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ARTICLE I.

THE SUFFERING SEABOARD OF SOUTH CAROLINA.

Among those who encountered the severe trials induced by the late war, none have experienced greater sufferings than the people who dwell on the seaboard of South Carolina. We propose to make some remarks in reference to the past and present condition of this people. We are led to do this by a desire to chronicle events which are but transiently under the eye of observation—*quæque ipsi miserrima vidimus*—and because we are deeply interested in the welfare of near neighbors, and cannot but profoundly sympathise with them as they walk in the furnace of affliction. We are so constituted as to be more thoroughly moved by actual instances of suffering and want, than by any abstract description of their nature, or by the most vivid portraiture of scenes which practically involve them. However forcible may be the expositions of the obligation to exercise pity, or however touching may be the narratives of remote cases of distress, we are more intensely excited by the spectacle of the object in affliction. The account of a starving fellow-creature may to some extent call forth our sympathy; but it is the sight of the emaciated form, the hollow eye, the sunken features, which stir the deepest emotions of the heart. The presence, in an Athenian court, of the wife and children of a man charged with the commission of a capital offence, more moved the Judges than the

tween saying that the tenure of office must be settled by the Almanac, and that it must be settled by the indications of the will of the Holy Ghost?

But we are not to settle this solemn question of demission by considerations of expediency. To the law and to the testimony. If we speak not according to this word, it is because there is no light in us.

ARTICLE VI.

THE GRATUITOUS IMPUTATION OF SIN.

The question whether the Augustinian theology teaches that sin may be justly imputed to or charged upon the guiltless without their concurrence, is now a question of vital importance to every branch of the Presbyterian community in our land, and we propose to devote the present article to a consideration of it. Dr. Hodge, for many years past, has decidedly taken the affirmative, and in his *Theology* repeats his previous utterances, and not only insists that this doctrine is an integral part of the Calvinistic system, and that it was held by Augustine, and by the representative divines of the Church ever since his day, but also that it is fundamental to the Protestant theology and evangelical system of doctrine as taught in the word of God. We cannot acquiesce in this representation, but, on the contrary, insist that it is unauthorised; and further, that it proceeds upon a misconception of the meaning of sundry terms employed in our theological language in relation to the doctrine of original sin. In a single brief article, we can present but few of the results of a protracted and thorough examination, and few only of the multitude of facts which may be alleged to prove that the doctrine referred to has not only never been recognised as a part of the Calvinistic system, but has always been regarded as hostile to the distinguishing principles of that system. The subject is one of vital importance,

both to ethics and theology; and our aim is to awaken not a spirit of prejudice and proscription, but such an interest in the subject itself as shall secure its timely and thorough investigation. And in order to prevent the misconstruction or misapplication of what we offer, we here remark that, by *the gratuitous imputation of sin* to the guiltless, we mean the doctrine which the distinguished Professor at Princeton has propounded on the subject, together with the exegesis by which, as he claims, it is supported.

The conception that sin may be gratuitously imputed to the guiltless, is charged by Zanchius* (when treating on the false views which have been entertained on original sin,) as one of the three leading errors of the Armenians, an ancient people dwelling in Armenia, converted early in the fifth century, and belonging to the Eastern or Greek Church. His words are: "In sententia itaque Armeniorum tres sunt errores: 1. Nullum reipsa in homines derivari peccatum ab Adamo, ut et Pelagius dicebat. 2. Omnes tamen damnationi aeternae obnoxios teneri *propter alienum peccatum*, Adae scilicet, omnium hominum parentis, nisi per Christum liberentur." In the view, then, of this truly great and representative divine—the intimate friend and correspondent of Calvin, Hyperius, Bullinger, Melancthon, Bucer, and Ursinus—it was a great error to hold that the posterity of Adam (unless redeemed by Christ,) are exposed to eternal death for a *peccatum alienum*, or foreign sin of their parent. In the Latin Church, however, the error does not make its appearance until much later. P. Lombard (1164) refers, without naming them, to some who taught it: "Quidem enim putant originale peccatum esse *reatum poenae pro peccato primi hominis*."* But after Scotus (1308) had laid the foundation for it by his bold and unambiguous assertion that "morality is founded on will," his disciple, Ockham, (1347) the founder of the sect of the Nominalists, gave to it a full and formal expression by defining original sin as imputed to the posterity of Adam, to be "the guilt of a foreign sin without

*Op. Tom. IV., pp. 34, 35.

†Lib. II., Distinct. 30, page 211, Paris, 1846.

any inherent demerit of our own ;" *i. e.*, as the ground or basis of its imputation : ("Reatus *alieni peccati sine aliquo vitio haerente in nobis.*") And Chemnitz, in his *Examen Conc. Tridentini*,* referring to the scholastics, says : "There are those who think that original sin is neither privation nor any positive depravity, *but only guilt on account of the fall of Adam, without any inherent ill-desert of our own*—sed tantum reatum propter lapsum Adæ sine pravitate aliqua haerente in nobis ;" thus making the depravity of our nature, and all the calamities of life, result from a *peccatum alienum* alone ; all of which representations evince that such a conception is exceptional and in conflict with what the Church has ever regarded as the Augustinian doctrine. And when Erasmus, with his strong predilections for Pelagianism, adopted the same view, Luther (on Gen. ii. 16, 17) thus refers to it : "And it seems that in our own day also, there are those who are deceived by this argument. For they so speak of original sin (*i. e.* inherent corruption) *as if it were no fault of ours, but only a punishment* (ac si non culpa sed tantum poena) : as Erasmus somewhere argues in express terms, 'that original sin is a punishment inflicted on our first parents, *which we their posterity are compelled to suffer on account of another's crime, without any demerit of our own*, (propter alienam culpam, sine nostro merito,) as an illegitimate child is obliged to endure the shame arising not from his own fault, but from that of his mother ; *for how could he have sinned who as yet did not exist ?* *These things may be flattering to reason, but they are full of impiety and blasphemy!*" And further on he adds : "Satan makes a mighty effort that he may nullify original sin ; and this would be to deny the passion and resurrection of Christ."

Pighius and Catharinus (who were both subsequently members of the Council of Trent,) taught at this time the same view. Pighius, in a work which he published in 1542, and of which Chemnitz, in his *Examen*, (page 97,) gives an analysis, had clearly asserted it, and maintained that "original sin consists alone in this, that the actual transgression of Adam is transmitted and

* Part I., p. 97, Frankfort, 1578.

propagated to his posterity only by guilt and punishment, (*reatu tantum et poena*.) without any corruption and depravity inhering in them; and that they, on account of the sin of Adam, are now guilty, because they have been constituted exiles from the kingdom of heaven; are subjected to the dominion of death; exposed (*obnoxii*) to eternal condemnation, and are involved in all the miseries of human nature; even as servants are born from servants, (who by their own fault have forfeited their freedom,) not through their own desert, but by that of their parents. And as children born out of wedlock suffer the shame of their mother, without any inherent fault of their own." This view of Pighius, as Chemnitz remarks, was approved and accepted by Catharinus. And it was presented and defended by him in the Council of Trent in two orations when the doctrine of original sin was under discussion. We have room only for a brief extract: "He maintained," says Polano,* "that it is necessary to distinguish sin from the punishment; that concupiscence and the privation of righteousness are the punishment of sin; and that, therefore, it is necessary that the sin should be a different thing." . . . "If they were the effects of sin in him, (Adam,) they must of necessity be in others also (*sin verò in eo peccati fuerint effectus, in aliis itidem esse*)." . . . "*He oppugned, likewise, the transmission of sin through generation, saying, 'that as, if Adam had not sinned, righteousness would have been transferred, not by virtue of generation, but only by the will of God, (non virtute generationis, sed solâ Dei voluntate.) so it is fit to find another method for the transfusion of sin.'* And he explained his opinion in this form: that as God made a covenant with Abraham and all his posterity when he made him father of the faithful, so when he gave original righteousness to Adam and all mankind, he made him such an obligation *in the name of all, to keep it for himself and them, observing the commandments, which because he transgressed he lost it as well for others as for himself, and incurred the punishment alike for them.*" . . . "So the very transgression of Adam belonged to every one: *to him as the cause, to others*

* See Hist. Conc. Trident., by P. S. Polano, lib. II., pp. 192, 193. Frankfort, 1621.

in virtue of the covenant (illius tanquam causae, aliorum virtute pactionis); so that the action of Adam is actual sin in him, and imputed to others is original; because when he sinned, all mankind sinned in him."

