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## ARTICLE I.

### A FEW MORE WORDS ON THE REVISED BOOK OF DISCIPLINE.

From recent indications we are inclined to think that the tide of prejudice which, at first, set so violently against the Revised Book of Discipline, has begun to ebb, and that the current is now changing in its favor. Objections are daily losing their force, misapprehensions quietly subsiding, and the propriety of the changes becoming more obvious; and although the mind of the Church is not yet fully prepared to adopt the book, yet, the estimate which is now formed of it is very different from that which prevailed a year ago. Even the tone of its assailants is significantly changed; instead of the bold shout of confident defiance with which they at first rushed to the assault, as if victory were as sure as the attack, they have come at length to perceive that there are weapons on the other side as bright and as keen as their own, and that if they succeed in achieving a triumph it will be after a hard conflict, and with strong misgivings as to the inherent righteousness of their cause. In this posture of affairs we have thought that

of Faith and Form of Government. They confessed it because they found it in the Bible. If good enough for them, it ought to be good enough for any of us, who are in many things their inferiors. As for the charge that these views are bigoted or intolerant, it is a slander. They are perfectly consistent with the most expansive charity. To assert them is merely to assert that in our judgment such is the doctrine revealed in the Scriptures.

Having awarded nothing but praise to Dr. Killen's book thus far, we will say, in closing, that we think his arrangement would admit of more clearness and compactness, and with this solitary censure we commend the work to all our readers, of every class, as exceedingly well worthy of their careful study.

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ARTICLE VI.

THE FIRST ADAM AND THE SECOND. *The Elohim Revealed in the Creation and Redemption of Man*: By SAMUEL J. BAIRD, D.D., Pastor of the Presbyterian Church, Woodbury, N. J. Philadelphia: Parry & McMillan. 1860; pp. 688, 8vo.

This book, as its title imports, covers the whole region of revealed Theology. It begins with the creation and ends with the consummation of all things. Exclusive of the Introduction, it consists of twenty-three chapters, and inclusive of the Index, of six hundred and eighty-eight octavo pages. A glance at the table of contents is sufficient to show, that the author deals in "thoughts more elevate," and that the high themes which he discusses, "providence, foreknowledge, will and fate," the primitive and fallen condition of mankind, the nature consequences and extent of sin, and the nature, consequences and extent of redemption, are not discussed in a spirit of vain

curiosity and false philosophy, but with the loyal design that he may "assert eternal providence, and justify the ways of God to men." All the topics which are successively brought before us, and they are those in which the knowledge of God and the knowledge of ourselves are concentrated, are reviewed under the formal notion of a manifestation of the Divine perfections and glory. In the second chapter, we have, indeed, as a key to the title of the work, an articulate exposition of the doctrine, that the design of all God's works, whether of creation or providence, is to reveal Himself. The heavens and the earth are treated as "an incomparable vesture," in which the Divine Majesty arrays itself in order to become visible to men, and this whole outward scene of things, the object of our sensations and perfections, is not regarded as a dark, gloomy, foreign power, but as an illustration of the Divine wisdom, a language in which God notifies to intelligence His own glory. The works are apprehended as so many words of God, and the sense with which they are all burdened is His own eternal power and Godhead. It is in man, however, that Dr. Baird finds the preëminent revealer of the triune Jehovah. He is the image of God. To him, therefore, special attention is given. His moral history is traced from the first moment of his being to the final consummation of the scheme of grace. The plan of Providence in relation to Him is critically canvassed, and the result of the whole is that solid wisdom, that knowledge of God and of ourselves, which constitutes the perfection and unity of our moral and intellectual nature. The author lays out his chief strength upon the doctrine of original sin. This is the central topic of the book. To this every thing else converges; the preliminary account of man's original condition is only an introduction to a just exposition of the effects of the fall, and the subsequent evolution of the economy of redemption is designed to cast its light back upon the nature and extent of the malady of which redemption is the remedy. The book, therefore, might very well have been entitled, a *Treatise of Original Sin*. It opens with a historical sketch of the doctrine in question, briefly recapitulating the state and progress of opin-

ion, from Tertullian to Edwards. The first three chapters, on the Triune Creator, the Eternal Plan, and the Providential Administration, are designed to furnish the key to the subsequent discussion, to lay down the principle which pervades the entire divine economy, and in the light of which all doctrinal truths are reduced to harmony and irradiated with new beauty. The author then enters directly upon the consideration of man, and in the peculiarities of his being, as personal and generic, in his moral and spiritual relations to God, and in the dispensations of Providence which have determined and conditioned them, he encounters those supreme questions concerning the law, sin and death; concerning redemption, holiness and life; concerning, in short, the two great covenants which exhaust the divine dealings with man, that constitute the sum and substance of Christian Theology. In the prosecution of these high themes he has exhibited abilities of no common order. He has endeavored, every where, to find the one in the many, to trace facts to their principles and to reconcile the testimonies of Scripture with the inductions of a sound philosophy. He has no charity for error. From the beginning of the book to the end, he keeps up a running fire against Pelagians and Hopkinsians, whom he evidently regards as the pests of the Church, left, like the remnants of the nations among the Jews, to be pricks in the eyes and thorns in the sides, as a punishment for unfaithfulness in the work of extermination. His eye never pities, nor his hand spares. Wherever he finds an enemy of God and His truth, he never declines the contest, and is quite content to leave the choice of weapons to his antagonist, being equally ready to assail heresy with the sword of the spirit, and science, falsely so called, with the weapons of right reason. That he has done good service to the cause of sound doctrine cannot be denied. His chapters on Providence, the Eternal Plan, the Principle of the Law, the Nature of Sin, and on the various phases of Optimism are singularly happy specimens of judicious speculation. The chapter on Providence, particularly, is entitled to great praise, and though we are not sure that he has done justice to McCosh, and are

quite certain that, in relation to things generated and corruptible, he will find it difficult to excogitate a better theory of identity than that of Edwards, properly restrained, yet, the whole discussion touching the connection betwixt God and His works is sound and Scriptural. It strikes us as a fault of the book that it betrays something of a captious spirit, a tendency to minute exceptions. Dr. Baird detects an error where others can see only a fault of expression, and belabours opinions with great vehemence, which the reader finds it impossible to discriminate from his own. Against Edwards, particularly, he has an inveterate spite. His doctrine of causation, his scheme of identity and his theory of the will, as well as special forms of theological opinion, are made the subjects of severe and biting criticism. In some of his strictures, Dr. Baird is unquestionably right, but in relation to the will, we confess ourselves utterly at a loss to discover the difference, in their fundamental principles, between the doctrines of Edwards and himself. If Dr. Baird's theory is not one of rigid, absolute determinism, we are unable to understand him, and if it is, it is a matter of comparatively little moment, whether the immediate determining cause be called a motive or an impulse, since, in either case, its efficacy is grounded in the nature. What the man is, determines what he does, as clearly, according to Edwards, as according to our author, and no man has given more prominence to innate habits and dispositions as controlling the will than Edwards.

But, without dwelling longer on minor and incidental points, we hasten to the main subject of the book. The light which the author thinks that he has thrown upon the doctrine of original sin, constitutes the distinguishing feature of the work, and gives it whatever claim it may have to special consideration as a theological contribution. He has a theory which, in his judgment, relieves the question of hereditary sin of most, if not of all, its difficulties. He can show how we are born guilty and depraved, without any imputation upon the goodness or justice of God, or any perplexity in the no-

tions of sin and holiness. The whole subject is perfectly clear to his mind, and the design of his book is to make it perfectly clear to the minds of others. Would that his success were commensurate with his aim! The chances are certainly against him. In a matter which penetrates into the lowest depths of human consciousness, which lays hold of the highest interests of the soul, which has agitated the most devout minds, and elicited the most earnest and anxious thoughts of the profoundest thinkers for eighteen centuries, in which all, without exception, have failed, and the more profoundly they have thought, the more intensely they have exclaimed, "Oh! the depths of the riches, both of the wisdom and knowledge of God! how unsearchable are his judgments, and his ways past finding out;" on such a subject, the presumption is that no new light has dawned upon the world, either from Scripture or consciousness, to dispel the obscurity which enshrouds it. We have read Dr. Baird's book with no little care, and while acknowledging its merits in other respects, we are constrained to say that, in reference to its main design, its success is no exception to the general rule. He has solved one mystery by the substitution of another, or, rather, buried the mystery altogether in impenetrable darkness. His theory briefly resolves itself into the doctrine of a numerical identity of nature between Adam and his posterity, in consequence of which, his sin is not constructively and legally, but strictly and properly, theirs. The thing which transgressed, and became guilty and corrupt in him, is the very identical thing which reappears in us, and of course brings its guilt and corruption with it. The only mystery in the case is that of the reappearance of the same thing in different forms of personal manifestation. This depends upon the law of generation. Dr. Baird accordingly lays out his whole strength upon that law, as being the keystone of the arch which supports his structure. He endeavors to show that it involves the communication, not of a similar or like, but of numerically the same nature, from the parent to the child. The father, substantially and essentially, though

not personally, is reproduced in the offspring. This is the theory, as compendiously as we can express it, upon which the author has undertaken to solve the problem of the Fall.

Of course, in all this there is nothing new. It is as old as the introduction of realism into the Christian Church. The author himself, in his preliminary historical sketch, has treated us to some rare specimens of this style of thinking, and we have lying before us, from Anselm and the opponents of Roscelin and Abelard, illustrations equally rich of the same type of speculation. When we read Dr. Baird's lueubrations upon a nature, the law of generation, and the relation subsisting between a nature and a person, we almost felt that we had been transported, by some mysterious power of enchantment, across the track of centuries, to the cloisters of mediæval monks, and to the halls of mediæval universities, and were listening again to the everlasting jangles about entities and quiddities, genera and species, which John of Salisbury so graphically describes. Dr. Baird's sympathies are with the buried realism of the past. He has proclaimed an open revolt against the whole spirit of modern speculation, and has endeavored to remand philosophy to the frivolous discussions from which, we had hoped, that Bacon had forever redeemed it. If the proof had not been before our eyes, we could not have believed that, in the nineteenth century, a man was to be found, out of "Laputa or the Empire," who could seriously undertake to solve theological problems by an appeal to the exploded henads of the realists, or gravely attribute a real substantive existence to genera and species. The book is, in this respect, as an American production, a downright curiosity. It is a reaction against the entire current of modern thought, not only in theology, but in philosophy; as formal a protest against nominalism, and the spirit of the inductive philosophy grounded in nominalism, as against the received system of orthodoxy, grounded in the same doctrine. It is, at least, five centuries too late, and five centuries ago it would not have been needed. Realism is dead and buried, and the progress of human knowledge, in every department of inquiry, since the thorough installation of the

