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DR. GIRARDEAU'S ANTI-EVOLUTION:

THE LOGIC OF HIS REPLY.

BY JAMES I. MARTIN.

COLUMBIA, S. C.

PRINTED AT THE PRESBYTERIAN PUBLISHING HOUSE.

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## APPENDIX.

From the Christian Observer.

REPLY TO DR. MARTIN.

*What is a Miracle.*

BY REV. J. L. GIRARDEAU, D. D.

In four successive numbers of the *Southern Presbyterian*, Dr. J. L. Martin has recently attacked an article written by me, and published in the last *Presbyterian Quarterly*, in defence of the contra-natural character of the miracle. The article was almost wholly occupied in vindicating against objections, the position that the miracle is contra-natural. When the argument had been finished, it occurred to me that the view sustained by it might be applied to atheism, materialism, pantheism, evolutionism, and agnosticism. Dr. Martin, as if possessed of my consciousness, declares it obvious that the purport of the article was the refutation of evolutionism. This is an entire mistake; and if he demands proof of a statement made by an old friend, I would refer to the whole apparent aim, strain, and tenor of the article, and to the very few words spoken in regard to evolutionism.

It would have been perfectly fair for him to single out the special application of the argument to the evolutionist, and make it the point of attack; but it was hardly so to say not a word with reference to the main contention of the article, and represent it as a "stupendous failure," because a single corollary did not, as he judged, refute the evolutionary hypothesis. Ruled, as his mind was, by this estimate of my argument, his whole discussion was foredoomed to be colored by prejudice.

My respect for Dr. Martin's acknowledged abilities induces me, although reluctantly, to say some things in reply. His own recapitulation of his first two articles is: "Dr. Girardeau's *Quarterly* article contradicts: 1. *Logic*, (1) in his redundant definition; (2) in his incoherent argument. 2. *The Confession of Faith*. 3. *Standard* authors: (1) A. A. Hodge; (2) Chas. Hodge; (3) J. H. Thornwell." The third article is devoted to proving that I contradict myself; and the fourth,

that I contradict the Bible. I shall limit my remarks to the criticism contained in the first article—namely, that I contradict logic; and to the chief points of that criticism, without attempting to follow it into its forest of specifications. I shall not strictly observe Dr. Martin's order of statement, because, begging his pardon, I cannot regard it as logical: he mixes proximate genus with specific difference.

#### THE DEFINITION OF MIRACLE.

I. Dr. Martin charges that my definition of a miracle is "redundant"—a "fatal" defect, which makes him as "my friend," "ashamed and sorry" for me. The definition he assails, briefly put, but not as clearly and fully as in the *Quarterly* article, is: *A miracle is a wonder, contra-natural, accompanying a professed divine message.* We are agreed that a definition proceeds by the proximate genus and the specific difference.

1. One of Dr. Martin's proofs of redundancy is, that wonder is superfluously inserted as a specific mark. He is entirely mistaken as to fact. I expressly assigned wonder, or wonderful event, as the proximate genus. I could not, therefore, have made it a specific mark. I did include in the specific difference, two specific marks, contra-natural and evidential. I did not include wonderful. That was explicitly made generic. The criticism stumbles badly at the outset.

In the next place, Dr. Martin denies that I had the right to incorporate anywhere in the definition the quality *wonderful*. For, if a miracle were repeated, it would cease to be wonderful. The pillar of cloud and fire, for instance, would not have been miraculous except at first. Dr. Martin narrowly limits the wonderful to the unexpected. Will he ever, in this world, cease to regard his conversion as wonderful? If so, he would be an exception to the class—converted sinners. The criticism is captious. He makes me, in the sequel, contradict Dr. Thornwell. But that great man upon this point says:

The scriptural term which gives us the nearest insight into the real nature of the miracle is precisely the one of which Dr. Trench speaks most slightly—the word *wonder*. It is true, that every wonder is not a miracle, but every miracle is a wonder.

Evidently he made wonder the proximate genus under which miracle is included. But, perhaps, his logic and his analysis of the nature of a miracle were fatally defective, like mine.

2. Dr. Martin reproaches me for redundancy, because I embrace, in the specific difference of the miracle, more specific marks than one. He

urges the absolute, irrefragable rule of logic, that the specific difference (*differentia*) is restricted to but one specific mark. In support of this position he uses Sir William Hamilton's authority against me. It behooved him to be very sure of this rule, before he mercilessly employed it as a pestle to bray me in his mortar. But—

(1) The enforcement of this rule would convict distinguished logicians of ignorance, ruin some of their definitions, and make sad havoc of others which are as dear to Dr. Martin as the blood of his heart. A few illustrations must suffice. Bowen says :

The intension of every species contains the genus—that is, the aggregate of marks which characterise the genus—and the specific difference—that is, the aggregate of marks by which this species is distinguished, both from the genus to which it is subordinate, and from the other species with which it is co-ordinate . . . species and genera may be perfectly discriminated by one or few characters.