Now the theory thus expounded by these men, and set forth in the Council in 1546, was rejected by the divines of the Reformation, to a man, as subversive of the whole system of grace. Nor can one prominent theologian, either Lutheran or Calvinist, be named amongst them, after this utterance, who (in referring to original sin) has not directly adverted to and condemned it, as given either by Catharinus or Pighius. The Socinians, however, who became a sect in Poland in the latter part of that century, adopted and defended it with great learning in order to destroy the doctrine of our participation in the first sin; and, in its support, elaborated the exegesis of Rom. v. 12-19, which has been adopted also by Dr. Hodge, as we shall show in the sequel.

The doctrine plainly announced by Augustine, and which has been always entertained and defended by the Calvinistic Church, affirms: 1. The natural and moral (or federal) headship of Adam. 2. That the threatening in Gen. ii. 17, included not only the loss of original righteousness, but spiritual and eternal death. 3. That in the threatening, both Adam and his naturally-begotten posterity were all comprehended. 4. And, consequently, *that all the evils which his posterity suffer, result from the first transgression.* Thus far Pighius and Catharinus concur in statement with Augustine; but at this point they diverge vitally and fundamentally from *the doctrine* he taught: *they* claiming that "the first transgression" was Adam's personal sin alone, which, being gratuitously imputed to the race when guiltless of subjective ill-desert, was the procuring cause of all the evils we suffer; whilst Augustine and the Reformed Church teach that "the first transgression" was not Adam's personal sin alone, but our sin also, in and with him; and which being imputed, produced all those appalling evils; *since in that transgression they all sinned, not putatively, but originally and potentially*, and were thus constituted ἀμαρτωλοί—*really sinners.* In other words, by participating in that offence, they became culpable; so that his sin, and

their sin in and with him, was imputed to them all; and that hence, from this common or universal sin, originated the inherent, hereditary corruption in which we all are born.

Such is the Church view. She has never denied, but on the contrary, has always pronounced it a heresy to deny that the very sin of Adam is imputed to his posterity. But her doctrine is and ever has been that that sin is imputed to us, not simply because of Adam's guilt therein, but because we ourselves participated with Adam therein, and that therefore it is charged upon us as well as upon him, and that we with him are thereby constituted sinners. It was imputed to him and to Eve, because they were alike guilty of its formal perpetration, and was not imputed to Eve merely because Adam had committed it, (though he was her representative,) but because she had participated therein. And in like manner it was imputed to the rest of the race; not merely because their father was guilty of its perpetration, but because they were guilty by participation, when "all sinned." That is, there was a moral and subjective ground in his case, and in the case of Eve, and in the case also of their posterity, for regarding and treating them as sinners. To say that the sin was not imputed to or charged upon our first parents, because they committed it, would be to deny that they were thereby constituted sinners with the rest of the race.

The imputation, therefore, was not that of a *peccatum alienum*, or *gratuitous* in either case. It was direct or *immediate* to Adam and Eve, but not *antecedent* to their personal transgression. With their posterity, however, who sinned in and with them, it was both *immediate* and *antecedent*, for they were not yet in possession of actual personality; or, as Augustine expresses it, *of the forms of life and being which they thereafter should possess*. Nor has the Church ever confounded *immediate* and *antecedent* imputation with *gratuitous* imputation.* Dr. Hodge, however,

* It was through courtesy to the distinguished Professor in Princeton, and in order to avoid the very appearance of captious criticism, that in the discussion of Imputation, in the *Danville Review* for 1861 and 1862, the terms *antecedent* and *immediate* imputation were occasionally employed (though under protest against such use as inaccurate,) as he em-

has repudiated the doctrine thus presented, by affirming that in the first offence the posterity of Adam contracted no subjective guilt or ill-desert, and that all the evils they suffer are penal inflictions on account of Adam's merely personal sin—a sin which, as he affirms, is to them purely a foreign sin, or *peccatum alienum*. But let us hear his own statement.

In the Princeton Essay,* the Doctor says: "Therefore, it is for the one offence of the one man that the condemnatory sentence (the *κρίμα εἰς κατάκριμα*) has passed on all men." Also in his late work, when referring to the analogy in Rom. v. 12–21, he says: "The parallel is destroyed, the doctrine and argument of the apostle are overturned, if it be denied that the sin of Adam, as antecedent to any sin or sinfulness of our own, is the ground of our condemnation."† Again: "There is a causal relation between the sin of Adam and the condemnation and sinfulness of his posterity." "His sin was not our sin. Its guilt does not belong to us personally. It is imputed to us as something not our own, a *peccatum alienum*, and the penalty of it, the forfeiture of the divine favor, the loss of original righteousness, and spiritual death, are its sad consequences."‡ And after describing the universality of sin in the race, he adds: "The only solution, therefore, which at all meets the case, is the scriptural doctrine that all mankind fell in Adam's transgression; and bearing the penalty of his sin, they come into the world in a state of spiritual death, the evidence of which is seen and felt in the universality, the controlling power, and the early manifestation of sin."§ Hereupon follow his citations of the Confessions of the Reformed Churches, in *Latin*,|| as though to verify the accuracy of this his representation of the church doctrine; and yet in not one of them can the principle be found which he has thus por-

ploys them. This acquiescence has since been regretted: for even under protest it was calculated only to perplex the question. The terms should be employed only in accordance with their usage in our recognised theology.

* First series, p. 161. Wiley & Putnam, 1846. These essays all originally appeared in the *Biblical Repertory* or *Princeton Review*.

† See his *Theology*, Vol. II., pp. 212, 213.

‡ *Ibid.*, pp. 215, 225.

§ *Theology*, Vol. II., p. 240.

|| *Ibid.*, pp. 228, 229.

trayed. In fact, Dr. Hodge is obliged to admit this, substantially, in the summary which he presents of their teaching.*

Again: "The sin of Adam did not make the condemnation of all men merely possible: it was the ground of their actual condemnation." "*All mankind were in Adam. He was the federal head and representative of the race. All men sinned in him and fell with him in his first transgression. The sentence of condemnation for his own offence passed upon all men.*"† "It was by one man, he (Paul) says, that sin and death passed upon all men, *because all sinned. They sinned through or in that one man.* His sin was the sin of all, in virtue of the union between him and them."‡ By comparing the view thus presented with the view as above given of the Armenians, Erasmus, Pighius, etc., it will be perceived that on the great points immediately under discussion, they are one and the same: that is, they all concur in stating (1) that the first sin was the sin of the first man only, and not of the race; (2) that it was charged upon his posterity gratuitously, *i. e.*, without any subjective demerit of their own; and (3) that through this imputation that one sin of the one man became the procuring cause of all the evils which have come upon the race. But before proceeding to examine the arguments by which Dr. Hodge would sustain this theory, it seems necessary here, in order to prevent any unnecessary mystification of the issue, to inquire into the meaning of the phraseology which, in the above quotations, we have *italicised*.

In presenting for the consideration or acceptance of our fellow-men any really important principle, it is obvious that all equivocal or ambiguous phraseology should be avoided, so far as its avoidance is possible; and, moreover, that in relation to matters sacred or divine, the obligation becomes absolutely imperative. How, then, may we regard these conditions as met or fulfilled in the foregoing exposition of a principle affirmed by its author to involve (according as it may be either accepted or rejected,) the well-being of the Church, and the very truth and existence of the religion of Christ? for Dr. Hodge repeatedly affirms that such is the fact. Let us endeavor briefly to sift this inquiry.

* Theology, II., pp. 230, 231. † *Ibid*, pp. 551, 552. ‡ *Ibid*, p. 202.

We do not remember that the Doctor, anterior to the discussion of the subject in the *Danville Review*, has, unless very sparingly, in the delineation of his theory, employed the language which we have placed in italics in the forecited passages. In his late work, however, it is of frequent occurrence. Has he then changed or at all modified his views of the doctrine itself? Not at all; for he still affirms them more emphatically, if possible, than before. Why, then, employ thus frequently the language referred to? And how is that language to be understood in the connexion?

Catharinus, as shown above, in unfolding and defending this same theory of the gratuitous imputation of sin, likewise endeavors to incorporate with his statement the same expressions; his aim being obviously to foreclose the objection arising from the divine affirmation in Rom. v. 12, that "*all sinned.*" But whether that objection can be thus ignored, will appear in the sequel.