inductive method, is a sufficient proof that the death of realism is the resurrection of truth. Dr. Baird has not given his allegiance to realism in the form in which it was maintained by Plato, and in which it first entered into Christian speculation. He expressly denies the separate and independent existence of universals, *universalia ante rem*. He embraces it as it was modified by Aristotle, *universalia in re*. His doctrine is, "that universals are, in a certain sense, realities in nature, but that the general conceptions are merely logical, the universals not having an existence of their own separate from the individuals through which they were manifested." The last clause of this sentence expresses precisely the Peripatetic doctrine as it was commonly understood. The first clause we are not certain that we fully comprehend. When Dr. Baird says that general conceptions are merely logical, does he mean that they do not represent the realities which, in some sense, exist in nature? If so, then no reliance is to be placed upon them. They have only a formal validity, and subjective consistency of thought becomes no guarantee for objective consistency of being. If the universals which we think, are not the universals which exist in nature, it is obvious that we cannot pass from one to the other, or make them the subjects of common predicates. If the universals which we think, are the universals which exist in nature, then how can it be said that our conceptions are merely logical? They evidently have an objective validity. This language, in the mouth of a nominalist, we can perfectly comprehend, and we can, also, understand how a Peripatetic realist can consistently maintain that our general conceptions are derived from individuals and dependent upon them, that they are logical in the sense that they are formed by the logical processes of analysis and comparison, but how he could represent them as *merely* logical, that is, as purely formal, we are unable to perceive. Dr. Baird restricts the existence of universals to a "certain sense." This qualifying clause means, simply, that they are never detached from individuals, that their existence is not separate and independent; but still he makes a real distinction between the particu-

lar and universal, as pertaining to the same object. In every individual thing there are, according to him, two elements—the principle of individuation, or that which makes the thing to be this and not that, or that and not this, and the principle of universality, which determines it to a certain genus. These are not different forms of contemplating the object, or different relations in which its properties and qualities are viewed. They are really different things, as distinct as the persons of the Trinity, and as incapable of being divided. The universal realizes itself in the individual, but is not to be confounded with it. It pervades it, without being a part of it.

In estimating the value of Dr. Baird's contributions, the first thing to be done is to settle precisely his notion of nature. What do we mean when we speak of the nature of a man, of the nature of a thing, and particularly, of a moral nature? We confess that we have experienced no little difficulty in trying to compass the precise sense in which Dr. Baird uses the term. In the first place, he explicitly denies that it can be legitimately used to designate "our conception of the mere aggregate of characteristics belonging to a given substance."\* Does this mean, that to signalize the properties of a substance, and to indicate the mode of their co-existence, is not to define its nature? that its nature is something more than the sum and combination of its attributes? If so, he distinctly repudiates the sense in which it becomes applicable to a class-notion, and the only sense in which it can enter into the description of an object. Man's nature does not consist of those qualities and faculties which are manifested in consciousness. It is nothing personal, nothing individual, and nothing even generic, in the sense of an abstraction of what is similar in the consciousness of the race. It is not thought, will, nor emotion, singly, or combined in the unity of a personal subject. Neither, according to Dr. Baird, is the nature something relative and accidental. In this sense it is used by Divines,

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\* P. 149.

when the predicates *holy* and *sinful* are applied to it. The phrase "moral nature," commonly denotes the possession of the faculties which are necessary to moral agency; while a sinful or a holy nature designates the pervading attitude of the soul in relation to God and the Divine law. There are passages in which Dr. Baird seems to use the term in both these senses. "A moral nature," he says, "is one, the essential characteristics of which are reason, will, the moral sense or conscience."\* Again, the nature is used as a synonym of the heart,† and must, accordingly, be taken as the complement of the affinities and tendencies which belong to the soul. It is that which lies at the root of the will, and conditions and determines all its operations. But, with these occasional exceptions, the whole current of his argument requires the sense of prevailing habitude or disposition to be discounted as impertinent. In this sense the idea of a numerical identity of nature in different persons becomes simply absurd. If nature expresses the tendencies or attitudes of the soul, the mode of its existence, or the law under which it exists and acts, it must obviously be numerically different, though it may be logically the same, in the case of every human being. A mode cannot be conceived apart from that of which it is a mode. To be, and to be in some definite condition, are the same thing. Natural or abstract being is impossible. Each soul must, therefore, have its own nature. It may be holy, it may be sinful—it must be one or the other, and its holiness or sinfulness is its own. These terms define the moral character of the particular being. Other souls may also be sinful or holy, and their holiness or sinfulness is also their own. The crookedness of one tree is not the crookedness of another. The posture of the soul is as strictly individual as the posture of the body. We might as well say that the hump-back of two men is numerically the same deformity, as to confound the moral obliquity of one man with the moral obliquity of another. The identity of these relations is simply the similarity by nature of which

\* P. 286.

† P. 160.

they are comprehended under a common term. Hence, according to that conception of nature which makes it the moral attitude of the soul, the depravity of A is no more the depravity of B, than the personal qualities of A are the personal qualities of B. A numerical identity of nature, and a personal diversity of existence, are flat contradictions. Discounting both these senses of nature, what other sense remains? Dr. Baird undertakes to enlighten us. In the first place, his nature "is not expressive of a mere abstraction, but designates an actual thing, an objective reality."\* This actual thing, or objective reality, is the "sum of the permanent forces which were at the beginning incorporated in the constitution of Adam and the creatures, and which, by their severalty, determine and define the several species of the living things."† Here the realism strongly crops out. Adam's constitution, in so far as he was an individual, is one thing: there is incorporated in it a set of forces which makes the *henad*, humanity, and in that set of forces his nature must be sought. Substances, we are told, "were at the beginning endowed with forces which are distinctive and abiding, and which in organic nature flow distributively in continuous order to the successive generations of the creatures."‡ It is clear, from these passages, that Dr. Baird understands by nature a real entity, active, efficient and powerful, which enters into and conditions the individual, but is not strictly a part of it; a something in which the individual lives and moves, and which is entirely distinct from its own properties or states. Accordingly, he explains our oneness with Adam upon the baldest principles of realism. "Our oneness," he says, "does not express the fact merely that we and Adam are alike, but that we are thus alike because the forces which are in us and make us what we are, were in him, and are numerically the same which in him constituted his nature and gave him his likeness. The body which is impelled by two diverse forces, *x* and *y*, moves in the direction of neither of them, but in that

\* P. 150.

† *Ibid.*

‡ P. 148.

of a different force,  $z$ , the resultant of the two. Yet is neither of the forces lost, but merely modified, each by contact with the other. The new force,  $z$ , is simply  $x$  modified by  $y$ . So, in the successive generations of the human race, so far as their traits are the result of propagation, so far as they are the offspring of their parents, theirs are but the same identical forces which were in their parents, only appearing under new forms."\*

But the crowning proof that Dr. Baird means something more than mere habits and disposition, or an all-controlling generic habit, or disposition, or tendency, or law (for all these terms have been employed to express the same idea), is that he makes the nature the proper and exclusive ground of moral obligation. The person is only a contrivance to reach the nature. The seat of obligation is not the *man*, but his *nature*. "From all this it inevitably follows," says he, "that all the responsibilities and obligations which can, in any conceivable way, attach to a person, must have their ground in the nature, and attach themselves essentially to it. Since, in general, every kind of obligation implies the exercise of some kind of efficiency, and since the moral nature is the only principle of moral efficiency in a person, it follows that all moral obligations must lay hold of the nature, else they are altogether nugatory and void."† If by nature, were here meant the properties of the personal soul, as endued with faculties adapted to moral distinctions, the meaning would be proper enough. But that sense the author has explicitly repudiated. Nature is nothing that constitutes a man—it is only what makes *the* man. To say that he here means moral habits and dispositions would be to make him write the most preposterous nonsense. The nature in that sense is not the subject, but the end of the obligation of the law. It is the very thing which the law requires. To have a holy heart, to love God supremely, to love our neighbors as ourselves; these are the very things which constitute the matter of the command. The

\* P. 150.

† P. 249.

very essence of obedience is the possession of a right nature. How absurd, therefore, to say that they are the things bound, or to which the command is addressed. Dr. Baird evidently means, or he means nothing, that behind the personal soul, with its essential cognitive and moral faculties, there exists a mysterious entity, of whose efficiency this soul, with its properties and attributes, is only the instrument. To that entity the law is addressed—that entity God holds responsible in the person—that entity is the substance of the man. The rest is mere contingency and accident. His meaning is put beyond all doubt by the comparison which he institutes between humanity and the Godhead. “A person,” he tells us, “is a several subsistence which is endowed with a moral nature. The word person, is expressive of the severalty, while the phrase moral agent indicates the efficiency of such a subsistence. In the blessed Trinity, each several subsistence is a person, of whom the three subsist in common in one undivided nature and essence. Among the angelic hosts, each one is a several person, having a distinct and several nature. Among men a nearer likeness to God is seen, in a plurality of persons, possessing a several and distributive property in one common nature. The relationship which subsists between men by virtue of their community of nature, is a shadow of the Divine unity, which falls infinitely short of the intimacy and identity which are realized in the blessed persons of the Godhead.”\* Now, when it is remembered that the Father, Son and Holy Ghost are *the same in substance*, that this is precisely the ground of their being one God, and equal in power and glory, it is obvious that Dr. Baird must mean that the ground of identity with the individuals of the human species, is their possession of a *common substance*. Their community of natures thus resolves itself into community of substance. And as the substance of the Godhead is that Divine Spirit which can be equally predicated of the three persons, so the substance of humanity must

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\* P. 237.

be that spiriual essence by virtue of which each man becomes a living soul. Adam's soul was the same substance with the souls of all his posterity. The forms of consciousness which this substance has assumed are as manifold and various as the human creatures in which it has been found, but the substance itself remains ever the same. The whole substance of the race was created in Adam—no new human substance has been created since. Man is essentially one spirit. As a dozen chairs made from the same oak are one matter, so a dozen souls sprung from Adam are the same spirit.