Jevons says :

It is evident, therefore, that there must be more qualities implied in the meaning of the species than of the genus, as well as a certain additional quality or qualities by which the several species are distinguished from each other. Now these additional qualities form the *difference*, which may be defined as the quality, or sum of qualities, which mark out one part of a genus from the other part, or parts.

These must serve as samples. Take now a practical specimen of definition by an old logician of whom Sir William Hamilton speaks with great respect, and whose work was a text book with John Owen and the dissenters of his day. Burgersdyck, in his *Institutionum Logicarum*, is defining logic itself. He proceeds by the genus and the difference. The genus is art. "The difference," he says, "is taken from the end, the office (!) and the matter or object." Here are three specific marks in the specific difference, and among them "office," for the use of which in the *differentia* of my definition, Dr. Martin chastises me.

But to come home: Let us take the definition of the Westminster Shorter Catechism. Begin with the definition of God. In this celebrated definition you have a number of specific marks con-noting along with the generic, the adorable subject. After pronouncing this "the best definition in a brief compass," Dr. Thornwell says :

Here the genus to which the substance of God is referred is spirit, in strict accordance with the Scriptures and the manifestations of his nature which are made by his works; the difference, those qualities which belong to spirit in its full and normal development, heightened beyond all bounds of conception by terms which are borrowed from God as an object of faith.

Take the definition of justification. The proximate genus is "act of God's free grace." But adoption belongs to the same genus. How is justification to be distinguished from adoption? By the specific difference. Now, that consists of a number of specific marks: (1) Pardon; (2) acceptance of the person as righteous; (3) imputation of Christ's righteousness; (4) reception of Christ's righteousness by faith alone. In this definition, which is clear, distinct, and adequate, you have in the proximate genus the nature, in the specific difference the office, the ground, the mode, the instrument; and, besides, the office of the instrument.

I need pursue this analysis of the Shorter Catechism definitions no further. The same will be found true, to a greater or less extent, of the definition of the work of creation, of the works of providence, of sin, of effectual calling, of sanctification, of repentance, of prayer, and of a sacrament. They all involve more than one specific mark in the specific difference. Now let Dr. Martin go and triumphantly flourish his inexorable rule, which I have so ignorantly violated, over the wreck of the Shorter Catechism which its application would make.

Hold! It will be said, these are not definitions proper. To this I answer: Logicians divide definition into two kinds—the narrower (*angustior*) and the wider (*latior*). Of course, then, the wide are definitions as well as the narrow. For definition would be the proximate genus, including under it the two species, narrow and wide. Now, in giving my definition of a miracle, I did not say that I was furnishing a narrow definition. I may have had the benefit given me of the supposition that I intended to use the wide, even if the critic held that it could not be the narrow. Why this vehement onslaught? Why the application to my definition of a rule applicable only to some particular kind of definition? Why, when the definition contained fewer specific marks than some of those in the Shorter Catechism? The critic has "o'er-vaulted himself." In his eager attempt to break down my argument, he has torn the Shorter Catechism to shreds. Calvinists have been wont to regard its definitions as excellent, whether they may be assigned to one kind or another, narrow or wide, but the same rule by which he would destroy mine would destroy them.

But is Dr. Martin quite sure that the narrow or strict definition limits the specific difference to one specific mark? The question is not, whether if one specific mark renders the definition adequate, one only ought to be inserted. That is admitted. But it is, whether one specific mark in all cases renders the definition adequate. Porphyry, in his cele-

brated Introduction to Aristotle's Categories, defines man as *animal, rationale, mortale*. In relation to this definition, he says :

The differences of rational and mortal are constitutive of man, but those of rational and immortal, of God, those, again, of mortal and irrational, of irrational animals.

This definition was adopted by Abelard, Albertus Magnus, and Petrus Hispanus. I am not defending the material truth of the definition, but instance it to show that great logicians have incorporated more than one specific mark into a specific difference. But it may be said that modern logic has expurgated this defect. Let us, then, hear Sir William Hamilton. In regard to the far-famed definition of man, he says :

If the definition, *man is a rational animal*, be adequate, we shall be able to say, *Every rational animal is human—nothing which is not a rational animal is human*. But we cannot say this ; for though this may be true of this earth, we can conceive in other worlds rational animals which are not human. The definition is, therefore, in this case too wide ; to make it adequate, it will be necessary to add *terrestrial*, or some such term as—*Man is a rational animal of this earth*.