Whatever may be the ordinary or established usage of the terms referred to in the forecited passages from Dr. Hodge, he therein confessedly employs them to convey no meaning which can be inconsistent with his constant affirmation that in the fall, *Adam alone contracted moral ill-desert or subjective guilt.* For though in this language his posterity are declared to *have sinned in and with him* in that first transgression, the sentence of condemnation which passed upon them was not for this *their* sin and fall in and with him, but for his sin and fall alone. Dr. Hodge, as he has so often announced, and now repeats in these very citations themselves, employs the terms to convey this and no other meaning. While in his Commentary on Romans v. 12-21, and in scores of other instances, he affirms that to suppose that the posterity themselves had contracted subjective guilt or depravity in the first sin, and anterior to the imputation to them of Adam's personal sin, and that this *their* sin was imputed to them, would be in effect to subvert the doctrine of justification by faith alone, and overturn the whole argument of the apostle.*

Let our readers, therefore, contemplate the statement. The

* See especially his review of Dr. Baird's *Elohim Revealed*, in the April and October numbers of the *Princeton Review*, for 1860.

posterity of Adam *sinned* in and fell with him in his sin, and yet *his sin (and not theirs)* is the sole ground of their condemnation and punishment. His sin and fall, and their sin and fall in and with him, brought subjective guilt and criminality *upon him*, and yet left *them* free of all subjective guilt and criminality until after his own sin and fall had been forensically imputed to them. They are condemned for his sin alone; and his sin alone is, by "a sentence of condemnation," (*κρίμα εις κατάκριμα*), set over to their account, and they are made forensically guilty of that sin alone, and not of their own sin and fall. Then, in virtue of the natural and federal relation between them and Adam, (which in no way, however, connects them morally or subjectively with his crime, according to Dr. Hodge,) this sentence of condemnation really constitutes their sinning in and falling with him, so far as any ill-desert on their part is concerned. For, until this sentence comes upon them, they are free of all sin or guilt, whether inherited and inherent or imputed; and free also of all subjective ground of condemnation, even though they sinned in and fell with him who in and through this very fall *did* contract subjective criminality. *So that their sin consists solely of the forensic imputation of his sin to them.* But as such imputation of a foreign sin could not, confessedly, take place until *after* the sin thus imputed had been perpetrated, so it is plain that they did not really sin in and fall with Adam, or *when* he sinned, (as the apostle affirms they did,) but *after* he had sinned and fallen. And if after he had sinned, then on what possible principle do Dr. Hodge and Catharinus allege that we sinned in and fell with him? His posterity were innocent (says Dr. Hodge) previous to the imputation of the *peccatum alienum*, and it was the imputation itself which constituted them guilty. Their sinning in and falling with him, therefore, is neither more nor less than a judicial act of the Creator, condemning them on account of a foreign sin of their father. But how, or on what ground, an act of the holy and blessed Creator is to be construed as our *sinning and falling*, and how it should come to be so described in a plain historic statement, Dr. Hodge has left the reader to explain.

Such, then, is the result which a fair analysis of the forecited

language yields : a judicial sentence of the righteous and eternal Judge condemning a subjectively innocent race for a crime which had been previously committed by their father, and of which he alone with Eve was subjectively guilty, may be fittingly and veraciously described in a dogmatic explanation of the occurrence by saying that *they sinned in and fell with* their father in that criminal transaction ! In view of which it need only be added that if Dr. Hodge considers such an utterance intelligible, he surely should be less free than he has shown himself to be in his application of the term "nonsensical" to the views of his brethren.*

As Adam was already morally depraved when he reached forth his hand and partook of the interdicted tree, on what ground are we to conclude that his posterity likewise were not depraved when they really (and not putatively) sinned in and fell with him in that transgression ? Such is the Augustinian faith on the subject ; and what, then, is there in the utterance that ought to have aroused, as it has, Dr. Hodge's denunciation and ridicule ? † It has the direct support of God's word, and is, moreover, clogged with no such incongruous consequences as attach to the theory which he has offered in lieu of it. Why, then, treat it thus ? Is it because we did not then *personally* exist, and therefore could not have personally participated in the sin ? But the Church has never taught that we did then personally exist, or personally participate ; and yet she has ever affirmed that we did then sin "originally," "potentially" (*δυνάμει*), "by participation;" and to use a more recent expression, "by an ethical appropriation of the guilt of the fall." But the *mode* in which this was effected, she has never professed to know, and therefore employs these expressions to designate the sinning of *the race*, as distinguished from the personal sinning of our first parents. For the fact of our actual sinning is historically announced as a momentary action of

* Dr. Hodge must excuse us for suggesting that the keen-edged satire of Pascal on a *sufficient grace that was not sufficient*, is quite in place here respecting this *sinning and not sinning at the same time, and by one and the same act*. See his Provincial Letters, Letter III.

† See especially his Revised Commentary on Romans, chapter v. 12-19.

the past; and the objection that we could not then participate, because we had no developed personal existence, if it could be made to apply to the case at all, is as fatal to the doctrine of any imputation as it could be to any participation in the offence. If, as Dr. Hodge alleges, a nonentity could not sin, a nonentity surely could not incur an imputation. And yet the divine averment directly assures us that the sinning of the race actually occurred *not after*, but *when Adam sinned*. And then, as both the act of Adam, and the already existing corrupt inclination which induced its perpetration, are the grounds of his condemnation, what hinders that our sin in and with him, and the corruption which led to it, should in like manner and along with his own sin as our head, constitute the ground of our condemnation—that is, the ground on which the apostle affirms that death passed upon all? Why vary the ground in its relation to his posterity?

The Church has always disclaimed any and every attempt at the philosophical solution of the *modus* of this participation, and is, therefore, (as stated in an article in the number of this REVIEW for April last,) quite as unwilling to adopt the solution which philosophical Realism proposes, as to sanction the solution propounded by Nominalism. She has always accepted the inspired statement (in Rom. v. 12, 18, 19,) *as a fact*; and in that fact, though of itself wholly inexplicable, her inner consciousness has always recognised a divinely given explanatory principle, which furnishes an intelligible and sufficient basis for the solution of all the great problems which have been started respecting the calamities of the race and their reconcileableness with the holiness, justice, and goodness of God.

We shall now proceed to consider the method of reasoning by which Dr. Hodge endeavors to sustain his doctrine; but must preface our argument with a brief remark on a point or two greatly insisted on by him in connexion with his claims on its behalf. And *first*, the Doctor objects strongly and repeatedly against the application of the term *theory* to designate his doctrine and exegesis on the subject. He frequently, and in a form that is calculated only to wound, applies that term to the doctrine of our participation in the Adamic sin, though this is the recog-

nised doctrine of the Church, and yet is aggrieved when either that term, or the term *dogma*, is applied to his own doctrine; though these terms have been applied to it directly by the Church theologians ever since that doctrine, with its exegesis, was asserted by Pighius, Catharinus, Slichtingius, and Crellius. We cannot, therefore, admit the disclaimer, much as it would gratify us to acquiesce in the wishes of Dr. Hodge. And neither can we, in the next place, assent to the demand that has recently been made on behalf of this theory, claiming that it is entitled to the *sobriquet* of "*the federal or representative system*"; for it has really no alliance with that system as taught in Calvinistic theology; but, as we are fully prepared to prove, is in radical hostility to all its distinguishing principles. Both Catharinus and Crellius claim quite as strongly as Dr. Hodge, that it was in consequence of Adam's violation of the covenant (*pactum*) made with him, that his innocent offspring were involved in the fearful calamities which have come upon the race. In regard to Catharinus, this is clear from the extracts given above. And as to the Socinian school, we cite below a passage from Crellius, the most profound genius of that school, which surely can leave no doubt on the subject.* But can this claim of theirs entitle their theory to the time-honored appellation of "*the federal or representative system*?" We say, No! and a thousand times, No! And yet, though this constitutes the sole claim of Dr. Hodge's theory to be so entitled, those who repudiate its claim to such a designation, are already invidiously accused of "*rejecting the federal system!*" To apply the term thus is therefore a misnomer; and Dr. Hodge must excuse us for affirming that it

* In his *Paraphrase of Romans*, he thus gives what he regards as the sense of Rom. v. 18: "Quare ut comparationem superius coeptam absolvimus, et totius rei summam concludamus: *quemadmodum ex uno delicto unius hominis, consecutum Dei judicium omnes homines damnationi subjecit, eo, quo supra explicuimus, facto: ita etiam una unius hominis justitia factum est, ut gratia divina, in omnes homines, qui nempe eam, ut diximus, amplectuntur, dimanaret, ac vitam illis sempiternam afferet.*" Let the reader compare this with a passage in Dr. Hodge's *Theology*, Vol. I., pp. 26, 27, beginning with, "Not only, however," etc.

can on no account be recognised. When Epeus had fabricated the wooden horse, Sinon was adroitly sent forth to the crowds of admiring Trojans to give it a name. He bestowed upon it a sacred appellation, (donum Minervae,) through the influence of which the inhabitants of the city became so infatuated as to welcome the structure, with all the desolation and horrors it contained, into the very heart of Troy; and on the following morning, ILIUM FUIT told the sorrowful result.