We have thus endeavored to elicit Dr. Baird's notion of human nature. We saw that it was not found in any of those properties and affections which constitute the personal consciousness—it was not the habitude or tendency of these properties and attributes to any given mode of manifestation—it was nothing relative or accidental. It is the ultimate ground of personality, the material condition of intelligence, responsibility, and will. It is an efficient power or a complement of forces which absolutely conditions and determines all the activities and all the states of the individual. It is the bond of unity to the whole race. It sustains the same relation to human persons that the substance of the Godhead sustains to the ineffable Three. It is clearly, therefore, the substance of the soul, considered as the substratum or basis of all personal consciousness—as that which contains the forces, the entire sum of the forces, that characterize the human species. Adam and his posterity are one substance; the same spiriual essence which underlay his consciousness, underlies theirs—they are partakers, not of a like, but of a common, nature. This is the doctrine, as far as we have been able to apprehend it. Hence the soul and nature are frequently used as interchangeable terms. For example: "The will is the soul disposed to the active embrace of the affinities which it realizes. It is the nature, viewed in the light of its tendency to give expressions to the aptitudes which it intuitively feels."\* Again: "Ed-

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\* P. 160.

wards has much on this point; but entirely fails to bring out the fundamental fact, that at last, it is the soul itself which endows the motive with the character in which it appears. The *nature* of the transgressor is the cause of his sins."\* Throughout the whole discussion upon the subject of the will, *the soul, the nature of the soul, and the moral nature,* are used as equivalent terms. One other passage will close this part of the subject. Considered as being appointed to glorify God and enjoy Him forever, the elements, Dr. Baird tells us, which are of most significance in the constitution of men, are "their moral natures and personality. The word *nature*, we have formerly defined to be the designation of a permanent force, dwelling in a substance. A moral nature is one the essential characteristics of which are reason, will, and the moral sense, or conscience." These faculties, it will be noticed, do not constitute, but characterize a moral nature. They, themselves, are not the permanent, abiding force which is called moral, but only the marks or signs of it. This force, therefore, can be nothing less than the substance of the soul, manifesting its moral peculiarities through these faculties of the personal consciousness, as its organs. The author subsequently adds, "the proper subject of a moral nature is a spiritual substance. In no other mode have we any reason to imagine it possible for it to exist at all."† The substance of the soul, as endowed with the forces which realize themselves in the faculties and energies of the personal consciousness, of which these operations are the signs and characteristics, that substance, as a causal force, which underlies them all, and conditions and determines them all, that substance is the nature. Or if there be any distinction between them, the substance is the ground, and the nature the causal energies which are contained in it. That is, the soul considered as simple being may be called substance; considered as a *cause*, or as endowed with power, it is nature; the word *nature* expressing directly the forces, and substance, that

\* P. 160.

† Pp. 226, 227.

in which they inhere. But for all the purposes of speculation the difference is purely formal. A substance to human thought is only the correlative of the properties which manifest it.

2. The next point to which we invite the attention of the reader, as further developing the philosophy of Dr. Baird, and furnishing cumulative proof of the truth of what we have said, is the relation subsisting between person and nature. It is, briefly, that of a cause to its effect. The person is a product of the nature. "It is certain,"\* says he, "that nothing may be predicated of the person which does not grow out of the nature. And if this must be admitted, there appears to be no ground on which it can be claimed that the nature, because existing in another person, is entitled to exemption from its essential guilt. The opposite view assumes the absurdity that there may be, and is, that in the person which has a subsistency and moral agency of its own; a competence to responsibility, and capacity to appreciate and experience the power of the law's sanctions, distinct from, and independent of, the nature. Is it said to be unjust to hold my person bound for an act which was committed in the person of another? The objection would be valid, were the person a force to control or modify the nature. But since the contrary is the case, it does not appear reasonable that exemption should be claimed on that ground. In fact, the nature, which was the cause of my person, was there. And as every power or principle of efficiency which is in the effect must have been in its cause, it follows, inevitably, that everything in me, upon which resistance to the apostasy might be imagined, was actually there, and so far from opposing, took part in the treason. We sinned in Adam, and fell with him in his first transgression. The accident of my personal existence, had it then been realized, would have added no new influences to those which were actually engaged, and would not have modified the result, nor changed the responsibility attaching to it. The objection here consid-

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\*P. 257.

ered strikes at the root of all responsibility, as well for personal as for native sin. If I am not justly responsible for Adam's transgression, because only my nature was efficient in it, then may I, with equal propriety, claim exemption in respect to personal sins, since in them my person is the mere subject of the action, and my nature is the sole efficient cause."

The nature not only generates the person, but the person is only an organization or instrument through which the properties of the nature can be unfolded in action. Without the person, the nature is a power without tools. Its appetencies can find no means of gratification. If it could be conceived as existing at all, which it cannot be, its forces would have to assume the form of a vain conatus. They would be simply strivings after being or manifestation. But the person furnishes them with all that is necessary for a full and distinct realization of their energies. Of course, the person in itself is quite subordinate; and all the rhetoric about its intrinsic dignity and its superiority to things, its essential rights and its ethical importance, is but attributing to the casket the properties which belong to the jewel enshrined in it. Dr. Baird distinctly affirms that the person is but an accident of the nature—inseparable, to be sure, but only an accident—and that its whole moral significance is to be resolved into the nature. It is no great thing, therefore, to be able to say I. It is not the personal subject, it is the impersonal forces which move it, that constitute the real dignity of man. All the faculties which distinguish the being that I call myself—memory, intelligence, conscience and will—are but the organs through which a being, that is not myself, plays off its fantastic tricks. I am a puppet, called into being by this mysterious power, only that it may have something to sport with and develop its resistless forces. Never was a poor demoniac more completely at the bidding of the possessing fiend, than the personal subject at the beck of this impersonal nature. Other philosophers have foolishly imagined that they were going to the very core of man's nature, essentially considered, when they de-

scribed it as *personal*. They have signalized this peculiarity as that which contains in it the ground of every other distinction from the rest of this sublunary world—other beings are *things*, man is a person. It is his nature to be a person. But Dr. Baird sharply distinguishes, though he does not divide, nature and personality. The person is to the nature what the eye is to vision, or the muscles to motion. The following passage is an explicit statement of his doctrine :

“ Whilst, thus, all moral obligations arise out of the constitution of the nature, and lay hold, essentially upon it, the subject against which they are enforced, is the person in which the nature subsists; and this for evident reasons. It is only in the form of a person that a moral nature can subsist. All that is proper to the person, or in any way characteristic of it as such, grows out of the nature, and is designed and constructed as a means for the activity of the nature; so that the person is but the nature embodied in a form adapted to its efficient action. It is the organization through which the nature may meet its responsibilities, by performing the duties demanded of it. Since, therefore, the nature can neither exist, nor, therefore, be responsible, neither recognize nor satisfy its responsibilities, but as it is embodied in a person; and since, to it, as thus embodied, the obligations which rest upon it are, for this reason, by God addressed, it follows that persons are the immediate and only subjects of moral law and responsibility. The nature comprehends all the forces which are proper to the person in which it subsists. Among these are not only included those of which obligation or obedience may be supposed, but those susceptibilities upon which may be predicated the realization of suffering, the endurance of punishment. There is, therefore, nothing in the person of which exemption can be imagined, as apart from the nature. Were it possible to take away the nature and yet the person remain; were it possible to suppose any other forces proper to the person than all its proper forces, then would there be room for the conception, that the person might be irresponsible for the nature, and have a responsibility distinct from it. But, so long as it is true that the moral nature is that which makes the person what it is in all moral respects, and that the only existence of the nature is in the person, it will follow that the attempt to separate the obligations of the nature and of the person is absurd and preposterous. The person is bound under the responsibilities which attach to the nature as subsisting therein, and can be held to no others than such as arise therein. The form of the obligation is, indeed, modified by the accidents of the person; but such accidental forms are always capable of resolution into general principles which attach essentially to the nature.” \*

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\* P. 250.

3. Let us next attend to the law of generation. In Adam, the nature and the person were concreated. He was, in the first moment of his existence, both an individual and the species, a man and humanity. In him the nature of the entire race was created once for all, and from him is propagated by generation, and so descends to all his seed.\* But what does the doctrine of propagation involve? "It implies that all the powers and forces which are, or to the end of time shall be, in the living creatures, vegetable and animal, by which the earth is filled and peopled, have their origin in those creatures which were made at the beginning of the world, and were implanted in them thus to be developed and perpetuated in their seed, to the end of time. It is not that the powers which are developed in the offspring have a likeness merely to those of the parent. This would be to attribute the whole matter to a continual exercise of creative energy. But the forces of the offspring are derived by propagation from the parents. Those very forces, numerically, were in the parents, and so back to the original progenitors. And yet it is as undeniable as it is inscrutable, that the entire sum of forces which operate in the living creation, vegetable and animal, were created and implanted in the primeval creatures at the beginning."† Dr. Baird further teaches, that the first man is the efficient cause of the existence of all other men. God made Adam, and Adam made the rest of the race. The whole man, in his entire existence, as spirit and body, is the effect of which generation is the cause. "We take the position," says Dr. Baird, "that the entire man proceeds by generation from the parents. We do not say, we do not mean, that the soul is generated by the soul, or the body by the body. But man, in his soul, body and spirit, is an unit composed of diverse elements, yet having but one personality, in which the soul is the element of universal efficiency. Of that personality, efficient thus, it is that we predicate generation, and, according to the maxim that like begets like, we hold the child, in its entire nature, to be the offspring of the parent.

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\* P. 256.

† Pp. 144, 145.

The entire race of man was in our first parents, not individually and personally, but natively and seminally, as the plant is in the seed. When Adam was created, among the powers which constituted his nature was that of generation. His substance was made to be an efficient cause, of which posterity, taken in their whole being, physical and spiritual, are the normal and necessary effect. Thus, in Adam and Eve, the human race had not a potential existence merely; but God, in creating the first pair, put into efficient operation the sufficient and entire cause of the existence of their seed.”\*

Generation, according to this account, performs two wonders. It first propagates the nature, and next, as the indispensable condition of the existence of the nature, it creates the person in whom the nature is to appear. The person is as truly the effect of the causal energy of the parent, as the communication of the nature. Here there occurs to us a difficulty which we crave to have solved. The nature of Adam and his posterity, we are told, is one, because it descends to us by generation. The essence of generation is to reproduce the same. If, now, the law of generation establishes an identity of nature between the parent and the child, why not, also, an identity of person? If the person is as truly its product as the nature, how comes it that the generated person should be different, while the generated nature is the same? If to generate is to propagate, why not the person be a propagation as well as the nature? Then, again, what is it that generates? Dr. Baird answers, the nature *through* the person. What is generated? The nature *in* a person. What, now, restricts the identity to one part of the product, while that which answers to both parts is active in the production? To us the dilemma seems inevitable, that either every human being descended from Adam is the same person with him, or that the law of generation concludes nothing as to the identity of nature. If a person can beget a numerically different person, we do not see why he cannot beget a numerically different nature. Besides

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\*Pp. 340, 341.

this, we have a vague suspicion that a cause and its effect are not commonly construed as the same thing. They are certainly, different in thought, whatever they may be in existence. If the cause does nothing more than continue itself, if what is called the effect is only a change in the mode of existence of the cause, a phenomenal variety of being, we crave to understand how the universe can be really different from its Author? Dr. Baird says that Adam is the cause, the efficient cause, of the existence of his posterity. If, now, his causal energy terminates in the reproduction of himself, and they must be one with him, *because* he is their *cause*, the bearing of the principle upon the theistic argument is too palpable to be mistaken. We shall land in but one substance in the universe, the  $\delta\nu\omega\varsigma \delta\nu$  of the Platonists, and all else will be shadow and appearance.

