were not uniform, it would not be the adequate expression of that infinite, calm and all-seeing knowledge which devises its plans wisely, and suffers no caprice, no fickleness to interrupt its majestic career. And if the course of nature were not uniform, the rational creatures of God would be rational in vain; neither angels nor men could have exercised the prudence and foresight which was a part of the high virtue that God bestowed on them. Men could not provide for a single day for those dependent on them. They could not know that the sun will rise to-morrow, that food will nourish the body, that corn sown in the cultivated field will spring up and yield a harvest for bread.

Nevertheless, there is nothing in true science which negatives the belief that God may work a miracle. That He can thus intervene, and, by special exertion of power, can suspend for a time the laws imposed on matter by Himself, is a proposition that will not be denied by any believer in a Personal God.\footnote{It seems difficult for men who devote themselves exclusively to what is called science to believe in the possibility of miracle. Professor Simon Newcomb says: "All scientific conclusions necessarily rest on the postulate that the laws of nature are absolutely unchangeable, and that their operations have never been interfered with by the action of any supernatural cause; that is, by any cause not now in operation in nature or operating in any way different from that in which it has always done,"—"Popular Astronomy," Edit. 1878, p. 522. Yet Sir Isaac Newton, Matthew F. Maury and Joseph Henry all knew something of science, and all believed, not only that miracles are possible, but that they have been actually wrought in our world!} Reverence for the character of the Infinite Creator does indeed forbid us to believe that He will thus intervene upon light
occasions or for slight causes. The heathen maxim, which deprecates the introduction of Divine intervention in the common course of human affairs unless the crisis be worthy to be solved by God Himself, may well apply to our belief in miracles.¹ And accordingly, the sober view of Christianity is that, though such interventions have occurred in the history of our world, they have occurred only at long intervals of time and for purposes indicating that a Divine crisis was at hand calling for such intervention.

To introduce a new order of beings, like angels or men, or a new species of living organism; or to sweep away an effete and hopeless generation in order to start the race of man on a new departure; or to authenticate a new revelation, and prove incontestably that it comes from God; or to save a chosen people as a depository of divine truth; or to introduce the Son of God to the world with appropriate majesty, even when He came only “in the likeness of sinful flesh and for sin,”—these are Godlike crises which justify the immediate intervention of God, and a temporary change in the ordinary course of His material universe.

And accordingly, we believe, on the testimony of the Word of God, that He caused angels to be created, not evolved, from lower natures; and that He caused successive species of fish, fowl and flesh to be created, not developed or evolved; and that He formed man of the dust of the earth, and formed woman from man; and that He caused a watery deluge to prevail which no ordinary laws of nature would have sufficed to raise; and that this deluge was sufficient to destroy all of the human race then living, save Noah and his family; and that He wrought miracles of judgment in Egypt, and miracles of mercy

¹ “Nec Deus intersit, nisi dignus vindice nodus
Inciderit.”

—Horatii, De Arte Poetica, ll. 191, 192.
to preserve the Israelites; and that He saved Daniel in the den of lions, and saved the three faithful Hebrews in the fiery furnace; and that after the miraculous incarnation and birth of the Son of God, this God-man wrought mighty miracles, healed the sick and cleansed the leper by a word, stilled the raging of winds and waves by a command, walked on the surface of the water, which was compelled to sustain Him, raised the dead, and finally rose, Himself, from the dead, and ascended to heaven.