And now, as to the reasoning which has been advanced in support of this theory.—Dr. Hodge admits that there must be a basis for the imputation of Adam's personal sin to his posterity, and that otherwise such imputation would be arbitrary and incapable of being justified.* But he maintains that the basis, is not their own subjective ill-desert, as, of course, he must do, claiming as he does that it is the imputation of a *peccatum alienum*, or Adam's strictly personal sin, which is the procuring cause of the spiritual death and moral corruption of the race. He, however, professes to find that the basis consists of "the union natural and representative between Adam and his posterity;" not, however, as it is taught by the Church theology, that this union, *by connecting the race subjectively with the sin of Adam*, constitutes thereby the ground of the imputation (*natura corrumpit personam*); but that it constitutes the ground of it without any such connexion, and while the race is entirely free of all subjective ill-desert; and on such a basis he endeavors to vindicate the procedure which he attributes to the Most High. He attempts, moreover, to support his view by adducing Rom. v. 12–21, together with numerous facts (claimed by him as analogies) derived from the Scriptures, and from the operations of Providence in its dealings with men. We shall defer our remarks on the passage in Romans until we shall have considered his statements containing the rest of the argument.

He says: "Our obligation to suffer for Adam's sin, so far as that sin is concerned, *arises solely from his being our representative, and not from any participation in its moral turpitude.*"†

*Theology, Vol. II., p. 196.

† Princeton Essays, first series, p. 17i.

And he cites from Stapfer the following statement: "God, in imputing this sin (Adam's), *finds* the whole moral person (the human race) ALREADY a sinner, and not merely constitutes it such." And this Dr. Hodge actually represents as a denial of antecedent and immediate imputation, and an assertion of the doctrine of "mediate imputation."* And in his *Theology*, he reiterates the affirmation.† Such a confounding of antecedent and immediate imputation with gratuitous imputation, on the one hand, and the church doctrine with the technical notion of *mediate* imputation on the other, is, to us, wholly inexplicable. But our limits will not permit us to dwell upon it here.

Thus, the actual doctrine entertained by the Calvinistic Church from the beginning, is set aside by Dr. Hodge, who, in lieu of it, maintains that the first sin *became common by being imputed*,‡ and not, as the Church has ever held and taught, *that it was common to all, and therefore imputed to all*; or, as Edwards, in his Reply to Dr. Taylor, expresses it, "The sin of the apostasy is not theirs, because God imputes it to them; *but it is truly and properly theirs, and on that ground God imputes it to them.*"§ And again: "The first existing of a corrupt disposition *is not to be looked upon as sin distinct from their participation of Adam's first sin. It is, as it were, the extended pollution of that sin.*"|| It is noticeable in the connexion that Dr. Hodge attempts no discussion of the view thus intelligibly and clearly presented, though it be the doctrine perpetually inculcated by the Church from the days of Augustine, but satisfies himself by stigmatising it as philosophical Realism, and mediate imputation, in the offensive theological sense of that term as applied to the views of Placaenus.

In his late work, and when treating on "the Representative Principle in Scripture," as involved in his views of the imputation of Adam's sin, he proceeds in the following line of argument, to which we invite especial attention: "2. This representative principle pervades the whole Scriptures. The imputation

* Princeton Essays, first series, p. 149.

† Vol. II., p. 207.

‡ See his *Theology*, Vol. II., pp. 191, 192, 196, 204, 205, 240, 253.

§ See Edwards's Works, Vol. II., p. 559 (New York, 1830). || *Ibid*, p. 334.

of Adam's sin is not an isolated fact;" in illustration and proof of which he adduces Exod. xxxiv. 6, 7, Jer. xxxii. 18, and the cases of Esau, Moab, and Ammon, with their descendants, and of Dathan, Abiram, and Achan, with their families; and also refers to other similar facts everywhere occurrent in the word of God, as well as to others mentioned in profane history. And then, by way of anticipating what he supposes "may be said—that this is not to be referred to the justice of God, but to the undesigned working of a general law, which, in despite of incidental evil, is, on the whole, beneficent," he adds: "The difficulty on that assumption, instead of being lessened, is only increased. On either theory, the nature and the degree of suffering are the same. The only difference relates to the question, why they suffer for offences of which they are not personally guilty. The Bible says these sufferings are judicial; they are inflicted as punishment, in support of law." . . . "The assumption that one man cannot righteously, under the government of God, be punished for the sins of another. is not only contrary; as we have seen, to the express declarations of the Scripture, and to the administration of the divine government from the beginning, but it is subversive of the doctrines of the atonement and justification," etc.*

The *imputation* which, in all these passages, (as well as throughout his three essays on that doctrine,) Dr. Hodge thus labors to sustain is, as our readers have doubtless observed, *gratuitous imputation*. And yet, though he has, in the same connexion, cited the cases, he does not believe that Philemon could have justly imputed gratuitously the debt of Onesimus to Paul, or that our sins were gratuitously imputed to our adorable Redeemer; that is, that in either case there could have been a just imputation, without the concurrence of him who was the subject of it. In what way, then, can such cases either illustrate or confirm the theory of the gratuitous imputation of sin? But not to dwell upon this, let us proceed to consider briefly this line of labored ratiocination; for the simple question is, whether sin may be gratuitously imputed or charged upon the guiltless.

* Theology, Vol. II., pp. 198-202.

The first important point demanding the reader's attention, is the marked endeavor of Dr. Hodge to illustrate and confirm and so identify his theory of the imputation of Adam's personal sin to a *subjectively innocent* posterity, (for so he affirms them to be,) with the imputation of a parent's sin to an already *subjectively guilty* offspring—as is the fact in all the cases adduced by him in confirmation and illustration of his position and argument. For he claims that the doctrine of imputation may be alike impeached in both cases, if it be liable to exception in the former. He assumes this without attempting to establish it, vital and fundamental as is the difference between the case of Adam and his offspring, and the other cases alleged; and thus rests the whole of his ratiocination upon a mere *petitio principii*. But let us contemplate the procedure in the light of a brief illustration.

If, in relation to the administration of some human government, it were claimed that, because the ruler had the conceded right in regard to sundry criminals already under sentence of death, to make a summary disposal of them by associating them in the punishment to which other criminals had been consigned, (*i. e.*, executing them all together,) and which punishment in no way transcended their own real desert, he therefore possessed the prerogative likewise to condemn and execute the guiltless, and that the two things are so far analogous that to question his right to do the latter would involve the denial of his conceded right to do the former, what would be either the moral or logical value of such an argument, however boldly and emphatically it might be insisted on? And what weight or intelligence could be accredited to the opinions of those who should insist on the validity of such a conclusion? And does the actual case in the matter before us (so far as the real point is concerned,) differ, in any essential particular, from that of the case supposed for illustration? Here is an existing race; guilty, polluted, and already under sentence of death; and God has, without transcending their actual desert, taken occasion to include portions of it in the punishment which is inflicted upon other portions for some specific offence. And this procedure, says Dr. Hodge, is sufficient to illustrate and confirm the assertion that God claims and exercises the prerogative

to condemn also the guiltless, and to treat them in a similar manner!

If Dr. Hodge can really regard these cases as parallel, we shall not object to his thus reasoning from one to the other; nor are we unwilling that his argument should be accepted as conclusive by any who may see its force and relevancy. But we do object to his endeavors to represent such views as the doctrine of the Church, or of the word of God. The Reformed divines could and did, with entire propriety, adduce the cases of Esau, Dathan, Achan, etc., with their seed, in illustration and confirmation of their doctrine of the imputation of the Adamic sin. For, according to that doctrine, the race was not (as Dr. Hodge makes it,) subjectively innocent anterior to the original imputation, but subjectively guilty, by a participation of the first offence, which was, therefore, imputed to them. But Dr. Hodge can, in no legitimate sense, allege those cases in support of his view, *that the race was guiltless when the imputation was made, and was constituted guilty through the imputation itself.*