The reader must have been struck already with the close correspondence between the reasonings of Dr. Baird in relation to the nature of man, and the reasonings of the Pantheists in relation to God. They postulate a great, impersonal, all-pervading ground of universal being, as he postulates a great, impersonal, all-pervading ground of human manifestation; the primal substance of the Pantheist is the life of all that lives, and yet has no life of its own; at the root of every consciousness, and yet without consciousness itself; the radical principle of all knowledge, and yet unable to utter the formula, behold, I know. So Dr. Baird's nature has no separate being of its own, and yet gives being to the man, is without intelligence or selfhood, and yet the basis of them both. The real being of the Pantheist conditions all, while itself is unconditioned; determines all differences, while itself without differences; is the secret of all relations, and yet absolved in itself from every relation. Equally absolute in reference to man is Dr. Baird's nature. And, as with the Pantheist, all that we call creatures are but phenomena of the primordial substance, forms in which it realizes itself, so with Dr. Baird, all human persons are but phenomena of his original nature; the vestments with which it clothes itself in order to become visible, or the instruments it seizes in order to act. The phenomenal manifestations of the

Panthiest obey by the law of development—those of Dr. Baird the law of generation. Each is a philosophy of one in the many. They both, too, arise from the same process of thought. The highest genus must necessarily absorb all differences, and potentially contain them, while none can be predicated of it. The descent develops these differences in increasing fulness until we come to individuals, which logically are of no value. The void absolute is the logical result of a realism which attributes real existence to genera and species. Beginning at the bottom of the line, we remove difference after difference until we reach undifferentiated being—the *εἶς ὅν*. If the genus is real, it develops from itself, as you come down the line, all the varieties of subordinate classes in which it is found. The nothing, in this way, is made to yield every thing. The highest genus, though itself nothing, yet as a genus, contains essentially all properties and all attributes. We have before us a curious illustration of the tendencies of realism to end in nihilism, in an elaborate argument of Fredigesius, which concludes with the famous axiom of Hegel, God equal nothing. The logic is unassailable; the absurdity lies in attributing existence to general names. Once give up the maxim of Nominalists, that all real beings are singular, and the law of classification expresses not only a process of thought, but the order of being, and you cannot stop until you reach an *ens realissimum* which, at one and the same time, includes the whole fulness of existence, and is totally void of predicates—at once a plenum and a vacuum. The argument is short, simple and unanswerable. If a species is a real substance, numerically the same in all the individuals, the genus must be a substance numerically the same in all its species, and thus, in ascending from genus to genus, we extend the numerical identity of substance, until we arrive at absolute being, which is numerically the same in all things, and which, being without attributes, must be both everything and nothing. We are quite confident that all the absurd speculations concerning the absolute, which have aimed to take away from us a personal God, and to resolve all existence into an unconditioned unity of substance are but offshoots of the spirit of re-

alism. The body has been buried, but the ghost still hovers about the haunts of speculation.

While on this subject of generation, there are other difficulties which we would like to have solved. Its law is that it propagates the *same* nature, not a like, but numerically the same nature. Does this nature exist whole and entire in each individual? If so, how can it be found in millions and millions of persons, and yet be only one? How can each man have all of it, and yet all have it at the same time? Upon this point we are like Bottom, the weaver, rather dull of comprehension. Or, is the nature divided? Then each man has only a distributive share, and if, in proportion to the number of heirs, the inheritance is diminished, the last man that is to be, has the prospect of a very slender interest. If, too, original sin grows less with the diminution in the quantum of nature, the race stands a chance of being considerably improved by the very law which has ruined it. How will Dr. Baird solve this problem of the one and the many? He has fairly raised the question, and he ought to have answered it. He has scouted the old doctrine that generation produces sons like their fathers; he ought to have shown us how they and their fathers can both have identically the same nature at the same time, without making that nature manifold, or without dividing it. We wish to see him fairly encounter the question which baffled the genius of Plato, and which Socrates pronounced to be a wonder in nature. It is a question which every phase of realism gives rise to, and when a man in the nineteenth century revolts to that philosophy, he ought to have something to say upon this cardinal matter.

As to the doctrine, for which Dr. Baird contends, of the transduction of souls, we regard it, in a theological point of view, as of very little importance. Holding, as we do, that the child is numerically a different being from the parent, different in substance, different in person, different in nature, different in every thing in which he is distinct, though in all essential respects, precisely alike, we do not see that the doctrine of original sin is relieved of a single difficulty by any theory as to

the mode of the production of the man. No matter how called into being, he is a separate, indivisible moral agent, and he is either mediately or immediately the creature of God. Generation is but the process through which God creates him, and whatever causes, independently of himself, condition his being, are ultimately to be referred to God. If it were wrong to create him under guilt, it is wrong to permit him to be generated under guilt. The only effect which the doctrine of traduction has is to widen the interval between the direct agency of God and the commencement of the soul—but make the chain of second causes as long as you please, you reach God at last, and these determining intermediate influences do not shift from Him the responsibility under which that soul begins to be. They are independent of it, and its state is as truly to be referred to His will, as if He created it at once by the breath of His mouth. Let it be granted that the soul begins its being in a certain state, and the conclusion is inevitable, either that the state in question cannot be sinful, cannot be charged upon the soul as guilt, or you must seek some other ground for the imputation than the mode of that soul's production. The great difficulty is how it comes to be guilty in God's sight, before it had a being, and it is no solution of this difficulty to tell us how it received its being. It is not, and cannot be, responsible for its state, unless that state is grounded in guilt which can be justly charged upon it. If it passes through a dirty channel and becomes filthy, its filth is misfortune, and not sin, unless it passes through that channel in consequence of a sin which can be regarded as its own. Hence we have never felt any zeal upon the question of traduction as a theological problem. If the child is a new being, it is a matter of no moment whether it is created at first or second hand. The guilt or innocence of its state must turn upon quite other grounds than those which determine how it came to be at all. Dr. Baird's hypothesis would solve the difficulty completely, if it were not wanting in one capital condition—the possibility of being true. It implies a palpable contradiction

in terms. It makes a million to be one, and one to be a million. It relieves perplexity by absurdity.

We cannot dismiss this subject without entering a caveat against the repeated representations of Dr. Baird, that the parent is the cause of the child. Stapfer is even still more extravagant in the manner in which he has reasoned upon the causal relation. And they both mean, not material or instrumental causes, but causes strictly and properly efficient. But can such language be vindicated? Consider the parent in the only light in which he has any ethical value, that of a personal, voluntary agent, and is he the maker of the child? Does he produce by a conscious exercise of power, and with a predetermined reference to the nature of the effect to be achieved? Does he act from design, or is he a blind, mechanical instrument? Can he fix the size, shape, bodily constitution, or personal features of his offspring? Can he determine the bias or extent of its intellectual capacities? Has his will, and that, Dr. Baird tells us, is the exponent of the nature, anything to do with the shaping and moulding of the peculiarities which attach to the fœtus? Can he even determine that there shall be any fœtus at all? It is perfectly clear that he is in no other sense a cause, than as an act of his constitutes the occasion upon which processes connected with the vital and material constitution of the sexes, and entirely independent of his will, are instituted, which, under the providence of God, terminate in an offspring which the Almighty has moulded and fashioned according to His will. He simply touches a spring which sets powers at work that he can neither control nor modify. He is only a link in a chain of instruments through which God calls into being, and the organic law through which all the changes take place that form and develop the child is but the expression, in the last analysis, of the efficiency of God. We cannot say, therefore, that the parent is the efficient cause of his offspring. The relation between them is not that of cause and effect, if by cause be meant anything more than an instrument or means. Our parents have no more made us than we

have made ourselves. We are God's creatures, and owe our being to His sovereign will.

The reader has now before him the grounds on which Dr. Baird explains our interest in the sin of Adam. It was strictly and properly ours, as really so as if it had been committed in our own persons. Each man can say, to use language which he has quoted with approbation, "there sinned in him not I, but this which is I. My substance sinned, but not my person; and since the substance does not exist otherwise than in a person, the sin of my substance attaches to my person, although not a personal sin. For a personal sin is such as, not that which I am, but I who am, commit—in which Odo, and not humanity, sins—in which I, a person, and not a nature, sins. But inasmuch as there is no person without a nature, the sin of a person is also the sin of a nature, although it is not a sin of nature." In a single phrase, Adam was every man, and therefore every man sinned in Adam. The very identical thing which makes any one a man, is the thing which apostatized in his great transgression, and, therefore, there is no marvel that it should be held guilty wherever it is found. The rogue is a rogue, no matter under what disguise he appears. The same is the same, and must always continue so; and original sin is, therefore, as necessary and inevitable as the law of identity. The imputation of guilt is disembarassed of all difficulty, for it is nothing more than a finding of the real facts in the case. It finds the race to be Adam, and it simply says so. There is no fiction of law, no constructive unity of persons, no mere relations, whether moral or political. There is simply the naked fact, that every human being did actually apostatize in the person of Adam, in the whole essence of his humanity.

There are some other conclusions which seem to us to follow with as rigid necessity from Dr. Baird's premises as the denial of constructive guilt. In the first place they make every man responsible for every sin of Adam. In every sin his nature was implicated—it was his nature that made him capable of sin or holiness—and his nature is expressed in every determination of his will. Now if that nature passes to his pos-

terity precisely as it was in him, it must pass burdened with all the guilt of all the transgressions of his life. We are, therefore, answerable not for the one offence alone, which seems to have been the idea of Paul, but for all his iniquity. His personal sins cannot be detached from the nature. The person is only the tool of the nature, and, therefore, as growing out of the nature, and conditioned upon the existence of the nature, all his personal shortcomings are really and truly ours. Dr. Baird has recoiled from this conclusion, but the distinction with which he has sought to evade it will not sustain him. "There are two classes of actions which, in this objection, are confounded; but which should be carefully distinguished. Of these one consists in such personal actions as result from the fact that the nature is of a given and determinate character. These, in no respect, change the nature, nor indicate any change occurring in it, but constitute the mere criteria by which the character and strength of its attributes may be known. After their occurrence the nature flows on, unchanged, to posterity, conveying to them, not the transient accidents which have thus arisen from it, but itself, as essentially it is. To this class belong all those sins of our intermediate ancestors, which are here objected to us. These in no wise modify the nature, nor are they fruits of any change taking place in it as inherited by them, but are the evidences and fruits of its being what it is, in the person by whom they are wrought, and to whom, therefore, they attach. The other class consists of such agency, as springing from within, constitutes an action of the nature itself, by which its attitude is changed. The single case referable to this class is that of apostasy—the voluntary self-depravation of a nature created holy. Here, as the nature flows downward in the line of generation, it communicates to the successive members of the race, not only itself thus transformed, but, with itself, the moral responsibility which attaches inseparably to it, as active in the transformation wrought by it, and thus conveyed." \*

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\* Pp. 508, 509.