Thus was introduced the mightiest kingdom this world has ever known—a kingdom “not of this world,”1 yet destined to fill the world with its glory. And in order to the full inauguration and visible opening of this kingdom, the power of working miracles was continued in the hands of the immediate apostles and servants of Christ until the requisite foundations were laid. Then this power passed away from earth and from the hands of men. It had done its work, and was recalled by Him who alone really holds it, and who will not exercise it on earth again until some august crisis again calls for His direct intervention.2

Miracles, being in their nature facts which come under the cognizance of the senses, are susceptible, like all other facts, of

1 John xviii. 36.
2 After the death of the apostle John, who is supposed to have died about A. D. 102, we have of course no miracles vouched for by Divine testimony, and none wrought by men or women which will stand the test of rigid historical criticism. But we have a few occurrences of a miraculous nature so well established by authentic history that it is more reasonable to believe than to deny them. To this class belongs the destruction, by the outburst of balls of fire, of the foundations of the temple at Jerusalem, which the apostate emperor, Julian, attempted to rebuild. It is related by the careful Roman historian, Ammianus Marcellinus, and by the Christian Eusebius, and is so consistently vouched for that even Gibbon seems compelled to adopt it as history.—“Decline and Fall,” N. Y. Edit., 1850, Vol. II., pp. 22, 436.
being proved by the testimony of witnesses, who may be so numerous and so severely tested that the falsehood of their evidence would be far more incredible than its truth.¹ And such is the case as to the material miraculous events on which the great remedial plan of salvation rests for its support—notably among which are to be mentioned the miraculous works of the God-man while on earth, His resurrection from the dead and ascension to heaven.

The Divine, and therefore supernatural and miraculous, elements of the remedial plan, so far as they constitute the humiliation of the Son of God in His life and death on earth, are all summed up in two rich verses of Paul's inspired letter to the Romans: "For what the law could not do in that it was weak through the flesh, God sending His own Son in the likeness of sinful flesh (ἐν ὑμμομοματί παρὰς ψυχής, literally in the likeness (or image) of the flesh of sin) and for sin, condemned sin in the flesh, that the righteousness of the law might be fulfilled in us, who walk not after the flesh, but after the Spirit."² The discussions through which we have passed will enable us to gain some insight into its deep meaning.

The law is that rule of action dictated by the Divine Spirit for the guidance of the dual creature, man. Had he obeyed this law it would have done for him what it was intended to do, i.e., secured his peace and happiness. But the resistance of his material nature (his flesh) to the perfect dominion of this law caused him to fall into sin. Thenceforth the law was

¹ On no question affecting Christian faith has its triumph been more signal, even in the forum of reason, than on the question of the sufficiency of testimony to prove a miracle. Dr. Henry Raffuer sums up the arguments pro and con in his lecture on "Miracles as an Evidence of Christianity," University of Virginia Lec. Evid. Chris., pp. 61-107. And the acute lawyer, Professor Greenleaf, in his work on the Resurrection of Christ, is equally strong.

² Romans viii. 3, 4.
powerless to save him—it was weak through the flesh. Now came the miraculous remedy. God sent His own Son in the image of the flesh of sin. This Son, by miraculous conception and birth, under the infinite power of the Holy Spirit, took upon Himself the material constitution and image of that very flesh that had sinned. He became a man. He consented that that majestic and divine material form and essence which He had possessed from all eternity should pass under the humiliation of being conceived in the womb of the Virgin Mary and born of her, subject to the lowly conditions and innocent infirmities of the very humblest of the race of fallen man, subject to grief, pain, suffering, sickness, and death. And all these humiliations He endured in the likeness of sinful flesh, and “for sin.”—περί αμαρτίας. His whole office herein was vicarious. He took the place of the sinner. And though He did no sin, neither was guile found in His mouth, yet He suffered every grief, every pang, every horror, every pain of dissolving nature, every shrinking from coming death, yes, every gloom of the eternal prison-house, that the sinner, not saved, will endure. For He entered the portals of death and of the grave, and endured sufferings equivalent to all the horrors of that eternal