This, however singular it may seem, is not the main feature of logical incongruity in this endeavor to sustain his theory. It will be observed from the foregoing citations that in the one case, to wit, that of Adam and his seed, Dr. Hodge finds both a natural and federal relation actually existing, and which he names *a federal and natural union of Adam with his posterity*; and thus far his finding is certainly accurate. But inaccurately, and upon the ground of this union alone, he assumes to justify the gratuitous imputation of guilt and punishment to the posterity of Adam, on account of his *peccatum alienum*; and claims, moreover, that this relation furnishes just and righteous ground for such imputation. In the other cases, however, which he alleges in confirmation of his argument, to wit, those specified in Exod. xxxiv. 6, 7, and Jer. xxxii. 18, as well as those of Korah, Achan, etc., and which he regards as sufficiently analogous to warrant his reasoning from the one to the other, he finds existing *the natural relation alone*—that of parent to his descendants. And yet, on the sole ground of this natural relation, he would justify the imputation and punishment in these cases. He has repeatedly

averred, as we shall presently see, that the difference between the two, as furnishing a ground for imputation, is vital and fundamental. And yet, notwithstanding this vital and fundamental difference, he here, in the extremity of his theory, is compelled to regard the cases as so intrinsically alike, that (as he endeavors to show) the justice of God may impute sin, pronounce sentence, and then punish, as well on the ground of the natural relation alone, as on the ground of the natural and federal conjoined; and that in either case, as well on the one ground as on the other, notwithstanding this vital inconsistency with each other, the requirements of justice may be exacted, and the divine law be sustained in its demands, and fully vindicated in its exactions! Such is the representation here exhibited, and by which the gratuitous imputation of sin is to be demonstrated. But if the facts be so, why and on what ground did divine justice, as Dr. Hodge so emphatically alleges, *require as indispensable to a just imputation*, that a moral or federal relation, along with the natural, should exist as the basis of its exactions and of the punishment it inflicted in the one case, (*i. e.*, that of Adam and his seed,) while in the other cases claimed by him as analogous and confirmatory of this statement, it makes no such requirement, but, on the contrary, regards the natural relation alone as a wholly sufficient basis for these exactions? Can any legitimate conclusion in favor of the gratuitous imputation of sin be deduced from such an argument?

And then still further. Even this is not the most incongruous element in the foregoing attempt to assimilate that dogma with Augustinian theology; for in regard to Adam and his posterity, Dr. Hodge finds *the federal relation alone* the ground of the judgment unto condemnation which passed upon the race. In referring to the *Larger Catechism*, Question 22, he says: "If English be any longer English, this means that it was our representative—as a public person we sinned *in him—in virtue of a union resulting from a covenant or contract*. Let it be noted that this is the *only union* here mentioned. The bond arising from our natural relation to him as our parent, is not even referred to. It is neglected because of its secondary importance,

representation being the main ground of imputation ; *so that when representation ceases imputation ceases, although the natural bond continues.*”* Again : “According to this view of the subject, *the ground of the imputation of Adam’s sin is the federal union between him and his posterity, in such a sense that it would not have been imputed, had he not been constituted their representative.* It is imputed to them, not because it was antecedently to that imputation and irrespective of *the covenant on which the imputation is founded*, already theirs, but because they were appointed to stand their probation in him.”†

Now if all this be so, then we are logically brought to the conclusion that the justice of God vindicates itself, and so sustains the divine law and government, on grounds which are not only opposite, but really subversive of each other, according to Dr. Hodge’s often-repeated affirmation. In the one case, it vindicates itself and sustains the government on the ground of the federal relation alone, as that relation is (says Dr. Hodge,) the sole ground of imputation ; and in the other and analogous cases, (as Dr. Hodge’s argument represents them to be,) it vindicates itself in the same demands, and upholds the same government, on the ground of the natural relation alone. And furthermore, in the former case, (*i. e.*, that of Adam and his seed,) the “*sin would not have been imputed ;*” and “*there could have been no imputation on the ground of the natural relation ;*” yet in the latter cases adduced for confirmation and illustration of the truth of this representation, *the natural relation is the sole ground of the imputation !* Such is the argument by which the Doctor would demonstrate that his theory is an integral part of Calvinistic theology, and so justify his violent proscription of his brethren who repudiate that theory. And thus, by confounding gratuitous with immediate and antecedent imputation, and by persisting in the unauthorised assumption that the gratuitous imputation of sin was taught by the Reformed Church, and that, consequently, what the Reformers with reason urged in support of their doc-

* Princeton Essays, first series, p. 187.

† Princeton Review, for 1860, p. 340.

trine, might also be alleged by him in support of his theory, Dr. Hodge has been led into these mortifying and fatal inconsistencies and contradictions. The instances alleged, as we have already stated, are all of them applicable for illustration and confirmation of the doctrine entertained by the Protestant Church, to wit, that the race was already morally corrupt when the imputation was made; while, on the contrary, every one of them furnishes a direct and unanswerable argument against the theory which Dr. Hodge would incorporate with the theology of the Church.

That the posterity of Adam were condemned for his personal sin alone, or the children of Dathan, Achan, and others, for their parents' sin alone—that is, without regard to their own existing depravity, as the argument of Dr. Hodge necessarily infers, is not only a wholly baseless assumption, but is condemned alike by the word of God and the convictions of our moral nature. The theological views of our Church in regard to the cases of Achan, etc., which are now adduced by Dr. Hodge in support of his theory, are clearly expressed by the late venerable Dr. Junkin, who, in 1835, in his argument before the Synod at York, (Pa.,) in the case of Mr. Barnes, remarks: "Mr. Barnes says that to deny this principle is the object of the eighteenth chapter of Ezekiel. *Here we agree, for I deny that the sin of Achan was the sole or true ground of his children's death.* And I deny it simply on the principle that evils upon a moral being can follow, in a perfect government, only the transgression of law; and this transgression must be committed either by the individual or by one rightfully authorised to act for him. *But Achan was not so appointed, . . . and therefore his sin could not be the sole, true, and legal procuring cause of their death; at the very most, it was the occasion only.* (b) Because, if Achan's sin was the *sole cause* of their death, they being yet infants, *their execution was itself an infinitely greater offence against the laws of right than Achan's sin.* He was not their representative in this matter, and their lives could not *justly* be the forfeit of his act. On the contrary, (c) they had been born under sentence of condemnation—they were guilty of death by the transgression of Adam," etc. "Here Mr. Barnes remarks: 'How can a just government

be sustained, in the ends of moral agents, if it holds those guilty who are innocent, and punishes those who have no ill-desert? This objection to the language is insuperable.' *So it is. But whose language is it? No Calvinist ever held it.* We do not say that children are innocent. The reverse is our doctrine. They have deeply-seated corruption in the heart, *and this is a result of their sin in their original representative, Adam.*"*

Our next point is the use and application which Dr. Hodge makes of Rom. v. 12-21, in order to support his theory. How, then, would he prove the gratuitous imputation of sin from this passage? for he claims most emphatically that it is here indubitably taught.

The points which he is obliged to assume as the basis of his argument from the passage are: 1. That *ἡμαρτον* they (all) *sinned*, and *ἀμαρτωλοὶ* *sinner*s, are to be construed in a metonymic or merely putative sense. 2. That the *modes* in which sin and righteousness are transmitted, are points of comparison in the analogy here instituted between the First and Second Adam; and 3. That the key of this alleged comparison of the modes, is the gratuitous imputation of the righteousness of Christ to his spiritual seed; that is, that Paul here compares not merely the facts of an imputation in both cases, but the *mode* in which Adam's sin is communicated to his posterity with the *mode* in which the righteousness of Christ is communicated to his seed; which being, confessedly, by a gratuitous imputation, and without any subjective desert of their own, so it must follow, says Dr. Hodge, that Adam's sin is imputed to his seed gratuitously, and without any demerit or ill-desert on their part; † which being granted, it becomes, of course, an actual necessity that both *ἀμαρτάνειν* and *ἀμαρτωλός* should be taken in a merely putative sense, and not as importing subjective demerit or sin.

* The Vindication, etc., by Rev. George Junkin, D. D., pp. 104, 111. Philadelphia. 1836.

† See, for example, his *Theology*, Vol. I., pp. 26, 27, and Vol. II., pp. 187-192, and 551, 552; also, his *Commentary on the passage*, especially the Revised Edition; and likewise, the *Princeton Essays*, first series, pp. 171-174, 176, 177; also, the *Princeton Review*, for 1860, pp. 339-341, 368, 763, 764.