Here, in the first place, it is explicitly stated, that the only sin in which the nature is active is that which changes its general attitude—perverts it from holiness and God. After it has become perverted it remains dormant, and the person comes forward as a mere exponent of this perverted state. Does Dr. Baird mean to say that the nature is not implicated in *every* sin? If so, he eats his own words, for he has again and again affirmed that the relation of an action to the nature is the sole ground of its moral significance. Besides, how can these actions manifest the nature if they do not spring from it? If the nature is not their cause, how can we determine anything in regard to its attitude from them as effects? Moreover, if the nature always conditions the moral determinations of will, these sins are either not voluntary, or the nature has ultimately produced them. In the next place, the ground of distinction between those moral actions which indicate a perverted nature, but in which it is not itself active, and those in which it is active, is most extraordinary. A man wants to know when his nature is active, and when not? or what actions modify it and what do not? and what is the answer of Dr. Baird? Simply this, that those actions alone directly implicate the nature which change its attitude. The criterion is not in the actions themselves, but in the effect. That is to say, Dr. Baird was anxious to limit the responsibility of Adam's posterity for his guilt to the single sin of his apostasy, and therefore extemporizes a distinction to suit the occasion. He does not show us how it appears that the nature was more active in this sin than in any other—that it was any more self-caused, or that it any more sprang from within. It had graver consequences, that will be freely admitted, but the consequences of an action do not determine its origin. In the third place, we do not understand what Dr. Baird means when he says that the sins of a fallen being do not modify his nature. If his idea is that they do not change its general attitude, that is clear. But surely they increase the amount of guilt and depravity. The blindness of the sinner may daily become intenser, and his heart harder. Are these no modifications of the nature? A man can fall

but once, but surely he may continue to sink lower. He but once turns his back upon God; but surely he can proceed farther in the direction to which he has turned. The body dies but once; but after death it can putrefy. Is putrefaction no modification of its state? Dr. Baird's doctrine, if this is his meaning, is simply absurd. Every sin modifies the nature; it strengthens the general habit of depravity and increases the tendency to repeat itself. There are endless degrees of wickedness and guilt, from the first act of apostasy to the desperate and malignant condition of damned spirits. Guilt accumulates and corruption festers. Hence, every sin which he committed modified Adam's nature. His first turned his face from God, and every succeeding one was a step further from the Holy One. Until renewed, his heart grew harder and his mind darker with every transgression; his guilt increased in the same proportion, and if his nature were numerically the same with ours, his nature must have come to us, not only as it was perverted by the first sin, but as it was modified by every subsequent offence. This conclusion is inevitable until Dr. Baird can specify what relation his nature had to the first sin which it did not have to any other sin. The distinction must not be grounded in the effect, but in the nature of the relation itself.

Another consequence which follows from Dr. Baird's doctrine,—in fact, from every doctrine which resolves the propagation of sin exclusively into the parental relation,—but more stringently from Dr. Baird's notion of numerical identity, is, that Adam, penitent and believing, must have begotten penitent and believing children. Conversion was another change in the attitude of his nature. It, at least, was no transient accident, but revolutionized the nature itself. Under the influence of Divine grace, the renewed nature turned again to God and embraced Him as the portion of the soul. Now, if the nature flows from parent to child, as it is in the parent, and this must be the case if it is numerically the same, then a converted parent must beget converted children. Dr. Baird will certainly admit that if Adam had maintained his integ-

urity his descendants would have been holy; he would have propagated the nature as it was in him. Having fallen, he propagates the nature as it is now perverted, that is, he still propagates it as it exists in him. If, now, he can propagate, as a holy being, and propagate as a fallen being, why not as a renewed being? What is there, we ask, in the new attitude superinduced by Divine grace, that prevents it from being imparted likewise? Or if there be any thing, how that can be numerically the same, which is radically different in all its aspirations and affections? Can a crooked tree be numerically the same with a straight one? Can a holy nature and a sinful nature be one? To state the matter in a very few words: the parent re-produces his nature in the child; his nature is a renewed one, therefore, the child must be renewed. This is the difficulty which never yet has been solved by those who are reluctant to recognize any other relation betwixt Adam and his seed than that of the parent and child, and we suspect never will be.

Having considered the essential principles of Dr. Baird's theory of original sin, we proceed to point out the modifications which, if generally adopted, they would inevitably work in our current theology. And first, in relation to imputation and guilt. Dr. Baird, as we understand him, does not object to the common definition, that guilt is the obligation to punishment, arising from the ill-desert of sin; neither would he cancel the distinction between the moral necessity of punishment, or that which springs from the inherent righteousness of the case, and the legal or judicial necessity which springs from the sentence of the law. To deserve condemnation, and to be condemned, are not formally the same thing. Intrinsic ill-desert Divines are accustomed to denominate potential guilt, or guilt in the first act, it is *dignitas pœnæ*. The judicial sentence of condemnation they call actual guilt, guilt in the second act—*obligatio ad pœnam*. Dr. Baird, however, and in this we agree with him, restricts the term guilt to the ill-desert itself, and makes the judicial sentence only the consequence of that. Hence, in strict propriety of speech, guilt is

the ground, and not the essence, of condemnation—the moral, and not the legal necessity of punishment. He is guilty who deserves to be condemned, whether he actually is so or not. So far, there is no difference of opinion. We also agree with Dr. Baird, that the imputation of guilt is simply the declaration of the fact. To condemn a man is to find or pronounce him guilty, and not to make him so. It is a verdict upon the case as it is, and introduces no new element. But the question arises, upon what grounds is a man pronounced deserving of punishment? And here we are compelled to shake hands and to part from our brother. He explicitly maintains that the *only* ground upon which the ill-desert of an action can attach to a man, is his own personal causal relation to it as its author. This we utterly deny. But we do not maintain, as Dr. Baird seems to insinuate, that a man can be pronounced guilty when the sin is not really his. All that we maintain is, that a sin may be ours, really and truly ours, and therefore chargeable upon us, when we have not, in our own proper persons, committed it; when we have, in fact, sustained no causal relation to it whatever. This is the point upon which we differ: not whether a man can be punished for what is not his own, but whether there is only one way of a thing's being his own. If there is a just moral sense in which an action can be mine, without my having actually committed it, then there is a ground upon which it may be righteously imputed to me, without my being the cause of it. Dr. Baird has no where proved that personal causation is the sole ground of propriety in actions. He asserts it, and confidently assumes it, but no where proves it. His notion is, that where there is guilt there must necessarily be the stain. We admit that guilt springs from the stain, but we deny that it is limited to the person in whom the stain is found. We contend that representation as really establishes the relation of propriety in actions as personal causation; that what a man does by his agent, he as truly does as if he did it in his own proper person. The maxim expresses the common sense of mankind—*qui facit per alium, facit per se*. The whole system of spon-

sorship in society is founded upon it, and no commonwealth could hang together for a single generation, if the principle were discarded. This is the principle upon which the imputation of Adam's first sin to us proceeds. He was our representative; he was our head, our agent, on probation, not for himself alone, but for all who should descend from him by ordinary generation. There can be no question that, if he sustained this relation to us, we are implicated in all that he did in this relation. His acts are ours, and we are as responsible for them as if we had committed them ourselves. "We sinned in him, and fell with him in his first transgression."

According to this view there is consistency in the language of our standards, when it is said that what is imputed to us, is not our own personal act, nor the act of that which subsequently became ourselves, but the guilt of *Adam's* first sin. It was the one sin of the one man that ruined us. According to Dr. Baird it was no more Adam's sin than ours. The relation of his person to it was altogether accidental—it only happened to express itself through his will—but essentially, it is ours in the very same sense in which it is his. What was peculiar to Adam is not imputed. If there is force in language, or coherence in thought, Dr. Baird totally and absolutely denies that anything personal to Adam is charged upon us. What is now ourselves used him as an instrument. He was simply the paw which the roguish nature used to steal with. We are now the paws with which it continues to practise its villainy—the instruments are changed, but the agent is the same. We leave it to any man in his senses to say whether such an account is reconcilable with the language of the Westminster Formularies. "The sin of Adam and Eve, which God was pleased, according to His wise and holy counsel to permit,"\* is explicitly affirmed to be the act, the personal act of eating the forbidden fruit, and the guilt of *this* sin, this personal act, is what is said to be imputed. But, according to Dr. Baird, that specific act could not have been imputed—it was not the act of the nature,

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\* Conf. of Faith, ch. vi.

but only an accidental manifestation of what the nature had become. It was personal, and not generic. "The action of plucking and eating the fruit was, in itself, as a mere act, a matter utterly insignificant."\* "We have shown already that the plucking and eating of the fruit of the forbidden tree was a mere accident, following the heart-sin."† Now, our standards just as precisely assert that *this* was the *very* sin whereby our first parents fell from the estate wherein they were created." "By *this* sin they fell from their original righteousness." Dr. Baird says that they *had fallen before* they committed the deed, and that the deed was only the proof of their fall; the Confession says, that the fall was the *consequence* of the deed, and that the deed was the judicial ground of the fall. It is perfectly clear that Dr. Baird does not teach the doctrines of the Westminster Divines. They held that the personal offence of our first parents was imputed—he holds that only our own offence is imputed. To make it clear that they mean a personal act, they specify the act to which they trace the ruin and condemnation of the race. Dr. Baird says that the race was ruined before that act was committed, and that the act itself "was utterly insignificant, a mere accident, following the heart-sin." They teach that the formal ground of the imputation of the first sin is the representative relation of Adam to his race. Dr. Baird teaches that the formal ground of the imputation of the first sin is that his race committed it. It is imputed to them in the same sense and on the same principle, in which it is imputed to him.

We repeat, therefore, and we defy Dr. Baird to escape from the conclusion, that, upon his premises there is no imputation of Adam's sin at all. It is not as *his*, but as subjectively and inherently *ours*, that we are held responsible for it. Upon the federal view, the sin could not be ours, but as it was *Adam's*, his personal relations to it were absolutely necessary to create our interest in it. He, as a person, and not a nature, was our

\* P. 508.

† P. 497.

head and representative; and, therefore, before we can be called to account, it is presupposed that he has acted.

In the next place, Dr. Baird utterly confounds the twofold relations in which Adam stood to the species, as a natural and as a representative head. According to him they are one and the same thing. The truth is, that in strict propriety of language, there is no headship at all. The nature in every case is the same, and the person is a mere channel of transmission. One man stands in the same relation to it as another, and, instead of the parent representing the child, the nature represents itself in both. But, passing over this objection, the parental relation *ex necessitate rei*, according to Dr. Baird, is federal. In the very act of creation, "his Maker," we are told,\* "endowed him with a prolific constitution, and in the blessing pronounced upon him at his creation, prior to any of the external actions by which the covenant of nature was formally sealed, he was ordained to multiply; to become of one the myriads of the human race. In all God's dealings with him, he is regarded in this light, as the root and father of a race who should proceed from him. They, by virtue of this derivative relation to him, were contemplated by God, as in him their head, parties in all the transactions which had respect to the covenant. Thus, they sinned in his sin; fell in his apostasy; were depraved in his corruption; and in him became the children of Satan, and of the wrath of God." Hence, to be a man, and to be a covenant head, are the same thing. It is the propagative peculiarity which directly makes the child responsible for the parent, and the parent for the child. God could not have dealt with Adam, but as a federal head. He did not appoint him to the office, but created him in it. "By the phrase, covenant head, we do not mean that Adam was by covenant made head of the race, but that, being its head, by virtue of the nature with which God had endowed him, he stood as such in the covenant. Adam sustained in his person two distinct characters, the de-

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\* P. 305.

markation of which must be carefully observed if we would attain to any just conclusions as to the relation he held toward us, and the effects upon us of his actions. First, in him was a nature of a specific character, the common endowment of the human race; and transmissible to them, by propagation, with their being. Again, he was an individual person, endowed with the nature thus bestowed on him in common with his posterity. Personal actions and relations of his, which did not affect his nature were peculiar to him as a private person. But such as affected his nature, with him, and to the same extent, involved all those to whom that nature was given in its bestowal on him."\* Accordingly, Dr. Baird teaches that the covenant of works was not a positive institution, into which God entered with Adam after his creation, but was the very form, and the only conceivable form, under which such a creature could be subject to the moral government of God. If not a word had been said concerning the forbidden fruit, and no limitation of probation introduced, it would still have been true that the apostasy of Adam would have been the apostasy of his race. His relationship, as a parent, necessarily implicated his seed in all that affected his nature. One more extract will remove all room for doubt.