1 It is not uncommon to find in theological treatises statements to the effect that Christ did not suffer with disease or sickness, because He would have been thus disqualified for the great duties of His mission. But no such view is countenanced by Holy Scripture. “Himself took our infirmities and bare our sicknesses,” (Matthew viii. 17.) Νοσσεσ (ημων) εμπαιταιεν. Νοσος means “sickness,” “disease,” “distemper,” not only in classic Greek, but in the ten instances in which it occurs in the New Testament. And even admitting that the passage from Isaiah, which Matthew refers to, does not necessarily include disease under our “grievs and sorrows,” yet assuredly the inspired gospel gives an interpretation which faith may accept. He was “in all points tempted like as we are;” and when we remember how large a part of the temptations we meet in life arise from disease and sickness, we can believe that our merciful High Priest suffered this kind of temptation also, “yet without sin.”
prison-house which is beyond the grave. And as eternity was bound up in His person—was the infinite condition of His person as God-man—so in His sorrowful life on earth, and in the garden, and in the mock-trial scenes, and on the cross, He suffered all the gloom and horror that the lost sinner could endure through eternal ages. The infinite dignity of His person caused the concentrated power of eternal years of suffering at once to be present with Him. Thus, in the humiliation voluntarily endured by His Son in the likeness of sinful flesh, God “condemned sin in the flesh.” Thus was it rendered possible that God “might be just, and the justifier of him which believeth in Jesus.”¹ And thus the penalty of the law being completely endured for sinners, and the requirements of the law being completely obeyed for sinners, the end of the remedial plan is accomplished. The righteousness of the law is fulfilled in us, who walk not after the flesh, but after the Spirit.

The elements of the supernatural and miraculous which enter into all these events of the humiliation necessarily render it transcendent. It is a holy mystery. But though we cannot comprehend it in all its length and breadth and height and depth, we can understand enough of it to save our souls. Above all, we can experience it—feel it; and this is better than intellectual comprehension. We can believe with the heart unto salvation.²

From the revealed facts of the humiliation, a question emerges which was very little considered by believers of the primitive days, but which in modern times has assumed imposing proportions.³ It is a question already referred to herein. Its

¹ Romans iii. 26.
² Romans x. 10.
³ "The Person and Sinless Character of our Lord Jesus Christ," is the title of a work by the late Rev. Dr. Wm. S. Plumer, which, though plain and simple in style, shows evidences of research and erudition. But the
simplest form is this: Was the Son of God, while in His estate of humiliation on earth, *impeccable? It is not, Was He actually sinless? On that point, all claiming to be Christians agree; and even the uncle and nephew, Lelius and Faustus Socinus, and their immediate followers, held that He was “without sin.” But was “the man Christ Jesus,” while on earth, so deprived of “freedom of will,” by the fact that He was also God, that He was incapable of yielding to temptation and committing sin? This question is far from being abstract or trivial in its practical bearing. Every man who has felt what temptation to sin is, and who has struggled with it and resisted it, successfully or unsuccessfully, will recognize the importance of such a query.

It is not to be denied that modern opinion, as held by repre-
sentative men of high standing in the Christian Church, differs, even to the extent of serious conflict, on this point.\(^1\) But its ultimate decision must be determined by the teachings of Holy Scripture, and the just inferences therefrom. Thus tested, the negative of the question seems to prevail, by the strength of the following scriptural arguments:

1. The Son of God, in order to be fitted for His estate of humiliation, was “made of a woman, made under the law.”\(^2\)

\(^1\) The absolute *impeccability* of Christ, while on earth and in His estate of humiliation, is held by the late venerable theologian, Rev. Professor Wm. S. Plumer, of Columbia Theological Seminary, in his work entitled “The Person and Sinless Character of our Lord Jesus Christ”; by the writer of an able article on “The Impeccability of Christ,” in the Southern Presbyterian Review, January, 1877, pp. 128–142; and by Rev. Hugh Martin, of Edinburgh, in his “Christ’s Presence in the Gospel History,” 2nd Edit. The negative of the question is held by Canon Farrar, in his “Life of Christ”; by Dr. Julius Müller, in his “Christian Doctrine of Sin”; by Dr. Ullmann, in his “Sinlessness of Jesus”; by Professor J. A. Dorner, of Berlin, in his “Christology”; by Dr. Philip Schaff, in his treatise on “The Person of Christ, the Miracle of History”; by Rev. Henry Patillo, in his “Sermons,” published in 1788; and by Dr. Charles Hodge, in his “Systematic Theology,” Vol. II., p. 457. The writer in the Southern Presbyterian Review addresses his argument rather to incautious statements and admissions of his opponents than to the question itself—flounders in the mire of the profitless dispute about the distinction between concupiscence and sin—in attempting to answer Dr. Hodge’s argument, and wholly omits all answer to the argument drawn from the scriptural doctrine that Christ was “made under the law.” Strangely enough, this argument seems to be pretermitted by all the writers on both sides. It is faintly touched, and certainly not answered, in Dr. Plumer’s work. Yet, in truth, it involves the gist of the question; for therein consists the inscrutable mystery of the distinction between the “freedom of will” in God, who is the author of law and above law, and the “freedom of will” in the “man Christ Jesus,” who was made “under the Law.” God cannot lie, cannot sin; but man *can* lie, *can* sin; though when perfectly sinless and perfectly strong, as was Christ, he certainly *will* not sin. Adam was sinless, but not strong.

\(^2\) Galatians iv. 4. *Ἰησοῦν εξ ἐνοικίων γένεσιν ὑπὸ νήπιον,* literally, “born from a woman, born under law.” The participle is from *γεννάω.*
Before His incarnation He was not under the law. He was God—equal in power and glory to the Law-giver—the source of law, and therefore above law, not under it. But when, for the purpose of carrying out the remedial plan and saving man, He consented to be made in the likeness of sinful flesh—made of a woman—made under the law; He became subject to the law, bound to obey the law. Necessarily, then, He had freedom of will as a man; He had power to disobey; for if He had not, then there was no merit in His obedience, He wrought no righteousness in obeying. He was a mere machine, without "freedom of will," but simply constructed by Divine power to run in a certain groove, and incapable of running in any other. So far, therefore, from exalting our esteem for Christ, this notion of His absolute impeccability—His inability to exercise freedom of will, really degrades Him, and eliminates all merit from His obedience.

2. The necessary conditions of being and of salvation, by reason whereof Christ was driven by the Spirit into the wilderness and there subjected for forty days to the temptations of Satan, show that He had freedom of will, which gave Him ability either to yield to temptation and fall, as the first Adam fell, or to resist and triumph, and thus become the Second Adam, the Saviour of tempted sinners. For what was the significance of that scene in the wilderness which immediately follows His baptism and the descent of the Holy Ghost like a dove, and the voice of the Divine Father proclaiming, "Thou art My beloved Son, in whom I am well pleased?" We are

—old form, ἤγεννα—which means, primarily, "to be born," though it often has the meaning "to become," "to happen," "to be produced," "to emanate," "to spring from," "to exist," "to be made." "Made," as applied to Christ, is not free from objection, for it holds implicitly the idea of creation, and Christ was never a creature. Scripture negatives any such idea, although the common theology is compelled to hold it as to His body, born of the Virgin Mary.
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told that “immediately the Spirit driveth Him into the wilderness.”
There was a necessity for this scene. The temptation of Eve by Satan was unavoidable, as we have seen. Much more was the temptation of the Second Adam unavoidable, for on its issue depended the salvation of all saints. But when the tempter drew near, whom did he approach? The Son of God, indeed, but yet a man—a man made of a woman, made under the law, and bound to obey the law. Now if this man Christ Jesus had no freedom of will, no ability to yield to the temptations offered, by the assent of His will thereto, then this scene in the wilderness loses all its significance. Satan, tempting the rocks and the sands of the desert near the Dead sea, offering them bread, tempting them to show their power by rending themselves away from their foundations, offering them all the kingdoms of the world and the glory of them if they would fall down and worship him, would have had as much significance—that is, none at all. Why none? Because the rocks and sands would have had no ability to yield to his temptations. Then, if Christ had no ability to yield, wherein did His victory over Satan consist? It was because He had freedom to yield, and yet, by His supreme virtue, refused to yield—successfully resisted all temptations, and overcame the devil in this mortal combat—that He has become fitted to be the Captain of our salvation.