The *first* of these points we shall consider presently. The *second* (*i. e.*, that the *modes* are here compared,) is the merest assumption, the truth of which is emphatically denied by all the leading divines of the first ages of the Reformation, such as Calvin, Hyperius, Beza, Pareus, Piscator, Rivetus, Gomar, De Dieu, and others; who, while they affirm the imputation of both sin and righteousness, deny that this imputation constitutes any part of the comparison in the analogy, and affirm that they are therein presented as points of antithesis. Rivetus, for example, says: "For the sin of Adam is communicated to us by generation, but the righteousness of Christ by imputation." So, too, Beza, Gomar, and the others.* Later divines, however, who affirm, equally with the above, the subjective guilt of the race in the first sin, *e. g.*, such as Marck and De Moor, think that the modes are herein presented as points of comparison, so far as the *fact* of our imputation in both cases is concerned; but at the same time are very careful to state that the *imputations themselves* are not to be compared. For there would be danger to the truth from such a procedure in regard to both branches of the comparison; that is, it should not be strained on the one hand, so as to enervate the doctrine of justification by faith alone; nor on the other, the doctrine that the first sin was the common sin of the race, and that the posterity of Adam were already corrupt and sinful when his sin was imputed to them. In other words, that the comparison of the modes here pertains simply to the fact that *both sin and righteousness are imputed*, and is not to be pressed so as to teach, on the one hand, that because the posterity of Adam *subjectively deserved* the imputation of his sin, the spiritual seed of Christ therefore *subjectively deserve* the imputation of his righteousness; or, on the other hand, that because Christ's righteousness is imputed gratuitously, therefore the merely personal sin of Adam was gratuitously imputed to a subjectively innocent offspring, as was then asserted by the Socinians and Remonstrants. And as

* Our limits will not allow us to cite here the testimony of the learned and venerable men referred to; but our readers may find a goodly number of them carefully and accurately cited in the *Danville Review* for 1862, pp. 517-530.

thus guarded and qualified, the statement that the modes may be referred to in the analogy, even if admitted, is, as is evident, wholly subversive of the doctrine of the gratuitous imputation of sin.

But the *third* of these assumptions, and that on which Dr. Hodge's theory of the gratuitous imputation of sin depends wholly for support, (for though we have stated them separately, it really involves the other two,) is not only unauthorised in Calvinistic theology, but contrary to the expressed dogmatic utterances of the Church from Augustine until now. In the commencement of this article we have shown how the principle itself has always been regarded by our approved divines, whenever they had occasion to advert to it. And we now affirm that Dr. Hodge cannot adduce a single representative theologian of the Church who has ever taught his theory and the exegesis he gives of the passage before us. The following are a few of his statements in which he endeavors to show that the passage does support it. "The scope of the passage is to illustrate the doctrine of justification on the ground of the righteousness of Christ, by a reference to the condemnation of men for the sin of Adam. The analogy is destroyed, and the point of comparison fails, if anything in us be assumed as the ground of the infliction of the penal evils of which the apostle is here speaking."* So, too, in his *Theology*: "Not only, however, does the comparison which the apostle makes between Adam and Christ lead to the conclusion that as all are condemned for the sin of the one, so all are saved by the righteousness of the other, those only excepted whom the Scriptures except."† Again: "The parallel is destroyed, the doctrine and argument of the apostle overturned, if it be denied that the sin of Adam, as antecedent to any sin or sinfulness of our own, is the ground of our condemnation."‡ All this, however, is but piling one assumption upon another, to wit, that the apostle, in order to show that God's mercy is perfectly gratuitous in justifying the penitent ungodly, must necessarily affirm like-

* Commentary on Romans v. 12, and repeated also on verses 15, 18, 19

† Vol. I., pp. 26, 27.

‡ *Ibid.*, Vol II., pp. 212, 213.

wise that his sentence of condemnation must also be gratuitous, and have no relation to the subjective demerit of the condemned. But the only refutation that an assertion so utterly unauthorised and absurd requires, is a bare denial. *It is not true* that, because God extends mercy gratuitously to the penitent believing sinner, he therefore inflicts vengeance gratuitously upon the innocent. Paul has in no way taught any such notion.

If this tremendous doctrine, that God may, without regard to its own agency or concurrence, charge soul-destroying guilt upon a guiltless, rational and accountable, creature, be taught in the Scriptures, this is absolutely the only place in which, with the slightest shadow of reason, it is claimed to be found. But though it be a doctrine which seems not only irreconcilable to the moral consciousness, but which, on the ground of the universally conceded canon—*causa causae est causa causati*—appears also to furnish a logical basis for the extenuation and excuse of all actual sin in the posterity of Adam, we offer not these as objections to the truth of the doctrine itself, on the supposition that there is to be conceded with it a scriptural basis; for, if but once plainly announced by the Spirit of Truth, it is as worthy of all acceptance as if he had announced it on every page of his word. But in respect to the claim that it *is* here announced, it certainly is not apart from the province of due consideration to suggest whether a doctrine which, if conceded to be taught, must essentially modify the conception hitherto entertained by the Church universal as to the whole system of revealed truth, and (as can be fully demonstrated,) logically render the most peremptory convictions of our moral nature pointless and uncertain, might not be expected to have been taught in the form of direct dogmatic statement, rather than be left to be merely *inferred* from a doubtful, or, at most, an incidental allusion found in an illustration which the apostle had selected for the purpose of setting forth to our helpless and perishing race the mercy and goodness of God. We say *doubtful allusion*; because the whole claim that the doctrine is true, depends on the aforesaid unsustained assumption that the *modes, i. e.*, of our justification through Christ and condemnation through Adam, form an integral part of the

comparison: an assumption which is destitute of support alike from exegesis and the analogy of faith. Take away, then, from the supposed points of resemblance the alleged comparison of the modes, and Dr. Hodge's whole theory of the gratuitous imputation of sin vanishes into thin air, hopelessly and forever. And since, therefore, the leading divines of the past ages, (as we have shown,) in expounding the passage, have failed to find the mode mentioned therein, and have emphatically denied that it is therein introduced as a part of the comparison of similitudes, is it not, we again ask, somewhat surprising that a doctrine of such tremendous sequences, both as regards our conception of God's moral perfections and of the relations he sustains to his accountable creatures, should have been unrecognised by the Church in any age, and be left by the Author of revelation to be developed only inferentially from one little corner of an illustration which had been introduced for the purpose of setting forth, by various points of similitude and dissimilitude, God's boundless love and compassion towards man as exhibited through our Lord Jesus Christ? And is it really conceivable that Paul should undertake to *illustrate* and establish God's infinite goodness and mercy to the race *by showing that he charges them gratuitously with soul-destroying guilt, and then treats them in accordance with the charge?*

The apostle having previously set forth the ruined and helpless condition of our race, and announced the way of deliverance through faith in our Lord Jesus Christ, and having shown, moreover, that they who accept the proffer of mercy obtain peace with God, being thus reconciled to him, and have free access to him through Jesus Christ, next proceeds to present, in a condensed and most impressive form, a view of the points which his argument had thus far elicited, and to show their relation to the whole scheme of redemption. He had been unfolding the awful truth that the Gentile world, and along with it the Jews, were all under sin—in a guilty, condemned, and hopeless state—but as yet had said nothing of the first fall as the procuring cause of all this woe, nor of the imputation of Adam's sin to his posterity. The fact that they were all alike under sin, (a fact to the truth of which their

own consciences bare witness,) was plainly stated, and there left as undisputed and indisputable. He had, as stated above, also announced salvation through our Lord Jesus Christ, and illustrated the method by which we may avail ourselves of the proffered mercy, declaring that God would receive and justify, through Jesus, all who believingly accept that proffer; and now, in summing up and illustrating the argument, he introduces the First Adam—the procuring cause of our fall and misery—and, after remarking that he was a type of him who was to come, to wit, Christ, shows how Christ, sustaining the relation of a Second Adam, was the procuring cause of our deliverance and salvation; and in dwelling on this analogy, shows that, as we were constituted sinners by the disobedience of the one—we all having sinned in and with him—so we are constituted righteous by the obedience of the other, who, by his obedience, had effected the reconciliation of which (in verse 11) he had just spoken. So that, as by the one offence, (justice demanding our punishment,) the judgment unto condemnation was pronounced against us, so by the one righteousness the free gift came upon all unto justification of life.

Such is a brief outline of the argument. On what ground, then, is it to be supposed that the analogy thus presented requires a comparison between the *mode* in which the judgment unto condemnation is inflicted, and that in which the free gift of righteousness is bestowed? Does not the simple fact that the one is inflicted on the race as a punishment for their sin, and the other bestowed as the free gift of mercy, delivering from all sin and condemnation, render the whole matter sufficiently obvious and easily understood? Then further. Can it really amount to anything, except to perplex the argument of the apostle, to add that the sentence of condemnation resembles the sentence of acquittal? They cannot certainly be compared as points of similarity, except so far as the righteous Judge of all has pronounced them both; and this surely does not infer a resemblance between them. For the judgment comes upon the race for the one offence in which we all participated; while, in the other case, the free gift, which is more than a sentence of mere acquittal, comes to us gratuitously; for in no sense could we merit that.