"Here, however, it is necessary to enter more particularly into consideration of the manner in which Adam was invested with the functions of a representative. That the cause of that office was the will of God, is not disputed by any who recognize the office. But it is a question how the Creator gave effect to His will in this matter. Was it by a positive arrangement, unessential to the completeness of the constitution of nature, extraneous to it, superimposed upon it, after the work of creation was complete? Or did he so order that the relation between the representative body and its head should be an organic one, a relation implied in the very structure of Adam's nature, incorporated with the substance of his being, and constituting an element essential to the completeness and symmetry of the whole system, physical, moral and spiritual? By many orthodox theologians of the present day, it is held that the representative relation of Adam did not exist until the positive provision was made respecting the tree of knowledge,

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\* Pp. 305, 306.

when it was constituted by a decretive act of God's sovereignty. We are constrained to take the opposite view, and to maintain, with the older divines, that the relation is as old as the first inscription of the covenant of nature on the heart of man in his creation. We look upon it as the essential element in the parental relation as it subsisted in Adam; the element which gives the family constitution all its significance."—pp. 308, 309.

Now we do not hesitate to assert that this complete confusion, or rather, amalgamation of the federal with natural headship, is a total abolition of the federal, in the sense in which it is taken in the Westminster standards. Their covenant is an institution posterior to creation—an institution proceeding from the sovereign will of God, in which the essential elements of moral government were largely modified by grace. What those modifications were we shall not here specify, as they are unimportant to the point before us. It is enough to say that moral government and the covenant of works are not synonymous, but that the covenant was the special form which God impressed upon it after the creation of man. We say further, that considered simply as a creature, a moral creature, there is no reason to believe that, independently of the sovereign appointment of God, the character and conduct of Adam would have had any legal effects upon the destiny of his offspring. Each man would have been under the moral law for himself, and his fortunes would have been in his own hand. All this is clear, if the covenant was subsequent to the creation. What say our standards? The first covenant is represented as having "*been made with man.*" The inference would seem to be that man was already in existence. This is not language which any one would adopt who intended to describe an innate law or a connatural principle. And although ingenuity may pat it to the torture, and wring out of it an interpretation to suit Dr. Baird's hypothesis, no one can pretend that it is the simple and obvious sense of the words. But let us admit, for the sake of argument, that these words are not decisive, what shall we say to the teachings of the Larger and Shorter Catechisms, in which it is expressly affirmed that the covenant of works *was a special act of Providence*

towards man in the estate wherein he was created. Providence presupposes creation, and here man's previous existence in a definite state is unequivocally affirmed, and the covenant is made with him as a creature existing in that holy and happy condition. The Larger Catechism\* recounts first his creation, then his insertion into Paradise, the injunction to cultivate the garden, the permission to eat of the fruits of the earth, the subjection of the creatures to his authority, the institution of marriage and the Sabbath, the privilege of communion with God—all these before it comes to the establishment of the covenant, making it as clear as the sun in the heavens, that the covenant was regarded as posterior to the creation, and as by no means synonymous with that moral law which was confessedly the rule and measure of the holiness that he had as a moral creature. The Shorter Catechism removes all perplexity when it declares in so many words,† that “when God had created man, he entered into a covenant of life with him.” The Latin version is, “After God had created man,” *post quam Deus hominem condidisset*. It is needless to pursue so plain a matter any further. Dr. Baird and the Westminster standards teach an entirely different doctrine as to the covenant, and of course as to Adam's federal headship. One makes both concreated with man—elements of his being as a moral propagative creature, his necessary attitude to God and his posterity. The other makes both the sovereign appointment of God, gracious dispensations of Providence towards him and his race, looking to a good, which, without such an arrangement, he could have no right to expect. In support of these views we are happy to be able to cite an authority which we know that Dr. Baird sincerely respects, and which is likely to have more weight with him than any arguments that we can employ. Dr. Breckinridge has put this subject in its proper light in a work to which Dr. Baird has more than once referred, and referred to in terms which indicate a deserved appreciation of its value.‡

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\* Quest. 20.

† Quest. 12.

‡ Knowl. God Object., Book v., c. 31.

Whatever, therefore, "the older divines" may have taught to the contrary, it is indisputable that the Westminster Assembly has represented federal headship as an instituted, and natural headship as an original relation, and has clearly distinguished between them. An instituted is not, however, to be confounded with an arbitrary relation. The appointment of Adam to the office of a federal head was not in contempt or defiance of the principles of equity and truth. His natural relations to his race rendered it consistent with justice that he should, also, be their representative. His natural headship, in other words, is the ground of his federal headship. The connection by blood betwixt him and his descendants constitutes a basis of unity by which, though numerically different as individuals, they may be treated as one collective whole. There is a close and intimate union, though not an identity, among the members of the human family. They are one race, one blood, one body—an unity, not like that of the realists, growing out of the participation of a common objective reality, answering to the definition of a genus or a species, but an unity founded in the relations of individual beings. It is this unity, and not the fancied identity of Dr. Baird, that distinguishes the family, the State, the Church, the world. That the human race is not an aggregate of separate and independent atoms, but constitutes something analogous to an organic whole, with a common life, springing from the intimate connection between the parts, is obvious from the very organization of society. There is one unity of nations, in consequence of which national character becomes as obtrusively marked as the peculiarities of individuals. There was one type among the Greeks, another among the Asiatics, still another among the Romans. The Englishman is in no danger of ever being mistaken for a Frenchman, and the Frenchman is not more distinguished from his Continental neighbors by his language than by his habits, his sentiments, his modes of thought. In the narrowest of the social spheres, the same principle is at work, and families are as decisively different by their characters as by their names. These facts reveal that there is a bond among men, a

fundamental basis of unity, which embraces the whole race. What it is we may be unable to define; we know, however, that it is connected with blood. This basis is that which justifies, but does not necessitate, God's dealing with the race in one man as a whole. So that Adam's federal headship is the immediate ground of our interest in his sin, and his natural headship is the ground of the representative economy. Adam stood only for his children, because his children alone sustained those relations to him by virtue of which he could justly represent them. If required to specify precisely what that is which constitutes the unity, the nature and kind of relationship, we frankly confess that we are not competent to solve the problem. We do not profess to understand the whole case. We accept whatever God has thought proper to reveal, and whenever the curtain drops upon His revelation, we lay our hands upon our mouth. In the meantime, although we cannot see the whole reason which is contained in natural for federal headship, we can see that the moral economy which admits of representation is supremely benevolent. If Adam had maintained his integrity, and we had inherited life and glory through his obedience, none would ever have dreamed that there was aught of hardship, injustice or cruelty in the scheme by which our happiness had been so cheaply secured. The difference of result makes no difference in the nature of the principle. Those who object do not remember that the law which made Adam our head and representative, is the law by virtue of which alone, so far as we know, the happiness of any man can be secured. Without the principle of representation, it is possible that the whole race might have perished, and perished forever. Each man, as the species successively came into existence, would have been placed under the law of distributive justice. His safety, therefore, would have been forever contingent. It is possible, that if the first man, with all his advantages, abused his liberty and fell, each of his descendants might have imitated his example, and fallen also. It is possible, therefore, that the whole race might have become involved in guilt and ruin. Some might

have stood longer than others, but what is any measure of time to immortality? Who shall say, but that in the boundless progress of their immortal being, one by one, all may have sinned? It is possible, nay, more, even probable; it is quite sure that this would have been the case with some; that multitudes, indeed, would abuse their freedom and die. But to sin under such circumstances is to sin hopelessly. There can be no redeemer if each man is to be treated exclusively as an individual. If we cannot sin in another, we cannot be righteous in another. If the principle of representation is not to be admitted into God's government, salvation to the guilty becomes hopelessly impossible. Under this principle, multitudes are, in fact, saved, when without it, all might have been lost. Hence, it is clearly a provision of grace, introduced for our good, for our safety, for our happiness, and not as a snare, or a curse. God had an eye to it when He constituted our species a race, connected by unity of blood, and not a mere aggregation or assemblage of similar individuals. He made Adam the root, because He designed to make him the head, the father, because He designed to make him the representative of all mankind. The natural constitution is evidently in order to the federal relation. Both are necessary in order to understand the doctrine of original sin. If we consider Adam merely as our first parent, his act is not necessarily the act of his child. If the paternal relation, such as it now obtains in the species, exhausted his relations to the race, it would be impossible to explain how they can be guilty on account of the first sin rather than any other. Even if it were granted that, as a father, he must propagate his own moral features, his children would receive them simply as a nature, without being ill-deserving on account of them, as a child might innocently inherit a distorted body which the parent had brought upon himself by guilt. The natural relation, therefore, taken as exclusive and alone, is wholly incompetent to bear the load of hereditary sin. There must be something more than parent and child in the case. It is vain to appeal to those analogies in which the offspring share in the sufferings incident to the

wickedness of their fathers. The offspring do, indeed, suffer, but they do not charge themselves with guilt; their sufferings are calamities, and not punishments. There must be some relation, legal and moral, by virtue of which the act of the parent becomes judicially theirs, before they can be penally responsible. This relationship is established in the covenant. That makes the act of their parent their sin and their crime. The two relations together, the natural and federal, explain the whole case, as far as God has thought proper to reveal it. I am guilty because Adam represented me. Adam represented me because I am his child. Birth *unites* me to him, as faith unites me to Christ. The union in each case is the basis of the covenant, and the covenant is the immediate ground of condemnation or acceptance.