3. The same scriptures which teach us that our great High Priest was “holy, harmless, undefiled, and separate from sinners,” and that the man Christ Jesus “did no sin, neither was guile found in His mouth,” and that He “magnified the law and made it honorable,” also teach us that “we have not an High Priest which cannot be touched with the feeling of

1 Καὶ εὐθὺς τῷ Ἰησοῦ τὸ νησίον ἐξάλλει εἰς τῆς ἔρημου.—Mark i. 12. The verb could not be stronger. It conveys the idea of irresistibly “throwing out.”
our infirmities; but was in all points tempted like as we are, yet without sin,”¹ and that “in that He Himself hath suffered, being tempted, He is able to succor them that are tempted.”² From this we have a right to infer that Christ felt the power of temptation. Although perfectly sinless, perfectly free from inclination to sin, and from motions of sin, and from τὸ Φρονήμα τῆς σαρκὸς, He had that in the human nature which He had voluntarily taken that experienced and knew what temptation really was. Otherwise He would not have been “in all points tempted like as we are;” for if there was absolutely nothing in Him which enabled Him to feel what power temptation has, then it could no more be declared of Him that He was “touched with the feeling of our infirmities,” “and tempted like as we are,” than it could be so declared of a stock or a stone. And if He was incapable of feeling the power of temptation, then it could not be properly said of Him that “He hath suffered, being tempted.” The Greek word rendered “hath suffered” is πεποθην, from παθω, which always contains the idea of “feeling,” “experiencing,” and often that of “painful feeling,” or suffering, in its common meaning. Now, if Christ was incapable of sin, He could never have experienced such feeling, and He would not have been “able to succor them that are tempted,” because He would have been for ever without experience of their danger—without knowledge of the mode in which the enemy could approach them.

Therefore we conclude that the Son of God, during the season of humiliation to which He voluntarily brought Himself that He might become the Second Adam and the Saviour of the human race, possessed freedom of will, which made Him able to yield to temptation and to disobey the law. The very

¹ Hebrews iv. 15. Ἡπετεραμενον δὲ κατὰ πάρτα καθ' ομοιωτητα—“being tempted as to all things with similarity” (to us).
² Hebrews ii. 18.
fact that He had that ability, and that He nevertheless triumphed over every temptation and continued absolutely sinless to the last, is that which constitutes His merit, that which makes the spotless righteousness which He wrought out in His life and His death, and which is offered to the penitent sinner, and that which enables Him to sympathize with poor sinners of Adam’s race, and to succor them in every honest effort they make to resist temptation.

And in answer to the question,¹ “If Jesus Christ was ever peccable and fallible, when did He become impeccably and infallible?” we have no difficulty in replying: when His days of humiliation ended, for then He resumed His throne in heaven, and was no longer “under the law.”

Turning from this important question to review farther the miraculous methods adopted by God for carrying out His remedial plan, we are called to remark that every miracle recorded in the Scriptures bore upon the working of that plan and tended to its accomplishment. And among these miracles —next to those immediately connected with the offices of Christ and of the Holy Spirit—none have advanced more wonderfully the purpose of God to save all of Adam’s race that can be saved than those miracles of inspiration which have sent forth into the world and given to man the book known as the Bible —the Word of God.

Language was not the invention of man. To suppose that Adam and Eve were brought into being, of mature constitution, bodily and mental, and yet furnished with no vehicle of thought by means of which their mental impressions and heart feelings could be communicated to each other, is to impute a serious defect to the work of the all-wise Creator. The postulate of a primitive language, suited to the pleasures and duties of the garden of Eden, is moderate and reasonable in the view of

¹ Dr. Plumer’s “Person and Sinless Character of Christ,” p. 108.
common sense. It does not by any means ignore the evident traces of words, formed upon visible objects and audible sounds, found in all languages, and indicative of human invention. Neither does it ignore the growth and formal perfection of language under the influence of human culture.