Where, then, is the resemblance? In the former, the one offence, on account of our participation therein, (*ἐφ' ᾧ πάντες ἠμαρτον.*) is charged upon us for condemnation; and is, therefore, in no sense a gratuitous imputation. In the latter, the one righteousness in which we did not participate, is gratuitously bestowed upon us for justification. And these things were, from the preceding argument of the apostle, sufficiently plain, and needed not to be formally presented in the analogy, even as points of antithesis, the mere statement of the facts being sufficient. But as to their being points of similitude and comparison, in the sense asserted by Dr. Hodge, there is nothing of the kind in the passage, nor has the Church ever entertained any such conception!

But as the Doctor claims that they really are points of similitude and comparison, let us now briefly inquire what he proposes to gain by so doing. We have shown above that in the analogy the two points—the one relating to justice, and the other to mercy—may, either or both of them, be unduly extended, unless the scope of the apostle be regarded, as De Moor, (*ut supra*) and Turretin, (Loc. 16, Quaest. 2, § 19,) and others, have carefully stated, though they held that the fact of an imputation in both cases is here implied. But Dr. Hodge, in this his assumption, does not propose to show that as the judgment unto condemnation is an act of punitive justice for subjective ill-desert, therefore the justification must likewise be regarded as flowing to us for subjective desert (which principle, absurd as it is, is still maintained by multitudes); but has chosen the other member of the antithesis as his starting-point; and as the free gift is a gratuitous bestowment, and in no way dependent on our subjective desert, so, in like manner, must the condemnatory sentence be a free and gratuitous bestowment! It is simply to incorporate with evangelical theology this astounding conception, that the analogy must be here pressed into a formal recognition of the modes—not as points of antithesis, which the early divines insist that they are—but as points of similitude! And Dr. Hodge peremptorily insists that unless this be granted, the whole analogy fails, “the apostle’s argument is overturned,” and we “take sides with the Jews against

him*." So that, according to the Doctor's exposition, we are to believe that, as the Most High bestows blessings and favors gratuitously, he therefore gratuitously curses his innocent creatures, and visits them with the exactions of his punitive or avenging justice. It would certainly seem that the mere statement of such a conception must, on reflection, suffice for its refutation and rejection. The subject is suggestive of themes for reflection, and we refer to a single one before passing to our next point.

The mercy here adverted to by the apostle as the free gift of God, is, as we have seen, a purely gratuitous bestowment upon the needy but penitent believer. It is entirely the work of God, therefore, who confessedly takes pleasure in all his works and ways, (Psalm civ. 31,) and can, with complacency, contemplate this and its happy results as his own work. Now the theory of Dr. Hodge makes the condemnatory sentence of Adam's *guiltless* offspring (for such he of necessity affirms them to be antecedent to that sentence) equally gratuitous, equally the work of God, who, as he thus clothes with this fearful guilt the innocent creature, hands him over into an indescribably dreadful condition of spiritual death and misery, and of abiding enmity to holiness and to himself, and to all his works and ways. And this, agreeably to the theory in question, is as purely and simply his own work as is the other. Will Dr. Hodge, then, or any who may have adopted this theory, undertake to say that our good and gracious God, who takes no pleasure in the death even of the sinner, can with complacency contemplate such a work as this, with its assured and eternal enmity to himself? Let the inquiry be fairly met and answered, and let there be no attempted evasion to the effect that the exhibition of wrath or indignation against sinners is always unpleasant to the Divine Nature, and is his strange work, and the like; for, even admitting this in its fullest extent, the question here pertains not to *sinners*, (as Dr. Hodge himself constantly affirms,) but to the *guiltless*. It relates to the grounds for the exhibition of this wrath against those who were *not* sinners, but subjectively *guiltless* or innocent of all sin and free from all ill-desert, and from any subjective blame whatever.

* See *Princeton Review* for 1860. pp. 341, 344, 345.

And, moreover, it was the exhibition of this very wrath against them which subsequent to its infliction brought them out of their guiltless state into a state of guilt and misery and spiritual death. We ask, then, again, will the venerable Princeton Professor, or any who accept his views, venture to affirm that God could with complacency contemplate *as his own* such a work, as he confessedly can his work of renewing and justifying and saving the redeemed? Their theory demands an affirmative answer to the inquiry; for a negative will be tantamount to an admission that the theory itself is false.

The science of hermeneutics, therefore, can furnish no relief in the extremity to which this theory finds itself reduced in the attempt to constitute *gratuitous* justification and *merited* condemnation points of resemblance and comparison in this analogy. And to achieve such a result, while *κρίμα* here retains its relation to *εις κατάκριμα*, is simply impossible. For a sentence unto condemnation can never be other than antithetical to the bestowment of a free and gracious gift.

In regard to verbal criticism, our readers need be detained but a moment. We have already shown that Dr. Hodge's attempted construction of the analogy renders it logically imperative that he attach to both *ἀμαρτάνειν* and *ἀμαρτωλός* a merely putative or tropical meaning, and that consequently he does attempt to explain them in this manner. In the issue these are the determining words, so far, at least, as this—that if they are unsusceptible of such a sense, the doctrine of the gratuitous imputation of sin becomes the merest fancy. For if *to sin* and *sinner*s, are here to be understood in a literal and not tropical sense, it irresistibly follows that there was in the race itself a moral or subjective ground for the imputation of the Adamic sin. How, then, stands the case in respect to the meaning of these terms?

Ernesti, in his *Institutio Interpretis*,* lays it down as an unquestioned principle of interpretation, that words are not to be explained tropically which have lost their *original* or proper signification (in tropicorum numero non esse habenda verba, quae

* In Part IV., Sect. ii., Cap. iv., § 7, Dr. Ammon's edition, Leipsic, 1809.

proprium significationem amiserunt); and in the category of these, both of the words referred to are indisputably to be placed. And accordingly, they are never employed in a metonymical or tropical sense in the Scriptures, unless their use in the passage before us is to be excepted. And hence Meyer, perhaps the ablest of modern interpreters, denounces the forensic interpretation of *ἀμαρτάνειν* in Rom. v. 12 as “*sheer grammatical arbitrariness*, for *ἡμαρτον* means *they sinned* and nothing else.”

In the New Testament, *ἀμαρτάνειν* is employed *forty-three times*, and *ἀμαρτωλός* *forty-six*; and in no instance is it even pretended that they are elsewhere employed therein in the sense claimed by Dr. Hodge in the passage before us. So that Whitby, in his Commentary, (in which he assails to his utmost the church doctrine of original sin,) after adopting for this purpose and insisting on the same exegesis of the passage which Dr. Hodge has given, is obliged to say that “it is true we meet not with the words *ἡμαρτον* and *ἀμαρτωλοὶ κατεστάθησαν*, in this sense, elsewhere in the New Testament.” This is so. And there is really, therefore, no solid reason why Dr. Hodge should insist on giving the words in this instance the meaning he does. Nor can he name any, except that (as we have above shown) the exigency of his theory requires it.

He claims, however, two instances in the Septuagint. The first is Gen. xliii. 9, (compare also xliv. 32,) where Judah uses the phrase, *ἡμαρτηκῶς ἔσομαι*, to bind himself to his father to return Benjamin to him; *i. e.*, If I fail to bring him back, then I shall have transgressed, or broken my faith with thee. Of course neither Judah nor his father would construe the pledge as irrespective of divine providences over which man could have no control. And this being so, can any one allege that Judah would not have been in every sense of the word *a sinner*—guilty of the breach of a solemn covenant, had he failed to do what he pledges himself to his father to perform? Where, then, is the metonymy?

In the second of these instances, (1 Kings i. 21,) Bathsheba, referring to herself and Solomon, says to David that, if Adonijah succeed in his attempted usurpation of the throne, I and my son shall be *ἀμαρτωλοὶ*, that is, we shall be held and treated as guilty of

that of which we shall really be guilty, to wit, *disaffection to his usurped reign*. Had he succeeded, therefore, and had he thus treated them, would the treatment have been contrary to the actual facts of the case? Could they have been otherwise than disaffected with such a usurpation of their prerogatives? And would their punishment have been for a merely putative guilt? Of course not. Such instances, therefore, instead of confirming Dr. Hodge's assumption, only add their testimony to prove it untenable.