That Dr. Baird's doctrine of guilt and imputation is not that of the Reformed Church is susceptible of superfluous proof. We have not space for quotations in detail, but there are several considerations which show that, whatever that doctrine might have been, it could not have been the scheme of Dr. Baird. In the first place, we acquit him of any sympathy with the mediate imputation of Placæus, but did it not occur to him, that the theory of Placæus could never have been originated, had the general sentiment of the Church been that we were actually guilty of the sin of Adam? Mediate imputation is an expedient for establishing a direct personal relation betwixt ourselves and the first transgression. It goes on the supposition that a man can be punished only for the sin which he has really committed. The problem it undertook to solve was, how the sin of another could be made to stand in personal relations to ourselves, and the answer it gave was, that we make it our own by a voluntary appropriation. Now, if it had been the doctrine of the Church that the sin of Adam was actually ours, it would have been ridiculously absurd to cast about for expedients, in order to make us justly responsible for it. No one would ever have dreamed of doubting that a man is chargeable with his own sins. This mediate theory, therefore, is a pregnant proof that the form in which the Church held the

doctrine was one which made us responsible for a crime in which we had no causal agency. In the next place, the bitter and malignant opposition of Socinians, Remonstrants and Pelagians is wholly unaccountable, if the Reformers taught nothing more than that a man was punished for his actual transgressions. This principle could not have been denied without abolishing moral distinctions. In Dr. Baird's doctrine the vulnerable point is our numerical identity with Adam. That being given, guilt and corruption follow as a matter of course. Now, if the Reformers had stated the doctrine in this shape, the opposition would have been to the principle, and not to the consequence. Then, again, the Reformers, almost to a man, asserted the immediate creation, and denied the generation of the soul. Calvin treats the theory of traduction with utter contempt. It received hardly less favor among the divines of France, Holland, Germany, England and Scotland. But the theory of traduction is essential to Dr. Baird's doctrine. It is, therefore, certain that this doctrine could not have been held by the Reformers. These considerations are conclusive. But there is another to be added, which makes assurance doubly sure. The Reformers all taught the imputation of our sins to Christ. Our ill-desert, our guilt, was charged upon him, and yet they never dreamed of the blasphemy of making him actually a sinner. Here, clearly, imputation implied responsibility for crimes on the part of one who was absolutely free from the stain, and who sustained no causal relation to them.

But how does Dr. Baird dispose of this case? Will the reader believe it? By a flat and palpable contradiction of every principle that he has sought elaborately to establish in the case of Adam and his posterity. He retracts his entire philosophy of guilt and punishment. We have never known a more remarkable instance of a theory breaking down under its own weight. He admits that Christ was our substitute; that He assumed our guilt; that He was held responsible for our sins. Was He, therefore, actually a sinner? Was the nature which He had numerically the same nature which apostatized? and was it charged only with its own proper act?

Not at all. Objective imputation does not involve subjective pollution. He simply sustains a relation to His people in which their sins are, "*in some proper sense,*" to be regarded as His. What is this proper sense? The reader will mark the answer.\* The substance is, that He was the federal head of those whose sins He bore, and who constituted one body with Him by virtue of, not a numerical identity of nature, but of a spiritual union subsisting between them—the very doctrine for which we have contended. He actually quotes with approbation the sentence of Owen, which is an unequivocal denial of his whole doctrine. "As what He (Christ) did is imputed unto them, *as if done by them,* so what they deserved on the account of sin is charged upon Him." How true that, if you expel nature with a fork, she will return. Dr. Baird is reduced to the necessity of abandoning his whole theory of imputation, or of admitting that Christ was a personal transgressor.

As to the authorities which he quotes in the chapter, *Of the Definition of Guilt and Imputation,* they make nothing for him. They only prove that guilt is inseparable from crime; no one denies that. They prove, further, that a man cannot be punished for a crime which is in no sense his own; no one denies that. But the real point in dispute is, whether there is only *one* sense, that of actual causation, in which a crime may be said to belong to us, and this point his authorities do not touch. Nay, if he had gone further, he would have seen that these very authorities distinctly teach, not only that we *can* sin, but that we *have* sinned vicariously. Then, again, Dr. Baird has quietly assumed that all those expressions by which the Reformers signalized our union with Adam, and represent his sin as ours, convey the idea of an actual participation in his offence. He has confounded union with identity. They clearly meant nothing more than that close and intimate relationship, springing from natural birth, which lies at the basis

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\*Pp. 606, 607.

of federal representation. To be in him seminally and radically, is not to be numerically one nature with him. It is to be like him and of him. As we have already said, they never taught an arbitrary imputation. They never taught that guilt was unconnected with crime; but they did teach that the crime might *belong* to a man, might be justly called *his*, where he was not implicated in the stain of it. If this is conceded, every passage which Dr. Baird has quoted in the chapter referred to goes for nothing. And that this must be conceded, we think capable of irrefragible proof. Although our limits do not allow us to enter into details, we must be permitted, in addition to the numerous quotations to be found in the popular treatises of theology, to close with one which we do not remember to have seen cited before. It is from the learned and venerable Cocceius. In allusion to the handle which Socinians made of the ambiguity of the word impute, he says: "They explain it to mean that God imputes the sin of Adam by thinking or judging that the posterity of Adam willed, thought, did, what Adam perversely willed, thought, did. Hence they represent God as judging those to be in existence who were only radically in being." That is, the Socinians charge imputation with making the descendants of Adam personally guilty of his sin. This would be to attribute an actual being to those whose existence was only potential. But, adds Cocceius, "*to impute, in the style of Scripture, is to judge that he has done a thing, who has not done it; not to impute is to judge that he has not done a thing, who has done it. To impute is either to condemn or absolve many individuals by one sentence, on account of the conjunction between them.*"\* This is exactly our doctrine, the doctrine of the Westminster standards, and of the whole Reformed Church. But it is not the doctrine of Dr. Baird.

Dr. Baird says, "the opinion seems to be entertained by some that the attempt to base our relation to the covenant and

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\* Sum. Theol., chap. xxx., § 4.

to the apostasy, upon our natural relation to Adam, involves, as a logical result, the doctrine of mediate imputation." He refers to ourselves, but has entirely misconceived our doctrine. We have always held that the natural is the *ground* of the federal relation. The doctrine is explicitly stated in the article referred to. What we objected to was, the idea that the natural relation alone explains our guilt and corruption; that we must receive our nature from Adam precisely in the moral attitude which it occupied in him, simply *because Adam was our father*. We insisted then, and insist now, that the law of generation, singly and alone, the law that like begets like, does not explain even native depravity, let alone guilt, and that if guilt is conceived as attaching to us in the *first instance, because we have a corrupt nature*, that is the doctrine of mediate imputation. We insisted then, and insist now, that the immediate formal ground of guilt is the covenant headship of Adam; that our depravity of nature is the penal consequence of our guilt in him, and that we are made parties to the covenant by the circumstance of birth, or the natural relation to Adam. We stated, then, that Calvin held the doctrine to which we object. We are now prepared to say, after a thorough examination of the writings of that great man, that, although he has often expressed himself vaguely and ambiguously, we are convinced that his opinion at bottom was the same as our own.

Dr. Baird exults in the superiority of his theory to the current theology, on account of the completeness with which it solves the difficulties in relation to hereditary sin. We admit, very candidly, that in his case, the only difficulty is in the theory itself. Given a numerical identity of nature transmitted from father to son, and its moral condition in the one is as explicable as its moral condition in the other. The murderer is the same, whether found in a palace or a hovel, and the law seizes him, wherever it finds him, on account of a crime which his change of place cannot modify. But upon the supposition that Adam's children are not Adam, but themselves, that they are new beings, called into existence by the

providence of God, two questions cannot fail to arise, which have always presented difficulties in speculation. The first is, how that which, now and here, begins its being, can begin it in a state of sin, without an imputation upon the character of God? The problem is to make God the author of the man without making Him the author of his sin. The second question is, how that which is inherent, which comes to us from without as a conditioning cause, and not as a self-conditioned effect, can carry the imputation of crime. How, as it exists in us, independently of any agency of ours, it can be contemplated with moral disapprobation, and render us personally ill-deserving? The answer to these questions exhausts the different theories of original sin, and Dr. Baird congratulates himself that he has fairly got rid of them. Confident in the advantages of his position, he has assailed, with spirit and vigor, the stronghold within which Edwards and his disciples have thought themselves impregnable. We really enjoyed the fight, it being, as Lucretius observes, "a great satisfaction to stand in the window of a castle, and to see a battle, and the adventures thereof, in the vale below." We felt all along, that all that was necessary was for them to take the offensive, and very feeble guns would be sufficient to demolish the fortress in which Dr. Baird conceived himself so strong. He may succeed in weakening their defences, but they can utterly annihilate his. Their doctrine has difficulties, but his is an absurdity.

A complete answer to these questions in the present state of our knowledge we hold to be impossible. Until we are put in possession of the entire case, no solution that can be given will go to the bottom of the subject. There will ever remain phenomena which our philosophy does not cover. But, at the same time, we are confident that the solution must be sought in the line of those principles of natural and federal headship which the Scriptures so clearly reveal. These principles show, paradoxical as the thing may appear, that the history of the individual does not absolutely begin with its birth. It sustained moral relations, and was implicated in moral acts before it was

born. This notion is essentially involved in the notion of a covenant. When Adam was appointed to this office, all his descendants, constituting an unity of body with him, sustained the same relations to the law and God which he sustained. Morally and legally they were in being—their interest in the covenant was just the same as if they had already received an actual existence. This being so, the sin of Adam must have produced the same judicial effects upon them as upon him. Their actual existence was to begin under the law of sin and death, as his was continued under it. God, in calling them successively into being, must, as the Ruler and Judge of the universe, produce them in the state to which justice had morally consigned them. The covenant, therefore, does explain the fact of their being sinners, before they were born—does give them a history before their actual being. The only question is, was the covenant just? That depends upon the fact whether natural headship creates an union with Adam sufficiently intimate to ground these judicial transactions. If it does, the mystery is solved. We maintain that it does, but acknowledge very frankly that we do not fully see how. We understand a part of the case, and only a part. The thing which has always perplexed us most, is to account for the sense of personal demerit, of guilt and shame, which unquestionably accompanies our sense of native corruption. It is not felt to be a misfortune or calamity, but a crime. We subscribe to every syllable which Dr. Baird has written upon this subject. Now, how shall this be explained? Discounting all the schemes which deny the fact itself, and construe native corruption into native misfortune, there are but three hypotheses which are supposable in the case. First, we have really had a being antecedent to our birth, in which, by a personal abuse of liberty, we determined and conditioned our mundane history. The second is, that we had a being in our substance, though not in our persons, which has determined the attitude of that substance. The third is, that we sinned in another, whose relations to us were such as to make him morally one with us. The first two hypotheses remove the difficulty, but they sub-

stitute a greater one. Of the two, if we were driven to choose between them, we should prefer the theory of a super-sensible existence. The consciousness of guilt connects it with our persons, and the argument is a short one which concludes from this consciousness to a previous personal existence. Our nature is sinful; it could not have been made so without our act; that corrupting act could not have taken place in time, for corruption begins with our life in time. We must, therefore, have had a transcendent existence, in which we could have conditioned the moral type of our appearance in time. The objections to this hypothesis are unanswerable. In the first place, the notion of a timeless existence is itself utterly unintelligible. Every finite being is conditioned, and conditioned both by time and space; and an intelligible world of real, substantive existences, without temporal relations, is altogether contradictory. In the next place, it is wholly unaccountable, how such a state, signalized by so momentous an act as that which ruined the agent, has so entirely passed from the memory, as to leave no trace behind. Surely, if anything had impressed itself upon our minds, such a condition, so different from the present, and so fruitful in its consequences, could not have failed to be remembered. Add to this the silence of Scripture, or rather the contrary teaching of Scripture, in its necessary implications, and the argument is complete.