I cannot multiply examples. How would Dr. Martin adequately define, by a single specific mark, evolution ? LeConte gives three ;—or creation ?—the Shorter Catechism gives four :—or a torpedo, either a fish, or a machine, or an article for blowing up an argument and its author ?

So far, as to the logical *form* of my definition of the miracle, I can see no reason for my sharing Dr. Martin's shame and pity in view of my failure in that respect.

#### THE OBJECT OF MIRACLES.

II. As I design to compress what I have to say into this communication, but little room is left for the consideration of the criticism of the *matter* of the definition, and argumentative application.

1. I hold that it is essential to the miracle and not accidental, that it is evidential. That it is a credential, and a credential of divine communications, is the catholic doctrine both of the friends and foes of the Bible. It never occurred to me to defend by strenuous argument what is universally, or at least well-nigh universally, conceded. Although Dr. Thornwell did not formally incorporate it in his definition, he treats it as essential to the miracle. But if the miracle be a credential, whether that feature of it is rightly or wrongly included in the definition, the use of that fact to prove that creation, *in the first instance*, was not a miracle, is relevant, whatever may be thought of the truth of the argument.

2. Dr. Martin is mistaken in alleging that I opposed supernatural and contra-natural as mutually exclusive. I do not know, and I fancy Dr. Martin does not know, that all which is supernatural is contra-natural, but I do know that all which is contra-natural is supernatural. This sweeps away a large section of Dr. Martin's argument to prove my self-contradiction.

3. Dr. Martin is again mistaken in affirming that I have held that the creation of Adam's body was miraculous. On the contrary, I have always, of set purpose, avoided expressing that opinion. This also vacates of force much of what he has said.

4. Dr. Martin presses the point that I am palpably wrong in making the evolution of Adam's body and its creation contradictories; and thus he reasons: My body was created, but it was evolved. There is here no contradiction. Where, then, is the contradiction between the creation and the evolution of Adam's body? I answer: None, whatever, if Adam's body was created like mine—that is, through birth. But to say that, is to beg the very question in dispute, namely, Was Adam's body created through birth? If it be granted that birth is a species of creation of bodies, does it follow that all bodies must be created in that way? Now, we maintain that Adam's body was not born, and that, consequently, it was created in a different way from ours. To argue, then, from the creation of our bodies through birth to the creation of Adam's body through birth is, I say, to beg the question in dispute. It is a question that cannot be settled by assuming that Adam's body was created in the same way as ours are. The question, at the present day, so far as the animal kingdom is concerned, is not as to evolution by birth *within* a species, but as to evolution by transmutation of species: *Are individuals of one species born of individuals of a different species just as individuals are born of individuals within the same species?* In a word, the issue is between evolutionism and special creationism. Dr. Martin misconceives, as many do, the point at issue.

5. Something must be said as to the bearing of my argument to prove the contra-natural character of miracles upon the Theistic evolutionist, and I meant one who is an out and out evolutionist, holding the evolution of everything, body, soul, and all. I had no reference, could have had none, in that argument, to a position held by no Theistic evolutionist that I know of. My eye was not resting on an hypothesis which reduces to unity two contradictories: the hypothesis that the first man's body was evolved by descent from animal forms, but that Adam's body was not so evolved; or, to put it more briefly, that the first man's body

was born, but that Adam's body was not born. It may have been left to children to refute it, who, when asked, Who was the first man? answer, Adam. It was antecedently improbable that such a man as Dr. Martin would valiantly contend for this *olla podrida*. True, he affirms non-contradiction between the Bible and science, but he could not have meant to affirm non-contradiction between the two propositions: The first man's body was evolved: Adam's body was not evolved, or, to affirm non-contradiction between an hypothesis embracing those contradictions and the Bible. It is incredible that Dr. Martin's logic would allow him to do that. But, yet, on the flag he flies at the head of his numerous columns, he inscribes the name of the leader who has maintained that grotesque hypothesis. Can it be that he does not understand the position of the leader for whom he is doing battle? For Dr. Martin speaks of Adam's body alone. There is one conceivable solution of the difficulty which, however, I am reluctant to adopt. May it be that Dr. Woodrow holds—and Dr. Martin knows it—to the hypothesis of *Pre-Adamite man*? That would save the contradiction. If so, tell it out. Let us know. But that can hardly be the solution, for two reasons: First, Dr. Woodrow would have had the courage of his convictions, and frankly avowed the belief; secondly, it would not help Dr. Woodrow one jot, as he would still be involved in self-contradiction; for, if the body of the Pre-Adamite man was evolved, and the body of Adam was not, there would have been a gap between the two which the process of evolution did not cross. I return, then, to the first supposition. Dr. Martin appears to as ignorant of Dr. Woodrow's views as the distinguished professor seems to be of his own.