Before leaving the point, we ought to remark that the claim set up by Whitby and Taylor of Norwich on behalf of this exegesis, to wit, that it was favored by several of the Greek fathers, is of no real weight. Those fathers did not receive the doctrine of original sin, and hence suggested the metonymic or figurative interpretation. It probably originated with Chrysostom, though not to the extent of making the verbs (*i. e.*, ἀμαρτάνειν and καθιστάναι) metonymic; but places the metonymy upon the noun ἀμαρτωλοί, which he makes to mean *obnoxious to punishment and condemned to death*. The conception owes its elaboration to the Socinian school in their efforts to destroy the doctrine of our participation in the first sin. And they and their followers, the Remonstrants, extended the metonymy, as Dr. Hodge also does, to both noun and verbs; thus making the apostle teach that the posterity were guiltless before the judgment came upon them; and that it came upon them because they were "regarded and treated as sinners" by that judgment coming upon them: which is certainly an "un-thinkable proposition."

Such, then, are the reasons on which Dr. Hodge would justify his interpretation of ἀμαρτωλός and ἀμαρτάνειν throughout this paragraph, to wit, that they are to be taken in a putative and not in a moral or literal sense; and signify simply that the race, not for its own sin, but on account of the merely personal sin of Adam, "*were regarded and treated as sinners.*" And this interpretation he arrays against the doctrine that all so participated in the first sin as to become really sinners. This, too, is precisely the exposition of the passage which the Socinian school from the first arrayed against the church doctrine of original sin. They adopt

and apply it with the view of destroying that doctrine, while the Doctor adopts and applies it just as they do, and claims to be thereby defending that doctrine. It would require many pages to develop the facts fully; but we can cite only a brief specimen or two.

Socinus (on verses 18, 19) says, that to be constituted sinners, and to be constituted righteous, here mean *to be regarded and treated as such*. "Pro peccatoribus habiti, atque ut tales tractati;" "Pro justis sunt habendi, atque ut tales tractandi."* Death entered into the world "*because God saw fit to punish the sin of the first man with death.*"†

Again: "For, as the offence and disobedience of Adam proclaimed him guilty of death, *from which it came to pass that the whole human race, as procreated and propagated from him after that guilt, was wholly exposed to death, so,*" etc. (ex quo factum est, ut universum humanum genus, quod post reatum illum ab ipso procreatum et propagatum est, morti penitus obnoxium sit, sic, etc., p. 225.)

Crellius, in his Paraphrase on verse 19, says: "For as through the disobedience of one it came to pass that many, that is, all who are begotten of him, *should be treated as sinners, and be subjected to the same punishment with the parent who had transgressed the divine law,* (tanquam peccatores tractarentur, et eidem supplicio cum parente legem divinam transgresso subjicerentur,) so also shall it be through the obedience of one man, that many, even all who by him are spiritually renewed, should be treated as righteous, and obtain the same reward which he obtained." (P. 213.)

Slichtingius, in his Commentary, says, on verse 14: "Sins, therefore, are imputed for death (imputata sunt ad mortem) to the posterity of Adam, not on account of the law of God which had not then been proclaimed, but on account of Adam and his sin (sed propter Adamum ejusque peccatum"). And after quoting verse 19, he adds: "*Of one man, even Adam—were constituted sinners; that is, were pronounced sinners, were condemned, were adjudged to death, and affected with death; for this constituting was by a decree and in execution of a decree.*" (P. 208.)

* Opera, Tom. I., p. 149.

† *Ibid*, Tom. II., p. 225.

In the *Compendiolum Socinianismi*, containing a statement of the doctrine of their churches, they say (in chapter iv., *On the Fall of Man and Original Sin*): "Our churches acknowledge that this guilt (*reatus*) has passed upon all the posterity of Adam, without any intervening fault (*culpa*) of their own:" That is, by a gratuitous imputation.

Here, then, is the theory of the gratuitous imputation of sin fully taught and affirmed by this school for the express purpose of destroying the doctrine of original sin as entertained and taught by the Churches of the Reformation. And is it really conceivable that that theory now, under the Midasian touch of Dr. Hodge, should have become that very doctrine of the Reformation itself, though we find it rejected and refuted by the Reformers, to a man? It is the theory which the Remonstrants likewise, and for the very same purpose, adopted; and the modern semi-Pelagians, such as Whitby, (see his commentary on the passage,) and Taylor of Norwich, throughout his work on Original Sin, which Edwards refuted; all of which can be demonstrated. And yet we are now required by not a few in our Church to accept it, under the penalty of forfeiting all claim to soundness of doctrine.* We earnestly hope that the matter will be promptly and thoroughly investigated by the Church, though in the kindest and most considerate spirit towards the venerable Professor at Princeton which fidelity to the truth of God will allow; for, after the most laborious and candid and thorough examination of the facts in the case, (not a tithe of which could be presented in

*See in Dr. Baird's *Rejoinder to the Princeton Review* a fact in illustration of this statement, which has never received from the Church the attention it demands. Dr. Baird, in the summer of 1854, when applying for admission into a Presbytery in New Jersey, on being questioned, expressed his dissent from Dr. Hodge's tropical interpretation of the passage before us, "that we are regarded and treated *as though* we had sinned in Adam;" upon which he was by the leading members of that body denounced and stigmatised "with almost every name of heresy which is most obnoxious to the Reformed Churches." (See pp. 2-5, published by Joseph Wilson, Philadelphia, 1860.) Such was even then the claim of this Socinian exegesis to revolutionise the theology of our Church.

this brief article,) we cannot but believe that the result of now accepting this theory and exegesis will be to clothe our Church in sackcloth and ashes for generations to come.

We cannot conclude without adverting to a matter which it would be unpardonable wholly to pass over in the connexion. Dr. Hodge, in defending his theory and exposition of Romans v. 12-21 from the charge of heresy, (see *Princeton Review* for 1860, pp. 762-763,) has remarked that the late Dr. Archibald Alexander read and approved his Commentary on Romans, anterior to its publication. The Doctor would do us great injustice were he to suppose that we would raise a question as to veracity in regard to anything which he has presented as a fact. But the precious memory of Dr. Alexander certainly does require a suggestion of the probability of mistake, or failure of recollection, in regard to some particular or other pertaining to this matter; for in 1833, and therefore only a short time anterior to the publication of Dr. Hodge's work, Dr. Alexander translated, endorsed, and published in the *Princeton Repertory*, part of the Refutation of the Socinian System by Arnold of Franeker, in which this very theory and exegesis are pointedly rejected and condemned. The article is republished in the Princeton Essays, first series, pp. 228-249. Let our readers turn, for example, to pp. 235, 237, and 241-243, and peruse likewise Dr. Alexander's concluding remarks, and they will perceive the grounds on which we offer the above suggestion.* For it does seem inconceivable

* For the sake of those who may not have access to the work referred to, we here present a brief extract. Arnold says: "As to the exception of Ostorodos, (a noted Socinian,) that in this passage the word 'sinners' does not denote those who were really such, but persons who are spoken of as if they had been sinners, it is too unreasonable to require a moment's consideration; but it is enough forever to silence this objection, that these persons are really subject to the penalty of death; if, therefore, they are liable to death, which is the wages of sin, they must be sinners; otherwise there would be no correspondence between the crime and punishment. If the crime was merely supposititious, and the punishment real, how could God be a just Judge when he treated those as real sinners who were putatively such?" (P. 243.) This work is highly extolled by Marck. Arnold died in October, 1680.

how that illustrious divine should, at that very time, have approved what he thus united with Arnold in so strongly denouncing. But we submit the facts without remark to the candor and kind consideration of our readers.

ARTICLE VII.

THE PROFESSIONAL STUDY OF THE BIBLE.

To the Church God has assigned the duties of preserving and of propagating the truths of the Holy Scriptures. She performs this service by her representatives, who are lawfully called and set apart for the purpose. Such officers are known by the Scripture term, presbyters, [elders,] and comprise two classes, presbyters who *teach* and *rule*, and presbyters whose sole function is that of *ruling*, generally distinguished by the terms teaching presbyters and ruling [elders] presbyters. The parity of these classes of presbyters is recognised in the constitution of the courts of the Church, and in all acts of government, except those belonging to a distribution of powers by rightful authority. These courts both preserve and propagate the truth, by Confessions and other formularies of doctrine, order, discipline, and worship, and also by special testimonies for sound doctrine and piety, or against heresy and vice. To the teaching presbyters, however, is assigned, by the Scriptures and the standards of the Church, the special work of propagating the truths of revelation, by the authoritative exposition of the Word, and the defence and inculcation of whatever "we are to believe concerning God, and the duty which God requires of man." That the ruling presbyter, or the probationer for the ministry and other lay catechists, may be intrusted by church courts, under proper restrictions, with a similar work, in subordinate positions and for limited periods, is not inconsistent with the foregoing propositions.

I. It is now of those who are, or propose to become, the teach-