The hypothesis of Dr. Baird being no less untenable, we are shut up to the third scheme, which we take to be the scheme of the Bible. We cannot carry human existence beyond Adam, nor Adam's existence beyond that creative fiat which gave him his being on the sixth day. Then and there the species began, and began holy. The Scriptures further inform us when and where and how he lost his integrity. From the time of his disobedience, all the race have borne the type of sin. There has been no holiness in the species from that hour to this, unless as supernaturally produced by the grace of God. It would seem, therefore, that the all-conditioning act which has shaped the moral character of the race, was no other than

the act which lost to Adam the image of God in the garden of Eden. Such seems to be the explicit testimony of Scripture. By one man's disobedience, many were made sinners. Either we are guilty of that act, or original corruption is in us simply misfortune. In some way or other it is ours, justly imputable to us, or we are not, and cannot be, born the children of wrath. But we are guilty; conscience testifies that we are guilty—that our native corruption is sin. But as we did not sin personally, as we did not sin naturally, we must have sinned vicariously. The only alternative is in ourselves or in another. Ourselves are out of the question. Therefore, we sinned in Adam, and our history truly began before our birth. Our appearance in time was not an absolute commencement, but moral relations preceded and determined it. In bringing us into the world sinners, God did nothing more than execute the decree of justice. As to the manner in which God executed that decree, the negative agency of withholding or not imparting the Divine image is sufficient to explain the effect. To be destitute of the image of God is to be in an unholy state, and the want of original righteousness necessitates positive corruption. But still the agency of God, in the production of that corruption, is purely privative and judicial. The case is this: The being to be produced is under the curse, exposed to the penalty of the law. That implies the withdrawal of the Divine favor, as manifested in that highest proof of it, the Divine image; and that implies the dominion of sin. This is precisely the doctrine of our standards. There is, first, guilt; then the want of original righteousness; and then the corruption of the whole nature. This is, also, the doctrine of Calvin, who expressly repudiates natural generation as an adequate explanation of depravity. His words are: "For the human race has not naturally derived corruption through its descent from Adam; but that result is rather to be traced to the appointment of God, who, as He had adorned the whole nature of mankind with most excellent endowments in one man, so in the same man he denuded it."\*

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\* Comment. Gen. iii. : 7.

Dr. Baird deceives himself with an analogy which, as illustrating the unity of the race, is perfectly proper; the analogy of the seed to the plant, and the oak to the acorn. But when an argument is derived from a figure of speech, the figure should be pertinent to the very point on which the argument turns. Here the design is to show that one man has corrupted the race in the way of nature because all have sprung from him. The true comparison, in a case thus contemplating derivative individuals, is not that of an acorn to the oak, but of a parent oak to other oaks which have come from it. God did not, at first, make acorns, but trees, and these trees produced the acorns, and these acorns have perpetuated forests. If, now, an oak in full maturity should drop an hundred acorns, and these acorns grow into a hundred other oaks, the question is, would these hundred oaks be numerically the same with one another and with their parent stock? And would this whole forest die if the parent tree should happen to decay? This is the case which is parallel with Adam and his posterity, and we humbly think that it gives no help to those who can see nothing but nature in the propagation of sin.

But if imputed guilt makes Adam's descendants really and personally corrupt, how shall we exempt Christ from the operation of the same penal consequence? He bare our sins in his own body on the tree, and yet was holy, harmless, undefiled, and separate from sinners. The judicial displeasure of God did not involve Him in personal sin. But, in the first place, it is overlooked that Christ never existed as a human person. He had our nature, but the person was that of the Eternal Son. In consequence of the intimate relationship of the human nature in Him to the Divine Logos, that nature was pervaded, conditioned and determined, in all its habitudes and in its whole being, by an influence which preserved it not only from sin, but from the possibility of sin. Jesus was what no other man ever was, or ever can be, but as made so by Him, absolutely impeccable. It is a mystery how His divine person, without disturbing His human liberty, or absorbing His human consciousness, or interfering with His human proper-

ties, or diminishing the moral significance of His temptations, could yet make it certain that He should never fail. But the case is even so. It was in consequence of this mystery that the enduring of the penalty by Him was an act of obedience. Others suffer from necessity. He obeyed, achieved an active righteousness, as truly in His death as in His life. As the judicial displeasure of God could not destroy the personal union between the two natures, it could not destroy that life of God in His soul, which is the condition of all holiness. He could not have become a sinner without ceasing to be Divine. His case, therefore, is altogether *sui generis*. In the next place, it is equally important to recollect that he stood as the head of a covenant, as a new beginning of the race, or rather of his seed. *He* was the *representative*, and not those, whose sins He bore. If they had been His head, then the case would have been parallel with the imputation of Adam's sin to his posterity. But He was not in them—they are not the centre of union—but they are in Him, and He is, accordingly, the source of influence. In the third place, the very nature of His undertaking required Him to be stronger than the curse. The penalty could not crush him, as it buries a creature in death, and therefore he is declared to be the Son of God, with power, by his resurrection from the dead. The case of Christ, therefore, is no manner of exception to our argument, that guilt, resting upon grounds of representative unity, must as necessarily entail a fall to the creature as personal transgression.

We have already intimated that we regard Dr. Baird's account of the covenant as seriously defective. He looks upon it as a natural institution, essentially contained in the moral law, as addressed to such a creature as man. He confounds man's state, considered simply as a moral agent, under a dispensation of moral government, and his state as in covenant with God. We have not space, now, to enlarge upon this error. We shall content ourselves with an exhibition of what we take to be the teachings of Scripture and of our own standards. As a moral creature, invested with the image of God, man was under the law, as a servant, bound to execute his

master's will, with no promise but the continuance of the Divine favor as he then enjoyed it. The condition of his servitude was perpetual innocence. As long as he obeyed, he would remain holy and happy as he was. As soon as he disobeyed, he was to die. His state was contingent, dependent upon his legitimate use, or the abuse of his liberty. As a moral creature, moreover, he was treated purely as an individual, and had no change taken place in his relations, each man as he came into being would have been on trial for himself. Now the covenant of works was a special dispensation of God's goodness, modifying this state in several important respects. Its aim was two-fold, to change the relation of man from that of a servant to a son, and to confirm him indefectibly in holiness, which is the essential notion of life. To achieve these ends, the period of probation was first made definite, and the notion of a completed righteousness or justification introduced. In the next place, the persons on probation were limited, and one made to stand for all, and thus the notion of imputation was introduced. In the third place, the field of temptation was contracted, and the question of obedience made to turn upon a single positive precept, which brought the will of man directly, face to face, with the will of God. Had man obeyed he would have been justified, and as this justification is the equivalent of perpetual innocence, it must have secured it, and man have been rendered immutable in holiness. This subjective change in his will from mutability to impeccability would have been accompanied with an external change in his relations from a servant to a son. This twofold change would have realized the notion of life. Upon this view the covenant is a conspicuous manifestation of the goodness of God. But it is a view totally inconsistent with Dr. Baird's notions of the constitution of man, and, therefore, with him the grace of God retreats before logical consistency.

One more thought and we have done. We regret that the importance which Dr. Baird attaches to the propagative property of man has led him to rank this among the elements which enter into the biblical notion of the image of God. In

the relation betwixt a parent and his child he detects a resemblance to the ineffable relation betwixt the first and second persons of the Trinity, and what is still more remarkable, in our faculty of breathing, he finds a representation of the procession of the Holy Ghost. The last is a pure fancy—there is nothing approximating to an analogy, much less to a resemblance of the things themselves. That there is some analogy in the first case may be admitted, but that is very far from proving that the analogy is any part of the Divine image. Man in his dominion over the creatures, sustains a relation analogous to that of God as Supreme Ruler, but dominion over the creatures is treated in the Scriptures as a consequence, but not as an element, of the image. The phrase has a specific, definite sense, abundantly explained in the Scriptures themselves, and we should neither add to it nor take from it. Least of all should we trust to fancy as its expositor. One thing would seem to be certain, that nothing can be included in it, which is shared by man in common with the brutes. To propagate their species and to breathe, is characteristic of all terrestrial animals, and as in these respects, the dog and the goat stand on a level with man, we are conscious of something like the degradation of a grand subject when we undertake to define the Divine image by such properties.

We shall here pause. We have singled out the prominent parts of Dr. Baird's book, in which we find ourselves unable to agree with him. It would have given us more pleasure to have dwelt upon the many fine features of it which we can most cordially approve. It is by no means a common-place work. The very consistency with which he has carried through a single leading idea, and interwoven it with the texture of a difficult and complicated discussion, shows the hand of genius and the power of disciplined thought. We thank him for his incidental death-blows to popular errors, and we love him for the zeal and heartiness with which he clings to the glorious doctrines of grace. If, in the points in which we have differed from him, we have said any thing personally offensive, it would give us more pain to discover it, than it can give him to read it.

We are conscious that we have written under a strong sense of personal esteem, and we are sure that Dr. Baird will reciprocate the wish, that in relation to the matters in dispute, each of us may seek, exclusively, for truth. We adopt the noble language of Socrates in the Philebus of Plato: νῦν γὰρ δήπου πρὸς γε αὐτὸ τοῦτο φιλονεικοῦμεν, ὅπως ἀγὼ τίθεμαι, ταῦτα ἔσται τὰ νικῶντα, ἢ ταῦτ' ἂν σὺ, τῷ ὀβλιθιστάτῳ δεῖ που συμμαχεῖν ἡμᾶς ἀμφω.



ARTICLE VII.

NOTICES OF RECENT PUBLICATIONS.

1. *Commentary on the Pentateuch.* Translated from the German of OTTO VON GERLACH, by Rev. HENRY DOWLING, Incumbent of St. Mary's, Kingswinford. Philadelphia: Smith, English & Co. Edinburg: T. & T. Clark. 1860; pp. 585, 8vo.

Otto Von Gerlach is a name honored among the truly spiritual portion of the German Church, for the earnest efforts made by that devoted man for the salvation of souls. He was born at Berlin, of a noble family of the Reformed faith, and after finishing the study of law, devoted himself to the service of the Church. He attended the Lectures of Schleiermacher, Neander, Marheineke and Hengstenberg, and having entered the University, pursued the labors of his sacred office with wonderful zeal and energy, full of efforts suggested by a ready invention in the art of doing good. To his pastoral labors and schemes for promoting missions at home and abroad, he added literary pursuits, which took a practical turn, all having a view to the promotion of vital godliness. His first labor in this direction was the translation of Wesley's Sermon on "Awake thou that Sleepest," &c. He also had Richard Baxter's works published in German, and a practical treatise of