Words are the material signs of thought, which is the peculiar work of spirit. Words are visible, or palpable, or audible. To a person able to see, visible words address themselves; to one able to hear, but not to see, audible words convey thought; to one not able either to see or hear, raised letters on a surface to which touch may be applied reach the soul within. But in all cases the material is used, in words, to convey the immaterial or spiritual—that is, thought. Hence, as the salvation of the soul of erring man consists in a change in the spiritual product of the flesh, it is natural and proper that this change should be wrought through the instrumentality of words used by the Holy Spirit. But mere human words cannot even instrumentally work this change. They are but the material signs of human thought, which, in fallen man, will be the outcome of material propensities, and generally evil. It must be the word of God, conveying a knowledge of the remedial plan and the inducements to accept it, that, used instrumentally by the Spirit, can regenerate man. And as the word is the material exponent of Divine thought, so, in the Scriptures, Christ, the only begotten Son, the material exponent of the Divine character—the χαρακτήρ τῆς υποστάσεως αὐτοῦ—is designated as The Word, who was with God, and who was God, and was in the beginning with God, and who was made flesh and dwelt among men, so that they beheld His glory, the glory as of the only begotten of the Father, full of grace and truth.

We are able to see, therefore, why God should have made His Word the material instrument for regenerating men in all ages of the world, and why He should have miraculously in-
spirited holy men, who spake as they were moved by the Holy
Ghost, and who, in successive ages, gradually formed the volume,
consisting of sixty-six different books, now known as the Holy
Scriptures. This Word of God, although in material form only,
is designated by inspiration as "the sword of the Spirit." Concerning it we have the declaration, "The Word of God is
quick, and powerful, and sharper than any two-edged sword,
piercing even to the dividing asunder of soul and spirit, and of
the joints and marrow, and is a discerner of the thoughts and
intents of the heart."  

In all ages this Word, in its substance, has been the instru-
ment used by the Holy Spirit for regenerating those old enough
to understand and wise enough to bow their wills to the God-
man therein made known. And since the reformation, when
this Word was unbound and sent forth on its proper mission,
the triumphs of the Son of God have been greater and greater.
Within a half century past, this Word has been sent forth in
millions of copies and in all known languages, and the effect
has been that on the map of the world we can trace by lines
and surfaces of clear light the countries wherein this Word has
free course, while other countries are yet shaded and darkened
by ignorance and lethargy. And of the thirteen thousand
millions of people now supposed to inhabit our earth, probably
one-half are directly or indirectly reached by this life-giving
Word.

Within the memory of men now living, the Fiji Islands, in
the South Pacific Ocean, were inhabited by men, women and
children, all of whom were idolaters and cannibals. Their chief
sources of delight were to kill and eat their fellow men. The
Word of God, carried by His missionaries, and ever accompanied
by His Holy Spirit, has penetrated those Islands, and now,
according to a recent narrative, given by the English nobleman

1 Hebrews iv. 12.
who is governor of those Islands, "out of a population of one hundred and twenty thousand, one hundred and two thousand are regular attendants at the mission churches, and the remaining eighteen thousand are not heathens, but members of other Christian churches. Out of sixty-two ordained ministers, more than fifty are natives, and they have three thousand native teachers constantly at work in their schools. Such results present to us a nation born in a day."

Even in lands yet reckoned as heathen, we believe that no man who honestly uses the light afforded him, and strives for a righteousness better than his own, will fail to find the God-man and to know that his Redeemer liveth. What then must be the position of every man in this day of light, in lands where the Holy Word is ever open?

If such a man shall at last be a part of that eternal evil in the universe, which neither power, wisdom nor love, though infinite, can eliminate, his conscience will bear eternal witness that he has only himself to charge with his perdition.
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