Further, Dr. Martin also does palpable injustice to Dr. Woodrow by identifying him with the thorough-paced theistic evolutionist, who holds to the evolution of soul and body. The truth is, that he meant to fight for Dr. Woodrow, but he really fights for another man. Dr. Woodrow avows his belief in all the miracles of the Bible, but this other man, with whom Dr. Martin confounds him, admits no miracle but what he calls the miracle of creation out of nothing in the first instance; all else is an "unbroken process of mediate creation." It was this man—the out-and-out theistic evolutionist, whom I fought in the paragraph criticised, and as Dr. Martin fights me for so doing, it is clear as day that he fights for the out-and-out theistic evolutionist. But he did not, as I believe, intend to identify Dr. Woodrow with the thorough-going theistic evolutionist, or to defend the latter. He simply made a mistake. In defending Dr. Woodrow, when he was not attacked, he "kicked before he was

spurred," and did injustice to his friend. This alone throws the argument of his first article, as the printers say, "into pi."

It will not answer for Dr. Martin to say that he only defended Dr. Woodrow in regard to a point at which he agrees with the pure theistic evolutionist, namely, the miraculous character of creation out of nothing in the first instance; for, first, he has not proved that Dr. Woodrow maintains that view; and, secondly, if that were so, he would still leave him exposed to the charge of admitting no other miracle but that, for such was my argument touching the evolutionist assailed in the paragraph in question. That would be to misrepresent both Dr. Woodrow and my argument. That argument was briefly this: If a miracle, as contra-natural, has occurred, it contradicts the position of the theistic evolutionist, for he admits no miracle but that of creation out of nothing in the first instance, but that cannot be a miracle.

#### WAS CREATION A MIRACLE?

Now, a few last words as to the position that creation out of nothing in the first instance was not a miracle.

(1) I expressly spoke of "creation from nothing *in the first instance*," and the whole paragraph limits the argument to that act of creation. The attempt, therefore, to involve me in self-contradiction, because I had admitted that creation out of nothing, as in the creation of Lazarus's animal life, may be miraculous, is utterly vain. Creation out of nothing *originating* a course of nature, and creation out of nothing *during* a course of nature, are very different things. The argument *ad hominem* is irrelevant. Dr. Martin misconceived, and therefore unintentionally misrepresented my position.

(2) That creation out of nothing *in the first instance* could not have been a miracle, was a conclusion from an argument in which I had vindicated the contra-natural character of the miracle. Manifestly, if the miracle be contra-natural, this conclusion is true, for, according to the supposition of creation from nothing in absolutely the first instance, there could have been no nature to be contradicted. It behooved Dr. Martin, therefore, to have refuted the argument for the contra-natural character of the miracle before he could fairly invalidate the conclusion. This, however, he has not done. To say that creation from nothing in the first instance was supernatural, is not enough. He must have shown that every supernatural event is miraculous. He did not show this, and, I imagine, cannot. So, also, in denying that creation out of nothing in



the first instance was evidential, and concluding that therefore it could not be a miracle, I meant to deny that it was a credential of a divine message or revelation. Now that we are certified of the fact, I admit that it is evidential of God's existence and almighty power. But that it was either when it occurred, or now, evidential of a divine message or revelation, I cannot see. Neither can I see how, in the first instance, it was evidential of anything, since, *ex hypothesi*, there were no recipients of evidence in exchange. If, however, Dr. Martin chooses to regard the miracle as not essentially evidential, he is entitled to his opinion. Only he must be content to occupy an exceptional position.

I must close here. I cannot follow Dr. Martin in his three remaining articles. If his charge that I have contradicted logic has been proved to be inconclusive, it is likely that the charge of contradiction to the Confession of Faith, standard authors, and the Bible, is in the same category. Be that as it may, the first argument must serve as a sample of the others. As to the charge that I have contradicted my humble self, I have only this to say, that as Dr. Martin has proved that I contradict logic, the Confession, standard writers, the Bible—everything, the proof that I contradict myself may be proof that I have got right.

A friend of Dr. Martin shouts triumphantly, in the *Southern Presbyterian*, that I have been struck by the "Martin cyclone." I deprecate the discourtesy, as he himself will the logic, of this definition of his attack: proximate genus, Storm; specific difference, consisting of four specific marks—(1) Windy; (2) Moving in a circle; (3) Blown by Dr. Martin; (4) Demolishing *Professor Girardeau*. "I would hasten my escape from the windy storm and tempest. . . . For it was not an enemy that reproached me; then I could have borne it; neither was it he that hated me that did magnify himself against me; then I would have hid myself from him: but it was thou, a man mine equal, my guide and mine acquaintance. We took sweet counsel together, and walked unto the house of God in company."